Understanding International Relations (IR) and Its Major Concerns as a

Discipline
International Relations (IR) is a dynamic and multifaceted academic discipline that
seeks to comprehend the intricate web of interactions between various actors on
the global stage. Far from being a mere reporting of daily "current affairs" or "world
news," IR delves deeper into the underlying structures, processes, and actors that
shape global politics. As Richard Devetak's "An Introduction to International
Relations" highlights, the discipline aims to move beyond ephemeral news
headlines to offer profound explanations, interpretations, and normative analyses of
international events.

At its core, "international relations" (lowercase) refers to the external relations

among nations, states, and peoples. The term "international" itself, coined by
Jeremy Bentham in 1780, initially captured relations among nations but has largely
evolved to denote relations among sovereign states, often referred to as "interstate"
relations. The academic discipline of "International Relations" (uppercase) is the
systematic study of these complex interactions, seeking to understand their
historical evolution, theoretical underpinnings, and contemporary challenges.

The Foundational Understanding of IR: The "Great Divide"

Historically, a central conceptual framework in International Relations has been the
"Great Divide," which posits a fundamental distinction between domestic politics
and international politics. This conceptual separation, championed by influential
theorists like Kenneth Waltz, is based on differing modes of organization: hierarchy
in the domestic realm and anarchy in the international realm.

The Domestic Realm: Hierarchy and Order

Within the domestic sphere, politics is characterized by the presence of a central,
supreme authority, typically a government. This authority holds a monopoly over the
instruments of violence, enabling it to lay down and enforce laws, establish and
maintain order, and ensure security and justice for its citizens. In this hierarchical
system, there are clear lines of authority and obedience, leading to a relatively
stable and predictable environment where peace and community can flourish.

The International Realm: Anarchy and Insecurity

Conversely, the international realm is defined by the absence of an overarching
authority or government. In this anarchical condition – meaning the absence of rule,
not necessarily chaos – the instruments of violence are dispersed and
decentralized among sovereign states. This lack of a central enforcer means that
states operate in a self-help system, where their own security is paramount, and
there is no higher power to guarantee justice or prevent conflict. Consequently,
insecurity, injustice, and war are permanent potentials, and often regular actualities.
States are perpetually caught in a "security dilemma," where measures taken by
one state to enhance its own security are perceived as threats by others, leading to
a spiral of mistrust and counter-measures. The concept of "anarchy" thus becomes
the core presumption and constitutive principle for much of the discipline's historical
development.

Origins and Evolution of IR as a Discipline

The formal establishment of International Relations as an academic discipline is
rooted in a pivotal historical moment: the aftermath of World War I (1914-1918). The
unprecedented scale of destruction and loss of life during what was then known as
the "Great War" spurred a widespread anti-war sentiment and a fervent desire to
prevent future conflicts. This traumatic experience, particularly for Europeans, led to
a belief in the possibility of eradicating war, a sentiment that had been largely
absent before the 18th century.

The Birth of the Discipline (Post-WWI)

The foundational purpose of IR, from its very inception, was to develop theories and
insights aimed at preventing or eliminating war. This purpose was accompanied by
practical, institutional measures, most notably the establishment of the League of
Nations in Geneva (1920) and the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague (1922). These institutions embodied new liberal-constitutional principles,
emphasizing contractual international law and multilateralism as means to promote
international cooperation and achieve peace and security.

The institutionalization of IR also saw the creation of dedicated academic

departments and chairs. The first was established in 1919 at the University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, followed by institutions like the London School of Economics
and Georgetown University. This institutional growth provided the infrastructure for
teaching, research, and the dissemination of knowledge through academic journals
and professional associations, solidifying IR's status as a distinct field of study.

