GUIDE FOR

DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS

MARCH 2021

American Bureau of Shipping

Incorporated by Act of Legislature of
the State of New York 1862

© 2021 American Bureau of Shipping. All rights reserved.

1701 City Plaza Drive
Spring, TX 77389 USA
Foreword (1 March 2021)
The application of dynamic positioning (DP) systems has been expanded significantly not only in the
number of DP vessels, but also in the range of applications and the advancement of DP technologies. In
order to address various needs of the industry, ABS developed the ABS Guide for Dynamic Positioning
Systems. The Guide replaces ABS DP system requirements previously included in the ABS Rules for
Building and Classing Marine Vessels (Marine Vessel Rules).

The Guide provides optional notations and technical specifics that reflect current industry practice and DP
technologies. The Guide covers ABS requirements for the design and testing of DP systems with the
following new features:

● Enhanced system (EHS) notations to recognize design features beyond current DPS-series notations
and to provide flexibility to owners and operators
● Station keeping performance (SKP) notations to recognize DP capability and to encourage robust
design of the DP system
● Increased level of detail on the technical requirements to help less experienced users
● Details of vessel type specifics to reflect industry need
● Requirements for testing comparable with current industry practice

The Guide is applicable to systems that are installed onboard vessels, offshore installations and facilities. It
is applicable to new constructions.

The November 2019 edition specified that Marine Transmitting Heading Devices (THDs) may be used as
one of the sensors where three vessel heading sensors are required.

The February 2020 edition added requirements for the DP Operations Manual. The associated functional
roles/operations for which the DPS notation is granted (e.g., Anchor Handling, Fire Fighting, Offshore
Support, Diving, Underwater Inspection, etc.) and a description of the functions and equipment involved
with maximum available electrical power to perform the specified vessel combined functions are to be
included in the DP Operations Manual.

The April 2020 edition addresses the application of DP notations and operations to articulated tug barge
combinations.

The March 2021 edition incorporates requirements and guidelines from IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1580, Marine
Technology Society (MTS) Guidelines for Fault Ride Through Capabilities, MTS Guidelines for Cross
Connections, OCIMF Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effects Analysis Assurance Framework Risk-
based Guidance (First edition 2020), ABS DC Distribution Systems and ABS Lithium Battery (Energy
Storage Systems) Guides requirements to support DP operations, and DP Operational Guidance (as found
in Appendix 4). Addition of a new optional notation EHS-E is also included.

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1580 (Guidelines for Vessels and Units with Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems) issued
on 16 June 2017 provides guidelines to the industry and lays out the principles for dynamic positioning
systems. This document provides an update to the previous guidelines in MSC/Circ.645 issued on 6 June
1994.

IMO MSC.1/Circ.1580 is to be applied to vessels and units constructed on or after 9 June 2017. For vessels
and units constructed on or after 1 July 1994 but before 9 June 2017, IMO MSC/Circ.645 may continue to
be applied.

This Guide becomes effective on the first day of the month of publication.

Users are advised to check periodically on the ABS website [Link] to verify that this version of
this Guide is the most current.

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 ii

 We welcome your feedback. Comments or suggestions can be sent electronically by email to
rsd@[Link].

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 iii

GUIDE FOR
DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS

CONTENTS
SECTION 1 General................................................................................................12
1 Introduction................................................................................... 12
3 Classification Notation.................................................................. 12
5 Definitions..................................................................................... 13
5.1 General............................................................................ 13
5.3 Equipment and Dynamic Positioning System.................. 14
5.5 Redundancy Design........................................................ 16
5.7 Performance and Operation............................................ 18
7 Documentation..............................................................................19
7.1 Dynamic Positioning System........................................... 19
7.3 Power System..................................................................20
7.5 Thruster System.............................................................. 20
7.7 DP Control System.......................................................... 20
9 Certification...................................................................................21
9.1 Control and Monitoring System Equipment..................... 21
9.3 Components and Subsystems.........................................21

SECTION 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design...............................................22

1 General ........................................................................................ 22
3 DP System Technical Requirements............................................ 22
3.1 Basic Requirements.........................................................22
3.3 Redundancy Design........................................................ 22
3.5 Physical Separation......................................................... 25
3.7 DP System Equipment Requirements............................. 26
3.9 Station Keeping Performance..........................................26
5 Essential Non-DP Systems...........................................................28
5.1 General............................................................................ 28
5.3 Emergency Shutdown System and DP Redundancy...... 29
5.5 Fire Protection................................................................. 29
5.7 Fuel Quick Closing Valves............................................... 29
7 Alarms, Monitoring and Instrumentation....................................... 29
9 Communications and DP Alert System.........................................31
9.1 Communications.............................................................. 31
9.3 DP Alert System.............................................................. 31
11 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis............................................... 31

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 iv

 11.1 General............................................................................ 31
11.3 Failure Mode Analysis..................................................... 32
11.5 FMEA Report................................................................... 33
13 DP Operations Manual................................................................. 34

TABLE 1 Summary of DP System Requirements for ABS DPS

Notations(4)........................................................................... 27
TABLE 2 Summary of Minimum Instrumentation at DP Control
Station (1 November 2013).................................................. 30

SECTION 3 Power Systems.................................................................................. 37

1 General ........................................................................................ 37
3 Power Generation System............................................................37
3.1 Vessels with DPS-1 Notation........................................... 37
3.3 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation........................................... 37
3.5 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation........................................... 38
5 Power Distribution (1 November 2013).........................................38
5.1 General............................................................................ 38
5.3 Vessels with DPS-2 or DPS-3 Notations......................... 38
7 Power Management System ........................................................39
9 Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems (UPS) .............................40
11 Energy Storage Systems Supporting Dynamic Positioning
Operations.................................................................................... 41
11.1 General............................................................................ 41
11.3 Considerations when Installing Energy Storage
Systems........................................................................... 41
13 Fault Ride Through (FRT) Capability............................................41
13.1 General............................................................................ 41
13.3 Pre-requisites for a live FRT capability test..................... 42
13.5 Live Test Requirements................................................... 43
15 DC Power Distribution Systems....................................................43
15.1 General............................................................................ 43
15.3 DC Control Power Supplies & Battery Systems.............. 43
15.5 DC Power Generation and Distribution System...............44

TABLE 1 Requirements for ESS......................................................... 41

SECTION 4 Thruster System.................................................................................45

1 General......................................................................................... 45
3 Thruster Capacity......................................................................... 45
5 Thruster Configuration.................................................................. 46
7 Thruster Auxiliary System.............................................................46
9 Thruster Control............................................................................46
9.1 General............................................................................ 46

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 v

 9.3 Control Parameter........................................................... 46
9.5 Manual Thruster Control (1 November 2013).................. 46
9.7 Emergency Stop.............................................................. 47
11 Thruster Monitoring and Alarm (1 November 2013)..................... 47

SECTION 5 Control System.................................................................................. 49

1 General ........................................................................................ 49
3 DP Control Station........................................................................ 49
3.1 General............................................................................ 49
3.3 Arrangement of DP Control Station (1 November
2013)................................................................................49
3.5 Arrangement of DP Control Systems...............................50
3.7 Arrangement of Control Panels....................................... 50
3.9 Arrangement of Data Communication Networks............. 51
5 DP Control System ...................................................................... 51
5.1 General (1 November 2013)............................................ 51
5.3 External Force................................................................. 51
5.5 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation........................................... 51
5.7 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation........................................... 52
5.9 Vessels with DPS-1+, DPS-2+ or DPS-3+ Notation........ 52
7 Manual Position Control System...................................................52
9 Control Mode Selection................................................................ 52
9.1 Manual/DP Control Modes (1 November 2013)...............52
9.3 Main/Backup Control Station........................................... 53
11 Position Reference System and Environment Sensor..................53
11.1 General............................................................................ 53
11.3 Vessels with DPS-0 or DPS-1 Notation........................... 54
11.5 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation (1 November 2013)........... 54
11.7 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation........................................... 54
11.9 Signal Processing............................................................ 54
13 Consequence Analysis (For DPS-2 and DPS-3) ......................... 55
15 Display and Monitoring (1 September 2015)................................ 55

SECTION 6 Auxiliary Systems (applies to DPS-2 and DPS-3)........................... 56

1 General ........................................................................................ 56
3 Fuel Oil (1 September 2015)........................................................ 56
5 Cooling Water (1 November 2013)............................................... 56
7 Compressed Air ........................................................................... 57
9 Lubrication Oil Systems (1 November 2013)................................ 57
11 HVAC and Ventilation .................................................................. 57
13 Piping ...........................................................................................57
15 Pneumatic Systems...................................................................... 57
17 Power Supply to Auxiliary Systems (1 November 2013).............. 57

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 vi

 SECTION 7 DP System Initial Test........................................................................58
1 General ........................................................................................ 58
3 DP System Performance Test.......................................................58
3.1 Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems (UPS).................58
3.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors...................... 58
3.5 Manual Position Control System (1 November 2013)......59
3.7 Manual Thruster Control System (1 November 2013)..... 59
3.9 Thruster Emergency Stop................................................59
3.11 DP Control System (1 November 2013).......................... 59
3.13 Control and Alarms (1 November 2013).......................... 59
3.15 Standby Changeover....................................................... 59
3.17 Protection Function..........................................................59
3.19 Communication................................................................60
3.21 DP Endurance Test (1 November 2013)..........................60
5 FMEA Proving Trial for DPS-2 or DPS-3...................................... 60
7 Surveys After Construction........................................................... 60

SECTION 8 Enhanced System (EHS) .................................................................. 61

1 Introduction................................................................................... 61
3 Enhanced System for DPS-2 and DPS-3..................................... 61
3.1 Enhanced Electrical System (EHS-E)..............................62
3.2 Enhanced Power and Thruster System (EHS-P).............65
3.3 Control System (EHS-C)..................................................66
3.5 Fire and Flood Protection (EHS-F).................................. 67
5 Summary of System Requirements for Enhanced System
Notations.......................................................................................68
7 Closed Bus and Standby Redundancy......................................... 69
7.1 General............................................................................ 69
7.3 Closed Bus Operation......................................................69
7.5 Standby Start................................................................... 70
7.7 FMEA and Testing........................................................... 70
9 Documentation .............................................................................71

TABLE 1 Summary of DP System Requirements for EHS

Notations ............................................................................. 68

SECTION 9 Station Keeping Performance...........................................................72

1 General ........................................................................................ 72
1.1 Definition..........................................................................72
3 Environmental Conditions.............................................................73
3.1 Wind.................................................................................73
3.3 Wave and Wave Spectrum.............................................. 74
3.5 Current.............................................................................74
3.7 Environments for SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) Notation.....................75

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 vii

 3.9 Environments for SKP Notation....................................... 75
5 Analysis Conditions...................................................................... 75
5.1 DP System Configurations...............................................75
5.3 Operating Conditions....................................................... 76
7 Environmental Load Calculation .................................................. 76
7.1 Wind and Current Force.................................................. 76
7.3 Wave Force......................................................................76
9 Other External Loads....................................................................76
11 Available Thrust............................................................................ 76
11.1 Available Thrust for Thrusters..........................................76
11.3 Thruster-Thruster Interaction........................................... 77
11.5 Thruster-Hull Interaction.................................................. 77
11.7 Thruster-Current Interaction............................................ 77
11.9 Tunnel Thruster................................................................77
13 Rudder Forces.............................................................................. 78
15 SKP Calculations.......................................................................... 78
15.1 SKP Notation................................................................... 78
15.3 SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) Notation................................................. 78
17 Documentation..............................................................................79

TABLE 1 Relationship between Wind and Wave (North Sea).............75

SECTION 10 Specific Vessel Types........................................................................ 80

1 Introduction................................................................................... 80
3 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units....................................................... 80
3.1 Basic Design Criteria for DP System............................... 80
3.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors...................... 80
3.5 Effect of Drilling Loads.....................................................80
3.7 Vessel Operating Condition............................................. 81
3.9 Emergency Shutdown System.........................................81
3.11 Emergency Disconnect System.......................................81
3.13 Maintenance Plan............................................................ 81
3.15 FMEA...............................................................................82
3.16 DP Alert System (1 November 2013).............................. 82
3.17 DP Operations Manual.................................................... 82
3.19 Documentation (1 September 2015)................................82
5 Project or Construction Vessels....................................................82
5.1 Basic Design Criteria for DP System............................... 82
5.3 Operation Configuration...................................................83
5.5 Position Reference Systems and Sensors (1
November 2013).............................................................. 83
5.7 Maintenance Plan............................................................ 83
5.9 FMEA...............................................................................83

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 viii

 5.10 DP Alert System (1 November 2013).............................. 84
5.11 DP Operations Manual.................................................... 84
7 Logistics Vessels.......................................................................... 84
7.1 Operation Mode............................................................... 84
7.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors (1
November 2013).............................................................. 84
7.5 DP Operations Manual.................................................... 84
9 Articulated Tug-Barge Combinations............................................ 84
9.1 General............................................................................ 84
9.2 Tug Barge Arrangement.................................................. 86
9.3 Barge............................................................................... 90
9.4 Surveys............................................................................91

TABLE 1 Instrumentation and Controllers at the Main DP Control

Station.................................................................................. 87

SECTION 11 Other Optional Notations (1 November 2013)................................. 92

1 Introduction................................................................................... 92
3 Integrated Software Quality Management for DP System............ 92
5 System Verification for DP System............................................... 92

APPENDIX 1 Available Thrust Assessment .......................................................... 93

1 General......................................................................................... 93
3 Thrust at Bollard Pull.................................................................... 93
5 Thruster-Thruster Interaction........................................................ 95
5.1 In Line Tandem Condition................................................ 95
5.3 Upstream Thruster Turned Tandem Configuration.......... 96
5.5 Forbidden Zones..............................................................97
7 Thruster-Hull Interaction............................................................... 98
7.1 Friction............................................................................. 98
7.3 Coanda Effect.................................................................. 99
7.5 Pontoon Blockage (1 November 2013)............................99
7.7 Tilted Thruster/Nozzle......................................................99
9 Thruster-Current Interaction....................................................... 100
11 Tunnel Thrusters.........................................................................101
11.1 Simplified Method (1 November 2013).......................... 102
11.3 Detailed Method.............................................................103

TABLE 1 Range of Forbidden Zone for Different x/D.......................... 98

FIGURE 1 Open Propellers................................................................... 94

FIGURE 2 Ducted Propellers.................................................................94
FIGURE 3 Thrusters Configuration in Tandem Condition......................95

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 ix

 FIGURE 4 Thrust Reduction of the Downstream Thruster in Open
Water....................................................................................96
FIGURE 5 Thrusters Configuration in Tandem Condition Turning
the Upstream Thruster......................................................... 96
FIGURE 6 Thrust Reduction of the Downstream Thruster
Considering Steering Angles of the Upstream Thruster.......97
FIGURE 7 Range of Forbidden Zone.................................................... 98
FIGURE 8 Thrust Reduction Ratio due to Hull Friction......................... 99
FIGURE 9 Correction Factor, C, as the Function of the Tilt Angle of
the Propeller Shaft............................................................. 100
FIGURE 10 Thrust Ratio for Ducted Propellers.....................................100
FIGURE 11 Thrust Ratio for Open Propellers....................................... 101
FIGURE 12 Dimensions of Transverse Tunnel Thrusters (1
November 2013)................................................................ 102
FIGURE 13 Tunnel Configuration..........................................................103
FIGURE 14 Protective Bars Cross Section........................................... 104

APPENDIX 2 Rudder Forces .................................................................................105

FIGURE 1 High-performance Rudder .................................................105

FIGURE 2 Steerable Nozzle with Flap................................................ 105
FIGURE 3 Steerable Nozzle with Fixed Fin.........................................106
FIGURE 4 Conventional Rudder......................................................... 106

APPENDIX 3 Abbreviations and References ...................................................... 107

1 Abbreviations ............................................................................. 107
3 References................................................................................. 108
3.1 ABS Publications........................................................... 108
3.3 Other Publications......................................................... 108

APPENDIX 4 DP Operations Guidance.................................................................110

1 Introduction................................................................................. 110
3 Themes....................................................................................... 110
3.1 DP Class........................................................................ 110
3.2 DP FMEA....................................................................... 110
3.3 DP Capability Plots.........................................................111
3.4 Position Reference Systems and Sensors..................... 111
3.5 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities...... 111
3.6 Trials and Checklists...................................................... 112
3.7 DP Operations Manuals.................................................113
3.8 Activity Operational Planning......................................... 113
3.9 Communications............................................................ 114
3.10 DP Planned Maintenance.............................................. 114
3.11 DP Incidents...................................................................115

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 x

 3.12 Reporting and Record Keeping......................................115
3.13 Competence...................................................................115
3.14 Manning......................................................................... 116
5 Recommended DP Documentation............................................ 116

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 xi

SECTION 1 General

1 Introduction (1 March 2021)

The requirements contained in this Guide are for dynamic positioning systems for ships, mobile offshore
drilling units, mobile offshore units and offshore support vessels. These requirements are to be used in
conjunction with Part 4 of the ABS Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels (Marine Vessel Rules),
Parts 4, 6, and 7 of the ABS Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Units (MOU Rules) and the
ABS Rules for Survey After Construction (Part 7). The requirements in the following sections are
particularly relevant.

ABS Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels

i) Internal Combustion Engines – Section 4-2-1

ii) Gas Turbines – Section 4-2-3
iii) Electric Motors and Motor Controllers – Section 4-8-3
iv) Gears – Section 4-3-1
v) Propulsion Shafting – Section 4-3-2
vi) Propellers – Section 4-3-3
vii) Piping System – Chapter 4-6
viii) Thrusters – Section 4-3-5
ix) Control Equipment – Section 4-9-9

ABS Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Units

i) Pumps and Piping Systems – Chapter 4-2

ii) Electrical Installations – Chapter 4-3
iii) Rules for Equipment and Machinery Certification – Part 6
iv) Surveys After Construction – Chapter 7-2

ABS Rules for Survey After Construction

i) Machinery Surveys – Chapter 7-6

ii) Shipboard Automatic and Remote-control Systems – Chapter 7-8
iii) Survey Requirements for Additional Systems and Services – Chapter 7-9

3 Classification Notation (1 March 2021)

The dynamic positioning systems built and tested in compliance with the requirements in this Guide and
relevant Rules may be assigned with different classification notations depending on the degree of
redundancy built into the system as defined below. These notations are not a requirement for classification
of the vessel and are to be assigned only on the specific request of the Owner.

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 12

Section 1 General 1

DPS-0 For vessels which are fitted with centralized manual position control and automatic heading
control system to maintain the position and heading (Station Keeping) under the specified maximum
environmental conditions.

DPS-1 For vessels which are fitted with a dynamic positioning system which is capable of automatically
maintaining the position and heading (Station Keeping) of the vessel under specified maximum
environmental conditions having a manual position control system.

DPS-2 For vessels which are fitted with a dynamic positioning system which is capable of automatically
maintaining the position and heading (Station Keeping) of the vessel within a specified operating envelope
under specified maximum environmental conditions during and following any single fault, excluding a loss
of compartment or compartments.

DPS-3 For vessels which are fitted with a dynamic positioning system which is capable of automatically
maintaining the position and heading (Station Keeping) of the vessel within a specified operating envelope
under specified maximum environmental conditions during and following any single fault, including
complete loss of a compartment due to fire or flood.

DPS-1, DPS-2 and DPS-3 classification notations are structured in line with the IMO MSC.1/Circ.1580
“Guidelines for Vessels and Units with Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems”. DPS-1, DPS-2 and DPS-3
are in line with IMO equipment class of 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

At the Owner’s request, the symbol + for the DPS-series notations may be assigned indicating additional
requirements for station keeping capacity and failure modes for static components of the DP systems.

At the Owner’s request, an enhanced system notation (EHS), e.g., EHS-E and EHS-P, as a supplement
for DPS-series notations, may be assigned. The notation provides the basis for the measurement to enhance
critical components of the DP system, including power system, thruster system, control system and
verification and validation of functionality. The main objective of the enhanced system notation is to
improve reliability, operability and maintainability. Section 8 of this Guide provides details for the
enhanced system notations.

Also, at the Owner’s request, a station keeping performance notation (SKP), as a supplement to the DPS-
series notations may also be assigned to the vessel. The objective of the station keeping performance
notation is to recognize the DP capability and to encourage robust design of DP systems. Section 9 of this
Guide provides details for station keeping performance requirements.

Section 11 of this Guide provides information about other optional notations that may apply to DP systems
such as those for Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM) and Software System Verification
(SSV).

5 Definitions (1 March 2021)

The following definitions of symbols and terms are to be understood (in the absence of other
specifications) where they appear in the Guide.

Note: Some of these definitions are sourced from MTS DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines, 2019 (Draft) and the
text for those definitions are given in italics.

5.1 General (1 March 2021)

Dynamically Positioned Vessel (DP Vessel): A unit or a vessel which automatically maintains its position
and/or heading (fixed location, relative location or predetermined track) by means of thruster force.

Failure: An occurrence in a component or system that causes one or both of the following:

a) Loss of component or system function; and/or

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 13

Section 1 General 1

b) Deterioration of functional capability to such an extent that the safety of the vessel, personnel or
environmental protection is significantly reduced.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): a systematic analysis of systems and sub-systems to a level
of detail that identifies all potential failure modes down to the appropriate sub-system level, and their
consequences.

FMEA proving trials: the test program for verifying the FMEA.

Industrial Mission: Industrial mission is the primary operational role of the vessel, typically applicable to
MODUs and Project and Construction vessels (e.g., Pipe-lay/Heavy-lift). (Note: by definition the
industrial mission for a Logistic Vessel is to support logistics).

Logistics Vessels: Offshore Support Vessels (OSV) and crew boats transporting, carrying out and
facilitating the logistics competence of cargoes, goods, supplies, crews, loading/unloading, offshore
exploration and production equipment, etc., across the maritime and offshore industries.

Specified Maximum Environmental Conditions: The specified maximum environmental conditions are the
specified wind speed, current and wave height under which the vessel is designed to carry out intended
operations.

Specified Operating Envelope: The specified operating envelope is the area within which the vessel is
required to stay in order to satisfactorily perform the intended operations under the specified maximum
environmental conditions.

Worst Case Failure (WCF): The identified single fault in the DP system resulting in maximum effect on
DP capability as determined through the FMEA study. This worst case failure is to be used in the
consequence analysis.

Worst Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI): The specified minimum DP system capabilities to be
maintained following the worst case failure. The worst case failure design intent is used as the basis of the
design. This oftentimes refers to the simultaneous failure of multiple thrusters and/or generators.

