Table of Contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction and Background 2
Purpose 3
Understanding the Crisis:
4-7
Barriers to Municipal Action
Study Design 8
Findings and Recommendations 9-11
Conclusion 12
Executive Summary
Canada’s housing shortage continues to get worse, impacting even small towns like Newmarket.
This report examines how such jurisdictions can break through fiscal, legal, and territorial barriers
for generating and retaining affordable housing. It is based on scholarly research, actual cases, as
well as experiential learning through a municipal internship with Newmarket’s Planning
Department.
Municipal governments, though not the main contributors of housing funds, have a strong role as
planners, using their zoning, planning, and incentive capabilities. Their ability is hampered, though,
by their restricted taxation powers as well as their dependence on provincial law. These are
particularly pressing issues for small municipalities, where long-term affordable housing initiatives
are not easy to support given their budget constraints.
In spite of such constraints, municipalities can adopt cost-effective and innovative strategies.
Innovated, recommended strategies involve taking advantage of Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) as well as
around Major Transit Station Areas (MTSAs) where provincial law empowers municipalities to
require affordable housing units within new developments. IZ is a sustainable measure that
matches growth from within, especially when implemented within high-opportunity locations such
as along transit lines.
Other suggestions involve collaborating with non-profits as well as the use of public land through
Community Land Trusts (CLTs) that ensure affordability forever and lessen the need for volatile
market mechanisms. The report further discusses density bonusing as well as Community Benefits
Charges (CBCs), mechanisms that can motivate developers to provide affordable units in return for
higher density.
The report determines that though there are significant structural issues for municipalities, strategic
planning, coupled with targeted policy action, can help contribute meaningfully toward local
housing affordability. For Newmarket, coordinating transit investments with affordable housing
incentives, finding surplus lands for development, as well as building partnerships with the non-
profit sector, will be steps forward.
Page 1
Introduction and Background
The Municipal role in a National Local Pressures: The Case of
Crisis Newmarket
Canada’s housing crisis has reached While senior levels of government control most
unprecedented levels, with millions of residents of the funding and regulatory levers,
struggling to access safe and affordable municipalities remain on the front lines of the
housing. Nationally, the gap between housing crisis, managing the day-to-day impacts of
need and housing availability is staggering, with housing instability in their communities. The
an estimation of 4.3 million homes missing that crisis is no longer isolated to major urban
would be affordable to people in core housing centres, it has spread to smaller municipalities
need (Whitzman, 2023). This shortfall reflects such as the Town of Newmarket, where local
decades of underinvestment in social housing housing markets are being strained by
and a growing reliance on the private market to population growth, investor-driven
meet public need. development, and a lack of deeply affordable
rental stock (SHS Consulting, 2023).
Municipal governments in Canada play a central
role in shaping housing outcomes through local In recent years, the Town of Newmarket, like
planning, zoning, and development approvals. many small and mid-sized municipalities in the
They are the frontline actors to address housing Greater Toronto Area (GTA), faces significant
needs of the local communities, focusing on pressure to accommodate growth while
engaging with communities and address maintaining affordability. As a lower-tier
challenges in housing policy execution provided municipality under York Region, Newmarket is
by federal and provincial [Link] are constrained by provincial policies, limited
responsible for implementing affordable housing taxation powers, and a lack of direct funding for
policies. While they do not typically fund or housing. As such, municipalities must find
operate housing directly, their decisions around innovative ways to meaningfully intervene in a
land use, incentives, and community deeply structural crisis.
infrastructure are crucial to both the production
and long-term preservation of affordable
housing in their communities (Harchard et al.,
2022).
Fig 1. Average price increase for a house across Ontario (Ontario Housing Affordability Task Force, 2022)
Page 2
Purpose
This report aims to investigate how the Town of
Newmarket, along with with other smaller
municipalities in Canada, can generate more
affordable housing units to address the ongoing
housing crisis. Drawing on academic literature,
municipal case studies and insights from a
placement at the Town of Newmarket this report
explores the role that local governments can play
in addressing housing need under fiscal and
legal constraints.
The purpose of this report is to evaluate the
policy tools available to municipalities to both
create new affordable housing and protect
existing affordable units. The report identifies key
lessons from other Canadian cities that have
experimented with strategies such as
inclusionary zoning, density bonusing, and
community land trusts. Ultimately, the goal is to
provide practical insights for municipal
policymakers and planners working to address
Canada’s deepening housing affordability crisis.
