COURSE CODE: – EDS322

COURSE TITLE: REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

LECTURER: DR. POPOGBE

Group Activity: African Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

Group 1: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Team Members:

1. Adepoju Sarah -230909023

2. Balogun Olasubomi -230909002

3. Bola-Ajayi Wuraola -230909035

4. Ebivwie Joseph Okperin -230909004

5. Jeremiah Nweke - 230909005

6. Temiloluwa B. Oluwatimilehin – 230909006

7. Ogunleye Alameen Olalekan - 230909038

ECOWAS: Legal Mandate, Economic Impact, Political Challenges,
and the Path Forward

1. Introduction
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the principal regional
organization for West Africa, established to promote economic integration, cooperation, peace,
and development among its member states. Conceived in response to the region's shared colonial
legacies, fragmented economies, and need for collective self-reliance, ECOWAS has grown over
five decades from a narrowly economic project into a dual economic-and-political institution that
shapes trade, security, and governance across sixteen West African countries.

This report presents a comprehensive analysis of ECOWAS, structured around five core issues: its
historical evolution and founding context; its legal mandate and institutional framework; its
economic and developmental impact in the areas of trade, free movement, and infrastructure; the
political and security challenges that continue to test its cohesion; and, finally, its outlook and
recommendations in light of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Taken together,
these sections show an organisation with an unusually strong legal and institutional foundation,
whose central challenge is not design but implementation.

2. Historical Background and Founding Context

Before ECOWAS was established, West African countries traded far more with their former
colonial powers than with one another. Most states emerged from independence in the 1960s with
small domestic markets, weak industrial bases, poor transport networks, and administrative
systems inherited separately from British, French, and Portuguese rule, all of which made regional
trade difficult. Inspired by the ideals of Pan-Africanism, African leaders increasingly recognised
that economic cooperation was essential for sustainable development, and sought a regional
framework that would remove trade barriers, encourage free movement, and strengthen economic
cooperation across the region.

The decisive push came from Nigeria. Following the end of its civil war in 1970, General Yakubu
Gowon's administration undertook a diplomatic tour of neighbouring states, and used the
opportunity to revive discussions on deeper regional cooperation. From the early 1970s, sustained
engagement between Gowon and Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma secured commitment
from both English- and French-speaking heads of state across the region. These efforts culminated
on 28 May 1975, when representatives of fifteen West African countries signed the Treaty of
Lagos, officially establishing ECOWAS.

Founding Members
The original signatories were Benin, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
and Togo, with Cape Verde acceding in 1977. Mauritania later withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000
to join the Arab Maghreb Union, leaving the bloc with a membership spanning English-, French-,
and Portuguese-speaking countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA],
n.d.). The founding objective was collective self-sufficiency: pooling the region's fragmented
markets into a single trading bloc large enough to support industrialisation and raise living
standards, while deliberately bridging colonial-era linguistic and currency divides (Central Bank
of Nigeria, n.d.).

Evolution of the Mandate

ECOWAS's early years focused chiefly on economic integration – promoting free trade,
improving transportation, and encouraging cooperation in agriculture and industry. This began to
change during the 1980s and 1990s, when civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone threatened
regional stability and produced the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the bloc's first
peacekeeping force. This marked ECOWAS's transformation from a purely economic community
into a regional security actor as well (Grokipedia, 2026).

This shift was formalised in the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, signed in Cotonou, Benin in 1993,
which strengthened ECOWAS's institutions and broadened its objectives beyond trade to include
political cooperation, peace and security, human rights, democratic governance, and sustainable
development (Grokipedia, 2026). Further institutionalisation followed with the 1999 Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, giving ECOWAS the dual economic-and-security
identity it retains today. In May 2025, ECOWAS marked its Golden Jubilee, with Gowon – the
last surviving founding head of state – reflecting on real progress made while acknowledging that
the founding vision of an “ECOWAS of the Peoples,” rather than an elite club of leaders, remains
unfinished business (Omoboye, 2025). Today, ECOWAS remains one of Africa's most influential
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and a key building block of the African Union's
regional integration agenda – the legal expression of which is examined next.

