SECURITY 397

The traditional state-centric approach

In the traditional approach to IR, the answer to the question 'Security for whom?' is not of much
concern since the key object of study is the state and it is taken for granted that security refers to
che security of the state. It is easy to see why the concept of security has usually been associated with
che security of the state. Writing in response to the carnage of the First and Second World Wars, as
well as the threat of the Cold War, key IR thinkers have viewed the core of the field as being the
issue of war and peace between states (Morget:ithau, 1973). The international system is viewed as
Definitions: Two Views anarchic - it has no overarching authority, such as a government in domestic politics. Because of
of Security chis anarchic condition, states are placed in competition with each other and must pursue power
Theoretical Perspectives: co achieve security. In this approach, security has three central features:
Integrating Security and I. Security and security studies are concerned with the preservation of the state from external
Political Economy (and internal) threats to its physical integrity and core values.
Major Developments 2. In an anarchical international system, state security is an issue of primary concern for policy
Key Issues makers and citizens. Indeed, it becomes the central priority since in the absence of an effective
security policy, a state is likely to lose its sovereignty.
3. An emphasis on military might as the key determinant of security. In other words, security is
Further Reading
defined almost exclusively in military terms.
It could be assumed that this traditional understanding of security, as state-based and concerned
••
" with military conflict, provides a simple and unambiguous basis on which states could pursue
national security. This is not the case, however, and, as Wolfers ( 1952) argued, 'national security' is
an ambiguous and pliable concept and goal. National security involves pursuing a policy that will
reduce threats to a nation or the values the nation embodies. However, it is difficult to say which
precise policies will increase security in any given situation.
One problem that arises is the 'security dilemma', where the attempts of states to increase their
security make everyone more insecure. For example, the attempts of State A to increase its secu-
rity pose a security threat to State B. From the perspective of State A, its increased security (mili-
tary) resources are simply for defensive purposes and do not therefore pose a threat to other states
in the international system. However, from the perspective of State B, the increase in State /\s
security resources appears as a threat. State B then takes steps to respond to the threat, but this
increases the insecurity of State A, which responds by taking measures that increase State B's inse-
curity and so on.
A real-life example involves the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. The Soviet
Union was threatened by the US monopoly of nuclear weapons after the Second World War. When
the USSR developed nuclear weapons in response to the US monopoly, the Soviet Union initially
felt more secure. However, Soviet possession of nuclear weapons increased US insecurity. The US
took steps to increase its security, causing the USSR to do the same and have the same impact on
the US. This led to an insecurity spiral and an arms race. Another difficulty with pursuing national
security is that it can use up resources that might leave the nation more insecure. For example, a
large military build-up might leave the nation economically vulnerable.
At the end of the Cold War, this traditional concept of security was challenged by a wave of 'new
security studies'. Some analysts argued that the notion of security should be expanded to include _
social issues, economic and environmental issues and that the idea of anarchy should be moderated
(Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1997). State-centric approaches continued to flourish, but they turned
their attention to a wider series of issues and security arrangements.
 398 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 399

