Previous consistent statement.
Prior consistent statements are declarations made by
witnesses before they take the stand that are consistent with the testimony they give while on
the stand:1 As a general rule, prior consistent statements ("PCS") are inadmissible. There are
three primary justifications for this rule: first; they are self-serving and lack probative value;
second; when adduced for the truth of their contents, they constitute hearsay; and finally:
given that they are a repetition of evidence adduced at trial through oral testimony, they are
superfluous and redundant, and therefore ought to be excluded on the basis of trial efficiency 2
At common law, these statements are inadmissable under the rule that prohibits proof of
consistent statements of a witness3 because they are thought to be inherently unreliable as a
result of their self-serving nature and the possibility that prior out-of-court statements could be
concocted to support subsequent in-court testimony. "If a statement of that kind were
admitted it would be easy to manufacture evidence by telling your various friends, and then
calling them as witnesses to prove what you had told them." 4 "The reason for the rule
appears to the Court to be that the evidential value of such testimony is nil. Because it does not
assist in the elucidation of the matters in dispute, it is said to be inadmissible as being
irrelevant."'5 The objection most often raised at common law to the admission of consistent
statements is that they are self-serving. There is a danger of fabricated evidence. 6 "[T]he
presumption ... is, that no man would declare any thing against himself, unless it were true; but
that every man, if he was in a difficulty, or in the view to any difficulty, would make declarations
for himself."'7
1
David M. Paciocco, "The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent Statements: Let's Get It Right" (2013) 17 Can. Crim. L.R. 181, at
p. 1 [Paciocco]
2
(R c. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788 at para. 36 [Dinardo]; R. v. Stirling, 2008 SCC 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272 [Stirling] at
para. 5; R. v. B.(D.), 2013 ONCA 578, [2013] O.J. No. 4365 [B.(D.) at para. 31; see also Paciocco at p. 185-186))
3
R. v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 167, 74 L.T.R. 730; Jones v. South-Eastern and Chatham Ry. Cos. Managing Comm., supra note 2;
R. v. Roberts (1942), 28 Cr. App. R. 102; Gillie v. Posho, Ltd., [1939] 2 All E.R. 196 (P.C.); The Nominal Defendant v. Clements
(1960), 104 C.L.R. 476; R. v. Neigel (1918), 39 D.L.R. 154, [1918] 1 W.W.R. 477, 29 C.C.C. 232 (Alta. C.A.); Welstead v. Brown,
[1952] 1 S.C.R. 3, [1952] I D.L.R. 465, 102 C.C.C. 46; R. v. Campbell (1978), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 6, 1 C.R. (3d) 309 (Ont. C.A.); Cross,
Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974) at 207; Sopinka and Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1974).at 264; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. IV, rev. Chadbourn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972) at 255, 1124; Gooderson,
Previous Consistent Statements, [1968] Camb. L.J. 64; Cross, Some Proposals for Reform in the Law of Evidence (1961), 24 Mod.
L. Rev. 32 at 43-46; Grossman, An Important Exception to the Rule Against Admission of Self- Serving Evidence (1963), 6 Crim.
L.Q. 27
4
Jones v. South-Eastern and Chatham Ry. Cos. Managing Comm., id. at 778 (L.J.K.B.), 805 (L.T.R.) per Swinfen Eady L.J.
5
R. v. Roberts, supra note 5, at 105. Also see the judgment of Morris L.J. in Corke v. Corke, [1958] 1 All E.R. 224 (C.A.),
discussed by Cross, Some Proposals for Reform in the Law of Evidence (1961), 24 Mod. L. Rev. 32 at 45.
6
MacCrimmon, M. T.. "Consistent Statements of a Witness." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 17.2 (1979).
7
R. v. Hardy, supra note 14, at 1093 per Eyre C.B.
There are exceptions to the common law rule, the most important being statements to rebut an
allegation of recent fabrication," recent complaints in sexual offences, statements of
identification, and res gestae. The rule is of recent origin. Until the early 1700's it was generally
accepted that prior statements of a witness were admissible, 8 but gradually objections to the
admission of these statements were sustained, 9 and the current common law rule has been
virtually unchanged since 1794.10
In Tanzania the position as at common law, the general rule is that a witness's previous
consistent statements are generally inadmissible as original evidence of the facts they contain.
This is because such statements are considered hearsay and cannot be used to "bolster" or
enhance the witness's credibility during their testimony in court. It's governed under section
175 of the Evidence Act11 which provides statutory Exceptions for Admissibility. The Evidence
Act provides exceptions where former statements are admitted not as proof of the facts stated,
but for other purposes. Therefore, In the Tanzanian evidence position, a prior consistent
statement is generally viewed as "moribund" (close to death in terms of utility and general
admissibility) because it is considered a self-serving statement that carries little weight in
proving the truth of the facts stated. The long-standing legal principle is that a witness's
credibility cannot be bolstered merely by showing they have said the same thing before, as the
previous statement suffers from the same potential defects (e.g., bias, faulty memory) as the
current testimony. The rationale is that "evidence is not made better by repetition". However,
it is "technically not dead" because it remains admissible in specific, limited circumstances as an
exception to the general rule:
8
Freind's Trial (1696), 13 St. Tr. 1 at 32; Squire's Trial (1753), 19 St. Tr. 262 at 270.
9
See Halliday v. Sweeting, discussed in The Case of the Borough of Ivelchester, [1775] 3 Doug. El. Cases 151 at 163. (The plaintiff
could not call the wife and sister of the witness to testify that the witness had told the same thing to them. No reasons are
given.) Also see Wigmore, supra note 5, Vol. V, (1974) at 12-28, 1364.
10
R. v. Hardy (1794), 24 St. Tr. 199 at 1093.
11
[Cap. 6 R.E 2023]