MODULE II:

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA (HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

Introduction
Development requires the organization of social and economic activities on a much larger scale
than is currently found in individual countries in Africa. Most countries in Africa are relatively
small, not only in population, but also in terms of economic output. This has led to efforts to
promote regional and sub-regional integration as a major strategy for promoting intra-regional
trade and accelerating development and structural transformation. In spite of the very modest
results achieved so far in this ongoing process, the strategy remains a major instrument for
helping the region to overcome the problems of economic fragmentation, and promoting
economic diversification and inter-linkages between production units in various countries. In this
unit, we shall map out the existing regional and sub-regional structures, achievements and
constraints of integration, trade union structures and some perspectives for a better
regionalisation in Africa.
Regional and sub-regional structures in Africa
Undoubtedly, the first argument for regional integration is that of efficiency: when producers and
countries specialize in goods that they can produce more cheaply, the whole region gains.
Second, economies of scale that cannot be made on the domestic market can often be achieved
on a larger regional market. Third, regional integration can provide experience and the benefits
of competition for generally high-cost producers with less risk than in the wider world.
There is a long history of regional integration arrangements in Africa, beginning with the
customs unions in 1900 between Kenya (then known as the East African Protectorate) and
Uganda. At present, there are broadly two kinds of regional groupings in Africa: those sponsored
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and those resulting from
other initiatives. The UNECA has promoted three sub-regional arrangements: the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
At the Pan-African level, the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC)
agreed upon in Abuja in 1991 was the culmination of previous declarations by African Heads of
State and Government and their ministers regarding their desire to create an Africa-wide
economic community (such as the Kinshasa Declaration of 1976, the Lagos Plan of Action and
the Final Act of Lagos of 1980).
At the 37th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia (July 2001), the OAU
was formally transformed into the African Union (AU) after 50 of the OAU’s 53 member States
ratified a new treaty. The new Secretary-General of the AU has been ask to transform the OAU
into the AU within a year.
In western Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) came into
existence in 1975 with the aim of eventually becoming a customs union and then a common
market, while integrating states in the West African sub-region. It comprises 15 member States

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(Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo), ten of which have
allegiances with other sub-regional groupings. The revised ECOWAS Treaty, signed in 1993,
seeks to consolidate and expand the achievements of ECOWAS and to tackle the excessive
number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the sub-region, strengthen the executive
capacity of the ECOWAS secretariat and expand the political functions of the community. It also
accords supranational status to ECOWAS as the sole representative institution for the West
African sub-region. Among other things, it added peacekeeping to the ECOWAS list of
objectives.
Presently, the West African sub-region has the largest number of IGOs (about 40 in all). These
include the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA, comprising Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, the Niger, Senegal and Togo), ECOWAS and
the Mano River Union (embracing Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). The UEMOA was
established in 1994. A major difference between UEMOA and ECOWAS is that the latter has a
functional monetary integration component.
On the basis of the agreement reached at the ECOWAS Council of Ministers meeting in 1993, all
remaining IGOs should have been transformed into specialized agencies of ECOWAS by 2005.
Numerous activities aiming to establish cross-border initiatives in eastern and southern Africa
in order to increase trade, investments and payments among collaborating countries have been
launched. This sub-region now has the second highest number of IGOs after West Africa.
The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) was created in 1978 and laid
the groundwork for the creation of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa
(COMESA) in November 1993. COMESA now embraces 21 countries, after the United
Republic of Tanzania withdrew its membership in 2000. The PTA embarked on five main areas
of cooperation: monetary, fiscal and financial; trade development and customs; transport and
communication; industry, energy and the environment; and agricultural development.
The COMESA treaty calls for the establishment of a customs union through the removal of all
trade barriers and the establishment of a common external tariff and rules of origin. The treaty
anticipates the coordination of macroeconomic policies as countries move towards the free
movement of services and capital as well as currency convertibility.
Unlike the PTA, COMESA now stresses a commitment to the redistribution of the benefits of
integration, through special regional programmes to promote the development of the least-
developed countries in the region to achieve balanced development within the common market.
Specific areas of cooperation have been identified, such as trade liberalization and customs
cooperation; transport and communication; industry and energy; monetary affairs and finance;
agriculture, and economic and social development.
Within the same sub-region there are also the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SADC (which includes ten of the
COMESA states) replaced the Southern African Development Coordination Conference which
was perceived as an organization whose goal was to reduce the sub-region’s dependence on
apartheid South Africa. SADC seeks greater coordination of external tariffs and the promotion of

