UNGA DISEC | Study Guide 2026 | Non-State Armed Groups & Advanced Weapons in Conflict Zones

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FIRST COMMITTEE DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

STUDY GUIDE
AGENDA :

Addressing the Proliferation of Non-State Armed Groups

and Advanced Weapons in Conflict Zones

Session Year: 2026

Committee: UNGA DISEC (First Committee)

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Table of Contents

1. Letter from the Executive Board 3

2. Introduction to the Committee (UNGA DISEC) 4
3. Introduction to the Agenda 5
4. Key Terms and Fundamental Concepts 6
5. Historical Background 7
6. Present Global Scenario 9
7. Advanced Weapons and Modern Warfare 11
8. Key Stakeholders and Major Actors 12
9. Case Studies 13
10. Challenges and Issues 15
11. How Delegates Should Prepare 17
12. Moderated Caucus Topic Suggestions 18
13. Rules of Procedure (UNA-USA) 19
14. Conclusion 20
15. Resources and Research Links 22

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1. Letter from the Executive Board

Esteemed Delegates,

On behalf of the Executive Board of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, the Disarmament
and International Security Committee (DISEC) , we extend a warm welcome to each one of you. The agenda
before this committee is not a hypothetical exercise. The proliferation of non-state armed groups and the growing
availability of advanced weapons in conflict zones is one of the defining security challenges of the twenty-first
century.
Every year, thousands of civilians are killed, displaced, or left permanently scarred by conflicts in which state
forces are not the only and sometimes not even the primary parties involved. From the deserts of West Africa to
the mountains of Afghanistan, from the rubble of Mosul to the coastlines of Yemen, non-state armed groups have
demonstrated a remarkable and alarming capacity to acquire, deploy, and sometimes develop weapons that were
once the exclusive domain of national militaries.
At the same time, rapid advances in technology particularly in the areas of autonomous weapons systems, AI-
guided drones, and hypersonic missile technology have begun to blur the boundary between what states can do
and what well-funded non-state actors might soon be able to do. This committee will need to grapple with both
dimensions of the problem simultaneously.
We expect all delegates to arrive at committee fully prepared. That means understanding your country's official
position, its alliances, its security interests, and its historical experience with either non-state armed groups or
arms proliferation. We expect you to engage constructively with delegates from opposing blocs, to listen as much
as you argue, and to understand that the most effective solutions here will require genuine cooperation across
geopolitical divides.
This study guide is your starting point, not your finishing line. Use it to build a foundation, then go deeper through
the resources listed in the final section. Read UN reports. Study the history. Look at the maps. Understand why
people take up arms and why the international community has so often failed to stop them.
Committee will demand the best from you intellectually, diplomatically, and ethically. We look forward to a
productive and substantive debate.

Sincerely,
The Executive Board

Sarthak Sharma Mitva Shah

Chairperson Vice Chairperson

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2. Introduction to the Committee (UNGA DISEC)

What is DISEC?
The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly officially known as the Disarmament and
International Security Committee (DISEC) is one of the six main committees of the UN General Assembly. It
was established as part of the original UN structure when the United Nations was founded in 1945. Its mandate
is grounded in Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which deal with the General Assembly's functions
and with the peaceful settlement of disputes.
DISEC meets annually in October and November, during the regular session of the General Assembly. It deals
with all questions relating to disarmament and international security. In practice, this means that the committee
considers issues ranging from nuclear non-proliferation and outer space governance to conventional arms control,
landmines, and increasingly the regulation of emerging technologies in warfare.

Mandate and Powers

DISEC operates under General Assembly procedures, which means its resolutions are adopted by vote and are
technically non-binding on member states. Unlike the UN Security Council, which can pass legally binding
resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the General Assembly and therefore DISEC can only
recommend. This distinction matters and delegates should keep it in mind throughout committee.
However, the influence of DISEC resolutions should not be underestimated. Resolutions passed here shape
international norms, inform treaty negotiations, and signal the collective will of the international community.
The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa
Treaty), and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty all had their intellectual and diplomatic roots in General Assembly
discussions.

Key Facts About DISEC

Established: 1945 (with the UN General Assembly)

Members: All 193 UN Member States

Voting: Simple majority for procedural; two-thirds for substantive matters

Resolutions: Non-binding recommendations (unlike UN Security Council)

Related Body: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Geneva-based Conference on

Disarmament

Annual Session: October-November, UN Headquarters, New York

3. Introduction to the Agenda

Defining the Problem

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The proliferation of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and advanced weapons in conflict zones is a compound
problem with multiple, interlocking dimensions. At its core, it refers to the spread and strengthening of armed
organizations that are not official state militaries, and the parallel increase in their access to sophisticated, often
lethal weapons including some technologies that were previously considered exclusively military-grade.
According to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons
contributes to at least 45 of the 49 conflicts currently active around the world as of 2024. These are not abstract
statistics they represent destroyed cities, fractured families, and populations trapped between warring parties with
no legitimate authority to turn to.

