5LM Human Rights
5LM Human Rights
II. CASES
1. Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights
2. Oposa vs. Factoran, Baldoza vs. Dimaano
3. David vs. Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
4. Meijoff vs. Director of Prisons
5. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
III. READ
Section 17-19, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution: Power of the Commissioner on Human
Rights
📑 CASE DIGEST
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No. 100150 – January 5, 1994)
Brigido R. Simon, Jr., Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo
v. Commission on Human Rights, Roque Fermo, and others as John Does
FACTS
A Demolition Notice signed by Carlos Quimpo, the Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to the private respondents who are
officers of the members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated.
The respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days up to July 12, 1990 within which they must vacate the
questioned premises of North Edsa. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, they were informed by
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park”.
On the 12th of July, the group was led by their President, Roque Fermo, who filed a letter-complaint with the
CHR against the petitioners asking the CHR Chairman for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon Jr. to stop the demolition of the private respondents stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA.
The CHR then issued an order directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
the North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors complaint before the Commission, and ordering the
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents as well as the CHR ocular
inspection, convinced on July 28th, the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents stalls.
The CHR then ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and
again directed the petitioners to desist from further demolition with warning that violation of said order would
lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.
The petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss had yet to be resolved. They
also argued that the CHR’s authority should be confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their
privilege to engage in business.
The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls and it imposed a fine of
P500 on each of them. The CHR also issued an order denying the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss stating that the CHR, under its constitutional mandate, had their jurisdiction
over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby denied for lack of merit.
The CHR opined that it was not the intention of the ConComm to create only a paper tiger limited to
investigating civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the
basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of
Man's inhumanity to man.
The petitioner’s MR was denied. It was subsequently reinstated, however in a resolution there was also an
issued temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to cease and desist from further hearing.
The petitioners pose whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction
1. To investigate the alleged violations of the business rights of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of QC
2. To impose the fine of 500 each on the petitioners
3. To disburse the amount of P200,000 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition
The court’s resolution in 1991, the SolGen was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR.
The CHR thus filed its own comment through one of its commissioners, Hon. Samuel Soriano. The Court
also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent who had since failed to comply with the
resolution requiring such comment.
The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by President Corazon Aquino via
EO 163 issued on May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded but also
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.
The powers and functions of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution
1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights
2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights
6. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights
8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by
it or under its authority
9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions
10.Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11.Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
6. Oposa vs. Factoran
7. Baldoza vs. Dimaano
8. David vs. Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
9. Meijoff vs. Director of Prisons
10.Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
IV. READ
Section 17-19, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution: Power of the Commissioner on Human Rights
📑 Digest GPT
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (G.R. No. 100150 – January 5, 1994)
Brigido R. Simon, Jr., Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo
v. Commission on Human Rights, Roque Fermo, and others as John Does
FACTS
➔ The case arose when the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council issued a
Demolition Notice requiring the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association to
vacate their stalls, sari-sari stores, carinderia, and temporary structures within three days to give way
to the construction of a People's Park.
➔ The vendors filed a complaint before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), alleging violations of
their human rights and requesting the CHR to intervene and stop the demolition. Acting on the
complaint, the CHR issued an order directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the
structures pending resolution of the complaint and later ordered financial assistance of up to
₱200,000.00 for the affected vendors after finding that the demolition had nevertheless been
carried out.
➔ Despite the petitioners' challenge to the CHR's jurisdiction through motions to dismiss, the CHR
cited them for contempt for violating its order to desist, imposed a fine of ₱500.00 each, and
denied their motions after declaring that it had jurisdiction because the demolition allegedly
violated the vendors' human and constitutional rights.
➔ Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court to prevent
the CHR from further proceeding with the case, questioning its authority to investigate the matter,
impose contempt sanctions, and order financial assistance.
ISSUE
❖ Whether or not the CHR had jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violation arising from the
demolition of the vendors' stalls as a human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
❖ Whether or not the CHR possessed the authority to issue an order directing the petitioners to
desist from demolishing the structures pending its investigation.
❖ Whether or not the CHR validly cited the petitioners for contempt and imposed a fine of ₱500.00
each for allegedly violating its order to desist.
❖ Whether or not the CHR could validly exercise quasi-judicial powers beyond mere investigation
by issuing coercive or injunctive orders.