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the free movement of capital and labour. It also has an interest in set ting up regional
infrastructure authorities and a development bank.
SACU was only established in its present form in 1969, but it stems directly from the 1910
agreement between South Africa and the three British High Commission Territories of
Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland.
The East African zone remained rather dormant for much of the period following the demise of
the East African Community in 1977. On 22 November 1991, the three East African presidents
met in Nairobi and agreed to reactivate and deepen cooperation between the three countries
(Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania). At the second tripartite summit on East
African Cooperation (EAC) in Kampala in November 1993, a protocol was signed establishing
the secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation in Arusha,
Tanzania. Since the signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community
in 2000, the Commission has been transformed into the East African Community.
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), grouping together Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, is another IGO. On 18 April
1995, an extraordinary summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government decided to launch a
new initiative involving the revitalization and restructuring of IGAD as an instrument for
expanded cooperation and sub-regional economic integration among IGAD member States.
Other groupings in the same sub-region are the Kagera Basin Organization (KBO), and the
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) consisting of Mauritius, Madagascar, the Comoros and
Seychelles. The IOC recently established its secretariat in Quatre Bornes, Mauritius. In addition,
in early 1995, the possibility of building a platform for regional cooperation in the wider Indian
rim was initiated. Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and South Africa all
participated in a meeting clearing the ground for future cooperation in the region which led to the
creation of the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI). Areas of cooperation were identified. They
include trade facilitation, trade and investment promotion and cooperation in the fields of science
and technology and human resource development.
In North Africa, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), consisting of Algeria, the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, is one of the oldest sub-regional cooperation
bodies in Africa. A Maghreb Common Market and Customs Union was to enter into force as of
1995. Progress has been rather slow, however, as there are still a number of tariff and nontariff
barriers to trade. There are differences in economic models as well as lack of coordinated
political decisions (e.g. during the Gulf War). The countries of the sub-region import their oil
from the United Arab Emirates rather than from Algeria or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (which
incidentally produce about three-quarters of the sub-region’s oil requirements).
In Central Africa, intra-sub-regional trade among Central African States is still minimal. The
treaty establishing the Union douanière des Etats de l’Afrique centrale (UDEAC) was signed in
1964. The Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), based in
Libreville, and
UDEAC have separately embarked on cooperation in the areas of food and agriculture, industry,
transport and communication. The third economic grouping the communauté économique des
pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL), consisting of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, is inactive.

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Achievements and constraints of integration
Despite the existence of these regional groupings, the African region remains affected by weak
cross-border economic links. Nonetheless, there is ambiguous empirical evidence on the
achievements of regional integration efforts in Africa. While there have been improvements in
intra-regional trade flows, very little progress has been made towards integrated infrastructure
development despite the potential for very high benefits.
Numerous problems have continued to impede the progress of regional integration in Africa. The
production structures of most African countries are the same and hence exportable products tend
to be competitive rather than complementary. Inadequate transport and communication have
partly contributed to the disjointed nature of African economies and severely restricted the
movement of goods, persons and capital. In addition, the lack of currency convertibility, the
continued existence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, a fear of losing out to more developed
member State(s) of sub-regional groupings, and differences among political leaders have
remained obstacles to closer integration throughout the continent.
Regional integration: Trade union structures
There is almost a one-to-one transposition of trade unions alongside the creation of a regional
integration process in Africa. In southern Africa, the Southern African Trade Union
Coordination Council (SATUCC) was formed in March 1993 at its inaugural congress held in
Gaborone, Botswana. With 12 affiliates, SATUCC campaigns for the development of strong,
independent and self-reliant national trade union centres across the sub-region.
In November 1991, SATUCC adopted the Social Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers in
Southern Africa. The charter is a solemn declaration and lays down the broad principles of a
model southern African labour law and, more generally, the place of the worker in society. In
March 1992, the Southern African Labour Council (SALC), a tripartite structure, adopted the
Social Charter.
In East Africa, the East African Trade Union Council (EATUC) is an umbrella organization
bringing together the national trade union centres within the East Africa Community member
States: Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. EATUC was established in 1988
and is currently composed of the Central Organization of Trade Unions (Kenya), the National
Organization of Trade Unions (Uganda), and the Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions. The
EATUC’s broad objective is to integrate workers’ interests and efforts in the East African region
with a view to developing a common approach towards enhancing social and economic justice,
through the participation of workers’ organizations at every level of regional integration. The
organization is also aiming to promote cooperation among workers in East Africa through the
joint development of workers’ education programmes, research activities and integration of the
gender dimension in trade union work.
As a regional workers’ body, EATUC is instrumental in ensuring that the East African
Community involves labour in all issues regarding regional integration, institutes tripartism as a
method of work, promotes the ratification of international labour standards by the member States
and the harmonization of labour laws and policies in East Africa, and encourages the concept of
free movement of the factors of production in the region. In addition, the EATUC has also
adopted an extended list of objectives such as the elimination of hunger through food security,
the creation of productive employment, and the promotion of conflict resolution in East Africa.

