The Evalutian

af Paptlar Sovereignty

PSfl

48OOA

Advance International Relations Theory Professor Hans-Ivlartin Jaeger Decembcr 03, 2009

ElisabethNicole Bames

t$w07772

Current international relations theory is demonstrating an intense interest in the question

of sovereignty in the sver more globalized world. The history of the term and its usage has
created an expectation that sovereign statehood theories

will

eventually become irrelevant. Current

of globalization predict the reduction of sovereignty and its eventual demise. These

theories see sovereisfy as becoming less relevant as authority becomes less absolute and ideas
become universalized- This 'diminishment' of sovereign right can be seen in the elimination

of

the state's right to autonomy against external interference in the realms of market economy,
development, civil rights, and the environment.

If

sovereignty is rooted in autonomy and territoriality, then

it could be argued that it is

being diminishe4 however, history reveals that laws and governance, even exclusive authority,
have existsd without being territorially defined. In fact, the normative elements of most cultures

could be interpreted as sovereigu laws,

if

we abandoa the common definition of sovereignty as

located within the state and reach for one mcre suited to an oxplanation of government as a
concpt. The diffrculties that globalization has caused in the conceptualization of the international

system of states is that sovereignty had been defined as exclusive governmental authority and

jurisdiction ovr a defined territory since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1643. This paper will
illnstrate that a retum to Jean-Jacque Rousseau's conceptualir-atiatr,of sovereignty as popular can

eliminate

the

seeming contradictions beftveen sovereign statehood

and

increasing

interdependence, while also explaining the evolution

of

governaflce in Western history, other

cultural narratives, and the international system of relations as a whole. In short, this paper will
argue that a return to an understanding of autharity in terms af popular sovereignty will allow

for a mare uniyerssl understanding of ltow governmnt

is, has been, and

will

be constituted.

The modern interpretation of the word soversignty is legal in naturo; "a sovereign state is
a

territorial jurisdictioru" and sovereignty "is a legal institution that authenticates a politicat order

based on indepeudent states whose governrnents are the principle authorities both domestically

and internationally'' (Jackson 1ggg,432). This has been the intemational interpretation of the

condition

of holding sovereign authority since

1648. The Treaty

of Westphalia

emphasized

borders and tenitoriality, and created the perception that "the nation-state is the only authority

which iq entitled to convey popular legitimacy to collective decisions at the internalional level"
(Friedrichs 2001, 491). There is one major error with this percepion: it is only applicable to the period after feudalism and before the electrical revolution.

If we are to understand

and explain

international relatiom &om

all

historical epochs, including feudalism, imperialism and

interdependence, we need to explainthe authority of governance.

There are several impressive authors who have done extensive work on sovereignty'
issues, and one of the main topics

of discussion is globalization. If sovereignty possesses "five

properties: tenitory, recognitiorq autonomy against external interference, cortrol of borders, and

legitimacy," (Inoguchi and Bacon ?001, 288), then questions arise: was sovereignty
absent/shared in times of Vatican supremacy?

Did aboriginal communiti$s posssss sovereignty?

Are states losing sovereignty to transgovernmental organizations? Does the US'possess more
sovereignty thaa other states? Did former colonial dependents ever have sovereignty? The need

to exptain the current system of interdependence, transgovernmentalism, universal human rights

regimes, regional organizations, intewentionism, imperialism, failed stales and powerful nongovemmental organizations has opened the door to further contemplation of sovereigtty.

By modern definitioru we are losing sovereignty. Yet sovereignty remains a defining

feature of relations in most regional and international organizations. As Inoguchi and Bacon

observe, Westphalian society still prevails, evsn though the sovereignty of the state (appears to)

continue to erode (2001, 295). How do we balance this contradiction

theorists posit that sovereignty is disaggregating into various functions:

in

relevancy? Some

The state is not disappearing it is disaggregating into its separate, ftnctionally distinct parts. These parts- courts, regulatory agencies, executives, even legislatures- are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new transgovernmental order (Slaughter 1997, 184)

While this is true, this explanation again embraces the standar{ territorially defined
sovereignty by placing the locus, and authority of governing, of all functions, within the 'state', and neglects to account for a rising collection of powerful non-state actors. Friedrichs addresses

this issue when he explains that 'the claim of the state system to the monopoly of legitimate political action in the international rehn is iacrmsingly chatlenged by the transuational market
economy" and by sooiety (Friedrichs 2001, 4e2).