❖ Whether or not the petition for prohibition had become moot despite the CHR having already
completed its hearings but not yet promulgated its final resolution.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and held that the Commission on Human Rights exceeded the
scope of its constitutional authority. The Court ruled that the CHR's investigatory jurisdiction extends only
to human rights violations involving civil and political rights, and that the demolition of vendors' stalls
involving their asserted right to conduct business did not fall within that constitutional mandate. It further
ruled that the CHR has no adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to issue restraining orders or
injunctions because such authority is not conferred by the Constitution or by law.
DISCUSSION
The Court emphasized that the Commission on Human Rights is not a court nor a quasi-judicial agency,
and although it may investigate complaints and determine facts involving alleged violations of civil
and political rights, it cannot finally adjudicate controversies or grant judicial remedies.
➔ It explained that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately limited the CHR's investigative
jurisdiction to civil and political rights, particularly those involving political detention, torture,
disappearances, salvaging, fair trials, treatment of prisoners, and similar abuses experienced during
the martial law regime, rather than extending it to all economic, social, or business-related
rights.
➔ The Court likewise clarified that while the CHR may cite persons for contempt, such authority
applies only to violations of its operational guidelines and rules of procedure necessary for
the exercise of its investigatory powers — such as refusing to obey summons or withholding
evidence, and not to disobedience of injunctive orders which it has no authority to issue. It further
held that the constitutional mandate authorizing the CHR to provide preventive measures and
legal aid services does not include the power to issue restraining orders or writs of injunction
because jurisdiction to issue such remedies belongs exclusively to the courts and cannot arise by
implication.
➔ Finally, the Court observed that although the CHR may investigate and thereafter endorse its
findings and recommendations to the proper government agencies, it cannot itself enforce rights
through coercive or adjudicative measures, thereby reaffirming the constitutional limits of the
Commission's authority.
FACTS
➔ The petition was filed by several minors, represented by their parents, together with the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), as a taxpayers' class suit against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), seeking the cancellation of all existing Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) and to prohibit the issuance, renewal, processing, and approval
of new TLAs.
➔ Timber License agreements are
➔ The petitioners alleged that the continuous issuance of TLAs and unabated deforestation had
caused severe environmental degradation, including water shortages, erosion, flooding,
destruction of flora and fauna, displacement of indigenous communities, siltation of rivers
and dams, reduction of agricultural productivity, and global warming, thereby violating their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
➔ They asserted that they represented not only themselves but also their generation and
generations yet unborn, invoking the concepts of intergenerational responsibility and
intergenerational justice, and claimed that the DENR Secretary held the country's natural resources
in trust for both present and future generations.
➔ The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the petitioners had no cause of
action and that the issues raised involved a political question, while the trial court additionally
ruled that granting the relief sought would impair contracts protected by the Constitution. The
petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari, alleging that the
dismissal constituted grave abuse of discretion because their complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action and raised justiciable issues.
ISSUE
❖ Whether or not the petitioners, particularly the minors, possessed locus standi and a valid cause of
action to sue for the protection of the environment and on behalf of future generations.
❖ Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of a specific legal right, namely the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
❖ Whether or not the controversy involved a political question beyond judicial review.
❖ Whether or not Timber License Agreements are contracts protected by the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution.
❖ Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. The
Court held that the petitioners had locus standi, recognizing that the minors could sue not only for
themselves and their contemporaries but also on behalf of generations yet unborn under the doctrine of
intergenerational responsibility, since every generation has the obligation to preserve the environment
for those who will succeed them.
Locus Standi
It ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action because it alleged the violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, the corresponding duty of the DENR to
protect that right, and the Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting and maintaining
Timber License Agreements. The Court further held that the controversy presented a justiciable issue, not
a political question, because what was involved was the enforcement of existing constitutional and statutory
rights and the determination of whether the executive committed grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, the Court ruled that Timber License Agreements are mere privileges and not contracts, are therefore
not protected by the non-impairment clause, and may be amended, modified, or revoked whenever national
interest or public welfare so requires, although the holders of the questioned TLAs must first be impleaded
as indispensable parties.