Why This Matters Now

Several converging trends make this agenda particularly urgent in 2025. First, the collapse of state authority in
large parts of the Middle East, the Sahel, and Central Asia following the wave of interventions and civil wars of
the early 2000s created a power vacuum that non-state actors were quick to fill. The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), at
its territorial peak in 2014–2015, controlled territory larger than the United Kingdom and collected hundreds of
millions of dollars in revenue.
Second, the global arms trade both legal and illegal has reached record volumes. The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in 2023 that global arms imports increased by 47% in the five-year
period from 2018 to 2022 compared to the previous five years, with conflict-affected regions accounting for a
disproportionate share of that increase.
Third, and perhaps most worryingly, the technology gap between state militaries and non-state actors is closing.
Commercial drones modified for military use, off-the-shelf AI components, and the diffusion of knowledge
through online networks have all contributed to a situation where a relatively small group with modest funding
can now field weapons systems that would have required a national defence budget a generation ago.

Link to Global Peace and Security

The consequences of NSAG proliferation extend well beyond the immediate conflict zones. Refugee flows
destabilize neighbouring countries. Terrorist attacks in Europe, Asia, and North America have been planned and
executed by individuals trained in NSAG-controlled territories. The drug and arms trades that sustain many of
these groups fund criminal networks that operate globally. When a Houthi drone strikes an oil tanker in the Red
Sea, global energy markets react. The local is international, and the international has local consequences.

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4. Key Terms and Fundamental Concepts

Delegates are expected to be fluent in the following terminology. These definitions reflect how the terms are
used in international law, UN documentation, and academic literature on armed conflict.

Term Definition

Non-State Actor (NSA) Any individual or group that holds significant power and influence but is
not affiliated with, directed by, or accountable to a recognized sovereign
government. In the security context, this typically refers to armed groups,
militias, and terrorist organizations.

Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) A more specific term referring to armed non-state actors who engage in
military or paramilitary activities. NSAGs may have political goals
(insurgencies), criminal goals (cartels), or ideological goals (terrorist
organizations)or a combination of all three.

Insurgency An organized, armed movement that aims to overthrow, challenge, or resist

an established government through a combination of guerrilla warfare,
subversion, and political mobilization. Distinguished from terrorism
primarily by scale and by the existence of a political program.

Proxy Warfare A conflict in which a major power supports and arms one or more local
parties, allowing the major power to pursue its strategic interests without
directly committing its own forces. The Cold War produced numerous
proxy conflicts; they remain common today.

Arms Proliferation The spread of weapons particularly advanced or dangerous weapons to new
actors, regions, or uses. Arms proliferation can occur through legal trade,
illegal trafficking, battlefield capture, or state collapse.

Autonomous Weapons Systems Weapons systems that can select and engage targets without direct human
(AWS) control. Also called 'lethal autonomous weapons systems' (LAWS) or 'killer
robots' by advocacy groups. The regulation of AWS is one of the most
contested issues in current international security law.

Hypersonic Weapons Weapons that travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (five times the speed of
sound). Their speed and manoeuvrability make them extremely difficult to
intercept with existing missile defence systems. Currently deployed by the
US, Russia, and China; proliferation risks are significant.

Arms Trafficking The illegal trade or transfer of weapons across national borders, often in
violation of international arms embargoes, export controls, or national laws.
Arms trafficking is a primary mechanism through which NSAGs acquire
weapons.

Terror Financing The provision of funds, resources, or financial services to terrorist or

militant organizations. Terror financing channels include state sponsorship,
charitable front organizations, criminal activity, cryptocurrency, and the
exploitation of informal money transfer networks.

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State Collapse A situation in which a national government loses the capacity to perform
basic functions including the maintenance of a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force across its territory. State collapse is both a cause and a
consequence of NSAG proliferation.

Arms Embargo A formal prohibition, typically imposed by the UN Security Council, on the
supply of arms to a specific country, region, or entity. Arms embargoes are
among the most commonly used non-military tools of international
pressure, but they are frequently violated.

Dual-Use Technology Technology that has both civilian and military applications. Commercial
drones, satellite navigation systems, and certain chemical compounds are all
dual-use. The dual-use nature of many advanced technologies complicates
export control regimes.

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5. Historical Background

Non-state armed groups are not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, private armies, mercenary forces, and
revolutionary movements have competed with established states for control of territory and populations. What
has changed in the modern era is the scale, the sophistication, and the global reach of these organizations.

The Cold War Era: Proxy Conflicts and the First Wave
The ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union from the 1940s to the 1991
generated a global network of proxy conflicts in which both superpowers armed, funded, and trained non-state
or quasi-state actors to advance their interests. The Afghan Mujahideen, funded and armed by the CIA through
Pakistan's ISI in the 1980s, is perhaps the most consequential example many of those fighters and their networks
later evolved into or collaborated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The end of the Cold War did not end proxy warfare. If anything, the collapse of the bipolar order left behind a
world of fragile states, surplus weapons, and unresolved ethnic and political conflicts, all of which provided
fertile ground for the non-state armed groups that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s.