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In West Africa, despite its revitalization in 1999, the Organization of Trade Unions of West
Africa (OTUWA) currently has no major activities. In Central Africa, the sub-regional trade
union body, Organization des travailleurs de l’Afrique central (OTAC), still has a long way to
go. In North Africa, the Union des syndicats des travailleurs du Maghreb arabe (USTMA)
brings together trade union federations in the subregion. On 1 May 1991, USTMA issued a
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in the Maghreb. The charter welcomed the
creation of the AMU and emphasized the need to make the social dimensions part of integration
efforts. There is also the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) which
groups trade union centres from the Arab world.
The trade union position is that present efforts to foster economic cooperation and regional
integration are doomed to fail if they continue to focus on the narrow areas of international trade
and customs union. Although the current schemes of regional integration address broad issues
such as resource mobilization, they have generally overemphasized capital and natural resource
mobilization, and have tended to ignore the critical role of human resource mobilization in
regional economic integration efforts.
Some perspectives for a better Integration
In order for trade unions to benefit from regional economic integration, they should increase
their role by ensuring that:
 they are involved in the design stages of any regional integration effort and demand of
their governments the right to be involved and consulted, together with other
stakeholders, on all matters of regional concern;
 labour and other social issues take centre stage, as there cannot be any economic
development devoid of a social dimension;
 they form or revitalize sub-regional trade union organizations in parallel to the sub-
regional economic groups, enabling them to mobilize their membership and lobby
effectively;
 sub-regional trade union organizations formulate social charters of fundamental workers’
rights in Africa akin to those of SATUCC and USTMA and ensure that they are adopted
by the respective economic grouping;
 together with other stakeholders, they spearhead civil education on the attributes of
regional integration in order to enhance everybody’s participation; and
 they continue drawing attention to areas of violations of human and trade union rights.
Conclusion
Despite the constraints on effective regional integration, many advisers and researchers in Africa
suggest that the need for regional integration still exists and may even be more pressing now that
market fragmentation which remains a problem in Africa is being eliminated in other parts of the
world and as capital mobility continues to rise. It is important to emphasize that regional
integration cannot properly succeed in the absence of a sense of belonging and identity of those
most affected within the proposed community of countries.
Regional integration is not just an economic issue but is a process of community-building or
social construction, not limited to the expansion of regional trade. It requires a holistic and
multidimensional approach and should acquire credibility and identity of purpose. Trade unions
have a major role to play in ensuring that the process is given a social dimension and that it
obtains legitimacy. These two elements have been sorely lacking so far.
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 Unit 7.
Politics and crises of succession in Africa