Human security The concept of human security was first introduced in the H uman Development Report J 994
The end of the Cold War provided space for the emergence of a new way of thinking about securit (UND P, 1994). This report set the tone for succeeding approaches to human security by focusing
that focused on the emancipation of the individual (Krause and Williams, 1997; Wyn Jones, 199 9 j on a wide definition that takes a preventive, 'people-centred' approach. The UND p definition
focuses on 'freedom from fear and freedom from want: thus covering safety from threats of hunger,
Sometimes called 'critical security studies', this approach replaced the state as the referent objec~
with the individual. They also rejected the assumption of international anarchy as a pre-given fea- disease and repression as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of
ture of the international system. Finally, in promoting an alternative conception of security, this daily life. The report lists seven different elements of human security: economic security, food secu-
approach recognized that threats to individual freedom come from a number of sources. Indeed rity, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political
states themselves can often be a key source of threat to individual security. ' security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-5). Human security, conceived in these terms as the prerogative of
The term 'human security' was developed to capture a concern with the large number of threats the individual, effectively links security to human rights and human dignity.
to human life that existed beyond death caused by interstate warfare. Two developments high-
Although the concept of human security has received considerable attention from scholars and
lighted the importance of human security. First, the end of the Cold War had reduced the threat of policy makers, there is no consensus on a precise definition. Since its inception, the concept of
large-scale interstate conflicts, but the incidence of intrastate conflict had become more prominent. human security has been defined and reinterpreted in numerous ways. While some groups have
Death from physical violence was more likely to be caused by civil wars or ethnic disputes within or accepted the broad view of human security taken by the UNDP, others prefer a more narrow defi-
across state boundaries than a formal war between states. Second, the easing of superpower tensions nition. A broad definition is provided by Kaldor (2007, p. 182), who defines human security as 'the
helped people recognize that death by starvation and disease was killing far more people than war- security of individuals and communities rather than states and it combines human rights and
fare. Issues such as the provision of food were increasingly seen as a security problem (see Box 17.1). human development'. In a similar vein, the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 7) defines
Human security proponents thus sought to expand the agenda in order to bring the perspective of human security as the 'vital core of all human lives: without any specification regarding the content
the individual and communities into focus and to address a range of threats to international secu- and context of this phrase on the grounds that 'different societies would interpret its meaning
rity beyond those posed by other states. differently'.
On the other hand, the Human Security Centre's annual Human Security Report (2005, p. viii)
takes the view that the concept should be confined to examining violent threats to individuals. In
this approach, attention is paid to civil wars, terrorism, false imprisonment, torture by state officials
I
I (police, intelligence services), but not issues such as famine or development. Former Canadian for-
• Although th ere are many definition s of fo od security, th e UN Food and Agri cult ure Orga nization's eign minister Lloyd Axworthy (2001) promoted this more limited form of human security as a
(FAO, 1996) definiti on is w id ely accepted: 'Food security exist s w hen all peop le, at all times, have cornerstone of his country's foreign policy for a number of years. Human security is thus defined in
physica l and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious fo od to meet their dietary needs terms of freedom from fear of physical violence.
and fo od preferences fo r an acti ve an d hea lthy life.' In March 1999, the UN established the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
The issue of food security came to prom inence in 2008 w hen, as a result of risi ng food prices, (UNTFHS) . UNTFHS finances activities undertaken by practitioners (either UN organizations
demonstrators took to t he streets in over forty countri es to protest about high prices and food or organizations approved by the UN) working to translate the human security approach into prac-
shortages. Although world food prices declined in 2009, they nevertheless constituted a severe tice. The UNTFHS handbook (UN, 2009c) provides the underlying rationale and principles guid-
st ra in for many consumers in developi ng countries. The combinati on of t he global fi nancial crisis ing its work.
and the wo rld food crisis co nt ributed to increas ing poverty levels in th e develop ing wo rld. An
infl uential report published by the UN Economic and Social Co mmiss ion for As ia and t he Pacific
(ESCAP, 2009) stated that t he 2008 fin ancial cri sis had become a fo od cri sis fo r 583 million
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: INTEGRATING SECURITY AND
peopl e in t he Asia- Pacifi c region. POLITICAL ECONOMY
Food insecurity remain s an issue of co ncern. For so me analysts, fo od security is a fu nction Readers will recall from Chapter 1 that the three traditional IPE perspectives had very different
of t he avai lability of foo d and in th is se nse t he resil ience of foo d production systems re lies on views of conflict and cooperation. These views have had consequences for how people have studied
ferti le land, access to fresh water and t he health of the oceans. Cli mate change is affecti ng all and thought about the relationship between security and political economy. The dominant
dimensions of food security (FAO, 2008). The detrimental impact of climate change on food approach to economics - liberalism - has stipulated that the economic and political worlds are
prod ucti on systems is being felt 'most by vu lnerable household s and communities t hat lack th e separate arenas dominated by different methods of behaviour. The economic world operates accord-
physica l and socioeco nom ic infrastructure to buttress thei r resi li ence' (E IU, 2018, p. 17). A focus ing to a set of economic laws, while the political world deviates from these laws. In the economic
on poverty and vu lnerab ility high lights t he link betwee n food secu rity and access ibility to food. As world, rational actors pursuing efficiency are rewarded, while the political world is marked by more
Sen (198 1) has demonst rated , food security is a fu nction of food dist ributi on.
emotional and irrational behaviour and rewards. As a result, economic liberals and liberals in IPE
The human secu rity impli cations of foo d insecu rity are devastating. Food insecurity increases
have tended to downplay or ignore the link between political economy and security. The one excep-
world hunger, resu lti ng in a higher incidence of ma lnutrition. Acco rdin g to FAO estim ates, about
tion is that liberals have often argued that free trade and democratic politics are likely to increase
735 million peop le faced hunger in 2022, 122 milli on more than before t he pa ndemic in 2019
(FAO, 2023).
peace between states. In contrast, power politics and critical approaches have tended to
 400 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
SECURITY 401
acknowledge the mutual influence of economics and security, but in different ways. Power politics
approaches have viewed economic interests as subservient to security interests, while many critical
. . ~;I"
Box
17.2 . Defence procurement
approaches have viewed security issues as being heavily influenced if not dictated by economic
interests. Defence procurement is an area where pol itical economy and national security clearly overlap.
Leading figures from the three traditional international political economy perspectives have all It can be defined as the processes by w hi ch nationa l govern ments procu re military eq ui pment
written on aspects of the relationship between security and political economy (Earle, 1986). and services. Defence proc urement varies from state to state depending on the state of civil -
Economic nationalists such as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List argued that financial and mil itary relations, the level of industrialization and techno logica l development, globa l and regiona l
industrial strength were prerequisites for military strength. In their view, it was the responsibility of tens ion, levels of t hreat perceptio n and t he genera l organization of mil itary fo rces .
the state to take action to protect national economic interests. Thus, Hamilton is often remem- Defence procureme nt is more t han an exercise in commerc ial po licy because the state plays
a key ro le in t he development of t he defence sector and the complicated links between t hat
bered for arguing that the US must protect its manufacturing base to bolster national power. List
sector and the rest of the eco nomy. Disti nctive elements of procuring military goods and services
advocated a protectionist policy for Germany, alleging that free trade was only in the interest of the
include:
strongest economic powers.
Early liberal thought contained several approaches to the relationship between economics and • the ro le of the government as t he key buyer and regulator
security. Adam Smith usually criticized the overly protectionist policies of mercantilists, yet he • t he high cost of arm s
acknowledged that there were circumstances where the interests of the state should trump com- • the importance of resea rch and development
mercial interests (Earle, 1986). For example, writing in the 1700s, Smith supported the British • the inflationary sp iral of weapons production
Navigation Acts, which stipulated that trade to Britain or its colonies must be carried in British • uncertainties related to the production process and the changing nature of externa l th reats
ships. The purpose of these Acts was to ensure a strong merchant marine and Royal Navy, as well as • information asymmetries between the buyer and the supp lier
protecting British economic interests. They were eventually repealed in the mid- l 800s. While • an oligopolistic market structure (de Fraja and Hartley, 1996; Rogerson , 1993).
Smith supported a professional army and military defence of British interests overseas, some later Governance issues play a major role in the defence procurement industry si nce secrecy
free traders such as Richard Cobden adopted a more pacifist stance and campaigned against foreign and lack of transparency, often justified on security grounds, can lead to corrupti on and waste .
interventions (such as the Crimean War). In March 2009, US President Barack Obama esti mated t hat changes in defence procureme nt
Ir
I A series of Marxist theorists and practitioners saw an intimate relationship between organized po licies cou ld save t he co unt ry ove r $40 billion (G ilm ore, 2009). The high cost of weapons also
• violence and political economy. To Marx and Engels, wars were a ruse that the ruling classes used makes defence procu rement a po litical issue. For exam ple, given t hat the UK suffered an intense
to divert attention from domestic problems and an opportunity for workers to overthrow the econom ic slowdown between 2008 and 20 10, does it make se nse to spend bill ions of pou nds on
ruling class should the war go badly (Neumann and von Hagen, 1986). States might engage in nucl ear-armed submari nes 7 The in dustri al-economic interests mixed with t he politica l-d iplomatic
imperialism because of domestic economic needs and desires, but foreign adventures had the issues involved in purchasing weapons make defence procurement an es pec ial ly con t entious
potential to weaken the security apparatus of the state and provide an opening for oppositional iss ue. Moreover, t he relati onsh ip bet ween defence procurement , military spending and econom ic
forces. Indeed, Lenin capitalized on Russia's disastrous performance in the First World War to growth is a subj ect of heated debate. In t he cont ext of deve loping co untries, some ana lysts argue
initiate the Russian Revolution. In the twentieth century, Marxists played a key role in launching t hat govern ments sho ul d pursue strategies of military moderni zation and se lf-rel iance in defence
revolutionary and nationalist wars in China, Vietnam, Africa and Cuba. Political power was procurement. Other analysts conten d t hat the deve lopment of wea pons syst ems is econom ica lly
seized and new economic systems were put in place following military defeat of their class wast efu l (Ba lakri shna n, 2008; Singh, 2005).
opponents.
Scholarly interest in the relationship between economic activity and security has varied over
increasingly pressured to change their economic policies as security ties were seen as being less
time in response to the external environment. One issue of current concern to policy makers and
significant.
scholars relates to defence procurement (see Box 17.2).
One of the cornerstones of much realist analysis of international relations has been a belief
The shifting balance between security concerns and economics can be illustrated through the
that issues of high politics are more important than issues of low politics (Keohane and Nye,
history of the US. Mastandumo (1998) argues that during those times when there has been no
1977, p . 23 ). High politics is seen as those issues that relate to the military security of the state and
great external threat, US economic and foreign policies have been pursued on different tracks.
low politics refers to other international issues, for example economic and environmental.
However, during times of high threat, foreign and economic policies were integrated, with one
However, even from a realist perspective, there is considerable justification for examining the
serving the interests of the other. At some points during the Cold War, US economic policy was
relationship between security and political economy (Ripsman, 2005). As noted above, tradi-
used to further foreign policy goals, while at other times foreign policy was used to advance eco-
tional mercantilist thought stressed that economic power is a prerequisite for military power. A
nomic goals. For example, when the US was concerned about Soviet expansionism, there was a
state's military power is dependent on the economic resources at its disposal. Over time, the key ·
tendency to support Japan and Europe through the Marshall Plan and open US markets to the
economic resources relevant for the production of military forces and support for war-making
exports of their allies. In the 1970s and 80s, foreign economic policy became more prominent as
efforts have changed but the connection between a strong domestic economy and national secu-
international monetary and trade issues were viewed as increasingly significant. Former allies were
rity has remained a key assumption of foreign and security policy. A state's economic strength can
 402 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 403