Hezbollah
Hezbollah (Arabic: 'Party of God') was established in Lebanon in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of that
country. It was created with direct support financial, military, and ideological from the Islamic Republic of Iran
and with organizational assistance from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Its founding ideology
blended Shia Islamist politics with an explicit commitment to armed resistance against Israel and what it
described as Western imperialism.
Over the four decades since its founding, Hezbollah has evolved from a militia into what many analysts describe
as a 'state within a state.' It provides social services, runs schools and hospitals, and participates in Lebanese
electoral politics while simultaneously maintaining one of the most capable non-state military forces in the world.
By some estimates, Hezbollah's arsenal includes over 150,000 rockets and missiles of varying range and
accuracy. It fought a full-scale war with Israel in 2006 and has been directly involved in the Syrian civil war
since at least 2013, fighting in support of the Assad government.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and most influential
Islamist political movements in the world. Unlike many of the other organizations discussed in this section, the
Brotherhood has historically pursued political change through a combination of social outreach, electoral
participation, and in some context’s violence. Its founding ideology called for the establishment of an Islamic
state governed by Sharia law.
The Brotherhood's influence has spread across the Arab world, and offshoots or affiliated movements exist in
Jordan, Palestine (Hamas), Tunisia, and many other countries. Its relationship with violence has been contested:
while the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood formally renounced violence in the 1970s, affiliates and splinter groups
have been linked to terrorist attacks. Several countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and others have
designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, a designation that is itself disputed.

The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh)

The Islamic State known by the acronyms ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant), or by the Arabic acronym Daesh emerged from the chaos of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Its
predecessor organization, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was founded by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
in the years following the invasion. After Zarqawi's death in a US airstrike in 2006, the group reorganized and,
capitalizing on the Syrian civil war that began in 2011, expanded dramatically.

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Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared a 'caliphate' in June 2014, ISIS controlled a territory
spanning large parts of Iraq and Syria, with a population of several million people and revenues exceeding USD
1 billion annually from oil sales, taxation, and looting. At its peak, it operated a sophisticated propaganda and
recruitment operation that attracted fighters from over 100 countries. It also carried out or inspired terrorist
attacks across Europe, North America, Asia, and Africa.
The territorial caliphate was militarily defeated by a coalition of forces including US-led international forces,
Iraqi government troops, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, and Syrian militias by 2019. However, ISIS retains an
active insurgency in Iraq and Syria, a significant presence in the Sahel and West Africa (through affiliates like
the Islamic State in Greater Sahara), and a continuing capacity to inspire lone-wolf attacks globally.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Lashkar-e-Taiba ('Army of the Pure') was founded in Pakistan in the late 1980s, with the original stated purpose
of waging jihad against Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. It has long been suspected of having deep
ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and it operated relatively openly in Pakistan for many years
despite international pressure to dismantle it.
LeT carried out the November 2008 Mumbai attacks a coordinated series of ten shooting and bombing attacks
across India's financial capital that killed 166 people and injured more than 300 others. It was one of the most
devastating terrorist attacks in South Asian history. Despite being designated as a terrorist organization by the
United Nations, the United States, and many other countries, LeT's leadership has faced limited legal
accountability within Pakistan.

Boko Haram
Boko Haram (the name roughly translates as 'Western education is forbidden') was founded in northeastern
Nigeria in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf. It began as a religious movement rejecting Western influence and secular
government but turned to violence in 2009 after a crackdown by Nigerian security forces. By the mid-2010s, it
had become one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations, responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands
of people across northeastern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
In 2014, Boko Haram attracted global attention with the mass kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok,
Nigeria an event that sparked the international #BringBackOurGirls campaign. The group pledged allegiance to
ISIS in 2015, though it subsequently split into factions, with one faction the Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP)now considered the more operationally dangerous of the two.

Houthi Rebels (Ansar Allah)

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah ('Supporters of God'), emerged from northern Yemen in the 1990s
as a revivalist movement among the Zaydi Shia Muslim community. Their armed insurgency against the Yemeni
government began in 2004. After years of sporadic conflict, the Houthis seized the Yemeni capital Sanaa in
2014–2015, triggering a military intervention by a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015. The result has been one of
the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world.
Iran has provided significant support to the Houthis, including ballistic missiles, drones, and military training a
relationship that the Houthis acknowledge and the Iranian government officially denies. Since October 2023, the
Houthis have conducted repeated attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, claiming to target vessels with
links to Israel in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. These attacks have disrupted a critical global shipping route
and prompted retaliatory strikes by US and UK forces.

