About this study

CSDG Papers

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

Security sector reform (SSR) has moved rapidly up the international aid agenda during the past decade. There is
growing recognition that SSR is fundamentally a political activity and that this requires a coherent response
among UK development, diplomatic and defence actors.
Number 13 June 2008
This comparative study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda had two aims: firstly, to examine who makes decisions
about security, the factors which influence decision-making, and the consequences for the security of people;
and secondly, to suggest ways to incorporate such knowledge more effectively into UK SSR programming.

The study was conducted by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College London in partner-
ship with the Centre for Democracy and Development in Nigeria, the Social Scientists’ Association in Sri Lanka,
and the Centre for Basic Research in Uganda.

Sunil Bastian is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo.
State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs:
Dylan Hendrickson is a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict, Security and Development Group,
King’s College London, and managed the Politics of Security Decision-Making research project. The Politics of Security Decision-Making

Review of Methodology and Lessons for Future Research

Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

The Conflict, Security and Development Group is a leading international resource for research, analysis,
training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of security and development. CSDG was
established at King’s College London in 1999 with the aim of bridging the academic and policy communities.
Its core mandate is to deepen understanding about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa,
Asia and Latin America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local, national,
regional and international levels.

CSDG’s Governance and Security programme is concerned with how international assistance in the security
domain (notably the SSR agenda) can be better tailored to the political context and the needs of aid recipients.

Conflict, Security and Development Group

School of Social Science and Public Policy
King’s College London Tel: +44(0)20 7848 1984
Strand, London Fax: +44(0)20 7848 2748
WC2R 2LS, UK [Link] CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT GROUP
About this study
CSDG Papers

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

Security sector reform (SSR) has moved rapidly up the international aid agenda during the past decade. There is
growing recognition that SSR is fundamentally a political activity and that this requires a coherent response
among UK development, diplomatic and defence actors.
Number 13 June 2008
This comparative study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda had two aims: firstly, to examine who makes decisions
about security, the factors which influence decision-making, and the consequences for the security of people;
and secondly, to suggest ways to incorporate such knowledge more effectively into UK SSR programming.

The study was conducted by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College London in partner-
ship with the Centre for Democracy and Development in Nigeria, the Social Scientists’ Association in Sri Lanka,
and the Centre for Basic Research in Uganda.

Sunil Bastian is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo.
State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs:
Dylan Hendrickson is a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict, Security and Development Group,
King’s College London, and managed the Politics of Security Decision-Making research project. The Politics of Security Decision-Making

Review of Methodology and Lessons for Future Research

Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

The Conflict, Security and Development Group is a leading international resource for research, analysis,
training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of security and development. CSDG was
established at King’s College London in 1999 with the aim of bridging the academic and policy communities.
Its core mandate is to deepen understanding about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa,
Asia and Latin America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local, national,
regional and international levels.

CSDG’s Governance and Security programme is concerned with how international assistance in the security
domain (notably the SSR agenda) can be better tailored to the political context and the needs of aid recipients.

Conflict, Security and Development Group

School of Social Science and Public Policy
King’s College London Tel: +44(0)20 7848 1984
Strand, London Fax: +44(0)20 7848 2748
WC2R 2LS, UK [Link] CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT GROUP
CSDG Papers
Number 13 June 2008

State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs:

The Politics of Security Decision-Making

Review of Methodology and Lessons for Future Research

Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

2 Copyright

This paper was published by the Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College
London ([Link]).

Enquiries concerning reproduction or dissemination of this report should be addressed to

Dylan Hendrickson ([Link]@[Link]).

An electronic copy of this report can be obtained from the Global Facilitation Network for
Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR): [Link]

Copy-editing by Alex Potter (fproduct@[Link]).

Design and typesetting by Richard Jones (rick@[Link]).
Printed in the UK by Russell Press Limited.

© King’s College London, 2008.

First published June 2008.

CSDG Papers seek to showcase policy-relevant research findings from the Conflict, Security
and Development Group’s different programme areas. All papers in the series can be down-
loaded in PDF format from our web-site: [Link]

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Contents 3

Abbreviations and acronyms ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 5

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

Key messages and lessons for future research .................................................................................................................................... 7

Background ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Key messages .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Lessons for future research ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11

1.1 The purpose of the paper ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
1.2 Partnership-based research and SSR ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 The structure of the paper ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2: Project design ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14

2.1 Researching security issues .................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.2 Research themes .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
2.3 Organization of the research ................................................................................................................................................................................ 17

Chapter 3: Implementation issues ...................................................................................................................................................................... 18

3.1 Methodology development ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1.1 Elaborating a robust conceptual framework ................................................................................................................. 18
3.1.2 Ensuring partner ownership of the research ................................................................................................................. 18
3.1.3 Incorporating policy concerns into the research ...................................................................................................... 20
3.2 Conducting the research ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
3.2.1 Micro-case studies ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.2.2 Country studies .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 26
3.3 Informing UK country strategies ................................................................................................................................................................. 28
3.3.1 Liaison with HMG conflict advisers in-country ...................................................................................................... 28
3.3.2 The Dubai policy conference .............................................................................................................................................................. 29
3.3.3 Securing engagement of policy end users in London ......................................................................................... 29

Chapter 4: Project management issues ...................................................................................................................................................... 30

4.1 Assessment of CSDG’s role .................................................................................................................................................................................... 30

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 4.2 Balancing donor and research partner interests .................................................................................................................... 30
4
4.3 Motivating research partners .............................................................................................................................................................................. 31

Chapter 5: Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32

References .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 33

Annex A: Research outputs .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 34

Annex B: Methodological framework ......................................................................................................................................................... 36

Annex C: Country research matrices .......................................................................................................................................................... 47

Annex D: Partner institutions ................................................................................................................................................................................. 54

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Abbreviations and acronyms 5

ACPP Africa Conflict Prevention Pool

CSDG Conflict, Security and Development Group
DFID Department for International Development
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
MOD Ministry of Defence
SSR Security Sector Reform
UK United Kingdom

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

6 Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the UK Government and benefitted from the support provided
by a number of HMG staff, both in London and overseas, who contributed to its design and
implementation.
In the field, the following conflict advisers participated in the project: James Fennel
(Nigeria), Steve Ainsworth (Sri Lanka) and Graham Carrington (Uganda).
In London, inputs into the study during the initial conception stage were provided by
an HMG Steering Committee that comprised Graham Thompson (DFID), Ciru Mwaura
(DFID), Phil Jones (MOD) and David Ashley (FCO).
Mark White (DFID SSR adviser) and Patrick Merienne (Conflict adviser, Africa Conflict
and Humanitarian Unit, DFID) actively followed the study during its implementation and
provided valuable feedback on the various project outputs.
We are also grateful for comments provided on earlier versions of this paper by Nicole
Ball, Sabiiti Mutengesa and Mark White.
The views expressed here are our own, and do not necessarily reflect the views and
policies of the UK Government’s Department for International Development, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, or Ministry of Defence.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Key messages and lessons for future research 7

Background
Security sector reform (SSR) has moved rapidly up the international aid agenda during the
past decade. The UK has played a leading role in developing the SSR concept, policy agenda
and modalities for delivering assistance in this area. HMG currently has SSR assistance
programmes in a number of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and Eastern Europe.
This comparative study of the politics of security decision-making focused on three
countries where the UK currently supports SSR: Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The aim of
the study was two-fold: firstly, to enhance understanding about who makes decisions about
security, the factors which influence decision-making processes, and the consequences for
the security of people; and secondly, to explore ways of incorporating this knowledge more
effectively into UK SSR programming.
This was a collaborative study between the Conflict, Security and Development Group
(CSDG) at King’s College London and research institutions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda.1
The research teams also interacted closely with the HMG conflict adviser in each country
as well as DFID’s SSR adviser in the implementation of the study.

Key messages
Because SSR is a fundamentally political activity, politics needs to be systematically accounted
for in UK SSR programming if such programming is to be effective. Development of a firm
evidence base to under programming will make it easier to tailor UK assistance to the needs,
priorities and circumstances facing partner countries, and to respond to changes in the politi-
cal environment.
Drawing on the experiences of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda, this study suggests that
UK programming in the security sector is based on a relatively weak empirical base, particu-
larly with regard to the politics of reform processes. The problem is not fundamentally one
of the poor capacity of advisers or a lack of appreciation of the importance of analysis. The
importance of evidence-based programming is understood by those managing SSR engage-
ments in all three countries.

1 The Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria), the Social Scientists’ Association (Sri Lanka) and the Centre
for Basic Research (Uganda).

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 Various factors make it difficult for SSR policy and programme managers to acquire the
8
political analysis they need:

the long-term nature of academic research;

the sensitive nature of security issues, which makes research difficult;
limited capacity within the advisory cadre to conduct analysis or digest research pro-
duced by others;
lack of ‘local knowledge’ about the contexts where HMG is working; and
the political imperative to develop programmes before there is adequate understanding
of these contexts.

As a consequence, HMG, like other donors, relies heavily on outside sources of analysis
to inform programming. In most cases, these are UK-based academic institutions or inter-
national consultants from outside the countries where SSR programmes are being established.
This makes it difficult to acquire the inside political knowledge required or to involve local
analysts in UK programming processes.
The methodology adopted for the present study sought to overcome some of these
problems by partnering with local institutions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The aim
of a ‘partnership-based’ approach was not simply to gain a richer analysis of security issues,
but to get local researchers more involved in the UK SSR programming cycle, from the stage
of agenda-setting through the development, implementation and evaluation stages.
The project proposed an iterative means of conducting research and developing SSR
programming. CSDG’s partner institutions took the lead in conducting the field research
and collating the findings. Preliminary findings were presented to the HMG conflict adviser
in each country at various stages over the course of the project, who was given the opportu-
nity to provide feedback and shape the next stage of the research. CSDG in turn took the lead
in comparing the country experiences, assessing the policy implications and presenting the
final results to the UK government.

Lessons for future research

1. Partnership-based research and donor SSR programmes
Lesson 1: Within the same research project, it may not be possible simultaneously to conduct
longer-term empirical research on sensitive security issues, build capacity among local
researchers and influence donor policy. This means that policy-relevant research on security
issues must set realistic objectives, particularly in difficult situations of conflict or political
instability. [p. 26]

Lesson 2: For a partnership-based approach to SSR research to work, donor programmes

need to be flexible enough to accommodate research findings. In turn, organizations that
are provided with the opportunity to influence donor policy and contractually commit them-
selves to delivering work need to accept that, in doing so, there is an accompanying level of
accountability. [p. 20]

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

2. Developing research agendas and methodologies 9
Lesson 3: Policy-relevant research on SSR must, where possible, involve national researchers
from the outset in designing the research project. This will enhance the sense of ownership of
research projects and strengthen analytical capacity within partner countries. In the long run,
both these aspects will contribute towards generating support for SSR. This is essential for the
success of SSR programmes. [p. 20]

Lesson 4: The study adopted a methodology based on a set of ‘micro’-case studies of critical
decision-making events. This turned out to be a successful approach to studying the politics of
security decision-making and unpacking its various dimensions. However, this approach could
be further improved by the development of a more rigorous method for selecting case studies.
[p. 17]

Lesson 5: There is currently limited knowledge to draw upon either at the empirical or con-
ceptual level on the politics of security decision-making in developing countries. Some of the
studies that have focused on the politics of state formation can be of help in this regard, but to
a limited degree. If a conceptual framework were developed on this issue, it would better inform
the interpretation of the case study material. [p. 18]

Lesson 6: There are likely to be trade-offs in terms of focus within a research project that will
affect the nature of its conclusions. Close donor involvement in determining research questions
can help to ensure that the findings of a research project are directly relevant to policy concerns
and result in practical policy recommendations. However, this may limit the scope for a criti-
cal evaluation of the assumptions that underpin donor SSR programming. The development
of a more independent research agenda will allow for this kind of critical analysis, but may, in
turn, make it difficult to translate research findings into practical recommendations that can
be used by donors. [p. 21]

3. Conducting policy-relevant research on sensitive issues

Lesson 7: The case study work benefitted from the prior experience of the authors on the sub-
jects that were selected for examination. This contributed to the timely conclusion of the studies
and a richer and more nuanced analysis. There were a number of cases where authors did not
have substantial prior research experience on security issues. While this in some ways slowed
the research process, the final outcome was that the pool of security analysts in each of the
three countries was expanded, as was capacity to engage in policy debates on security issues
(see Recommendation 11 in the Synthesis of Findings paper). [p. 22]

Lesson 8: It is not always necessary to study politically ‘hot topics’ in order to understand some
of the structural features of the security decision-making process. By examining decision-making
events from the past, it is possible to overcome some of the sensitivities of research of this nature
and come up with policy-relevant findings. [p. 23]