~
be defined in terms of 't~e p~oductive resources :hat its society po~sesses; !abour, technology,
natural resources, real capital ( in the form of factones, power dams, railroads, inventories of mate- Interdependence did not stop Russian tanks
rials and manufactures, and so on) ; and claims on the output of other societies inherent in reserv
of internatio~al li~uidity (gold, ~oreign currencies) and foreign investments' (Knorr, 197 5, p. 46)~ A pro min ent Europea n strategy fo r dea li ng wit h Russian military power since t he
1970s has been t he attempt to engage Russia in economic rela tions and dipl o mati c
The contnbut10n of economic resources to military potential will, of course, depend on th
dialogue. Foll owing li bera l prin ciples, t he hope was t hat increased econom ic re lations
ways in which they are mobilized and the alternative uses of national economic product. The link~
between Europe and Russia wou ld foste r peace and facilitate good relations on the Eu ropea n
ages be~ween economic resources and national military power give rise to a number of dilemmas
co ntin ent. Western Eu ro pe became reli ant on Russia n sources of energy (gas and oil), wh il e
and policy problems. For example, to what extent should a state seek to organize production alon
Russ ia conti nued to engage with West ern businesses and buy consu mer prod ucts. Howeve r
nationalist lines or sh~uld it be ope~ t~ foreig~ trade and investment? A nationalist policy ma;
t he t hreat of fi nancial loss and eco nomic t urmoil was insufficient to deter Russian from invad in~
ensure the construcnon of domestic industnes geared to national defence and ensure self-
Ukra in e in 2022. Russ ian co ncern abo ut t he Ukrain e joining the Western military alli ance (NATO)
sufficiency in strategic goods. But such an economic nationalist policy may also be undertaken at or the EU overrode th e perceived benefits of economic cooperati on with t he West. In t his case
a cost to efficiency and lead to a reduction in aggregate economic wealth. Such dilemmas form the libera ls we re mista ken about the ability of eco nomic interdependence t o prevent inte rstat~
centre of debates between neomercantilists and liberal theorists. co nfl ict.
Just as some modern-day realists have examined the link between political economy and secu-
rity, some liberals have suggested that peace is intimately connected to following liberal policies.
constraints built into democratic political structures and the cultural values of peaceful resolution
Proponents of commercial liberalism, who focus on the influence of the market on domestic and
typical of democratic decision-making structures. However, they also insist that democracies are
transnational actors, contend that economic exchange reduces the likelihood of war among states
not constrained from waging war against authoritarian and totalitarian states (Russett, 1993).
(Moravcsik, 1997). From a liberal perspective, humans are rational, risk-averse actors who make
Critics contend that there is no conclusive evidence to prove that democratic states are peaceful in
decisions on the basis of personal gain and loss. On the basis of these assumptions, trade and invest-
their relations with each other because they are democratic. Indeed, it may be the case that peaceful
ment across national borders provide positive benefits to states and thus the resort to war is likel
conditions produce democratic states rather than the reverse, as the democratic peace thesis holds.
to diminish s~c~oeconomic welfare. In such circumstances, rational states will focus on the gai~
It has also been suggested that the mathematical probability that democratic states would fight each
f~om econ~mic i~tercourse rather than the costs of war. The contention that liberal economic poli-
,, other is small because historically there have been few democracies (Brown et al., 1996). It has also
..I c_ies and a !i~eral international order are positively related with peace has long been a mainstay of
liberal polmcal theory (Howard, 2008). In the 1970s, these arguments were given added relevance
been argued that countries in the transition to democracy become more violent and prone to war
(Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). .
with the development of interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Interdependence the-
Critical approaches to international relations have argued that capitalism can promote violence
ory argued that under conditions of complex interdependence, there was an absence of issue hier-
and the existing structure of capitalism inflicts continuous violence on some groups of people. The
archy. Foreign policy is not simply reducible to a concern with national security; military force has
notion of 'structural violence' is that the operation of the system itself causes people to be injured
limited utility and is ineffective in controlling outcomes; and when economic interdependence
or killed (Galtung, 1969). For example, the world has enough food for everyone, but the system of
between states is high, it contributes to a search for peaceful solutions to conflicts and reduces the
distribution and payment is flawed so that millions of people regularly die from lack of nourish-
resort to violence.
ment. No individual or group is specifically targeted nor is it intended that people die from starva-
There is an enormous body of theoretical and statistical literature that seeks to examine the
tion. Nevertheless, we have organized food production and distribution in such a way that people
. commercial liberal proposition that peace is a product of economic interdependence. The results
die on a regular basis from starvation. This violence is structural and inherent in the system as it is
of these studies are mixed. Some studies provide statistical evidence in support of the claim
presently organized.
( O'Neal et al., 1996; O'Neal and Russett, 1997), while other studies find no conclusive supportive
evidence (Barbieri, 1996; Ripsman and Blanchard, 1996/7). This literature suffers from a number
of ambiguities, with the most important being the failure to agree on a definition of economic MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
i~terdependence. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2022 raised serious questions about the There have been dramatic changes in the global security structure since the end of the Second
liberal assumption that increased economic relations were capable of fostering peace (see Box World War. We define a security structure as the overarching framework of material, institutional
17.3). and ideational resources in response to perceptions of threat. A security structure thus comprises
A_ relate~ liberal theory links the domestic political system with the possibility of international material and normative elements. Here, we discuss two major changes in the global security struc-
~onflict ..Going back to the thinking of Kant in the eighteenth century, liberals argue that a peaceful ture. The first was the postwar creation of a security structure dominated by a bipolar interna-
internanonal system requires the presence of a large number of democratic states. The extensive tional system. This system featured the rise of the national security state and the military- industrial
dem~cratic peace literature debates the connection between democracy and peace. Proponents of complex, as well as global military and economic competition between the USSR and the US. The
t~e link argue that democratic states do not engage in warfare with each other, while opponents collapse of bipolarity and the ending of the Cold War triggered a new security structure. This ·
dispute the data on w~ich these claims have been made. Proponents of the democratic peace thesis post-Cold War security structure was less state-centric and has seen the rise of new security
argue that democratic states tend to resolve conflict over the bargaining table because of the challenges.
404 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 4 05

The Cold War security structure Eisenhower was not a lefi:wing radical. He was a war hero who had commanded the D-Day invasion
During the Cold War (1948- 89), the meaning of security in international relations 1· of Normandy and was the first commander of NATO forces in Europe. And yet this person, who
. 1 c d .. . Iterature was schooled in the military and rose to be president, highlighted the dangers of an expansionist
a.1most exc1us1ve y rererre. to the military preservation of the nation-state Threats to · 1secu-
· nanona
nty were seen as emanatmg from external sources. Fundamental threats to territorial int · military and arms industry to US democracy.
. . egnry or The origins of the military-indust rial complex lie in the changing nature of warfare. Over a
va1ue systems . were h eld to. emanate from either real conflict of interests or ideological motivations
· ·
or b ot h . Given the. dommant status of number of centuries, warfare transformed from an activity waged by a small number of people
. . .the US and the Soviet Union , the interests of th ese two (knights, mercenaries or small professional armies) to one fought by nations and societies as a
superpowers wer~ mevitably on a collmon course, according to experts who emphasize the C l
War as a clash of mt~r~sts. ~e bipolar distribution of power inevitably led to a struggle for po;e; whole (Howard, 2009). The French Revolution mobilized a whole society that eventually served as
On the other hand, It 1s possible to conceive of the rivalry as the outcome of an ideological the basis for Napoleon's conquest of Europe. The US Civil War was an early indication of the
. 1· d . h fl· ·
con Ict destruction to come from new weapons and the use of industrial strength and might to destroy an
b etween capita ism an commumsm. W ether the origins of the Cold War are rooted in a st 1
for power, an ideological dispute or even the result of misperceptions, from the perspective 0 ~gg e
. 1 1· . 1 h
nanona po mca economy, t e key issues relate to the ways in which this global conflict shmter-d
f opponent. The First World War confirmed the trend of whole nations being mobilized for combat,
while victory in the Second World War required the harnessing oflarge industries to produce tanks
.. 1 d . . . ape and ships in the US and USSR, as well as the creation of new super-weapons such as nuclear bombs .
po1inca an economic systems and patterns of mternat10nal economic intercourse.
Cold War security for the USSR and US rested on large militaries based in numerous countries and
. Two issues are of p~rticular imp~rtance in this r~spect. First, the central goal of states was con-
ce~ved as self-preservat10n and the discourse of secunty placed emphasis on military weapons as the the deployment of advanced military technology. Military technologies ranged from the latest
pnma~y reqmrem~n~ for defence and security. As a result, there was increased military spending on innovation in fighter aircraft to nuclear-powered, armed submarines to intercontinenta l ballistic
b~th_ sides of ~he ~~v1de and an arms race. In this scenario, nuclear weapons were an important tool missiles. The large corporations that supplied these technologies and the militaries that used them
withm ~states military arsenal. The existence of nuclear weapons gave rise to policies of deterrence formed a relationship of mutual dependence as both sought to influence the procurement policies
(to avoid the use of these deadly weapons), non-proliferatio n (to halt the spread of this destructive of their political leaders.
tool) a~d t7e security dilemma. The cost of military armaments and the impact of defence spending
on nanona eco~omies were contributory factors to the search for arms agreements.
The post-Cold War security structure
1!1e sec~nd issue related to the impact of the bipolar security structure on international eco-
The most significant change in the security structure since the end of the Second World War has
~omIC r~lanons. One result of the Cold War was the creation of effectively two separate systems of
been the end of the Cold War ( 1989). It is not too dramatic to note that the world fundamentally
mtern~uonal trade and payments. The bipolar security structure with opposing alliance systems
changed with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. This change
gave nse to a w_estern system of free-market economies and a communist system of centrally
brought with it not only a rethinking of security relations but also changes in the dominant security
planned. e~onom1es. These two systems devised separate international organizations to regulate
discourse. The focus on the national security state was now challenged by considerations of a
economic mt~rcourse._ For_ example, the World Bank and the IMF, among other institutions, played
broader nature (discussed above). The end of the Cold War heralded an end to bipolarity and ini-
central roles m coordmatmg Western policy, while the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
tially ushered in a unipolar world order, with the US as the dominant military superpower. Some
was created to manage relations among centrally planned economies in the Soviet orbit.
analysts thought that the end of bipolarity signalled the opportunity to pursue a 'peace dividend'.
Another consequ~nce ~f the Cold War security structure was the economic competition
The peace dividend could arise by diverting finance that had previously been spent on armaments
betwee~ :he US and its allies and the Soviet Union in the developing world. The rivals were in
to peaceful purposes, and also by seizing the opportunity for international cooperation with the
c~mpetm~n not only over access to resources and markets but also over economic systems, as each
tned to wm con~erts to _its ~conomic ideology. In this sense, it was believed that national security cessation of superpower rivalry.
In this new world order, the hope of many experts that an era of multilateral cooperation for
was ~nha~ce~ by captunng states to the economic system preferred by the US or the Soviet Union.
security purposes would develop initially appeared to be well founded. In 1992, Boutros-Ghali,
~e imphcat10ns for states in the developing world were ofi:en disastrous. Some countries, such as
then UN Secretary-General, proclaimed the Agenda for Peace, which committed the UN to iden-
Vietnam, A~gola ~nd ~i~aragua, became battlegrounds, while others devoted badly needed
tification of conflict at an early stage, peace-making efforts to bring parties to an agreement, and
resources to mcreasmg military security.
peacekeeping and peace-building (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). However, the conditions required to sus-
The close relationsh~p betw~en the pursuit of security and the national economy during the
tain the new multilateralism proved elusive. The imperatives of national security remained of vital
Co~d ~ar can be seen m the nse of the military-indust rial complex. In his final speech to the
importance to most states and the economic and political resources necessary to underwrite the
nation m 1961, US President Eisenhower (1961) warned his citizens that: 'In the councils of gov-
new order were not forthcoming. As the financial and human costs of the new interventionism
ernment, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
became evident, leading states were less inclined to support such policies .
unsought.' bY t h e m il.1tary m· d ustn·a1 complex.' He was refernng
· to the political influence exercised The easing of Cold War tensions highlighted the significance of internal conflicts in the global
by the existence of a large military establishment and a massive arms industry. The outgoing presi-
security structure. Since 1945, three-quarters of all armed conflicts have been within countries and
dent feared
. that the combined p ower o f a m1·1·1tary d es1nng
· · new an d more weapons systems and an as many people died in internal conflicts between 1980 and 2002 as in the First World War (Kahl,
~rms 1~dustry eag~r to s_ell those weapons would influence public policy in a direction that would
2005, p. 77). These conflicts are supported by a particular global political economy, which nurtures
e agamst the national mterest and personal liberty. In many ways, this was a shocking statement.
406 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 407