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6. Present Global Scenario

West Asia and the Middle East

The Middle East remains the most heavily affected region in the world in terms of NSAG activity. The 2003 US
invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, and the subsequent fragmentation of state authority across
Syria, Libya, Yemen, and parts of Iraq have created conditions in which armed non-state actors operate with
near-impunity across vast territories.
The Gaza conflict, which dramatically escalated following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023; one
of the deadliest single-day attacks on Jewish people since the Holocaust has reshaped the regional security
landscape. Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip and is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States,
European Union, and others, carried out a coordinated attack that killed approximately 1,200 Israelis and took
over 240 hostages. Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza has resulted in over 35,000 Palestinian deaths
according to Gaza health authorities, one of the most severe humanitarian crises in recent memory.
The Gaza conflict has also activated other NSAGs in the region. Hezbollah has engaged in near-daily exchanges
of fire with Israel along the Lebanese border. Houthi forces in Yemen have fired dozens of ballistic missiles and
drones at Israeli territory and at shipping in the Red Sea. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have attacked
US military installations. This pattern of interconnected, multi-front conflict sometimes called the 'Axis of
Resistance' by its participants illustrates the degree to which regional NSAGs operate as part of a coordinated (if
not centrally commanded) geopolitical network.

North Africa and the Sahel

North Africa and the Sahel region; a belt of semi-arid land stretching across the continent from Senegal to Sudan
have seen an alarming increase in NSAG activity over the past decade. The collapse of the Libyan state following
NATO's intervention and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 released a massive quantity of weapons into the
regional black market, fuelling conflicts from Mali to Niger to Chad.
ISIS affiliates and al-Qaeda-linked groups, particularly the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM)
and ISWAP, have significantly expanded their presence in the Sahel. The UN Development Programme
estimated in 2023 that up to 30 million people in the Sahel live in areas affected by extremist violence. Military
coups in Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) have further destabilized the region and
complicated international counterterrorism efforts.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains one of the most complex NSAG environments in the world.
The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces,
has fundamentally altered the security calculus. The Taliban itself a non-state actor that became a de facto
government now faces challenges from the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has carried out
numerous deadly attacks within Afghanistan and internationally, including the 2021 Kabul airport bombing that
killed 13 US service members and approximately 170 Afghans.
In Pakistan, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, has dramatically increased
the tempo of attacks since the Afghan Taliban's return to power. The TTP and the Afghan Taliban are distinct
organizations, though they share an ideology and historical ties. The TTP is believed to operate from bases in
eastern Afghanistan, a situation that has produced significant tension between Islamabad and Kabul.
The region is also a significant transit point for arms trafficking, with weapons originating from conflicts in the
Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia flowing through the porous border areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.

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7. Advanced Weapons and Modern Warfare

Hypersonic Weapons
Hypersonic weapons defined as systems that travel at speeds above Mach 5 (approximately 6,000 km/h)represent
a qualitative leap in offensive military capability. Unlike ballistic missiles, which follow a predictable parabolic
arc, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) can manoeuvre during flight, making them far harder to intercept with
existing missile defence systems.
Russia used its Kinzhal hypersonic missile in Ukraine as early as 2022the first confirmed combat use of a
hypersonic weapon in history. China has tested its DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle. The United States has several
hypersonic programs in advanced development. While full hypersonic missile systems remain beyond the
capabilities of any current NSAG, the components and precursor technologies are dual-use, and the proliferation
of hypersonic technology among state actors increases the risk of eventual leakage to non-state actors through
state sponsorship or theft.

AI-Powered and Commercial Drones

The modification of commercially available drones for military use has already transformed the battlefield in
numerous conflicts. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (2020), Azerbaijan's use of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2
drones decisively shaped the outcome of the war. In Yemen, Houthi forces have used drones many with Iranian-
supplied guidance systems to strike targets deep inside Saudi Arabia, including a 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco
oil processing facilities that temporarily disrupted nearly 5% of global oil supply.
The critical point is that the drone technology itself is readily available. DJI Phantom drones, originally designed
for photography and videography, have been adapted as bombing platforms in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine. ISIS
pioneered the weaponization of commercial drones during its territorial phase; the technology and tactics have
since spread widely. The addition of AI-based targeting systems available through open-source code and cheap
computing hardware raises the prospect of drones capable of autonomous target identification.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS)sometimes called lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)are
defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as weapons that can identify, select, and attack
targets without human intervention. They represent a fundamental challenge to existing frameworks of
international humanitarian law, which require human judgment in targeting decisions.
The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for an international ban on autonomous weapons that
'cross ethical red lines.' As of 2025, negotiations at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in
Geneva have been inconclusive, largely due to resistance from the United States, Russia, and other major military
powers that are investing heavily in AWS development. The risk of AWS proliferation to non-state actors either
through state sponsorship or through the commoditization of the underlying technology is a central concern for
this committee.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Despite the attention given to high-tech weapons, the vast majority of conflict deaths worldwide are still caused
by small arms and light weapons rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars. The UN
Secretary-General's report on small arms (2023) estimated that there are approximately 1 billion firearms in
circulation globally, with roughly 857 million in civilian hands. The illicit portion of this market fuels virtually
every active armed conflict.

