ADVANCED ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: Whether the Special Leave Petition filed by the Human Rights Organization Har Kisi
Ka Rakshak before the Supreme Court of Indiana is Maintainable?
May it please the court, the respondent would like to humbly submit before the honorable court
of Law that the special leave petition filed in the present matter is not maintainable. It has to be
understood that the Court has evolved and formulated a principle that if the essential judgment
is not assailed and the challenge is only to the order passed in review, this Court is obliged
not to entertain such special leave petition. The said principle has gained the authoritative
status and has been treated as a precedential principle for more than two decades, and we are
disposed to think that there is hardly any necessity not to be guided by the said precedent.
Article 136 does not confer a Right of Appeal, but merely a discretionary power to the Supreme
Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice under exceptional circumstances1. In
Pritam Singh v. The State2The Supreme Court held that the power under Article 136 of the
Indiana Constitution is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.
In concluding the Discussion on Article 136 in the same case, it was held by the Supreme Court
that ‘Generally speaking, this court will not grant Special Leave, unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done
and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the
decision appealed against.’
Although the power has been held to be plenary, limitless3, adjunctive, and unassailable4, in M.
C. Mehta v. Union of India5 and Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri6 It
was held that the powers under Article 136 should be exercised with caution and in accordance
with law and set legal principles
1.1 Absence of substantial question of law
It is a predominant principle that an SLP must raise a substantial question of law. The
1
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196
2
Pritam Singh v. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169
3
A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546
4
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467
5
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4618
6
Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri, AIR 2005 SC 15
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that it will only entertain SLPs that present
significant legal issues warranting its intervention.
The High Court's judgment in favor of the police team was grounded in a thorough examination
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged encounter. The Supreme Court, in State
of Maharashtra v. Ramesh G. B. [AIR 2006 SC 167]7, reiterated that the scope of judicial
review in matters involving police action is inherently limited, particularly when the police are
acting in the line of duty. The Court recognized that law enforcement officials often operate
under high-pressure situations and must make quick decisions based on the information available
to them at the time. Therefore, the High Court's findings, which were based on factual
assessments, do not raise any substantial question of law that would necessitate Supreme
Court intervention.
The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is crucial in determining the
maintainability of an SLP. The High Court's decision was primarily based on the assessment of
evidence and the circumstances leading to the encounter, which are matters of fact rather than
law. The Supreme Court has held in K.C. Sareen v. CBI [2001 (6) SCC 584]8 that an SLP
cannot be entertained merely because another view is possible. The Court emphasized that the
mere existence of differing opinions does not constitute a substantial question of law. In this
case, the findings of the High Court are well within the ambit of law and do not indicate
any gross legal misinterpretation.
1.2 Lack of locus standi and no vested interest of the petitioner
The principle of locus standi9 is fundamental to ensuring that only those with a direct and
substantial interest in a matter can seek judicial intervention. This principle is enshrined in
various legal frameworks and has been reinforced through numerous judicial pronouncements.
The petitioner, ‘Har Kisi Ka Rakshak,’ is a third party with no direct interest in the matter. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that only parties who are aggrieved by a judgment or order
7
State of Maharashtra v. Ramesh G. B. [AIR 2006 SC 167]
8
K.C. Sareen v. CBI [2001 (6) SCC 584]
9
Principle of Locus Standi
have the right to appeal. In the case of Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [AIR 1993 SC 892]10
Supreme Court of Indiana held that third-party interventions cannot be allowed where the
petitioners lack a direct and substantial interest.
The organization is not an aggrieved party in this case, as it does not represent the accused or
their families, nor does it have any direct stake in the outcome of the police action. Therefore,
the SLP is not maintainable on the grounds of locus standi.
1.3 Discretionary Nature of Article 136
Article 136 of the Constitution of Indiana empowers the Supreme Court to grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, or order of any High Court. However, it is
crucial to understand that this power is discretionary and not a matter of right. The Supreme
Court has consistently emphasized that the exercise of this discretion should be judicious and
sparingly applied, particularly in cases where the High Court has rendered well-reasoned
judgments. The Court does not entertain Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) as a routine matter,
especially when the lower court's decision is based on a thorough examination of the facts and
law.