5.3 Equipment and Dynamic Positioning System (1 March 2021)

Active Component: Active components or systems requiring external power, such as generators, thrusters,
switchboards, all related DP computer and communication networks, sensors, remote controlled valves,
compensators, etc.

Static Component: Static components are in particular: cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.

Dynamic Positioning Control Station (DP Control Station): A workstation designated for DP operations,
where necessary information sources, such as indicators, displays, alarm panels, control panels and internal
communication systems are installed, including DP control and independent joystick control operator
stations, required position reference systems’ Human Machine Interface (HMI), manual thruster levers,
mode change systems, thruster emergency stops, and internal communications.

Dynamic Positioning Operation (DP Operation): Use of the DP system to control at least two degrees of
freedom in the horizontal plane automatically.

Dynamic Positioning System (DP System): The complete installation necessary for dynamically
positioning a vessel including, but not limited to, the following subsystems.

i) Power system
ii) Thruster system, and
iii) DP control system
iv) Independent joystick system (when required)

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 14

Section 1 General 1

Power System: All components and systems necessary to supply the DP system with power, the power
system includes, but not limited to:

i) Prime movers with necessary auxiliary systems including piping, fuel, cooling, pre-lubrication and
lubrication, hydraulic, pre-heating, and pneumatic systems
ii) Generators
iii) Switchboards
iv) Electrical distribution system (cabling and cable routing) and
v) Power management system if applicable
vi) Power supplies, including uninterruptible power supplies (UPS)

Thruster System: All components and systems necessary to supply the DP system with thrust force and
direction. The thruster system includes:

i) Thrusters with drive units and necessary auxiliary systems including piping, cooling, hydraulic,
and lubrication systems
ii) Main propellers and rudders if these are under the control of the DP system
iii) Thruster control systems
iv) Manual thruster controls
v) Associated cabling and cable routing

DP Control System: All control components and systems, hardware and software necessary to dynamically
position the vessel. The DP control system consists of the following:

i) Computer system/joystick system

ii) Position and heading reference systems
iii) DP sensor system
iv) Control station and display system (operator panels)
v) Associated cabling and cable routing
vi) Networks

Computer System: A system of one or more programmable electronic devices, associated software, and
hardware peripherals and interfaces. Microprocessors, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Distributed
Control Systems (DCS), PC or server-based computation systems are examples of computer-based
systems."

Interface: A transfer point (includes physical and logical interfaces) at which information is exchanged.
Examples of interfaces include: input/output interface (for interconnection with sensors and actuators);
communications interface (to enable serial communications/networking with other computers or
peripherals).

Peripheral: A device performing an auxiliary function in the system (e.g., printer, data storage device).

Joystick System: A system with centralized manual position control and manual or automatic heading
control.

Position Reference System: All hardware, software and sensors that supply information and/or corrections
necessary to give position and heading references, including its power supply.

ABS GUIDE FOR DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS • 2021 15

Section 1 General 1

DP Sensor System: A system comprising devices that measure vessel heading (such as gyro compasses),
vessel motions (such as motion reference units), and wind speed and direction.

Consequence Analyzer: A software function which continuously verifies heading and position and issues
an alarm if the vessel (in its current operating mode) in the current weather conditions is not be able to
keep the heading and position in the case that any of the predefined worst-case failures should occur.

Control Mode: Method used for station keeping. Control mode for a DP system may be:

i) DP control mode (automatic position and heading control)

ii) Manual position control mode (centralized manual position control with selectable automatic or
manual heading control)
iii) Auto track mode, auto follow or follow target mode (considered as a variant of DP position
control, with programmed movement of reference point)
iv) Manual thruster control mode (individual control of thrust (pitch or speed), azimuth, start and stop
of each thruster)

Manual Position Control System: A system with centralized manual position control and automatic
heading control, referred to as a joystick system.

Manual Thruster Control System: A system which provides an individual control lever for each thruster.

Phase back: A method utilized to temporarily reduce power consumption following an event, to stabilize
the power plant and avoid a black-out.

5.5 Redundancy Design (1 March 2021)

Autonomous System: An autonomous system is a system that can control and operate itself, independently
of any control system or auxiliary systems not directly connected to it. In the DP context, Autonomy is the
ability of main machinery such as generators and thrusters to make themselves ready for DP without the
need for hierarchical control. The use of the word autonomy here should not be confused with its use in
applications such as self-driving ships and vehicles.

Bus tie Breaker: A device connecting/disconnecting switchboard sections.

Closed Bus: Closed bus often describes an operational configuration where all or most sections and all or
most switchboards are connected together, that is, the bus-tie breakers between switchboards are closed.
Also called joined bus, tied bus or closed-ring. The term closed bus/ closed bus-ties refers to a
configuration in which the power plant is operated as a common power system. An alternative to closed
bus is open bus, sometimes called split bus or split ring.

Common Cause Failure: In the context of DP system, the term “common cause failure” is used to describe
a failure which causes a malfunction in more than one redundant equipment group. Each redundant group
may malfunction in a different way. For example, an over excitation failure in one generator causes another
to trip on field failure.

Common Mode Failure: A failure that occurs when events are not statistically independent, when one
event causes multiple systems to fail. In terms of DP system, the term “common mode failure” is a subset
of common cause failure in which the redundant elements malfunction in the same way. E.g., a short
circuit fault on a common power distribution system may cause a voltage dip in all redundant equipment
groups which causes all power consumers to malfunction and trip on undervoltage.

Critical Redundancy: Equipment provided to support the worst-case failure design intent.

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Section 1 General 1

Cross Connection or Common Point (X Groups): Common points Components or systems that are shared
by more than one independent group or redundant group may be assigned to a common X-Group of
components, these common components or common points between the redundant or independent groups
are fault propagation paths with the potential to defeat the redundancy concept. Cross Connections are
common points introduced to achieve certain objectives, such as providing back up power, transferring
power or data between redundant groups, or facilitating maintenance activities. Such cross connections are
fault propagation paths with the potential to defeat redundancy. Common points and cross connections can
result in fault propagation pathways leading to failures exceeding the worst-case failure design intent if not
adequately mitigated by appropriate compensating provisions. Note that all cross connections are common
points but not all common points are cross connections. The design of compensating provisions should
take this into account.

Compensating Provisions: Compensating provisions are applied to common points and cross connections
to mitigate the effects of fault propagation. They may include protective functions, such as over current
protection and attributes such as fault ride through capability. The effectiveness of compensating
provisions should be validated by testing.

Differentiation: A method to avoid common mode failures by introducing a change in the characteristics of
redundant systems based on the same principle, e.g., use of Inertial Aided Navigation (IAN) on one of the
two redundant GNSS systems.

Diversity: The property of introducing differences into redundant elements to avoid common mode,
common cause failures. Different levels of diversity are possible such as specifying different
manufacturers for redundant GNSS systems. Even greater diversity can be achieved through orthogonality
which requires redundant elements to operate on different principles.

Fail-Safe: The system is to return to a safe state in the case of a failure or malfunction and this should not
result in a loss of position or heading.

Hidden Failure: A failure that is not immediately evident to operations or maintenance personnel, and
which has the potential for failure of equipment to perform on-demand functions, such as protective
functions in the power plant and switchboards, standby equipment, backup power supplies or lack of
capacity or performance.

Independence: A system that can operate without the assistance of central control or other systems or
subsystems. In this Guide it is mainly in reference to main machinery such as generators and thrusters.
Auxiliary and control functions are to be provided in a manner that makes the machinery as independent as
practical to minimize the number of failures that can lead to the loss of more than one main item of
machinery.

Non-critical Redundancy: Equipment provided over and above that required to support the worst case
failure design intent. Its purpose is to improve the reliability and availability of systems.

Physical Separation: With reference to DPS-3 vessels, fire and watertight subdivisions required to support
the worst case failure design intent in respect of DPS-3 failure criteria.

Redundancy: Ability of a component or system to maintain or restore its function, when a single fault has
occurred. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components, systems or
alternative means of performing a function.

Redundancy Concept: The means by which the worst case failure design intent is achieved. It is to be
documented as part of the preliminary design process.

Redundant Groups (Subsystems): Two or more component groups each of which is capable of individually
and independently performing a specific function.

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Section 1 General 1

Segregation: Refers to systems or equipment intended to provide redundancy. Reduces the number of
connections between systems to reduce the risk that failure effects may propagate from one redundant
system to another.

Single Fault: The single fault is an occurrence of the termination of the ability to perform a required
function of a component or a subsystem in the DP system. For vessels with DPS-3 notation, the loss of
any single compartment is also to be considered a single fault.

Single Fault Tolerance: The ability of a system to continue its function, following a single fault, without
unacceptable interruption.

Orthogonality: With reference to redundant systems, the secondary means of providing a function should
be based on completely different principles to reduce the risk of common mode failures. (e.g. Gyros-
spinning mass versus Fiber Optic Gyros (FOG), anemometers (ultrasonic versus mechanical).

5.7 Performance and Operation (1 March 2021)

Activity-Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG): Guidelines on the operational, environmental and
equipment performance limits for the location and specific activity. (For drilling operations, the ASOG
may be known as the Well-Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG)).

Availability: (IEC 191-02-05) The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under
given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval, assuming that the required external
resources are provided. This ability depends on the combined aspects of the reliability performance, the
maintainability performance and the maintenance support performance.

Fault Ride Through: The capability of a vessel’s DP system power plant and control systems (for a closed-
bus operation) to recover from the effects of a fault anywhere on the main and distribution systems (e.g.,
on a main switchboard bus segment or on a major feeder circuit) without significant malfunction before the
bus-tie breaker opens to isolate the faulted side of the system during a "limited" time or voltage drop.
“Limited” time is to be defined by the designer in order to make the system stable. The severe voltage
excursions associated with the operation of over current protection is a very typical example of a condition
which requires ride through capability.

Loss of Position and/or Heading: The vessel’s position and/or heading is outside the limits set for carrying
out the industrial activity in progress.

DP Capability/Station Keeping Analysis: A theoretical calculation of the vessel’s capability to maintain

position under particular conditions of wind, waves and current from different directions. It is to be
determined for different thruster combinations, (e.g., all thrusters, loss of most effective thrusters, WCF).

Maintainability: (IEC 191-02-07): The ability of an item under given conditions of use, to be retained in,
or restored to, a state in which it can perform a required function, when maintenance is performed under
given conditions and using stated procedures and resources within a stated time.

Operability: Service operability performance (IEC 191-19-06): The ability of a service to be successfully
and easily operated by a user.

Resilience: The ability of a system to withstand a failure and to continue operations following failure. It
may include the ability to recover from a failure without suffering significant damage.

Spinning Reserve: The difference between the total power from immediately available sources (such as
running generators, Energy Storage Systems, etc.) and the consumed power.

Station Keeping: Maintenance of a desired position and/or heading or track within the normal excursions
of the control system and inside the limits set for carrying out the DP activity in progress, under the
defined environmental conditions (e.g. wind, waves, current, etc.).

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Section 1 General 1

System Flexibility: The ability of a system to adapt to internal or external changes to allow its primary
mission to be satisfied.

Time to Safely Terminate: This time is calculated as the amount of time required in an emergency to
physically free the DP vessel from its operational activity following a DP abort status and allowing it to be
maneuvered clear and to proceed to safety.

7 Documentation
Where one of the classification notations described in Subsection 1/3 is requested, the following plans,
data and documentations are to be submitted for review as applicable. These documentation requirements
are in addition to the requirements for the vessel’s mandatory classification notations. The requirements on
the extent of the documents are given in the related Sections of this Guide. The following symbols are used
in this Section for the type of review of the documents :

R: Documents to be reviewed.

I: Documentation for information and verification for consistency with related review.

OB: Documentation which needs to be kept onboard.

7.1 Dynamic Positioning System (1 March 2021)

Documents listed in this section are mainly related to the global functionality, performance and
characteristics of an integrated DP system.

i) DP Operations Manual (R, OB)

ii) System description including a block diagram showing how the various components are
functionally related (R)
iii) Details of the DP alarm system and any interconnection with the main alarm system (R)
iv) General Arrangement drawing for DP Control Station including control console, control panel,
layout of Navigation bridge deck, list of equipment, etc. (R)
v) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA, Proving Trials) (DPS-2, DPS-3) (R, OB)
vi) DP station keeping capability analysis including environmental force calculation, thruster force
calculation and capability polar plots for normal operational case and for post Worst Case Failure
operational case. The capability plots are to represent the environmental conditions in the area of
operation and the mission-specific operational condition of the vessel. (R)
vii) DP System and Periodic Verification and Testing Plan (R, OB)
viii) Cable routing layout (DPS-3) (R)
ix) Details of the emergency stop system for thrusters (R)
x) Specification of safe operating envelope of environmental conditions for DP operation (I)
xi) Basic design of DP system redundancy (DPS-2, DPS-3) (R)
xii) Description of vessel emergency shutdown (ESD) system if applicable (R, OB)
xiii) Description of emergency disconnecting system (EDS) if applicable (I)
xiv) Planned inspection and maintenance (I, OB)
xv) Fault Ride Through test plan (R)

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7.3 Power System (1 March 2021)

Documents listed in this section are mainly related to the power system including all components and
subsystems necessary to supply the DP system with power.

i) Electrical power generation system (R, OB)

ii) Power distribution system (R, OB)
iii) Load analysis (R, OB)
iv) Auxiliary system distribution (R, OB)
v) Uninterruptable power supply system (R, OB)
vi) Description of bus-tie breaker protective functions where applicable (R, OB)

7.5 Thruster System (1 March 2021)

i) Thruster system arrangement (R)
ii) Thruster control system (R)
iii) Thrust output and power input curves (I)
iv) Thruster auxiliary system (R)
v) Thruster monitoring system (R)
vi) Description of emergency stop system for thrusters (R)
vii) Thrust response time for thrust and direction changes (I)
viii) Thrust reductions due to interaction effects (I)
ix) Manufacturer test procedure (R)
x) DP trial test procedure (R, OB)
xi) Manual for operation and maintenance (I, OB)
xii) Thruster Fail-Safe and Verification and Validation documents (e.g., within or part of FMEA) (R,
OB)

7.7 DP Control System (1 March 2021)

i) DP Control system, scope and arrangement (R)
ii) Details of the position reference system and environmental monitoring systems (R)
iii) Details of the consequence analyzer (DPS-2, DPS-3) (R)
iv) Certification of suitability of control equipment for the marine atmosphere (I, OB)
v) Control system functional description (I, OB)
vi) Manufacturers’ equipment operation documents (R)
vii) Software quality plan (I)
viii) FMEA of DP control system (DPS-2, DPS-3) (R, OB)
ix) Manufacturer test procedure (R, OB)
x) DP trial test procedure (R, OB)
xi) Manual for operation and maintenance (I, OB)

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9 Certification

9.1 Control and Monitoring System Equipment

Control and monitoring (alarms and instrumentation) system equipment used in a DP control system to be
assigned a DPS notation is to be certified for suitability in the marine environment.

Hydraulic and pneumatic piping systems associated with the thruster system are to be subjected to pressure
tests at 1.5 times the relief-device setting using the service fluid in the hydraulic system and dry air or dry
inert gas for pneumatic systems as testing media. The tests are to be carried out in the presence of a
Surveyor.

9.3 Components and Subsystems

The components and subsystems associated with the dynamic positioning system are to be certified or type
approved according to the vessel’s mandatory classification notation.

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SECTION 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design

1 General
The dynamic positioning (DP) system includes subsystems of power supply system, thruster system and
DP control system. Those subsystems and related components are to meet the requirements for the vessel’s
mandatory classification notations.

This section provides general requirements for a DP system with a DPS-series notation. More detailed
requirements for each subsystem are given in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

Section 8 of this Guide provides the requirements for enhanced system notations (EHS) and Section 9
provides the requirements for station keeping performance notation (SKP).

3 DP System Technical Requirements

3.1 Basic Requirements (1 March 2021)

A DP system is to be designed to possess a certain level of station keeping capability, reliability and
redundancy. The class notation of DP System addresses the reliability based on the redundancy and fault
tolerance of the DP system.

i) For a vessel with the notation DPS-0, or DPS-1, a loss of position and/or heading (station
keeping) may occur in the event of a single fault.
ii) For a vessel with the notation DPS-2, a loss of position and/or heading (station keeping) will not
occur in the event of a single fault in any active component or system, excluding a loss of
compartment or compartments.
iii) For a vessel with the notation DPS-3, a loss of position and/or heading (station keeping) will not
occur in the event of a single fault in any active or static component or system, including complete
loss of a compartment due to fire or flood.
iv) The redundant components and systems are to be immediately available and with such capacity
that the DP operation can continue for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated
safely.
v) The period for safely terminating a work in progress is to be specified by the Owner.

The selection of the level of DP class notation of the vessel for a particular operation is outside the scope
of this Guide. Some Coastal States impose minimum DP Equipment Class requirements for activities
carried out within their jurisdiction.

The station keeping capability is normally defined and presented by the limiting environmental conditions
under which the vessel can maintain the position and heading, both in intact and post worst-case failure
conditions. The limiting environmental conditions and operational modes for a DP vessel are to be defined
by the Owner.

3.3 Redundancy Design (1 March 2021)

Note: Some of these requirements are sourced from MTS Document titled “MTS, Technical and Operational Guidance
(TECHOP) TECHOP_ODP_17_(D) (C3EL2 -Cross-Connections, Commonality, External Interfaces and
Influences) October 2019 (Draft) and the text for those requirements is given in italics.

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

3.3.1 DPS-Series Notations (1 March 2021)

For the notation DPS-0 and DPS-1, there is no requirement for redundant systems.

For the DPS-0 notation, the dynamic positioning system is to have a manual position control
system.

For the DPS-1 notation, the dynamic positioning system is to include an automatic dynamic
positioning system and a manual position control system.

A vessel with DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation is required to have an automatic dynamic positioning
system, manual position control system and to be single fault tolerant.

The single fault tolerance is to be achieved by the design of redundant systems. The station
keeping capability after a single fault is to be achieved by providing control, electric power and
thrust, without reliance on operator intervention.

For DPS-1+, DPS-2+ or DPS-3+ notation, transverse thrust force and yaw moment are not to be
solely dependent on the propellers and rudders. The thruster configuration is to be arranged so that
they can provide transverse force and yaw moment for station keeping.

For the DPS-2 notation, common static components may be accepted in systems which do not
immediately affect position keeping capabilities upon failure (e.g. ventilation, and seawater
systems not directly cooling running machinery). Normally, such static components will not be
considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated.

For the DPS-2 notation, a single fault includes:

i) Any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards, communication

networks, DP control computers, sensors, remote controlled valves, etc.)
ii) Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) that may immediately
affect position keeping capabilities upon failure or is not properly documented with
respect to protection.

For the DPS-2+ notation, a single fault includes:

i) Items listed above for DPS-2

ii) Coolers and filters
iii) Fuel oil service tanks and supply pipes to engines
iv) Short-circuit of bus-bars for switchboards, where applicable
v) Fault tolerance to short circuits and ground faults is to be validated by testing, where
applicable.

For the DPS-3 notation, a single fault includes:

i) Items listed above for DPS-2, and any normally static component is assumed to fail
ii) Any components in any one watertight compartment from flooding
iii) Any components in any one fire subdivision from fire
3.3.2 Consideration of Redundancy (1 March 2021)
i) The redundancy is to have two or more items of equipment or system required to perform
a function so that the redundant unit can take over from the failed unit without
unacceptable interruption of the function.

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

ii) Redundant components and systems are to be immediately available for use without
needing manual intervention from the operators and with such capacity that the DP
operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated
safely. The transfer of control is to be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the DP
operation(s) for which the vessel is designed. In general, a full stop and restart of the
system does not comply.
iii) Automatic start of equipment may be accepted as contributing to redundancy only if they
can be tested to prove that they can be brought into operation automatically before
position and heading keeping performance is degraded.
iv) The redundancy depends on systems being available in both number and capacity to
produce the required DP capability after worst-case failure. Independence of redundancy
groups is to take into account all technical functions.
v) The redundancy design can consist of two fully redundant power and thruster systems
each capable of maintaining position and heading if the other fails. The design can also
make use of multiple systems each providing partial redundancy such that the vessel can
maintain position with all combinations of independent systems that survive any defined
fault. The redundancy design is to provide suitable combinations of available systems
following any defined fault.
vi) The transfer of failures between redundant subsystems is to be prevented by effective
compensating provisions. Efficacy of compensation provisions is to be demonstrated by
validation testing.
vii) The failure of redundant components or systems is to be revealed by alarms. The
possibility of hidden failures is to be minimized through periodic testing.
3.3.3 Basic Design of Redundancy and Redundancy Concept
Basic design of redundancy and the redundancy concept of the DP system are to be developed at
the early design stage and are to be submitted to ABS for review.

The documentation is to include at least the following:

i) General arrangement of DP system

ii) Worst-case failure design intent (WCFDI)
iii) Limiting environmental conditions for DP operation
iv) Power plant configurations for DP operation
v) Allowable loss of power sources after one failure
vi) Allowable number of failed thrusters
vii) Time period for safely terminating a DP operation after each considered single fault

The documentation is to be reviewed during the design process is to confirm if the worst-case
failure design intent is met.

The worst-case failure design intent is to describe the minimum amount of propulsion and control
equipment remaining operational following the worst-case failure, and is to be used as the basis of
the design development.

3.3.4 Redundancy Design Analysis (1 March 2020)

Redundancy is to be verified through Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) considering
relevant failure modes. Detailed requirements for FMEA are provided in Subsection 2/11.

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

3.3.5 Cross Connections or Common Points (1 March 2021)

For DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations, connections between otherwise redundant and separated
systems or redundancy groups are to be kept to a minimum, and made to fail to the safest
condition. Failure in one system is not to propagate to another redundant system.

The DP FMEA is to identify, assess, and address cross connections. Cross connections are to be
addressed by fail-safe designs and conditions, protecting functions, and testing. Tests for identified
cross connections are to be included in the DP FMEA Trials. The FMEA is to identify and analyze
for hidden failures which will result in a loss of redundancy.

Compensating provisions may include protective functions, isolation strategies, alarms,

monitoring, and periodic testing or procedures.

i) The term ‘cross connections’ means physical connections between redundant equipment
groups.
ii) Cross connections can also be created by the colocation of equipment supplied from
redundant power distribution systems. In DPS-3 designs, these connections are made by
considering the effects of fire and flooding in a common compartment.
3.3.6 Hidden Failure Monitoring (1 March 2021)
Hidden failure monitoring is to be provided on all devices where the FMEA shows that a hidden
failure will result in a loss of redundancy.