Discussion
The Court declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution is a fundamental right that exists independently of the Bill of Rights because it pertains to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation, and carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. It recognized the landmark doctrine of intergenerational responsibility, holding that the present
generation has the obligation to conserve and protect the country's natural resources so that future
generations may equally enjoy them, thereby allowing minors to represent generations yet unborn in a class
suit. The Court emphasized that the DENR has the constitutional and statutory duty under Executive Order
No. 192, the Administrative Code of 1987, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) to conserve, manage, and protect the country's natural resources for
both present and future Filipinos. It likewise clarified that the expanded definition of judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes courts to determine whether any branch or
instrumentality of the government committed grave abuse of discretion, thereby limiting the application of the
political question doctrine in cases involving legally demandable rights. Finally, the Court reaffirmed that
Timber License Agreements are neither contracts nor vested property rights, but merely privileges subject to
regulation, modification, or revocation in the exercise of the State's police power, and even assuming they
were contracts, the non-impairment clause must yield to the State's duty to protect public health, welfare,
and the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano
FACTS
Municipal Secretary Dominador C. Baldoza filed an administrative complaint against Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano for allegedly abusing his authority by refusing to allow employees of the Municipal
Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court for the preparation of a report on the
peace and order conditions of Taal, Batangas. The respondent judge denied any intention to refuse access
to court records and maintained that while court records are public documents, access to them is subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where, and how they may be inspected in order to prevent improper
use, unnecessary curiosity, partisan politics, or public scandal. He further explained that the court had
recently experienced incidents such as the tampering of the court's padlocks and believed that unrestricted
access could result in disorder, prompting him to require that inspection be conducted under his supervision
and after appropriate guidelines were established. During the investigation, Mayor Corazon A. Caniza moved
to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony among municipal officials, while the complainant himself later
manifested conformity with the dismissal but was nevertheless required to present evidence, which consisted
solely of the written correspondence between the parties. After examining the documentary evidence, the
Investigating Judge found that respondent had in fact allowed inspection of the docket books under
reasonable conditions and recommended his exoneration, finding no abuse of authority.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent judge committed abuse of authority by regulating access to the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court. Whether or not members of the public have the right to inspect official
court records and other public documents. Whether or not a judge may impose reasonable conditions and
supervision over the inspection of court records without violating the public's right of access to information.
Whether or not the respondent's restrictions constituted an unlawful prohibition rather than a permissible
regulation of access. Whether or not the administrative complaint against the respondent should prosper.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint and exonerated Judge Dimaano. It held that the
respondent did not arbitrarily refuse access to the court records because he merely required that the
inspection be conducted under reasonable conditions and under his supervision, which were not shown to
be unreasonable. The Court ruled that while official court records are public documents subject to inspection,
the official having custody thereof possesses the authority to regulate the manner of inspection in order to
preserve order and prevent abuse, although such authority does not extend to an absolute prohibition of
access. It emphasized that access to public records is founded upon the people's right to acquire information
on matters of public concern, a right expressly recognized by the Constitution, subject only to limitations
imposed by law. Accordingly, since the respondent merely exercised reasonable regulation rather than
unlawful denial of access, he was not administratively liable.
Discussion
The Court explained that the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern includes the right
of access to official records, documents, official acts, transactions, and decisions, recognizing that the free
exchange of information is indispensable in a democratic society because informed citizens are essential to
meaningful public participation and decision-making. It reiterated that although public officials who have
custody of public records may regulate the time, place, manner, and conditions of inspection to ensure the
orderly operation of their offices, they cannot prohibit the lawful exercise of the public's right of access except
where restrictions are authorized by law. Citing Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court affirmed that the custodian of
public records is expected to exercise unbiased and impartial judgment in accommodating persons who
lawfully seek access to official records, without inquiring into their motives except when the purpose is clearly
unlawful or amounts to mere idle curiosity. The Court likewise stressed that it is not the responsibility of the
custodian of public records to determine whether the information obtained might later be used to create
scandal or cause embarrassment because any liability arising from publication rests upon the publisher and
not upon the official who lawfully allowed access. Finally, the Court recognized that although access to public
records is a constitutional right, reasonable restrictions imposed by law, particularly those necessary to
protect public order or address immediate and impending dangers, may validly limit such access.