Lesson 9: Careful thought must go into planning research on security issues, due both to its
sensitivity and data limitations. Because primary, published sources of information on security

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 decision-making are very difficult to get hold of – if they exist at all – researchers must rely
10
much more on interviews and secondary sources of information. This can make it possible to
piece together a picture of a decision-making event, but requires adequate time to carry out.
Research projects on sensitive security issues may demand a greater focus on primary sources
of data, given the lack of published material in this area. Working with primary sources demands
more time for making contacts and confidence-building. [p. 24]

Lesson 10: Formulating policy recommendations in a research study on security issues is a

potentially difficult and sensitive undertaking. This is particularly the case in countries where
analysis of security issues by academics is discouraged or where they have limited prior expe-
rience in this type of research. This factor should be borne in mind when donors request that
the research they commission should be policy-relevant. [p. 28]

Lesson 11: Governments and security agencies are still very reluctant to share information on
security issues, although the fact is that much of this information can now be found on the
Web. However, this can make it more difficult to establish its accuracy or authenticity. It can
therefore be in the interests of governments to provide more information on security issues to
the public in order to prevent misunderstandings about security policy. [p. 25]

4. Feeding research findings into SSR programming

Lesson 12: Different kinds of research may be necessary to influence policy. While longer-term
academic research can provide a stronger understanding of the context in which SSR is taking
place, it may not provide actionable recommendations for programme managers. [p. 28]

Lesson 13: In order for country offices to draw maximum benefit from SSR research that has
been commissioned from local analysts, SSR project advisers should be actively engaged in
managing the research. Regular interaction between researchers and the policy end users pro-
vides the latter with a sense of the emerging research findings and an opportunity to clarify in
which areas policy guidance can be of help. [p. 29]

5. Managing and incentivizing research partners

Lesson 14: In managing policy-relevant research, there is a difficult balance to strike between
meeting the contractual obligations of the ‘customer’ and satisfying research partners that they
are not simply instruments for carrying out donor policy. This requires that all three partners
work closely together in defining the research model that will be adopted. [p. 30]

Lesson 15: Academic incentives, such as the possibility of publishing papers and opportuni-
ties for pursuing the subject on a long-term basis, can be important motivating factors for
researchers. This is particularly the case where financial incentives are limited, making it
important that provision for eventual publication of research outputs be made from the outset
of projects. [p. 31] 

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Chapter 1 11

Introduction

1.1 The purpose of the paper

This paper examines the methodology used for a comparative study of the politics of security
decision-making that focused on Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. This study was carried out
during 2006–07 with UK government funding and was co-ordinated by the Conflict, Security
and Development Group (CSDG) at King’s College London.2 The overall aim of the project was to
provide a stronger knowledge base for security sector reform (SSR) policy and assistance activities.
The study was conducted in close partnership with the Centre for Democracy and
Development in Nigeria, the Social Scientists’ Association in Sri Lanka and the Centre for
Basic Research in Uganda. These research partnerships were integral to the study’s aims and
methodology. This paper describes how we conducted the research, assesses the strengths
and weaknesses of our approach, and draws lessons that may inform future policy-relevant
research that deals with politically sensitive security issues.
This assessment should be read in conjunction with the Synthesis of Findings paper, which
discusses our research findings and their implications for UK SSR policy and programming.3
The analysis and lessons contained in this paper is specifically targeted at the UK government,
although they may also have relevance for other donors.
The views expressed here reflect our own assessment of which aspects of the project
worked well and which did not. In writing this paper, we drew on the views of the research
teams in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda, as well as the UK conflict and SSR advisers involved
in the project. The researchers were encouraged to include in their papers an assessment of
the challenges they faced in conducting the field work.4 These issues were discussed at project
meetings held in each country. We also draw upon the discussion that took place at an inter-
national policy conference held in Dubai in April 2007, at which the preliminary project
findings were discussed.

1.2 Partnership-based research and SSR

The premise of this project was that UK SSR policy and programming processes would ben-
efit from a stronger knowledge base on security issues. More research, however, will clearly

2 The study was funded through the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools.
3 Hendrickson, ‘State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs, Synthesis of Findings’.
4 For a list of the study outputs, see Annex A.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 be of limited benefit for donors unless the findings are relevant to policy concerns, packaged
12
in a manner that is accessible to those who formulate SSR policy and develop programmes,
and provided in a timely manner. This suggests that there is a need to ensure that research,
policy and programming processes are carefully linked.
For donor policymakers to have confidence that they are receiving the best information
possible, it is important that research on security issues is carried out in a rigorous manner
by researchers who have relevant local knowledge. Until recently, much of the research on
security issues that the donor SSR community has drawn upon has been heavily influenced by
the policy concerns of donor funding agencies.5 While this policy-driven research has served
the bureaucratic imperative within aid agencies to develop and administer programmes, it
has not always favoured good empirical analysis of the complex political and institutional
dynamics that affect SSR processes.
The problem has not been solely one of a lack of information. Insufficient effort has
been made to draw upon other strands of relevant existing research on security issues of a
more academic nature , including in developing countries. This reflects more fundamental
problems with the way that the knowledge base for donor SSR policymakers has been con-
structed, as a result of which much of the knowledge generated comes from sources external
to the country where an SSR programme is being developed.
The question was how to better link research, policy and programming processes so that
research findings on security issues could be conveyed in an appropriate and timely manner
to those responsible for SSR programming. By working with research partners in Nigeria,
Sri Lanka and Uganda, we sought to incorporate locally generated knowledge directly into
UK SSR programming processes. The aim was not simply to gain a local perspective on the
security challenges facing these three countries, but to actually get local researchers more
involved in the programming cycle, from the stage of agenda-setting through the develop-
ment, implementation and evaluation stages.
The notion of ‘policy-relevant’ research as we use it here (as opposed to ‘policy-driven’
research) therefore implies a synergy between the production of research and its potential
uses, to ensure that relevant and up-to-date knowledge on security issues is available at the
time it is needed by those developing and managing donor SSR programmes. To have an
impact, this approach requires a collective learning process in which researchers, those man-
aging the research and the donor policy end users of the research work closely together.
As this project illustrates, achieving this goal is challenging, given the sensitivity of
research on security issues, the capacity limitations of the parties concerned, resource and
time constraints, and – not least of all – differences in views among researchers about where
to strike the balance between responding to donor policy concerns and seeking to influence
them. This raises an important question – which we examine – as to whether it is possible to
conduct empirical research on sensitive security issues, build capacity among local researchers
and influence donor policy at the same time, within the same research project.

5 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of SSR research and practice in recent years, see Ball and Hendrickson,
Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR).

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

1.3 The structure of the paper 13
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines how we designed the project, including
the organization of the field research and the interface with the UK government research end
users. Section 3 examines the practical challenges we faced in developing the methodology,
conducting the research and feeding our findings into the UK policy process. Section 4 dis-
cusses several key project management issues that impacted on its implementation. By way
of conclusion, we sum up what we would do differently if we were to carry out research of
this nature again.6 

6 The Annexes contain a more detailed summary of the project’s methodological framework, a matrix that summarizes
the micro-case studies carried out in each country and a list of the key project outputs.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

14 Chapter 2
Project design

2.1 Researching security issues

In developing the study, the nature of the subject that we were dealing with and the specific
challenges faced by researchers working in the field all had an impact on the approach we
adopted. Traditionally, research on security issues in developing countries has been extremely
state-centred, as is still the case in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The principal concern of
this research has been the question of state security; more specifically, the defence of terri-
torial integrity and the protection of governmental institutions and political elites. The term
‘national security’ has been commonly used, implying that the state is the same thing as the
nation – an assumption that is highly questionable.
One consequence of this focus on the state has been the tendency to consider research
into security institutions itself as a security issue. The understanding was that this kind of
research should only be carried out by agencies authorized by the state. Confidentiality and
secretiveness were hallmarks of such research. Any interference into this world from researchers
outside the sanctioned circle was not only frowned upon, but also considered as a security
threat. These ideas are still dominant in developing countries and become even more hard-
ened when states are under threat by armed groups. This was the case in the three countries
where we carried out our research.
Because most of the existing research on security is dominated by the above concern
with state security, the body of knowledge that examines security from other perspectives is
smaller by comparison. In the case of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda, the research commu-
nity working on security issues is relatively small. In addition, these researchers have limited
secondary sources of information to draw on. In many instances, they have to start from
scratch. Each of these factors creates difficulties in conducting research on security decision-
making at an acceptable level of quality, and has particular implications for the time, effort
and approach required.
To an extent, the introduction of broader international concepts such as ‘human security’
and ‘security sector reform’ have opened the way for and legitimized research on security
issues by non-state actors, including academics and civil society groups. This is the case
because these concepts promote a more holistic understanding of security that includes
both military and non-military dimensions; that is, they treat security as a public good, as
we have done in this study. There are thus a range of new entry points and perspectives for
security analysis that do not necessarily require researchers to engage with the sensitive ‘hard’

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

security issues that are more likely to arouse suspicion on the part of conservative governments.
15
That said, any research that is carried out on issues of ‘security’ can still arouse suspicions.
The concepts of human security and SSR nonetheless have limitations when applied to
empirical analysis. Both have emerged in response to a drive within the international aid
community to address the twin imperatives of peace and development through integrated
policies and programmes. Both are based on a normative agenda aimed at encouraging
states to develop people-centred approaches to security that are consistent with democratic
norms and human development goals. Both, therefore, have been developed as guides for
states seeking to develop institutions that are more responsive to public security needs.7
However, both concepts are less useful when it comes to telling us how states actually
make decisions about security, and the factors that influence this process. From our stand-
point, understanding how the decision-making process works should be the starting point for
better informed international SSR policy. Because there is a very sparse literature on security
decision-making in countries that are experiencing violent conflict, the main aim of this
project was to generate new insights into this question that can serve as a basis for comparison
and the development of SSR assistance strategies that are better tailored to the specificities
of the societies in question.

2.2 Research themes

The first aim of our research project was to get beyond the focus on formal security institu-
tions that is often the starting point for SSR analysis, and to increase our understanding of
how history, politics and power relations affect security decision-making processes within
governments.8 Security is an extremely contested category of political thinking, because each
social group, government or donor agency has its own idea of what security entails. Competition,
co-operation and conflict among these diverse players therefore characterizes this political
contestation for security. This in turn defines what is possible in terms of achieving policy
and institutional changes that will achieve the widest possible security benefits for society.
For the purposes of this study, our point of reference is an expansive understanding of
security taken to mean the state of affairs in which individuals and social groups are able to
exercise their legitimate rights and freedoms in a safe environment. We approach security
through a public policy lens rather than as a concern of traditional security actors alone. This
is because we are interested in what weight those who make decisions about security give to
the different military and non-military dimensions of the security problems that affect citi-
zens, and how they choose between the coercive and non-coercive policy options available
to the state to address security problems. In particular, we are interested in how decision-
makers balance the security interests of states and the security interests of citizens.

7 For a detailed discussion of the current state of the art of donor thinking on SSR, see OECD-DAC, Handbook on
Security System Reform.
8 A copy of the methodological framework is attached in Annex B.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 The notion of responsiveness as we use it in this paper is therefore a measure of how those
16
with security decision-making authority respond when a country’s population or sections
thereof are confronted with security problems. Responsiveness is a function of the capacity of
the citizenry to articulate their preferences, the capability of the state to process and respond
in a timely manner, the form and quality of the response, and whether it reflects an attempt
by government to meet the demands of the diverse groups in society equitably. The notion
of responsiveness provides a means of assessing the complex interplay of factors that shape
public policy processes and ultimately determine which groups in society benefit from these
processes.
In developing the methodology, we initially considered various approaches. In response
to a request from DFID, we explored the idea of conducting surveys at the local level to estab-
lish how people perceive security and define their needs, how they interact with state security
establishments, and how they cope when faced with shortfalls in state provision of security.
However, a preliminary review of the literature convinced us that there were already signifi-
cant insights available on these issues; certainly enough to map out some of the key policy
challenges states face in responding to public security needs. Where there appeared to be a
much larger gap in knowledge was on the decision-making side.
Little information was available on the factors that determine how state decision-makers
perceive (or fail to perceive) their obligation to render such a vital service as security, and,
in particular, how these perceptions and broader political dynamics shape the way in which
security decision-making occurs. Because it is difficult to examine these kinds of issues at a
generic level, we anchored our studies in an analysis of a number of specific ‘micro’ decision-
making events. This was intended to help bring out the complex decision-making dynamics
that are often more clearly discernible in the context of an actual crisis or episode where key
security decisions are made. To be most useful, these micro events should shed light on the
nature of state–societal interaction in the decision-making process.
We identified three broad questions that we felt would help us to generate policy-relevant
insights into the factors that shape decision-making and state responsiveness:

Firstly, what are the main sources of decision-making authority in the societies we are
examining? Real power in security decision-making rarely lies where it appears, i.e. as
reflected by formal organizational charts or official government pronouncements on
security matters. This is all the more so in societies where there has been a decay of state
institutions, and non-state actors are heavily involved in justice and security provision.
Secondly, what are the avenues of influence by which different groups in society exercise
their ‘demand’ for security? SSR is a political agenda that generally requires significant
alterations in power relations among different groups in society. Yet SSR assistance
policy is often narrowly focused, targeting security agencies within the state without
adequately accounting for who will drive the ‘demand’ for change, particularly if the
proposed changes are resisted by the security establishment. Such an approach in effect
assumes that political and security elites can reform themselves, in the process down-
playing the crucial role that political pressure has to play in bringing about policy change.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 Thirdly, how do external actors impact upon security decision-making? There has been
17
insufficient critical reflection on the ways in which donor interventions both in the
security sector and the broader public domain may unwittingly make it more difficult
for governments to meet the security needs of their populations. Aid dependency, eco-
nomic and political conditionalities, and deficit reduction objectives (imposed as part
of financial stabilization packages), among others, can all impact negatively on state
sovereignty in the security domain and, in particular, governments’ ability to respond
when the security of their populations is threatened.