3. Legal Mandate and Institutional Framework

ECOWAS's legal mandate rests on the original Treaty of Lagos (1975) and its strengthening
through the Revised Treaty of Cotonou (1993), which together define the Community's objectives
and machinery.

Objectives
• Promote economic integration
• Create a common market
• Ensure free movement of people, goods, and services
• Promote peace and security
• Encourage democracy and good governance
• Improve living standards in West Africa

Institutional Framework
ECOWAS carries out its responsibilities through the following institutions (tralac Trade Law
Centre, n.d.):

• Authority of Heads of State and Government

• Council of Ministers
• ECOWAS Commission
• ECOWAS Parliament
• ECOWAS Court of Justice
• ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)
• Specialized Agencies

Authority of Heads of State and Government

As the highest decision-making body, the Authority determines ECOWAS policies, approves
treaties and agreements, and appoints the President of the ECOWAS Commission.

Council of Ministers
The Council implements decisions of the Authority, coordinates regional policies, prepares the
annual budget, and supervises ECOWAS programmes.

ECOWAS Commission
Headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria, the Commission manages daily operations, implements regional
policies, coordinates development programmes, and represents ECOWAS internationally.

Other Key Institutions

• ECOWAS Parliament: represents citizens, promotes democracy, and advises on regional
policy.
• ECOWAS Court of Justice: interprets ECOWAS law, settles disputes, and protects human
rights.
• ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID): finances infrastructure,
supports agriculture, and promotes regional development.

Strengths and Challenges of the Framework

On paper, this framework gives ECOWAS a genuinely comprehensive legal architecture: it
promotes regional cooperation and economic integration, encourages democracy, maintains peace
and security, and provides legal mechanisms for dispute resolution. In practice, however, the
Community continues to struggle with poor implementation of decisions, limited funding, political
instability and coups, the persistence of national interests over regional ones, and delays in
implementing treaties – tensions that resurface throughout this report, most visibly in the
discussion of trade integration and political security below.

The legal foundation built on the 1975 Treaty of Lagos and the 1993 Revised Treaty empowers
ECOWAS to promote economic integration, peace, democracy, and sustainable development.
Through its institutions, ECOWAS continues to strengthen cooperation among West African
countries despite persistent political and economic challenges – the practical record of which is
assessed in the next section.

4. Economic and Developmental Impacts: Trade Integration, Free Movement, and

Infrastructure

4.1 Trade Integration

Framework. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), adopted in 1979 and extended
to industrial products in 1990, is the core instrument for regional trade. It grants duty-free access
to unprocessed goods, handicrafts, and approved industrial products of ECOWAS origin
(ECOWAS Trade Information System, n.d.).

Achievements.

• A Common External Tariff (CET) has been operational since 2015, harmonising how the
bloc taxes goods from outside the region.
• A Single Customs Declaration Form and a Customs and Connectivity Programme have
simplified the cross-border movement of goods.
• ECOWAS maintains links to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
payment infrastructure, supporting regional settlements.
Persistent gaps.

• Intra-regional trade remains low relative to potential; non-tariff barriers – paperwork,

multiple checkpoints, and informal levies – often matter more than tariffs themselves.
• Inadequate transport infrastructure is estimated to add roughly 30–40% to the cost of goods
traded across the region, well above global norms (tralac Trade Law Centre, 2024).
• Small and medium enterprises, which account for a significant share of regional economic
activity, remain largely excluded from formal cross-border trade because of persistent gaps in
trade finance (International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2022).

4.2 Free Movement of Persons

Framework. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement grants citizens visa-free travel,
residence, and establishment rights within the region using the ECOWAS common passport or ID,
and remains one of the most liberal free-movement regimes among Africa's RECs (Britannica,
n.d.).

Achievements. The protocol has facilitated large-scale labour migration and cross-border informal
trade, particularly among women traders and rural populations.

