CASE LIST RAJASTHAN RENT CONTROL ACT, 2001

Whether notice to quit/for eviction in accordance with section 106

of the transfer of property act was necessary.

1. V. Dhanpal Chattiar vs. y. Ammal 1979 SC

During the post-war years all the State Legislatures passed Building
and Rent Control Acts to give protection to tenants against
unreasonable eviction by the landlords as well as to prevent the
landlords from exploiting the tenants by way of exorbitant rents. As
in the case of all social legislation which is designed for the
protection of the needy, the Rent Control Acts have brought
considerable inroad on the landlord’s freedom of contract. Many
Acts have brought about considerable changes in the rights and
liabilities of the lessor and the lessee and the tilt of the law is largely
in favour of the lessee. The landlord is bound to let out his
premises on rent to a person even against his wishes when the
concerned authority allots a particular premises to a person. When
once the premises are so allotted, the landlord is bound to give the
premises to that person and at the rent fixed by the authority
concerned. In the matter of determination of the tenancy the
State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with
the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position
under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover
possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds
enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the
termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord, under the
definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts,
remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the
express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means
"a person continuing in possession after the termination of the
tenancy his favour." It is also provided that no landlord can treat a
building to have been vacant by merely terminating the
contractual tenancy 335 as the tenant still lawfully continues in
possession of the premises. Yet another important feature of the
Rent Acts is that either by way of a non-obstante clause or by
necessary implication these enactments have done away with the
law contained in s. 108 of the T. P. Act dealing with rights and
liabilities of the lessor and the lessee.

In the instant case the appellant filed an application against the

tenant under s. 10(3)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1970 calling upon him to quit on the ground of
personal necessity. The Rent Controller rejected her application.
The Appellate Court, while holding that the respondent required the
premises bona fide for her personal necessity, dismissed the
application on the ground that a notice to quit was necessary and
that the notice given by her was not in accordance with law. In
revision the High Court held that notice to quit under s. 106, T.P.
Act was not necessary. Dismissing the appeal the rent controller
held that the requirement of the respondent was not genuine and he
accordingly dismissed the petition. But on an appeal by the lady
landlord the appellate court held in her favour on the point of her
requiring the premises bonafide fore her personal use, however her
petition was dismissed on the ground that a notice to quit was
necessary and the one given by her was not in accordance with law.

The landlord took up the matter in revision to the madras high court
and the single judge held that notice to quit under section 106 of the
transfer of property act was not necessary for seeking an eviction of
a tenant under the Tamil Nadu Rent Act. So, when a particular state
rent act provides by its provisions that eviction of tenant cannot be
done unless following conditions are satisfied and notice is given to
the tenant it is sufficient and if the same is not provided like in the
Bombay and West Bengal rent control act the requirement of section
106 of Transfer of property comes into operation.

Therefore, the Supreme Court in this case held the following:

1. The High Court was right in its view that no notice to quit was
necessary under section 106 of the transfer of property act to
enable the landlord to get an order of eviction against the
tenant and on the question of requirement of notice under
 section 106 of T.P. Act there is no scope for taking different
views on the basis of difference in phraseology of various rent
acts and the difference in language does not bring about any
distinction.
2. In the case of a landlord wishing to evict his tenant under the
rent acts determination of the lease in accordance with the
transfer of property is unnecessary, as it is mere surplusage or
is non-essential because the landlord cannot do eviction of
tenant even after such determination and the tenant continues
to be a tenant even thereafter. So that being so, making out a
case under the rent act for eviction of the tenant by itself is
sufficient and is obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis
of determination of the lease by the issue of notice in
accordance with section 106 of T.P. Act.
3. Although the rent acts restrict the rights which the landlord
possesses either for charging excessive rents for evicting
tenants, if within the ambit of those restricted rights the
landlord makes out his case, it is a mere empty formality, a
mere surplusage to ask him to determine the contractual
tenancy before the institution of a suit for eviction. Such a
notice under the T.P. Act is necessary because the mere
determination of the lease entitles a landlord to recover
possession. But under the rent control acts it becomes
unnecessary technicality to insist that the landlord must also
 determine the contractual tenancy. It is no practical use to
insist again upon a notice under section 106 after placing so
many restrictions under rent acts on the landlord’s right to
evict the tenant.
4. But where a landlord, by way of abundant caution, to butteress
his case gives a notice to the tenant that he intends to file a suit
for eviction, it is not open to the tenant to say that such a
notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfil all the
technical requirements of section 106 of the T.P. Act. Once the
liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn
round and say that the contractual lease has not been
determined. The action of the landlord in instituting the suit for
eviction on the grounds mentioned in any state rent acts will
amount to an expression of his intention that he does not want
the tenant to continue his lease and the jural relationship of
lessor and the lessee would come to an end on the passing of
an order or a decree for eviction.
5. The restricted area under the various state rent acts has done
away to a large extent, with the requirement of the law of
contract and the transfer of Property Act. This being so there is
no reason to impose an unnecessary and unjustifiable formality
of terminating the contractual lease.
6. Secondly, if protection from eviction is claimable by the tenant
even after determination of the contractual tenancy under the
 rent acts there is no reason why the law of contract engrafted
in Transfer of Property Act should again be imported for
seeking eviction of the tenant.
7. If the termination of the contractual tenancy by notice does not
entitle the landlord to recover the possession of the premises
and he becomes entitled to recover the possession only if he
makes out a case under the special provisions of the state rent
acts then termination of the contractual relationship by notice
is not necessary.
8. Where, on the other hand over and above the protection under
the relevant act a clause in the lease deed gives an extra
protection given to the tenant against eviction must be
adhered to. But for this reason it is not correct to say that
section 106 of the T.P. Act gives an extra protection to the
tenant against the eviction. The purpose of this provision is
merely to terminate the contract which the over-riding rent
acts do not permit to be terminated.

Hence, giving of notice to quit under section 106 of transfer of

property act was a discretion of various state rent control acts.

2. Babu Ram vs. Narayan Das 1958

In this case there was a house in the city of Jodhpur near Gulabsagar
and the house once belonged to Mangilal and Ballabhdas and they
rented it to the defendant-appellant on a rent of Rs. 3/- per annum.
This rent was later on increased to 3/8 and then a suit was brought
by Mangilal and Ballabhdas against the appellant for his eviction
treating him trespasser because the defendant did not attorn to him
and he also questioned the validity of the house sale in the plaintiff’s
favour. At the same time plaintiff claimed that Mangilal and
Ballabhdas sold their house to him and he was their tenant and
therefore plaintiff could not treat him as a trespasser.

The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, but on an
appeal by the defendant the decree was reversed by the first
appellate court and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed with costs and
the plaintiff then brought the present suit for ejectment/eviction of
the defendant on the basis of tenancy and it was therefore averred
by the defendant that he had become the tenant from the date on
which the plaintiff purchased the property from Mangilal and
Ballabhdas. The defendant than did not pay him monthly rent that an
amount of Rs. 126/- was outstanding against the defendant on
account of rent upto the date of suit and therefore it was prayed that
a decree for arrears of rent and eviction should be passed against the
defendant. It was also stated by the plaintiff that the defendant was
not entitled to protection under section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises
(control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 because he was a defaulter
and also because the plaintiff, who was upto this time living in a
rented house, needed the house in dispute for his own personal use
and occupation.

The defendant contested the suit on several grounds as in the first

instance it was urged by him that the house was not sold by Mangilal
and Ballabhdas to the plaintiff for Rs. 4000/- as arrested by the
plaintiff and that the sale was fictitious and it was effected only for
outstanding the defendant from the possession of the disputed
house. He also denied that the plaintiff wanted the house for his own
use or that the defendant had become a defaulter. So, on the basis
of the arguments of the parties the suit was decided on the basis of
following issues:

I. Whether the defendant was barred from raising the plea that
the plaintiff was not defendant’s landlord on account of the
decision of the district court jodhpur according to which the
relationship of the landlord and the tenant was held as
established.
II. (a) whether the defendant’s objection that Mangilal and
Ballabhdas did not sell the house in dispute to the plaintiff for
Rs. 4000/- was barred by the principle of resjudicata and could
not be raised.
(b) if that objection is not barred by the principle of resjudicata
then whether the plaintiff has purchased the house in dispute
for Rs. 4000/- Mangilal Ballabhdas.
III. Whether the present suit was barred on the principles of res
judicata, because the former suit for the possession by the
plaintiff were dismissed.
IV. Whether the plaintiff required the house in dispute reasonably
and bonafide for his own occupation?
V. Whether the notice given by the plaintiff to the defendant was
not in accordance with section 106 of Transfer of Property Act?
VI. Whether the defendant has not paid rent to the plaintiff and
has become defaulter and so the plaintiff is entitled to evict the
defendant from the house after recording evidence of both the
parties.

The trial court therefore decided the issues no. 1, 2(a), 4, 5 and 6
against the plaintiff, whereas issue no. 2(b) and 3 were decided in
the plaintiff’s favour. The trial court proceeded under sec. 13 (4) of
the Rajasthan Premises) Control of Rent and Eviction) Act and found
that the defendant was liable to pay Rs. 160/- for arrears of Rent
together with interest. The defendant deposited this amount and
thereafter there was no dispute between the parties so far as the
question of arrears or rent was concerned. And aggrieved by the
decision of trial court the plaintiff went in appeal decided by the
district judge.

And it is thus clear that even 15 days’ notice was not given to the
defendant to vacate the premises and therefore the revision
application was allowed and it was held that notices were not valid
and in the present case it is common ground between the parties
that the notice was given and the defendant was required to vacate
the premises. Also it is clear that the defendant was given more than
one month’s time to vacate the premises and no possible prejudice
could occasion to him.

3. Shree ram Vishram Marathe Vs. Peetamlar Govind Patel 1990

4. Kuldeep Singh vs. Shiv Saran Das Rakesh Kumar 1997

In this case two shops were leased out to a partnership firm and on
dissolution, lease hold right was portioned amongst the partners and
the shops were being started to be used as godowns. In this case
section 13 of East Punjab Rent Restriction Act was applied and the
question that arose in the course of proceedings for consideration
referred by single judge bench are:

I. The premises viz. shops let out for non-residential purposes

can be converted into a godown and vice versa and
II. Whether by acceptance of rent the landlord is estopped from
seeking ejectment or eviction on the ground of change of user.

Thus, in the view of the observations made above, we are of the

considered view that:
 I. Changing the nature of building that is from residential and
non-residential to residential or shop into godown and godown
into shop, would be a change of purpose.
II. Acceptance of rent after the change of the user having been
brought about without the written consent, would be of no
consequences. And the only way the change of purpose can be
brought about by the tenant is under a written consent from
the landlord.

Thus, the revision petition was allowed and the order of the
appellate authority is set-side and the respondents are directed to be
ejected/evicted and they are granted three months time to vacate
the premises subject to payment of arrears of rent till date.

5. Balkrishan vs. Vasudev 1997

The suit property consists of a shop and it forms a part of a building

owned by Sarvajanik Sampati trust, but on 01.01.1973 the shop was
taken on rent by Balkishan, the plaintiff-respondent on a monthly
rent if Rs. 30/- and on 25.12.1975 Balkishan sub-let the shop to
Vasudev, the defendant-appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-.
The suit is governed by the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises
(control of rent and Eviction) act, 1950.

But the appellant fell into the arrears of the rent for the period
01.01.1981 to 31.12.1982. and the respondent served a notice on
the appellant and then filed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent as
also for eviction on the ground available under clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of section 13 of the act, whereas on 30.03.1983, the trust
also filed a suit for eviction against its own tenant- the respondent
on the ground of unlawful sub-letting of the premised by the latter.

And the issue that arose from the decision is: whether a sub-tenant
inducted by a tenant in the premises governed by the provisions of
rent control law can, during the continuance of sub-tenancy and
without vacating the premises, attorn in favour of the owner of the
premises and thereby refuse to discharge his obligations towards the
tenant who admittedly inducted him in the premises?