3.3.7 Fault Propagation Paths (1 March 2021)

Cross connections are potential fault propagation paths that may spread failure effects in one
redundant equipment group to another. Such coupling or spreading condition may result in the
failure of both systems accompanied by failure effects of a severity greater than that of the Worst-
Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI).

3.3.8 Marine Auxiliary Services (1 March 2021)

Cross connections in marine auxiliary systems are allowed in some DP notations and there may
be no separation of pipework in some designs. Such designs can be vulnerable to common mode
failures associated with contamination, leakage or aeration of the fluids they transport. Such
vulnerabilities are usually managed with effective enforcement of procedural barriers. Full
separation of marine auxiliary systems is desirable. Cross connections for maintenance purposes
can be accepted with mitigation measures in place.

3.5 Physical Separation

For a vessel with a DPS-3 notation, the redundancy groups are to be separated by bulkheads and decks
that are fire-insulated by A-60 class divisions. The separation is to be watertight if below the damage water
line.

Cables for redundant equipment or systems are not to be routed together through the same compartments.

If not avoidable, cables for redundant systems are to be separated by at least one A-60 barrier. Thus cables
associated with one system could be run in an A-60 class duct with the other system running through the
compartment or both sets of cables routed through separate ducts.

Redundant piping system (i.e., piping for fuel, cooling water, lubrication oil, hydraulic oil, etc.) is not to be
routed together through the same compartments.

If not avoidable, such pipes are to be separated by at least one A-60 barrier. Thus pipe-work associated
with one system could be run in an A-60 class duct with the other system running through the
compartment or both sets of pipe-work routed through separate ducts.

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

3.7 DP System Equipment Requirements

To meet the requirements for a DPS-series notation, the minimum number of subsystems and components
and the redundancy for: power system, thruster system and DP control system are provided in 2/3.9
TABLE 1. The detailed requirements for each subsystem and the arrangement of the equipment are given
in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively.

3.9 Station Keeping Performance (1 March 2021)

A DP system is to be designed to be able to maintain the position and heading under the specified limiting
environmental conditions. The design environment is to be specified by the owner.

i) A vessel with a DPS-0 or DPS-1 notation is to be able to maintain position and heading under
specified environmental conditions with all thrusters intact.
ii) A vessel with a DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation is to be able to maintain position and heading under
specified environmental conditions during and after any single fault of the DP system.
iii) The station keeping performance assessment is to be carried out for:

a) Design environmental conditions

b) Normal operational condition
c) Standby condition (where applicable)
d) All thruster intact condition
e) Onset of Worst Case Failure as defined in the Redundancy Concept Worst-Case Failure
Design Intent
f) Other conditions, such as the failure of the most effective thruster or least effective
thruster, may also be included in the assessment
iv) The environmental load calculations, including those for wind, current and wave drift forces, are
to follow suitable procedures. API RP 2SK and the ABS Rules for Mobile Offshore Units can be
used for environmental load calculation.
v) Thruster degradation due to interactions is to be considered in the station keeping capability
assessment.
vi) Other effects due to industrial activities, such as pipe tension, heavy lift, hawser tension, riser
load, etc., are to be taken into account in the station keeping capability analysis.
vii) The effect of the vessel’s industrial activities on available power for the DP system is also to be
considered in the assessment.
viii) Station keeping capability can be presented using traditional DP capability plots or using thrust
utilization plots.
ix) The station keeping capability analysis report is to be submitted for review. The following
information is to be included in the report:

a) Vessel general arrangement and main particulars

b) Projected areas for wind and current
c) Available power for DP system
d) Thruster arrangement, maximum thrust
e) Thruster degradation
f) Wind, current and wave force coefficients
g) Wind and wave relationship used where applicable
h) Description of analysis method

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

i) DP capability plots
j) Thrust utilization under the specified limiting environmental conditions where applicable

TABLE 1
Summary of DP System Requirements for ABS DPS Notations(4) (1 March 2021)

Subsystem Equipment Minimum Requirements for each Classification Notation

or
Component

DPS-0 DPS-1(7) DPS-2(8) DPS-3 (5) (9) Remarks

Redundant, in See 3/3

Non- Non-
Generators and Prime Movers Redundant separate
redundant redundant
compartments(5)

1 with bus-tie 2 with bus-ties, in See 3/5

Main Switchboard 1 1 separate
Power compartments
System
Bus-tie Breaker 0 0 1 2

Non- Non- Redundant Redundant, in

Distribution System redundant redundant separate
compartments

Power Management(2) No No Yes Yes

Non- Non- Redundant Redundant, in See 4/3

Thrusters Arrangement of Thrusters redundant redundant separate
compartments

DP Control: Number of 2 + 1 in backup

0 1 2
Control Computers control station
See 5/3.5
Manual Position Control:
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joystick with Auto Heading

Manual Thruster Control Yes Yes Yes Yes See 4/9.5

1 2 3 2 + 1 in backup
Position Reference Systems
Control control station
System 2 + 1 in backup See 5/11,
Wind control station 10/3.3, 10/5.5,
1 2 3
MRU(3) 2 + 1 in backup 10/7.3
Sensors: 0 1 3
Vessel control station
1 2 3
Heading (6) 2 + 1 in backup
control station

2 + 1 in separate
UPS 0 1 2 See 3/9
compartment

Backup Control Station for Backup Unit N/A N/A N/A Yes See 5/9.3

Consequence Analyzer No No Yes Yes See 5/13

FMEA No No Yes Yes See 2/11

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Section 2 Dynamic Positioning System Design 2

Notes:

1 DPS-0 is an ABS system class. It applies to a manual position control system fitted with automatic heading control and
with a free-standing position reference system. DPS-1, DPS-2 and DPS-3 are in line with IMO equipment class 1,
class 2 and class 3, respectively.

2 If all thrusters are direct diesel drive, a power management system is not required.
3 (1 November 2013) If position reference systems are dependent on correction of the measurements for roll and pitch
noise, their associated MRUs are required.

4 For enhanced system (EHS-E, EHS-P, EHS-F and EHS-C), additional information is provided in 8/5 TABLE 1.

5 (1 November 2013) Where “separate compartments” is indicated, the equipment is to be located in separate
compartments arranged to support the worst-case failure design intent in respect of DPS-3 failure criteria.

6 Where three (3) vessel heading sensors are required, one of these may be a THD (Transmitting Heading Device), such
as a GPS-Satellite-Compass. This is to have type approval for compliance with the Performance standards for Marine
Transmitting Heading Devices (THDs), as referenced by SOLAS Chapter V, by a recognized certification agency/
organization.

7 DPS-1+ notation may be assigned for DP system meeting DPS-1 requirements plus 1 stern thruster.

8 DPS-2+ notation may be assigned for DP system meeting DPS-2 requirements plus 2 stern thrusters and redundancy
of static components.
9 DPS-3+ notation may be assigned for DP system meeting DPS-3 requirements plus 2 stern thrusters.

5 Essential Non-DP Systems

5.1 General (1 March 2021)

Essential non-DP systems are essential systems which are not directly part of the DP systems, such as
common fire suppression systems, engine ventilation systems, heating, ventilation and air conditioning
(HVAC) systems, and emergency shutdown systems, that in the event of failure could cause a failure in the
DP system.

The redundancy concept for the DP system is to be followed through to these systems so that actions or
failures initiated by these systems do not cause consequences that exceed the worst-case failure design
intent. The actions initiated by these systems are to be scaled to the detected threat level and are to be
addressed in the FMEA of the DP system.

The design and operation of ESD and Fire and Gas Safety shutdown systems are to meet the following:

a) be in line with the DP redundancy concept of the vessel;

b) subjected to a systems engineering approach;
c) subjected to documented proving trials.

Nuisance alarms, fire and gas safety shut down alarms and non-explosive gas influx related triggers, are
not to result in an automatic shutdown or loss of thrusters.

Default operation of emergency shutdown (ESD) and fire and gas safety shutdown systems are to be in
advisory mode (initiating alarms).

Operating in supervisory mode with the potential of shutting down DP critical equipment due to non-
explosive gas influx related triggers or spurious triggers is to be avoided. Any decision to operate in
supervisory mode is to be based on verification of the systems engineering approach and proving trials to
demonstrate that the system is resilient to shutdowns triggered due to spurious events (e.g., sensor failures,
input output card failures (benign and aggressive failures)).

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5.3 Emergency Shutdown System and DP Redundancy

The DP system is not to be affected by failures of the emergency shutdown systems. For DPS-2 that will
include any failure in the shutdown systems and for DPS-3 it will include the effect of fire on associated
cabling and piping in any compartment.

The effect on the DP system due to any reasonable act of mal-operation is to be considered. This means
that the shutdown systems is treated in the same way as any other part of the vessel’s DP system that meets
the same redundancy requirements and have their failure modes analyzed in the FMEA of the DP system.

In spaces such as thruster rooms and auxiliary machinery spaces, an immediate effect on DP systems due
to a spurious shutdown of ventilation is to be prevented and to be confirmed during FMEA proving trials.

5.5 Fire Protection

Fixed firefighting systems may include CO2 or other fire suppressant agents such as water mist. These
systems are to be arranged in a manner that supports the overall divisions in the DP redundancy concept.

Where possible, the release of the fire suppressant is to only affect one redundant machinery group.

5.7 Fuel Quick Closing Valves (1 March 2021)

These valves are provided to allow rapid isolation of fuel supplies in emergency situations. The valves are
to be provided in line with the requirement of the vessel’s mandatory classification notations. They are to
be arranged in a manner that allows fuel to be isolated to only one redundant machinery group without
affecting the operation of any others. Due consideration is to be given to verify that the arrangement does
not introduce a common point which could defeat the DP redundancy concept. Efficacy of compensating
provisions/mitigating measures to address any vulnerability due to the common point is to be validated by
testing.

7 Alarms, Monitoring and Instrumentation

The main purpose of the alarm and monitoring system is to give the DP operators the abnormal condition
and status information they require to maintain safe and efficient operation of the system. Information
relating to power management, propulsion, ballast control, HVAC, etc., are to be available.

The displays and alarms as specified in 2/7 TABLE 2 are to be provided at DP control stations, as
applicable.

2/7 TABLE 2 provides the summary of minimum basic instrumentation at the main DP control station.
Additional instrumentation may be necessary. The detailed information for displays and alarms for the DP
system’s components and subsystems are given in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively.

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TABLE 2
Summary of Minimum Instrumentation at DP Control Station
(1 November 2013)

System Monitored Parameters Alarm Display

Engine lubricating oil pressure – low x

Engine coolant temperature – high x

CPP hydraulic oil pressure – low and high x

CPP hydraulic oil temperature – high x

CPP pitch x

Thruster RPM x

Thrust direction x
Thruster Power System
Thruster motor/semiconductor converter coolant leakage x
(See 4/9 & 4/11)
Thruster motor semiconductor converter temperature x

Thruster motor short circuit x

Thruster motor exciter power available x

Thruster motor supply power available x

Thruster motor overload x

Thruster motor high temperature x

Thruster operation (on-line/off-line) x

Status of automatically controlled circuit breakers x

Bus bar current and power levels x

Power Distribution
System High power consumers – current levels x
(See 3/5)
Status of power management system x x

Spinning reserve x

Excursion outside operating envelope x

Control system fault x

System Performance Position sensor fault x

(See Section 5) Vessels target and present position and heading x

Wind speed and direction x

Selected reference system x

Thruster location (pictorial) x

Available thrust used and thrust vector x

Specific Requirements
Available thrusters on stand-by x
for DPS-2 & DPS-3
(See Section 5) Consequence analyzer alert x

Position information of individual position reference systems

connected x

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9 Communications and DP Alert System

9.1 Communications
Communication is a key management tool during execution. This is to be incorporated in the design phase.

i) At least one means of voice communication is to be provided between each DP control station and
the navigation bridge, the engine control position, any other relevant industrial function control
centers associated with DP and any location required by the vessel’s mandatory classification
notation.
ii) The voice communication system is to be powered by a battery or an uninterruptible power supply
system sufficient to operate the system for at least 30 minutes.
iii) The Communication systems are to be located within easy reach of the DP operator at the DP
control stations.

9.3 DP Alert System (1 March 2021)

DP alert statuses in operation are to be clearly defined and are, at a minimum, to have the following three
levels

i) Normal operational status

ii) Degraded DP status
iii) DP emergency status

A system of visual and audible alarms is to be provided at each DP control station, on the navigation
bridge and at the propulsion engine control position or centralized control station, if fitted. The alarms are
to be capable of being manually activated from the DP control stations (including DP back-up control
station, if fitted) to indicate DP operational status. Where such an alert system is not easily included the
means of clear communication of the statuses are to be agreed before commencement of operations.
Section 10 of this Guide provides more detailed information for specific vessel types.

The guidance provided by IMCA M 103 “Guidelines for Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned
Vessel” and by MTS “DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guideline” can be used for the design of DP alert
system.

11 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

11.1 General (1 March 2021)

FMEA is only applicable to DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations. In general, two FMEAs are to be considered,
one covering the main DP control systems and the other for all other systems onboard related to DP
operations.

The purpose of the FMEA is to indicate whether or not the DP system meets the requirements of the
relevant DP notation and complies with the vessel’s WCFDI.

The DP FMEA is to be performed based on this Guide, IMCA M 166, IMCA M 178, IEC 60812, “DP
Vessel Design Philosophy Guideline” by MTS, Annex 4 of IMO High Speed Craft Code or equivalents.

The objective of the DP FMEA is to, at a minimum, include the following:

i) Identify and provide recommendations to eliminate or mitigate the effects of all single faults and
common mode failures in the vessel DP equipment which, if any occurs, would cause total or
partial loss of station keeping capability.
ii) Demonstrate effective redundancy.

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iii) Identify potential “hidden” failures with the potential to defeat the DP redundancy concept.

Results of the DP FMEA are to be verified during FMEA proving trials. The DP FMEA test program is to
be developed based on the analysis results, analysis method and assumptions. The relevant test program is
to be provided to ABS for review and approval.

DP FMEA and DP FMEA test programs are to be kept onboard and they are to be updated to cover
subsequent alterations to the DP system hardware or software.

11.3 Failure Mode Analysis (1 March 2021)

For a DPS-2 or a DPS-3 notation, loss of position and/or heading (station keeping) is not allowed to occur
in the event of a single fault. Single fault includes, but is not limited to the following:

i) All redundant components, systems or subsystems

ii) A single inadvertent act of operation (ventilation, fire suppression, ESD) where applicable and if
such an act is reasonably probable
iii) Hidden failures (such as protective functions on which redundancy depends) where applicable
iv) Common failure modes
v) Cross connections or common points
vi) Governor and AVR failure modes where applicable
vii) Main switchboard control power failure modes
viii) Bus tie protection where applicable
ix) Power management system
x) DP control system input and output arrangement
xi) Position reference processing
xii) Networks
xiii) Communication failure
xiv) Automatic interventions caused by external events, when found relevant (e.g., automatic action
upon detection of gas)

The failure mode analysis is also to include:

i) The most predictable cause associated with each failure mode

ii) The method of detecting that the failure has occurred
iii) The effect of the failure upon the rest of the system’s ability to maintain position
iv) An analysis of possible common failure modes
v) Benign and aggressive failure modes

Where parts of the system are identified as non-redundant and where redundancy is not possible, these
parts are to be further studied with consideration given to their reliability and mechanical protection. The
results of this further study are to be submitted for review.

When there are more configurations for the diesel electric plant design to cope with equipment
unavailability (e.g., failures or equipment taken down for maintenance), it is important that all
configurations that are possible to be included in DP operations are analyzed in the vessel’s DP system
FMEA to prove that the DP system remains redundant. Fault tolerance of the configurations is to be made
visible and understood by the crew.

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Compensating provisions upon which the redundancy concept depends upon are to be clearly identified.
Analysis is to cover alternate configurations the vessel intends to operate in (due to long term
unavailability of DP related Station Keeping Equipment or equipment rendered unavailable due to
maintenance requirements).

An FMEA worksheet is to be compiled for each equipment failure assessment. Some pertinent aspects to
be included in the worksheets are:

i) System name (including main system, system, and subsystem)

ii) Reference drawings
iii) Equipment name or number
iv) Function description
v) Operational mode
vi) Failure modes
vii) Failure causes
viii) Failure effects (including local effect and end effect)
ix) Failure detection
x) Corrective action
xi) Severity of failure effect (providing definitions of categories of severity)
xii) Remarks

FMEA worksheet examples given in IEC 60812, OCIMF DP FMEA Assurance Information
Paper, Appendix 2 of IMCA M 166 or Appendix 2 of Annex 4 of IMO International Code of Safety for
High-Speed Craft may be used.

11.5 FMEA Report

11.5.1 FMEA Analysis Report (1 March 2021)
The DP FMEA analysis report is to be sufficiently detailed to cover all the systems associated
with the dynamic positioning of the vessel.

The DP FMEA analysis report is to be a self-contained document including, but not limited to the
following:

i) A brief description of the vessel, vessel’s worst-case failure design intent and whether the
analysis has confirmed or disproved it
ii) Definitions of the terms, symbols and abbreviations
iii) Analysis method and assumptions
iv) A description of all the systems associated with the dynamic positioning of the vessel and
a functional block diagram showing their interaction with each other. Such systems would
include the DP electrical or computer control systems, electrical power distribution
system, power generation, fuel systems, lubricating oil systems, cooling systems, backup
control systems, thruster/propulsion/rudder systems (as applicable), all DP pertinent
networks, etc.
v) System diagrams are to be included where appropriate
vi) A description of each physically and functionally independent item and the associated
failure modes

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vii) Identification of redundancy groups for each system. This can be provided in tables
and/or color-coded system diagrams and/or other clearly understood methods
viii) Fail safe condition for each redundancy group as applicable
ix) For each system, identification of cross-connections and common points. Each cross-
connection or common point is to be analyzed for propagation with description of the
impact on the redundancy concept. Provisions to compensate or mitigate the effects of the
cross-connection are to be documented, analyzed, and validated by testing
x) A description of the effects of each failure mode alone on other items within the system
and on the overall dynamic positioning system
xi) Identification of all operating modes with a description of different configurations and
settings associated with the operating modes. Failure modes and tests are to incorporate
all operating modes
xii) Analysis findings and recommendations
xiii) Conclusions including worst-case failure and recommended changes
xiv) Recommended FMEA tests

The FMEA analysis report is to be updated after major modifications and is to be kept onboard the
vessel.

11.5.2 FMEA Proving Trial Report (1 March 2021)

A FMEA proving trial procedure is to be developed as part of the FMEA study. The objective of
the FMEA proving trial is to confirm the FMEA analysis findings and also to confirm that
essential functions and features upon which the fault tolerance of the DP system depends are
functional in so far as it is practical to do so (attributes of protection, performance, detection,
power management, etc.). The proving trial report is to establish the FMEA test list and the
corresponding test procedures including but not limited to the following:

i) Purpose of test or failure mode (objective of the test and the attributes that are intended to
be validated by the test, e.g., fault ride through capability test, etc.)
ii) Vessel and equipment setup
iii) Test method
iv) Expected results
v) Observed results
vi) Failure detection
vii) Failure effects
viii) Outstanding or resolved action items
ix) Comments
x) Witness name, signature and date for each test

After completion of DP proving trials, the final version of DP FMEA analysis and DP proving
trial report, including final analysis/conclusions based on actual results from DP testing, are to be
submitted.

13 DP Operations Manual (1 March 2021)

For each vessel, a vessel specific DP system Operations Manual is to be prepared and submitted solely for
verification that the information in the manual, relative to the dynamic positioning system, is consistent
with the design and information considered in the review of the system. One copy of the Operations

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Manual is to be kept onboard. It is to be readily accessible at the DP control location and used by the DP
operators as a reference for conducting DP operations.

The DP system Operations Manual is intended to provide guidance for the DP operator about the specific
DP installations and arrangements of the specific vessel. The DP Operations Manual is to include but is
not be limited to the following information.

i) Organization and responsibility during DP operations

ii) DP system operator’s and ECR operator’s responsibility and manning
iii) Definitions of the terms, symbols and abbreviations
iv) The associated functional roles/operations for which the DPS notation is granted (e.g., Articulated
Tug Barge Combination, Anchor Handling, Fire Fighting, Offshore Support, Diving, Underwater
Inspection, etc.) and a description of the functions and equipment involved with maximum
available electrical power to perform the specified vessel combined functions.
v) A description of all the systems associated with the dynamic positioning of the vessel, including
backup systems and communication systems
vi) The block diagram showing how the components are functionally related
vii) The restriction of maximum environmental condition for DP operation (e.g., wind speed, wave,
current, tide, etc.)
viii) A description of the different operational modes and transition between modes
ix) A functional description of each system, including backup systems and communication systems
x) Operating instructions for the normal operational mode (and the operational modes after a failure)
of the DP electrical or computer control systems, manual position control system, manual thruster
control system, DP equipment (thrusters, electric motors, electric drives or converters, electric
generators, etc.)
xi) Description of fault symptoms with explanation and recommended corrective actions. This could
be the reference to specific documents, such as Well Specific Operational Guidelines (WSOG) or
Activity Specific Operational Guidelines (ASOG), and the locations of the documents.
xii) Instructions for tracing faults back to functional blocks or systems. This could be the reference to
specific documents, such as functional descriptions of the systems, DP FMEA documents, and the
locations of the documents.
xiii) Description of cross-connections and common points identified in the DP FMEA along with
appropriate corrective actions and compensating, or mitigating provisions
xiv) Location check list (e.g., field arrival)
xv) Watch keeping check lists (during DP operation)
xvi) Field arrival trials procedures
xvii) Training and drill (DP related)
xviii) References to where more specific information can be found onboard the vessel, such as the
detailed specific operation instructions provided by the manufacturer of the DP electrical or
computer control systems, manufacturer’s troubleshooting procedures for vendor-supplied
equipment, DP FMEA and DP FMEA Trials, etc.
xix) DP capability plot
xx) Incident report instruction and format
xxi) Annual tests and procedures
xxii) Examples of tests and procedures after modifications and non-conformities

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xxiii) Blackout recovery procedure

xxiv) List of critical components and dependencies critical to the defense of the DP redundancy concept

Note: These elements are to be addressed in the Preventive Maintenance System and vessel specific
familiarization for on board personnel.

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SECTION 3 Power Systems

1 General (1 March 2021)

The power systems are to be in compliance with the relevant Rules for vessel’s mandatory classification
notations. This Guide provides additional requirements for DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations in regard to
redundancy and with respect to maximum single failure, as specified for each notation.

IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1580 states:

“For equipment class 2, the power system is to be divisible into two or more systems so that in the event of
failure of one system at least one other system will remain in operation and provide sufficient power for
station keeping. The power system(s) may be run as one system during operation, but is to be arranged by
bus-tie breakers to separate the systems automatically upon failures which could be transferred from one
system to another, including, but not limited to, overloading and short-circuits.”

For equipment class 3, the power system is to be divisible into two or more systems so that in the event of
failure of one system, at least one other system will remain in operation and provide sufficient power for
station keeping. The divided power system is to be located in different spaces separated by A-60 class
division. Where the power systems are located below the operational waterline, the separations are also to
be watertight. Bus-tie breakers are to be open during equipment class 3 operations unless equivalent
integrity of power operation can be accepted.”

The above criteria from IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1580 are to be followed in the design of the power system for
DPS-2 and DPS-3 systems.

Alternative energy storage systems (e.g. Li-Ion batteries, supercapacitors, and flywheels) may be used as
energy storage sources of power to thrusters as long as all relevant redundancy, independency and
separation requirements for the relevant notation are complied with. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the
available energy from such sources may be included in the consequence analysis function required in
paragraph 5/3.3 below when reliable energy measurements can be provided for the calculations.

3 Power Generation System

3.1 Vessels with DPS-1 Notation

Generators and their distribution systems are, as a minimum, to have the capacity to supply sufficient
power to the thrusters to maintain vessel’s position within the specified operating envelope in addition to
supplying industrial activities and essential ship service loads.

When power is shared, power supply to industrial activities and essential ship service loads is not to affect
DP operations.

3.3 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation (1 March 2021)

In addition to the criteria above for DPS-1, generators and their distribution systems are to be sized and
arranged for Worst Case Failure of any bus section. Sufficient power is to remain available to supply
essential ship service loads, critical operational loads and maintain the vessel’s position and heading within
the specified post failure operating envelope.

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The post failure remaining power plant is to be able to start any non-running load without the associated
voltage dip causing any running motor to stall or its control equipment to drop out.

Essential services for generators and their prime movers, such as cooling water and fuel oil systems, are to
be arranged such that, with any single fault, sufficient power remains available to supply the essential loads
and to maintain position and heading within the specified post failure operating envelope.

3.5 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation (1 March 2021)

In addition to the criteria above for DPS-2, generators and their distribution systems are to be sized and
arranged in at least two compartments with A-60 and watertight boundaries so that, if any compartment is
lost due to fire or flood, sufficient power is available to maintain position and heading within the specified
post failure operating envelope, and to start any non-running load without the associated voltage dip
causing any running motor to stall or control equipment to drop out.

Essential services for generators and their prime movers, such as cooling water and fuel oil systems, are to
be arranged so that, with any single fault in the systems or the loss of any single compartment, sufficient
power remains available to supply the essential loads, the critical operational loads and to maintain
position and heading within the specified post failure operating envelope.

5 Power Distribution (1 November 2013)

5.1 General
The switchboard is to be arranged for manual and automatic remote controls and be provided with all
necessary alarms, controls and indications to allow local manual control of the power plant.

The distribution system at the main power generation level is to be arranged to reflect the split in the
redundancy concept.

The split in the auxiliary power system is to follow the split in the main power generation system to match
the worst case failure design intent.

Every UPS and battery system is to have a main power supply from an auxiliary system switchboard
appropriate to the split in the redundancy concept and if a backup supply from the emergency switchboard
is provided, loss of the emergency switchboard is not to prevent starting of main generators after a
blackout.

The status of automatically-controlled circuit breakers is to be monitored as described in 2/7 TABLE 2.

The bus-bar current and power levels are to be monitored as described in 2/7 TABLE 2. An alarm is to be
initiated upon failure of any of the required power supplies.

Spinning reserve, the difference between online generator capacity and consumed power is to be displayed
in the DP control station. The display is to be continuously available and is to be provided for individual
bus sections for split-bus power arrangements.

5.3 Vessels with DPS-2 or DPS-3 Notations (1 March 2021)

For DPS-2 or DPS-3, the switchboard is to be designed such that no single fault will result in a total
black-out, including failure of all equipment in any fire and/or watertight subdivision for DPS-3.

For DPS-2, a main bus bar system consisting of at least two sections, with at least one bus tie breaker
between any two bus sections, is to be arranged.

For DPS-3, each switchboard room is to be separated by watertight A-60 partitions. A bus tie breaker on
each side of the partition is to be arranged.

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Bus ties are to be designed to prevent a fault from propagating from one bus section to another.

When the DP system is designed including the configuration of closed bus tie breaker, this breaker is to be:

i) A circuit breaker capable of breaking the maximum short circuit current in the connected system
ii) Coordinated in relation to generator breakers to avoid total loss of main power (black-out)

Details of the bus-tie breakers and generator breakers, such as protection settings, coordination study
between bus-tie breakers and generator breakers and other related information are to be submitted for
review.

Consideration is to be given to effective intelligent detecting and executing methods featuring ultra-fast
acting actions by the devices, including rapid communication to other protective systems under the
coordination scheme, to prevent and/or mitigate the detected fault being migrating to other parts of the
switchboard.

Bus bar control and protection systems are to be designed to work with both open and closed bus tie
breakers.

Analysis of relevant failure modes with closed bus-tie configurations to be addressed in the FMEA so that
the redundancy of the DP system meets the design intent. For the relevant failure modes, reference is made
to the following:

● MTS “DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines”

● IMCA M 103 “Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels”
● IMCA M 247 “Guidance to Identify DP System Components and their Failure Modes”

For DPS-3, in addition to the above requirements, the closed bus design is to include the following:

i) Power system protection as in 8/3.1.2(c) of this Guide

ii) Fault ride through capability. All equipment essential for dynamically positioning system are to
have fault ride through capability, allowing for a short circuit condition to clear before under
voltage protection is actuated. Low voltage transients during a short circuit condition are not to
cause the motor starter to drop out, or other drives to fail. See also Subsection 3/13 of this Guide.

7 Power Management System (1 March 2021)

The power management system is to be capable of operating with both open and closed bus-tie breakers
where applicable. For a DPS-2 or a DPS-3 notation, where DP operations are configured with diesel
electric driven thrusters, power management systems are to be provided. Power management systems may
be of an individual designed type or integrated with other switchboard/generator control systems. The PMS
is to have redundancy according to the equipment class and a blackout prevention function.

i) Power management system is to be capable of providing sufficient power for essential operations,
and to prevent loads from starting while there is insufficient generator capacity. Facilities to
disable the automatic functions: stop running generators, or to disconnect generator breakers, bus
tie breakers, or thruster breakers are to be provided to allow manual operation by the DP operator
when necessary.
ii) Consideration is to be given to techniques such as power limiting of heavy consumers, shedding of
non-essential loads and temporary thrust reduction to maintain the availability of power. Total
failure of the power management system is not to produce failure effects exceeding the worst case
failure design intent and to be demonstrated through FMEA.
iii) Power management system is to be supplied with an uninterruptible power supply system (UPS).

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iv) A failure in the power management system is to initiate an alarm in the DP control station. When
the power management is disconnected, manual operation of the switchboard, as described in
4-8-3/5.5.4 of the Marine Vessel Rules, is to be provided.
v) Loss of an online generator is not to result in the sustained overloading of the generators
remaining on line. If sufficient power is not available, the power management system in
conjunction with “controls” of consumers is to reduce system load in a coordinated fashion to
restore power balance. The restoration of power balance may be accomplished by load reduction
of specific consumers, load shedding and sectionalization of the electrical network.
vi) The power management control system is not allowed to remove the last online generator. The
remove of the last online generator is to be determined by the DP operator.
vii) When the DP system is designed with a closed bus tie configuration for DPS-2 or DPS-3, the
power management system is to have protective measures implemented in order to provide the
required integrity between the redundancy groups. The power management system is also to be
able to communicate with other alternate protection systems if applicable. Analysis of relevant
failure modes are to be addressed in the FMEA.
viii) For DPS-3 notation, the power management system is to be arranged such that no single fault,
including fire or flood in one compartment, will render all the power management systems
inoperable.

If all thrusters are direct diesel engine driven, a power management system is not required.

Where the electrical distribution systems are provided by a mixture of shaft generators from the main
propulsion shafts and axillary generators, a power management system may be exempt provided other
means of limiting and securing the power to thrusters for DP operations are in place and the main
switchboard is arranged with split bus bar configurations.

9 Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems (UPS) (1 March 2021)

For the DPS-1, DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation, uninterruptible power supply system (UPS) is to be provided
(i.e. minimum one UPS for equipment class 1, two UPSs for equipment class 2 and three UPSs for
equipment class 3) for automatic DP control system and its associated monitoring and reference system.
The arrangement and number of UPSs are to be in accordance with 2/3.9 TABLE 1. The reference systems
and sensors are to be distributed on the UPSs in the same manner as the control systems they serve, so that
any power failure will not cause loss of position keeping ability. UPS arrangements are to support the
WCFDI and the redundancy design. UPSs that do not follow the redundancy design on a vessel may result
in undesired cross connections between redundancy groups and may lead to a failure which exceeds the
WCFDI.

Where a group of UPSs shares a common power source from a switchboard, loss of that switchboard is not
to exceed the worst case failure design intent when all UPS batteries in that group are depleted.

Each uninterruptible power supply system is to be capable of supplying power for a minimum of 30
minutes after failure of the main power supply. A fault in any UPS is to initiate an alarm in the DP control
station.

For the DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation, the power supplies of the UPSs for the main DP control system are to
be provided from different sides redundancy groups.

For the DPS-3 notation, the back-up DP control system and its associated reference systems are to be
provided with at least a dedicated UPS. The UPSs are to be located and arranged such that no single fault,
including fire or flood, in one compartment will interrupt the power supplied to the remaining control
system and associated reference sensors.

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11 Energy Storage Systems Supporting Dynamic Positioning Operations

(1 March 2021)

11.1 General
In general, Lithium type battery systems can be used to power electrical loads such as large power
propulsion and vessel’s loads.

Typical Energy Storage Systems (ESS) can be of the lithium battery or supercapacitor type.

Lithium batteries and/or supercapacitors installations are to comply with the related ABS Guides. See
Table 1 for reference.

TABLE 1
Requirements for ESS

Applicable System Guide Refrence

ESS Lithium Batteries ABS Guide for Use of Lithium Batteries in the Marine and Offshore Industries

Super Capacitors ABS Guide for Use of Supercapacitors in the Marine and Offshore Industries

11.3 Considerations when Installing Energy Storage Systems

When installing ESS supporting the DPS system, the following is to be considered in the design phase of
the project:

i) The ESS power is to be reserved for use by critical loads and not depleted by others.
ii) When the energy storage and conversion equipment is located downstream of the rectifiers that
feed those loads, it is not to feed a distribution side fault and thus there is to be no change in the
fault characteristics of the power plant. Coordination studies and short circuit test results are to
be validated.
iii) The battery installation is to be distributed so that the concentration of flammable or explosive
materials in any one space are reduced.
iv) Connecting the batteries at the thrusters’ bus level rather than to the main distribution system’s
busbars may require installation of batteries at other more locations.
v) The ESS system is to be sized and selected accordingly to operate and provide its functionality
without damage, effect, or degradation throughout its service life.
Note: The text in italics above (11.3 i. through 11.3 iv.) is sourced from MTS document titled “DP Vessel Design
Philosophy Guidelines, 2019 (Draft)”.

13 Fault Ride Through (FRT) Capability (1 March 2021)

13.1 General
Fault ride through (FRT) capability is to be provided for:

i) Vessels with the DPS-3 and DPS-3+ notations as per 3/5.3 of this Guide.
ii) Vessels with the EHS-E and EHS-P notation as per 8/3.1.1 and 8/3.1.3(e), and 3/5.3 of the ABS
DPS Guide.
iii) Fault ride through (FRT) capability is to be demonstrated first by computer modelling and
simulations as per 13.3.1 below.
iv) Secondly by a physical live test, e.g., a short circuit test (or any other equivalent fault ride through
live test) as per 13.5 below.

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v) In general, the power system attributes are to be proven by the combination of the simulation and
testing process to demonstrate the FRT capability. The attributes are listed in 5.2 of the in Marine
Technology Society (MTS) document TECHOP_ODP _09(D), May 2015.
vi) Documentation supporting the computer modeling process and simulation results are to be
provided to ABS for review.
vii) Documentation supporting and demonstrating the physical live tests (e.g., test protocols, tests
setups, methodologies, results, etc.) is to be provided to ABS for review.
viii) Consider risks associated with the test. A risk assessment is to be conducted to identify if the live
test is adequate.
ix) In case the risk associated with a live test is found to be high, virtual test(s) may be considered in
lieu of live test(s), provided the power plant model has been validated through lower risk level live
test(s).
x) Model files developed during the modelling, simulation and validation processes are to be
available to ABS upon request.
xi) Live tests are to be witnessed by the Surveyor.

The fault ride through is the capability of a vessel’s DP system power plant and control systems (for a
closed-bus operation) to recover from the effects of a fault anywhere on the main and distribution systems
(e.g., on a main switchboard bus segment or on a major feeder circuit) with significant malfunction before
the bus-tie breaker opens to isolate the faulted side of the system during a "limited" time or voltage drop.
“Limited” time is to be defined by the designer in order to make the system stable.

Note: In general, common points that span the redundancy groups have the potential to introduce fault propagation
pathways. An example of compensating provisions to address such vulnerabilities is to demonstrate fault ride
through capability of equipment that may be impacted by faults propagating through the common point.

13.3 Pre-requisites for a live FRT capability test

13.3.1 Computer modeling and simulations:
i) The entire electrical network is to be modelled for a specific FRT capability analysis.
ii) Computer aid tools appropriate for the analysis are to be used.
iii) Several fault locations on the electrical network, defined configurations, fault types,
and/or operational modes are to be selected in order to determine the worst fault case
scenario(s).
iv) Failure mode simulations are to include short circuits, earth faults, arcing faults, crash
synchronization, inadvertent connection of a stopped generator, generator’s pole slipping
conditions. See also attributes to be proven as per 13.1.v) above.
v) The most practical and least risk fault condition (based on the simulation case scenarios’
results) is to be selected to conduct the live test as required in 13.5 below.
13.3.2 Equipment Design
i) Equipment is to be designed and built to facilitate testing or be of a suitable design and
construction so as to facilitate safe, effective verification by testing.
ii) Vendor electrical equipment’s data/parameters as needed are to be available for the
modelling process.
iii) All equipment being tested is to meet Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)
specifications to carry out the tests that verify and validate the simulations.
13.3.3 Resources
i) Fault ride-through testing is to be carried out by entities / organizations with the required
technical knowledge / knowhow, tools (modelling / simulations / data capture) technical
and operational expertise and competent resources.

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Section 3 Power Systems 3

ii) Organizations of this type are also to have the test equipment, software and facilities to
carry out the modelling and simulation work such as Real Time Digital Simulation or
Hardware-in-the Loop testing.

13.5 Live Test Requirements

i) In general, the live test is to follow the recommendations as listed in the Marine Technology
Society (MTS) TECHOP ODP 09 (D) (May 2015), A Method for Proving the Fault Ride Through
Capability of the Vessels with HV Power Plant.
ii) The physical live test, e.g., a short circuit test (or any other equivalent fault ride through live test)
is to be in accordance with a prescribed step by step test protocol provided by the power system
designer, integrator, and vendors in order to validate the simulation / analysis results as stipulated
in 13.3.1 above.
iii) All equipment essential for the DP system is to have fault ride through capability, allowing for a
short circuit condition to clear before under voltage protection is actuated. Low voltage transients
during a short circuit condition are not to cause a motor starter to drop out, or other drives to fail.
iv) One successful fault ride through capability test is required to validate the modelling work and
analysis selected for the worst-case scenario(s). If major changes to the electrical network
topology and coordination protection schemes are made throughout the life of the vessel, then the
FRT capability tests are to be revalidated.
v) The physical live tests are to be performed under an Electrical Hazard Safety Program.
vi) Successful test results, along with all deviations and findings are to be submitted to ABS for
verification.

15 DC Power Distribution Systems (1 March 2021)

15.1 General
For DP vessels designed with a DC power distribution topology, they are to comply with the ABS Guide
for Direct Current (DC) Power Distribution Systems.

15.3 DC Control Power Supplies & Battery Systems

i) DC control power and battery charger systems are to be provided, as a minimum, in accordance
with the overall redundancy concept. The design is to consider addition of non-critical
redundancy to improve availability. For example, a second battery supply to allow battery
maintenance.
ii) The output of DC systems supplying equipment intended to provide redundancy is not to be cross
connected. Crossovers for maintenance are not to be provided in DP Class 3 vessels if this can
lead to transfer of fault by fire or flooding. Control supplies are to have a primary supply from the
appropriate part of the power distribution system in a manner that supports the redundancy
concept and a backup power supply from the emergency power distribution systems. The risk of
transfer of fault and hidden failures is to be reduced to a minimum.
iii) Control supplies for thrusters and generators are to be provided in a manner that makes each
thruster or generator as independent as possible.
iv) Control systems for sensitive circuits are not to be shared with heavy energy consumers such as
circuit breaker spring winders. Simultaneous operation of multiple spring winders may cause
control systems to malfunction.
Note: The text in italics above (15.3 i. through 15.3 iv.) is sourced from MTS document titled “DP Vessel Design
Philosophy Guidelines, 2019 (Draft)”.

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Section 3 Power Systems 3

15.5 DC Power Generation and Distribution System

i) The generator sets are to be distributed in a minimum of two bus bars connected by bus-tie
breakers.
ii) Where the main source of electrical power is for propulsion of the vessel, the main DC bus is to be
subdivided into at least two sections, which are to be connected by DC circuit breakers or other
approved means.
iii) The electric power sources are to be connected to the DC bus directly or through power electronic
converters (such as AC/DC rectifiers or DC/DC converters). The electrical power sources are to
be protected against faults with protective devices such as DC circuit breakers, fault current
limiting/bypass converters, solid state switches and fuses, or a combination.
iv) An ESS system connected to the DC busses can be considered as static spinning reserve and are to
be able to handle peak shaving for variable loads. Their capacity is to be considered in the overall
system calculation. The ESS system is to be controlled and interfaced to the system’s energy
management system (EMS).
v) Generator speed and load curves are to be automatically controlled by EMS based on actual
system load.
vi) The DC bus is to be properly sized to withstand the short circuit current available on the DC bus
and arranged such that the temperature rise will not affect the normal operation of electrical
devices connected to it. The DC bus-tie breaker is to be an ultrafast acting device able to trip a
short circuit condition at voltage levels such as 1500 VDC to enable selectivity between functional
groups. Coordination between the AC generator protection and rectifier module protection during
a short-circuit condition on the DC bus is to be provided for DC distribution systems supplied by
AC generators.

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SECTION 4 Thruster System

1 General (1 March 2021)

The thrusters are to comply with the requirements of Part 4, Chapter 3 of the Marine Vessel Rules, as
applicable.

The thruster system is to be designed for continuous operation.

When the main propulsion propellers and rudders are included under DP control, they are considered as
thrusters and all relevant functional requirements of this Guide are to be applied.

When the main steering system is included under DP control, the steering gear is to be designed for
continuous operation.

3 Thruster Capacity (1 March 2021)

The thruster system is to provide adequate thrust in longitudinal and lateral directions and yawing moment
for heading control.

● Vessel with DPS-0 or DPS-1 notation. The vessel is to have thrusters in number and of capacity
sufficient to maintain position and heading (station keeping) under the specified maximum
environmental conditions.
● Vessel with DPS-1+ notation. Transverse thrust force and yaw moment are not to be based on the
propellers and rudders. The thruster configuration is to be arranged to provide the required transverse
force and yaw moment for station keeping.
● Vessel with DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation. The vessel is to have thrusters in number and of capacity
sufficient to maintain position and heading (station keeping), in the event of any single fault, under the
specified maximum environmental conditions. This includes the failure of one or more thrusters.
● Vessel with DPS-2+ or DPS-3+ notation. The vessel is to have thrusters in number and of capacity
sufficient to maintain position and heading (station keeping), in the event of any single fault, under the
specified maximum environmental conditions. This includes the failure of one or more thrusters.
Transverse force and yaw moment are not to be based on the propellers and rudders. In post-failure
conditions, the combination of propellers and rudders may be accepted as a side thruster for transverse
force for back-up purposes only when the engine is continuously running in minimum RPM with the
propeller pitch at zero during the DP operation.

Thruster installations are to be designed to minimize interference with other thrusters, hull and other
surfaces.

In the calculation of available thrust in the consequence analysis and station keeping capability analysis,
the interference effect between thrusters and other effects that could reduce the available thrust is to be
considered.

A single fault in the thruster system, including pitch, azimuth or speed control, is not to result in
unintended operation of pitch, speed and direction.

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Section 4 Thruster System 4

5 Thruster Configuration (1 March 2021)

The thruster arrangement is to provide adequate maneuverability under all operating conditions. The layout
of the multiple thrusters is to take into account the need for continued operation with the loss of the most
effective or critical thruster(s), as well as the need to maintain position and or heading upon the onset of
the worst case failure, where multiple thrusters may be lost. (i.e., Worst Case Failure).

A single fault in the thruster system is to be such that the thruster fails to a safe mode so that the vessel’s
position and heading are not affected. Fail to a safe mode could be a failure to zero thrust or motor stop.

7 Thruster Auxiliary System

Auxiliary systems whose functions have a direct effect on the thruster system, for example, lubrication oil,
cooling water, control air and uninterrupted power supply systems, are to be provided for each thruster
system in a manner that supports the worst case failure design intent.

9 Thruster Control

9.1 General (1 March 2021)

Built-in features are to be provided to prevent overloading of the drive system. Manual override of control
is required so that pitch, rpm, azimuth or other parameters of individual thrusters can be controlled and can
be stopped if necessary.

Thrusters in DP operation are to provide controllable thrust from zero load to full load in step-less
increments. This can be achieved through control of the propeller pitch or the speed of the propeller, or
other parameters.

For DPS-1, DPS-1+, DPS-2, DPS-2+, DPS-3 and DPS-3+ notations, the DP control system and
manual position control systems (Section 5) are to be provided for the thruster system. In addition, a
manual thruster control system is to be provided. For DPS-0 notation, a manual position control system is
to be provided.

9.3 Control Parameter

Command of thruster pitch, azimuth and rpm is to be provided by a closed-loop control system where
feedback signals are compared with the sent commands. Sensors connected to the system are to provide
independent signals representing each of the above three parameters. For fixed pitch propeller thrusters,
two parameters of azimuth and rpm are to be represented through sensors. If the dynamic positioning
system uses other parameters, such as thrust, amperage, and power, in the closed-loop control system,
those parameters are to be monitored.