The "Great Debates" Shaping IR Theory

The intellectual history of International Relations is often narrated through a series
of "great debates," which reflect the discipline's ongoing theoretical self-reflection
and evolution.
• The First Great Debate (Idealism/Liberalism vs. Realism): This
foundational debate, famously framed by E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years'
Crisis, 1919-1939, pitted the optimistic, reform-oriented tenets of liberalism
(often termed "utopianism" by its critics) against the more pessimistic, power-
centric views of realism.
Liberalism: Rooted in the belief in human progress, liberals
emphasize humanity's capacity to improve and escape the "Hobbesian
state of war." They advocate for "peace through law" and "peace
through commerce," seeing international trade, law, and organizations
 as crucial for world order. Key thinkers include John Locke, John Stuart
Mill, and Immanuel Kant.
Realism: In contrast, realists argue that states exist in a condition of
anarchy, compelling them to prioritize survival and security through the
pursuit and balancing of power. They view international relations as a
tragic realm where "national interests clash," and history is
characterized by "recurrence and repetition" of conflict. Canonical
figures include Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes.
While the "debate" itself might have been more of a theoretical
juxtaposition than a direct exchange, it profoundly shaped the core
assumptions and questions of the discipline.
• The Second Great Debate (Behavioralism vs. Traditionalism): Emerging
in the 1960s and 1970s, this was primarily a methodological quarrel. It
questioned the most appropriate way of acquiring knowledge in IR,
contrasting the "scientific" approach (which sought to emulate the methods of
the natural sciences to explain international politics) with the "classical"
approach (which was interpretive, historical, and more attuned to normative
judgments). While perhaps a "minor skirmish" in its immediate impact, this
debate underscored the critical importance of epistemological reflection
within the discipline.
• The Third Great Debate (Positivism vs. Post-positivism / The Critical
Turn): This ongoing debate represents a significant challenge to the
mainstream approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism. "Critical theories" –
encompassing Marxism, feminism, postmodernism, Critical Theory, and
constructivism – fundamentally question the idea of objective or value-free
analysis. They operate from the premise that "theory is always for someone
and for some purpose," seeking to reveal the latent assumptions, interests,
and purposes that shape thinking about international relations. Critical
theories reject the notion that the present system is natural or immutable;
instead, they view prevailing structures of world order as human creations
sustained through social practices. This "constructivist" perspective implies
that if these structures are constructed, they can be transformed into more
just and less violent arrangements. This "critical turn" also led to a
questioning of the "Great Divide," arguing that the distinction between inside
and outside, hierarchy and anarchy, is a socially and historically constructed
device rather than a natural given.
Major Concerns of IR as a Discipline: Traditional and New Agendas
The evolution of IR has led to a broadening of its concerns, moving from a
predominantly state-centric focus to one that incorporates a wider array of actors,
issues, and processes. This shift is often conceptualized as the interplay between
"traditional" and "new" agendas.

The Traditional Agenda ("High Politics")

The traditional agenda of International Relations, heavily influenced by realism and
early liberalism, primarily focuses on "high politics" issues, where diplomatic and
strategic matters take center stage. States are considered the principal actors, and
the core concerns revolve around their external relations. This includes:
• Nationalism and Security: The study of national identity, state interests, and
the measures states take to ensure their survival and protection from threats.
• Arms Control and War: Analyzing the dynamics of military power, the
proliferation of weapons, and the causes, conduct, and consequences of
armed conflict.
• Diplomacy and Great Power Relations: Examining the art and practice of
negotiation between states, and the interactions and power dynamics among
the most influential global actors.
• International Law: Understanding the relationship of states to international
legal frameworks, including the laws of war, and their role in regulating state
behavior.
The article emphasizes that this traditional agenda remains highly relevant. As long
as sovereign states exist and the potential for war persists, these issues will
continue to be central to the study of International Relations. However, the "critical
turn" prompts a re-evaluation of whether the traditional agenda alone possesses all
the necessary intellectual resources to fully grasp the complexities of contemporary
states, war, and law.

The New Agenda ("Globalisation and Global Governance")

The "new" agenda in International Relations arises from the recognition that the
"Great Divide" is not as clear-cut as once imagined and that issues previously
relegated to "domestic" or "low politics" have profound international implications.
This agenda is largely shaped by the phenomena of globalization and global
governance.
• Globalization: Defined as the "widening, deepening and speeding up of
global interconnectedness," globalization is a multidimensional phenomenon
driven by advancements in information, communication, and transportation
technologies. It has complex and often contradictory implications for
international relations. While it fosters global interconnectedness,
cosmopolitan communities, and secular modernity, it can also lead to the
fracturing of states, the rise of virulent forms of ethno-nationalism and
religious fundamentalism, and the precariousness of vulnerable populations
like asylum seekers. Furthermore, while promising prosperity and peace,
globalization can also enable transnational threats like terrorism.
• Global Governance: This refers to the evolving global system of rule that
relies on a blend of formal and informal authorities. It is distinct from global
government, as it does not imply a single, overarching world authority.
 Formal Institutions: Include traditional international organizations like
the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which play crucial roles in setting norms, mediating disputes, and
coordinating international action.
Informal Authorities: Encompass "private" actors such as credit-
rating agencies that regulate financial activities globally, and
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) like Oxfam or
Amnesty International, which assist states and international
organizations in providing "global public goods" and addressing
humanitarian crises.
Global Economic Institutions (GEIs): Organizations like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are critical
components of global governance, exerting significant (and often
controversial) influence over the global economy, particularly in the
Global South.
The new agenda signifies a shift in focus from solely state-centric interactions to
recognizing the growing influence of global and transnational actors, structures, and
processes. It also highlights the increasing importance of ideas and norms, which
are often irreducible to material power. This is evident in the rising prominence of
issues such as religion, human rights, refugee movements, and environmental
concerns on the global agenda. These issues often transcend state borders and
raise profound moral considerations, driving the growth of humanitarianism and
even debates about the use of force to alleviate suffering.

Moreover, the "critical turn" and the rise of the new agenda have transformed how
we understand international actors and structures. They are no longer viewed as
fixed, material objects but as contested entities socially constructed through a
range of material and "ideational" (non-material) practices. This understanding
implies that these structures are susceptible to modification and change, which can
occur through peaceful means, as seen in various "color revolutions" and the end of
the Cold War. Even traditional issues like war are subject to change, with the
emergence of "new wars" involving non-state actors, guerrilla tactics, and evolving
technologies.