such chaos and makes them difficult to resolve. Kaldor ( 1999) has labelled the wave of conflicts
following the Cold War as 'new wars'. These wars take place in states with weak or nonexistent cen-
17.4'i1 Conflict minerals in the DRC
tral authority, sometimes referred to as 'failed states'. The state is unable to retain its monopoly of
violence, which leads to a proliferation of armed groups including renegade army units, paramili- In th e late 1800s, t he popu lation of the Congo suffered greatly as the world demanded rubber
taries, local self-defence units, mercenaries and foreign troops. The state is unable to raise sufficient during t he second Industri al Revolution. In t he early twenty-fi rst century, the Congolese suffer
revenues from taxation to support the national economy. As a result, a great deal of economic activ- aga in as th e world demands minerals for t he electro nics of t he informati on revoluti on. Indeed,
global co nsumption of 'conflict min erals' has f uell ed ongoing mass murder and rape in t he eastern
ity grinds to a halt or becomes dominated by criminal gangs and mafias. Local strongmen use fear,
areas of the DRC. Governm ent military units as well as non-state mi litias and form er rebel groups
insecurity and hatred of other populations to maintain power and engage in a population displace-
use force to control the mines and use the profit from the mines t o fuel their military activity. The
ment policy through murder, ethnic cleansing or making particular regions uninhabitable.
two pri ma ry minerals are cassiterite (th e ore fo r tin) and co lumbite-tanta lite (known as co ltan,
Since new wars cause such damage to existing state structures and economic activity, local mili-
from w hich t antalum is extracted), w hich are both used in creating electroni c good s such as
tary forces finance their activities by extracting resources from the local population and tapping
lapt ops and mobil e phones. Compani es such as Ap pl e, HP, Dell and Sams ung ri sk having confli ct
external sources of finance. The population as a whole must also turn increasingly to external actors
minerals in their supply chain, t hereby fu el ling the co nflict. States also profit from t hi s t rade, with
for survival. Local warlords use a variety of tactics to raise funds from the local populations. They Malaysia being the primary destination for Co ngo's tin ore, China process ing the majority of
can force locals to sell possessions at cut-rate prices, collect protection money from terrified inhab- tantalum and Rwa nda facilitating the export of Congo's tin ore th rough its territory. A re latively
itants, tax the movement of goods, loot local resources, hold prominent individuals hostage and new source of demand for confli ct minerals is the global transiti on to renewa bl e energy, w hi ch
control criminal activity. Hard-pressed civilians may be forced to rely on humanitarian assistance uses cobalt and lithium for electric vehi cle batteri es.
from international organizations in the form of refugee camps, emergency shelter, food aid or St eps could be ta ken to limit th e trade in con flict minera ls and prevent the financing of
development assistance in order to survive. Another source of external support comes in the form military group s engaged in murd er and rape (G loba l W itness, 20 10). Corporati ons could foll ow
of remittances sent by family members working in more prosperous states. due dili gence sta ndards set out by the UN Security Council t o ensure that co nflict minera ls are
External financial resources for local warlords come from a variety of sources. If these groups exc lud ed from their supply chain. Major states could police th eir corporations and ensure that aid
happen to control a valuable local resource, they can sell these products on the international mar- t o th e DRC is not diverted to militarizing eco nomi c activity.
ket. Examples include cocaine from Columbia, heroin from Afghanistan, diamonds from Sierra
Leone and cassiterite (tin) from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; see Box 17.4). In some
cases, large multinationals are crucial in facilitating the movement of these products to the global
sentiments can be used to mobilize people, but localized acts of ethnic cleansing are often aimed at
marketplace. Similar to civilian use of remittances, local ethnic militias can tap their diaspora com-
seizing the land and property of those being ejected. Local elites organize the co~fi~cation of t~eir
munities for funds to purchase arms and supplies. Local warlords can also draw on the services of
former neighbours' property and create a new economic structure that serves their interests. Smee
foreign governments. In some cases, chis may involve explicit support from neighbouring states,
the local economy collapses as a result of violent conflict, the general civilian population is often
such as Serbian and Croatian support for groups in Bosnia or Rwandan support for opposition
impoverished while criminal gangs control the import of products to satisfy local nee~s. The alleged
groups in the DRC. In other cases, local warlords will divert international humanitarian aid by tax-
solidarity within ethnic communities gives way to a reign of intimidation and corr~~n~n. Once the
ing convoys or charging exorbitant customs duties to allow access to local populations.
violence has begun, local warlords actively scuttle peace accords and block reconcil~anon becaus~ a
The issue of groups financing themselves through the sale of precious natural resources raises
return to legitimate state structures threatens their economic profiteering. Resolving the conflict
the broader issue of the relationship between competition for scarce resources and organized vio -
requires attention to the newly established criminal economic interests.
lence. Conflict analysts have noted a relationship between civil wars and two resource conditions
Another feature of the post-Cold War security structure is the threat of non-state actors. The
(Kahl, 2005). The first condition is characterized by growing populations, environmental degra-
September 2001 al-Qaeda hijacking of US passenger planes and subsequent att~ck ag~inst the
dation and increased competition for renewable resources. In this scenario, ever-increasing num-
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC ushered m a heightened
bers of people are caught in a downward spiral of destroying their local environment to meet
sense of insecurity in Western states and altered the security landscape in the advanced indu~trial-
survival needs, which increases political conflict and undermines long-term stability. A second
ized world. The attacks highlighted the threat that non-state actors could pose to the modern infra-
condition occurs not when there is a shortage of natural resources, but when groups control
structure of advanced economies. Could a cyberattack knock out a country's communications
highly valued resources such as diamonds, oil or minerals. In these cases, there is an incentive for
systems and seriously damage a nations' economy? Might whole systems be ~hrown into panic by
ocher groups to engage in violence to control these resources. In addition, groups that control
the effective targeting of power plants? Was it possible that a small nuclear smtca~e bomb could be
precious resources are likely to overinvest in their development and neglect other aspects of eco- detonated in a large urban centre? The rise of threats from non-state actors also raised human secu-
nomic and political development. In the longer run, this leaves the economy and polity vulnera-
rity questions. Does the threat from these actors reveal underlyi~g _p~obl~ms related to poverty,
ble to economic shocks.
poor governance and marginalization? Do issues of global economic lnJUStlce have to be addressed
A political economy approach to new wars suggests that while historical and identity issues are
in order to reduce the support for these actors?
significant aspects of these engagements, the fuel sustaining them is to be found in the economic
The response of Western states to an increased sense of insecurity was a tightening of b~rders
and political structures combatants have created (Griffiths, 1999). Nationalist and ethnic
and an increase in security and surveillance measures. Airlines and airports increased security by
 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 409