9.5 Manual Thruster Control (1 November 2013)

The manual thruster control system is to be independent of the DP control systems so that it will be
operational if the automatic control systems fail. The system is to provide an effective means of
individually controlling each thruster from main DP control station. The system is to provide an individual
lever for each thruster and to be located at the main DP control station.

If not practical to provide an individual lever for each thruster, sharing a lever between thrusters may be
acceptable provided that following conditions are satisfied:

i) For DPS-0 and DPS-1, thruster control levers can provide controls of thrust in transverse and
longitudinal directions and resulted yaw moment at same time.
ii) For DPS-2 and DPS-3, thruster control levers can provide controls of thrust in transverse and
longitudinal directions and resulted yaw moment at same time after any single fault. For DPS-3,
single fault also includes a loss of a compartment due to fire or flood.

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Section 4 Thruster System 4

Any failure in the manual position control system is not to affect the capabilities of the manual thruster
control system to individually control each thruster or related group of thrusters.

Manual thruster control is to be available at all times, also during all failure conditions in the main DP
control system.

A single fault in the manual thruster control system is neither to cause significant increase in thrust output
nor make the thruster rotate.

9.7 Emergency Stop (1 March 2021)

An emergency stop facility for each thruster is to be provided at the main DP control station. The
emergency stop facility is to be independent of the DP control systems, manual position control system and
manual thruster control system. The emergency stop facility is to be arranged to shut down each thruster
individually.

This emergency stop is to be arranged with separate cables for each thruster.

Electrical cables potentially exposed to hydrocarbon fires in engine rooms and spaces where fuel oil is
contained these cables are to be fire-resistant coated.

An alarm is to be initiated upon loop failure (i.e., broken connections or short-circuit) in the emergency
stop system.

The emergency stop activation buttons are to be placed in a dedicated layout representing the thruster
location and which is consistent with the vessel’s axis and layout, or they may be arranged together with
the corresponding thruster levers if these are arranged in accordance with the physical thruster layout.
Where an accidental operation of the emergency stop buttons can occur, a protective cover is to be
mounted.

Emergency stops for thrusters are to be located within easy reach of the DP operator (DPO) e.g., within the
bridge, at the main DP control station.

Emergency stops for thrusters are to be laid out in a logical manner which reflects the position of the
thruster in the vessel’s hull.

For equipment classes 2 and 3, the thruster emergency stop system is to have loop monitoring.

11 Thruster Monitoring and Alarm (1 November 2013)

Thruster monitoring is to be provided at the DP control station. This monitoring is to be continuously
available by indicators/screens. The following parameters are to be monitored:

i) RPM, pitch, azimuth

ii) CPP hydraulic oil pressure and temperature
iii) Thruster load and motor temperature
iv) Thruster motor/semiconductor converter coolant leakage
v) Thruster motor/semiconductor converter temperature
vi) Thruster motor power availability
vii) Thruster motor short circuit
viii) Lube oil pressure and temperature
ix) Thruster operation (on-line/off-line)

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Section 4 Thruster System 4

Alarm systems for leakage, motor overload and high temperature, abnormal pressure are to be audible and
visual and are to be installed on the DP control station. Their occurrence and reset status is to be recorded.
2/7 TABLE 2 summarizes the parameters for monitoring, display and warning.

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SECTION 5 Control System

1 General (1 March 2021)

In general, control and monitoring system components (alarms and instrumentation) for dynamic
positioning systems of a vessel intended to be assigned a DPS notation are to comply with the
requirements of the vessel’s mandatory classification notations.

Notes:
Good engineering practice promotes the concept of maintaining clear segregation between systems intended to provide:
● Control
● Monitoring
● Protection

3 DP Control Station

3.1 General (1 March 2021)

The general requirements for system arrangement for the different notations of DPS-0, DPS-1, DPS-2,
and DPS-3 are listed in 2/3.9 TABLE 1.

In general, the following items are to be located at the DP control station:

i) Operator stations for DP control and manual position control

ii) User interface displays for required position reference systems
iii) Manual thruster control levers
iv) Thruster control mode change systems
v) Thruster emergency stops
vi) Means to monitor thruster, main propeller and rudder performance (if relevant to DP) and manage
unwanted thrust
vii) Equipment for internal and external communication

System components that do not require frequent or immediate operator attention may be installed in
alternative locations.

DP control systems and equipment are to meet the requirements of the ABS Rules for Building and
Classing Marine Vessels Section 4-9-3.

3.3 Arrangement of DP Control Station (1 November 2013)

The DP control station is to display information from the power system, thruster system and DP control
system so that correct functioning of these systems can be maintained.

For DPS-3 notation, a backup DP control station is to be provided in a separate compartment located and
arranged such that no single fault, including a fire or flood in one compartment, will render both the main
and backup control system inoperable. This room is to be separated by an A-60 class division from the
main DP control station, and located with easy access from the main DP control station.

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Section 5 Control System 5

The main and backup DP control stations are to be arranged so that the operator does not need to change
position during operation and the operator has a view of the external surrounding area and all activities
relevant to the DP operations. For the backup DP control station, alternatively, a closed-circuit TV (CCTV)
system is acceptable for viewing the external surrounding area.

If a view of the vessel’s exterior limits and the surrounding area is not considered important for the
intended operations, for example, for MODUs, the main activity after damage of the main DP control
station is to cease the drilling operation, the arrangement for viewing the vessel’s exterior may not be
necessary for the DP backup control station.

3.5 Arrangement of DP Control Systems (1 March 2021)

DP control mode is to include control of position and heading. Set-points for control of position and
heading are to be independently selectable.

For the DPS-0 notation, a manual position control system is to be fitted

For the DPS-1 notation, a DP control system and a manual position control system are to be fitted.
Transfer of control between the two systems is to be initiated manually.

For the DPS-2 notation, a DP control system with two DP control computers and a manual position
control system are to be fitted. Transfer between two DP control computers is to be automatic and
bumpless with no loss of position and/or heading.

For DPS-3 notation, a main DP control system with two DP control computers, a backup DP control
system, and a manual position control system are to be fitted. The backup DP control system is to be
located at the backup DP control station. The backup DP control system is to have an automatic position
control mode, and is to be interfaced with a position reference system, motion reference unit (MRU or
equivalent) and a vessel heading sensor which are able to operate independently of the main DP control
system. The transfer between the main DP control system and the backup DP control system is to be
smooth with no loss of position and/or heading. See 5/9.3 for modes of transfer.

In general, each DP computer system is to be isolated from other on-board computer systems and
communications systems for maintaining the integrity of the DP system and command interfaces. This
isolation may be achieved using via hardware and/or software systems and physical separation of cabling
and communication lines. Robustness of the isolation is to be verified by analysis and proven by testing.
Specific safeguards are to be implemented to secure the integrity of the DP computer system and prevent
the connection of unauthorized or unapproved devices or systems.

3.7 Arrangement of Control Panels (1 March 2021)

The operator is to have easy access to information on displays or by visual indication. Display systems and
the DP control station are to be based on sound ergonomic principles which promote proper operation of
the system. The effect of any action is to be immediately displayed, preferably with graphics. In addition to
the DP system command signals, the feedback signals are to be displayed where applicable.

The selection between operational modes (DP mode/manual position control mode/manual thruster control
and if part of the thruster system, propellers and rudders) is to be provided and easily operated. Indications
of active mode and the operational status of different systems are to be displayed on the control panels.
Indicators and controls are to be arranged in logical groups, and be coordinated with the geometry of the
vessel where applicable.

Indication of the system in charge, and changes in operational mode, is to be clearly provided to the DP
operator. Indications of changes in operational mode is to be visually indicated along with an audible
alarm.

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Section 5 Control System 5

Manual operating levers and other controls are to be placed in close proximity to the DP operator and
intuitive in nature. Means for preventing inadvertent operation of vital or critical controls are to be
considered such as recessed or covered switches and others. Protection of those buttons can be provided by
a two-button arm/fire system, or by placing a passive cover over them.

If an erroneous sequence of operations may lead to a critical situation or damage of equipment, appropriate
interlocks are to be arranged.

Controls and indicators placed in the DP control stations are to be lighted properly to permit use day and
night. Lights for such purposes are to be easily adjustable.

3.9 Arrangement of Data Communication Networks (1 March 2021)

When the DP control system utilizes a data communication network to distributed thruster control units,
this network is to be separated from the communication network(s) for manual thruster controls and
manual position control.

The communication network for the DP control system is to be duplicated and each is to be routed as far
apart from each other as practical for DPS-2, see also 4-9-3/13.1.2 of the Marine Vessel Rules. The
network is to be duplicated and physically separated for DPS-3. The manual position control system is not
to share the same communication network with the DP control system.

DP related networks, including data communication networks, are likely to introduce common points that
span the redundancy groups. Such common points have the potential to introduce fault propagation
pathways which can defeat the redundancy concept. These common points are to be clearly identified in
the DP FMEA and addressed appropriately (e.g., Single Failure Propagation Analysis concluding on the
local effect and global effect, compensating provisions, or mitigating measures and efficacy of same to be
proven by validation testing, etc.).

5 DP Control System

5.1 General (1 November 2013)

In general, the DP control system is to be arranged in a DP control station. This system is to be located so
that the operator can easily maintain an overview of both the vessel and the surrounding area.

Design is to be robust enough to reject erroneous signals that could affect control of position and/or
heading. If all position reference systems fail the DP control system is to use the internal model to send
control signals.

The transition between the DP control modes is not to lead to a significant change in thrust output.

5.3 External Force (1 March 2021)

If there are external forces from other equipment that can affect the vessel positioning such as from pipe
tensioners, hawser tension, or fire monitors; then a comprehensive system engineering approach is to be
implemented for automatic or manual feed forward compensation. This is to consider the external sensor
redundancy and failure modes (benign and aggressive failure modes). In addition to error checking
functions provided by redundancy, the acceptable signal ranges are to be carefully bounded to be within a
realistic range.

5.5 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation (1 March 2021)

DP control system is to consist of at least two independent computers systems so that, in case of any single
failure, automatic position keeping and heading control ability will be maintained. Failure of common
facilities, such as self-checking routines, alignment facilities, data transfer arrangements, and plant

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Section 5 Control System 5

interfaces, is not to cause the failure of more than one computer system. An alarm is to be initiated if any
computer fails or is not ready to take control.

The DP control system is to perform self-monitoring and automatically transfer DP control after a detected
failure in one control computer. The automatic control transfer from one control computer to another is to
be bumpless with no loss of position and/or heading (station keeping).

The cabling for the DP control computers and the thrusters is to be arranged such that under single fault
conditions it will be possible to control sufficient thrusters capable of providing thrust to control surge,
sway and yaw and to keep the vessel within the specified operating envelope.

An alarm is to be initiated for any failure of a DP control system or a sensor and also for the cases where
the sensor or control system is not activated or on standby. Self-monitoring and comparison between
systems are to be provided and warnings are to be generated upon detection of an unexpected difference in
thruster command, position or heading.

5.7 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation (1 March 2021)

In addition to the requirements for the DPS-2 notation, the following requirements also apply:

The computer systems described above do not include the backup computer system, thus, an additional DP
control system is to be located in the backup DP control station and transfer of control to it is to be initiated
manually from the backup DP control station.

The backup DP control station is to perform self-monitoring and continuously communicate its status to
the main DP control station. An alarm is to be initiated if the backup DP control station fails or is not ready
to take control.

The backup DP control station is to be ready to operate and maintain the position once it assumes
command. The switch-over of the control to the backup DP control system is to be operated from the
backup DP control station and is to occur via manual transfer when the main DP control station is affected
by failure, fire or explosion.

The cabling for the DP control systems and the thrusters is to be arranged such that under single fault
conditions, including loss of a compartment due to fire or flood, it will remain possible to control sufficient
thrusters to keep the vessel within the specified operating envelope.

5.9 Vessels with DPS-1+, DPS-2+ or DPS-3+ Notation (1 March 2020)

For DPS-1+, DPS-2+ or DPS-3+ notation, the main DP control system is to include a common joystick for
the manual control of thrusters with mode selection of automatic and manual heading control. This
requirement is applicable to the backup DP-control system for DPS-3+ notation.

7 Manual Position Control System

The manual position control system is to be independent of the DP control systems and is not to rely on
common cabling. The system is to be arranged such that it will be operational if the DP control systems
fail. The system is to provide one joystick for manual control of the vessel position and is to be provided
with the arrangements for automatic heading control.

9 Control Mode Selection

9.1 Manual/DP Control Modes (1 November 2013)

A simple device is to be provided in the DP control station for the selection of the thruster control modes
(i.e., manual thruster control, Manual Position Control and DP control). The device is to be designed so
that it is always possible to select manual thruster controls after any single fault in the DP control mode.

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Section 5 Control System 5

Thrusters within the DP control system may also be individually de-selected from DP control to manual
thruster control for service and vessel specific operations.

9.3 Main/Backup Control Station

For DPS-3 notation, the mode selector between main DP control station and backup DP control station is
to comply with redundancy requirements. The transfer to the backup DP control station is to be fail-safe,
so that if the main DP control station is damaged in any way, transfer of control can still be initiated and
assumed at the backup DP control station. Transfer of control to the backup DP control station is to be
performed manually, such that inadvertent control transfer to an unattended station is avoided.

11 Position Reference System and Environment Sensor

11.1 General
The Position reference systems are to be in compliance with the relevant requirements for the mandatory
classification notations of the vessel for electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic components and subsystems.
Accuracy and limitations of the position references used are to be adequate for the specific task in which
the vessel is engaged.

(1 November 2013) The design of position reference systems and environment sensors with respect to
power, signal transmission, and interfaces is to follow the system redundancy requirements. Sensors and/or
position reference systems may be shared with other systems provided failure in any of the other systems
cannot cause failure or loss of performance of the DP control system.

11.1.1 Motion Reference Unit (MRU)

Where position reference systems are dependent on correction of the measurements for roll and
pitch noise, motion reference unit (MRU) or equivalent is to be provided.

11.1.2 Diversity (1 November 2013)

Where more than two positioning reference systems are required, at least two are to be based on
different measurement techniques and each of the two are to be independent with respect to signal
transmission and interfaces. Special consideration may be given where the use of different
measuring principles is not practicable.

11.1.3 Loss of Inputs of Position Reference Systems (1 March 2021)

Loss of one or multiple position reference system inputs or sensor inputs are not to lead to
significant change in thrust output. In general, upon recovery of the inputs the last position or
heading set point before the loss is not to be automatically applied unless this feature is required
for specific functionality that has been developed by the DP Control System vendor. Such
functionality is to be subjected to a comprehensive system engineering approach (e.g., FMEA) and
validated by testing. The DP operator may choose any other set point if the set point suggested by
the control system is significantly different from the actual vessel position and/or heading.

11.1.4 Alarms
Alarms for sensor malfunctions are to be included in monitoring of positioning reference systems
and environment sensors. An alarm is to be initiated on detection of a sensor failure, even if the
sensor is in a standby or offline use at the time of failure.

11.1.5 Power Source

For the DPS-1, DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation,the power source to the position reference systems and
environmental sensors are to be supplied from UPSs. Following components of the position
reference systems, where applicable, may not need to be powered by UPS.

i) Transducer hoist systems

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Section 5 Control System 5

ii) Taut wire derrick control system

iii) Heave/tension compensation (taut wire)
iv) Part of gangway system

11.3 Vessels with DPS-0 or DPS-1 Notation (1 March 2021)

For the DPS-0 notation, a position reference system, a wind sensor and a vessel heading sensor are to be
fitted. For the DPS-1 notation, they are to be provided in duplicate. Special considerations may be given
where the use of different measuring principles is not practicable. The two independent position reference
systems are to be installed and be simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation.

Where user interface computers and displays are required for position reference systems, they are to be
independent of the DP control system. The user interface display is to be placed at the DP control station
and easily readable by the DP operator. Power supply to the position reference systems is to be from the
corresponding UPS connected to its associated sensors (except for notation DPS-0).

11.5 Vessels with DPS-2 Notation (1 November 2013)

In addition to the requirements for the DPS-1 notation, a third independent position reference system, a
third wind sensor and a third vessel heading sensor are to be provided. A single fault is not to affect
simultaneously more than one position reference system (i.e., no common mode failures).

Where user interface computers and displays are required for position reference systems at least two of
them are to be independent of the DP control system. The user interface displays are to be placed at the
main DP control station, and they are to be easily readable by the DP operator. UPSs are to be provided for
the power supply of the position reference systems and associated sensors, and they are to be in accordance
with the overall redundancy requirements.

11.7 Vessels with DPS-3 Notation

In addition to the requirements for DPS-2 notation, the third wind sensor, third vessel heading sensor and
the third independent position reference system are to be directly connected to the backup DP control
station and with their signals repeated to the main DP control station with appropriate signal isolation.

The sensor receivers connected directly to the backup DP control system are in general to be installed in
the same compartment as the backup DP control system. For sensors that cannot be located in the same
compartment as the backup DP control station room (e.g., wind sensor, GPS antenna, taut-wire or hydro
acoustic transducer), redundancy is to be provided as far as possible by separation and physical distance.

The independence between main and backup DP control systems is to be provided. Signal isolation of
position reference system and sensors is to be provided, such that failures cannot propagate from one
system to the other system.

11.9 Signal Processing

Position reference systems are to be capable of providing new position data with an update rate and
accuracy suitable for the intended automatic DP operations. The individual position reference system is to
be self-operational, and not dependent on the DP control system for operation.

For satellite based systems, interface and necessary equipment for receiving differential correction is to be
installed. Where several position reference systems are required, the DP control computers are to use
signal processing techniques to validate the data received. The reference position of each system is to be
available at the operator's request. Position reference systems that rely on motion reference compensation
are to be provided with a means of selecting available motion reference units for use.

When several systems are combined, the resulting value used in further processing is not to change
suddenly or significantly if one or more systems are selected or deselected. Failures in a positioning
reference system that might affect positioning or redundancy adversely are to initiate an alarm. If a

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Section 5 Control System 5

positioning reference system can stall or in other ways produce corrupt or out of range data, a method is to
be provided to enable rejection of the data and an alarm is to be initiated.

13 Consequence Analysis (For DPS-2 and DPS-3) (1 March 2021)

For a vessel with DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation, the DP control system is to incorporate a consequence
analyzer that monitors the composite thrust vector necessary to maintain position and heading under the
prevailing environmental conditions in the event of predefined worst case failure. Additionally, the
consequence analyzer is to be able to perform calculations to verify that in the event of a single fault there
will be sufficient thrust available to maintain position and heading. Failure conditions may also be
simulated under hypothetical conditions (e.g., loss of thruster, generator, auxiliary systems, etc.). This
simulation is to be clearly identified and is not to affect the actual control system in any fashion.

The consequence analysis is to be automatically running at pre-set intervals. The calculation ongoing is to
be displayed. The analyzer is not to be disabled while in DPS-2 or DPS-3 DP operations.

The sampling or filtering of the consequence analysis is to be such that a useful warning can be given in
sufficient time but without initiating numerous nuisance alarms which will bring the credibility of any
warnings into doubt.

When the consequence analyzer predicts a failure mode that would cause a loss of position in the
prevailing weather condition, and alarm is to be initiated and acknowledged by the DP operator.

15 Display and Monitoring (1 September 2015)

The DP control station is to receive alarms and warnings reflecting the status of the DP system. If the
vessel exceeds preset position and heading limits an alarm is to be initiated. If the alarms in the DP control
station are slave signals of other alarm systems, there are to be a local acknowledgement and silencing
device. The silencing device is not to inhibit new alarms.

The display unit is to present a position plot including the location of the vessel relative to the reference
sources. The plot may be vessel relative, or a true motion presentation. For DP control systems designed
with redundancy, there is to be at least two independent position displays. If the display is used for
presentation of warnings or alarms, they are to have priority over other information and they are not to be
inhibited by other data currently being displayed.

The critical DP alarms and displays are to be available in DPS-3 backup DP control station. Non-critical
DP alarms (e.g., grouping of alarms, logging on by authorized crew only to the alarm monitoring system,
etc.) are to be of non-intrusive type announcements for the DP operator, since in a fire or loss of
compartment situations, many failed electrical systems, thrusters and other alarms may be initiated
simultaneously.

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SECTION 6 Auxiliary Systems (applies to DPS-2 and DPS-3)

1 General (1 March 2020)

The design of the components of auxiliary systems is to be in compliance with the requirements of the
vessel’s mandatory classification notations. For DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations, the auxiliary systems that
are part of the DP system are to be arranged in accordance with the redundancy requirements given in
2/3.3.

A single failure effect analysis for auxiliary systems is to be included in the DP system FMEA. The
following items are to be considered where applicable:

i) Fuel oil system

ii) Lubricating oil system
iii) Cooling water system
iv) Compressed air system
v) Hydraulic system
vi) Pneumatic system, etc.
vii) Ventilation/HVAC system
viii) Piping system equipment (e.g., purifier, heat exchanger, transfer pump, etc.)

3 Fuel Oil (1 September 2015)

The fuel system is to be arranged to follow the redundancy concept. The duty pump is to be powered from
within the same redundancy group as the component or system it serves. The effect of pump failure is not
to exceed the WCFDI. If the fuel system requires heating, then the heating system is to be designed with
the appropriate level of redundancy.

The design of the fuel system is to facilitate isolation of services between DP operation and industrial
functions if applicable.

Actuators for quick closing valves are to be installed on a per engine basis and hence, any remote control
system is to fail safe with respect to station keeping.

Fuel strainers and filters are to be arranged to facilitate changes without taking equipment out of service.

For DPS-3, a minimum of one service tank is to be provided for each redundant group. The service tanks
are to be in separate compartments with A-60 partitions following overall split redundancy concept. The
valves in the crossover facilities, if arranged, are to be located as close as possible to the bulkhead and
operable from both sides.

5 Cooling Water (1 November 2013)

The cooling system is to be arranged to follow the redundancy concept. The duty pump is to be powered
from within the same redundancy group as the component or system it serves. The effect of pump failure is
not to exceed the WCFDI.

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Section 6 Auxiliary Systems (applies to DPS-2 and DPS-3) 6

For twin screw vessels where cooling pumps are engine driven, a duplicate spare pump carried onboard, in
lieu of the standby pump, is acceptable, as long as loss of pump would not exceed the WCFDI.

Engine room sea water cooling systems could be incorporated into the thruster seawater systems provided
the redundancy concept is not violated.

In consideration of the severe consequences arising from the loss of water or gas accumulation, fresh water
cooling systems are to be arranged with full separation between systems providing required redundancy.
For a DPS-2 notation, the pipe can be considered not to fail.