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8. Key Stakeholders and Major Actors

Delegates should familiarize themselves with the positions of the following key actors. These positions are not
static they evolve with changing governments, alliances, and on-the-ground realities but understanding the
baseline interests of each actor is essential for effective diplomacy.

Actor Position, Interests & Involvement

United States The US has historically led efforts to counter NSAGs through direct military
action, train-and-equip programs, and counterterrorism cooperation. It is a
leading arms exporter and has been criticized for the secondary proliferation of
US-supplied weapons. Post-Afghanistan withdrawal (2021), the US has shifted
toward an 'over-the-horizon' counterterrorism model.

Russian Federation Russia uses proxy forces and private military companies (notably the Wagner
Group, rebranded as the Africa Corps) as tools of foreign policy, particularly in
Syria, Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic. It is among the world's
largest arms exporters. Russia has vetoed multiple UN Security Council
resolutions related to armed group accountability.

China China emphasizes non-interference and state sovereignty, opposing measures it

views as impinging on the internal affairs of member states. It is a growing arms
exporter, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. It supports counterterrorism
frameworks through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) while
resisting international monitoring mechanisms.

Iran Iran is the primary state sponsor of a network of non-state armed groups across
the Middle East (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias). It views these
groups as a strategic deterrent and as instruments of regional influence. Iran
consistently denies arms transfers to non-state actors at the UN level.

Israel A major regional military power directly engaged in conflict with multiple
NSAGs (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis). Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes
against arms transfers to Hezbollah in Syria. It strongly advocates for
international action against state-sponsored NSAGs.

Saudi Arabia Leader of the coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen. A major arms importer
(primarily from the US and UK). It views Iran's NSAG network as an existential
threat and advocates for stronger international mechanisms to counter Iranian
arms transfers.

Pakistan Pakistan's complex relationship with NSAGs has made it one of the most
sensitive cases in international security. The Pakistani military and intelligence
services have been accused of supporting certain militant groups as strategic
assets, while simultaneously fighting others. Pakistan disputes these
characterizations and emphasizes the security challenges it faces domestically.

Turkey A NATO member that has also been accused of supporting various armed groups
in Syria and Libya. Turkey is a significant and growing arms exporter (Bayraktar
drones). Its position on NSAGs varies considerably depending on the specific
group and context.

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United Arab Emirates A key partner in the Yemen coalition. Has been linked to funding various armed
factions in Libya. Advocates strongly for designating Islamist political
movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as terrorist organizations.

European Union Generally, supports multilateral approaches to arms control and NSAG
regulation. EU member states are significant arms exporters; the bloc has
struggled to maintain a consistent arms embargo enforcement posture. Hosts
significant arms control negotiations through its member states.

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9. Case Studies

Case Study 1: The Islamic State Territorial Control and the Weapons Economy
Background
The Islamic State's capture of the Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014 represents the most dramatic territorial seizure
by a non-state actor in the post-Cold War era. Within days, ISIS controlled Iraq's second-largest city, the
surrounding Nineveh plains, and a substantial portion of Iraq's northern and western territories. Its momentum
carried it across the border into Syria, where it captured Raqqa and declared it the capital of a self-proclaimed
caliphate.

The Weapons Question

How did ISIS arm itself? The answer involves multiple channels. First, the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face
of ISIS's advance in 2014 resulted in the capture of enormous quantities of US-supplied weapons including
Humvees, artillery pieces, and large stocks of small arms which had been provided to the Iraqi military during
the post-2003 reconstruction period. The Costs of War Project at Brown University estimated that the US had
provided over USD 25 billion in security assistance to Iraq between 2003 and 2011; a significant portion of this
equipment ended up in ISIS's hands.
Second, ISIS generated its own revenue. At its peak, it was earning an estimated USD 1.5 million per day from
oil sales alone, supplemented by taxation of the population under its control, looting of banks (it reportedly seized
over USD 400 million from the Mosul central bank), and extortion of businesses. This revenue allowed it to
purchase weapons on the black market, including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGMs) from regional arms markets.
Third, ISIS demonstrated a sophisticated capacity to manufacture improvised weapons, including drone bombs,
chlorine-filled rockets, and car bombs. Its weapons manufacturing operations were documented by the Conflict
Armament Research group, which tracked over 40,000 items recovered from ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

International Response
The international response to ISIS was ultimately a military coalition that included over 60 countries. The US-
led Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) began airstrikes in August 2014. By
2019, the territorial caliphate had been eliminated. However, the committee should note that the conditions that
allowed ISIS to emerge political marginalization, state collapse, regional proxy competition have not been
fundamentally addressed.

Key Lessons for the Committee

• State-supplied weapons can quickly become NSAG weapons when state institutions collapse.
• Economic resources are as important to NSAG capacity as military hardware.
• Military defeat does not eliminate an ideology or the conditions that produce armed groups.
• International coalitions, while effective militarily, struggle to address political root causes.