limiting what could be taken on airplanes and beefing up screening of passengers and cargo. Many aid as an instrument of statecraft, that is, bilateral development assistance that nominally has the
states introduced new anti-terrorism legislation that targeted a wide range of individuals and objective of promoting economic growth, and aid specifically targeted to meet political and secu-
groups. The US used the threat of terrorism to invade and overthrow the governments of rity goals. Of course, various donor motives are not completely separate. The objectives of promot-
Afghanistan and Iraq, causing extensive loss of life. ing economic growth and poverty reduction, mitigating conflict and expanding democratic
One feature that continued from the Cold War security structure into the twenty-first century governance are perfectly compatible. For example, aid that results in improved economic growth
was the global arms trade. A number of countries developed large military-industrial complexes can create the conditions for political stability and thus fulfil a political objective. Analysis of the
and sought out export markets to support their activity. In some countries, the military industry is allocation of aid shows conclusively the importance of political concerns in donors' motives
primarily run by the private sector (Australia, Canada, Germany Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, the (Maizels and Nisanke, 1984). For some analysts, key political goals are related to the preservation
UK and the US), while in others it is run by state-led companies (China, Greece, India, North of order, stability and peace in the international system (Brandt Commission, 1983), while for
Korea and Russia). The largest number of arms companies are in the US, followed by China others the main motive is more closely related to the national interests of donor states.
(although information is sparse), Russia, the UK and France. In the largest producers, the industry Changes in aid policy are the result of changing circumstances, changing norms governing the
contributes to considerable employment. For example, the military industries of the US, China and recipient-donor relationship and international development policy, and changing views about the
Russia employ between 6 and 9 million people (Hartley and Belin, 2021). It is estimated that the efficacy of aid. Aid as an instrument of statecraft is viewed by donors within the overall context of
value of the global arms trade in 2020 was $112 billion (SIPRI, 2023). their foreign relations with recipient countries, other potentially affected countries and competitor
By the third decade of the twenty-first century, security concerns shifted back to fears about nations. During the Cold War era, aid was an important instrument of foreign policy. Both the US
interstate conflict. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia brought large-scale warfare back to the and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies used economic aid as an instrument in the Cold
European continent. International economic activity was disrupted as Western countries imposed War struggle, with Western countries' aid programmes targeted to supporting anti-communist
sanctions on Russia and Russia scrambled to find new markets for its energy products. Across the regimes and aid from the communist bloc focused on supporting anti-Western sentiment in the
Pacific Ocean, tension between the US and China increased over the status of Taiwan and competi- Third World. Economic aid was deployed in the ideological conflict between the rival economic
tion over high-tech products. The spectre of a world increasingly divided between the US and and political systems and to win votes in international organizations such as the UN. For the ex-
Chinese political economies raised the issue of commercial rivalry and military conflict. colonial powers determined to maintain postcolonial spheres of influence, financial influence and
national culture (especially in the case of France), aid was geographically concentrated in their ex-
Ii
'I colonies. For example, French foreign aid went almost exclusively to ex-French colonies and British
'. KEY ISSUES
Traditional threats to security such as terrorism and nuclear war remain important in contempo-
aid was concentrated on its ex-colonies.
In the post-Cold War environment, democracy promotion has emerged as a key goal of demo-
rary global politics. For many people, instruments of violence threaten their physical security on a cratic states and foreign aid as a suitable instrument with which to pursue this objective. Sizeable
daily basis. Here, we examine two issues relevant to the political economy of security. Economic funds have been specifically allocated to democracy promotion by aid agencies. For example, the
statecraft links economic security and foreign policy and thus raises fundamental questions con- US Agency for International Development budgeted $1,051 million in 2004 for democracy and
cerning economic instruments of state policy. Transnational crime and corporate espionage illus- governance/conflict (Tarnoff and Nowells, 2004). The political economy of aid and democracy
trate the dark or covert side of GPE and reveal some of the security-related activity on non-state has focused on the usefulness of this tool of economic statecraft. The evidence suggests that the
actors. results have been disappointing (S. Brown, 2005; Crawford, 2005). One reason for the failure of
economic aid to promote democracy rests with the internal obstacles in the recipient states. It has
Economic statecraft and security been argued that the absence of a receptive political culture, chronic poverty and nonexistent insti-
tutions inhibit the efforts of donors to promote democracy in Africa (5. Brown, 2005, pp. 183-4).
Economic statecraft is the use of economic resources to exert political influence by a state. Two
Donor shortcomings are another reason for the failure of democracy promotion (5. Brown, 2005,
issues have been most prominent in recent studies of economic statecraft: economic aid and eco -
pp. 185- 9). A study of the failed EU attempt to promote democracy in Ghana blamed EU mem-
nomic sanctions.
ber states for approaching democracy promotion in a narrow manner and being more concerned
Economic aid is generally seen in terms of 'carrots: that is, inducements for other states to behave
with fostering their self-interests than developing the norms and principles of democratic gover-
in a particular manner. However, aid can be used as a stick if it is withdrawn. Economic sanctions
nance (Crawford, 2005). In a different but related manner, Cohen and KiiP<;ii (2009) contend that
are more clearly in the stick or coercion category. Both aid and sanctions have become controversial
US democracy promotion efforts have been hampered by a failure to adequately distinguish
features of diplomatic practice.
democracy from other strategic objectives such as development and humanitarian and public
Foreign aid can be categorized in a number of different ways. For example, a donor may classify
health assistance. A third reason rests with the tool of political conditionality itself (S. Brown,
the provision of aid in terms of bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting political
2005, pp. 184- 5). Political conditionality can be limited by constraints on the donor and recipient
and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic assistance and military aid. Here, we
sides. Donors may have unclear objectives and are limited by the sovereignty of the recipient states
are specifically concerned with bilateral development aid and economic assistance supporting
from imposing their goals. On the recipient side, political conditionality is limited by the ability of
political and security goals. We are not explicitly concerned with the economic effectiveness of
local elites to evade demands for change, compliance by authoritarian rulers who appear on the
bilateral aid, humanitarian aid, multilateral aid or military aid. Our focus is on the use of economic
410 CONTEMPO RARY CHALLENGE S SECURITY 411