FACTS
Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent, was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai by the Japanese
forces during the Japanese occupation as a secret operative and, after liberation, was arrested as a
Japanese spy by the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps before being turned over to the Commonwealth
Government for disposition, where he was eventually ordered released by the People's Court. Thereafter, the
Deportation Board found that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally without inspection and admission by
immigration authorities and ordered his deportation to Russia, but despite repeated efforts, including
attempts to place him aboard Russian vessels, no country or ship would accept him because he lacked
travel documents and was allegedly stateless. In an earlier habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court
sustained his temporary detention as a necessary incident of deportation proceedings, recognizing that the
Government could detain an undesirable alien for a reasonable period while making arrangements for
deportation but warning that an excessively prolonged detention could justify his release. More than two
years after that decision, the Government remained unable to deport Mejoff despite continuous efforts, and
he consequently filed a second petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his continued detention had become
unlawful because there was no foreseeable prospect of effecting his deportation. The Government opposed
the petition, asserting that it was in the country's best interest to continue detaining Mejoff and expressing
concern that, if released, he might engage in subversive activities because he had been brought into the
Philippines by the Japanese forces.
ISSUE
Whether or not an alien ordered deported may be indefinitely detained when the Government is unable to
carry out the deportation order. Whether or not Mejoff's prolonged detention violated the constitutional
guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Whether or not the constitutional
protection of liberty extends to an alien who is neither a Philippine citizen nor formally charged with any
crime. Whether or not the Philippines' adoption of generally accepted principles of international law and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects an alien against arbitrary detention. Whether or not Mejoff
should be released under reasonable conditions despite the outstanding deportation order.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of Mejoff subject to
reasonable conditions. It held that although the Government may temporarily detain an alien pending
deportation, such detention cannot continue indefinitely where deportation has become impossible despite
the Government's diligent efforts, as continued confinement would amount to arbitrary deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. The Court ruled that the constitutional guarantee protecting liberty extends not
only to Philippine citizens but also to all persons, including resident aliens who are not enemy aliens and
against whom no criminal charges are pending. It likewise declared that the Philippines' adoption of generally
accepted principles of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reinforces the
prohibition against arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention of human beings. Accordingly, the Court ordered
Mejoff's release upon the conditions that he remain under the reasonable surveillance of immigration
authorities and post a ₱5,000 bond to ensure his availability whenever the Government became capable of
deporting him.
Discussion
The Court emphasized that temporary detention is a permissible incident of deportation proceedings
because it enables the Government to arrange the removal of undesirable aliens, but once deportation
cannot be accomplished within a reasonable time despite earnest efforts, the legal basis for continued
detention disappears and further imprisonment becomes unconstitutional. It explained that the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law applies to all persons,
including aliens, except enemy aliens, thereby recognizing that fundamental rights are not confined to
Philippine citizens alone. The Court further relied on Section 3, Article II of the Constitution, which adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and cited the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, particularly its recognition that every human being is entitled to liberty and
protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile regardless of nationality. It also adopted the reasoning
of American jurisprudence holding that when a deportation order can no longer be executed because no
country will receive the alien, the authority to continue detention effectively becomes functus officio, making
further confinement without legal basis and justifying the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Finally, the
Court rejected the Government's speculative fears that Mejoff might engage in subversive activities if
released, holding that imprisonment cannot be justified solely by anticipated or uncommitted offenses and
that any legitimate concerns regarding public safety may instead be addressed through reasonable
surveillance and other lawful preventive measures, rather than indefinite detention.
KURODA v. JALANDONI
FACTS
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General
of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during 1943 and 1944, was charged before a Military
Commission convened under Executive Order No. 68 with unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge
his duties as commander by permitting his troops to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of war in violation of the laws and customs of war. He filed a petition
before the Supreme Court questioning the legality and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 68,
contending that the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention and therefore could not
prosecute him for violations of its provisions, and that the Military Commission consequently lacked
jurisdiction over his person and the offenses charged. Kuroda likewise challenged the participation of
American attorneys Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port as prosecutors before the Military Commission,
arguing that they were not members of the Philippine Bar authorized to practice law in the Philippines and
that their appointment diminished Philippine sovereignty and violated the Constitution. He further asserted
that the United States had no legal personality to participate in the prosecution because it was not a party in
interest in the criminal case instituted in the name of the People of the Philippines. Accordingly, Kuroda
sought to declare Executive Order No. 68 unconstitutional and to permanently prohibit the Military
Commission and the participating prosecutors from proceeding with his trial.
ISSUE
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68, establishing the National War Crimes Office and Military
Commissions for the trial of war criminals, was constitutional and valid. Whether or not the Military
Commission had jurisdiction to try Kuroda for alleged violations of the laws and customs of war despite the
Philippines not being a signatory to the Hague Convention at the time. Whether or not the rules embodied in
the Hague Convention, Geneva Convention, and other accepted principles of international law formed part of
Philippine law. Whether or not American attorneys Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port could validly
participate as prosecutors before the Military Commission despite not being authorized to practice law in the
Philippines. Whether or not the participation of the United States in the prosecution impaired Philippine
sovereignty or lacked legal personality.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No.