Introduction
The crises of leadership succession are related to the problem of political instability in Africa.
This twin problem is a result of the failure of African states to truly embrace the basic
requirements of party politics and principles of democracy. This unit will explore various
manifestations of political instability in Africa, and how they have contributed to the failure of
African states to properly integrate and to address the crisis of state authority. This unit then has
to examine the following; explaining the crisis of succession and instability, party politics and
instability and the manifestation of party politics and instability.
Explaining the Crisis of Succession and Instability
Our task here is to enrich that discussion by stating the link or nexus between the crisis of
succession and political instability. One of the requirements needed to identify a democracy that
is consolidated is how it can meet the transfer of power test, or what Ojo (2006) called the “two-
election test”. He explained that democracy is consolidated when “a government that has itself
been elected in a free and fair context is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the result.”
What is more important is accepting the result when the incumbent government is defeated at the
polls and without hesitation voluntarily hands over to the winning party.
This criterion is perhaps the major hurdle to democratisation and a major factor in political
instability in Africa. Since independence, most African states have been grappling with this
challenge.
In Ghana, the failure of the opposition to change the C.P.P. government led to a military coup in
1966. In 1983, the Shagari’s administration could not satisfy the two election test. In both Kenya
and Zimbabwe, a hurriedly packaged, but potentially vulnerable inclusive governments saved the
two countries from descending to anarchy. Liberia and Sierra Leone, for the greater part of the
1990s, experienced protracted civil wars.
Beyond the crises associated with problems of leadership succession other factors also combine
to produce political instability in Africa. But the significance of each factor will vary according
to the circumstances of each country, history, level of economic development, and place within
the international system. The Nigerian civil war which raged for 30 months produced social-
economic, as well as political consequences, which successive regimes have not completely
solved almost four decades after it ended. In Sudan, the ongoing civil war has cost more than 2
million lives and displaced more than 4 million others, according to a 2003 estimate (Smith,
2003).
In developed societies, the values that are associated with t h e stability of political systems are
moderation, bargaining and accommodation. These values according to Almond and Verba,
(1963) are usually considered to be correlated with the level of a nation’s political culture. In
their studies, they found out that for most African states there is an absence of political stability

6
because political attitudes do not recognise the primacy of territorial and constitutional
arrangements, as well as the
legitimacy of authority and willingness to accept the outcomes of the rules of the game. As a
result rather than transit to, or consolidate democracy, what we see is constant regression to
authoritarianism. And as posited by Gill (2000) “the danger of authoritarian regimes is that the
weakness of institutional procedures for resolving disputes creates significant potential for
instability”.
In recent times, there are rays of hope of stability in some part of Africa. Botswana, though a
small country provides a good record of stability. Ghana and Nigeria have also met the two
election test. In Angola, a General election was held, the first in fifteen years after a civil war and
the signing of a peace agreement.
Party Politics and Instability
Political parties have been recognised by most states as necessary for political stability.
Huntington, (1968) has provided the most elaborate statement of this relationship. According to
him, political parties help a state to absorb the increasing level of political participation, which is
usually generated by modernisation.
In his words “the stability of a modernising political system depends on the strength of its
political parties”. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has institutionalised mass support.
However, in Africa, due to many factors, political parties are weak and far from being
institutionalised. They lack coherent organisation, not cohesive, incapacitated by lack of
independent sources of funding and afraid of competition. Consequently, citizens confer low
legitimacy on parties and party systems.
What a closer study of African politics has revealed is that politicians selectively manipulate
party structures, systems and arrangements to suit vested interest. The single-party system which
usually finds it difficult to incorporate all elements within a state without coercion used to be a
popular brand in Africa. Similarly, the values inherent in multiparty option, which was meant to
take into account the diversities of a typical African State are always eroded by the sweeping
influence of the dominant party, as Nigeria presently experience with the People’s Democratic
Party (PDP). But the two-party systems, which has proven to be the most effective means of
moderating polarisation, given the experiences of Euro-American democracies, is not always a
popular model in Africa. In the final analysis, if we recognise that China and Russia have made a
success of one-party system, Britain and USA of two-party, and Germany and France of multi-
parties, it then becomes clear that what is important for Africa is the legitimisation and
institutionalisation of parties in African political framework. We can safely adapt to Africa the
data generated by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in their studies of Latin American countries,
about the ingredients of party system institutionalisation. These are:
a. The rules governing party competition are commonly observed, widely understood and
confidently anticipated;
b. There is stability in the number of parties competing for office.
c. Parties are strongly rooted in society, affecting political preferences, attracting stable
electoral support and demonstrating continuity in ideological terms;
d. Political elites recognise the legitimacy of electoral competition as the route to the office;
and