In the landmark case of K.K. Verma v. Union of India [AIR 1954 SC 321]11, the Supreme
Court articulated that the SLP should not be employed as a mechanism for re-examining facts or
questioning the merits of a case unless compelling reasons are presented. This principle
underscores the importance of respecting the findings of lower courts, particularly when they
have conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence and legal arguments. In the present case, the
High Court has provided a reasoned judgment based on the facts presented, and there are no
compelling reasons that necessitate the Supreme Court's intervention.
Moreover, in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954 SC 520]12, the
Supreme Court reiterated that Article 136 is intended for extraordinary situations where a grave
10
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [AIR 1993 SC 892]
11
K.K. Verma v. Union of India [AIR 1954 SC 321]
12
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954 SC 520].
injustice has occurred. The Court emphasized that the SLP should be reserved for exceptional
circumstances that warrant interference. In the current matter, no such extraordinary
circumstances exist that would justify the Supreme Court's involvement. The High Court's
judgment stands as a well-reasoned decision that does not exhibit any signs of injustice or error.
In State of U.P. v. Rajendra Singh [AIR 2009 SC 1661]13, the Supreme Court further clarified
that the SLP is not a substitute for an appeal and should not be used to challenge the factual
findings of the lower courts. The Court highlighted that the SLP should only be entertained
when there is a substantial question of law or when the lower court's decision is manifestly
unjust. In this case, the High Court's decision is neither manifestly unjust nor does it raise any
substantial question of law that warrants the Supreme Court's review.
Additionally, in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [2003 (3) SCC 524]14, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the SLP should be exercised with caution and should not be used
to re-evaluate the evidence or the merits of the case. The Court emphasized that the SLP is
meant to address significant legal issues rather than to serve as a forum for rearguing the
case. The present case does not present any significant legal issues that would necessitate the
Supreme Court's intervention.
Furthermore, in K.K. Verma v. Union of India15, the Supreme Court also pointed out that the
SLP should not be entertained merely because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of the
case. The Court's role is not to act as a court of appeal but to ensure that justice is served in
extraordinary circumstances. The High Court's judgment in this case reflects a careful
consideration of the facts and law, and there is no indication of any miscarriage of justice that
would warrant the Supreme Court's intervention.
Thus, the principles established in these landmark cases underscore the discretionary nature of
the Supreme Court's power under Article 136. The SLP should be reserved for exceptional
13
State of U.P. v. Rajendra Singh [AIR 2009 SC 1661]
14
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [2003 (3) SCC 524]
15
K.K. Verma v. Union of India [AIR 1954 SC 321]
circumstances where a grave injustice has occurred or where substantial questions of law arise.
In the present case, the High Court has delivered a well-reasoned judgment based on a
thorough examination of the facts, and there are no compelling reasons to warrant the
Supreme Court's intervention. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the Special Leave
Petition should be dismissed, as it does not meet the criteria for exceptional circumstances that
would justify the exercise of this discretionary power.
1.4 Presumption of Good Faith in State Actions
The principle that state officials, including police officers, are presumed to act in good faith is
well-established in Indian jurisprudence. In the landmark case of State of Maharashtra v.
Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [1982 AIR 1249]16, the Supreme Court held that public officials
should be presumed to act in good faith in the discharge of their duties unless there is clear
evidence to the contrary. This presumption is rooted in the understanding that public servants are
entrusted with significant responsibilities and are expected to act in the public interest.
In cases where the actions of state officials are called into question, the burden of proof lies
with the party alleging mala fide intent or misconduct. The petitioner, ‘Har Kisi Ka
Rakshak,’ has the responsibility to provide concrete evidence demonstrating that the police acted
with malice or in bad faith.