The choice of the final question reflected the fact that we wanted this project to focus
on conflict-affected countries where there is generally heavy donor involvement.

Lesson: The study adopted a methodology based on a set of ‘micro’-case studies of critical
decision-making events. This turned out to be a successful approach to studying the politics of
security decision-making and unpacking its various dimensions. However, this approach could
be further improved by the development of a more rigorous method for selecting case studies.

2.3 Organization of the research

The second aim of our research project was to find ways of better linking SSR research, policy
and practice so that our research findings would be conveyed in an appropriate and timely
manner to those responsible for UK SSR programming. The selection of Nigeria, Sri Lanka
and Uganda as subjects for this study was in part influenced by the fact that there was a UK-
supported SSR initiative in each country and that the resident UK conflict adviser expressed
an interest in our research agenda. We also identified a local institutional partner in each
country to co-ordinate the micro-case study research and the country studies.
It was the role of the team leaders to put together a team of researchers and to determine
which case studies would be appropriate to cover in Phase One of the project. Six case studies
were selected in each country (see Annex C). The aim of these micro studies was to provide
the empirical data that would feed into the country studies authored by the team leaders in
Phase Two of the project. The three country studies in turn were to inform the Phase Three
work on policy issues, which was kick-started by an international meeting in Dubai in April
2007 that brought together the research team leaders and a wider group of country experts,
UK government policymakers and outside policy analysts.
It was envisaged that there would be both a policy and an academic audience for the
research findings. On the policy side, the research model was intended to encourage regular
interaction between the researchers and the UK conflict advisers based in each of the three
countries. To that extent, the research was intended to feed into both ongoing policy formu-
lation and programming, where relevant, and to inform future programming. The conflict
advisers were therefore invited to attend periodic meetings of the country research teams,
which were also attended by the London-based CSDG project co-ordinator. 

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

18 Chapter 3
Implementation issues

3.1 Methodology development

3.1.1 Elaborating a robust conceptual framework
The development of a more robust conceptual or theoretical framework early on in the
project could have provided better guidance in the choice of case studies and the case study
research. We can learn from the example of a different study undertaken by the Social
Scientists’ Association – the Sri Lankan partner in the present project – several years ago.
This was a study focusing on agrarian change in Sri Lanka. The field study was carried out
in eight locations; but the choice of these locations was supported by a conceptual framework
that captured the principal characteristics of the Sri Lankan agrarian system and hypoth-
esized certain trajectories of agrarian change. The field locations were chosen to test different
aspects of these trajectories.9
If we translate this experience into the focus of the present project, it is necessary to
strengthen our conceptual and theoretical insights into the politics of security decision-
making. This would likely mean dwelling much more on the politics of policy-making
processes in general, before examining the security sector in particular. Even if the body of
knowledge specifically related to the politics of decision-making in the security sector is
thin, we can benefit from general literature on the politics of decision-making within states.
Strengthening our understanding of this conceptual debate can be of benefit in informing
the choice of case studies.

Lesson: There is currently limited knowledge to draw upon either at the empirical or concep-
tual level on the politics of security decision-making in developing countries. Some of the studies
that have focused on the politics of state formation can be of help in this regard, but to a lim-
ited degree. If a conceptual framework were developed on this issue, it would better inform the
interpretation of the case study material.

3.1.2 Ensuring partner ownership of the research

The initial and crucial stages of the design of the project were carried out by CSDG, in con-
sultation with the UK government. A final decision on DFID funding was not made until

9 See Gunasinghe, ‘Peasant Agrarian Systems and Structural Transformation in Sri Lanka’.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

the basic methodology had been developed and approved. Only then could a final decision
19
be made on project partners. This meant that the country teams, especially the case study
authors, only entered into the picture after the central ideas of the research had been formu-
lated. They were all invited to comment on the methodological framework that informed
the overall project design, including the case study method, but there was limited opportu-
nity for discussions with the country team members.
This model of project design, which involved a three-country comparative study co-
ordinated from the UK, influenced the sense of ownership of the project within the country
teams. For some of the case study authors, completion of the work took the form of finishing
a commissioned piece of work rather than implementing a study in which they had a deeper
interest. As one of the Sri Lankan authors put it, ‘We completed what was asked from us, but
did not have an idea of the rest of the process.’ In the case of Uganda and Nigeria, the various
project meetings and briefings by the country study authors helped to fill this gap. But it was
difficult to break through the structural flaws that were built into the research design.
Although there were a number of discussions in each country explaining the entire
project, the engagement of the case study authors with the wider objectives of the projects
remained weak. More could have been done to rectify this situation through a greater number
of consultations between senior researchers and the case study authors, but the issue was
about much more than a mere transfer of knowledge concerning the larger project. The fact
that basic work around developing the methodology did not involve all of the project partici-
pants (24 people, across three countries) meant that it was more difficult to ensure from the
outset a sense of ownership among everyone involved.
The alternative is to explore ways and means by which country teams could be involved
in the research design process right from the beginning. This could take several forms. For
example, the country team or representatives of country teams could be more involved from
the initial point of formulating research ideas onwards. It should also be possible to locate
some parts of the initial design process within the countries concerned. This would certainly
demand a much longer period for project formulation and more resources. However, in order
to provide a greater degree of legitimacy in the global South for this type of research, this
might be essential. It also can help research to escape the accusation of Northern domination.
Such an approach is also essential for capacity-building in the global South on security
sector research. This in turn is an essential element in achieving the ultimate goal of this
research, which is sustainable reforms within the security sector. The greater the capacity
in the global South for this type of research, the greater is the chance of this region owning
the knowledge generated by the research and accepting these ideas. This is essential for the
success of a highly politically sensitive reform agenda such as SSR.
The basis for an effective collaboration between donors and the research community
must be some form of research compact. Donor SSR programming must be flexible enough
to respond to the changes that research findings entail; while researchers who seek to pro-
duce policy-relevant research must, for their part, be willing to accept some direction from
donors about what issues are relevant, to present research in a form that is accessible to policy-
makers, and to do so in a timely manner. SSR research will not achieve policy relevance

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 merely through the greater involvement of local analysts, but through a better synergy between
20
its production and its potential uses.

Lesson: Policy-relevant research on SSR must, where possible, involve national researchers
from the outset in designing the research project. This will enhance the sense of ownership of
research projects and strengthen analytical capacity within partner countries. In the long run,
both these aspects will contribute towards generating support for SSR. This is essential for the
success of SSR programmes.

Lesson: For a partnership-based approach to SSR research to work, donor programmes need
to be flexible enough to accommodate research findings. In turn, organizations that are pro-
vided with the opportunity to influence donor policy and contractually commit themselves to
delivering work need to accept that, in doing so, there is an accompanying level of accountability.

3.1.3 Incorporating policy concerns into the research

From the outset of this project, the aim, was to develop a programme of research on security
decision-making that would be policy-relevant but not policy-driven. There are different
perspectives on the question of how policy change can best be promoted within the donor
SSR community.
One view is that this can best be achieved through focused policy studies that present
specific sets of recommendations to donors about how to provide SSR assistance more effec-
tively. In line with this, one would start out with a specific set of policy questions determined
either independently or in consultation with donor partners. By enabling researchers to take
into account the needs of policymakers right at the beginning of the research design, this
can help to ensure that a study’s conclusions and recommendations are more relevant and
richer. The risk, however, is that this may reduce the space for critically evaluating some of
the basic assumptions of SSR policymakers.
Another approach, which we favoured in this study, reflects a view that policy change
is actually driven by broader processes of debate and reflection within the donor community.
Influencing mindsets, therefore, requires changes in the policy discourse in the area of SSR
that are more likely to come about as the knowledge base on SSR issues is broadened and
deepened. This may increase the likelihood that specific policy recommendations on SSR,
which remains a very new and sensitive area of engagement for most donors, will be taken
on board at a later stage. It may be more difficult, however, to come up with conclusions and
policy recommendations that can be presented to donors in easily digestible packets.
The premise of this study was therefore that there is a need for a much more fundamental
understanding of the political drivers of security decision-making by external actors. We
sought the independence to define our research questions in a way that was not directly
influenced by the UK policy concerns of the day. The aim was to liberate ourselves from
thinking about security decision-making from the point of view of how we felt it ought to
work, but rather to seek to understand how decision-making actually works in practice, and
then ask what this means for donor policy. This task, we felt, would be more effectively achieved
if we delayed the serious policy discussions until the latter stages of the project.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 The usefulness of research for policymakers can be varied. Research can often add value
21
simply by providing more information and a nuanced understanding of society, rather than
specific answers to specific policy questions. This has value in itself, especially in a world
where there is a tendency to generalize about historically and culturally varied societies. In
this case, comparative research can help to underscore the dangers of formulaic approaches
to policy-making that assume that security sectors share similar features and that universal
solutions can be applied in different countries or regions.
Comparative analysis can also help policymakers to break out of the dominant Western,
normative framework of thinking about how countries should tackle their security challenges.
One shortcoming of policy-driven SSR research is that it concentrates too much on Western
approaches to security and is subjective in its emphasis on democratic models. Donors need
to engage with security institutions as they are, rather than how they believe they ought to
be. In the rush to find solutions to problems, the need for basic analysis is often overlooked.
The approach we adopted also reflects the fact that most of our researchers in Nigeria,
Sri Lanka and Uganda are themselves part of the processes of political change and, to that
extent, involved in defining or redefining the terms of the political debates with regard to
security in their own countries. This suggests that there is a strong case for donors to invest
in a longer-term agenda of fostering national, research-led debates on SSR that are not directly
linked to immediate programming concerns.
There are therefore trade-offs in terms of focus within a research project such as this.
None of the country research focused directly on UK SSR programming. If it had, this would
have involved much closer scrutiny of the programme aims and modalities for delivering UK
assistance, as well as the specific institutional actors with which the UK is engaging. Such a
focus would have made it easier to come up with specific policy recommendations about how
the UK can strengthen its programming, but it would likely have made it more difficult to
address more fundamental questions about the political factors that affect decision-making.

Lesson: There are likely to be trade-offs in terms of focus within a research project that will affect
the nature of its conclusions. Close donor involvement in determining research questions can help
to ensure that the findings of a research project are directly relevant to policy concerns and result
in practical policy recommendations. However, this may limit the scope for a critical evaluation
of the assumptions that underpin donor SSR programming. The development of a more inde-
pendent research agenda will allow for this kind of critical analysis, but may, in turn, make it
difficult to translate research findings into practical recommendations that can be used by donors.