The fail safe condition for valves in the fresh water system is to fail as is. The fail safe condition for
temperature regulating valves is to be fail open.

The display of running pumps is to be provided and an alarm is to be initiated for abnormal stop and/or
change over to a standby pump.

7 Compressed Air
Compressed air systems for DP related functions are to follow the redundancy concept. Compressed air for
starting engines is to be independent to the maximum extent feasible. Control air and starting air may be
taken from the same source provided any pressure drops associated with starting air do not affect the
control function. Loss of air supply to the thrusters is to be alarmed and is to have no effect on thruster
operation.

9 Lubrication Oil Systems (1 November 2013)

Lube oil systems for engines are to be associated with one engine only. Where common facilities are
provided, such as, facilities for storage, changing and disposing of oil, means are to be provided to prevent
inadvertent cross connections between engines which could lead to one engine sump being emptied and the
other overfilled.

11 HVAC and Ventilation

Ventilation and HVAC for spaces containing equipment essential to DP are to be arranged to comply with
redundancy so that acceptable temperature can be maintained after any single fault in active components
and ventilation damper actuation energy source. This requirement also applies to switchboard rooms and
instrument rooms containing components that are parts of the DP system.

13 Piping
Crossover pipes are acceptable, except in ventilation ducts, provided the cross over pipes can be closed at
both sides of separating bulkheads. Crossover valves, where fitted between independent systems to
facilitate maintenance, are to be provided with local and remote monitoring to indicate open/closed status.

15 Pneumatic Systems
Pneumatic systems are to be designed according to required redundancy in view of the risk of leakage.

17 Power Supply to Auxiliary Systems (1 November 2013)

Power for auxiliary systems associated with DP systems is to be taken from within the redundancy group.
Auxiliaries for thruster systems such as cooling water pumps and fans are to be powered from the same
redundancy group as that providing the drives.

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SECTION 7 DP System Initial Test

1 General (1 March 2021)

The components and subsystems associated with the dynamic positioning system are to be tested according
to the vessel’s mandatory classification notations, where applicable, prior to testing of the dynamic
positioning system.

Once completed, the dynamic positioning system is to be subjected to final tests. These tests are to prove
essential features of the DP system and its design redundancy. Objectives of the test are to verify the intent
of the DP vessels redundancy design (worst case failure design intent) and to validate the same by testing.
In order to achieve this objective, attributes of Performance, Protection and Detection on which the
redundancy concept depends upon will need to be validated by testing.

A DP test program is to be developed to contain test procedures and acceptance criteria and identify the
configurations for all DP related systems for test. The DP test program is to include procedures for DP
system performance testing and procedures for FMEA proving trials for DPS-2 and DPS-3, as applicable.

When deemed necessary by the attending Surveyor, additional tests to those specified by the DP test
program may be required.

The DP test program is to be kept onboard the vessel. Any changes to the DP system other than like-for-
like replacement of equipment are to be notified to ABS and included in a revision of the DP test program.

3 DP System Performance Test

The performance testing of the DP system is to be carried out to the satisfaction of the attending surveyor
in accordance with a DP system performance testing procedure which includes but is not limited to the
following:

3.1 Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems (UPS) (1 March 2021)

The UPSs are to be operated and confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily. The UPSs are to be operated
without the normal main power input for 30 minutes to confirm that the batteries are capable of supplying
the output power with full functioning of the DP control system (DPCS). The alarms for the UPSs are to be
tested.

Note: UPSs play a prominent role in the integrity of the DP system and are likely to be present in systems other than the
DPCS UPS's, (e.g., UPS's for control power of switchboard, mission critical UPS's with interfaces to the DP
System etc.).
Note: Fault ride through capability and fault tolerance capability may depend on UPS's. It is important that such
dependencies are clearly identified and reflected in the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. By-pass and
synchronization functionality, if present is to be comprehensively analyzed and tested to verify that malfunction/
mal-operation does not defeat the redundancy concept.

3.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors

All position reference systems, sensors, MRUs, and vessel heading sensor(s) for the DP systems are to be
tested and confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily. The alarm systems are to be checked by simulating
failures of the sensors and the reference systems.

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Section 7 DP System Initial Test 7

3.5 Manual Position Control System (1 November 2013)

For a DPS-1, DPS-2 or DPS-3 system, the operation of the manual position control system using one
joystick at DP control station and supplemented by an automatic heading control, is to be confirmed to be
functioning satisfactorily.

3.7 Manual Thruster Control System (1 November 2013)

The operation of the manual thruster control system using individual levers, at the DP control station in
accordance with Section 4 of this Guide is to be confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily.

3.9 Thruster Emergency Stop (1 March 2021)

The operation of thruster emergency stop and monitoring alarms, including loop monitoring, is to be
tested.

3.11 DP Control System (1 November 2013)

For a DPS-1 system, the operation of the automatic control system and a manual position control system
including manual transfer of control between the two systems is to be confirmed to be functioning
satisfactorily.

For a DPS-2 system, the operation of the DP control system and a manual position control system
including automatic transfer of one DP control computer to another upon failure is to be confirmed to be
functioning satisfactorily. Upon failure of the DP control system, it is to be verified that the manual
position control is possible.

For a DPS-3 system, the operation of three DP control computers and a manual position control system
including main DP control system automatic transfer of one DP control computer to another upon failure is
to be confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily. Manual transfer of control is to be verified to be possible
at the backup DP control system located in the back-up control station. Upon failure of the main DP
control system, it is to be verified that the manual position control is possible.

Performance of the position reference systems in DP mode is to be tested for all possible combinations of
position reference systems (PRS), and on each PRS as a single system.

The main DP control system in a DPS-2 or DPS-3 system is to perform self-check routines which are to
automatically changeover to a standby system when critical failure conditions are detected. An alarm is to
be initiated in case of failure.

3.13 Control and Alarms (1 November 2013)

Functions of thruster controls and related alarms are to be tested and to be confirmed functioning
satisfactorily.

Change of thruster controls between DP control system, manual position control system and manual
thruster control system is to be tested and to be confirmed functioning satisfactorily.

3.15 Standby Changeover

Changeover to standby pumps (e.g., sea water, fresh water, hydraulic) is to be tested if these pumps
provide essential redundancy, (e.g., standby seawater cooling pump which is required to start on failure of
the running pump).

Any other standby changeovers that are included in the Operations Manual are to be tested.

3.17 Protection Function

The functions of protection equipment are to be tested if they are designed to provide essential redundancy
of the DP system.

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Section 7 DP System Initial Test 7

3.19 Communication (1 March 2021)

A means of voice communication between the main DP control station, and the thruster room(s) is to be
tested and confirmed to be functioning satisfactorily.

A means of voice communication between the main DP control station, the engine control position and any
operational control centers associated with DP is to be tested and confirmed to be functioning
satisfactorily.

Refer to 2/9.1 for continuity of power supply for essential communication.

3.21 DP Endurance Test (1 November 2013)

A DP endurance test is to be carried out for at least 6 hours with the complete DP system in operation. It
can be combined with the test of DP control systems. The failures related to DP system performance are to
be recorded and analyzed. Where possible the test environment is to reflect the limiting design operating
conditions.

5 FMEA Proving Trial for DPS-2 or DPS-3 (1 March 2021)

For a DPS-2 or DPS-3 system, FMEA proving tests are to be carried out to the satisfaction of the
attending Surveyor. The tests are to confirm the findings from FMEA analysis that the vessel is able to
maintain position and heading after the loss of redundant groups identified by the FMEA, as well as clearly
identify and prove the vessel's Worst-Case Failure and validate that the Worst Case Failure Design Intent
has been achieved.

The FMEA test procedures are to be developed in the FMEA analysis covered in Subsection 2/11 of this
Guide.

The vessel's DP system FMEA is to have analyzed and tested all the configurations that the vessel is
intended to be operated in over its life cycle (e.g., closed bus configurations, and FRT tests). The test
procedures are to be based on the simulation of failures and is to be carried out under as realistic conditions
as practicable.

Validation testing is to be carried out to demonstrate that the common point introduced by the closing of
the bus ties does not provide a fault propagation pathway, and equipment related to DP Station keeping
(including auxiliary systems and supporting systems) demonstrate voltage dip fault ride through capability.

The schedule of these tests is to be designed to demonstrate the level of redundancy established in the
FMEA. Where practicable, the test environment is to reflect the limiting design operating conditions.

Closing out of action items from the FMEA, and proving trials are to be well documented and auditable.

After completion of the DP proving trials, the final version of the DP FMEA and DP proving trial report,
including final analysis/conclusions based on actual results from DP testing, are to be submitted.

7 Surveys After Construction (1 March 2021)

Surveys after construction for dynamic positioning are to be in accordance with 7-9-6/3 of the ABS Rules
for Survey After Construction (Part 7).

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SECTION 8 Enhanced System (EHS)

1 Introduction (1 March 2021)

At the Owner’s request, an Enhanced System notation (EHS), as a supplement to a DPS-series notation,
may be assigned to a DPS-2 or DPS-3 vessel. The main objective of the enhanced system notation is to
improve reliability, operability and maintainability of the DP vessel.

The enhanced system notations mainly emphasize the following properties of the DP system:

i) Robust design of power plant and thruster system;

ii) Enhanced protection systems for generators and thrusters: Failure detection and discrimination of
failed components before a full or partial black-out situation occurs;
iii) Automatic blackout recovery;
iv) Enhanced position reference system and sensor system for increased availability and reliability;
v) Fire and flood protection for higher risk areas.

The notation includes provisions for standby start, closed bus operation and transferable generators. These
are beneficial to the overall environment, operational flexibility and system maintainability

Four separate enhanced notations are provided as follows:

● Enhanced Electrical System (EHS-E): This notation covers the requirements for the electrical and
power management systems that are beyond those for the DPS series notations.
● Enhanced Power and Thruster System ( EHS-P ): This notation covers the requirements for the power
system and thrusters that are beyond those for the DPS-series notations.
● Enhanced Control System: ( EHS-C ): This notation covers the requirements on the DP control
systems including control computers, position reference systems and sensors, which are beyond the
minimum requirements for DPS-series notations.
● Fire and Flood Protection System ( EHS-F ): This notation covers the requirements for fire and flood
protection considering the risk level of the areas. This is a supplement for a DPS-2 system. It is not
necessary for a DPS-3 system, since a DPS-3 system has higher requirement in this regard.

The separate enhanced system notations provide the Owner with the flexibility of selecting an individual
EHS notation or combined EHS notations that best fit the design intent.

To be granted an EHS- series notation, the requirements given in this Section are to be met in addition to
the requirements for DPS-series notations.

3 Enhanced System for DPS-2 and DPS-3

A vessel with DPS-2 or DPS-3 notation may be assigned enhanced system notations if the system meets
the additional requirements given in this section.

For a vessel with a DPS-2 notation, the Enhanced Power and Thruster System Notation (EHS-P), the
Enhanced Control System Notation (EHS-C), Fire and Flood Protection (EHS-F) Notation or any
combination, such as EHS-PC, EHS-PF, EHS-PCF, may be assigned.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

For a DPS-3 vessel, EHS-F is not necessary since DPS-3 has a higher fire protection requirement.

3.1 Enhanced Electrical System (EHS-E) (1 March 2021)

3.1.1 System Design (1 March 2021)
The design of power plant and thruster systems are to adhere to clearly defined worst case failure
design intent.

The design is to include fault ride through capabilities and functions for automatic quick blackout
recovery.

The design for transferable thrusters and generators is to be fault tolerant and fault resistant, which
means that a single fault is not to cause failure of more than one redundancy group and is not to
cause total black-out.

A strategy for detecting hidden failure that could defeat the DP redundancy concept is to be
developed. The strategy is to include means to effectively test protection systems and standby
redundancy. Such systems are to be designed so that they can be tested on Surveyor’s request.

3.1.2 Power System (1 March 2021)

3.1.2(a) Power Generation (1 March 2021)
Each generator set is to be autonomous in terms of control and automation functions. Common
cause failures associated with load sharing, interlocks, permissive and others are to be avoided by
distributing control and monitoring functions to local systems responsible for each item of main
machinery.

3.1.2(b) Power Distribution

With Enhanced Generator Protection (EGP), described below, information about bus load sharing
conditions is to be directly derived from the bus bar.

Generators are to be capable of droop mode operation, with any central communication
infrastructure minimized.

i) Load Sharing. The load sharing system is to be designed so that the system can be tested,
both for correct sharing and consequences of failure. The design is to incorporate the
possibility for testing that critical failures are detected by the control system. The failure
of the power management system is not to result in the failure of the load sharing system
in any load sharing control modes.

● Active (kW) Load Sharing. If a scheme for isochronous load sharing is implemented,
the generator speed controllers are to automatically switch to load sharing in droop
mode upon failure of isochronous load sharing. Means to test the transfer
conveniently are to be provided.
● Reactive (kVAR) Load Sharing. The generators are to be able to operate in voltage
droop mode, without the need for reactive load sharing communication between the
AVRs. If differential compensation between voltage regulators is implemented, the
system is to automatically switch to voltage droop control mode operation if a failure
in the reactive load sharing lines occurs. Means to test the transfer conveniently are to
be provided.
ii) Switchboards. Switchboards are to be protected against potential arc damage either by arc
detection, by insulated bus bars, or by any other means.
iii) Circuit Breakers. A minimum of two bus-tie breakers, one on each side, between
switchboards is to be provided, with monitoring and control contacts from each.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

The Power Management System and generator incomer circuit breaker cubicle are to
provide a visible indication of generator breaker status (open/closed). The Power
Management System is to alarm if the status of the circuit breaker feedback differs from
the issued command.
3.1.2(c) Power System Protection (1 March 2021)
System Design. Controls and protection systems are to be designed to facilitate local monitoring,
controllability, fault detection, and acting in a timely manner to prevent fault propagating to other
sections.

A zone or segmented concept is to be implemented with error checking such as bus bar differential
protection or equivalent. The generator protection system is to be designed so that it is possible to
verify protection settings and test black-out recovery. Additionally, alarms and detection systems
are to be capable of being tested after system delivery, and be available for demonstration at the
request of the Surveyor.

i) Enhanced Generator Protection. In addition to the generator protection requirements for a

vessel’s mandatory notations, the following functions, as a minimum, are to be provided.

a) Identification of faults based on continuous monitoring of generator voltage and

speed characteristics.
b) Monitor generator behavior over time and reveal anomalous behavior, and take
action before system performance is affected, or critical failures occur.
c) Trigger alarms if anomalies have continued beyond the pre-set intervals set by
failure analysis, indicating that maintenance is required.
d) Identification of a faulty generator without relying on information from other
generators.

EGP is to detect and alarm at least the following anomalies included but not limited to:

a) Excess and insufficient fuel

b) Over and under-excitation
c) Generator instability or hunting
d) Loss of exciter current
e) Active and reactive power sharing imbalance

All failures identified are to initiate an alarm or trip of the faulty generator as appropriate.
The system is to be designed so that these features can be tested on the request of the
Surveyor.

If a generator is faulty, its circuit breaker is to automatically open and the generator is to
trip. In the event the breaker does not open, this is to be detected and the bus-tie breakers
closest to the generator are to open automatically.
ii) Closed Bus Operation. If a failure is detected and an action is taken which fails to remove
the failure, the protection system is to further isolate the fault by automatically isolating
the affected switchboard.

Bus frequency and voltage is to be monitored for operation within normal limits. If
deviation occurs outside these limits for a pre-determined time interval, tie breakers are to
automatically open, converting to a split bus system. An alarm is to be initiated.
iii) Blackout Prevention System. Power consumers are to include intelligent blackout
prevention that is not dependent on the Power Management System, including:

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

a) Dynamic limiting of power of the propulsion (and drilling services if applicable)

according to available power
b) Response time quick enough to avoid damage to the generators
3.1.3 Thruster System (1 March 2021)
3.1.3(a) General
Thruster drives are to have short circuit, earth fault, thermal, over current and overvoltage
protection. Motor starting and stopping controls are also to be provided near the drive.

Each thruster drive control system is to have all the intelligence necessary to start the thruster and
make it ready for DP control. Interlocks are to be provided to prevent a drive resetting itself under
a short circuit condition.

Thruster drives are to be able to start the thruster even when the propeller is turning due to inflow.

Note: Thruster drives could be equipped with dynamic breaking resistors to permit more robust control of the
drives operating point during various fault conditions.
3.1.3(b) Interfaces
Where power management functions are integrated in electrical drives, the interface between the
different power management functions is to be analyzed in the FMEA. Where both the Power
Management System and the local electrical drives can limit and control power to the thrusters,
care is to be taken so they do not interfere with each other and cause a control oscillation between
the two systems.

3.1.3(c) Fast Phase Back

To prevent power plant instability, variable frequency drives for the thrusters are to facilitate fast
phase back; and in the case of drilling operations, phase back of the drilling system is also to be
implemented. Care is to be taken so these two systems do not interfere with each other and cause a
control oscillation.

The criteria and order that equipment is phased back in (drilling equipment or thrusters) is to be
described and added to the Operation Manual and be known to the DP operator and ABS.

Individual thruster drives are to directly sense under frequency in the system and cut back thrust.

3.1.3(d) Fault Ride Through Capability (1 March 2021)

All equipment essential for the dynamically positioning system is to have fault ride through
capability, allowing for a short circuit condition to clear before under voltage protection is
actuated or the effects cause DP related consumers to malfunction. Low voltage transients during
a short circuit condition are not to cause the motor starter to drop out, or other drives to fail. See
Subsection 3/13 of this Guide for more information.

3.1.4 Blackout Recovery (1 November 2013)

3.1.4(a) General
The power management system is to be able to re-establish the functioning of the power plant
automatically, without any human intervention, within 60 seconds after blackout, generators and
thrusters for DP are also to be available within 60 seconds. The system is to be able to re-establish
the needed power for maintaining position and heading control within the specified envelope.

The power management system is to be able to start all available generators after a blackout and to
connect them to the electrical network.

3.1.4(b) Inrush currents (1 March 2021)

High inrush currents that may damage equipment and trip feeder breakers are to be avoided. This
could be done by a pre-magnetizing function for high voltage transformers or other equally

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

effective means. If a pre-magnetizing function is utilized and faults are detected during the pre-
magnetizing sequence, the connection of the specific piece of equipment experiencing a fault is to
be aborted and an alarm is to be sent to the Power Management System.

3.1.4(c) Power Distribution and Management

To avoid problems with synchronization, detection of a dead bus, defined here as a situation where
the bus is de-energized, is to be secure, and in the form of a redundant detection system (e.g., dead
bus relay and bus voltage transducer).

A dead bus closing facility is to be implemented for overriding the synchronizing function if the
bus is dead.

Two generators are not to be able to connect to the dead bus at the same time.

3.1.4(d) Thruster System

All thrusters are to be ready for operation without manual intervention. The thruster drives are to
have their own local control system monitoring the condition of the main power system and
reconnect as soon as the main power system is ready for the operation of the thrusters.

3.1.5 Uninterruptable Power Supply Systems (UPS) (1 March 2021)

If a system has independent subsystems for automation, control and supervisory systems, these are
to be supplied by a dedicated UPS.

The unit is to be of the online type as defined in 4-8-3/5.9.1 of the Marine Vessel Rules, that is,
there is to be no transfer time if a power failure occurs. The UPS are to have sufficient capacity to
allow operations to be brought to a safe stop or discontinued with a minimum capacity of 30
minutes as required in Section 3.

3.2 Enhanced Power and Thruster System (EHS-P) (1 March 2021)

3.2.1 Systems Design
The system is also to comply with EHS-E requirements as prescribed in 8/3.1 above.

Additionally, the generator sets and thruster sets are to be autonomous in the provision of auxiliary
support services and control functions.

Redundancy groups are to be clearly defined and well separated. Divisions are to be appropriately
maintained throughout the design.

3.2.2 Power System

Power Generation. Each generator set is to be autonomous in terms of critical auxiliary systems
(see 8/3.2.4), control and automation functions.

3.2.3 Thruster System

Autonomy (1 November 2013). Each thruster set configuration is to be autonomous and operate
independently from equipment that is not directly associated with its operation.

Thruster seawater cooling system can follow the group redundancy concept with one duty and one
standby pump. Engine room sea water cooling systems can be incorporated into the thruster
seawater systems provided the redundancy concept (within the same redundancy group) is not
violated. Fresh water cooling system is per thruster. Cooling water for the thruster can also be used
for auxiliary systems for that thruster.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

3.2.4 Auxiliaries
Each thruster and generator set is to be autonomous in terms of auxiliary systems that are directly
connected to it so that a single fault in the auxiliary systems is not to result in failure of more than
one thruster/generator set.

Separate fuel oil service tank for each generator is to be provided. These are to be located within
their compartmental redundancy group.

Fuel water content monitoring with remote alarms is to be installed either at the input to the
service tanks or at the output of a purifier, whichever is more practical.

Purification and transfer to the service tanks are to be arranged such that a single fault in the
purification and transfer systems is not to result in failure exceeding the WCFDI. Fixed piping can
be shared between generator/thruster sets in the same redundancy group.

Separate fresh water cooling system for direct cooling of each engine is to be provided. External
sea water or fresh water cooling systems can be on a per redundancy group basis, but in all cases,
are to be arranged such that a single fault in external water cooling systems is not to result in
failure exceeding the WCFDI. External water cooling systems for engine rooms could be
incorporated into thruster external water cooling systems provided the redundancy concept is not
violated.

Compressed air for starting engines is to be arranged such that a failure of one air compressor or
air receiver is not to result in failure of more than one generator set.

For standby units, on which the redundancy depends, the readiness of auxiliary systems is to be
maintained and communicated to the DP-control systems.

Units, which are intended to provide standby redundancy for each other, are not to share auxiliary
systems, control power or starting facilitates.

3.3 Control System (EHS-C)

3.3.1 DP Control Computers
3.3.1(a) DP Control Station and DP Controller
Three DP control computers (redundant main DP control system and a backup DP control system)
each with their own independent power supplies are required.

For DPS-2 vessels, the manual position control system can be replaced with an additional DP
control system (independent of the two DP control computers required by the basic DPS-2
notation). The additional DP control system is to meet all of the requirements for the independent
joystick control system while also providing DP control capabilities. Independence of the
controller, workstation and network is to be maintained.

3.3.1(b) DP Data Logger (1 November 2013)

A data logger with easy playback facilities is to be implemented. The data logger is to stamp all
data with time and date. Data logged are to include manual and automatic input to the DP control
system and operational data of all DP relevant systems. Data recorded are to include status data
and behavior data of generators and thrusters. The data are to remain stored for at least 7 days, be
easily accessible to the operator and be available for upload to offline storage media. Time and
date are to be synchronized to a common reference.