Conclusion: Continuity, Change, and the Interplay of Agendas

In conclusion, the study of International Relations is characterized by a fascinating
interplay of continuity and change, traditional and new agendas. While the core
purpose of preventing war remains as urgent today as it was in 1919, the nature of
war and the global landscape have evolved dramatically. The "new" agenda does
not supplant the "traditional" but rather supplements it, providing essential
intellectual resources to comprehend the complex realities of contemporary
international relations.
The traditional concerns of states, security, and power dynamics remain vital, yet
they are increasingly intertwined with global issues like climate change, pandemics,
human rights, and the roles of non-state actors. Understanding how these
traditional and new agendas interact, and how the "Great Divide" between domestic
and international politics is increasingly blurred, is paramount for students of IR.
The discipline continues to offer a rich array of intellectually exciting and politically
urgent questions, providing a framework to navigate and make sense of our
interconnected and ever-changing world.

[Link] is the ‘Big Bangs of IR’? Critically evaluate de-colonial accounts of IR.

The study of International Relations (IR) has long been shaped by foundational
narratives that pinpoint specific historical moments as pivotal "big bangs" for the
discipline's subject matter and its academic emergence. Traditionally, two such
moments stand out: the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the supposed birth of the
discipline in 1919. However, a growing body of critical and de-colonial scholarship
vigorously challenges these conventional accounts, arguing that they are not only
historically inaccurate but also perpetuate a deeply Eurocentric and often racist
understanding of global politics and the field itself. This essay will first describe the
traditional "big bangs" of IR and then critically evaluate them through the lens of de-
colonial accounts, demonstrating how these revisionist perspectives dismantle the
myths and call for a more inclusive and historically nuanced understanding of
international relations.

I. The Traditional "Big Bangs" of International Relations

The conventional narrative in International Relations identifies two primary "big
bangs" that are often presented as the definitive origins of the modern international
system and the academic discipline that studies it. These moments serve as
foundational myths, shaping how students and scholars understand the very nature
of global politics.

A. The Ontological Big Bang: 1648 and the Westphalian Myth

The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, is widely regarded in traditional IR as the
seminal event that gave birth to the modern international system. As K. J. Holsti's
"From States Systems to a Society of States" and de Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson's
"The Big Bangs of IR" both discuss, this moment is conventionally understood to
have ended the Thirty Years' War and fundamentally reshaped European political
order.

According to this traditional view, 1648 marked the definitive end of the medieval
respublica Christiana, a vaguely hierarchical religious order under the authority of
God, mediated by the Papacy and the Holy Roman Emperor. In its place, the
Westphalian treaties are said to have established a system of legally equal,
sovereign states, each possessing exclusive authority over its defined territory. Key
principles attributed to Westphalia include:
• Sovereignty: The idea that rulers possessed final authority within their own
realms, free from external superiors like the Pope or the Holy Roman Emperor.
• Non-interference: The principle that states should not interfere in each other's
internal affairs, including religious matters.
• Territoriality: The institutionalization of clearly defined borders as the basis for
state organization, replacing the more nebulous "realms" of earlier eras.
• Balance of Power: The emergence of a shared interest among European states
in maintaining a stable equilibrium to prevent any single power from achieving
hegemony.
This narrative posits that Westphalia effectively abolished the remnants of political
hierarchy in Europe, ushering in an era of formal anarchy where independent
political actors with equal legal standing interacted without a higher authority. This
"ontological big bang" is presented as the moment when the basic units of
international relations—the sovereign states—exploded into being, setting the stage
for all subsequent global interactions.

B. The Epistemological Big Bang: 1919 and the Birth of the Discipline
The second "big bang" concerns the academic discipline of International Relations
itself, conventionally dated to 1919. This narrative suggests that IR emerged
directly from the profound human tragedy of World War I, driven by a collective
desire to understand and prevent future conflicts.

The "evolution of ir ignou" PDF highlights that it was only after World War I that the
formal teaching of International Relations began in universities, particularly in the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland. Key institutional
developments often cited include:
• The establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Relations at
Aberystwyth, University of Wales, in 1919, with Alfred Eckhart Zimmer as its first
holder.
• The founding of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service in the USA in the same year.
• The creation of the International Relations department at the London School of
Economics in the early 1920s, offering a wide range of degrees.
• The establishment of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in
1927, intended to train diplomats for the League of Nations.
This period is also traditionally associated with the "First Great Debate" in IR, where
"idealists" (or "utopians") sought to establish a peaceful world order through
international law and institutions like the League of Nations. Their optimistic vision,
however, is said to have been tragically undermined by the outbreak of World War
II, leading to the triumph of "realism" in 1945, which emphasized power politics and
national self-interest. This "epistemological big bang" thus presents IR as a
discipline born out of a noble purpose, undergoing a crucial intellectual evolution
from naive idealism to pragmatic realism in response to real-world events.