surface to meet the demands for change while maintainin g existing practices, and the capacity to One of the main reasons why the evidence on the utility of sanctions is so inconclusive is
shrug off demands for change if access to alternative sources of finance are available. because the motivation s of the sender countries are not always clear. Governme nts impose sanc-
Economic sanctions, which were at one time a relatively uncontenti ous tool of foreign polic tions for a variety of reasons . Some of these reasons are instrument al, that is, the sender seeks to
have become a controvers ial issue in global politics. The political economy of economic sanctio~ impose costs on the target state such that the target will alter its behaviour and comply with the
has focused on the utility of sanctions as an instrumen t of foreign policy and the impact of sanc- demands of the sender. However, sender states also impose sanctions for expressive or symbolic
tions on the target population . On both issues there are diverse opinions and competing research reasons. Sanctions imposed for expressive purposes serve to send a signal of disapproval to the
findings. On such a controversial issue, it is unsurprisi ng to note that there is no agreed definition target state but do not envisage complianc e, or they have been imposed in order to meet
of economic sanctions. Some scholars concerned with the usefulness of sanctions as an instru- the demands of a domestic interest group rather than to achieve their declared aims. Sanctions can
ment of statecraft tend to support definitions that make reference to the purpose of sanctions. also fail because the costs are too high. The costs incurred by domestic producers or allies weaken
From this perspective, Doxey ( 1996, p. 9) defined sanctions as 'penalties threatened or imposed as the resolve to maintain the economic measures. Furthermo re, the success of sanctions is also
a declared consequen ce of the target's failure to observe internation al standards or internation al dependent on the extent to which the target state can evade the coercive measures either through
obligations'. Other writers have tried to develop definitions that omit reference to the intent of mobilizing domestic resources (political and economic) or by finding substitute suppliers of the
the sanctions. Thus, Hufbauer et al. (2007, p. 3) define economic sanctions simply as 'the deliber- embargoed goods. History is replete with examples of domestic mobilizati on against external
ate, governmen t-inspired withdrawa l or threat of withdrawa l of customary trade or financial interventio n in the form of sanctions and sanctions busting.
relations'. Given these caveats, it is not surprising that there is no consensus on the impact of sanctions.
Although economic sanctions have been dated to 432 BC (Dadkhah, 2006, p. 1386; Hufbauer Hufbauer et al. (2007) reject the claim that sanctions don't work. These authors argue that in the
et al., 2007, p. 9), they became prominent in the twentieth century with the creation of the League cases they examined between 1914 and 2000, sanctions were partially successful 34 per cent of the
of Nations. The Covenant of the League of Nations (and the UN Charter) allocates to collective time (Hufbauer et al., 2007, p. 158). The reasons for success and failure were related to the type of
economic sanctions an important role in the preservatio n of internation al peace and security. Since policy change sought, the costs of enforcing sanctions, the extent to which sanctions were instr~-
the end of the Cold War, states have increasingly turned to the use of economic sanctions. Between mental or expressive and conflicting aims among senders. Whether a 34 per cent success rate 1s
1914 and 1989, there were 121 cases of economic sanctions, but between 1990 and 2000 there actually a success is debatable. What does seem clear though is that even with a limited success rate,
were 53 cases (Hufbauer et al., 2007, pp. 20- 32). Sanctions have been utilized in relation to major sanctions have increasingly been used as a foreign policy and security tool (Mulder, 2022).
contempor ary issues such as ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses, nuclear proliferatio n and ter- Prior to the upsurge in sanctions since 1990, there was limited interest in the potentially harm-
rorism (see Box 17.5 for the example of Iran). ful consequen ces of economic sanctions on civilian population s. With the increased resort to
sanctions in the post-Cold War period and a changing moral climate, debates concerning the
legality and utility of sanctions have been compleme nted with concern over the possibly damag-
Box S .
17.5 anctions against Iran ing impact of sanctions on target population s. A series of high-profil e cases, most notably sanc-
tions against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, spurred interest in the humanitar ian conseque_nces
Iran has been a repeated target of econom ic and pol itica l sanctions. In 1979, t he US imposed of sanctions. It has led to a change in perception concerning the destructive nature of sanct10ns.
sa nctions in respo nse to t he storming of its embassy by Ira nian students. Co ncern s about Ira n's Interest in the humanitar ian impact of economic sanctions poses a number of issues and has given
nuclear weapo ns programme led to an intensificat ion of sa nctions in 2011. The EU, the US and rise to contendin g views. A central issue concerns the extent to which foreign policy goals sho~ld
Ca nada imposed a travel ban on Iran ian officials involved in its nuclear progra mme or suspected take precedenc e over the human rights of target population s, and the circumstan ces under which
of human rights abuses. A number of co untries (inclu ding the US, t he UK and Canada) also humanitar ian actors will decide on the unacceptab le consequen ces of sanctions. It has been
imposed a fi nancial services boycott, wh ich prevented t heir financial institutions from engaging argued, on the one hand, that the unintended , harmful consequen ces of sanctions can be a_ccepted
in any activities w ith Iran ian ban ks. In 2012, th e EU joined the US in instituting an oil embargo
as long as the desired political goal is achieved. On the other hand, it is contended that, given the
preventi ng t he import of Iranian oil. Th is was supplemented by an insura nce ban on ships
close relationshi p between political goals and humanitar ian objectives, the senders should cease
t ranspo rti ng Irania n oi l. Iran ian oil exports were red uced by 50 per cent. Lower oi l exports meant
their activities once it becomes apparent that the objectives cannot be attained (Weiss et al., 1997,
a red uction in fo reign currency, w hich made it more difficu lt for Ira nians to purchase fo reign .
pp. 18- 19).
goods. Among t he population at large, the impact was felt in ris ing food prices and a slowing Western states deployed waves of economic measures
Sanctions became headline news when
economy. The econom ic impact was damaging, but t he economy was not crippled (Borger and in February 2022. The init~al respon~e to the
Dehghan, 2012). against Russia following its invasion of the Ukraine
Russian invasion prompted the US to impose restrictive financial measures. Russian financ_1al asse~s
The sanctions seemed to have some impact because in 2015 Iran negotiated an agreement engaging with Russian busi-
w it h a group of internationa l powers (the US, France, Brita in, China, Russ ia and Germany) to sca le
in the US were seized, Western financial firms were prevented from
back its nuclear programme in return fo r t he lifting of econom ic sa nctio ns. However, in 2018 US nesses and Russian firms were denied access to the SWIFT payments system. Russia responded by
Pres ident Donald Trump broke with Europe and China by unilaterally reintroducing sa nctions. The restricting the outflow of hard currency from its territory and raising dome:tic interest ~ates to
new sanctions did not seem to be linked to a strategy of changing Iranian behaviour, but we re stabilize its own currency. Western goods disappeare d from Russian stores, flights to ~ussia from
intended to 'pun ish ' Iran for a long list of policies that th e US found objectionab le. Europ e were ended and it became increasingly difficult for Russia's military indusmes to access
412 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 413

high-end comp~ter chips. ~ussia weathered the storm of these sanctions in 2022 b d · . with the aim of committin g one or more serious crimes or offences ... in order to obtain direct!
to other countnes a~d relymg on its oil and gas wealth (Whalan and Belton 202/ 1ven1ng trade or indirectly a financial or other material benefit'. Organized criminal activity covers a wide ran :
The more complICated iss~e in~olved Russia's oil and gas industry. The US an1· Eur . f illegal activities, including drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, trading in human orga!s,
0
mented more measured . sanctions
. m this area because they feared th at rap1·d targetmg
. ofope rnoney laundering , illicit traffic in weapons, theft of art and cultural objects, corruption and brib-
h unple-
tors wou
. ldii Ieadd to a spike
R . moil prices and shortages of supp1y m . Europe. Europe phased i t ese b sec-
ery of officials, environme ntal crime and the use of legal networks for illegal business activities
uss~an o an ~as while Western states imposed a price cap limiting the price aid f,
ucts if they were
~a an on (see Box 17.6).
. msured
. or delivered by Western compan1·es . Th . P d uall
e mtent was to gra or t ese
d prod-
The expansion of transnation al criminal activities has been linked to the end of the Cold War
revenue
1 RI uss1a gamed. from oil and gas without upseu1·ng th e mternat1on
. . a1energy mark y re uce and the intensification of globalization. Criminal networks have taken advantage of weak central
R the
was
1 h argeh y. successful m transferring its energy exports away firom Europe toward s In d·Ia and ets. Ch· ussia governments in the former communis t world, and the increase in ethnic conflict in Central and
a t oug m many_cases it had to accept a discounted price. llla, Eastern Europe, to expand their activities. Economic globalization has provided the conditions for
. . ~estern sanctions on Russia were notable for three reasons. First Russia was able to . the massive expansion of transnation al organized crime. Economic liberalization, technological
1mt1al h Western financial measures and prevented a fin anc1a . 1co llapse 's econ d man withstand change and the transforma tion of transport systems have facilitated the growth of transnation al
.
as C ina and India did not participate in the sanctions regime a~d ste 'd . y countnes such criminal activity (Serrano, 2002, p. 25). The liberalization of trade and finance has provided ave-
Western
b economic
. activity. Third ' sanctions did impose a . cost ppe m_toandmake nues for the operation of criminal gangs. ICT has not only provided the infrastruct ure to allow
n economic on Russia · up for
ut were msufficient to change Russia's military campaign in the short ru Th . its pe~ple, these groups to coordinate their activities, it has also opened up new avenues of illegal activity such
P";:"l ofRussian action and would inmasingly ,aise the cost of [Link],n ac;i~n ~::~1::'1:ed d~ap- as internet fraud. The expansion of transport networks has increased the flow of legal and illegal
a s ort-ter~ impa~t. A fourth, unanticipa ted, outcome is that the confront;t ion shifte not ave
goods.
markets, with Russian products headed to India and Ch" h"l E d energy Transnatio nal organized crime poses a security threat in traditional and human security terms.
its transition to renewable fuels. ma, w I e urope took steps to accelerate It poses a direct threat to the political stability of weak states, and an indirect one to stronger states.
~tate~ can also use 'national security' as an excuse for carrying out economic olicies t Transnatio nal organized crime poses a direct threat to governance and state institution s through
national mdustry from foreign competitio n. In 2018, the US laced 25 p . o protect increasing corruption in governmen t and subverting good governance. The ensuing lack of legiti-
10 per cent tariffs on aluminium entering the US k fi P E per cent tanffs on steel and macy can undermine governmen tal and state authority. Moreover, the links between transnation al