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 e. Party organisation exists independently of powerful leaders, with well-resourced
nationwide organisations and well established internal procedures for recruitment to party
offices.
A cursory look at these criteria will reveal that party systems in Africa are both a negation and
violation of them. In Africa rules governing competitions are skewed in favour of incumbents;
parties are banned or selectively unbanned; they lack clear cut or differentiated ideological
positions and rely on patronage from members in government to survive. For these reasons,
parties out of power in African states increasingly find it difficult to survive. And it is common
wisdom that the demise of party systems, especially the competitive type, as was witnessed in
many African states in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and even up to 2000 is a recipe for
political instability. In Africa rather than deepen party systems, or consolidate democracy, what
has been enriched is the idea that the only way to protect one’s interest is to acquire and hold on
to a monopoly of power, to the exclusion of other groups.
Manifestations of Political Instability in Africa
There are many instances and manifestations of political instability in Africa. These incidents
were either caused by internal or external factors or a combination of some of them.
1. Secessions
Secession may be defined as the formal separation of a region from a nation-state of which it
formerly constituted an integral part. For example, when an ethnic group or a combination of
them threatens to separate. Where secession is threatened, the parent state may seek to placate
the dis-satisfied group by offering various constitutional concessions aimed at devolution of
power, or creation of states. But this was not sufficient to switch the Eastern region of Nigeria
from the direction of secession in 1967. Alternatively, the parent state may respond with
repression like when the parent state of Ethiopia imposed nationality under its amended
constitution (Ghai, 2000). Other repressive measures may range from cultural assimilation to
genocide.
In those African states like Eritrea and South Sudan where secession threats were actualised,
national governments often by force of arms frustrated the bids to prevent the breakaway regions
leave with its rich mineral deposits. In Congo, the secession attempt of the mineral-rich Katanga
province, inspired by neo-colonial forces, was countered by the United Nations peacekeeping
force (Nkrumah 1967:18-20). In Morocco, King Hassan threatened a resumption of war if the
people of Western Sahara voted for any United Nations (UN) planned referendum (Smith
2003:196).
2. Civil War
Civil War may be a direct result of military response to secession or may arise due to other
factors. In Nigeria superior military force was used to suppress the Biafran rebellion against the
federal government. Problems arising from the failure of African states to fully integrate may
also lead to civil wars. The nation-states in Africa were not built on a basis of common religious,
cultural, linguistic or racial factors. The only common identity was anti-colonial nationalism. For
this reason, a crisis of integration have been rearing for most African states because most of the
national governments are failing in winning the full commitment of their citizens.
3. Military Coups

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We can only add here that a military coup is another manifestation of instability. Military
putsches are not only a disservice to the military itself but also disruptive of the larger civil
society. Incessant coups create high turn-over which the victorious coupists view as a tactical
necessity to assure them of the loyalty of the rank and file. Mass executions that normally follow
abortive plans and the forceful retirements of soldiers whose loyalties cannot be guaranteed
constitute a drain on the national resource already spent to train them. It may also breed counter-
coups, thereby promoting more instability.

Conclusion
Crises of leadership succession are a major factor in political instability for many African states.
This instability has manifested in many forms: secession bids, civil wars, military coups and
failed states. During the Cold War era, the economic buffer and security umbrella provided by
the two superpowers ensured that scores of Africa states, which though stumbled from one crisis
to another, yet retained their nominal status.
But in the post-cold War era, many are either under instant threats or engulfed in civil wars when
the external backings were withdrawn. This has forced many African leaders to begin to look
inwards for solutions to the problem of political instability. It is only when it is recognised that
the crisis of state authority or government legitimacy is at the roots of African political
predicament, that a search for a solution can be said to have begun.
In this Unit, we examined how the crisis of leadership succession has often led to political
instability in Africa. We noted that the lack of institutionalisation of party systems is also central
to what is now called democratic deficits in Africa. We outlined the major features of instability
and observed that we can hardly separate political failures from the economic crises, which many
African states presently confront.

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 Unit 8.
Border Conflict in Africa

Introduction
After African states obtained their independence, the artificial and poorly demarcated borders of
many countries were considered the most potent source of conflict and political instability. Only
a third of African borders are clearly delimited and demarcated. Ill-defined or unclear borders are
a potential source of conflicts, particularly in relation to disputes over boundaries drawn to a
great extent by colonial powers. This resulted in heated debates on whether to revise or maintain
the colonial borders. The argument split the academic community and policy-makers into two
camps, the revisionists and the anti-revisionists. However, the continent’s pioneer integration
organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) nowadays the African Union (AU)
commits to a progressive border agenda recognising the positive contribution of Border
Governance to peace, security, integration, resource sharing, trade facilitation, as well as
inclusive growth and sustainable development of borderlands. This unit thus examines the origin,
evolution, peace attempts (AU) and propose solution in borders management in Africa.
The Genesis of Border Conflict in Africa
The primacy of well-defined and stable borders for state survival and inter-state relations is well
set out in SE Finer’s admonition: ‘Tell a man today to go and build a state and he will try to
establish a definite and defensible territorial boundary and compel those who live inside it to
obey him.’ The centrality of borders is further underscored by Max Weber’s popular dictum that
for a state to be a true state it must claim ‘the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force
within a territory’. It is noteworthy that no state can claim monopoly over any territory that it is
not able to define and defend properly.
With regard specifically to the African state, the importance of boundaries is not in question.
However, the borders of African states have had a consistently poor reputation. Like the African
state itself, African boundaries have been described variously as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘artificial’
colonial constructs, imposed on unwilling and unparticipating African peoples who have either
suffered dearly from their impact, or simply ignored them. Arguably, one of the key challenges
of African boundaries has been their arbitrary colonial origin, alongside the fact that, despite
their formal recognition and reification by African governing elites, they have remained porous,
undefended and even un-defendable. Their rather haphazard demarcation resulted in the merger
of disparate social groups into single polities that have tended to be highly unstable, fluid and
even irrelevant in some cases.