II. Critical Evaluation and De-Colonial Accounts of IR's "Big Bangs"

While the traditional narratives of 1648 and 1919 provide a convenient and
seemingly coherent origin story for IR, critical and de-colonial accounts profoundly
challenge their historical accuracy and expose their underlying Eurocentric biases.
These revisionist perspectives argue that the "big bangs" are, in fact, "myths" that
serve to legitimize a particular, narrow understanding of international relations while
obscuring a richer, more complex, and often less flattering global history.

A. Debunking the Myth of 1648: A Prolonged and Non-Eurocentric Evolution

De-colonial accounts, drawing from historical and historiographical scholarship,
systematically dismantle the notion of 1648 as a singular, transformative "big bang."

1. Historical Inaccuracies of 1648

De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson's "The Big Bangs of IR" meticulously argues that
the Treaties of Westphalia did not inaugurate the era of sovereignty as commonly
understood. Instead:
• Constitutional Document for the Holy Roman Empire: The treaties primarily
functioned as a constitutional document for the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), not a
general European treaty establishing universal sovereignty.
• Limited, Not Initiated, Sovereignty: The idea that rulers had final authority over
their territory predated 1648, stemming more from the Reformation (e.g., Peace of
Augsburg in 1555). In fact, Westphalia limited this right regarding religious
confession, reverting to an earlier status quo.
• Persistence of Feudal Elements: The HRE was not dissolved until 1806, and
feudal elements and "layered systems of sovereignty" (as noted in the IGNOU
PDF) persisted well beyond 1648. France and Sweden were even awarded
fiefdoms, and the Swedish monarch became a vassal of the Emperor, illustrating
the continued feudal character.
• War Aims: The Thirty Years' War was not solely about containing the
universalistic ambitions of the Habsburgs; interventions by powers like Denmark,
Sweden, and France were often driven by opportunistic desires to exploit
Habsburg weakness.
Kevin Blachford's "From Thucydides to 1648" further emphasizes that the
emergence of the modern state and the anarchic states-system was a "long
process of change" rather than a clear-cut break. He argues that IR's "rigid statist
ontology" forces a "blinkered" view of history, mining it only to confirm "present
truths" about the modern state system.

2. The Problem of Eurocentrism and Empire

The most profound critique from de-colonial accounts centers on the inherent
Eurocentrism embedded in the 1648 myth and its problematic "elision of empire."
• Eurocentric Metanarrative: De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson argue that the
1648 myth is underpinned by a "Eurocentric metanarrative" that assumes
European exceptionalism in the creation of sovereignty, ignoring significant
extra-European influences from China, India, the Middle East, and the
Americas. This creates a "two-step Eurocentric big bang theory": Europe
single-handedly creates sovereignty, then "graciously bequeaths" it to
"inferior Eastern societies" through expansion.
• Persistence of Hierarchy: Far from ending hierarchical political formations,
the post-1648 era witnessed a "proliferation of international imperial-
hierarchies." The sovereign state, in this view, was the "bare exception" for
centuries, not the norm, as international hierarchies remained prevalent. The
traditional narrative "sanitizes" the post-1648 era of its pervasive imperialism.
• "Othering" Pre-Modern and Non-Western Histories: Blachford extensively
details how IR's Westphalian narrative "otherizes" historical periods and non-
Western actors, portraying them as backward or uncivilized to reinforce
Western superiority.
Medieval Era: Dismissed as a period of "decay and ignorance" and
used as a "negative analogy" for contemporary challenges, ignoring its
complex political orders and the fact that "divided forms of power and
order have always existed."
Byzantium: Despite being a major geopolitical, cultural, and economic
power for over a thousand years, the Byzantine Empire is largely
neglected or referred to pejoratively in IR, its diplomacy dismissed as
"fraudulent." This overlooks Byzantium's significant influence on early
modern history and even the Italian Renaissance, demonstrating how
the West was "equally shaped by Byzantium."
Nomadic Peoples: Groups like the Huns are dismissed as
"barbarians" or a "transitory phase" to modern nation-states, ignoring
their institutional diversity and agency.
Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire, a major power heavily
involved in European balance-of-power politics, is often presented as
"absent or passive," serving as a "comparative foil" for Western
superiority rather than being recognized for its co-constitutive
developments with the West.
These critiques highlight that the "container" notion of the state, central to the 1648
myth, obscures the "thick" social space of interaction and exchange relationships
that have historically characterized global politics. The fixation on sovereignty
originating solely within early modern Europe leads to a "tempocentrism" that takes
Western ascendancy as a "natural state of affairs" and a "predestined reality."

B. Debunking the Myth of 1919: Beyond a Noble, Eurocentric Birth

De-colonial accounts also challenge the traditional narrative of IR's birth in 1919,
exposing its historical inaccuracies and its problematic Eurocentric and racist
underpinnings.