3.2 Conducting the research

3.2.1 Micro-case studies
Human capacity issues
Given that this project was dealing with a relatively new area of research, and one that was
particularly sensitive, we anticipated that there would be difficulties in finding researchers
with the right background to participate. With only a few exceptions, none of the researchers

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 that were involved in the project from any of three countries had direct expertise on security
22
decision-making per se. Each was chosen, rather, because their knowledge matched the micro-
case studies that were selected for each country study.
In the Sri Lankan case, it was possible to find researchers to complete the case studies
without difficulty. This was contrary to the usual belief that the security sector is an area
where it is a difficult to find researchers due to its political sensitivity. The Sri Lankan team
was a mixture of academics, independent researchers from civil society organizations and a
retired civil servant. The ability to successfully mobilize this team reflected the varied links
of the Social Scientists’ Association with academia, the Sri Lankan bureaucracy and other
civil society organizations.
The actual researching of the Sri Lankan case studies did not meet any special difficul-
ties, primarily because the authors had prior experience of the subjects chosen. Two of the
members were directly involved in the subjects that they dealt with in another capacity. The
former civil servant, who had been secretary to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, was
directly responsible for the implementation of the security arrangements during the peace
process. Another researcher, who analysed the workings of the various commissions that
were appointed to inquire into disappearances, was a member of one of these commissions.
The researchers’ respective backgrounds, which fitted with the topics they worked on, were
critical for the timely completion of the Sri Lankan case studies. The participation of a former
civil servant that had held a sensitive position in the government reflects the availability of
a certain space for this type of work, even in difficult circumstances.
In the cases of Uganda and Nigeria, we did not achieve as close a fit between the exper-
tise of the researchers and the topics they were researching and writing on. This reflected a
number of factors, including the general lack of prior research experience on security issues
among the case study authors. While each was selected to work on general issues where he/she
had a relevant background, the relative lack of experience on researching security issues (with
several notable exceptions) meant that it was difficult for the researchers to move beyond a gen-
eral treatment of the topic and engage with the specific research themes we were examining.
This research challenge was to a certain extent mitigated by support provided to the
researchers by their team leaders, but was in other ways exacerbated by the practical chal-
lenges of researching sensitive security issues.

Lesson: The case study work benefitted from the prior experience of the authors on the subjects
that were selected for examination. This contributed to the timely conclusion of the studies and
a richer and more nuanced analysis. There were a number of cases where authors did not have
substantial prior research experience on security issues. While this in some ways slowed the
research process, the final outcome was that the pool of security analysts in each of the three
countries was expanded, as was capacity to engage in policy debates on security issues. [See
Recommendation 11 in Part I on building national research capacity.]

Security sensitivities
Many of the decision-making issues explored were sensitive because of the prevailing situa-
tions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda at the time that the project was conducted. All three

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

of these countries were faced by major internal armed conflicts. In this context, any discus-
23
sion on issues such as human security or human rights is likely to be viewed with suspicion
and possibly as an activity against the current regime. This suspicion and opposition can be
accentuated if the studies are externally funded.
The case study authors in all three countries found it difficult to find people to be inter-
viewed when conducting their field research. In the case of Uganda, a letter of introduction
written by CSDG served to open some doors to the researchers, primarily in Kampala and
with government agencies. But in the field, where security concerns are heightened, it was
less straightforward to approach security personnel for interviews unless the case study
authors had direct contacts that they could draw on.
In some cases, there were also concerns about physical security that influenced how
the research was approached. Thus the researcher working on irregular forces in Nigeria’s
Delta region felt the need to drastically limit his travel and time spent in the field. This was
also the case to an extent in northern Uganda and the Karamoja region, where the sheer
inhospitableness of the region in terms of travel was also a significant barrier to research.
The sensitivities of the research were perhaps most heightened in Sri Lanka, where there
was already suspicion among certain political quarters and within the academic community
about externally funded initiatives in the security domain. Over the past few years, there have
been regular attacks in the press on the peace lobby and a number of NGOs involved in
SSR work due to their links with international actors. As a consequence of this, research on
security issues has tended to focus on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or anti-terrorism
rather than state security institutions or practice. Minority (non-Sinhalese) researchers in
particular would not be able to look at these subjects.
The Sri Lanka research team got around these difficulties, to an extent, by not focusing
on contemporary security issues. The case studies selected therefore spanned a period from
the late 1970s through 2002–03, when the country’s ceasefire agreement was signed. The Sri
Lanka experience shows that it is not always necessary to study politically ‘hot topics’ in order
to understand some of the structural features of the security decision-making process. In
fact, there may be certain advantages in avoiding hot topics altogether, because field work
on these issues is likely to confront serious difficulties, and the information collected might
be highly skewed due to ongoing political debates. It might simply be more fruitful to study
the underlying structural features of these political and security events from the past.

Lesson: It is not always necessary to study politically ‘hot topics’ in order to understand some
of the structural features of the security decision-making process. By examining decision-making
events from the past, it is possible to overcome some of the sensitivities of research of this nature
and come up with policy-relevant findings.

Data limitations
In researching the case studies, the biggest difficulty faced by all of the researchers was finding
published primary data on security decision-making to draw on. This meant that the researchers
were more dependent on secondary literature, interviews or focus group discussions in order
to generate insights on their topics.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 Interviews posed a problem in many cases due to either the sensitivity of the topic –
24
which made people reluctant to talk – or because of the unavailability of key informants. For
example, the author of the case study on the passage of the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act
in Sri Lanka found that many of the Tamil informants, including lawyers, who had direct
knowledge of the event were reluctant to talk. The author of the study on the government’s
handling of the July 1983 Sinhalese riots found it difficult to locate some of the people involved,
because the event took place more than two decades ago.
In the case of Uganda, the authors of the case studies on the government response to
the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency and the militarization of public security in Kampala
both required interviews with senior military officials, which were hard to get due to their
busy schedules. In the case of the study on the donor influence on security decision-making
at the time of the Uganda Defence Review, many of the key donor actors who had insights
into this topic were no longer based in the country.
The Nigerian authors faced similar experiences. The study on the government decision
to invite the American private security company Military Professional Resources Incorporated
to help professionalize the army was seriously hampered by the difficulties faced in getting
interviews with key defence officials with knowledge of this event.
A general observation relevant to all three countries is that there is often a discrepancy
between information that governments or security agencies categorize as ‘secret’ or ‘confi-
dential’ and what is available in the public domain. There is an increasing amount of infor-
mation available on the World-Wide Web, for instance, which has formerly been restricted
to official agencies.
These experiences have implications for planning research on sensitive security topics.
For a start, it should be recognized that if the objective is to interview informants with first-
hand knowledge of the issues being examined, it may take a significant amount of time to
make the appropriate contacts and win their confidence. When subjects from the past are
being investigated in order to avoid political sensitivities, the challenge is of a different nature,
because it is harder to find people who were associated with the events in question.
In these circumstances, many of the authors relied on secondary material for much of
their information. While this helped to overcome the issue of sensitivity, it was difficult to
get the detailed and nuanced information that was ideally required for a study of this nature.
Another issue that arose when using secondary data was the reliability of using newspaper
material. Since newspapers can easily sensationalize some of the issues, this raises a particular
problem for research on security studies.

Lesson: Careful thought must go into planning research on security issues, due both to its sen-
sitivity and data limitations. Because primary, published sources of information on security
decision-making are very difficult to get hold of – if they exist at all – researchers must rely
much more on interviews and secondary sources of information. This can make it possible to
piece together a picture of a decision-making event, but requires adequate time to carry out.
Research projects on sensitive security issues may demand a greater focus on primary sources of
data, given the lack of published material in this area. Working with primary sources demands
more time for making contacts and confidence-building.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Lesson: Governments and security agencies are still very reluctant to share information on
25
security issues, although the fact is that much of this information can now be found on the
Web. However, this can make it more difficult to establish its accuracy or authenticity. It can
therefore be in the interests of governments to provide more information on security issues to
the public in order to prevent misunderstandings about security policy.

Resource and time constraints

The time allocated for the case study work made it something between a consultancy and an
academic research project. This made it difficult to explore primary sources and question key
informants in sufficient depth. If the case studies could have been concluded purely on the
basis of secondary sources, the allocated time would have been sufficient. But as already noted,
there was little available documentation of the kinds of issues that were being examined.
The case study methodology adopted also meant that the project ended up having a
considerable number of outputs. In the end there were 16 case studies, three country studies
and two policy papers. The researching and writing of all of these papers were scheduled to
be carried out within a time period of less than one year, although the time line for the pro­
ject ended up being extended by nine months due to extensive delays in completion of the
country studies.
The time constraint was also problematic from another point of view. The project was
intended to come up with policy-relevant insights and recommendations that were intended
to inform UK policy in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. It was difficult enough, given the
information constraints for the researchers, to produce with a detailed picture of how decision-
making works in their respective societies. To then develop policy recommendations on the
basis of the limited information that they were able to gather was always going to be difficult,
all the more so since there was a time constraint.
This meant that the researchers were under pressure vis-à-vis the UK government,
which was the end user of this research, while also needing time to carefully consider their
findings in view of the need to formulate some clear, policy-relevant conclusions that they
would feel comfortable defending.
In the event, very few of the case studies were able to generate the level of detail and
nuance about security decision-making that had originally been envisaged (Section 3 in the
Methodological Framework (see Annex A) gives a sense of the kinds of questions we wanted
the researchers to ask). This project finding is of itself policy-relevant, for it suggests that if
it is this difficult for local researchers to explain how decision-making works, then external
actors are likely to be much more disadvantaged when it comes to understanding this area.
This underscores the need not simply for more and better research, but – perhaps more
importantly – for caution when it comes to planning interventions in the security sector.
There is a potential tension, therefore, between the objective of supporting long-term
academic research (and building capacity in this domain), on the one hand, and generating
policy-relevant research findings, on the other, due to the fact that donors usually work
within narrow time frames. Donors need to be aware of this and recognize that the two
objectives are not always compatible. Building local research capacity is key to reducing the

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 reliance on external researchers, but this requires support for long-term research that may
26
not directly benefit donor programming.

Lesson: Research projects on sensitive security issues may demand a greater focus on primary
sources of data, given the lack of published material in this area. Working with primary sources
demands more time for making contacts and confidence-building. Where researchers are
required to come up with policy-relevant recommendations based on limited evidence, this
also places additional pressure on them.

Lesson: Within the same research project, it may not be possible simultaneously to conduct
longer-term empirical research on sensitive security issues, build capacity among local research-
ers and influence donor policy. This means that policy-relevant research on security issues must
set realistic objectives, particularly in difficult situations of conflict or political instability.

3.2.2 Country studies

The main aim of the country studies was to provide a comprehensive picture of the factors
that affect security decision-making and state responsiveness to public security needs. This
involved both background contextual analysis and interpretive work, drawing on the case
study findings, which were intended to provide empirical evidence about security decision-
making processes. The country study authors were asked to address five broad questions:

What are the historical and structural factors that have shaped state responsiveness to
security needs?
What are the nature and structure of the formal state security decision-making
architecture?
What do the micro-case studies tell us about how security decision-making works in
practice?
What can one learn from the country’s experience with regard to our three propositions?
What are the key features of security decision-making that external actors need to be
aware of before intervening in the security domain?

Interpreting the case study findings

The writing of the country studies posed a number of challenges, not least – in the cases of
Nigeria and Uganda – because of the variable quality of the case studies. In each case, only
five of the six case studies that were commissioned were completed; while several others were
only completed in draft form. There was wide variation in the degree to which authors aligned
their case studies with the key propositions being explored in the study. The empirical evi-
dence about decision-making provided by the authors was also, in certain cases, quite limited.
These factors complicated the task of the country study authors. Where empirical infor-
mation from the case studies was insufficient, this required that the country study authors
either conducted additional research or placed greater emphasis on the contextual sections
of the report. This in turn made it more difficult to come up with firm evidence-based policy
messages directed at the UK government.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 This final interpretive task was intended to involve the case study researchers, the relevant
27
UK conflict adviser and the CSDG project manager, who were to be brought together in a
workshop format to discuss the study findings. In the event, it was only in Sri Lanka and
Uganda that it was possible to present a draft of the country study to the research team. In
neither case did this attract extensive feedback from the case study authors. In the case of
Nigeria, the country study was delayed by six months, by which time it was too late to solicit
the views of case study authors on the interpretations it contained. These experiences suggest
that it is important to rethink the format of these workshops in order to facilitate a more
in-depth discussion on the interpretation of the case study findings.

Aligning the country studies with one another

Another challenge arose with regard to the comparative dimension of the project. It was
proposed in the methodological framework that the three studies explore a common set of
propositions and adopt a common structure. The aim was to ensure that several key themes
of policy interest identified by CSDG were examined, to facilitate comparison among the
findings of the three country studies and to help in generating clear policy messages for the
UK government. But in practice, there was a strong view among the lead authors of the
country studies that squeezing the different historical and political experiences of the three
countries into a common framework would end up masking the nuances and diversity of
each country experience. This resulted in the three country studies approaching the key
project themes in different ways, highlighting issues that the team leaders felt best reflected
national circumstances.