However, the High Court, after a thorough examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the encounter, found no evidence of mala fide intent on the part of the police
officials. This finding reinforces the presumption of good faith and indicates that the petitioner
has not discharged the burden of proof required to challenge the actions of the police.
1.5 The Natural Justice is not infringed in the present matter
16
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [1982 AIR 1249]
In the context of the present case, it is crucial to affirm that the principles of natural justice have
been meticulously upheld throughout the judicial proceedings. Natural justice, which
fundamentally includes the right to a fair hearing and the right to be heard by an impartial
tribunal, serves as a cornerstone of the legal framework in Indiana. The police action under
scrutiny was executed in the line of duty and subsequently subjected to rigorous judicial
examination by the High Court. The High Court's reasoned judgment, grounded in the evidence
presented, underscores the commitment to ensuring that all parties involved had ample
opportunity to present their respective cases.
The High Court's judgment is a testament to a comprehensive evaluation of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the police action. The principles of natural justice were not only
acknowledged but actively upheld, as the police officials were afforded the opportunity to
present their defence. The High Court meticulously assessed the evidence before arriving at its
conclusion, thereby reinforcing the integrity of the judicial process.
In the landmark case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [AIR 1978 SC 597]17, the Supreme
Court underscored the significance of the right to a fair hearing as an essential component of
natural justice. The Court articulated that any law that deprives a person of their personal liberty
must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The High Court's process in the present case
aligns seamlessly with this principle, as it ensured that the police officials were granted a fair
opportunity to defend their actions. The procedural safeguards in place reflect a commitment to
justice and fairness, which are paramount in any judicial proceeding.
Furthermore, in Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [AIR 1973 SC 1461]18, the
Supreme Court established the "basic structure doctrine19," asserting that certain
fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial, are inviolable and form part of the basic
structure of the Constitution. This doctrine reinforces the notion that any action taken by the
state, including police actions, must be subject to scrutiny to ensure compliance with the
principles of natural justice. The High Court's judgment in this case exemplifies adherence to this
17
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [AIR 1978 SC 597]
18
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [AIR 1973 SC 1461]
19
Basic Structure Doctrine
doctrine, as it meticulously evaluated the actions of the police within the framework of
constitutional rights.
In addition, the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [AIR 1970 SC 150]20 further elucidates
the importance of natural justice in administrative actions. The Supreme Court held that even in
administrative proceedings, the principles of natural justice must be observed to prevent
arbitrary decision-making. The High Court's thorough examination of the police action reflects a
commitment to these principles, ensuring that the actions taken were not arbitrary but rather
justified based on the evidence presented.
It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner, ‘Har Kisi Ka Rakshak,’ does not represent an
aggrieved party in this matter and, therefore, lacks the requisite locus standi to claim that
its rights have been violated. The absence of a direct grievance undermines the foundation of
the Special Leave Petition (SLP) and further supports the argument for its dismissal. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that only those who have a direct and substantial interest in
the matter at hand can seek redress through the SLP mechanism.
The SLP serves as a vital instrument within the Indian judicial system, functioning as a "residual
power" vested in the Supreme Court to be exercised judiciously in cases where substantial
questions of law arise or where gross injustice has occurred. The discretionary nature of this
power allows the Court to refuse to grant leave to appeal when such conditions are not met. In
the present case, it is evident that no gross injustice has been perpetrated against the petitioners,
nor is there a substantial question of law that warrants the Supreme Court's intervention.
Thus, the counsel respectfully submits that the principles of natural justice have been upheld
throughout the judicial process, and the High Court's judgment reflects a thorough and fair
examination of the facts. The absence of locus standi on the part of the petitioner, coupled with
the lack of any substantial question of law or gross injustice, compels the Court to dismiss the
Special Leave Petition. The Supreme Court possesses the authority to reject this petition, and it is
imperative that this power is exercised judiciously to maintain the integrity of the judicial
system.