It is his contention that

recognizing multiple

overlapping authorities is the key to understarrding the diminishment of the state as an organizing principle.

By recognizing '$tate sovereignty' as a way of organizing "states, such that their political
indepetdence is mutually recognized and they coexist and interaet on a foundation of formal equality and a corresponding right of non-intervention

" (Jackson

1999,434) we can perceive

it

as a historical development a legal determination that o'serves an epistemic function: allowing

one to think of the

multiplicity of autonomous political communities and their interrelationship,"

(Cohen 2A04, 15). As such,

it cannot provide an explanation of the evolution of govenraoce

structures. To put it simply, while perceptions of sovereignty are linked to territory, statehood, or

any other variable concep, the discipline will be unable to explain and adap to the differences

between'then' and onolv'.

What are the differences between then and now? How has the international society of 'states' changed? It was mentioned earlier that there has been an increase in the proliferation,
strength and success of civil society acters, non-goveflrmental organizations, non'state aotors,

and social movements amorrrrg other things, but why is this happening now? The simplest
answer is, in this case, the introduction of electric light.

Ivlarshall Mcluhan shows readers how the simple change from automation to electonics
has changed our perceptions of space and time.

With it humanity became aware of each other in

trever expscted ways: television brought with it the possibiltly to empathize with individuals and groups from every corner of the [Link], and allowed for governments to manage larger and larger

territories and influence more people, aod the internet took spatial boundaries out of
consideration. It is now possible for anyone with an idea to form or join any type of community

or movemeu! gving power to actors with agendas independent of state interests. Staughter
reveals this phenomenon as

"a radically expanded communications capacity that

empowers

individuals and groups while diminishing traditional authority- (Slaughter, 1997, t84).
Easy to access and relatively inexpensive, the internet and its ability to unite (virrually) peopte from all over the world has created a multitude of new social and political networks, and has fostered further interdependence of national economies (Keohane and Nye 1998,

83). This

increased the aumber of non-governmental organizations participating in politics, and the power

of social movements and civil

societies

to mobilize people. These organizations and

actors

(whose power base is often territorially dispersed) have been wielding influence, sometimes as

'experts' in their fields, and have been able to participate in domestic and intemational decision-,

rofitl-, and law-making. This

means that modern definitioffi

of state sovereignty,

unable to

account for the risrng strength of non-governmental organizations, social movements and non-

state actors, do not assist in discussions of the future necessary; as globatization

of governance. A different definition is

governance by 'reducing' the

apprs to be changing the nature of

domestic and international authority of the state, the issues of global govemance, international law, and international institrfrions are becoming more relevant. Or is globalization 'reducing' authority et all? If one were to apply Mcluhan's argument that the electric revolution {and the information age that followed) changed the nature of sptial
perceptions to the arguments of world risk theorists that global risk awareness, (or an awareness

of

unawareness) has contributed

to

interdependence, one could posit that sovereignty

is not

'changing hands' as

it

were, like some finite commodity, but that the realms of authority are
as

multiplying due to an awareness of new governance concorns, such

the internatioral economic market. As such, there are

the global environment, or

necessitate some sort

*"rfHffiH

of sovereign authority erlery day. For example, the second'created the perceived necessity for
international legal institutions and human rights

standards,ffikw

realms

of

sovereign

authority that transeended the existing legitimacy given to states to act on behalf of their cifizens.

HIV/AIDS, genocide, and terrori$m

exercise of sovereign authority.

are

just a few of the issues that create new arenas for the

The results of this phenomenon have been manifold. States, in their belief in the statecentric de{inition of sovereignty, claim authority in these functions as an equal member of the

political community. International institutions and rights regimes have claimed authority as well,
based on perceptions

of 'popular' legitimacy, and many new forns of

governance (from the

social movement to the corporation to the non-govenrmental organization) have arisen in

response to global discourses. However, the rise of these new forms [Link] (those based

on popular sovereignty instead of modern extemal sovereignty) has not diminished

the

sovereignty of the state. The state retains the sovereign authority of statehood, domestic law and

security as described in the Treaty of Westphalia; thsse non-state actors have merely taken
positions in international power forums that never existed before the advent of globalization. They are a popular resporlss to new concems by new communities based on corlmon values and

interests instead

of

geogfaphical proximity. Global

risk, global

awareness, global

interdependence, and global communities have created a need for a new conception of sovereign

authority. These oew governailce areas are the concern ofevery state and institution and every
new astor beCause they are, by nature oftheir 'globality', the concern of everyone.