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Moreover, since independence, Africa’s boundaries have remained unconsolidated, resulting in
the extension of state jurisdiction to border areas being frustrated and the formation of requisite
state institutions being thwarted. Related to this, and deriving from it, is a weakened state
capacity that has itself engendered social instability and conditions that have in many instances
encouraged irredentism. In fact, Africa’s colonial borders have been a factor in the inability of
many African states to institutionalise governmental efficiency and to engender meaningful
national consolidation.
The discourse on the arbitrariness and ill-defined character of Africa’s borders and the
controversy over the associated policy of border status quo maintained by Africa’s governing
elite since the 1960s have been emotive and sentimental. The reality of the situation is that, on
the one hand, it has been practically impossible to have sustainable stability and long-term peace
and security within and among many African states and, on the other, the porous and unviable
African borders have resulted in the regionalisation of instability and conflict, producing chaos
and even anarchy in areas such as the Mano River in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and the
Horn of Africa. In fact, conflicts, including those related to borders, have continued to be among
the major challenges facing the continent and stand out as the most serious obstacle to the
attainment of the continent’s liberation dreams of economic, social and political wellbeing for all
of Africa’s peoples. Aside from the instability that has characterised African boundaries, the
neglect of border areas, especially when it comes to the provision of infrastructure and core state
services, has been a contributory factor to the continent’s slow pace of integration.
The Political Context: A Situational Analysis
Border zones continue to constitute threats to the region, states and communities of the GLR.
Core in these are cross border attacks by armed groups and bands of cattle rustlers, smuggling,
motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, flows of small arms and now threats of terror networks.
The foregoing has transformed borders into crush points of conflicts. Underlying this are several
factors: The border spaces are made ideal by existing obstacles to accessibility (terrain, forests,
deserts). They constitute ideal sanctuaries on either side of the frontiers.
The net effect has been endemic violent conflicts that generate not only refugees but also
conflicts through the very presence of refugees. The region has had to endure genocide, and
millions lost in war and post-war related deaths, influx of small arms, and cross border
pastoralist conflicts and extreme levels of poverty. It is notable that conflicts in the GLR revolve
around contestation over the idea of the state (ideologies around which state politics are
organized), physical base (population and resources) and institutional framework of the states.
That the states face vulnerabilities and threats despite their endowments in natural resources
points to the inability to maximize on what Hernando De Soto calls dead capital. This is capital
whose existence we may not be aware of/ have forgotten or have never unravelled ways of
adding value to it for effective use. This ranges from unexploited potential in its pastoralist
resources in zone 3 to huge eco-tourism, agriculture and human resources prevalent in Zone 1.1

1
Border security can be improved by initiating security enhancing economic activities within zones. In the case of
GLR, such activities should be initiated within 12 zones as stipulated in the Protocol on Non-Aggression, Mutual
Defence, Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts among the States of the Great Lakes Region and as described in IC/GLR
project no 1.1 on Joint Security Management of Common Borders. These are Zone 1 (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC),
Zone 2 (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), Zone 3 (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia), Zone 4 (Sudan, Uganda and
DRC), Zone 5(Sudan, CAR and DRC), Zone 6 (RoC, DRC and CAR), Zone 7 (DRC, RoC and Angola), Zone 8