~=:~;: ;~:~
US ·ustified this action b 1 . .
rit/ (Ross 2018) Th
' . . e
0i mar et rom urope, Canada and Mexico. The
a1;_m g that st~el and aluminium imports threatened its national secu-
m Jtary reqmred advanced metals while steel and aluminium
criminal groups and terrorists pose a direct threat to all states. In areas where governmen tal control
is weak, transnation al organized crime can inflame regional conflict and destabilize regional rela-

M .
:;;~:::~t:",:ctme
me o
r::rn ;his a,gument might have been believable i;:i::
encas strategic nvals. However Euro e Canada a d
tions through illegal cross-border activity, which can lead to the creation of territorial zones outside
the control of the central government, or through the supply of illegal weapons to combatant s. The
economic activities of transnation al criminal groups also pose a traditional threat to the security of
fr:;~~s ~~i:!~;: c~: j:~~e~;~.p~~e;~, tt~:~u:~p ~:::p!:~:: i::es UanSdnMeeed~ steel ~nd alumini:m the state. An interdepen dent global economy provides opportunit ies for money laundering and tax
US d d p ·d Ti , ' x1can are eager to meet
~man . res1 ent rumps actions more likely emerged from other sources One mot" . evasion. Transnatio nal organized criminal activities can threaten legal ma~kets, destroy legitimate

:::!::~::i;::t;;:
~as a esire .to carry through on a campaign promise to protect US workers from. forei n c::ano~

dM . ."
oth« countties. Banning impmts would inmase the need
US was also mvolved ma difficult renegotiati on ofNAFTA with Canada
r!, dom~:::,
:;e on :~:°uf ;~;~!s
undermine d by th .
;~~I:~~~i tool for remin~~g other countries about how dependent they
f . 1S mhay have legmmate concerns about its steel industry being
Poverty, underdeve lopment, misgui ded criminal justice pol icies and globa l mobil ity have acted
e imports o nva s sue s Ch" h · 1 together to tra nsnationa lize criminal economic acti vity. Particularly violent examp les of t hi s are
imports from allies was a convenien t ploy. a ma, t e nanona security justification for banning t he IV1 S- 13 (IV1ara Sa lvatrucha) and IV1ara 18 gangs (Ara na, 2005) . In t he ea rl y 1990s, these gangs
we re loca l groups in a poor part of Los Angeles, and comprised mainly refugees from El Sa lvador's
civi l war. Following the riots in Los Ange les in 1992, US crim inal and immigratio n policies beca me
Transnational crime and corporate espionage more severe. Th ousands of Centra l Americans were arrested and deported. These US gang
deportations transnationalized their criminal activities and destabilized the states of El Sa lvador,
~n;:;:rot~~ ~;l!:::/oencaulns·tey st~uctul reh, trabnsnationa~ organized crime has become recognized as Honduras and Guatemala. They are esti mated to have 70,000-10 0,000 members. The gangs
cunty. t as een a maJor th · US · 1
since 1996 when President Clinton defined the fi ht . eme m . nat~ona security strategy qui ckly expanded their activity in drug traffi cking, car theft, prostitution , human trafficking and
rity priority. There is no ag d d fi . . f g . agamst orgamzed crime as a national secu- contract ki lling. Although Ce ntra l American states rounded up and impri so ned thousa nds of gang
ree e mt1on o orgamzed er· · 1· h · members, membershi p re mained hi gh because of a lack of economic opport uniti es for young
criminal organizati on does . Th U ime smce a mono it ic transnation al
Crime (UN 2000 A t" I 2 ) d not exist. e N Co · . 'T . people. The gangs returned to the US more dangerous than w hen they had departed. They now
b nvent10n agamst Hansnano nal Organized
' ' r ic e a a opts a road definitio
a 'structured group of thre . . n, d efi nmg
· ·
an orgamzed criminal group as engage in a w ide range of criminal activity, often extremely violent , across Cent ral and North
e or more persons, ex1stmg fo r a period of time and acting in concert
America.
 414 CO NTEMPORARY CHALLENGES SECURITY 415

businesses and expand illegal markets, resulting in a negative impact on economic growth and It is also possible that corporations can be manipulated to inadvertently assist states in pursuing
development. Poor economic performance often results in situations where a large illegal economy national security interests. The most prominent example of this was the ability of Russian intelli-
has been allowed to flourish. gence services to use internee communication platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and
Transnational crime also has serious implications for human security. It can have a damaging Instagram to spread disinformation during and following the 2016 US presidential election (CPRP,
impact on state capacity by limiting the government's revenue, with a resultant decline in spending 2018; New Knowledge 2018). Russian troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency (IRA)
on infrastructure projects and social services. Thus, there is a direct impact on human security when used US social media platforms to distribute messages aimed at supressing voter turnout for
services such as education and health are curtailed. Moreover, activities such as the supply of illegal Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. They did this through three main tactics. One was to mis-
drugs, trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation, forced labour or the harvesting of body pares direct voters to nonexistent polling stations or deceive them into 'voting' by text. A second tactic
are obviously injurious to the persons subject to such activities. Furthermore, transnational crime is was to encourage voters to vote for third parties to reduce the number of Democratic Party voters.
accompanied by increased violence, loss of individual autonomy and consequent increased The third was to discourage people from voting by suggesting that both parties were equally bad or
insecurity. that voting did not matter. While the IRA also tried to increase support for Trump, it was especially
interested in supressing the votes of Black people in key states because they tended to vote heavily
in favour of the Democrats.
Corporate espionage
One of the reasons why Russia enjoyed considerable success in intervening in domestic US poli-
'Corporate espionage' refers to companies spying on other companies to gain commercial advan- tics was that the social media platforms were fixated on a business model that valued revenue flows
tage (Javers, 2010). Here, we broaden the investigation to examine how corporations have colluded over truth. The major platforms were slow to recognize that they were being used for political ends.
with state intelligence organizations, how states have used their intelligence organizations to assist Their business model relied on advertisers paying to be able to target social media users. Security
their corporations and how corporations have engaged in security activity against civic associa- services and political parties can use the same data that corporations use to microtarget potential
tions. A noticeable trend is a merging of state and corporate interests as states and corporations customers. Unfortunately for democracy, social media platforms can be weaponized to facilitate
collaborate on espionage projects. A question of concern is whether corporate activity in the intel- the spread of inaccurate, misleading and sometimes hateful propaganda.
r' ligence field poses a threat to democracy. The case of Chinese telecom giant Huawei illustrates how a company's overly close relationship
One side of the problem concerns companies cooperating with state intelligence agencies to with its home country's security services can hinder international commercial success. Huawei is
monitor citizens or suppress dissent. Chapter 5 mentioned corporate actions to curb WikiLeaks the world's largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment and the second largest manu-
through denying the use of servers or refusing to process financial payments such as donations. A facturer of smartphones (behind Samsung and ahead of Apple). It is also very interested in being a
series of revelations in 2013 indicated that some high-tech companies were actively working with key player in the race to build the infrastructure for the next generation of wireless communic~-
US intelligence services to subvert internet privacy (Greenwald et al., 2013 ). For example, Microsoft tions, called SG. However, a number of issues have caused Western governments to become suspi-
was accused of working with the US National Security Agency (NSA) to facilitate its monitoring cious of the company. Chinese legislation requires its citizens and corporations to be willing to
of web chats on Microsoft's Outlook portal and facilitate access to its cloud storage service assist its national spy agencies with intelligence gathering. This created the fear that Huawei tele-
OneDrive. It has been further alleged that the NSA had direct access to the systems of several major communications devices could be built with back doors installed, allowing Chinese intelligence
internet companies such as Skype, Apple, Google, Yahoo and Facebook. The NSA is also rumoured services to access data ( Cilluffo and Cardash, 2018). Western discomfort is intensified because
to have worked with major high-tech companies to place 'back doors' in their electronic systems to Huawei's founder formerly worked for the Chinese army.
allow easy access to security services. This has allowed the NSA in the US and GCH Q (Government Concerned about Chinese state and corporate espionage against US technology companies and
Communications Headquarters) in the UK co gain access co emails, banking and medical records the possibility of the Chinese government using Huawei's technology for surveillance, the US gov-
on a vast scale. ernment banned Huawei's products from US infrastructure projects in 2019. This move caused
The close relationship between internet companies and security services poses a challenge for conflict with the Chinese government, which supported Huawei's innocence. It also put pressure
these corporations. On one hand, they are often legally required to cooperate with intelligence on US allies (Australia, Canada, Japan and the UK) to enact similar bans or risk having the US
services; on the other, their cooperation with these services places their businesses at risk if consum- restrict shared intelligence. High-tech companies interested in maintaining good relations with the
ers lose faith in the security of their communications. Foreign companies and customers may be US government also ended some of their commercial relations with Huawei. Leading companies
reluctant to use US companies if they are aware of the extent to which their data is shared with US that took action included Panasonic, Google, Intel, ~alcomm and Lumentum. In the UK, a num-
intelligence agencies. ber of telecom carriers delayed the introduction of new Huawei SG mobile phones. The outcome
Another way that high-tech companies can assist governments to suppress political dissent is of this dispute has security implications for the US, its allies and China, but it also has serious eco-
through selling their products to state agencies interested in monitoring or eliminating online dis- nomic implications for the high-tech industry in North America, Europe and Asia. Commer~ial
sent and activism. The Citizenship Lab at the University of Toronto has reported on the use of competition between corporations has been fused with security competition between leadmg
products made by a California company, Blue Coat Systems (Markoff, 2013). Blue Coat's produces states.
can be used to filter content and detect particular web applications. The Canadian study revealed The flip side of companies working for intelligence agencies is state intelligence agencies work-
that Blue Coat Systems' products were being used in Syria, several other Arab states, China, ing on behalf of or against particular corporate interests. In some cases, states are prepared to defend
Indonesia, Venezuela and a number of other states with poor human rights records.
416 CONTEMPOR ARY CHALLENGES
SECURITY 417
their corporations against attacks from other corporations or states, while in other case h f the Student/ Farmworker Alliance, which had been lobbying for a wage increase for migrant
s t ey act
support a particular economic model (see Box 17.7). In October 2012, speaking to the or . to ;arrn workers harvesting tomatoes bound for Burger King (Schlosser,_ 2008). .
tion Business Executives for National Security, the US Secretary of Defense announc d ghaniza-
By their very nature, corporate espionage activities take place behmd a curtam of secrecy and it
government would d erend US private sector computers against cyberattacks of foreie n t at th e
£