Coming up with robust policy messages

The aim of the project was not to generate specific policy recommendations for the UK gov-
ernment, but rather to identify some key features of the security decision-making environment
in the three countries that could inform external policy and programming processes. However,
since formulating policy messages is essentially a political act, the burden of responsibility
placed on the researchers was even greater. This becomes more acute if researchers who are
engaging in this exercise live and work in the specific locations where research is carried
out. If the quality of research is questionable, the policy recommendations can be questioned.
This can lead to a serious backlash in a politically sensitive subject like the security sector.
There is often a delay in translating research findings into policy recommendations.
This study sought to bridge this gap through regular meetings between the researchers and
the policy end users in the UK government missions in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The
success of this knowledge transfer exercise was variable, working best in Sri Lanka and not
at all in the case of Nigeria, due to the delays around completion of the country study. In
Uganda, the DFID office drew upon findings from the country study when it drafted its
2007–10 SSR programme strategy.
But our experiences also illustrated that as useful as it was to bring together the researchers
and the research end users, this was not sufficient in and of itself to influence policy. The
reason was that pure knowledge does not easily translate into a bureaucratic form that can

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 feed into country programming for HMG. On the one hand, the material generated by the
28
country studies was rich, adding a new layer to our understanding of security decision-
making in all three countries. On the other hand, the knowledge and policy insights that
were generated by the study did not appear that significant compared to the efforts that went
into the study. This is not to stay that nothing has been added, but rather that the process of
influencing UK SSR policy and programming in the three countries, at the very least, takes
much longer than we allowed for.

Lesson: Formulating policy recommendations in a research study on security issues is a poten-

tially difficult and sensitive undertaking. This is particularly the case in countries where analysis
of security issues by academics is discouraged or where they have limited prior experience in
this type of research. This factor should be borne in mind when donors request that the research
they commission should be policy-relevant.

Lesson: Different kinds of research may be necessary to influence policy. While longer-term
academic research can provide a stronger understanding of the context in which SSR is taking
place, it may not provide direct answers to programming challenges.

3.3 Informing UK country strategies

3.3.1 Liaison with HMG conflict advisers in-country
The main point of contact for the project in HMG’s missions overseas was the conflict adviser.
In Sri Lanka, the conflict adviser was closely involved from the beginning in discussions
around the project methodology and the development of the Sri Lanka research agenda.
This close involvement reflected in part the fact that funding for the Sri Lanka portion of
the project came directly from the country office and that it had a greater stake in the out-
come of the research. The SSR programme in the country was under way and stable.
In the cases of both Uganda and Nigeria, funding came from the Africa Conflict Preven­
tion Pool (ACPP) budget in London. Both country offices agreed to support the research
initiative, but it was not derived directly from their SSR programme. In the case of Uganda,
the UK’s SSR engagement was in flux at the time, which was reflected in the fact that the con-
flict adviser responsible for SSR was devoting most of his time to other tasks. In Nigeria, there
was no SSR programme per se, though it was anticipated that the Security, Justice and Growth
programme that was coming to a close would be eventually expanded into an SSR programme.
Both of the conflict advisers were transferred to other countries part way through the
project. This, combined with the fact that they had other pressing demands on their time,
limited their participation in the research meetings. In the case of Nigeria, there was a long
delay in appointing the new regional conflict adviser; in the case of Uganda, the adviser who
took over responsibility for the project came in at the tail end of the field research. These
factors made it difficult to transfer knowledge in an effective manner and underscore the
importance of continuity in advisory staffing, particularly when it comes to research pro­
jects such as this.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Lesson: In order for country offices to draw maximum benefit from SSR research that has been
29
commissioned from local analysts, SSR project advisers should be actively engaged in manag-
ing the research. Regular interaction between researchers and the policy end users provides the
latter with a sense of the emerging research findings and an opportunity to clarify in which
areas policy guidance can be of help.

3.3.2 The Dubai policy conference

The workshop held in Dubai over a three-day period in April 2007 was useful from various
standpoints, despite the fact that the Nigeria team leaders were not present. The Sri Lanka
and Uganda draft country studies were presented, and structured feedback was provided to
their authors by a discussant, which was useful in assisting them to complete the studies.
Several of the case study authors were also invited from all three countries, which gave them
a better sense of the purpose of the project and also allowed them to share some of their
empirical findings with the broader group.
We also discussed the comparative aspects of the research, reviewed the methodology,
and considered the broader implications of our research for UK and donor policy in the three
countries. This discussion was facilitated by the participation of the conflict advisers, the
DFID SSR adviser from London and several members of the Security Sector Development
Advisory Team, which is engaged in all three countries. In addition, a number of outside
policy analysts and academics with a background in SSR were invited, who also enriched
the debate.
The absence of the Nigeria team leaders from the meeting and the lack of a country
study, however, limited the discussion on the comparative and policy issues. This also sig-
nificantly set back completion of Phase Three of the project. The momentum for finalizing
all three of the country studies slowed after the Dubai workshop, reflecting in part the fact
that all of the team leaders had other demands on their time.

3.3.3 Securing engagement of policy end users in London

Efforts to generate interest in our research from within DFID, FCO and MOD were not as
successful as we hoped. From the outset of the project, representatives of all three depart-
ments were members of the Steering Committee that oversaw the early stages of the project,
primarily relating to the development of the methodology. Once the field research began,
however, the frequency of meetings was reduced and a number of committee members were
transferred to new jobs. Efforts were made to invite representatives from the departments
to the Dubai meeting, but only the DFID SSR adviser,the ACPP conflict adviser, and two
members of the SSDAT were able to attend. As a result of subsequent delays in completing
the project, this made it more difficult to convene a meeting in London to which interested
HMG parties could be invited to receive an update. 

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

30 Chapter 4
Project management issues

4.1 Assessment of CSDG’s role

The impetus for this project came from CSDG, which developed the initial research ideas
and secured funding from the UK government. With the project designed in such a way
that the institutional partners in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda would carry out the field
research, CSDG was placed in the position of essentially managing a research project. This
position had several advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, it allowed CSDG to play a more strategic role in terms of shaping
the research agenda, bringing out the comparative findings and ultimately translating these
findings into a format that would be useful for the UK government. From the UK government’s
perspective, this was also a useful role for CSDG to play, because it was administratively
much simpler to subcontract to a UK-based institution rather than dealing with multiple
organizations in Africa and Asia. From the standpoint of generating policy-relevant find-
ings, it was also a real advantage to have a UK-based institution located in London in close
proximity to DFID, FCO and MOD.
The downside, however, was that CSDG was placed in the position of having to manage
the research activities of Southern-based institutions, a situation that may have undermined
their ownership of the research activities and findings. To the extent that this was a true
research partnership, all parties should have felt that they had a stake in the research design,
including determining the division of labour among the different parties. But there was a
strong perception among partner institutions that the research was UK-driven, even if in
practice they had latitude to determine the approach to take.

Lesson: In managing policy-relevant research, there is a difficult balance to strike between

meeting contractual obligations of the ‘customer’ and satisfying research partners that they
are not simply instruments for carrying out donor policy. This requires that all three partners
work closely together in defining the research model that will be adopted.

4.2 Balancing donor and research partner interests

Our research model had a number of practical limitations. Firstly, a substantial portion of
the overall project budget went to cover the salaries of the CSDG staff members, whose daily
costs were significantly higher than those of their counterparts in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Uganda. Budget constraints did have an impact on the field research, which had implications
31
for the quality of the research, as well as for the time and resources available for the country
teams to process and ‘package’ their findings.
Secondly, the research was largely geared towards influencing UK government policy
rather than the policies of the Nigerian, Sri Lankan and Ugandan governments. This may
have increased the sensitivity of the research, given that it may have been interpreted in
official circles within these countries as external interference in the security domain. It is
possible that this reduced the incentive for the researchers to engage in the analysis, since
the ultimate end users were to be external actors.

4.3 Motivating research partners

One of the biggest incentives for all of the country teams was the possibility of the separate
publication of case studies. Members of all the team also expressed interest in follow-up
work. In the case of Sri Lanka, the team members expressed the hope that this study would
be the beginning of joint work in the area of security. Both these issues were raised in the
course of discussions during the study. No doubt the monetary incentive was also important,
but it alone would not have been able to bring the group together and finalize the work in
time. Much wider academic interests were important.
Nonetheless, this created a dilemma for CSDG, since the ultimate decision on how the
research outputs could be used is to be determined by the UK government, which funded
the research. Not surprisingly, it reserved the right to make a final decision on publication
only when it had seen the final product. This meant, however, that CSDG was not able to
confirm with its project partners until late in the day that the research outputs would be
published. The lack of a specific budget for publication meant that once the go-ahead was
given by the UK government, CSDG and project partners needed to draw upon their own
resources to publish their work.

Lesson: Academic incentives, such as the possibility of publishing papers and opportunities for
pursuing the subject on a long-term basis, can be important motivating factors for researchers.
This is particularly the case where financial incentives are limited, making it important that
provision for eventual publication of research outputs be made from the outset of projects. 

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

32 Chapter 5
Conclusions

If we were to do research of this nature again, how would we do things differently? In light
of the project findings, the aim of increasing knowledge about how security decision-making
works in conflict-affected countries remains in our view a worthwhile objective, and one that
should be a priority for donors engaged in SSR. The question, therefore, is how this kind of
research can be done in a way that results in policy-relevant findings and guidance. The key
here is policy ‘relevance’, which suggests that research is not driven solely by the search for
a quick SSR policy fix, but seeks to provide a framework for a more informed scrutiny of SSR
policy, with the aim of strengthening its foundations and relevance to the societies where it
is being promoted.
As we have argued in this paper, there is a potential tension between the goal of generat-
ing detailed empirical knowledge of security decision-making, which is a long-term academic
project, and the donor requirement for information that responds directly to specific policy
concerns and is produced within a ‘consultancy’ time frame. If we add to this the fact that the
pool of researchers with expertise on security issues tends to be quite small in most develop-
ing countries, then it is evident that strengthening national capacity to conduct research on
security issues may be a precondition for obtaining the quality locally generated research that
we have argued donors require for effective SSR programming.
The question is whether there are sufficient incentives for donors to invest in building
indigenous research capacity, as opposed to simply turning to international consultants to
meet their information requirements, which often occurs. The richness of the analysis pro-
duced by this project – even though it is variable in quality – does provide a platform for
testing the foundations of donor SSR policy and contributing to programming that is better
tailored to the specificities of different societies. Exactly how this information can be trans-
lated into the practical kinds of analysis and guidance that donors desire requires a collective
learning process in which researchers and donors work closely together.
As this project illustrates, there are various ways in which such ‘collective learning’ can
be enhanced. The starting point must be acceptance by both researchers and the donor cus-
tomers of this research that the explicit aim of the research project is to inform policy and
programming, as opposed to simply increasing the bank of knowledge about how security
decision-making works. This will provide a basis for constructive partnerships between
researchers and their donor customers in defining how policy-relevant research projects are
designed, implemented and managed. 