1. Historical Inaccuracies of 1919

De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson argue that the idea of IR having a sudden
"miraculous virgin birth" in 1919 is a myth:
• Earlier Antecedents: The discipline had significant antecedents in the late 19th
century, particularly in debates concerning imperialism, geopolitics, and trade.
Scholars like John A. Hobson, Norman Angell, Harold Laski, and Woodrow Wilson
were writing and developing ideas well before 1919.
• Myth of the "First Great Debate": The notion of a clear-cut "First Great Debate"
where idealism was definitively "demolished" by realism is also challenged. While
E.H. Carr's work certainly generated reaction, there was no widespread "great
debate" that led to a triumphant realist victory. Instead, the "realism-triumphant"
narrative after World War II was more of a "political move" to enshrine specific
foreign policy approaches and insulate the field from other academic influences,
relying on a "politics of amnesia" regarding non-realist research.
2. Eurocentrism and Racism in IR's Foundations
Perhaps the most damning aspect of the de-colonial critique is the exposure of the
"dark side" of IR's origins:
• Noble Myth vs. Inconvenient Truth: The "noble myth" that IR was born in 1919
to solve the tragedy of war for "all peoples" obscures an "inconvenient truth": that
much of international theory has been imbued with the purpose of defending and
promoting "Western civilisation"—a "West Side Story" that perpetuates a "deep
structural amnesia."
• Racist Foundations: De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson, citing Robert Vitalis,
assert that the discipline's rationale was founded on a "racist 'white supremacist'
outlook." Interwar scholarship, even among those labeled "idealists," was deeply
influenced by Eurocentric and racist metanarratives.
• Woodrow Wilson Example: Woodrow Wilson, often considered a founding icon
of liberal internationalism, is highlighted as an example. His academic writings
were steeped in "explicit scientific racism," where self-determination was to be
granted only to "civilised Eastern Europeans" but withheld from "non-white races."
 His advocacy for the League of Nations Mandate System, while presented as a
step towards internationalized governance, was underpinned by a "paternalist
Eurocentrism"—a belief that "inferior races could be brought to maturity under
Western tutelage."
• Imperialist Hierarchy: Many interwar scholars, far from ignoring power, actively
supported maintaining an "imperialist hierarchy of racial and/or civilisational
power of the West over the East." Even anti-imperialist thinkers often operated
within Eurocentric or racist frameworks, reifying the West and denying agency to
the East.
The persistence of the 1919 myth, despite revisionist insights (as noted by de
Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson), reveals a reluctance to confront these uncomfortable
truths. Even when textbooks replace "idealist" with "liberal," it often serves to
"perpetuate the myth under a different name," glossing over the pluralism and
problematic aspects of interwar theorizing.

III. The Implications of De-Colonial Critiques for IR

The de-colonial critiques of IR's "big bangs" are not merely academic exercises in
historical revisionism; they carry profound implications for the discipline's self-
understanding, its theoretical frameworks, and its ability to engage with the
complexities of contemporary global politics.

A. Challenging the "False Prospectus"

De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson argue that IR operates on a "false prospectus"
because its "ontological and epistemological geneses" are "twisted." The
"pervading myths" of 1648 and 1919 have had a "tremendous function in
disciplining our thinking," normalizing certain concepts as common sense and
setting rigid "parameters or outer boundaries" for the field.
• Rigid Statist Ontology: The 1648 myth produces a "rigid statist ontology" that is
"ill-equipped to handle the challenges of global governance, suzerainty, empire
and international hierarchy" (de Carvalho et al.).
• Ahistorical Extrapolation: The 1919 myth presents the discipline as an
"ahistorical extrapolation backwards of current developments and concerns,"
hindering a nuanced understanding of its own evolution (de Carvalho et al.).
• Intellectual Convenience: These myths offer "intellectual convenience,"
providing simple, tidy stories that avoid the messy realities of historical change
and the persistent role of hierarchy and power beyond the state-centric
framework.
• Eurocentric Identity: Confronting these myths is tantamount to confronting the
"Eurocentric identity of the discipline" itself, a "leap" that many find too
challenging.
B. Towards a More Inclusive and Reflexive Discipline
The de-colonial critiques call for a fundamental rethinking of IR, urging the
discipline to embrace a more critical, historically informed, and truly global
perspective.
• Broadening Historical Perspective: Blachford explicitly calls for IR to "broaden
its engagement with history to consider the international prior to 1648 and to
examine global and transnational historical accounts that challenge the states in
anarchy framework." This means moving beyond "presentism" and recognizing
that history is not just a "shallow quarry" for confirming "present truths."
• Beyond State-Centric Ontology: The critique pushes IR to move beyond a
"state-centric" and "substantialist" ontology, which assumes states "precede
interaction." Instead, it advocates for a "relational approach" that views the
international as a "thick" social space of interaction and co-constitution,
acknowledging the "diversity of histories and historical interactions" (Blachford).
• Decentering Europe and Recognizing Mutual Developments: De-colonial
accounts emphasize the need to "decenter early modern Europe as the sole
object of historical study" and recognize the "mutual co-constitutive developments
between east and west." This challenges the "singular homogenizing narrative" of
globalization as solely arising from European modernity and supremacy
(Blachford).
• Emancipatory Role of Critical Theories: The IGNOU PDF highlights that post-
Cold War "Critical theories" (constructivism, feminism, post-modernism) are
"emancipatory" in nature, aiming to "provide for the emancipation of human
beings from social institutions and practices that oppress them." This aligns with
the de-colonial project of challenging oppressive narratives and power structures
within the discipline.
• Disciplinary Dialogue and Vigilance: De Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson conclude
by urging "constant vigilance" against the perpetuation of these myths in teaching
and textbooks. They call for "disciplinary dialogue" to "question the very noble
identity of the discipline that has been cherished for too long," arguing that this is
necessary to move beyond its "intellectual prison." While acknowledging the risk
of "re-nationalization" of IR if not careful (Blachford, citing Kang), the overall thrust
is towards a more pluralist discipline inclusive of global experiences.
IV. Conclusion
The "big bangs" of International Relations—the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and
the alleged birth of the discipline in 1919—are not merely historical markers but
deeply ingrained myths that have shaped the discipline's self-perception and
theoretical foundations. As critical and de-colonial accounts powerfully
demonstrate, these narratives are fraught with historical inaccuracies and serve to
perpetuate a Eurocentric, often racist, and ultimately limited understanding of global
politics.
The myth of 1648 distorts the complex, prolonged evolution of sovereignty and the
international system, sanitizing the persistent role of hierarchy and empire while
ignoring significant non-European influences. Similarly, the myth of 1919 presents a
sanitized, noble origin story for the discipline, obscuring its problematic Eurocentric
and even racist foundations and the true, more fragmented, history of its intellectual
development.