Case Study 2: The Yemen Conflict Proxy War and Drone Proliferation
Background
The Yemeni civil war, which escalated sharply in March 2015 when a Saudi-led coalition intervened against the
Houthi movement, has produced the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The UN estimates that the conflict has
killed over 150,000 people (directly from fighting) and contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands more

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from famine, disease, and the collapse of the health system. More than 21 million Yemenis roughly two-thirds
of the country's population require humanitarian assistance.

The Weapons Dimension

The Yemen conflict illustrates two distinct aspects of the weapons proliferation problem. First, there is the
question of legal arms transfers to the Saudi coalition. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and other
Western governments have sold billions of dollars in weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have been
used in the Yemen campaign. Human rights organizations have documented numerous incidents in which these
weapons were used in strikes on civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, and wedding parties. This
has generated intense political controversy in Western capitals about the ethics and legality of arms exports to
conflict parties.
Second, there is the question of Iran's arms transfers to the Houthis. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has
documented Iranian-origin ballistic missiles, drones, anti-ship missiles, and underwater drones in the Houthi
arsenal. Iran's support has transformed the Houthis from a regional rebel movement into an actor capable of
projecting force across the Arabian Peninsula and, since October 2023, into the Red Sea shipping lanes.

The Red Sea Crisis

Since November 2023, the Houthis have conducted over 100 attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea,
using anti-ship missiles and drones. They have targeted vessels with alleged links to Israel but have also struck
ships with no such connections, resulting in the deaths of crew members and significant disruption to global
trade. The Red Sea carries approximately 12–15% of global trade. The diversion of shipping around the Cape of
Good Hope has increased transit times and costs significantly.
The US and UK have conducted retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen since January 2024, under
Operation Prosperity Guardian. These strikes have degraded but not eliminated Houthi missile and drone
capabilities, illustrating a broader challenge: advanced weapons, once transferred to a non-state actor in a
permissive environment, are extremely difficult to neutralize through military action alone.

Key Lessons for the Committee

• Proxy warfare allows state actors to pursue strategic objectives while maintaining deniability.
• Legal arms transfers to state actors can contribute to humanitarian crises when those states fight in
civilian-populated areas.
• Drone and missile technology transferred by state sponsors can give NSAGs strategic reach far
exceeding their traditional capabilities.
• Commercial shipping a critical artery of global trade is vulnerable to NSAG interdiction.

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10. Challenges and Issues

Arms Trafficking and the Illicit Market

The illicit arms trade is one of the most persistent and difficult-to-address challenges in international security.
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the majority of weapons used in armed conflicts
begin their lives as legal transfers they enter the illicit market through state collapse, corruption, battlefield
capture, or deliberate diversion by arms suppliers. Tracing these weapons back to their origin requires forensic
investigation capacity that many affected states simply do not possess.
End-user certificates (EUCs)the documents that are supposed to ensure weapons remain with their intended
recipients are routinely forged or ignored. The Conflict Armament Research group documented in a 2017 report
that weapons supplied by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to fighters in Yemen and Libya had been transferred to a
variety of unintended recipients, including ISIS.

Lack of International Regulation for Emerging Technologies

The governance gap around autonomous weapons and AI-enabled military technologies is stark. The Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been discussing the regulation of LAWS since 2014 without
reaching any binding agreement. Meanwhile, the technology continues to advance rapidly. The risk is not
theoretical the UN Panel of Experts on Libya documented in 2021 that a Turkish-made Kargu-2 autonomous
drone may have been used to attack retreating fighters in Libya, potentially constituting the first autonomous
lethal engagement in history.

Proxy Warfare and State Accountability

One of the fundamental challenges of addressing NSAG proliferation is that many of the most dangerous groups
operate with the direct or indirect support of UN member states. When Iran arms the Houthis, when Russia uses
Wagner Group fighters in Africa, or when Pakistan's ISI has historically supported certain militant groups, those
states can claim deniability while the groups in question gain state-level resources and capabilities. Holding states
accountable for the actions of proxies through international law is extraordinarily difficult.

Terror Financing
NSAGs require financial resources just as much as they require weapons. Terror financing flows through multiple
channels: state sponsorship, charitable organizations used as fronts, legitimate businesses, criminal activity (drug
trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, extortion), and increasingly cryptocurrency. The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) has developed international standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
(AML/CFT), but implementation is uneven, particularly in countries with weak financial oversight capacity.

Weak State Institutions and Governance Failures

At the deepest level, the proliferation of NSAGs reflects failures of governance. Where states cannot provide
security, economic opportunity, or political representation to their populations, armed groups will fill the vacuum.
This is not a problem that can be solved solely through military intervention or arms control it requires sustained
investment in political institutions, economic development, and the rule of law. These are precisely the areas
where the international community has the worst track record.