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

References 33

Ball, N. and D. Hendrickson, 2006. Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice
and Research. Study prepared for the International Development Research Center,
Ottawa.
Conflict, Security and Development Group, 2008. ‘State Responsiveness to Public Security
Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making – A Comparative Study of Nigeria,
Sri Lanka and Uganda: HMG SSR Policy Briefing’. Conflict, Security and Development
Group; King’s College London.
Gunasinghe, N., 1985. ‘Peasant Agrarian Systems and Structural Transformation in Sri
Lanka’. In Capital and Peasant Production: Studies in Continuity and Discontinuity of
Agrarian Change in Sri Lanka, ed. Charles Abeysekera. Social Scientists’ Association,
Colombo.
Hendrickson, Dylan, 2008. ‘State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of
Security Decision-Making: Synthesis of Findings and Implications for UK SSR Policy’.
Conflict, Security and Development Group; King’s College London.
OECD-DAC (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development
Assistance Committee), 2007. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform:
Supporting Security and Justice. Available from [Link]
Sutton, R., 1999. ‘The Policy Process: An Overview’. Overseas Development Institute Working
Paper, London.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

34 Annex A Research outputs

Micro-case studies
Nigeria
Irregular forces and security in the Niger Delta (Fidelis Allen, University of Port
Harcourt)
O’odua Peoples Congress and vigilante activities in Lagos State (Abubakar Momoh,
Lagos State University)
The political economy of public security decision-making: the case of the Bakassi Boys
of Abia State (Nwaorgu Omenihu C., University of Port Harcourt)
The politics of security decision-making: MPRI case study (Julie G. Sanda, National War
College, Abuja)
The politics of security decision-making: the case of the Hisbah in Kano State (Y. Z. Ya’u,
Centre for Information Technology and Development, Kano)

Sri Lanka
Responsiveness for defence: security decision-making for peace-making (Austin Fernando,
Independent researcher)
Security concerns of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka (Farzana Haniffa, Law and
Society Trust, Colombo)
Sri Lanka Defence Forces: a case study of decision-making processes and the defence
reform initiative of 2002 (Sundari Jayasuriya, Aus-Aid)
The role of disappearance commissions as a mechanism to provide redress for human
rights abuses (Amal Jayawardane, University of Colombo)
The Prevention of Terrorism Act of Sri Lanka: security decisions as a cause of insecurity
(S.I. Keethaponcalan, University of Colombo)
Security policy-making in Sri Lanka: a case study of government actions and non-actions,
May–August 1983 (Jagath P. Senaratne, Independent researcher)

Uganda
Carrot and stick: the oscillating security policy positions on the Northern Conflict in
Uganda (Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Makerere University, and John Ssenkumba, Centre for
Basic Research)
Donor influence on security decision-making in Uganda: insights from the defence
budgeting process, 2002-05 (Dylan Hendrickson, CSDG, King’s College London)

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 The politics of security decision-making in Uganda: an analysis of the dynamics of
35
forceful disarmament in Karamoja (Frank Muhereza, Centre for Basic Research)
The politics of security decision-making in Uganda: the case of the Arrow Boys militia
in Teso Region, eastern Uganda (Abbas Wetaaka Wadala, Marcus Garvey Pan-Afrikan
Institute, Islamic University, Mbale )
Decision-making in the provision of public security in an urban setting: the case of
Operation Wembley and the Violent Crime Crack Unit (VCCU) in Kampala, Uganda
(John Ssenkumba, Centre for Basic Research)

Country studies
Nigeria country study (Okechukwu Ibeanu, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and Abubakar
Momoh, Lagos State University)
Sri Lanka country study (Jayadeva Uyangoda, Social Scientists’ Association, and Sunil
Bastian, International Center for Ethnic Studies)
Uganda country study (Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, both CSDG, King’s
College London)

Policy papers
State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making:
Synthesis of Findings and Implications for UK SSR Policy (Dylan Hendrickson)
State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making:
Review of Methodology and Lessons for Future Research (Sunil Bastian and Dylan
Hendrickson)
State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: the Politics of Security Decision-making
– A Comparative Study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda: HMG SSR Policy Briefing
(edited by Dylan Hendrickson)

Electronic copies of the country studies and the policy papers can be down-loaded from
[Link]

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

36 Annex B Methodological framework

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King’s College London has received
funding from the UK government to carry out a study on security decision-making processes,
focusing on case studies of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda. The project will comprise three
phases:

1) development of a methodology
2) fieldwork, and
3) policy analysis

The research will be coordinated by CSDG and carried out in partnership with researcher
partners in each country, drawing on inputs from other policy experts as required.

1.2 Project aim

The overall aim of this project is to gain a better understanding of how states make security
decisions, and the factors that determine whether this process is responsive to the needs of
different groups in society. The specific objectives are:

To generate new insights into how decision-making works in different political contexts
through detailed case studies of Nigeria, Uganda and Sri Lanka.
To provide a framework for external actors to better understand the specific decision-
making dynamics of different countries.
To contribute to the development of SSR strategies that are more politically informed
and sensitive to how public policy processes impact upon security.

1.3 Expected outputs

The key outputs of this project will be:

A methodology to assess security decision-making dynamics.

A series of micro-case studies of security decision-making events.
Detailed country studies of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda.
Brief policy notes to inform the UK assistance programmes in each country.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 A summary report examining the policy implications of the research.
37
Concise policy briefings summarizing the project findings.

1.3 Structure of this report

This framework paper discusses:

1) our approach to the study of security decision-making processes;

2) the key questions we want to answer;
3) the methods we will use; and
4) our field research plans, including who we will partner with.

2. Concept and approach

A key policy question informs this study: how can the international community support the
development of state institutions for security provision that are more responsive to the needs
of populations?
This question is of relevance in a broad range of developing countries across Africa,
Asia and Latin America, including countries that are currently engaged in armed conflicts,
that are seeking to rebuild following wars, or that enjoy relative stability and security. Amidst
great diversity, these countries share a number of broad characteristics: a weak state monopoly
of violence, low levels of institutionalization, and minimal political community, the outcome
of which is tensions within the political system that frequently erupt violently.
State-building processes in these societies have not as a rule resulted in security institu-
tions that conform with the idealized Western model of a public service provider, in terms
of the way they either operate or perform. Insecurity remains a defining feature of life for
large numbers of people. For many, particularly in rural areas, the state has never been a
regular presence in their day-to-day lives or, where it has been, has itself often been a source
of insecurity. This has led many people – in some cases the majority – to rely on either their
own means or informal security institutions for protection.
In addition, there has been a growing trend in recent years for international actors to
play a greater role in the delivery of security in these societies. This has included short-term
crisis management initiatives to either ‘enforce’ or ‘keep’ the peace, and longer-term assistance
activities designed to strengthen the implementation and management of security policy.
This has resulted in external actors having a greater say over how countries (particularly
those which are aid-dependent) make and implement security policy, in the process inter-
vening in what has traditionally been the most sovereign of policy domains.
For the most part, international assistance programmes in the security domain have been
weak in responding to the specifics of these diverse societies. The conventional approach to
understanding shortfalls in security provision is to explain this in terms of how the state
security apparatus diverges from Western models of security provision. Accordingly, the
‘reform’ challenge becomes one of finding a way to fill the identified gaps in resources, human
capacities and ‘political will’ which plague the dysfunctional system, in order to bring it closer
in line with the external model.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 In the process, however, adequate attention is rarely paid to how the trajectory of insti-
38
tutional development within state security institutions in developing countries has been
shaped by the prevailing context, and how this context will shape and condition subsequent
reform efforts. In particular, where the state security apparatus is organized to serve narrow,
elite institutional or political interests rather than to protect the wider public, as is often the
case, then a narrow emphasis on re-centering the state in the security game along Western
lines may be ineffectual, at best, or exacerbate insecurity, at worst.
In this context, efforts to support the development of more responsive security institu-
tions need to be based on a stronger empirical understanding of three core issues: the sources
of decision-making authority in the security domain, the channels by which different social
groups and special interests influence decision-making processes, and the ways in which
external interventions impact upon them.
This project will seek to yield new, detailed insights into these questions in differing
political contexts, through case studies of security decision-making processes in Nigeria,
Sri Lanka and Uganda. Our primary focus is on security decision-making processes and the
factors which affect the implementation of security policy, rather than operational issues.
For the purposes of this project, the term security is used in a very broad sense to mean
the state of affairs in which individuals and social groups are able to exercise their legitimate
rights and freedoms in a safe environment. We approach security through a public policy
lens rather than as concern of the traditional security agencies and actors alone.
We take this approach because we are interested in what weight those who make deci-
sions about security give to the different military and non-military threats facing citizens,
how they choose between coercive and non-coercive policy options available to the state to
address these threats, and the extent to which these strategies reflect the reality of non-state
security provision. In particular, we are interested in how decisions are influenced by differ-
ent understandings of security, how different groups in society assert their ‘demand’ for
security, and whose interests are secured in the policy process.
Policy responsiveness is shaped by three interrelated factors:

1) the inclination of decision-makers to adopt policies that address the needs of specific
groups faced with insecurity;
2) the capability or institutional capacity to assess these needs effectively, devise appro-
priate policy responses, and implement this policy; and
3) accountability: the factors which determine whether decision-makers are held answer-
able if security decisions do not meet people’s needs.

The notion of responsiveness implies a relationship between those who make security
policy, those who are tasked with implementing it (the ‘providers’ of security), and those
who are, or should be, a beneficiary of this service. The nature of the relationship between
these actors is key in determining how much leverage different social and political groups
have to demand security services and whether policy-makers or security providers can be
held accountable for failing to provide them. Analysis of how policy-makers, security pro-

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

viders (in both the state and non-state domain) and different groups in society interact is
39
therefore central to understanding state policy responsiveness.
Where the relationship between these actors is weak or conflictive, or indeed the state
is, by acts of commission or omission, the cause of its population’s insecurity, then it is also
essential to understand how people cope with the security shortfall. While many studies
highlight the existence of parallel formal and informal security structures, what is less clear
is how these two levels are connected, and what happens to people who fall into the gap
between the two. We therefore need to know more about why certain social groups are able to
secure protection from the state while others are excluded or prefer to rely on either informal
sources of security or their own personal strategies to protect themselves.
In our countries of focus, standard analytical tools based on models of ‘good govern-
ment’ will be of limited utility in examining these kinds of issues. In the Western model, the
capacity of a political system to respond effectively to the security preferences of its citizens
depends on a number of conditions:

1) the centralization of authority and power in those who govern;

2) national consensus around the idea of security and safety as a public good;
3) the ability of citizens to assert their ‘demand’ for security through the political process;
4) adequate administrative capacity and resources to deliver security services; and
5) a security apparatus which is protected from social and political pressures.

Where the state has a weak monopoly of violence and coercion, low levels of institu-
tionalization, and minimal political community, these conditions rarely hold. The political
context and policy environment in which security policy-making occurs may therefore differ
significantly from the West and be heavily influenced by indigenous practices. This can include
practices that may in some sense be considered ‘traditional’ and stem from these countries’
different trajectories of state-building, or that have emerged in response to the inadequacies
of more formal institutional frameworks, often transferred from outside.
We need to reappraise how we think about state policy responsiveness to security needs
in light of the different circumstances which prevail in developing countries. There are a
number of key characteristics of these states which manifest themselves in a variety of forms
which will shape how we examine security decision-making:

The decentralization and dispersion of security provision. There is a tendency to focus analysis
of security decision-making processes at the national level, even though the policy chain
encompasses a broad range of security actors involved in the formulation, management and
implementation of policy at different levels of the state structure. This suggests that security
decision-making should be examined on multiple, interacting levels which take into account
the regional, international, and sub-state actors involved in the production of security. Hitherto,
the emphasis has been exclusively on weak or ‘fragile’ states, leaving out the important factor
of how the policies and practices of external actors contribute to the deficiencies in these
countries, let alone the interaction between formal state actors and informal providers of

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 security. The latter is made more important by the growing privatisation and retraditionaliza-
40
tion of security. At the regional level, there is a need to consider the intermeshing of domestic
insecurities with inter-state antagonisms and the reinforcing overlaps of the insecurities of
different weak states inhabiting the same region. In addition, we need to go beyond dichot-
omous categories of state vs. non-state or state vs. community and gain a more nuanced
understanding of social structure and how this is reflected within the state and impacts upon
security decision-making processes.

The informalization of policy-making processes. Development policy embodies a strong pref-

erence for formal institutions and procedures because they increase the scope for enforcing
the accountability of political authority to citizens. This can, however, lead to a tendency to
downplay the importance of informal norms and practices and the impact of special interests,
patronage, and so on in security decision-making. This is an inherently political process,
influenced by a wide range of formal and informal practices that both increase and decrease
accountability. Where formal rules and procedures are weak, informal practices are often
more influential and explain why security policies are often not implemented in line with
stated policy objectives. By the same token, the functioning of these informal institutions
may be the key to ensuring that security services are provided in a manner that meets the
needs of different social groups.

The influence of external ideas, agendas and interests. SSR assumes a heavy degree of autonomy
of security decision-makers in relation to their external partners. Yet decision-making pro­
cesses are typically influenced by various external agendas which can have mixed effects on
the outcome of security policy processes. These agendas include:

1) new normative frameworks such as human security which have been heavily promoted
by development agencies;
2) the impact of the global War on Terror;
3) aid policy, including conditionalities, in countries which are heavily aid-dependent; and
4) defence relations, particularly where these bind countries into – or encourage – the pur-
chase of military equipment.

We need a better understanding of where external security interests are supportive of

national policy processes and in what circumstances they can work at cross-purposes with
each other, and with internal agendas.

The exclusionary nature of security decision-making. The democratic model of security decision-
making is based on the ability of groups within society to assert their demand for security
through the political process. Whether and how this occurs may depend more on the nature
of the informal relationships which bind security elites with populations (ethnic, religious,
communal, etc.) than the functioning of formal political processes and accountability mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, the reality in many countries is that security decision-making remains
the closed preserve of a small number of military and political elites, and that it is a matter

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

of policy to exclude outside participation in this process. State-making usually involves a
41
process of consolidating power by central authorities, which may run counter to the security
interests of certain social groups. Control of the security policy process, more so than other
areas of public policy, underpins the exercise of power.