20
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [AIR 1970 SC 150]
ISSUE NO. 2: WHETHER THE POLICE ACTION RESULTING IN THE KILLING OF
THE FOUR ACCUSED WAS JUSTIFIED OR AMOUNTED TO AN EXTRAJUDICIAL
EXECUTION?
With due respect and honor, the counsel from the side of the respondent would like to submit that
the police action resulting in the killing of four accused was merely the heat of the moment and a
force for self-defence, and maintaining public peace and order and the present case revolves
around the tragic yet legally significant events following the brutal rape and murder of Dr. Sita
Ramakrishna. The accused individuals, Ram, Sham, Lakhan, and Sadhu, were apprehended by
the police after substantial evidence indicated their involvement in the heinous crime. On
December 25, 2024, while being transported to the District Magistrate, the accused allegedly
attempted to escape, seizing a police officer’s firearm and taking a constable hostage. Given the
imminent threat to human life and the potential for the accused to escape justice, the police
officers were compelled to use force, resulting in the deaths of the four accused.
The primary contention in the Special Leave Petition (SLP) is that this incident constitutes an
extrajudicial execution. However, the respondents strongly argue that the police officers acted in
self-defence, in accordance with statutory provisions, and within their legal authority to prevent
escape and ensure public safety. The petitioners' claim of extrajudicial execution fails to
recognize the pressing circumstances that necessitated the police action.
2.1 Police Officers Acted in Self-Defence Under the Legal Framework of Private Defence
The concept of private defence is a fundamental principle of criminal law that permits an
individual to use reasonable force to protect themselves or others from an imminent threat of
harm. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) provides a clear legal framework for self-defence,
recognizing situations where the use of force—even deadly force—is justified.
Under Section 96 IPC/ Section 34 of BNS, 2023 21, no act done in the exercise of the right of
private defence is considered an offense. Further, Section 97 IPC/ Section 35 of BNS, 202322
21
Section 96 IPC/ Section 34 of BNS, 2023
22
Section 97 IPC/ Section 35 of BNS, 2023
allows an individual to defend their own body or that of another against an act that causes death
or grievous injury. Most importantly, Section 100 IPC/ Section 35 of BNS, 2023 23 states that the
right of private defence extends to causing death if there is a reasonable apprehension of death or
grievous hurt. In the present case, the accused took control of a police officer’s firearm and held
a constable hostage, creating a real and immediate danger to life. Under these circumstances, the
police officers had every legal right to use deadly force to neutralize the threat.
Judicial precedents have consistently upheld the right to private defence in law enforcement
scenarios. In Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 5 SCC 776 24The Supreme Court ruled
that self-defence is available when there is a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger, and a
person does not need to wait until they suffer harm before acting. Similarly, in State of U.P. v.
Ram Swarup (1974) SCC 14425The Court recognized that law enforcement officers can
justifiably use force when confronted with an armed or dangerous accused. The ruling in Kuldip
Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 3 SCC 25 26 further emphasized that police officers are not
required to suffer injury before defending themselves.
In the present case, the police officers were faced with an uncontrolled situation where the
accused had already seized a firearm and taken a hostage. This not only placed the officers in
imminent danger but also jeopardized the safety of the public, as an escaped accused could have
used the firearm to commit further crimes. Given the clear legal recognition of private defence,
the use of force in this case was not extrajudicial but a necessary act of self-preservation.
2.2 Accused Attempted to Escape and Posed an Imminent Threat to Law Enforcement
The second crucial issue pertains to whether the accused attempted to escape, thereby justifying
the police's use of force. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) explicitly provides for
using force to prevent an escape attempt by an accused facing serious charges. Section 46(2) &
(3) CrPC/ Section 43 of BNSS 27 states that if a person forcibly resists arrest or attempts to
23
Section 100 IPC/ Section 35 of BNS, 2023
24
Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 5 SCC 776
25
U.P. v. Ram Swarup (1974) SCC 144
26
Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 3 SCC 25
27
Section 46(2) & (3) CrPC/ Section 43 of BNSS
escape, law enforcement officers may use all necessary means to prevent such an escape,
including lethal force if the accused is charged with a capital offense such as murder or rape.