Understanding the Crisis:
Barriers to Municipal Action
Municipalities play a crucial role in housing independently mandate affordable
policy, but their capacity to act is severely housing initiatives and enable income
limited by factors beyond local control. The generating tools without enabling
growing prominence of cities in housing provincial frameworks. Even where
has been accompanied by overlapping municipalities have expressed willingness
responsibilities with provincial and federal to implement bold zoning reforms, such as
governments. This “entanglement” can permitting multi-plexes or mandating
result in poor coordination and opaque affordability near transit, they remain
accountability (Harchard et al., 2022). In bound by provincial planning acts and
practice, cities are expected to plan for and restrictions (Starr & Pacini, 2001).
accommodate new housing, yet they often
lack the authority or resources to implement These constraints are compounded by
it. Whitzman et al. (2022) similarly observe Canada’s federal structure, which
that jurisdictional ambiguity leaves each produces significant jurisdictional
level of government pursuing different fragmentation. The Constitution does not
approaches, and that federalism continues clearly assign responsibility for housing to
to impede the development of affordable any one level of government, creating a
housing. This section explores the principal situation where federal, provincial, and
obstacles facing municipal housing municipal actors each play overlapping
initiatives: fiscal shortfalls, legal and roles without coordinated governance
institutional constraints, and additional (Porter, 2004). The result is a fragmented
practical impediments such as governance system where municipalities are tasked
fragmentation, planning delays, and with implementing housing policies but
political opposition. lack control over the funding, legislation, or
long-term planning tools needed to do so
effectively (Hachard, 2020). While federal
Legal, Institutional and agencies like CMHC develop national
Jurisdictional Constrains strategies and provinces set planning
Municipal legal authority in Canada is legislation, municipalities are left to
delegated by the provinces, and cities operationalize complex housing goals with
cannot act beyond what provincial inadequate resources or authority.
legislation allows. Municipal governments
are famously described as “creatures of the Continued on following page
provinces,” meaning they exist entirely at the
discretion of provincial governments and
possess no constitutional autonomy of their
own (Breton, 2021). As a result,
municipalities do not have the power to
Page 4
Understanding the Crisis: Barriers to Municipal Action
Moreover, existing zoning bylaws in many Across the province, cities were handed
municipalities still prioritize low-density, responsibility for operating and
single-family housing. Changes to these administering social housing through
bylaws often require complex official plan devolution in the 1990s and early 2000s,
amendments and multiple layers of approval, often without sustainable or adequate
further slowing reform. Whitzman et al. (2022) funding (Starr & Pacini, 2001).
emphasize that restrictive zoning codes and
minimum parking requirements continue to Furthermore, municipalities lack access to
hinder the creation of affordable and income or sales tax, and they are often
supportive housing across the country. restricted from imposing other income
generating methods such as vacancy taxes
In short, municipal governments in Canada or linkage fees without provincial approval
operate within a legally restricted and (Hachard et al., 2022). Affordable housing
jurisdictionally fragmented environment. They initiatives are therefore forced to compete
are expected to deliver housing solutions with transportation and other
without being granted the powers or supports infrastructures for the limited funds. This
required to do so. forces municipalities to rely on
unpredictable and short-term grants from
Fiscal Constraints higher governments, making it difficult to
Municipal budgets in Canada are chronically plan and finance long-term housing
mismatched with their housing solutions.
responsibilities. Local governments have very
limited revenue-raising powers. They receive For smaller municipalities such as the
only about 10% of all tax revenues and depend Town of Newmarket, the effects of this
almost entirely on property taxes (Harchard et fiscal imbalance are even more
al., 2022). Their revenues depend on property pronounced. With fewer resources, these
taxes, meaning low-income renters contribute municipalities often struggle to initiate or
a larger share of their income to taxes sustain affordable housing initiatives.
compared to high-income homeowners,
despite the availability of deferral programs for As Liebig (1993) and Whitzman et al.
low-income homeowners (Thompson et al., (2022) argue, this structural fiscal
2022). imbalance leaves municipalities with
substantial responsibilities but minimal
In Ontario, municipalities fund approximately means, limiting their ability to build new
77% of all social housing costs, far exceeding units, preserve existing stock, or even
the contributions made by the federal and maintain emergency shelter capacity.
provincial governments (Hachard et al., 2022).