Persistent gaps.

• Implementation remains uneven, as conflicting national immigration enforcement and border

harassment undermine the protocol on the ground.
 • Political shocks disrupt free movement directly: the January 2025 withdrawal of Mali,
Burkina Faso, and Niger created immediate uncertainty over the movement and legal status
of citizens from those states (Georgetown Security Studies Review, 2025).

4.3 Infrastructure
Framework. ECOWAS infrastructure programmes in transport, energy, and telecommunications
aim to physically connect the region and make legal integration usable in practice, not merely
notional.

Achievements.

• Early initiatives such as INTELCOM funded regional telecommunications links from the
1980s onward.
• The region continues to invest in road corridors and the West African Power Pool, which
supports cross-border electricity trade.
Persistent gaps.

• Rural road connectivity remains a binding constraint across the continent: the World Bank's
Rural Access Index shows that, even under optimistic investment scenarios, the share of the
rural population within 2 km of an all-season road would rise only from about 39% to 52%
by 2030 across developing countries as a group – a deficit West Africa reflects sharply
(Mikou et al., 2019).
• Landlocked Sahelian states depend heavily on coastal ports – Cotonou, Lomé, Abidjan, and
Tema – so infrastructure or political disruption at these ports has outsized economic effects
on the interior.

4.4 Quick Verdict

ECOWAS has built a genuinely strong legal and institutional framework for trade and free
movement – arguably the most advanced among Africa's RECs. But implementation continues to
lag the ambition: infrastructure deficits, non-tariff barriers, and, more recently, the AES
withdrawal all show that regional economic integration remains fragile whenever political will
breaks down, a theme the next section examines directly.

5. Political and Security Challenges: Bottlenecks, Conflicts, and Sovereignty Traps

5.1 Bottlenecks in Enforcement

Framework. ECOWAS's main disciplinary tools against member states are suspension,
diplomatic mediation, and economic sanctions, backed since 2012 by Supplementary Act

Persistent gaps.

• Sanctions have repeatedly failed to reverse coups while imposing heavy costs on ordinary
citizens rather than the military elites who seized power – as seen in Niger, where sanctions
hit an economy of over 25 million people hard without restoring the elected government
(International Politics and Society [IPS] Journal, 2026).
 • Enforcement is inconsistent: ECOWAS's harsher response to Niger's 2023 coup, compared
with softer treatment of other cases, has fed perceptions of double standards.
• Member states have grown increasingly reluctant to cede further sovereignty to ECOWAS
institutions, which limits how far reform proposals can go without risking additional
withdrawals.

5.2 Recurring Conflict and Insecurity

Framework. Since the 1990s, ECOWAS has repeatedly had to respond militarily and
diplomatically to internal conflicts and jihadist insurgency across the region.

Achievements.

• The now-defunct ECOMOG intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and early
2000s, and its successor, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), helped secure a peaceful
transfer of power during the 2017 Gambian election crisis (ORF, 2026).
• The ESF also played a role in foiling an attempted coup in Benin in December 2025, one of
the bloc's more effective recent security interventions (ORF, 2026).
Persistent gaps.

• Jihadist groups such as JNIM, ISGS, and ISWAP continue high-casualty attacks across the
Sahel and its borderlands; a 2025 JNIM attack in Benin's Parc du W National Park alone
killed 54 soldiers, underlining how insecurity now extends well beyond the Sahel core (The
Soufan Center, 2025).
• A coup in Guinea-Bissau in late November 2025, following a disputed election, showed that
democratic backsliding remains an active, not merely historical, problem for the bloc (IPS
Journal, 2026).

5.3 Sovereignty Traps: The AES Withdrawal

Framework. The clearest illustration of ECOWAS's political fragility is the loss of three
founding-era member states to a rival bloc.