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11. How Delegates Should Prepare

Researching Your Country

Your first task is to understand your country's relationship with the agenda. Ask yourself the following questions:
Is your country directly affected by non-state armed groups, either as a target or as a host country? Does your
country have a history of supporting, arming, or tolerating NSAGs? What is your country's position on the major
arms control treaties (ATT, CCW, NPT)? Has your country been subject to UN arms embargoes? Has your
country had troops involved in counterterrorism operations or peacekeeping missions?
The UN General Assembly's voting record is publicly available and searchable at [Link]. Look at how
your country has voted on First Committee resolutions related to arms control, disarmament, and international
security over the past decade. These votes will tell you a great deal about your country's baseline positions.

Building Your Country Stance

Once you understand your country's interests and history, synthesize them into a coherent position paper. A good
position paper addresses: what your country thinks the core problem is; what your country has done domestically
to address it; what international mechanisms your country supports or opposes; and what kind of resolution
language your country could support.
Be realistic about your country's position. If your country is a major arms exporter, it will likely resist measures
that significantly constrain exports. If your country has been targeted by NSAGs, it will likely support stronger
international action. If your country has historically been suspicious of Western-led interventionism, it will likely
prefer solutions that emphasize sovereignty and non-interference. Work within these constraints, not against
them.

Bloc Formation and Diplomatic Strategy

In DISEC, as in all UN committees, no resolution passes without coalition-building. Identify the natural allies
for your country's position early. Think about your region, your alliances, your shared security interests. Also
identify the major blocs that will be forming typically, you will see a Western bloc led by the US and EU, a
Russia-China alignment, a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc, and various regional groupings.
The most successful delegates are those who can negotiate across bloc lines. They listen carefully to opposing
positions, identify shared interests, and find language that different sides can accept. They are willing to
compromise on secondary issues to secure agreement on primary ones.

In Committee
• Come prepared with at least one specific policy proposal not just general principles.
• Use the moderated caucus to make substantive arguments, not just restate your country's position.
• In unmoderated caucuses, actively seek out delegates whose countries have different positions and
engage them diplomatically.
• Contribute to the draft resolution process either by sponsoring clauses or by engaging in clause-by-
clause negotiation.
• Read the draft resolutions that emerge from negotiation carefully before voting.

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12. Moderated Caucus Topic Suggestions

The following topics are designed to generate substantive, debate-worthy discussion. Each topic reflects a
genuine area of disagreement in international security policy.

# Topic

1 Should the United Nations establish a binding international treaty to prohibit autonomous weapons systems
capable of selecting and engaging targets without human oversight?

2 To what extent does state sponsorship of non-state armed groups constitute an act of aggression under
international law, and what enforcement mechanisms should exist?

3 Is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) an effective instrument for preventing arms proliferation to non-state
actors, and what reforms if any are needed?

4 How should the international community balance national sovereignty with the responsibility to intervene
when non-state armed groups commit large-scale atrocities?

5 Should the transfer of armed commercial drones to conflict parties be subject to the same international
controls as conventional military weapons?

6 How effective are UN arms embargoes, and what mechanisms would make them more enforceable in
practice?

7 To what degree is economic underdevelopment and political exclusion rather than religious ideology the
root cause of NSAG proliferation, and how should this affect the international response?

8 Should financial institutions and cryptocurrency platforms be subject to binding UN standards to prevent
their use in terrorist financing?

9 Given that private military companies (PMCs) now operate in many of the same spaces as NSAGs, should
they be subject to the same international regulatory frameworks?

10 How should the international community respond when a non-state armed group exercises effective control
over territory and provides government-like services to a civilian population?

11 Should the sale of weapons to states engaged in military operations with documented civilian casualties be
subject to binding international restrictions?

12 What role should regional organizations such as the African Union, Arab League, and ASEAN play in
coordinating the international response to non-state armed group proliferation?

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13. Rules of Procedure (UNA-USA)

This committee follows the UNA-USA (United Nations Association of the United States of America) model
rules of procedure. The following is a summary of the most commonly used motions, points, and procedures.
Delegates are encouraged to review the full UNA-USA rules document prior to committee.

Basic Flow of Committee

Committee sessions open with a Roll Call, during which delegates announce their presence as 'Present' or 'Present
and Voting' (the latter commits you to vote on all substantive matters). The committee then sets the agenda by
voting on a motion to open debate on the agenda item. Once debate is open, the committee alternates between
moderated and unmoderated caucuses to discuss the issues and negotiate resolution language.

Key Motions
Motion Purpose and Requirements

Motion to Open Debate Puts the committee into formal session on the agenda item. Requires a simple
majority.

Motion for a Moderated Sets a total time and speaking time for structured debate. Delegate states the
Caucus purpose of the caucus. Requires a simple majority. The chair recognizes speakers
from a speakers list.

Motion for an Unmoderated Suspends formal rules to allow delegates to move around the room and negotiate
Caucus directly. Delegate states the purpose and duration. Requires a simple majority.

Motion to Introduce a Introduces a draft resolution document for committee consideration. Working
Working Paper papers require a minimum number of signatories (varies by conference).

Motion to Table Debate Suspends debate on the current topic, either temporarily or permanently.
Requires a two-thirds majority. Moves to the next agenda item.