By critically evaluating these "big bangs," de-colonial accounts expose the "false
prospectus" upon which much of IR has operated. They challenge the discipline to
move beyond its "intellectual prison" of inherited biases, rigid ontologies, and
historical amnesia. The imperative for IR is clear: to embrace a more rigorous,
inclusive, and self-reflexive engagement with history, recognizing the diverse voices
and experiences that have shaped global interactions. Only by dismantling these
cherished myths can International Relations truly aspire to be a global discipline
capable of making sense of a complex, interconnected, and diverse world.

Q. Describe the evolution of IR as a discipline.

The evolution of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline is a complex

narrative, marked by shifts in its subject matter, theoretical approaches, and
institutionalization. From its nascent beginnings rooted in diplomatic history to its
contemporary multi-paradigmatic landscape, IR has continually adapted to the
changing global political landscape and internal academic debates. This discussion
will trace the key stages of IR's evolution, highlighting the dominant concerns and
methodological approaches of each era, while also incorporating critical
perspectives that challenge the discipline's traditional Eurocentric origins.

I. Early Foundations: Pre-Disciplinary Thought and the Westphalian Context

While IR as a formal academic discipline is relatively young, the study of
interactions among political entities has a long history. Ancient examples of
international systems, such as those of the Sumerian city-states (3500 B.C.) and
Greek city-states, exhibited rudimentary forms of diplomacy, trade, and norms of
war and peace. These early systems, however, did not meet the "basic requirement
to be called as International Relations" in the modern sense.

The modern history of International Relations is conventionally tied to the

emergence of the nation-state system in the 17th century. The Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 is often cited as the "real beginning" of modern IR, as it is
understood to have recognized the idea of sovereign nation-states and to have
abolished remnants of political hierarchy in Europe. This transition from a vaguely
hierarchical religious order of medieval Europe (respublica Christiana) to a system
of independent political actors with equal legal standing is seen as foundational.
However, it's important to note that even after Westphalia, "layered systems of
sovereignty" still existed, particularly within the Holy Roman Empire. Some scholars
argue that the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 might be a more appropriate document
for delineating the sovereign state, as it more clearly reflected the norm of a
sovereign having "no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the
territory's sovereign borders".

During this pre-disciplinary phase (roughly 1648-1919), the study of international

relations was predominantly Diplomatic History. It was largely dominated by
historians rather than political scientists, focusing mainly on the state system. The
studies were descriptive, chronological, and rooted in the historical past, with little
effort to develop causal relationships or analyze contemporary events
systematically. This era lacked scientific rigor and theory-building, hindering the
analytical and theoretical growth of the subject. The only notable exception before
1900 was Paul S. Reinsch's pioneering lectures on world politics at the University of
Wisconsin.

II. Institutionalization and Early Theoretical Debates (1919-1945)

The devastation of World War I served as a major catalyst for the formal
institutionalization of International Relations as an independent academic discipline.
The period between the two World Wars saw the emergence of dedicated
academic programs and a shift in focus.

A. The "Current Events" and "Law and Organization" Stages (1919-1945)

With the end of World War I, the teaching of IR began in universities in the UK,
USA, and Switzerland. Key developments included:
• The establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International
Relations at Aberystwyth, University of Wales, in 1919.
• The founding of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service in 1919.
• The establishment of the department of international relations at London
School of Economics in the early 1920s.
• The creation of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva
in 1927, intended to train diplomats for the League of Nations.
This period saw a shift from diplomatic history to an interest in current events and
happenings in international relations. However, this "complete neglect of history"
led to a "limited knowledge of international relations" and hampered theory-building,
as contextualization of contemporary developments was missing.