• The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was formed as a defence pact directly in response to
ECOWAS's threat to use military force against Niger following its July 2023 coup (Sow &
Li, 2025).
• Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally exited ECOWAS on 29 January 2025, accusing the
bloc of failing to support their fight against jihadist violence while serving Western interests
(Georgetown Security Studies Review, 2025).
• In response, ECOWAS's Parliament has approved a new Mutual Defence and Constitutional
Order Protocol, establishing a 5,000-strong ECOWAS Standby Intervention Force (ESIF) –
the most significant reform of its security architecture since 1999 (African Security Analysis,
2026).
• Not every outcome has been negative: ECOWAS lifted all sanctions on Guinea in January
2026 after its transition process was judged complete, showing that patient, election-
anchored diplomacy can still succeed (IPS Journal, 2026).
ECOWAS's security record mirrors the tension already identified in its economic performance:
strong legal and institutional design is repeatedly undermined by inconsistent enforcement and by
member states' readiness to prioritise national sovereignty over collective commitments whenever
the two collide. How ECOWAS reconciles that tension will shape whether it can credibly anchor
West Africa's integration into the wider African market – the subject of the final section.

6. Outlook and Recommendations: ECOWAS and AfCFTA

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a continental trade agreement designed to
create a single African market by reducing trade barriers, encouraging the movement of goods and
services, promoting investment, and strengthening economic integration among African countries.
Established under the African Union's Agenda 2063 and in force since 2019, AfCFTA aims to
build a single market of roughly 1.3 billion people with a combined GDP of about US$3.4 trillion
(African Union, n.d.; AfCFTA Secretariat, 2025).

Outlook for ECOWAS

The future of ECOWAS depends on deeper economic integration and stronger participation in the
wider African market. ECOWAS can use its existing regional trade arrangements to help West
African countries capture the benefits of AfCFTA. To do so, ECOWAS should focus on:

• Increasing trade among West African countries.

• Promoting industrialisation and the production of finished goods.
• Improving infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and electricity.
• Encouraging digital trade and modern customs systems.
• Supporting the free movement of people, goods, and services.

Alignment with AfCFTA

ECOWAS and AfCFTA share similar goals of reducing trade barriers and promoting economic
integration. ECOWAS can support AfCFTA by harmonising its trade policies, removing
unnecessary restrictions at borders, improving customs procedures, and developing regional value
chains. For example, West African countries could process agricultural and mineral resources
within the region rather than exporting mainly raw materials – an approach that would create jobs,
raise incomes, and improve economic development.

Policy Recommendations
• Remove non-tariff barriers such as unnecessary border delays, excessive paperwork, and
illegal checkpoints.
• Strengthen the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) to make regional trade easier.
• Harmonise ECOWAS policies with AfCFTA so businesses can trade more easily across
Africa.
• Improve regional infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, electricity, and
telecommunications.
• Promote industrialisation by encouraging manufacturing and value addition.
 • Support women and youth entrepreneurs through finance, training, and access to markets.
• Strengthen private-sector participation in regional and continental trade.
• Improve monitoring and implementation to ensure member states actually carry out agreed
policies.

7. Conclusion
ECOWAS has evolved, over five decades, from a narrow economic pact born of post-colonial
necessity into one of Africa's most institutionally developed regional bodies – spanning trade, free
movement, peacekeeping, and democratic governance. Its legal mandate and institutional
framework are arguably the most advanced among Africa's Regional Economic Communities, and
its record includes genuine achievements: the ETLS and Common External Tariff, a still-
functioning free movement regime, and security interventions that have, at times, restored
constitutional order.

Yet the same thread runs through every section of this report: ambition consistently outpaces
implementation. Non-tariff barriers, infrastructure deficits, inconsistent sanctions enforcement,
and – most dramatically – the 2025 withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all demonstrate
that regional integration remains fragile whenever national political interests diverge from
collective commitments. ECOWAS should nonetheless serve as a strong regional foundation for
AfCFTA: by removing trade barriers, improving infrastructure, promoting industrialisation, and
harmonising its policies with the continental framework, ECOWAS can help West African
countries access the wider African market – increasing trade, investment, employment, and
economic development across the region.
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