The key to understanding the evolution of sovereignty in international relations is in the idea of popular sovereignty, specifically (but not exactly) the popular sovereignty described by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Of particular interest is this passage:

Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of-the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole. At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and ioltective body... receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. (Rousseau 1762, bk 6)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conceptualization

of sovereiguty describes a voluntary submissiou to

the will of a group, and the power each person's membership gives to the legitimacy of that
group. To Rousseaq any persoil that does not break or subvert the laws of their sovereign state
(regardless of the form of government) is submiuing to the

will of thE collective. This perception

wilt help to better define the ongoing transformation of sovereignty. If Rousseau's argumeat is
taken without its state-centric contoxt, one reveals the modern definition of popular sovereignty as "based on the consent of the governed" (Cohen ?OA4,

U). Removal from the historical

contExt creates flexibility as to whom 'the govemed' refers to. "Government is to serve the

interests

of the citizewy and public

purposes generally" (Cohen 2AA4,

l4), therefore

an

institrntiorU organization

or actsr with significant public support {perceived as serving their

interests) can be considered a governing arrthority in the context of popular sovereignty.

In the internatiorml contcxt, the collective is often perceived as the society of states,

as

equal and autonomous repressntatives of their citizen populations, and popular sovereignty

would be considered any institution that this society felt was in their collective interests to support. But are states (and their representatives) really the citizenry of the world? It can be
argued that the global nature of these issues makes them exfiemely relevant to the individual aud

to communities; decisions made regarding these issues would affect people and cammunities
more than they would affect states, and
states

it

has been demonstrated tbat peaple do not consider

to have exclusive authority over these decisions (through the rise of new and competing

forrrs of govemment, non-state actors). Is

it

people, then, conceived

of as a single global

community consisting of equal autonomous individuals, that provides the ultimate authority? lvlany modern theorists say 'Yes!'; it is posited that udversal norns can be implanented

ttrat allow the world to "dispense ontirely with the anachronistic discourse and rules of
sovereignty aad replace the old interrational law and slow international institutions with
decentered efficient cosmopolitan governance and law-making" (Cohen 2A04,8). Cosmopolitan

democracy has become a popular theory, purporing that it is tegitimate as

it couceives itself

as

popular sovereignty.

According to cosmopolitan liberalism, it is... high time to systematize the emergent conception of the moral basis of international law and politics theoretically and to take the next steps pragmatically to complete the moralization and "individualization" of the global political system... All concur *state-centisrn" that and the principle of the sovereign equallty of states in intemational law has to be abandoned and replace by a direct focus on the individual... as the subject of cosmopolitan law and justice (Cohen 2006, 486)

The difficulty with this theory is the conceptualization of this 'moral basis' as universal,
aad all nations as having a sense of shared identity (the identity of rights-bearing individuals who

value liberal democracy and equality). This is the assumption that cosmopolitans make when

they suppose a lasting interoational political and legal order could be supported by a global
cosmopolitan society. Deudney and Ikenberry argue

that'No enduring political order can exist

without a substantial sense of community and shared identity. Political identity and community
and political structure are mutually dependent" (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999,193). This is due

to ths conceptualization of political structure as legitimized by popular authority. Laws of

community exist because they are popularly constructed. This doss not msan that every governmffrt is created through democracy, merely that every political system continues at the
behest of its population (as demonstrated by obedience to law, lack

of an obviously dissident

collective).