Concurrently, a strong trend emerged emphasizing international legal

organizations and institutionalization. This approach was based on idealism,
optimism, and hope that through legal and institutional setups like the League of
Nations, issues of conflict, violence, and war could be overcome. This "visionary
outlook" believed that peace could be attained through law and organization, rather
than power politics.
However, this idealistic thrust was criticized for being "far from the existing realities
of international relations" and failing to factor in the dynamism of global politics. The
failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II became a stark example of
the limitations of this approach, and no general theorization of international politics
emerged during this period.

B. The "First Great Debate": Idealism vs. Realism (A Contested Narrative)

The period between the World Wars is traditionally depicted as the arena for the
"First Great Debate" between idealists (or utopians) and realists. In this narrative,
idealists, having failed to prevent war, were supposedly "demolished" by the rising
tide of realism, with E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau as key figures.

However, de Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson critically evaluate this narrative, labeling
the "First Great Debate" as a "myth". They argue that while Carr's book The Twenty
Years' Crisis (1939) did create a reaction, there was "no wide-ranging debate and
certainly no feeling that any 'idealist' position had been demolished". This narrative,
they contend, was more of a "political move" in the immediate post-World War II
years to enshrine a specific foreign policy (realism) and insulate the field from
behavioralist political science. The so-called "idealists" were often
mischaracterized, exhibiting a "breadth and diversity of thought" and frequently
holding positions that shared common ground with realist precepts, even actively
supporting aspects of European imperialism.

III. The Scientific Studies Stage and Dominance of Realism (1945-1991)

The end of World War II profoundly transformed international politics and the study
of IR. The emergence of new states in Asia and Africa made international politics
truly global, and the onset of the Cold War introduced new issues like proxy wars,
nuclear threat, and the balance of power. The increasing influence of non-state
actors also demanded a shift towards more "rational and scientific studies".

A. Rise of Realism and Neo-Realism

This era saw the dominance of Realism and later Neo-Realism.
• Classical Realism: Propounded by Hans J. Morgenthau in his 1948 work
Politics among Nations, Classical Realism argued against idealism. It emphasized
the selfishness and brutishness of human nature, the corruptibility of institutions,
and the anarchic nature of the international system. States, operating in a
"somewhat lawless context" with no centralized authority, are primarily concerned
with their self-preservation and the pursuit of power. Classical Realism was rooted
in a mix of history, philosophy, and theology.

• Neo-Realism (Structural Realism): In the 1970s, Kenneth Waltz's Theory of

International Politics (1979) marked the ascendance of Neo-Realism. Waltz
attempted to give realism a scientific basis by focusing on the anarchical structure
 of the international system as the primary determinant of state behavior. He
argued that states are unitary, rational actors in a self-help system, concerned
with survival, and that the international system's structure conditions them into
similar patterns of behavior. Waltz famously argued that bipolarity (a balance
between two great powers) is the most stable arrangement. Neo-Realism
minimized the importance of domestic institutions, diplomacy, and human nature,
which were central to Classical Realism.

B. Systems Theory and Behavioralism

The post-WWII period also saw a push towards making political science more
scientific through quantitative methodology and behavioral studies.
• Systems theories prioritize the structure of the international system to explain
state behavior and interactions, treating the international system as a "formal and
independent variable". While facing debates on defining the "system" and
empirical support, this approach widened the scope of IR studies.
• Other partial theories influenced by behavioralism, such as decision-making
theory, game theory, communication theory, and bargaining theory, focused
on foreign policy analysis through scientific and value-free approaches.
Despite efforts by realists and behavioralists to study IR scientifically, these
approaches were criticized for not interpreting international relations holistically,
often focusing primarily on conflict while neglecting cooperation. Their inability to
predict major transformations, such as the end of the Cold War, highlighted their
limitations.
IV. Post-Cold War Era: Critical Theories and Globalization (1991-Present)
The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about significant changes in the nature of
international relations and ignited new theoretical discourses, leading to a
"Paradigm shift". This period is sometimes described as moving beyond "post-
Westphalia" to a "post sovereignty" phase.

A. Emergence of Critical Theories

New Critical theories emerged, including constructivism, feminism, and post-
modernism, which raised normative questions previously missing in Cold War
discourses. These theories were less concerned with scientism or analytical
frameworks and more with "problem-solving" and "emancipation". They aimed to
critique dogmatism, de-legitimize existing orders, and focus on social and political
examination.
• Constructivism: Emphasizes that human behavior and institutions, including
the state, are "socially constructed" and determined by identity, values,
history, and practice.
 • Feminism: Argues that gender-based role differentiation is socially, rather
than biologically, determined.
• Post-modernism: Expresses "incredulity towards meta-narratives," de-
constructing and distrusting accounts of human life that claim direct access to
truth.
While these theories provide rich insights, they are often seen as "partial
approaches" that explain specific phenomena but do not offer a complete
understanding of international relations.

B. Globalization and its Paradoxes

Parallel to these theoretical shifts, the world witnessed the phenomenon of
Globalization after 1991. This phenomenon has been subject to both positive and
negative interpretations, presenting a "paradox" for IR scholars.