In Toronto for example, the city receives no
provincial funding to support the Toronto
Community Housing Corporation, despite
managing over 60,000 units (Whitzman et al.,
2022).
Page 5
Understanding the Crisis: Barriers to Municipal Action
Systemic Inefficiencies in increasing carrying costs and deterring the
Affordable Housing Delivery construction of below-market housing
(Canada Mortgage and Housing
Despite growing demand for affordable
Corporation, 2020). These delays are
housing, the structure of Canada’s multilevel
especially damaging for non-profit housing
governance system creates significant
initiatives, which often operate on tight
inefficiencies that hinder municipalities from
margins and rely on time-sensitive
acting decisively. The jurisdictional
government funding (LaFleur, 2024).
fragmentation meant that there is a diffusion of
responsibilities between different levels of
government. This led to a lack of coordination,
inconsistent priorities, and unclear
accountability (Hachard et al., 2022; Whitzman
et al., 2022). Federal initiatives like the National
Housing Strategy may offer funding, but
implementation is often shaped by provincial
regulations and municipal zoning decisions.
As a result, housing providers must navigate a
complex and disjointed landscape. A single
affordable housing development might
require federal capital support, provincial
approvals for rent supplements, and municipal
planning and zoning permissions, which are
all operating on different timelines, with Figure 2. Growth in regulatory complexity: Between
different criteria, and little intergovernmental 1970 and 2020, the number of words in Ontario’s
alignment. This layered bureaucracy Planning Act increased from 17,000 to 96,000,
introduces risk and uncertainty that can delay while the Provincial Policy Statement more than
or derail projects entirely, particularly for doubled since 1996. These expansions reflect the
smaller non-profit or community-based increasing procedural burden municipalities face in
developers who lack the administrative planning and development approvals (Ontario
capacity to manage these complexities (Fang Housing Affordability Task Force, 2022).
et al., 2023).
Continued on following page
Municipalities are also constrained by slow
and cumbersome local approval processes.
Development proposals typically require
multiple rounds of rezoning, site plan
approvals, public consultations, and
sometimes appeals to provincial tribunals like
the Ontario Land Tribunal. In major urban
centres such as Toronto and Vancouver,
approval timelines for large-scale
developments can exceed a year, significantly
Page 6
In addition to administrative challenges,
municipalities must also navigate significant
political and community opposition. Proposals
for affordable, supportive, or higher-density
housing frequently provoke NIMBY (Not In My
Backyard) resistance, driven by fears over
traffic, density, or declining property values.
These objections can lead to public backlash,
council pushback, or legal appeals that delay
or dilute projects (Fang et al., 2023). Elected
officials in suburban or affluent wards may
hesitate to support such developments due to
Figure 3. Zoning rigidity in Toronto: An
political risk, even when plans align with
estimated 70% of residential land is zoned
housing affordability goals. Canada’s strong
exclusively for single- or semi-detached
commitment to local democracy means that
homes, limiting the city's ability to promote
vocal opposition can often override expert
gentle density and diversify its housing stock
planning recommendations.
(Ontario Housing Affordability Task Force,
2022).
The municipal government, faced with
jurisdictional challenges, fiscal constraints and
the overall inefficiencies in affordable housing
delivery often finds itself responsible for
implementing ambitious housing goals
without the authority, funding, or institutional
support necessary to achieve them. As such,
local municipalities must find innovative ways
and cost-effective tools to work around these
constraints to create and preserve affordable
housing.
Page 7
Study Design
This report draws on a combination of
academic research, municipal case studies,
and experiential insights gained through a
placement with the Town of Newmarket’s
Planning Department. The primary
methodology involved a qualitative review of
housing literature, focusing on scholarly work
related to municipal governance, affordable
housing tools, fiscal federalism, and
intergovernmental coordination. In total, 43
academic and policy sources were reviewed.
To contextualize the academic findings, the
report also incorporates one internal municipal
planning document provided during the
placement. This document outlines an
affordable housing initiative under
consideration by the Town of Newmarket,
which focuses on encouraging gentle density
through planning policy updates and
identifying soft sites for potential affordable
housing development. While not quoted
directly due to confidentiality, the initiative
informed the understanding of how smaller
municipalities are approaching the housing
crisis within their limited policy and fiscal
capacities.