The discontinuity of policy-making processes. The standard linear model of policy-making, which
is rational, balanced, and analytical, is characterized by the objective analysis of options and
the separation of policy from implementation. There is much evidence to suggest that this
model is far from reality, and that policy-making ‘is actually rather messy, with outcomes
occurring as a result of complicated political, social and institutional processes.’10 These
processes often result in a narrowing of policy alternatives considered by decision-makers,
rather than a broadening. The lack of continuity and predictability in policy process is accen-
tuated in states with lower levels of institutionalization and which are faced with persistent
political turmoil. Because there is less likely to be a clear structure in the security decision-
making process which is amenable to analysis, it is important to understand how the political
and institutional environment, as well as personal preferences, shape decision-making.
These five themes provide a framework for our comparative analysis of security decision-
making processes. We set forth three broad propositions about the factors which affect
decision-making in the context of states with a weak monopoly over the instruments of
coercion, low levels of institutionalization, and minimal political community:

1) Decision-making authority in the security domain is diffuse, forcing central authori-

ties to accommodate competing sources of decision-making authority at different levels
of the state structure and outside the state domain in order to implement security
policy.
2) Different groups in society exercise their ‘demand’ for security more through informal
relationships (class, kinship, ethnic and other ties) rather than formal political processes
and accountability mechanisms, which affects the state’s ability to provide security as
a public good.
3) The nature of the state’s relationship with external actors (including donors and regional
and global powers) impacts on the political and policy environment for security decision-
making, with consequences for the state’s ability to maintain sovereignty over security
matters.

Our research findings will help us to reach some broad conclusions about whose interests
are secured in the decision-making process, and how, and the specific factors which shape
policy responsiveness in different political contexts. This will open the way for an assess-
ment of where entry-points exist to promote more responsive state decision-making, and
the complementary approaches that may be required to address the needs of specific groups
neglected by the state security system.

10 Sutton, ‘The Policy Process: An Overview’.

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

42 3. Methodology
3.1 General principles
The following questions provide a general framework for the comparative analysis of security
decision-making processes. Flexibility in terms of determining the exact focus and approach
will be required to ensure that the country studies address those issues which have been
particularly influential in the historical evolution of the decision-making culture in each
country. In addition, sensitivities around this area of research will determine what is feasible
and what is not in each country.
Drawing on this framework, each of the country teams will clarify the methods to be
used, including the micro-case studies for each country. The research programme will be sum-
marized in a Research Matrix which will be agreed with CSDG before the fieldwork begins.
The comparative element of the study will be based primarily on the three propositions
elaborated above. While the micro-case study analysis will enrich the comparative dimension
of this project, case studies should be selected primarily in terms of how they contribute to
our understanding of the decision-making culture in each country. A generic question guide
has been developed for the micro-case studies which will offer a basis to compare and con-
trast how decision-making works in different contexts.

3.2 Guiding questions

3.2.1 Context for conflict and insecurity
Historical context
What are the historical and structural factors which impact upon insecurity? How has
the security sector evolved in response to political and security events? What factors
explain the degree to which security decision-making is integrated into wider govern-
ment planning and oversight processes?
Socio-political structure
What are the key sources of conflict and insecurity? How is this affected by the country’s
social and political make-up? To what extent do various social groups accept the authority
of the state? What other factors explain the state of security or absence of violent conflict?
Threats and vulnerabilities
What are the key military and non-military threats facing the country and population,
both internal and external? How are these influenced by levels of human development
and other vulnerabilities?

3.2.2 Mapping security arrangements

This section will provide a broad mapping of the spectrum of arrangements which exist for
security provision, ranging from the formal state apparatus to the informal.

Formal security apparatus

Who are the key state actors involved in security provision? What instruments are
available to the state to promote security? To what degree is security provision central-
ized or decentralized?

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 Informal security arrangements
43
In the absence of state security provision, what strategies do populations use to secure
themselves? By what means do they lobby government or other groups for security services?
What kinds of irregular security formations have emerged to fill the security vacuum?
What is the nature of their relationship with the communities within which they exist?
Individual coping strategies
Which are the key groups which fall into the ‘gap’ in security provision? What are the
political and institutional dilemmas the state faces in providing security to these groups?
How are these security provision constraints linked to wider governance challenges
facing the state and society?

3.2.3 Security decision-making dynamics

The aim of this section is to explore, by means of micro-case studies, how the institutional
machinery for security decision-making works in practice.

Decision-making structures
Sources of decision-making authority
From where do the key security decision-makers derive their legitimacy? How much
support does the general populace accord the decision-making mechanism? To what
extent is it based on legislative processes? Is it personalized?
Security policy orientation
What is the country’s security posture, interests and values? How does its geo-strategic
context influence security thinking? What external alliances exist? How is the country
influenced by its development partners? What are the key security legislation, doctrines
and policies? What is the level of national consensus on ends and means of security policy?
Decision-making structures
What is the institutional machinery for planning, formulation and implementation of
security policy? How do these policy processes function? What is their composition?
How integrated are they into government-wide planning and budgeting processes?
How decentralized are they? What is their degree of autonomy?
Decision-making processes (questions to inform case studies)
Context
How did the security issue emerge on the decision-making agenda? What was the issue?
What was the context?
Process
How did the decision-making process evolve? Who was involved in the process? How
was the security problem defined? Were different courses of action weighed up? On what
basis was the chosen option selected?
Influencing factors
Which factors impacted upon the decision which was taken?
Decision-makers’ own preferences. How was the decision affected by the mind-set
and values of the decision-maker? How did conceptions of security influence the

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 process? Did this result in a narrowing or broadening of the discussion of options?
44
What personal, institutional or political interests were at stake in the decision?
Are formal structures bypassed? Did the decision-making process conform with
an established procedure? If not, in what way was it a departure from this? What
was the rationale for the change in approach?
Interest groups. How was the decision affected by different interest groups? Were
these groups state- or society-centred? How was their influence exerted? Through
formal or informal mechanisms or relationships? At what stage of the process?
What was the impact of political bargaining, special interests, patronage, etc.? Did
the social obligations of decision-makers affect their conduct? To what degree is the
decision-making body penetrated by private interests and influences? How does
this affect decision-making?
External actors. How have external factors influenced the decision-making process?
In what ways have external and internal agendas been complementary or worked
at cross-purposes?
Implementation
Which factors impacted upon how the decision was implemented? How robust, adap-
tive and responsive are structures for managing security policy? How have institutional,
financial and political constraints affected the speed and flexibility of implementation?
How do capacity issues affect decision-making? Does the final outcome reflect the deci-
sion which was taken?
Outcome
What was the outcome of the decision-making process? Does the security decision re-
flect enunciated policy aims? Do the stated policy aims reflect the security challenges?
Whose interests are secured in the policy process? How responsive was the decision-
making machinery to the needs of different social groups affected by the security problem?

3.2.4 Assessment of findings

This section examines each of the three propositions and assesses the degree to which they
are validated by the country study.

Sources of authority in security decision-making

Channels of influence for ‘demanding’ security
External determinants of security policy

3.2.5 Entry-points for enhancing policy responsiveness

In light of current structures, capacities and interests within the security domain, this section
identifies entry-points which exist to enhance state responsiveness.

3.3 Methods
The research will require a multi-method approach, combining desk-based and primary research.
The methodology will be qualitative in nature as the research demands in-depth investiga-
tion of complex political processes.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 Each country study will be based on six micro-case studies which will help to draw out
45
the contours, nuances and details of decision-making processes. (The criteria for selecting
these case studies are discussed below). The research methods will need to be determined
by the specificities of each study and in consultation with the lead researcher. In each case,
analysis of relevant secondary material should provide background for the event, to be sup-
plemented with data gathered from focus groups, key informant interviews, and workshop
discussions.
CSDG’s research partners have the requisite knowledge of research methodologies,
including experience in participatory methods, and also have access to researchers who are
sensitive to and skilled in various research techniques. It is anticipated that the local partners
will lead in determining the specific methods and questions which are most appropriate for
the study. CSDG will support this process, including the development of a Research Matrix
to organize the relevant information for each country study.
The research process will require the convening of three meetings in each of the case
study countries. The first will be to brief the research team on the project, to clarify the
methodology and assign micro-case studies; the second for researchers to present their pre-
liminary findings for critical discussion, before completing their final papers; the third for
the research convenors to feed back to the project participants for comment, a draft of the
final consolidated paper.
This workshop approach should be seen as a learning process. It will offer an opportu-
nity to bring together independent policy analysts and decision-makers, and to share views
on how decision-making processes work, or might work better. This is a process that could
be supportive of incipient SSR processes in Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda, but given the
obvious sensitivities a decision on whether formally to link the research and policy processes
should be carefully considered.
The key to the success of this workshop approach will be our ability to bring together
people from the different policy communities and social groups who can enrich our under-
standing of state-societal dynamics in the decision-making process. This dimension is cur-
rently missing or downplayed in the SSR literature as well as more general academic studies
on security in developing countries.

3.4 Micro-case studies: criteria for selection

The aim of the case studies is to enhance our understanding of the micro-politics of security
decision-making in different institutional contexts. The case studies should:

consist of a distinct decision-making event from within the past five years which has
had a significant impact on security provision or the management of security policy;
bring out the nature of interaction between those who make decisions, those tasked
with implementing decisions, and the intended beneficiaries;
provide a perspective on how decision-making occurs at different levels of the state
system and, as relevant, the interaction between formal and informal security institutions;

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 shed light on the actions and preferences of individuals who may fall into the ‘gap’ in
46
security provision and consequently rely primarily on their own protection strategies;
and
provide insights into how external actors or influences have impacted upon decision-
making processes and how this has affected the outcome.

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

Annex C Country research matrices 47

Research matrix: Nigeria

Institutional partner: Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja
Lead researchers: Dr Jibrin Ibrahim (Director, CDD), Prof. Okechukwu Ibeanu (University
of Nigeria, Nsukka), Dr Gani Yoroms (National War College), and Dr Abubakar Momoh
(Lagos State University)
Micro-case Author Point of entry Key questions Methodology
study

1. Deployment Dr Toure Kazah- The killing of What was the histori- Secondary materials
of the Nigeria Toure, Ahmadu 19 soldiers by cal context for the news reports
military in Zaki Bello University Tiv militias formation of militia academic material
Biam in 2001 which precipi- groups in the region? official reports exam-
tated military What was the context ining the crisis, includ-
reprisals by the in which the massacre ing by the Commission
state of government soldiers of Enquiry
occurred?
Who was responsible Key informant interviews
for the decision to Tiv community leaders
deploy the material militia leaders
into Zaki Biam and military commanders
who was consulted? government officials
Who were the key members of the Com-
security actors mission of Enquiry
involved in the
deployment, and how Focus groups (subject to
was the security deci- security considerations)
sion implemented? members of the Tiv
What were the conse- community affected
quences in terms of by the violence
security for the Tiv militia members
community and its
relations with the
state?

2. The formation Dr Omenihu C. The breakdown What was the context Secondary sources
of the Bakassi Nwaorgu, Dept. in public secu- in which the Bakassi newspaper reports
boys (vigilante of Political and rity in 1999 in boys emerged? other academic sources
group) in Abia Administrative Aba which led To whom were they
state in the late Studies, Univer- to a violent responsible and Key informant interviews
1990s sity of Port backlash against whose interests did local community
Harcourt criminals by they secure? leaders
local traders, How did the Bakassi local and national
and the subse- boys evolve over time government officials
quent formation and why were they leaders of the Bakassi
of the Bakassi legitimized by the boys
boys local government?
What was their rela- Focus groups
tionship with local members of the
police forces and the Bakassi boys
national government? market traders

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

48 To what extent did
the Bakassi boys
effectively meet local
security needs?

3. The impact Dr Julie Sanda, The govern- How was the need for Secondary material
of external Dept. of Con- ment’s decision reform identified? news reports
assistance on flict Studies, to invite MPRI Who defined the policy documents
national reform National War to support the agenda?
and policy proc- College, Abuja military’s reform How was the decision Key informant interviews
esses programme to invite MPRI arrived senior military officers
at? key government
Was there any conver- officials
gence between the diplomats
local demand for civil society leaders
reform and external and academics
interests? members of the
What was the role of legislature
the defence estab- politicians
lishment and national
legislature in this
decision?
To what extent was
the decision exter-
nally influenced?