In this case, the accused were charged under Section 302 IPC/ Section 103 of BNS (murder) 28
and Section 376A IPC/ Section 66 of BNS (rape causing death) 29—both offenses punishable
by death or life imprisonment. As such, their escape attempt was a grave threat to justice, and the
police had full legal authority to use force to prevent it. The presence of a hostage situation
further escalated the necessity of immediate action.
Courts have long recognized that law enforcement officers must act decisively in preventing
escape attempts. In Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 7230, the Supreme
Court held that police officers are not required to wait for an actual attack before responding to
an escape attempt. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal (1964) AIR 33 SC 31, the Court
ruled that the police have the authority to use force to prevent accused individuals from evading
justice. The ruling in Ram Prasad v. State of U.P. (2002) 7 SCC 679 32 reaffirmed that lethal
force is justified if an accused charged with a capital offense attempts to escape custody.
Applying these principles to the present case, the police officers had no alternative but to act
swiftly to neutralize the threat posed by the accused. Allowing the accused to escape would have
created an immediate danger to society and undermined the judicial process. The police officers,
therefore, acted lawfully in using necessary force.
2.3 Actions of the Police Were in Accordance with Legal Provisions and Precedents
Beyond private defence and escape prevention, the police action was also fully compliant with
established statutory provisions and judicial precedents that govern law enforcement
responsibilities. The Police Act, 186133 which regulates police conduct, mandates that officers
must take all necessary measures to prevent crimes and protect public safety. Section 2334 of the
Act obligates police officers to suppress violent offenses and maintain law and order.
28
Section 302 IPC/ Section 103 of BNS (murder)
29
Section 376A IPC/ Section 66 of BNS (rape causing death)
30
Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72
31
State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal (1964) AIR 33 SC
32
Ram Prasad v. State of U.P. (2002) 7 SCC 679
33
The Police Act, 1861
34
Section 23 of the Police Act, 1861
Additionally, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Guidelines on Encounter
Killings (2010)35 acknowledge that police officers may use force in self-defence or in dangerous
situations, provided that the incident is later subject to judicial review. In People’s Union for
Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635 36, the Supreme Court recognized
that police officers can use lethal force when faced with an imminent threat, provided an inquiry
follows. The ruling in State of Punjab v. Wassan Singh (1981) 2 SCC 137 further established
that police officers acting in good faith within their duty are protected from criminal liability.
In the present case, the police officers were in the process of transporting the accused to the
District Magistrate when the sudden escape attempt and hostage situation arose. The officers had
no prior intent to harm the accused but were forced into a split-second decision to protect lives.
Given the legal framework supporting police discretion in high-risk situations, the claim of
extrajudicial execution is untenable.
2.4 The Necessity to Maintain Public Order and Peace
One of the primary responsibilities of law enforcement agencies is to maintain public order and
peace, ensuring that society is not disrupted by criminal activities or public unrest. The tragic
incident involving Dr. Sita Ramakrishna had already ignited national outrage, and any failure to
take immediate and decisive action against the accused could have led to widespread public
disorder, mass protests, and potential lawlessness. In situations where an incident shakes the
collective conscience of society, it becomes imperative for the police to act in a manner that not
only upholds the law but also reassures the public that justice will be served effectively.
The Police Act, 1861, under Section 23, explicitly mandates that police officers must take all
necessary steps to preserve public peace, prevent crimes, and apprehend offenders. In this case,
had the accused successfully escaped, it could have led to an aggravated public outcry,
undermining the faith of the people in the justice system. The government and law enforcement
agencies are bound to ensure that public confidence in the rule of law is upheld, and this
necessitates preventing any event that could trigger lawlessness.