Case studies from other smaller municipalities
are also used to examine what may be feasible
for smaller towns like Newmarket. Through
using both academic and real-world municipal
practices, it aims to bridge the gap between
academic inquiry and actionable policy
recommendations.
Key findings and
Recommendations
municipal funding. Inclusionary Zoning,
After thorough review of relevant literature combined with alternatives for developers
X case studies, key findings include
and such as community benefit charges or density
various viable policy tools to increase bonusing tools to allow for alternatives and
affordable housing supply despite fiscal, offset developer costs, it is a financially viable
legal and institutional constraints. tool for municipalities facing budget
constraints (Brunick, 2004). It has also been
endorsed by the province of Ontario in 2018
Inclusionary Zoning
through amendments to the Planning Act,
Inclusionary zoning is a policy requiring
which allows municipalities to implement
private developers to allocate a percentage of
inclusionary zoning.
affordable units within new housing projects.
In Ontario, IZ was recently enabled specifically
Smaller municipalities like Newmarket can
around Major Transit Station Areas, and
adopt these lessons to leverage IZ effectively.
several mid-sized municipalities are actively
Given Newmarket’s ongoing urban growth
exploring or implementing this strategy. For
and transit-oriented development
example, Kitchener, Waterloo, and Cambridge
opportunities, particularly around the GO
in Ontario are working collaboratively with the
station and Yonge Street rapid transit
Region of Waterloo to introduce an IZ program
corridors, a tailored IZ policy could effectively
designed to secure affordable units within
ensure that new residential projects
new residential developments near their light-
incorporate affordable units, addressing
rail (ION) transit stations (Region of Waterloo,
housing affordability proactively without
2025).
significant municipal expenditures (SHS
Consulting, 2023)
Mississauga provides another example of how
IZ policies can be adapted effectively in mid-
sized municipalities. Mississauga is advancing
an IZ policy targeting transit-oriented
development around its major transit nodes,
with the intention of increasing the city's
affordable housing supply without significant
municipal funding. By focusing IZ
requirements around transit hubs, the city
leverages existing infrastructure investments
and ensures that affordable units are
accessible to residents relying on public
transportation (City of Mississauga, 2022).
Figure 4. Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) requires
The benefits about IZ is that it is sustainable some units in new developments to be
and cost effective, as it does not require direct affordable, as shown in white.
Page 9
Key findings and Recommendations
Partnerships and Land Neighbourhood Land Trust in Toronto. The
acquisition for Affordable land trust, supported by the City of Toronto
and philanthropic partners, purchased
Housing
rooming houses to prevent the displacement
Small and mid-sized municipalities can
of low-income tenants and preserve
expand affordable housing effectively by
X affordability amidst rapid gentrification (PNLT,
partnering with non-profit organizations and
2017) . As noted in earlier analysis, such land
leveraging public land assets. Many smaller
stewardship practices demonstrate how local
municipalities such as the Town of Newmarket
governments can empower communities to
lack dedicated housing departments and
take collective ownership of housing futures,
significant budgets but can facilitate
bypassing some of the traditional constraints
affordable housing projects by contributing
imposed by senior governments or private
land, minimal funding, or administrative
markets.
support.
For municipalities like Newmarket, these tools
Smaller counties such as Muskoka have
are highly transferable. By auditing its surplus
successfully partnered with Habitat for
public land, issuing calls for non-profit
Humanity, utilizing surplus municipal land to
partnerships, and establishing a modest land
create affordable housing units (Habitat for
acquisition reserve, the Town can take
Humanity, 2023).These partnerships offer
proactive steps toward securing land for
municipalities a cost-efficient means to deliver
affordable housing without incurring
housing, as the capital burden is shared or
unsustainable costs. When these strategies
absorbed by non-profits who bring provincial
are used together, it can enable municipalities
or federal funding, volunteer labour, or
to advance affordable housing objectives in
organizational expertise (Harchard et al.,
ways that are both financially feasible and
2022).
locally controlled.
Other forms of collaborations such as working
with Community Land Trusts (CLTs), also
represent an innovative approach that
provides lasting affordability. CLTs acquire
and hold land in perpetuity, removing it from
the speculative market and enabling
community-based organizations to offer
affordable housing over the long term (August
et al., 2022) . Municipalities can support CLTs
through land donations or long-term leases,
ensuring that affordability is preserved for
uture generations (City of Mississauga, 2024).