68. It ruled that the President validly issued the Executive Order pursuant to his powers as
Commander-in-Chief and in conformity with Section 3, Article II of the Constitution, which adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, thereby authorizing the
prosecution of persons responsible for war crimes under internationally recognized laws and customs of war.
The Court further held that although the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention, its rules
had already become part of the generally accepted principles of international law and therefore formed part
of Philippine law, while the Philippines, then under the sovereignty of the United States when the crimes
were allegedly committed, was likewise bound by the rights and obligations arising from treaties between the
belligerent nations. It also ruled that the participation of American attorneys Hussey and Port was valid
because Military Commissions are special military tribunals governed by Executive Order No. 68 rather than
the Rules of Court, which require bar membership only for practice before ordinary courts, and because
allowing the United States to participate in prosecuting crimes committed against its government and citizens
did not constitute a surrender of Philippine sovereignty but rather an act of international comity.
Consequently, the Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over Kuroda and refused to
interfere with the ongoing proceedings against him.
Discussion
The Court emphasized that Section 3, Article II of the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, thereby incorporating into Philippine law the fundamental
rules embodied in the Hague Convention, Geneva Convention, and established precedents of international
jurisprudence concerning accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws
and customs of war even without specific legislative enactment or Philippine accession to those treaties. It
likewise reiterated its ruling in Yamashita v. Styer that the power to establish military commissions for the trial
and punishment of war criminals is an essential incident of the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief,
since war is not deemed terminated merely because hostilities have ceased and the punishment of war
criminals remains an unfinished aspect of waging war until fully accomplished. The Court further declared
that the Philippines' attainment of independence did not extinguish its authority to prosecute war crimes
committed during the Commonwealth period because such offenses were committed against the same
sovereign people, drawing an analogy to Laurel v. Misa, where the Court held that crimes of treason
committed before independence remained punishable after the establishment of the Republic. It also
explained that Military Commissions are special tribunals created by special law and therefore are not
governed by the ordinary Rules of Court, making it unnecessary for prosecutors appearing before them to be
members of the Philippine Bar, especially considering that military tribunals have historically permitted
representation by military personnel who are not lawyers. Finally, the Court recognized that allowing
representatives of the United States to participate in the prosecution was consistent with international
cooperation because the United States, having suffered injuries from the same wartime atrocities, voluntarily
entrusted the prosecution of those crimes to a Philippine tribunal, and permitting such representation
strengthened rather than diminished Philippine sovereignty.
V. READ
Section 17-19, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution: Power of the Commissioner on Human Rights
NOTES
NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS - Ex: Right to work; right to social security; right to
➔ The Aggregate of privileges, claims, benefits, form and join trade unions; right to education;
entitlements, and moral guarantees that pertain right to rest and leisure, right to health; right to
to man because of his humanity. shelter
➔ Acc to Jose Zalaquett: A system of values or - The second generation of economic, social and
elements which are inherent to human dignity. cultural rights is also known as the second
➔ Acc to Jean Jacques Maritain: “The human generation of equality rights.
person possesses rights because of the very
fact that it is a person, a whole, master of itself, THIRD GENERATION
and of its acts, and which consequently is not - Intended to benefit individuals, groups and
merely a means to an end, but an end which peoples and its realization will need global
must be treated as such” cooperation based on international solidarity.
➔ Legal and moral entitlements that have evolved - Ex: right to peace, right to development,
as a basis for constructing how state power is environmental rights, right to self determination,
used and particularly to limit its use against the right to food, rights of women, rights of
rights of citizens. children, right to humanitarian disaster relief;
➔ Acc to Jose W. Diokno: “No cause is more right to water.
worthy than the cause of human rights” “They - Also known as the third generation of solidarity
are what make man human” rights.
Development
Another example of a solidarity/collective right.
● A comprehensive economic, social, cultural and
political process which aims at the constant
improvement of the well-being of the entire
population and of all individuals through their
meaningful participation (Declaration on the
Right to Development)
● Acc to Amartya Sen: A process of expanding
the freedoms that people enjoy and requires
the removal of major sources of unfreedom like
poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities,
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public
facilities, intolerance or overactivity of
repressive states.