35
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Guidelines on Encounter Killings (2010)
36
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635
37
State of Punjab v. Wassan Singh (1981) 2 SCC 1
Judicial precedents have consistently affirmed that maintaining public order is a paramount duty
of the State. In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta (2011) 6 SCC 189 38, the
Supreme Court recognized that while police officers must act within the bounds of law, they also
bear the responsibility of ensuring that their actions do not lead to breakdown of law and order.
In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) AIR 740 SC 39, the Court held that the State
has the authority to take preventive measures to ensure that acts of violence do not escalate into
public disorder. Similarly, in A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) AIR 710 SC 40It was reaffirmed
that preventive measures, including police action, are justified when public safety is at risk.
In the present case, the gruesome nature of the crime, combined with the nationwide outrage,
posed a significant threat to public tranquillity. Any indication of police inefficiency or
negligence, such as allowing the accused to escape, could have led to violent protests, disruption
of daily life, and a potential breakdown of law and order. The Supreme Court, in Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) AIR 955 SC41, emphasized that public order is distinct from
ordinary law and order situations and that extreme cases may necessitate immediate and decisive
police intervention.
Moreover, allowing the accused to escape would have sent a dangerous message to other
offenders, emboldening them to evade justice and creating a precedent of lawlessness. The police
action in neutralizing the accused was, therefore, not only a response to an immediate threat
but also a preventive measure to maintain public peace and uphold the rule of law. Thus, the
allegation of extrajudicial execution is unfounded, as the officers were compelled to act in the
interest of public safety and order.
In conclusion, the necessity of preserving public order is an essential element of law enforcement
responsibilities, and the actions taken by the police officers in this case were entirely justified
under the legal framework. The respondents submit that the claim of extrajudicial killing must be
dismissed, as the police acted not only in self-defence and prevention of escape but also in
furtherance of their duty to maintain public order and peace.
38
Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta (2011) 6 SCC 189
39
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) AIR 740 SC
40
A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) AIR 710 SC
41
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) AIR 955 SC
In light of the foregoing arguments, the respondents submit that the police action was justified
and does not amount to an extrajudicial execution. The officers acted in self-defence under
Sections 96-100 IPC/ Section 34-38 of BNS 42to prevent escape under Section 46(3) CrPC/
Section 43 of BNSS, and within their legal authority under the Police Act, 1861. The
overwhelming statutory support, judicial precedents, and immediate threat to life validate the
police action. Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed, and the officers should be absolved
of any wrongdoing.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) CHALLENGING THE ENCOUNTER DEATHS
WITHOUT ORDERING AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION?
May it please your lordship, The petitioners in the Special Leave Petition (SLP) contend that the
High Court of Tamtamabad erred in dismissing the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by the
42
self-defence under Sections 96-100 IPC/ Section 34-38 of BNS
human rights organization ‘Har Kisi Ka Rakshak’ without ordering an independent investigation
into the encounter deaths of the four accused. However, the respondents argue that the High
Court’s decision was legally sound, as it was based on the factual matrix of the case, relevant
legal principles, and precedents governing police encounters, judicial oversight, and the scope of
PILs.
The High Court exercised its discretionary power in determining that the police action was
justified under the prevailing circumstances, and there was no prima facie evidence of mala
fide intent. The decision aligns with the well-established judicial principle that courts should not
interfere in law enforcement operations unless there is clear evidence of abuse of power or
procedural lapses. The respondents submit that the High Court acted in accordance with legal
standards, and an independent investigation was neither warranted nor legally obligatory.
3.1 PILs Cannot Be Used to Challenge Lawful Law Enforcement Actions Without Substantive
Evidence
The concept of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was introduced as a tool to provide access to
justice in cases where fundamental rights of marginalized groups are violated. However, the
Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against the misuse of PILs to challenge state actions
without substantive legal grounds. Courts have repeatedly held that PILs should not be
entertained merely based on public sentiment or unverified allegations against law enforcement
agencies.