These models also help protect existing
affordable housing from displacement and
redevelopment pressures, which could be Figure 5. Community Land Trusts (CLTs) lower home prices
seen in the case of the Parkdale by separating land ownership from the home and ensure
long-term affordability through resale conditions (Law, 2021).
Page 10
Key findings and Recommendations
Community Benefit Charge and Several benefits of density bonusing include
Development Incentives for the ability of private-sector investment sans
substantial municipal cost, mixed-income
Affordable Housing
developments, as well as urban intensification
Density bonusing, also known as bonus
consistent with municipal intent (Moore,
zoning, enables municipalities to grant
2024). Strong market conditions are, however,
developers additional density or height
necessary for the effectiveness of bonusing, as
beyond existing zoning limits in exchange for
weak markets reduce developers' ability to
community benefits such as affordable
provide extra benefits to the community sans
housing. Historically governed by Section 37
additional incentives. The shift to the CBC
of Ontario’s Planning Act, this tool allowed
system restricts the ability of municipalities as
cities to negotiate directly with developers,
well as flexibility, ultimately reducing public
capturing a portion of increased land values
benefit overall (Moore, 2024).
resulting from rezoning (Moore, 2024). In
2020, Ontario transitioned from Section 37 to a
For a town such as Newmarket, strategically
standardized Community Benefits Charge
utilizing density bonusing or the new CBC
(CBC), capping contributions at 4% of land
model is still an attractive option. By explicitly
value, significantly reducing municipalities'
identifying affordable housing as a priority
flexibility (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs
community benefit in planning policy
and Housing, 2023).
statements and perhaps incorporating pre-
zoning incentives along transit nodes,
The City of London has explicitly leveraged
Newmarket can effectively make such a tool
density bonusing to advance affordable
work. Coupling density incentives with clear
housing objectives. London’s Official Plan
affordable housing requirements would
included bonusing policies to permit extra
provide transparency for developers as well as
height for developments that provided public
members of the public, guiding them towards
benefits like affordable housing. By 2021,
expected positive urban growth impacts.
London had secured the creation of 94 new
affordable housing units through Section 37
bonusing agreements with developers. These
units were negotiated as part of various
rezoning approvals, demonstrating how
bonus zoning can directly yield affordable
rental units in a mid-sized city context. London
viewed this tool as so important that it formally
objected to its removal; city staff noted that
losing Section 37 would undermine their
ability to obtain affordable units in exchange
for height and density bonuses(Fleming,
2019).
Page 11
Conclusion
Addressing the housing affordability crisis in municipalities like Newmarket requires both creative
thinking and pragmatic policy application. Despite limited jurisdiction and fiscal resources, local
governments are uniquely positioned to act as catalysts for change by leveraging their planning
authority and engaging community partners.
The most effective strategies integrate land-use planning with fiscal innovation. Inclusionary
Zoning (IZ) near Major Transit Station Areas (MTSAs) can make sure new developments have
affordable units. By targeting such demand areas, municipalities can leverage their scarce
leverage to create substantial public value without direct cost outlays. The success of IZ, though,
depends on careful planning, transparent implementation, and market feasibility.
No less essential are non-profit collaborations and public land assembly for affordable housing.
Community Land Trusts (CLTs) and initiatives enable municipalities to avoid speculation markets
while maintaining long-term affordability. These models secure communities, providing a
counterpoint to private market instability.
Last, strategic density bonusing and CBCs, especially where there is high market demand, can
provide additional affordable housing and public infrastructure benefits. While there is less
negotiation latitude with the adoption of the standardized CBC approach, municipalities can still
coordinate planning tools for alignment, putting affordable housing on the priority list as a main
benefit. In Newmarket, pre-zoning near transit nodes and explicit benefit structures can facilitate
such a goal.
Ultimately, municipalities can't fix the housing problem on their own. But through policy
alignment, innovative partnerships, and place-specific planning tools, municipalities such as
Newmarket can contribute meaningfully to the production and preservation of affordable housing.
This report advocates for an engaged, place-sensitive approach that capitalizes on Newmarket’s
opportunities for generating equitable, inclusive, and sustainable urban development.
Page 12
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