Motion to Close Debate Moves the committee to voting procedure on the resolution(s) before it. Requires
a two-thirds majority. Speaker time is given to two speakers for and two
speakers against before the vote.

Motion to Divide the Requests a separate vote on individual operative clauses of a resolution. Requires
Question a simple majority.

Key Points
Point Purpose

Point of Order Used to address a procedural error or to clarify a procedural matter. Takes
precedence over all other business. Cannot be used to make substantive
arguments.

Point of Personal Privilege Used when a delegate's ability to participate in committee is compromised (e.g.,
cannot hear a speaker, wants to switch on fan). Should be used sparingly.

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Point of Parliamentary A question directed to the dais about the rules of procedure. Must be asked
Inquiry during appropriate pauses in proceedings.

Right of Reply Requested after a speech that has personally or directly insulted a delegate's
country.

Point of Information A question asked by a one delegate to another after their speech, only if the
speaker yields to POIs.

Yields
A yield happens at the end of a delegate’s speech when they have time remaining on the clock. Instead of
wasting that time, they can yield it in one of three ways:

Yield to Another Delegate

The speaker gives their remaining time to a specific delegate, who then uses it to speak. That delegate cannot
yield again the time ends with them.

Yield to Questions (POIs)

The speaker opens the floor to questions from other delegates. The chair calls on delegates who wish to ask
questions, and the original speaker answers them until the time runs out. This is one of the most dynamic and
engaging options.

Yield to the Chair

The speaker simply gives up their remaining time. The chair moves on. This is the default if no yield is stated.

Voting Procedure
During voting procedure, the chamber is closed and no delegate may enter or leave. Delegates vote on each
resolution in turn. A simple majority is required to pass most substantive resolutions in DISEC. Delegates may
abstain. Draft resolutions that pass become the formal recommendations of the committee.

Working Papers and Draft Resolutions

A working paper is an informal document that outlines proposed policy positions. When a working paper gains
sufficient support (as determined by conference rules), it may be upgraded to a draft resolution and formally
introduced to committee. Draft resolutions consist of preambulatory clauses (which note the context and
background) and operative clauses (which are the actual policy recommendations). Operative clauses should be
specific, actionable, and written in the active voice.

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14. Conclusion

The proliferation of non-state armed groups and advanced weapons in conflict zones is not a problem with easy
solutions. It is woven into the fabric of contemporary geopolitics into the proxy competitions of major powers,
the governance failures of fragile states, the inequalities that drive people to take up arms, and the rapid advance
of technologies that make violence cheaper and easier to organize than at any previous point in history.
What this committee can do what the United Nations itself was designed to do that is to provide a space where
these issues are confronted honestly, where different perspectives are heard with respect, and where the collective
intelligence and goodwill of the international community is brought to bear on problems that no single country
can solve alone. The resolutions that emerge from this committee will not by themselves end any conflict. But
they can build norms, create frameworks, and signal intentions that shape the choices of states and other actors
over time.
Every delegate in this room represents not just a country but the idea that international cooperation is possible
and that it matters. The history of disarmament is full of failures, but it also includes genuine achievements the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Landmines Treaty, the Arms Trade Treaty that have saved real lives. This
committee is part of that tradition.

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15. Resources and Research Links

Delegates are strongly encouraged to consult the following sources when preparing their research and position
papers. All links were current as of the time of publication.

United Nations Official Sources

• UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): [Link]
• UN General Assembly First Committee: [Link]
• UN Panel of Experts Reports (Yemen, Libya, Sudan, etc.):
[Link]
• UN News (global coverage of conflict and disarmament): [Link]
• UN Register of Conventional Arms: [Link]
• UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (UNPoA):
[Link]
• Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) official website: [Link]
• UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament (Securing Our Common Future, 2018):
[Link]

International Research Institutions

• Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): [Link]
• Conflict Armament Research: [Link]
• International Crisis Group: [Link]
• Small Arms Survey (Geneva): [Link]
• Financial Action Task Force (FATF): [Link]
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapons:
[Link]

News Sources
• Reuters World News: [Link]
• UN News: [Link]
• Al-Monitor (Middle East focused): [Link]

Key Reports to Read

• SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2023 Report
• UNODA'Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament' (2018)
• UN Secretary-General's Report on Small Arms (A/78/123, 2023)
• UN Panel of Experts on Yemen Final Reports (2022, 2023)
• Conflict Armament Research ‘Weapons of the Islamic State' (2017)

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• ICRC'Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of

Weapons' (2016)

Note on Citations in Resolutions

When citing sources in your working papers and speeches, delegates should refer to:

(a) UN General Assembly or Security Council resolution numbers (e.g., A/RES/73/27)

(b) UN Secretary-General Reports by document code (e.g., A/78/123)

(c) Named international treaties and conventions

(d) Named reports from recognized international research institutions

Avoid citing partisan political sources, social media, or anonymous online content.

UNGA DISEC First Committee

Study Guide 2026 Session

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