In State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 40243, the Supreme Court
articulated that PILs must not be frivolous and should be supported by tangible evidence that
substantiates claims of violations of fundamental rights. The Court underscored that the
purpose of a PIL is to address serious issues affecting the public interest, and it should not be
employed as a tool for personal vendettas or to harass public authorities. The ruling
highlighted the need for a prima facie case to be established, ensuring that the courts are not
inundated with baseless petitions that could detract from their ability to address genuine
grievances.
43
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402
The Court's emphasis on the requirement of tangible evidence aligns with the broader principles
enshrined in the Constitution of India. Article 1444 guarantees the right to equality before the
law and equal protection of the law, which necessitates that all individuals, including public
authorities, are treated fairly and justly. Therefore, a PIL that lacks a prima facie case of
wrongdoing undermines this principle by potentially subjecting public authorities to
unwarranted scrutiny and harassment.
Similarly, in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004) 3 SCC 34945, the Supreme
Court reiterated that PILs cannot be wielded as instruments to harass public authorities without a
prima facie case of wrongdoing. The Court emphasized that the judiciary must exercise caution
in entertaining PILs, ensuring that they are based on credible evidence and legitimate concerns.
This approach is vital in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and preventing the
misuse of PILs for ulterior motives.
The legal framework governing PILs is further supported by the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, particularly Section 91 CrPC/ Section 94 of BNSS 46, which mandates that a
suit for the enforcement of a public right must be brought by the Attorney General or a public
officer. This provision underscores the importance of having a legitimate representative of the
public interest initiate legal proceedings, thereby ensuring that the courts are approached with
genuine concerns rather than frivolous claims.
Moreover, the principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing, as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution47, necessitate that any allegations made against public authorities
must be substantiated with credible evidence. The requirement for a prima facie case serves to
protect the rights of individuals and institutions from being subjected to baseless accusations,
thereby upholding the rule of law.
Applying these principles to the present case, the PIL filed by the Human Rights Organization
'Har Kisi Ka Rakshak' alleged "cold-blooded murder" without providing substantial
evidence to support claims of extrajudicial killing. These claims were based on speculation
44
Article 14 of Indiana constitution
45
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004) 3 SCC 349
46
Section 91 CrPC/ Section 94 of BNSS
47
Article 21 of the Indiana Constitution
and conjecture, alleging that the police had conducted a pre-planned extrajudicial
execution.
However, no credible evidence was presented to substantiate these claims. The High Court's
dismissal was appropriate given the absence of credible evidence indicating that the police acted
with malice or outside the bounds of the law. The presumption of legality in police actions must
prevail unless clear evidence suggests otherwise.
3.2. Independent Investigations Are Not Mandated When Prima Facie Justification Exists
The petitioners argue that the High Court should have ordered an independent investigation into
the encounter deaths. However, the legal position established by the Supreme Court states that an
independent probe is not automatically required unless there are serious doubts regarding the
integrity of the police action.
In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635 48, the
Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines for police encounters. Among these
guidelines, the Court emphasized that a mandatory judicial inquiry and the registration of
a First Information Report (FIR) are only warranted when there is prima facie evidence
suggesting extrajudicial execution. This means that unless there is clear and compelling
evidence indicating that the police acted with malice or unlawfully, the presumption of legality in
police actions should prevail. In the present case, the High Court undertook a meticulous review
of police records, medical reports, and witness statements, all of which supported the police's
claim that the accused attempted to escape and took a constable hostage. The absence of any
prima facie suspicion of mala fide intent led the High Court to conclude that an independent
investigation was unnecessary.
In Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72 49, further clarifies the standards for
evaluating police encounters. The Court asserted that police actions must be assessed based on
concrete evidence rather than conjecture or public sentiment. It emphasized that judicial
intervention should be limited to cases involving clear abuse of power or misconduct by law
enforcement. This principle is vital in ensuring that the judiciary does not overstep its bounds
48
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635
49
Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72
and interfere in police operations without substantial justification. In the current case, the High
Court found no evidence that would suggest any wrongful conduct by the police, thereby
reinforcing the legitimacy of their actions.
Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh (1995) 3 SCC 367, the Supreme Court reiterated
that courts should refrain from intervening in police matters unless there is substantial evidence
indicating wrongful intent. This ruling underscores the importance of allowing police to perform
their duties without undue interference, particularly in high-stakes situations where quick
decisions are necessary to protect public safety.
The presumption of good faith50 in police actions is a well-established legal principle, as
reaffirmed in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) 2 SCC 463. This
presumption holds that police actions are conducted in good faith unless proven otherwise. It is
essential to recognize that law enforcement officers often operate in high-pressure environments
where split-second decisions are required. The legal system must provide them with a degree of
protection against unwarranted scrutiny, particularly when their actions are justified by the
circumstances.
The absence of prima facie evidence of extrajudicial execution or wrongful intent justified the
High Court's conclusion that an independent investigation was unnecessary. The ruling
reflects a careful consideration of the complexities involved in policing and the need to maintain
public safety while respecting the rights of individuals. The High Court was justified in rejecting
the PIL without ordering an independent inquiry.
3.3 The High Court’s Power of Judicial Review Was Exercised Properly
1. The High Court's decision to dismiss the PIL is also legally sustainable under Article 226
of the Constitution of Indiana51, which grants High Courts the power of judicial review.
This power allows the court to determine whether a government action is lawful and
constitutional, but it does not mandate automatic intervention in all police actions. Courts
50
presumption of good faith
51
Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiana
are expected to exercise restraint in matters involving security, public safety, and law
enforcement discretion.
The police were acting under the belief that the accused posed an imminent threat to
their lives and the lives of others. Inspector Satya's statement indicated that the accused
attempted to escape and seized a service weapon, which could have justified the use of
lethal force. The High Court rightly recognized that the police must be allowed to act
decisively in situations where public safety is at risk.
In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of
Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 16152, the Supreme Court held that judicial review must be
exercised with caution, particularly in cases involving state discretion and public safety.
Likewise, in Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC
68353, it was emphasized that courts should not interfere with policy decisions and
executive functions unless they are manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional.
2. While the principle of "innocent until proven guilty54" is fundamental, it must be
contextualized within the realities of law enforcement. The accused were apprehended
under grave allegations of heinous crimes, including the brutal murder of Dr. Sita
Ramakrishna. The High Court's dismissal does not negate the presumption of innocence
but acknowledges the complexities involved in policing high-stakes situations where
immediate action may be necessary to prevent further harm.
The High Court's dismissal aligns with judicial precedents that allow for police discretion in life-
threatening situations. The Court's ruling in Kehar Singh v. Union of India55 supports the
notion that police must be empowered to act in the interest of public safety, even if such actions
may lead to tragic outcomes.
52
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC
161
53
Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC 683
54
innocent until proven guilty
55
Kehar Singh v. Union of India
Similarly, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra (1980) 4 SCC 556 56, the
scenario includes a police encounter where the accused were shot dead during an alleged attempt
to escape. The Supreme Court held that the police must be allowed to act in the interest of
public safety, particularly when faced with dangerous criminals. The Court noted that the
presumption of innocence does not preclude law enforcement from taking necessary actions to
protect the public, especially when there is a credible threat to life.
The High Court examined the material evidence, including police reports, forensic findings, and
situational assessments, before arriving at its conclusion. Given that no procedural lapse or
abuse of power was evident, the court was correct in exercising its discretion to dismiss the PIL
without ordering an independent investigation.
Hence, the respondent courteously submits that the High Court of Tamtamabad did not err in
dismissing the PIL without ordering an independent investigation. The PIL was filed without
substantive evidence, independent inquiries are not legally mandated in the absence of prima
facie suspicion, and the High Court exercised its judicial review powers correctly. The police
acted within their legal authority, and there was no material evidence to suggest that the
encounter was staged or pre-planned.
Thus, the allegation that the High Court failed in its duty is unfounded, and the Special
Leave Petition should be dismissed on the grounds that it lacks merit.
56
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra (1980) 4 SCC 556