So, in this case it was already stated that respondent’s tenancy in the
suit will not come to an end unless and until decree for eviction on
one of the ground available under the Rajasthan Act has been passed
against him and termination of his tenancy upheld by a judicial
verdict.

Thus, in this case the plea of eviction by paramount title is not

available to the appellant to the appellant for three reasons:

I. It cannot be said that the trust is armed with a legal process for
eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted by the tenant-
respondent or to which he has no defence.
 II. The attornment by the appellant in favour of the trust is
voluntary and not under any compulsion and
III. It cannot be said that the trust has such good and present title
against the tenant-respondent so as to hold the appellant
liable to be evicted against his will.

As already stated and even at the risk of repetition, it has to be

emphasises that in the view of the tenant-respondent’s relationship
with the trust being one governed by the provisions of the rent
control law, his title as tenant will not come to an end unless and
until the suit for eviction filed by the trust against the respondent is
decreed and the decree has achieved finality and for the foregoing
reasons, the appeals are dismissed with costs.

6. Rasik Auto stores v. Naveen vs. hantodkar

After hearing the senior counsel for the petitioners it was found that
his only contention was that in the light of clause 13(3)(vi) of C.P. and
Berar Rent Control Order, 1949 because the landlord is having other
premises of his own in the adjoining part of the very suit premises
and the suit for possession of the premises was liable to fail.

The landlord in this case wanted the premises or the portion of

premises for the purpose of his bonafide occupation, provided that
he is not occupying any other premises of his own in the city or town
concerned.
Thus, from the facts of the present case it is clear that the rent
controller as well as by the appellant court that 300 sq. ft. of the
accommodation available with the respondent landlord in the
building is insufficient for two doctors as the landlord and his wife
both are practicing doctors and in the view of this finding it was the
view that there is no need for remand and the ratio of the decision
would squarely state in the face of the petitioner.

Hence, the petition was dismissed and fails.

7. K. Ramnarayan vs. Pukhraj

8. Indira Education institutions, Kuchaman city vs. State of
Rajasthan 1992

The petitioner is running a residential college under the name and

style of ‘Indira College of Library Science’. It also runs a hostel for the
students who study in the said college. The premises which were
taken on rent for running the said college and hostel had no water
and electric connection. Electric connection was subsequently
obtained in January, 1989. The assistant engineer, PHED, Nawa and
the Nagar Palika , Kuchaman city have intimated the vide their letters
annexures 2 and 3 that water connection can be given to the
petitioner on its furnishing “No Objection Certificate” from the
landlord. But no reply was filed by the respondent and it has been
contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
respondent no. 2 and 3 had no jurisdiction to ask for “no objection
certificate” of its landlord, there is no such law or rule and if there is
any such law or rule it is unconstitutional and it deserves to be struck
down. He lastly contended that the respondent no.2 is under legal
obligation to grant water connection to the petitioner as water is
absolutely necessary for the functioning of a college or a hostel.

The government advocate contended that the disputed premises had

no water connection when it was taken on rent by the petitioner
from its landlord and there is no provision in the Rajasthan Premises
(control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 conferring the right to
tenants to gel water connection, electric connection and sanitary
fittings installed in the demised premises without the consent of the
landlord like section 28 B of U.P. Urban Buildings (regulation of
letting, rent and eviction) act, 1972.

So, the petitioner being in the occupation of the demised premises

so, in our opinion, entitled to have a water connection and
accordingly the writ petition is allowed and it is directed that the
respondents will give water connection to the petitioner and no
order was passes related to costs.

9. Devraj Lata vs. Sanjay Kumar 2013

10. Bhawani vs. Roshan

The defendant-appellant has preferred this second appeal under
section 100 of the CPC against the impugned order of the judgment
and the decree dated 31.07.2010 passed by additional district judge
Sikar whereby the learned appellate court has upheld and affirmed
the judgement and decree passed by the Trial Court.

11. Kailash chandra dad vs. state of Rajasthan