The data logger is to be able to log the main DP control system and the backup DP control system
or additional DP control system (for DPS-2). The failure of the data logger is not to cause the
failure of the two systems.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

3.3.1(c) Capability Plot (1 November 2013)

Online capability plots are to be updated using the tuned models on sea trials and include the
simulation of the most relevant failure modes. Online capability plots are to be verified for
accuracy during DP trials as possible.

3.3.1(d) Uninterruptable Power Supplies System (UPS) (1 March 2021)

The power source of all control system components are to be supplied from a dedicated UPS.

The UPSs distribution panel and fuse protection for the DP control systems are to be designed to
isolate and clear faults individually.

3.3.2 Position reference systems

3.3.2(a) General (1 November 2013)
Four sets of position reference systems are to be implemented. The systems are to be designed so
that three of the position reference systems are available at any given time and location
considering blocking, noise, etc.

One set of position reference systems is to be directly connected to the backup DP control system
or additional DP control system (for DPS-2). The main DP control system is to be able to read the
information from that system and the failure of that position reference system is not to cause the
failure of both DP control systems.

The position reference systems chosen are to reflect the planned operating conditions such as deep
water (normally deeper than 500m), open water or close proximity to other units. In deep water
(deeper than 500m) at least one of the position reference systems is to be an acoustic reference
system.

UPS supplies to position reference systems are to be sourced to prevent multiple sensor loss of the
same sensor types.

3.3.2(b) Position Reference System Differentiation

No less than two of the position reference systems are to be a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS). At least one of these is to use GPS, GLONASS, or equivalent. At least one of the GNSS
systems is to be a dual frequency receiver. The DP control system is to alarm any unrealistic GPS
jumps in the signal or rapid drift.

3.3.2(c) Error Checking

A system for error checking and weighting of the position references is to be provided.

3.3.3 DP Sensors
Four Motion Reference Units (MRUs) and four vessel heading sensors are to be implemented,
with at least one based on different operating principles to the others a different manufacturer an
working on different principles..

A minimum of four wind sensors is to be operating with at least one based on a different operating
principle to the others (ultrasonic vs. mechanical).

3.5 Fire and Flood Protection (EHS-F)

3.5.1 General
The EHS-F notation is supplement for DPS-2 vessels with fire and flood protection implemented
based on the fire risk level. This information is not necessary for DPS-3 vessels, since DPS-3
notation has higher requirements for fire protection.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

3.5.2 Physical Separation

3.5.2(a) General
Physical separation is to be provided between redundancy groups, A-60 separation for machinery
spaces of high fire risk and A-0 for other locations along the boundary of redundancy groups.

The high fire risk area is the area defined by 4-8-4/1.11 of the Marine Vessel Rules including:

i) Machinery spaces as defined by 4-7-1/11.15 and 4-7-1/11.7 of the Marine Vessel Rules
ii) Spaces containing fuel treatment equipment and other highly flammable substances

Watertight bulkhead separation is to be in place below the damage waterline for machinery spaces.

3.5.2(b) Power System

Each redundancy group is to have its own service tanks and it is to be located in individual
compartments separated by A-60 partitions and be watertight if below the damage waterline.

Each switchboard serving a different redundancy group is to be located in individual

compartments separated by at least A-0 partitions and be watertight if below the damage
waterline.

3.5.2(c) DP Control Station (1 November 2013)

Main and back-up (or additional) DP control stations are to have separate spaces, but A-0 partition
is not required.

The controllers, not located in DP control station, for the main DP control system and backup (or
additional) DP control system are to be located in separate spaces with at least A-0 partitions.

The redundant communication networks for the main DP control system is to be physically
separated with A-0 partitions in general, A-60 in high risk fire space and watertight if below the
damage waterline.

3.5.2(d) Thrusters
Thrusters are to be located in separate watertight compartments with at least A-0 separation,
provided fire risk escalation is low and active fire protection fitted in each compartment.

5 Summary of System Requirements for Enhanced System Notations

Enhanced system notations (EHS-series) are complementary to the corresponding DPS-series notations.
The requirements for the DPS-series notations given in 2/3.9 TABLE 1 are to be complied with. In
addition, the listed requirements in 8/5 TABLE 1 are also to be complied with for the Enhanced System
notations (EHS-series).

TABLE 1
Summary of DP System Requirements for EHS Notations (1 March 2021)

EHS-E EHS-P EHS-C EHS-F

Autonomous Generator Set 2 + 1 backup DP control Generators and Prime

(1)
computers and controllers (4) Movers
Separate compartments, A60
Bus Tie Breaker Bus Tie Breaker Wind Sensors for high fire risk area.
Redundantly configured Redundantly configured 3 + 1 in back up control Watertight below damage
between each bus segment between each bus segment station waterline

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

EHS-E EHS-P EHS-C EHS-F

Power Distribution System

Vessel Heading Sensors
Enhanced Generator Enhanced Generator A0 between redundant
3 + 1 in backup control
Protection (1,2) Protection (1,2) groups. Watertight below
station
damage waterline

Thruster System
MRU
Enhanced Power Enhanced Power A0 between redundant
3 + 1 in backup control
Management (1,3) Management (1,3) groups. Watertight below
station
damage waterline

Position reference systems Controller Space

Autonomous Thruster Set (1) 3 + 1 in backup control A0 between redundant
station (5) groups

Notes:

1 Controls and supervision of those functions are to be integrated in the control center with the centralized
control system and are to be communicated with DP controls.

2 Enhanced generator protection functions to be provide per Subsection 8/3.

3 Enhanced Power Management capability to be provided per Subsection 8/3.

4 (1 November 2013) For DPS-2 vessels, manual position control system can be replaced with an additional DP
control system as per 8/3.3.1(a). DP Data Logger is to be included as per 8/3.3.1(b).

5 Position reference systems are to be based on at least two different design principles. For deep-water
conditions, GPS and Hydro Acoustics may be used.

7 Closed Bus and Standby Redundancy (1 March 2021)

7.1 General (1 March 2021)

The DP system with enhanced electrical (EHS-E) and enhanced power and thruster notation (EHS-P)
could have flexibility of closed bus operation and redundancy depending on standby start of the systems.

The included in FMEA. The MTS publication, “DP Operations Guidance”, can be used in the
development of Operations Manual regarding closed bus operation.

7.3 Closed Bus Operation (1 March 2021)

The closed bus-tie configuration is to be capable of preventing a black-out under relevant fault conditions.

The compensating provisions in the DP system's redundancy concept are to be such that the minimum
number of required running generators (i.e. two or more) are to be connected to two or more sections of the
main bus. The minimum number of running generators are to be determined from the unit's DP capability.
The worst-case failure of the configuration is not to result to a blackout.

The total number of running generators is to be determined based on the power requirements, needed
spinning reserve and the ability to phase back other loads.

If bus frequency or voltage is outside of predefined limits the tie breakers are to open and the system is to
run as a split system.

The power system is to automatically subdivide for any failure effect that has the potential to defeat the
redundancy design intent.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

Any DP system designed for operation with closed bus ties are also to be capable of being configured and
operated with a defined performance and post failure capability in open bus ties configuration.

7.5 Standby Start (1 March 2021)

The standby start of the components or sub-systems of the DP system may be acceptable. The changeover
operation is to be automatic and reliable provided that the position and heading of the vessel are within the
specified limits and DP performance is not degrading. If no specific limit is specified, the maximum
allowed changeover time is 45 seconds.

The availability of standby start functions is to be monitored at the DP control station and communicated
with the DP control system.

In addition, the following factors are to be considered when using standby start as redundancy:

i) Single fault does not cause total blackout including loss of entire compartment for DPS-3.
ii) A failure in one redundancy group is not to cause failure of any other redundancy groups.
iii) A failure in the system being changed over to is not to cause failure of any other redundancy
groups.
iv) Changeover is not to cause failure of the redundancy group that is being connected to.
v) One standby generator, at a minimum, is to be considered not available when needed.
vi) Redundant components or systems which are providing a standby function are not to share
auxiliary systems or other services with the equipment they are providing standby redundancy for.

For a situation where thrust is to be immediately available (e.g., pipe laying) the redundancy is not to be
based on standby start and changeover.

7.7 FMEA and Testing

Subsection 2/11 of this Guide provides the requirements for FMEA analysis and FMEA proving trial for
DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations. In addition to the requirements in Subsection 2/11, the enhanced features
included in EHS-series notations are to be analyzed in FMEA and verified through testing.

In addition to the failure modes provided in Subsection 2/11, for EHS-series notations, following failure
modes, where applicable, are also to be considered in FMEA analysis.

i) Operation of protection systems (breakers, bus ties, etc.) related to short circuit
ii) Severe voltage dips associated with short circuit faults in power plant configured as a common
power system
iii) Failure to excess and insufficient fuel
iv) Over and under-excitation
v) Governor and AVR failure modes
vi) Failure modes related to standby start and changeover
vii) Power management failure on load sharing, malfunction, etc.
viii) Phase back thrust and large load
ix) Blackout recovery

The above required analyses are to be supported with extensive verification by testing. The test procedures
are to be based on the simulation of failures and is to be carried out under as realistic conditions as
practicable.

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Section 8 Enhanced System (EHS) 8

9 Documentation
The documentation required in Subsection 1/7 are to be expended to include the enhanced features where
applicable, such as, but not limit to, following documents,

i) DP Operations Manual (I, OB)

ii) System description including a block diagram showing how the various components are
functionally related (R)
iii) Power generation and distribution (R)
iv) Power analysis (R)
v) Description of Power management (R)
vi) Thruster control system (R)
vii) Auxiliary system for power generation and thrusters (R)
viii) DP control system (R)
ix) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) (R, OB)
x) Test procedure for FMEA (R)

In addition, the following additional documents are to be provided where applicable:

i) Description of protection design philosophy and protection systems the redundancy concept of DP
system depends on. (R)
ii) Analysis of effects of severe voltage transients on power system stability (R)
iii) Short circuit analysis (R)
iv) Simulation of severe over/under voltage and over/under frequency faults to prove the robustness
of the power plant and its protection scheme for closed bus operation (R)
v) Protection coordination analysis (R)
vi) Documentation of protection settings (R)
vii) Description of automatic blackout recovery (R)

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SECTION 9 Station Keeping Performance

1 General
At the Owner’s request, a station keeping performance notation (SKP), which s supplemental to the DPS-
series notations that may be assigned. The main objective of the station keeping performance notation is to
provide for the consistent assessment of the station keeping performance reflecting the latest technology
and to encourage robust redundancy design of DP systems.

The station keeping performance (SKP) notation can be granted if the analysis has been carried out
according to this Section and the results satisfy the requirements.

Station keeping performance (SKP) may be assigned to each of the DPS-series notations as supplemental
information about the DP system.

There are two levels of station keeping performance notations: SKP and SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) (refer to the
definitions in 9/1.1 of this Guide).

Notation SKP is for the station keeping assessment for given limiting environmental conditions and the
assessment results meet the requirement of this Guide.

Notation SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) provides more information other than limiting environmental conditions in
terms of probability that the vessel can remain on station for a given site environment.

1.1 Definition
1.1.1 SKP
SKP is an optional notation as supplemental information about the station keeping performance
for specified limiting environmental conditions, such as wind speed and direction, wave height
and frequency, current speed and direction. In general, the limiting environments are to be applied
to intact (all thrusters running) and damaged (worst case failure) conditions unless the limiting
environmental conditions for post failure cases are also specified. The directions for wind, wave
and current can be different and are to be specified by the Owner.

For example, a 1-year return environment is often used for MODUs as the limiting environment
for DP operations. In that case SKP indicates that the station keeping performance of the vessel
under the 1-year return environmental conditions has been verified through analysis, following
procedures given in this Section.

1.1.2 SKP (a,b,c,d,e,f) (1 November 2013)

SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) is an optional notation as supplemental information about the station keeping
performance for a given environmental location. The analysis is to be carried out for many
combinations of wind speeds, wave height and current speeds. The wind speed and wave height
relationship is to be provided for the specified location. A co-linear condition for wind, wave and
current is assumed.

a The probability that the vessel can remain on station at the selected site f and current speed of e with all
thrusters/rudders in normal operation conditions

b The probability that the vessel can remain on station with the failure of minimum effect single thruster/rudder
at the selected site f and current speed of e

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Section 9 Station Keeping Performance 9

c The probability that the vessel can remain on station with the failure of maximum effect single thruster/rudder
at the selected site f and current speed of e

d The probability that the vessel can remain on station at the selected site f and current speed of e with the
worst case failure condition

e Current speed in knot (Owner-specified or typically 1.5 kt)

f Environment location (Owner-specified or a representative typically North Sea location)

For example SKP(95, 95, 85, 75, 2, North Sea) stands for

i) 95% of time the vessel can remain on station with a current speed of 2-kt, North Sea wind
and wave conditions, all thrusters operating,
ii) 95% of time the vessel can remain on station with a current speed of 2-kt, North Sea wind
and wave conditions, with failure of minimum effect single thruster,
iii) 85% of time the vessel can remain on station with a current speed of 2-kt, North Sea wind
and wave conditions, with failure of maximum effect single thruster, and
iv) 75% of time the vessel can remain on station with a current speed of 2-kt, North Sea wind
and wave conditions, with worst case failure condition.
1.1.3 Normal Operation Condition
This is a designed condition for normal operation of a floating unit. The operating condition may
be designed for one specific draft, or more than one operating drafts. If there are more operational
conditions, minimum and maximum operational drafts need to be considered in the DP capability
assessment.

1.1.4 Standby Condition

The standby condition is a condition when the intended operation is stopped voluntarily or
involuntarily due to weather or other conditions. For an offshore drilling unit, the standby
condition is a condition when risers are disconnected.

1.1.5 Traditional DP Capability Plot

In the traditional DP capability plot, the limiting environmental conditions are determined by
varying wind speed for a given thruster configuration. Current speed is given and wave height is
related to the wind speed.

1.1.6 Thrust Utilization Plot

In the thrust utilization plot, the thrust demand is calculated for a given limiting operating
environmental condition. The wave height, wind speed and current are predefined. These types of
plots allow the individual input of wind, current and wave data (in magnitude and direction) and
display the power required for the thrusters over a 360 degree heading angle of the vessel.

3 Environmental Conditions
The environmental conditions are to be specified by the Owner of the DP vessel. The maximum design
environments are generally to be determined by annual statistics.

3.1 Wind
Wind is treated as a constant in direction and speed. The wind speed is to be specified using one minute
mean at height of 10 meters above water surface. A value of 1.18 could be used to convert hourly mean
wind speed to one minute mean speed.

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3.3 Wave and Wave Spectrum

For SKP notation, significant wave heights and characteristic periods (frequencies) are to be provided. For
notation SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f), the relationship of wind speed and wave height and the probability of non-
exceedance of each given wind speed are to be provided.

The wave drift force is to be calculated for irregular sea states which can be described by a wave spectrum.
A wave spectrum depends on geographical areas. The Owner of the DP vessel may specify the most
appropriate wave spectrum determined from metocean data for the intended operating locations.

If a site specific wave spectrum is not available, the JONSWAP wave spectrum can be used for the North
Sea and operating locations with limited fetch area. The JONSWAP wave spectrum can be expressed as:

ag2 4
S ω = exp −β ωp /ω γa
ω5

where

S = wave energy density, in m2/(rad/sec) (ft2/(rad/sec))

α = 0.0081

g = standard gravity, in m/sec2 (ft/sec2)

ω = angular frequency of wave component, in rad/sec

β = 5/4

ωp = peak frequency, in rad/sec

γ = peak enhancement factor

a = exp[(– (ω – ωp)2/2 ω2pσ2]

σ = 0 . 07 ifω ≤ ωp
0 . 09 ifω > ωp

For open seas, Bretschneider spectrum can be used and the spectrum is given by:

5ωp4H2
s 4
Sς ω = exp −1 . 25 ωp /ω
16ω5

where

Sζ = wave energy density, in m2/(rad/sec) (ft2/(rad/sec))

Hs = significant wave height, in m (ft)

ω = angular frequency of wave component, in rad/sec

ωp = peak frequency, in rad/sec

3.5 Current
The current velocity is to include components due to tidal current, storm surge current, and wind driven
current. The Owner of the DP vessel may specify the current speed determined from metocean data for the
intended operating locations.

For a MODU, the current profile needs to be provided for the calculation of current load on risers if
deemed important, especially for those geographic areas where current force can be the governing design
load.

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Section 9 Station Keeping Performance 9

3.7 Environments for SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) Notation

A typical SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) notation normally refers to the use of a set of representative North Sea wind
and wave conditions (see 9/3.7 TABLE 1) and 1.5-knot current.

For a SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) notation for particular locations, for example the Gulf of Mexico, the site specific
information for current speed, non-exceedance probability of wind speed (wave height) and relationship
between wind speed and wave height are to be provided. The site specific environmental conditions are to
be submitted for review.

TABLE 1
Relationship between Wind and Wave (North Sea)

Hs (m) Tp (s) Vw (m/s) P non exc

0 0 0 0.0

1.28 5.3 2.5 14.3

1.78 6.26 5 35.7

2.44 7.32 7.5 56.9

3.21 8.41 10 73.3

4.09 9.49 12.5 85.2

5.07 10.56 15 92.5

6.12 11.61 17.5 96.6

7.26 12.64 20 98.4

8.47 13.65 22.5 99.3

9.75 14.65 25 99.7

11.09 15.62 27.5 99.9

12.5 16.58 30 99.9

13.97 17.53 32.5 100.0

15.49 18.46 35 100.0

Note: Significant wave height, peak period and wind speed are based on Table 3 of “Specification for DP Capability
Plot” by IMCA. The probabilities of non exceedance are based on BMT Global wave statistics.

3.9 Environments for SKP Notation

For the SKP notation, the limiting environmental conditions including wave height and period, wind speed
and current speed, and their corresponding directions are to be provided by the Owner. The co-linear
condition of wind, wave and current is to be assumed if direction information is not provided.

For a MODU, the conditions for operation and standby need to be provided. In general, the 1-year
environmental condition may be used for the operational condition.

5 Analysis Conditions

5.1 DP System Configurations

As a minimum, two conditions need to be considered:

i) All thrusters in normal operating condition

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Section 9 Station Keeping Performance 9

ii) The worst case failure condition

The worst case failure condition is to be determined from the basic design of redundancy concept.

5.3 Operating Conditions

Two operating conditions are to be considered as applicable.

i) Normal operating condition. If a vessel is designed for operating at different loading conditions,
namely different drafts, these are to be included in the station keeping analysis.
ii) Standby condition where applicable.

7 Environmental Load Calculation

Model test data on wind, wave and current load are to be used whenever possible. If however no model test
results are available, the loads can be calculated according to this Guide.

7.1 Wind and Current Force

7.1.1 Non-ship Shape Unit
For a non-ship shape unit, wind and current force can be calculated according to ABS Rules for
Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Units or ABS Rules for Building and Classing Floating
Production Installations, where applicable, or API RP 2SK.

7.1.2 Ship Shape Unit

For a ship shape unit, wind and current force can be calculated according to API RP 2SK or the
OCIMF publication, “Prediction of Wind and Current Load on VLCCs”.

7.1.3 Current on Drilling Risers

For a MODU, current force on drilling risers is to be included where deemed important.

7.3 Wave Force

Second order wave drift forces and yaw moment are to be considered in the station keeping capability
analysis. They are to be calculated by using an appropriate hydrodynamic analysis computer program or
extrapolated from model test results of a similar vessel.

9 Other External Loads

Where applicable, other external loads, such as pipeline tension, mooring line tension, heavy lift, may be
considered for the DP capability assessment.

11 Available Thrust

11.1 Available Thrust for Thrusters

Manufacturer’s test data of full scale or suitable model test for the thrust output of thrusters are to be used
as the basis of SKP notation in general. The assessment of available thrust is typically indicated as thrust
at full rated power. The availability of full power is a function of the prime mover characteristic. The
power/torque/rpm characteristic for diesel driven thrusters is to be evaluated to determine the level of
power available during DP operations (i.e., during zero inflow velocity).

For thrusters with controllable pitch propellers as well as with hydraulically driven prime movers, full
power is to be available at any inflow velocity.

Electric drives typically have a certain RPM range in which full power is available. The thruster propeller
is to be selected so that DP operations fall within this range. The selection of the propeller pitch should
consider this range for optimum system efficiency.

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Section 9 Station Keeping Performance 9

If no test results are available for the thrust output of thrusters, Appendix 1 of this Guide provides the
guidelines for determining available thrust, which deals with typical thrusters and installation scenarios for
DP vessels. Those guidelines may be used for preliminary studies.

11.3 Thruster-Thruster Interaction

When one thruster operates downstream of another, the available thrust of the thruster is reduced due to
thrusters interaction. The effect of the interaction depends on the following

i) Distance between the thrusters

ii) Azimuth of the thrusters
iii) Diameter of the thruster propeller
iv) Thruster load
v) Thruster design/configuration (i.e., degree of tilt of the propeller and/or nozzle axis)

This interaction effect is to be included in the station keeping performance assessment. The results from
full scale or suitable model test for the thrust-thrust interaction effect are to be used whenever possible. If
no such results are available, Appendix 1 of this Guide can be used as guidelines for the assessment of the
interaction effect on the available thrust.

11.5 Thruster-Hull Interaction

The interaction between thrusters and the hull also reduces available thrust of the thrusters. The interaction
includes following factors and they are to be included in the station keeping performance analysis.

i) Friction. The flow of the slipstream along the hull will result in the thrust degradation due the
friction of the hull. The degradation is related to the length and breadth of the flow along the hull.
ii) Coanda Effect. When a thruster is oriented in a transverse direction, the output thrust of the
thruster is affected by a so called Coanda effect. The reduction of the thrust is related to the bilge
radius and the length of the flow underneath the hull.
iii) Pontoon Blockage. The blockage of the slipstream due to presence of the pontoon, such as when a
slipstream is orientated toward the pontoon, will affect the thrust output of the thruster. The effect
is related to the distance between the pontoons and the azimuth of the thruster.
iv) Tilted Thruster/Nozzle. A tilted thruster/nozzle can reduce above mentioned thruster-hull
interactions and hence to improve the output of the thrust of the thrusters. This improvement can
be considered in the station keeping performance analysis.

The full scale or model test results for the effects of thruster-hull interactions mentioned above and the
tilted thruster/nozzle are to be used whenever possible. If such results are not available, Appendix 1 of this
Guide can be used as guidelines for the assessment of the interaction effect on the available thrust.