This cosmopolitan notion of a "eommon humanity" that can form a basis for an
international cosmoplitan govemance regime (Cohen 20A6,487), is flawed: a survey of nonWestem states and non-state actors reveals a tendency toward relativism, and a general rejection

of liberal notions of universalism. However, cosmopolitan libemls mainain that there has been a
consensus on a list of basic human rights, as demonstrated by "the treaffient of human rights as jus cager$ in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" (Cohen 2004,10)"

law
that

It

seems

in rnodern times, 'the battle over the international order is one between sovereigntists

\Mho are

still enchanted by the state and cosmopotians who are entranced rather by human rights and who
seek a fundamental revision of the principles 485).

of international law and politics" (Cohen 2006,

Neither view pressnts a reasonable explanation for the sxistence of communities engaged in dialogue outside state authority. If there existed a universal set of values (upon which to build

cosmopolitan order), then why does every international discourse include conflicts

of

community interes8, or conflicts between the interests

of

states and the interests

of

these

communiti*f,If inOiriduals are the locus of governance, and democracy the solution to balancing individual interests, then why do we have the smergence of new communities engaging in
international discourse? Why aren't individuals engaging directly with their stete?
Governance, or the creation of law, is an act taken

*in the ftlme of the people, not the

individual" (Katm 2000, 3), and is basod on the good

of the collective,

rather than

consideration of individuals as right-karirg and autonomous. The purpose

of government is

primarily to enforce the perceived good, which is a collective goal, and the purpose of law "is

first of all an expre$$ion of our sonse of ourselves as a single, historical community engaging in
self-government" (Kahn 2000, 3). Communities are bypassing the state because they are new

communities that transcstd borders

to encapsulate entire movements, pints of view, and

arguments worldwide. ln other words, the electric revolution and information age has created a plethora of new trans-national communitiee with a shared identity, but without shared borders.

It is Rousssau's

contention that the legitimacy

of

sovereign authority

is found in

obedience, support for the rulss the authority makes, and remnants of this argument can be seen

in the work of many modern scholars, including Katrn: '1o obey the law,... is to participate in
popular sovereignty" (Kahn 2003, 3).
engage

It follows thst to participatn in the creation of laws is to

in popular sovereignty as well. Communities that have formed into active non-state

entities have

ben prticipating in ths discourse that is

shaplng internatioual law and are

therefore participating in the act of governing. As such, non-state actors have a claim to some
degree of sovereigt legitimacy in international discourse.

Again, it is important to keep in mind that "a gain in power by non-state actors does not
necessarily translate into a loss of power for tlre state" (Slaughter 1997,184). The state remaim

an essential governance structure, "military force still plays a significant role in relations
between $tates, and in a crunctL security stilt outranks other issues in foreign policy" (Keohaae

nd Nye 1998, 84). Non-state actors are claiming a degree of sovereign legitimacy in new and diverse areat

of govfiulnce, not in areas taditionally the purview of state sovereignty. The

novelty

of

these conoerns

is

demonstrable as o'all actors

state and non-state, regional,

transnational, public and private- are frarning their actions, policies, and goals to transcend the

fsrmal interstate realm that the statist model of global goveflumce privileges" (Franceschet 2002,
26). Instsad of the 'law' of territorial sovereignty, the actors involved in these initiatives *derive

their legitimaey from the promotion of subsrantial values. Whether human rights or sustainable developmen! whether tho emanciption or klamic values, no actor can easily dismiss these
claims, if backed by sufficieotly strorg sopietal forces" (Friedrichs 2001, 491).

collective values, and their ability to govem the actions of their supporters, andlt@sentlhese collective values as

Frt of the intemational

govomzurce regime designates these actors as

functionally sovereign. To clariff, the non-state actors that have become involved in governance
sffuctures and norm fonnulation are popularly sovereign There is a complexity here that must be addressed: sovereignty

in the case of international governance is therefore not the exclusive

sovereignty of oue actor to goverrl nor is it (as cosmopoliaa liberalists suppose) the sovereignty

of individuals en masse. The sovereigu authority that non-state actors possess is of the same type

10

that states Fssss: popular sovereignty. This is the authority of an actor (goveroment,
organizatiorq institution)

to govern on behalf of the people,

those who constitute

a unique

community with a desire for a specific form of

law Before the electric revolutiori and the

elected

information age, this meant the authority

of an actor (sovereign, democratically

representative, etc.) to govsrn within tlre borders of a state was legitimized by the desire of the people to have a unique government, and specific laws. In the case of international governance,

sovereignty is manifold. Any actor that has a legitimate claim to popular sovereignty has some
degree of authority in the creation of governance institutions.