4. The role of Dr Abubakar What is the context in Secondary material

the O’odua Momoh, Lagos which the OPC news reports
People’s State University emerged in Lagos other academic studies
Congress (OPC) State? police records
in providing What were the objec-
security tives of the OPC and Key informant and
how were these in-depth interviews
linked to Yoruba state police command
nationalism? community leaders
How does the OPC OPC faction leaders
function in terms of
its internal decision- Focus groups will be con-
making? ducted in three locations
What has been the in Lagos State: Ikorodu,
nature of their inter- Mushin, and Somolu
action with state members of different
security forces in OPC factions
light of their dual community elders
militia / vigilante role? community members

5. The formation Y. Z. Ya’u, Centre The decision by Why did the State Secondary research
of the Hisbah for Information the State House Assembly form the news reports
Corps (police) in Technology and Assembly to Hisbah Board? government
Kano State Development establish the How was this decision documents
following the (CITAD), Kano Hisbah Board taken, and who influ-
implementation which was enced it? Key informant interviews
of Sharia law in empowered to What was the involve- members of the
northern Nigeria recruit ‘justices ment of the public in Hisbah Board
of peace’ to this decision? local police officials
ensure compli- How did the public court officials
ance with Sharia and specific social religious leaders
law groups respond to Hisbah Corps members
this decision?
To what new security Focus groups with repre-
concerns did the deci- sentatives of interest
sion give rise, and groups that have chal-
what were the policy lenged the Hisbah Corps
responses?
What was the impact
of the Hisbah Corps
on the security of
different social groups?

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

6. The role of Fidelis Allen, The decision by Who are the key irregu- Secondary material 49
irregular Department of the leader of lar security actors in news reports
security forces Political and the Niger Delta the Delta region? academic material
in the Niger Administrative Volunteer Force Whose interests do
Delta region Studies, Univer- to declare war they serve and on Key informant interviews
with respect sity of Port on the Federal what is their legitimacy as well as focus group
to community Harcourt Government in in local communities discussions will be con-
grievances Sept. 2004 based? ducted in Rivers and
and conflict To what extent do Bayelsa States.
between differ- these irregular forces oil companies
ent ethnic meet the security youth associations
groups and the needs of the local militants
state populace? government officials
How has the role of community members
oil production in the traditional rulers
region conditioned
the nature of the inter- In the event that the
action between the security situation pre-
state and irregular cludes focus group dis-
security forces? cussions, questionnaires
How have the decisions will be used to solicit
of different actors in information.
the region (state, oil
companies, informal
armed groups) been
conditioned by their
interpretations of
security?

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 Research matrix: Sri Lanka
50

Institutional partner: Social Scientists’ Association (SSA), Colombo

Lead researchers: Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda (SSA) and Sunil Bastian (International Centre
for Ethnic Studies)
Micro-case Author Point of entry Key questions Methodology
study

1. Factors Fara Hanifaa, Three key politi- Why security guaran­ Secondary material
which explain Law and Society cal events where tees for the Muslim text of peace
why government Trust, Colombo security of the community were key agreements
decision-making Muslim commu- to an effective peace civil society
has not been nity was at stake: settlement (despite commentary
responsive to the a) Indo-Lanka the fact the commu-
security needs nity was not party to Key informant interviews
Accord (1987)
and concerns of b) CFA (2002) the conflict) political leaders active
the Muslim c) Post-tsunami Avenues of influence at the time
community. administrative by which Muslims have Muslim community
structure sought to influence leaders
(2005) political processes officials involved in
Why structures of the decision-making
peace process have
not allowed for Muslim Fieldwork (possibly
security concerns to through use of focus
be taken on board groups)
Relationship between people within Muslim
the decision-making community who bore
process and exclusion of the security
the Muslim community consequences

2. How state S. I. Keethapon- The decision to Why did the Govern- Secondary sources
legislation calan, Dept. of pass the 1979 ment pass the PTA? parliamentary debates
impacted upon Political Science, Prevention of What factors explain (Hansard)
the security of University of Terrorism Act why avenues for the press
an ethnic Colombo (PTA), how it Tamil community to reports from human
community was reached, influence this decision rights monitors and
and its impact were closed? organizations
on the security What does this say
of the Tamil about the space within Key informant interviews
community the state for other those involved in
communities to lobby passing the PTA
for their security victims of the PTA
interests? human rights activists
Implications for the Tamil lawyers
human rights and
security of Tamils
How Tamils coped in
the light of security
problems created by
the PTA

3. The security Jagath Government Government’s role in Secondary material

implications Seneratne, handling of the precipitating the archive material
of the independent Sinhalese riots riots newspapers
government’s researcher of July 1983 The political purpose
mishandling of which precipi- which the riots served Key informant interviews
a political crisis tated Sri Lanka’s How the riots were political leaders
civil war managed victims of the riots
Security consequences ex-officials
for the Tamil former military officers
community
Factors behind the
breakdown of the legal
infrastructure

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

4. The ineffec- Prof. Amal 1996 Commis- Factors behind the Secondary material 51
tiveness of Jayawardama, sion of Enquiry violent outbreak of reports from the Com-
mechanisms University of established JVP nationalism in the mission of Enquiry
used to seek Colombo to examine late 1980s press reports
redress in government- Establishment of a
response to perpetrated Commission of Enquiry Key informant interviews
abuses commit- disappearances on disappearances Commissioners
ted during the during the JVP Why this mechanism involved in the Enquiry
government insurgency was ultimately victims who went
response to the ineffective before the Commission
JVP insurgency What this says about key government
the political space for officials
justice human rights activists
What were the impli-
cations for justice?

5. The failure Sundari Factors explain- What were the sources Secondary material
of a defence Jayasuriya, ing the decision of decision-making reports from the DRC
reform initia- Aus-Aid to establish and authority at the time? donor reports
tive, and the subsequently Analysis of military
reasons why close the strategies – and who Key informant interviews
Defence Review was driving them Head of the DRC
Committee (political influence) (Dennis Pereira),
(DRC) Limitations in donor defence secretary at
understanding of the the time
political climate UK officials from both
(including the LTTE’s BHC and London
perspective, the secu- King’s College
rity sector, etc.) personnel involved in
Politicization of secu- supporting the DRC
rity policy-making other donors

6. The relation- Austin Fernando, The fractured Context for the Secondary material
ship between former Secretary nature of signing of the 2002 documentation from
the political to the Ministry decision-making Cease-Fire Agreement the peace process
class and the of Defence which under- Reasons there was not sub-committee reports
military pinned the sign- integrated machinery articles written on the
ing of the 2002 for government subject
Cease-Fire decision-making
Agreement and Why the military was
the subsequent not adequately con-
collapse of the sulted on the CFA, and
De-Escalation why this was of concern
Committee in to them
2003. Factors behind the
collapse of the De-
Escalation Committee
What does this case
say about the relation-
ship between the
political class and the
military?

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

 Research matrix: Uganda
52

Institutional partners: Makerere University and Centre for Basic Research (CBR)
Lead researchers: Sabiiti Mutengesa (CSDG), Frank Muhereza (Centre for Basic Research),
Prof. Dent Ocaya-Lakidi (Makerere), and Dylan Hendrickson (CSDG)
Micro-case Author(s) Point of entry Key questions Methodology
study

1. Government Phillip Kasaija, The GoU’s ‘car- How does the state Secondary materials
policy concern- Dept. of Political rot and stick’ choose between avail- news reports
ing the war in Science, Mak- approach to the able policy instruments academic literature
the north of erere University north of Uganda, to deal with security government policy
Uganda John Ssenkumba, focusing in crises? documents
Centre for Basic particular in the What purposes did the
period following following policy Key informant interviews
Research
the launch of responses serve: senior government
Operation Iron- amnesty/peace nego- officials
Fist in March tiation, Intl. Criminal military officials
2002 Court, movement of local government
populations into officials
‘protected’ camps? Acholi leaders
What were the factors civil society groups
and processes involved donor actors
and the pressure on
the state to adopt or Focus groups: John
eschew any one Ssenkumba will assist in
option? conducting three focus
group discussions in the
Gulu area

2. Donor impact Dylan Hendrick- The May 2003 What was the context Secondary material
on government son, CSDG, decision to for tensions between grey literature from
security policy- King’s College increase military donors and govern- the Defence Reform
making London spending by ment over military Unit and other donors
30% following spending?
completion of How have donors Key informant interviews
the Defence sought to influence Defence Reform Unit
Review levels of military MoD/National Sec
spending? UPDF
How was the May Ministry of Finance
2003 decision made? President’s Office
To what extent is the President Museveni
determination of UK, Dutch, US, and Irish
defence spending missions in Uganda
seen as the preroga- World Bank, IMF
tive of the C.-in-C. SSDAT
and senior military DFID, FCO and MOD
leadership?
How have donor efforts
to constrain military
spending impacted on
security policy?

3. Changing John Ssenkumba, The decision in The channels through Secondary material
government Centre for Basic 2003 to estab- which critical decisions court records
approaches to Research, lish a special on security policy and police records
public security Kampala unit headed and public safety are key informant
in response to manned by mili- processed interviews
changes in the tary personnel The process through focus groups
nature of urban to address which the decision to
crime escalating form the VCCU was Key informant interviews
organized crime reached (whether senior security officials
in Kampala through or in exclusion key government
of parliament, the officials
National Security civil society groups
Council, cabinet, etc.) community leaders

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008

 Public perceptions on 53
the conduct and
efficacy of the VCCU

4. Factors Abbas Wetaaka Formation of Popular pressures that Secondary materials

behind the Wadala, Marcus the ‘Arrow Boys’ led to the decision to documentation from
emergence of Garvey Pan- militias in constitute militias local councils
civil militias in Afrikan Institute, response to the The channels used by academic literature
Teso region Islamic Univer- expansion of local communities to
focusing on the sity in Uganda, LRA operations advance their demands In-depth interviews –
role of local Mbale in the Teso for improved security RDCs, DS officers, local
communities in region in late in the face of stock council leaders, MPs,
shaping key 2002 thefts by raiders from Arrow Boys and Com-
policy decisions Karamoja, and LRA manders, community
incursions leaders, NGOs
The interplay of the
motivations of central
state decision-makers,
implementers and
beneficiaries

5. The role of Prof. Dent The war in the What kind of security Secondary material
parliament in Ocaya-Lakidi, north, especially issues or challenges records of parliament
providing Dept. of with regard to confronted parliament? (Hansard)
oversight of Political Science, ‘Operation Iron In what kind of decision- committee minutes
government Makerere Fist’ and the making activities did
decision-making University Juba Peace parliament engage? Key informant interviews
Talks, to high- What were the outputs? participants in
light the role of What impacts, if any decision-making
parliament in are discernable, came non-participant
security decision- out of parliament’s experts (e.g. from
making. outputs? academia)
What were the consti- parliamentarians
tutional, political and Defence Committee
international contexts
within which parliament
functioned?

6. The parallel Frank Muhereza, Factors behind What is the historical Secondary material
‘state’ and pas- Centre for Basic the process of context for tensions press reports
toral security Research, arming and between the state and policy documents
systems which Kampala rearming the pastoral ‘security’ strat- academic literature
coexist in Karamajong egies in Karamoja? civil society
Karamoja pastoralists in What decisions underlie documentation
the face of community livelihood
persisting and security strategies? Key informant interviews
government What are the factors Karamajong traditional
‘disarmament’ driving recent disarma- leaders
campaigns in ment campaigns and government officials
the region how successful have from the Office of the
they been? PM
military officers involved
in disarmament

Review of Methodology Sunil Bastian and Dylan Hendrickson

54 Annex D Partner institutions

The Centre for Basic Research (CBR) is a research and training organization based in Kampala.
Established in 1988, CBR is a centre of excellence on sustainable development issues. CBR
conducts basic and applied research of social, economic and political significance to Uganda
in particular and Africa in general, so as to influence policy, raise consciousness and improve
quality of life.
[Link]/

The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) is an independent, not-for-profit,

research, training and advocacy organization based in Abuja, Nigeria. Its primary mission
is to be a catalyst and facilitator for strategic analysis and capacity building for sustainable
democracy and development in the West African sub-region. Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, who managed
the Nigeria research, is Director.
[Link]/

The Social Scientists’ Association (SSA) is a leading civil society institution in Sri Lanka
committed to the production and dissemination of critical knowledge in the areas of political
economy, gender, social and political change, conflict and peace processes. The SSA is also
engaged in community education and advocacy. SSA publishes Polity, a monthly journal on
current critical issues concerning Sri Lanka. 
[Link]/

The Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) is a leading international resource
for research, analysis, training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of secu-
rity and development. CSDG was established at King’s College London in 1999 with the aim
of bridging the academic and policy communities. Its core mandate is to deepen under-
standing about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa, Asia and Latin
America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local,
national, regional and international levels.
[Link]/

CSDG Papers 13 June 2008