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Underlying the inability of the states to activate these for productive purposes is the absence of
infrastructure and security to facilitate movement of goods and services within the region. Self
help efforts by states have failed to resolve this contradiction. Instead they have generated
security dilemmas and complexities. Under the former, every action of an actor is viewed with
suspicion and elicits an immediate counter reaction. Complexities are also a function of
communities living across the frontiers, multiple threats and actors and internal vulnerabilities.
What is notable in border zones is the artificiality of the frontiers. Most of these have split
communities making it impossible for them to move their goods and services across especially
when conflicts emerge. Given the constancy of conflicts and poor infrastructure border zones do
not attract both local and foreign investments either. The net effect is that border zones despite
the presence of resources are also the most underdeveloped. The constancy of conflicts makes it
impossible for states on their own to initiate development in these zones.
The IC/GLR has acknowledged these dynamics in border zones and therefore proposed a border
security management framework. The reality of the matter is, however, that security cannot just
be created through cooperation structures alone. Rather it is a function of reducing border
specific vulnerabilities. This implies the transformation of conflict engendering variables into
security generating variables for state, regional and community socio-economic and political
reproduction. In the GLR security revolves around the question of how states can enhance
structural penetration in border zones to allow development and human security. Given the
dynamics of the threats and the prevailing internal vulnerabilities, such a process can only take
place through a regional approach to development.
Border Conflict Dynamism and early attempts
A number of African countries have at different times since independence been in conflict with
each other over common boundaries. These conflicts have revolved around issues of trans-
boundary minorities, trans-boundary resources, unclear frontiers, and the contestation or
difficulty of implementing existing colonial and post-colonial boundary agreements. Between the
late 1950s and the late 1990s, more than half of Africa’s states have been involved in some form
of boundary-related conflict. While some of these conflicts were resolved speedily through
bilateral negotiations or third-party facilitation (Côte d’Ivoire–Liberia 1960/1961, Mali-
Mauritania 1960/1963 and Dahomey-Bissau-Niger 1963/1965), others were very protracted, e.g.
Ethiopia-Somalia (1950 to 1978 and beyond) and Cameroon–Nigeria (1963 to 2002).
Although some of these conflicts were resolved through sub-regional and regional mediation
efforts, others could only be resolved after referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
There have been four major cases in this regard, including the Tunisia-Libya boundary dispute
that received an ICJ ruling in 1994, the Guinea Bissau-Senegal border conflict that was brought
to an end by an ICJ ruling in 1992, the Libya-Chad claims over the Auzou Stripe, which was
only brought to closure by an ICJ verdict in 1994, and the Cameroon-Nigeria border conflict that
was settled by a 2002 ICJ verdict. Table 1 summarises some of Africa’s trans-border conflicts
from the late 1950s to 2000.
The information in the table suggests that there was a prevalence of border-related inter-state
conflicts in Africa in particularly the first 15 years after independence. And although the
incidence of inter-state border conflicts decreased considerably thereafter, particularly from the

(DRC, Zambia and Angola), Zone 9 (Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia), Zone 10 (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda),
Zone 11 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda) , Zone 12 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi).

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late 1980s onward, Africa’s borders have continued to pose serious challenges. As a result, the
management of boundary problems has been a central issue in policymaking circles at both
regional and continental levels. This has resulted in numerous border management proposals and
resolutions.
Against the background of protracted border conflicts between Nigeria and some of its
neighbours, and in particular the recurrent violent clashes between its security forces and
Cameroonian gendarmes over their common maritime boundary, Nigeria proposed the
establishment of an OAU Boundaries Commission at the 37 th Ordinary Session of the Council of
Ministers in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 1981. The proposal was aimed at evolving a framework that
would permit the technical management of all Africa’s border problems with as little political
interference as possible. The proposal was referred to an ad hoc ministerial committee that had
been mandated to study an earlier proposal by Sierra Leone for the establishment of a Political
Security Council. The Secretary-General of the OAU was directed specifically to obtain the
views of member states on the establishment of a Boundaries Commission.