Authority to create international law is also manifold, as law cannot be universal. A lack

of cqmmon identity, and the insistence of altemative govenvmce

multitude of communities and "layers

preferences manifests as a

of authority" (Friedrichs 2001, 475),

each with some

legitimate claim

to popular representdion of

govenrance preferences. The result

of

these

conflicts of poputar sovereignty is often disobedience of 'International Law' in the form of

treaties and conventions. This disobedience inrplies these 'laws' are not universally legitimate.

This runs counter to many modern theorists hopes for a regime of global governance based on
universal human righB and univenal rule of law.

There is a necessity

to clarifu the

substantive arguments

of this peper. Primarily,

territorial sovereigng is often misrepresented by intenrational relations theories as exclusive

legitimate authority over domestic law and the right to equal participation (by states) in the

formulation of intsmational law. Howeveq globalization has created many new social and
political relationships that cannot be explained in this mannsr. The definition is temporally and
conceptually specific and as such has little relevance to an understanding of the evolution

of

d{i&ICHffi.

It

can be argued that legitimacy of taw is onty demonstrable by the

11

obedience of those governed by it. This leads to a consideration of sovereign authority as based

in the collective, in the members of its constituency as a community {or demos) and therefore as
popular. Rousseau offers a good start to the conceptualization of sovereignty as popular, and it

follows from his work that any effective govemment or institution of governance has legitimacy

in its popularity. However, this "should not lead us to think that all actors have equal power,
legitirnacy and moral auihority to rnake claims... power differentials permeate international

politics and existing institutionalization" (Franceschet 2002: 29). The realities of resources
persist, and actors must be able to mobilize populations or represent popular interestslvalues in

order to exercise some measure of influence in the fbrmulation of intemational govemancs

initiatives.

The acceptance of
conelusions: discourse that forms the basis of i

authority as popplaily based

some claim to legitimare authority to participate in the

govemanoe. Governance on the intentational level,

the discourse tbat occurs

(if it

occurs in a manner that allows the prticipation of all legitimate

actors in the seeking of consensus) is itself sovereign; the different communities represented are

self-governed by the discourse their representative supports, and that discourse can inlluence

others

in goveming. In

summation, international governance

is not a matter of

exclusive

authority but the confrontation of multiple sovereign authorities. There is a need to msve away

from aspirations of universalism, and 'global' governance. To conclude with a suggestion,

gCIvernance

of international

areas

of aoncern, such as the environment, \ryill be most effective

when the discourse of policy-making involves all legitimate political actors, (including popular
non-$tate entities), as the pclicy is less likely to be disobeyed by the communities who were

involved in its creation, therefore any formal international gCIvernarce institution should allow

L2

for proportional representation of popularity and the partrcipation of any and all
popular non-state actors.

states and

13

References:

Cohen, Jean L. 2A04. Whose sovereignty? Empire versus internationallaw. Ethtcs and International Affairs 18 (3): l-24.

Coheq Jean L. 2AA6. Sovereign equallty vs. imprial right the bafile over the order". Constellations 13 (a): 485-505.

o'new

world

Deudney, Daniel and O. John Ikenberry. 1999. The nature and sources of liberal international order. Rev iew of I nt eruat iorual Studie s 25 : 179 -196.
Francesohet, Antonio. 2AA2. Justice and international

or&r: two rnodels of global

governaooe.

Globsl Goverfiante 8: 19-34.

Friedrichs, Jdrg. 2001, The meaning of new medievalism. EuropeanJownal of International Relations 7:475-501. Inoguchi, Takashi andPaul Bacon. 2001. Sovereignties: Westphalhn,liberal and anti-utopian. Internatioftal Review of the Asia-Pacific l:285-304.
Jackson, Robert. 1999, Sovereignty in world politics: a glance at the conceptual and historical landscape. Political Studies 47 : 431-456.

Kahrr, Paul W. 2000. American hegemony and international [aw: speaking law to power: popular sovereignty, hum&n rights, and the new international order. Chicago Journal af International Law 1: 1-13. Keohane, Robert O. And Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1998. Power and interdependence in the information age. Foreign Affiirs ?1 {5):81-94.

Mcluhan, tvlarshall. 1964. Understanding mediq: ths extensions of man New York: McGrawHill Book Company. ---e\#
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.176?. The Sacial Contract. Retrieved from:

<[Link] on November 18,2009.

Slaughter, Anne-Mari e. 1997 . The real new world order, Foreign Affairs 76 (5): I 83- 197.

L4