Arguments supporting Globalization highlight:

• Increased interdependence of the world economy and open trade.
• Greater interconnectedness, communication, and social cohesiveness.
• The emergence of a common culture and homogeneity across nations.
• The perceived collapse of time and space, leading to a "global village".
• A shift towards a transnational order, with allegiances moving from states to
sub-state, transnational, and international bodies.
• The development of a cosmopolitan culture and a "risk culture" addressing
common humanitarian concerns.
Arguments opposing Globalization contend that it:
• Primarily strengthens capitalism, focusing on trade, FDI, and finance rather than
human development.
• Is "uneven in its effects," benefiting the rich and widening the gap between rich
and poor countries.

• Is seen as the "latest stage of Western imperialism," not a "Globalization with a

human face".
• Facilitates global operations for negative forces like drug cartels and terrorists.
• Does not ensure good global governance, as multinational corporations (MNCs)
and transnational corporations (TNCs) are not easily controlled by any single
country or global agency.
• Presents a paradox: is it a triumph of Western capitalism or the rise of Asian
economic dynamism?.
The developments of critical theories and globalization present a complex scenario
for contemporary IR. While critical theories address emancipation, globalization
poses problems of an "inegalitarian world order". These multifaceted challenges
make it difficult to develop a single, overarching general theory for understanding
IR.

. Critical Perspectives: Decolonizing IR's Evolution

A significant ongoing debate within IR, particularly in the post-Cold War era,
involves critical and de-colonial scholars who challenge the discipline's Eurocentric
foundations and its conventional evolutionary narrative. These scholars argue that
the "big bangs" are myths that mask a biased understanding of global history and
political interactions.

A. Challenging Eurocentrism and "Missing Voices"

Kevin Blachford, in "From Thucydides to 1648," argues that IR's adherence to a
Westphalian narrative "problematic and Eurocentric understanding of the state and
the international system". He contends that IR often uses pre-modern history as a
"foil" to define Western modernity and its superiority. This results in a "narrow and
limited tale of European states and their inter-European interactions from 1648 to
today," neglecting vast periods and non-Western contributions.

Blachford highlights how various non-Western or pre-modern histories are

"otherized" and dismissed as backward, serving to reinforce the exceptional
achievements of the Westphalian moment. Examples include:
• The medieval era, which is "routinely used pejoratively as examples of
backwardness or as examples defined by their lack of Western characteristics".
• The Byzantine Empire, despite its thousand-year existence and significant
geopolitical, cultural, and economic power, is largely overlooked or mentioned
with "pejorative" terms.

• Nomadic peoples (like the Huns) are often dismissed as "barbarians" lacking
societal foundations.
• The Ottoman Empire is often presented as "absent or passive" and used as a
"comparative foil" for Western superiority, despite its major role in the European
balance of power.
This "tempocentrism" of the Westphalian narrative takes "Western ascendency as
the natural state of affairs" and overlooks the multiple interconnected histories and
transnational relations that have shaped global politics.

B. Implications for the Discipline

The de-colonial critique calls for IR to "decolonize the discipline" and our
understanding of the international. It argues that IR needs to:
• Broaden its historical engagement: Moving beyond the narrow Eurocentric
narratives to consider a wider range of global and transnational historical
accounts that challenge the "states in anarchy" framework.

• Re-read processes of modernity and imperialism: Examining these processes

as a prelude to Eurocentric stories, rather than accepting them as self-evident.

• Challenge disciplinary myths: Recognizing that "disciplinary myths" of 1648

and 1919 reify the present and project modern political constructs backward.
• Move towards a "relational approach": Instead of viewing states as self-
contained units, seeing the international as a "thick social space of interaction and
co-constitution," recognizing the diversity of historical interactions beyond
simplistic binary oppositions of anarchy or hierarchy.

• Increase interdisciplinarity: Fostering greater dialogue with historians,

particularly transnational historians, to overcome the "fifty-years' rift" between IR
and history and move beyond "methodological nationalism".

VI. Conclusion
The evolution of International Relations has been a dynamic journey from
unsystematic historical chronicling to a complex academic discipline grappling with
a multitude of theories and global phenomena. While the "big bangs" of Westphalia
in 1648 and the discipline's birth in 1919 traditionally mark its foundational
moments, critical and de-colonial scholarship has rigorously exposed these as
"myths" that obscure a more nuanced, diverse, and often uncomfortable history.

From the early dominance of diplomatic history to the interwar emphasis on current
events and legal institutions, and subsequently the post-World War II rise of realism
and behavioralism, IR has constantly sought to understand and predict international
phenomena. The post-Cold War era introduced critical theories and the pervasive
phenomenon of globalization, further complicating the theoretical landscape.

The ongoing de-colonial critique represents a crucial stage in IR's evolution. By

challenging the discipline's Eurocentric biases and its narrow historical narratives, it
compels IR to move beyond a "false prospectus" and embrace a truly global and
inclusive understanding of international relations. The future of IR lies in its ability to
engage in constant vigilance, disciplinary dialogue, and a rigorous, historically
informed self-reflection, recognizing that a more complete and accurate
understanding of its own evolution is essential for making sense of the complexities
of the world.