. difficult to gauge their prevalence and extent. However, it is clear that corporations
(Nakashima, 2012). This came in the wake of a cyberattack against the Saudi Arabian
0 J
Saudi Aramco, in which a virus replaced crucial files with a picture of a burning US flag. Inrnpany
copowers 5
and state
:ntelligence agencies do interact to monitor the activities of other corporati_ons, states and civil
societies. It is a significant element of the covert or underside of the global polmcal economy.
cases, 1t 1s reare d t h at state-sanctio
· · £ · ne d h ac kers are attacking £rore1gn
·
corporate interests F other
. . . . · or exam-
ple, m M_ay 2014, the US government filed a~ md1ctment agamst a group of Chinese military hack-
ers allegmg that they had attacked Westmghous e Electric, SolarWorld US Steel All h CONCLUSION
'
Technologies, the USW and Alcoa Inc. (Arthur, 2014). The charges added credence' to eg . eny Cha ter 1 noted how various disciplines have tended to evolve without much reference to develop-
. private
sect~r reports t~at C~ma-based hackers had attacked a series of iron, steel, chemical, high-tech and rnen~s in other fields . Some approaches to security and international political economy have been
media compames dating back to 2006. A stranger example occurred in December 2014 wh equally insular. Despite this, many theoretical approaches have ~oted the i~t~rsection of security
en t h e
~orth Korea~ government was accused of hacking into Sony Pictures' computer system in retalia- and economic issues. At the broadest level, the international secunty system limits the free exchange
tion for filmmg a comedy ( The Interview) that made fun of an assassination attempt on N h of goods and services because of interstate and intrastate conflict. _Political eco~omy deve~opment s
, l d Ort
Koreas ea er. also influence the relative security of various national and subnational populations. The mtroduc-
?1ese examples demonstrate the increasing salience of cybersecurity in the contemporar y global tion of new concepts of security, such as human security, has encouraged analysts to think about the
polmcal economy. Government s are beginning to develop policies to protect their economies, and multiple threats to individuals. In addition to the topics covered in this chapter, iss~es of disease,
societies. For example, the Australian government committed A$400 million in defence cybersecu- hunger and environment al degradation pose equally serious physical and psyc~olog1cal t_hre~ts to
rity capabilities ( Commonwe alth of Australia, 2016) , and its 201 7 Foreign Policy White Paper rec- human survival as direct physical violence. In these areas, political economy vanables, which mflu-
ognized that 'a cyber attack could seriously compromise national security' ( Commonwealth of ence the distribution of food, the manufacture of vaccines and the exploitation of the environment,
Australia, 201 7, p. 74). The EU has also developed a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy (EU have a clear impact on human security.
2013, 201 7). ' The consideratio n of security and political economy leads us to another topic central to the
The third side of this issue is corporations engaged in espionage against civil society groups. interests of political scientists and international relations specialists - governance. In previous
Many corporations have chief intelligence officers tasked with identifying threats to the corpora- chapters, we have examined how rules are made and how governance is exercised over the complex
tion, including threats from non-profit civil society groups. Beyond using public sources to accu- global economic activity. This is the focus of Chapter 18.
mulate intelligence, corporations may hire ex-military or intelligence service members to investigate
or infiltrate civil society groups. Activities that have been documented include computer hacking,
wiretapping, voicemail hacking, theft of computers, disinformati on campaigns and investigating 111 Further Reading
activists' private lives. Consulting companies hired by the US Chamber of Commerce to combat The strategic studies imp li cati ons of some key po litica l econom ists are considered in two chapters
the non-profit Chamber Watch (a public interest group monitoring the Chamber of Commerce's in Peter Paret (ed.) (1986) Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age: Edward
activities) suggested a wide range of strategies and a proposed budget of $2 million a month to Mead Earl e's 'Adam Smith, Alexa nder Hamilton, Fre drich Li st: The Economic Foundations of M ilita ry
Power', and Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen's 'Engels and Marx on Revolution , War and the
combat Chamber Watch's activities (Ruskin, 2013). Another example is Burger King's infiltration
Army in Society'. Pet er Dombrowski (2005) outlines how politica l economy influ ences int ernati onal
security in Guns and Butter: The Political Economy of International Security. The human security concept
was initially pub li cized by th e UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human
Security. The UNO DC's (2005) The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat
Ca nada offe rs anothe r exa mple of a country where corporate and state interest s seem to have Assessment provides an excellent int ro duction to t he breadth and scope of transnational crime . A
become fused, at least in the natural resou rce sector. In autumn 2013, it was revealed that recent review of the history of econom ic sanctions as a tool of war is provided in Nicholas Mulder's
Cana da's electroni c spies , t he Commun icatio ns Security Esta bli sh ment , had been invo lved in (2022) The Economic Weapo n: Th e Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War.
monitoring Brazil 's Ministry of M ines and Energy. T hey were able to access the ministry's email,
electro ni c and telephone co mmu nicati ons. The Ca nad ian govern ment also co nvened regu lar
meetings bringing together federal agencies, spy and po lice forces w ith corporate officia ls to
review th reats to energy infrast ructure, cha ll enges by environmenta l groups to energy projects,
and econom ic and corporate espionage (Lukas and Groves, 2013). Even the domestic pol ice
fo rce was bent to service t he natural resource sector, with t he Roya l Canad ian Mounted Po li ce
declaring the existence of a radical 'anti-petroleu m' movement t hreaten ing t he Canadian natural
reso urces development strategy (McCarthy, 2015).