FORUM: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
QUESTION OF: The End of Nuclear Order: From the Collapse of New START
and the Death of Security Assurances to an Unconstrained Global Arms Race
— Rebuilding the Architecture of Global Nuclear Restraint in a World Where
Accountability Stops Precisely Where the Arsenal Begins.
SPONSORS: Federation of Russia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
French Republic, United Mexican States
SIGNATORIES: Republic of India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of
Belarus, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Swiss
Confederation, Republic of Indonesia, Ukraine, Federative Republic of Brazil
The United Nations General Assembly,
Recalling that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) remains the cornerstone of international peace and security,
binding its States Parties to non-proliferation, disarmament, and the
peaceful use of nuclear energy,
Emphasizing the interrelated, indivisible nature of the NPT’s three pillars
(non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses) and reaffirming that
efforts to strengthen one pillar must respect the other pillars,
Noting with deep concern the expiration of the New START Treaty on 5
February 2026 (the last remaining U.S.–Russia arms control agreement),
leaving no formal limits on the two largest nuclear arsenals,
Alarmed by public indications from certain nuclear-armed States that they
intend to expand their deployed arsenals beyond previous caps and even
to resume nuclear explosive testing,
Recalling the September 2025 proposal by the Russian Federation that
both the United States and Russia voluntarily continue to observe New
START’s quantitative limits for one year beyond the treaty’s lapse, as a
confidence-building measure to preserve strategic stability,
Recalling Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances,
which affirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT have a
legitimate interest in receiving assurances against the use or threat of
nuclear weapons,
Emphasizing the role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) under
Article VII of the NPT, and noting that the Russian Federation has ratified
all protocols to such zones it has signed, thereby extending legally
binding negative security assurances to over 100 States,
Welcoming efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction in the Middle East (as envisaged by the 1995 NPT
Review Conference), and encouraging the engagement of all States in the
region in this process,
Affirming the inalienable right of all States to develop and use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV of the NPT), and noting the
importance of international cooperation and assistance (e.g. nuclear fuel
cycle and technology support) to allow non-nuclear States to benefit from
civilian nuclear applications under full IAEA safeguards,
Emphasizing the necessity of effective IAEA safeguards to ensure non-
proliferation, including support for the universal adoption of the IAEA’s
Additional Protocol to strengthen the inspection regime,
Noting with concern that participation by non-nuclear States in nuclear-
sharing or extended-deterrence arrangements raises challenges for the
NPT framework, and reaffirming that any future security assurances must
take such arrangements into account in an equitable manner,
Affirming that sustainable disarmament efforts must fully address the
legitimate security concerns of all States and uphold the principle of
undiminished security for every nation;
1. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to negotiate immediately a new,
multilateral strategic arms control framework which:
(a) maintains the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads
for both the Russian Federation and the United States;
(b) seeks to involve additional nuclear-armed States (notably the People’s
Republic of China) in setting comparable limitations on their strategic
arsenals;
(c) includes mutually agreed verification and confidence-building
measures, such as reciprocal data exchanges and on-site inspections
where feasible;
2. Calls upon nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm and extend legally
binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States,
including by:
(a) ratifying or acceding to the protocols of all existing nuclear-weapon-
free zone treaties to provide binding assurances to their members;
(b) giving careful consideration to extending comparable assurances to
States engaged in nuclear-sharing or extended deterrence arrangements,
in recognition of the legitimate concerns raised by such States;
3. Urges all States, especially those whose ratification is needed for entry-
into-force (such as the United States, China, India, and Pakistan), to
finalize ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
without further delay, and calls on every nuclear-weapon State to uphold
its current moratorium on nuclear explosive testing;
4. Encourages all States to cooperate fully with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and supports the universal adoption of the IAEA’s
Additional Protocol to strengthen safeguards, while ensuring that
verification remains objective and respects national sovereignty;
5. Invites member States to promote the creation of additional nuclear-
weapon-free zones in regions not yet covered by such agreements, and
calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to provide legally binding
assurances to the members of these zones against nuclear attack;
6. Encourages the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, welcoming participation
by all States of the region and affirming that any agreed zone should
include legally binding security assurances for its members;
7. Calls on states involved in nuclear-sharing or extended-deterrence
arrangements to ensure that such activities remain fully compatible with
their NPT obligations, and to consider measures (such as enhanced
security assurances or revised deployment concepts) that reconcile
alliance commitments with the goal of global disarmament;
8. Emphasizes the importance of expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation
under strict IAEA safeguards, including through technical assistance, joint
research and development, and partnerships in nuclear energy, medicine,
agriculture, and industry, to enable developing States to benefit safely
from civilian nuclear technologies;
9. Emphasizes the need for greater transparency and confidence-building
among all nuclear-armed States, and invites the development of practical
risk-reduction mechanisms (such as advance notifications of major military
exercises, direct communication hotlines, and mutual data-sharing) to
reduce the danger of miscalculation or accidental escalation;
10. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs, to convene an annual consultative forum involving
both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, with the mandate to
review strategic stability issues and to propose further steps (political,
legal or technical) to strengthen global nuclear restraint.