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The ministerial committee subsequently recommended that a Boundaries Commission should be
established as a technical subsidiary organ of the proposed Security Council, or alternatively that
it should be made one of its permanent committees. However, the mandate of the ad hoc
committee was abruptly terminated by the 41 st Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers on
the grounds that prevailing circumstances on the continent did not permit the establishment of a

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Political Security Council. Since the establishment of a Boundaries Commission had been linked
to the establishment of a Political Security Council, the Boundaries Commission idea died with
the ministerial committee.
Despite this failure, African leaders continued to indicate concern about the implications of the
continent’s arbitrary and poorly demarcated borders. They maintained that the struggle for the
liberation of the continent from colonialism and its after-effects, and the establishment of an
atmosphere of peace, security, and economic and social progress, was attainable only by the
elimination of the causes of border tensions. This mood was reflected by the adoption of peace
and security resolution CM/Res.1069 (XLIV) by the Council of Ministers at the 44th Ordinary
Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July 1986.
In June 1991, Nigeria re-introduced a revised and more elaborate proposal for the establishment
of an OAU Boundaries Commission at the 54th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of
Ministers in Abuja, Nigeria. This proposal included recommendations for the establishment of
national boundaries commissions by individual OAU members and of regional commissions by
Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Although Nigeria registered little success with this
proposal, it eventually succeeded in inserting elements of the proposal into one of the signature
structures it introduced into the OAU, namely the Council on Security, Stability, Development
and Cooperation in Africa (CCSDCA). The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the
CSSDCA, adopted by the OAU Assembly in Durban in July 2002, recognised the fact that
border problems continued to threaten the prospects of peace and security on the continent and
contained specific provisions for addressing border questions. In particular, the MoU provided
for the delineation and demarcation of inter-African borders by 2012. For its part, the AU has
upheld the principle of the inviolability of African borders as evidenced in Article 4(b) of its
Constitutive Act. Other cardinal objectives include the achievement of greater unity and
solidarity among African countries and peoples, the acceleration of the political and socio-
economic integration of the continent, and the promotion of peace, security and stability.
However, it is clear that these noble objectives will remain pipe dreams unless Africa succeeds in
properly demarcating its borders and transforming border areas from being a source of inter-state
conflict.
Proposed Solutions for a better Border Management
Although Africa’s governing elite has remained faithful to its policy of territorial status quo,
strong lateral and vertical pressures appear to be forcing a re-orientation in the approach to the
management of state boundaries. The focus is now on transforming borders from barriers to
bridges of integration and cooperation, and on developing the border areas to stop these from
acting as conduits for the transmission of conflict and violence. For this to happen, however,
African states, individually and collectively through regional and sub-regional organisations,
should consider the following proposals, among others:
■ The adoption of policies that will transform border areas from their current neglected
and backward status to areas that are properly integrated with the rest of the country. This can be
achieved by the development of road, rail and communications infrastructure, and the location of
industries and related economic activities in border areas.
■ Where natural resources occur in border areas, governments should consider the option
of their joint exploitation by border peoples, with the dividends being shared.

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 ■ The development of mechanisms and policies that will facilitate collaboration among
border-area administrative personnel, in particular immigration and custom officials.
■ The assessment of the historical, economic and cultural ties and other commonalities
that exist among border peoples, and harnessing these to foster cross-border cooperation and
inter-state integration.
■ Governments and regional organisations should identify and monitor potential sources
of tensions among border peoples and intervene timeously in an effort to resolve them before
they engulf national governments. This would require the setting up of border-based early
warning systems linked to the regional early warning mechanisms of the Regional Economic
Communities (RECs).
■ Finally, for all these policy actions to occur, the ongoing project aimed at delineating
and demarcating African borders properly would need to be accelerated to remove the
ambiguities caused by the contestation of boundary lines and related issues of jurisdiction over
territories and resources. This would require the establishment of effective national, regional and
continental border commissions, with their interfaces clearly defined. The acceleration of the
work of the AUBP would also entail sensitising various stakeholders, especially border peoples,
about the advantages of border delimitation and demarcation. Fears that such exercises would
result in the erection of barriers that would impede peoples’ movements and activities would
need to be allayed.
Conclusion
Africa’s interstate boundaries have remained a major source of conflict and instability on the
continent, largely because of their artificial character, poor delineation and demarcation, and
their porousness. In spite of recognition that the colonial boundaries are not viable in their
current state, the continent’s governing elite has elected and stuck to a policy of territorial status
quo, partly because of a legitimate concern that any attempt to review the boundaries will lead to
anarchy. Although this policy is said to have averted the border contestation a border review
policy may have produced, a number of border conflicts have occurred since African states
achieved independence. Some of these have been brief, while others have been very protracted.
As a matter of fact, boundary-related inter-state conflict has been the prevalent reason for
conflict on the continent, while the colonially imposed African state system has gone largely
unchallenged.

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