11.7 Thruster-Current Interaction

Current inflow could reduce the thrust output of the thrusters and the thrust reduction is to be included in
the station keeping performance analysis. Manufacturer’s test data of full scale or suitable model test for
the current effect is to be used whenever possible. It such data is not available, Appendix 1 of this Guide
can be used as guidelines for the assessment of the current effect.

11.9 Tunnel Thruster

The available thrust generated by a transverse tunnel thruster is highly affected by the tunnel installation,
location, and the geometry and configuration of the hull. The assessment of the tunnel thruster
performance is to be based on axial flow pump hydrodynamics, not on marine propeller theories.
Manufacturer’s test data of full scale or suitable model test for the efficiency of the tunnel thruster is to be

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used whenever possible. It such data is not available, Appendix 1 of this Guide can be used as guidelines
for the assessment of the effiency of the tunnel thrusters.

13 Rudder Forces
For vessels with conventional propulsion arrangements, the propeller jet and its interaction with the rudder
can be used to develop transverse forces in the stern of the vessel in lieu of thrusters during dynamic
positioning operations. When this approach is used, the following considerations are to be addressed:

i) Control over propeller thrust from zero to full power is required. This requires the installation of a
controllable pitch propeller for diesel engine driven systems.
ii) Only twin-screw propulsion systems are to be considered for generating transverse rudder forces.
With most rudders (exception: some steerable nozzle designs), the generation of transverse force
simultaneously generates an unwanted force in the ahead direction. This parasitic thrust is to be
compensated by thrust delivered in the astern direction by operating the second propeller (or by
other azimuth thrusters, if available).
iii) The use of conventional rudders for DP yields to very limited side forces. High-performance
rudders or steerable nozzles are preferred for DP applications.

Manufacturer’s test data of full scale or suitable model test for the rudder forces are to be used whenever
possible. If such data is not available, Appendix 2 of this Guide can be used as guidelines for the
assessment of the rudder forces.

15 SKP Calculations
The calculations for SKP are based on the balance of horizontal forces and yaw moment while the vessel
is maintaining both position and heading. Those forces and moment include all forces and yaw moment
resulted from thrusters, wind, waves, current and other external forces where applicable.

Where the vessel has been subject to alteration or addition, which may affect the station keeping
characteristics of the DP system, the SKP is to be recalculated.

15.1 SKP Notation

For the SKP notation, the station keeping performance can be carried out by using quasi-static analysis
approach or time-domain simulation approach that includes the dynamic component of wave load,
controller and thruster response time.

The station keeping performance assessment is to include the following:

i) Limiting environmental conditions specified by Owner

ii) Co-linear condition of wind, wave and current
iii) Different directions for wind, wave and current specified by Owner
iv) Analysis for 10-degree interval of headings between 0 to 360 degrees if not specified by the
Owner
v) Analysis for the heading ranges specified by the Owner

15.3 SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) Notation

For the SKP(a,b,c,d,e,f) notation, the requirements for SKP is to be met if applicable. In addition,
following conditions are to be considered.

i) Relationship of wave height, period and wind speed to be provided

ii) SKP numbers of (a, b, c, d) are calculated considering all heading station keeping capabilities.

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iii) Capability calculation for 10-degree interval of headings between 0 to 360 degrees
iv) The SKP numbers are the weighted sum of all heading results.
v) If no heading probabilities are specified, equal probability for all headings can be used.

17 Documentation
Where the DP system is to be supplemented with a station keeping capability notation, the following
information is to be submitted for assignment of a SKP.

i) General arrangement and lines plan

ii) Thruster arrangement
iii) Thruster power and thrust
iv) Thruster interactions
v) Capability plots
vi) Documentation on the environmental conditions long term distribution (any area for intended
service)
vii) Relationship between wind speed and wave height if applicable
viii) Owner specified limiting environmental conditions

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SECTION 10 Specific Vessel Types

1 Introduction (1 April 2020)

While station keeping using DP is a common function of all DP vessels, other functions driven by specific
activities that a vessel will undertake are also to be considered. Additional criteria, specific to several
vessel types, are given below. Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, Project or Construction Vessels, and
Logistics Vessels are addressed, respectively, in Subsections 10/3, 10/5, 10/7, and 10/9 as follows.

3 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units

3.1 Basic Design Criteria for DP System

3.1.1 Fault Tolerance
For DP MODUs, DPS-2 equipment class and above are to be considered excluding self-elevating
units that may use the DP system and its thrusters to maintain position only when installing the
unit on-site (e.g. setting jack-up legs).

3.1.2 Limiting Environmental Conditions

Although the environmental conditions are specified by the Owner of the DP MODU, in general,
one-year environmental condition for the area of operation is to be considered for DP MODU
operating conditions. For position standby conditions, the design environmental condition is
normally higher than that for operating conditions.

3.1.3 Station Keeping Performance

Station keeping performance is to be assessed for the limiting environmental conditions for
operating and for position standby conditions.

Station keeping performance assessment is also to be performed for intact and post worst case
failure conditions.

The current load on risers is to be considered, if deemed important.

3.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors (1 March 2021)

The selection and installation of position reference systems and sensors are to take into account the
suitability and reliability of the systems.

Satellite and acoustics are two types of position reference systems that are suitable for deep water
operation. The update rate of acoustics and the impact of possible obstructions for the satellite systems are
to be considered when deciding the suitability of the position reference system.

Enhanced DP control system (EHS-C), includes additional requirements for position reference systems
with enhanced availability and reliability, see Section 8 for more information.

3.5 Effect of Drilling Loads

Power consumption of drilling operations and power sharing between the DP system and drilling
operations are to be analyzed and submitted for review.

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3.7 Vessel Operating Condition

In addition to the normal drilling operational condition, positioning standby condition is also to be
considered in the DP system design in terms of available power to the DP system and the station keeping
capability.

3.9 Emergency Shutdown System (1 March 2021)

The general emergency shutdown philosophy for the vessel and the effect of the emergency shutdown
system on the redundancy of the DP system is to be carefully considered.

Risks associated with technical faults and inadvertent spurious operation after inadvertent operations of the
emergency shutdown system are to be considered. Each vessel is to develop a detailed plan for recovery
and restoration of operation after operation of each level of ESD.

ESD Stations that can enable a total unit shutdown are not to be located in locations which are unmanned
under normal operations except in the backup DP Control Station, if provided. Where ESD stations are
provided at the lifeboat stations or other unmanned locations, the total unit ESD (complete shutdown) is to
be protected from unauthorized personnel or not available at these unmanned locations.

3.9.1 ESD Operation Manual

i) The ESD Operation Manual describes the ESD system and unit specific operational
guidelines.
ii) ESD Operations are to consider the potential risks and risk areas as well as the
appropriate responses for each risk.
iii) The ESD Operation Manual is to define the ESD levels and provide a list of equipment or
areas that are affected by the different ESD levels. Also, the manual is to indicate which
ESD levels are available at each ESD station. Further, the manual is to provide
instructions on to reset the affected systems after each ESD.
iv) The descriptions and instructions in the ESD Operation Manual are not to conflict with
the WCFDI identified in the DP FMEA.
v) The ESD Operation Manual is to provide guidance describing the typical scenarios that
the ESD levels are to be used and who has access to use them.
vi) The ESD Operation Manual is to be included or referenced in the unit’s operating manual.
3.9.2 Gas Detection/ESD System Cause and Effect Chart
Where shutdown groups are initiated automatically upon gas detection, a Gas Detection/ESD
System Cause and Effect Chart shall relate gas detection sensors to ESD shutdown groups of
equipment and areas on the unit.

3.11 Emergency Disconnect System (1 March 2021)

Time for safe disconnection of Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) is to be considered in the DP system
design for the post failure station keeping capability.

The operational impact of working in suitable water depth is to be considered in terms of required safe
disconnecting time and the feasibility of the equipment and procedures is to be studied.

3.13 Maintenance Plan

DP MODUs are to have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance
of the DP system, equipment and support systems.

Planned maintenance is to address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping
capabilities. This is to include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers, bus tie breakers, etc.

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Maintenance is to include regular cleaning, calibration, and testing of equipment as outlined in

manufacturers’ recommendations and industry guidelines.

Records of planned and unplanned maintenance are to be kept in an auditable format, either hard copy or
appropriate electronic format. These records are to include vendor service records as well as maintenance
performed by vessel personnel. These records are to be kept onboard for the period specified by the Owner,
and they are to be available for review by the Surveyor during periodic surveys of the vessel to maintain
the DPS related notation.

3.15 FMEA (1 March 2021)

In addition to the DP system, the DP FMEA for a DP MODU is to take account of non DP systems that
have interfaces with and potential impact on DP and station keeping, such as:

i) Drilling system
ii) Emergency shutdown system
iii) Safe Disconnection of risers
iv) Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP)

3.16 DP Alert System (1 November 2013)

A system of visual and audible alarms, supplied by a UPS and with an indication of power being available,
is to be provided in each DP control station, on the navigation bridge, at the engine control position, at drill
floor, and at drilling supervisor’s office. The status of the DP system in operation is to be indicated.

3.17 DP Operations Manual

In addition to the requirements of Subsection 2/13, the DP Operations Manual for a MODU is to address
operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP system. This includes ESD
systems installed on DP MODUs and emergency disconnect system.

Detailed procedures are to be developed for operating ESD and EDS. Procedures are to highlight criteria
for initiation and consequences. The MODU’s DP operating manual is to clearly identify where this
information can be found if not included in the manual.

The MTS publication “DP Operations Guidance, Part 2, Appendix 1 (DP MODU)” can be followed for the
development of the DP Operations Manual.

3.19 Documentation (1 September 2015)

In addition to the documentation requirements of Subsection 1/7 of this Guide, the following documents
are to be submitted for review:

i) ESD Operation Manual

ii) Gas Detection/ESD System Cause and Effect Chart

5 Project or Construction Vessels

5.1 Basic Design Criteria for DP System

5.1.1 DP Control System (1 March 2021)
The DP control system is to be equipped with suitable DP modes for the activities carried out by
the project/construction vessels.

When carrying out industrial missions, the availability of the suitable DP mode is to be verified.

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The following selected DP control modes are relevant to specific DP activities.

i) Target Follow: Enables the DP vessel to follow a moving target.

ii) Heavy Lift: Takes account of the effects of the load transfer on the mass of the vessel and
the additional lateral force.
iii) External Force Compensation: Where the measured external force acting on the vessel,
which is separate from the environment, is included in the DP calculation and treated as a
force feed forward. This mode is used to account for pipe tensions in a pipe laying vessel
and hawser tension in a shuttle tanker.
iv) Fire Monitor Compensation: Used to compensate for the varying forces exerted on a
vessel from discharge of a fire monitor.
v) Weathervane: Enables the DP vessel to rotate with the wind, current and waves around a
fixed or moving point called the terminal point. Neither the heading nor the position of
the DP vessel is fixed. The heading of the vessel is controlled to point towards the
terminal point. The position of the vessel is controlled to follow a circle, called the
setpoint circle, around the terminal point. This mode is appropriate for connected shuttle
tanker/FPSO operations.
5.1.2 Station Keeping Performance
External forces and weathervane are to be included in the station keeping performance assessment
where applicable. .

5.3 Operation Configuration (1 March 2021)

In general, the DP project/construction vessels are to operate in open bus. If a closed bus tie is one of the
operation configurations, risk assessment is to be performed.

Validation testing is to be carried out to demonstrate that the common point introduced by the closing of
the bus ties does not provide a fault propagation pathway and equipment related to DP Station keeping
(including auxiliary systems and supporting systems) demonstrate voltage dip fault ride through capability.

5.5 Position Reference Systems and Sensors (1 November 2013)

The selection and installation of position reference systems and sensors are to take into account the
activities carried out by the DP vessels and the obstructions from other units.

For project/construction DP vessels, redundancy of the relative reference systems is to be considered when
carrying out activities close to other structures and the loss of the relative reference system is to be
included in the FMEA.

Satellite and acoustics are two types of position reference systems that are suitable for deep water
operation. The update rate of acoustics and the impact of possible obstructions on the satellite systems are
to be considered when deciding the suitability of the position reference system.

5.7 Maintenance Plan

For Project/Construction vessels where preventive maintenance is to be carried out while undertaking
project activities, due consideration is to be given to methods that will permit the vessel to continue the
operation in the identified operation mode. The details are to be included in the Operations Manual.

5.9 FMEA
In addition to the DP system, the Overall Vessel FMEA for a DP project/construction vessel is to take
account of non DP and auxiliary systems, if applicable, that have interfaces with and potential impact on
DP and station keeping.

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5.10 DP Alert System (1 November 2013)

For diving support vessels, a system of visual and audible alarms, supplied by a UPS and with an
indication of power being available, is to be provided in each DP control station, on the navigation bridge,
at the engine control position, in the dive control, saturation control and air diving control areas, in the
working area, and, where applicable, the ROV or submersible control position. The status of the DP
system in operation is to be indicated.

5.11 DP Operations Manual (1 March 2021)

In addition to the DP system, the DP Operations Manual for a project/construction vessel is to address
operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP system, if applicable.

An Activity Specific Operation Guideline (ASOG) is to be developed for each activity undertaken by the
vessel and be referenced in the DP Operations Manual.

The MTS publication, “DP Operations Guidance, Part 2, Appendix 2 (Project and Construction Vessels)”,
can be followed for the development of the DP Operations Manual.

7 Logistics Vessels

7.1 Operation Mode (1 March 2021)

The DP logistics vessel mainly provides logistics support for the project. The vessel, in general, works in
DP mode in a 500m proximity operation zone. Generally, closed bus tie operation is to be avoided for
logistics vessels. If closed bus tie is one of the operation configurations, risk assessment is to be
performed.

Validation testing is to be carried out to demonstrate that the common point introduced by the closing of
the bus ties does not provide a fault propagation pathway and equipment related to DP Station keeping
(including auxiliary systems and supporting systems) demonstrate voltage dip fault ride through capability.

7.3 Position Reference Systems and Sensors (1 November 2013)

The selection and installation of position reference systems and sensors are to take into account
obstructions from other units. For DP logistics vessels, loss of the relative reference system is to be
included in the FMEA for the activities to be carried out. The redundancy of the relative reference systems
is to be considered where necessary and is to be consistent with the redundant design of the DP system.

7.5 DP Operations Manual

The MTS publication, “DP Operations Guidance, Part 2, Appendix 3 (Logistic vessels)”, can be followed
for the development of the DP Operations Manual.

9 Articulated Tug-Barge Combinations (1 April 2020)

9.1 General
The requirements of this subsection apply to the application of dynamic positioning notations as offered in
this Guide (refer to Subsection 1/3) for Articulated Tug-Barge (ATB) combinations that comply with
Section 5-3-1 of the Rules for Building and Classing Steel Barges. The requirements of this Guide are to
be applied except as modified herein. The barge and associated towing vessel are considered dependent
upon each other to satisfy the dynamic positioning requirements when the two vessels operate as a
combined unit in DPS mode. To apply the DPS notations as outlined in this Guide, the towing vessel is to
be ABS classed and assigned the Towing Vessel ATB notation and the barge is to be ABS classed and
assigned the ATB notation as per Section 5-3-1 of the Rules for Building and Classing Steel Barges.

Example notations for both the barge and associated towing vessel:

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✠A1 Barge, ATB, DPS-0

✠A1 Towing Vessel ATB, DPS-0

Dynamic positioning systems built and tested in compliance with the requirements in this Guide and
relevant Rules may be assigned with different classification notations depending on the degree of
redundancy built into the system as defined in Subsection 1/3 of this Guide. These notations are not a
requirement for classification of the ATB and are to be assigned only on the specific request of the Owner.

Where dynamic positioning is requested, both the barge and the associated towing vessel as part of the
ATB combination are to receive the same selected DPS notation (refer to Subsection 1/3). In addition to
the notations, the following comments will be maintained in the ABS Record for both the barge and
associated towing vessel in compliance with this Guide:

● Towing Vessel ATB:

“Classed to operate in DPS mode as an ATB with the associated barge(s) (Vessel Name(s) and Class
Number(s))”.
● Barge ATB:

“Classed to operate in DPS mode as an ATB with the associated towing vessel(s) (Vessel Name(s) and
Class Number(s))”.

In cases where either the towing vessel or barge request a DPS notation as an independent vessel in
addition to an ATB combination, documentation and testing is to be conducted for both modes of DP
operations. The proposed separate DP modes of operation are to be outlined in the DP Operations Manual
(Subsection (2/13). The above record comments are to reflect the separate independent and dependent ATB
combinations as applicable.

Where changes are made to the ATB combination for dynamic positioning operations, the owner is to
notify ABS. Multiple vessel combinations may be permitted with each combination configuration
approved and recorded.

9.1.1 Documentation
The following documentation is to be submitted in addition to that required in Subsection 1/7 of
this Guide.

● General Arrangements of Combined ATB Unit (R, OB)

● DP Operation Manual (I, OB)
● ESD Operation Manual (I, OB)
● Maintenance Plan (I, OB)
● Tug/Barge heading deviation analysis (I)
● Cable installation and arrangement details between barge(s) and associated towing vessels (R)
9.1.2 Certification
The components and subsystems associated with the dynamic positioning system as fitted on both
the towing vessel and barge are to be certified or type approved for suitability in the marine
environment in accordance with Section 4-1-1 of the Rules for Building and Classing Marine
Vessels.

9.1.3 Alternatives
Equipment, components, and systems for which there are specific requirements in this Guide, or
its associated references, may incorporate alternative arrangements or comply with the

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requirements of alternative recognized standards, in lieu of the requirements in this Guide. This is
subject to such alternative arrangements or standards being determined by ABS as being not less
effective than the overall safety and strength requirements of this Guide or associated references.
Where applicable, requirements may be imposed by ABS in addition to those contained in the
alternative arrangements or standards so that the intent of this Guide is met. In all cases, the
equipment, component or system is subject to design review, survey during construction, tests and
trials, as applicable, by ABS for purposes of verification of its compliance with the alternative
arrangements or standards.

9.2 Tug Barge Arrangement

9.2.1 Connection between the Towing Vessel and Barge
9.2.1(a) Access
Readily available access between the barge and associated towing vessel is to be provided.

9.2.1(b) Cables Between Tug and Barge

Details of the hard-wired connections made for the supply of electrical power, communications,
control and monitoring between the barge and associated towing vessel are to be submitted.

i) Power Connection Box and Cable

Where power is to be provided from the towing vessel to the barge or from the barge to
the towing vessel, the requirements of 4-8-2/11.1 of the Rules for Building and Classing
Marine Vessels.

ii) Cables and Connections

Cable and associated fittings between the barge and associated towing vessel are to meet
the requirements of 4-8-3/9 of the Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels.

iii) Installation
Cable installations between the barge and associated towing vessel is to meet the cable
installation requirements of 4-8-4/21 of the Rules for Building and Classing Marine
Vessels.

Cables are to be installed and supported so as to avoid chafing and undue stress in the
cable. Cable supports and associated accessories are to be robust and are to be of
materials that are corrosion-resistant or suitably treated to resist corrosion and arranged so
that flexure of the cable from the movements between the towing vessel and the barge is
kept to a minimum. Cable installation and arrangement details between the barge and
associated towing vessel are to be submitted.

9.2.2 DP Control System

The main DP control station as addressed by Subsection 5/3 of this Guide is to be provided on the
associated towing vessel navigation bridge.

Alarm, monitoring and instrumentation for systems fitted on the barge are to be provided on board
the barge in a centralized control room and provided at the main DP control station on board the
associated towing vessel. Instrumentation and controllers associated with the barge machinery are
also to be provided at the main DP control station, as required by this guide (refer to 2/7 Table 2)
and in accordance with Table 1 of this section as applicable.

Where power is supplied to the barge from the associated towing vessel for DP operations, the
alarms, displays, and controls as reflected in Table 1 may be reduced. Items A1-A6, B1-B4, and
D1-D2 are to be maintained at the main DP control station, as applicable.

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TABLE 1
Instrumentation and Controllers at the Main DP Control Station

Notes
[A = Alarm; D = Display;
System Monitored/ Controlled Parameter A D C
C = Controller/Actuator]
[x = Applies]

System Monitoring A1 System power supply main and x x Applicable to main and
secondary feeders: failure, status, and secondary power sources
transfer

A2 Individual power supply to control, x x Alarm may be common

monitoring, and safety

A3 Alarm system - disconnected x

A4 Integrated computer-based system: x Alarm is to be activated before

data highway abnormal conditions critical data overload

A5 Integrated computer-based system: x

duplicated data link - failure of one
link

A6 Automatic control systems x x

Others B1 Control station transfer x x Display: to indicate the station

in control.
Control: to provide
1) transfer switch
2) acknowledgment switch

B2 Air conditioning system - fails x If necessary for equipment

environment control

B3 Machinery space - fire detected x x

B4 Machinery space - bilge level high x

Electric Power C1 Starting, paralleling & putting x

Generating Plant generator online

C2 Generator running x

C3 Voltage - high and low x x

C4 Current - high x x

C5 Frequency - high and low x x

C6 Failure of on line generator x

C7 Generator engine auxiliaries start/stop x x Automatic start/stop, if fitted,

is to be alarmed

C8 Bearing lube oil inlet presure - low x x Automatic shutdown prime

mover

C9 Generator cooling inlet pump or fan x

motor – fails

C10 Generator coolng meduim temp - high x x

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Notes
[A = Alarm; D = Display;
System Monitored/ Controlled Parameter A D C
C = Controller/Actuator]
[x = Applies]

Power Distribution D1 Status of automatically controlled x

System circuit breakers

D2 UPS fault x

Fuel oil system E1 Service tank level - low x

Diesel Lubricating F1 Bearng oil inlet pressure - low x x Automatic shutdown with
Engine oil alarm at low-low

F2 Bearing inlet oil temperature - high x x

F3 common rail servo oil pressure - low x

Cooling F4 Pressure or flow - low x x

medium
F5 Temperature at outlet - high x x

F6 Expansion tank level - low x

Fuel oil F7 Fuel oil leakage from injection pipe x

F8 Common rail fuel oil pressure - low x

Starting F9 Energy level - low x x For application requiring

medium automatic generator paralleling

Speed F10 Overspeed x Auto Shutdown

9.2.3 Automation
The control, alarms, and monitoring associated with machinery fitted on the barge and associated
towing vessel are to be accordance with Chapter 4-9 of the Rules for Building and Classing
Marine Vessels, as applicable.

Separate from the DPS FMEA (DPS-2/DPS-3), an overall ATB combination FMEA is to be
conducted where DPS control integration may have an impact on essential services and safety
functions on either the tug or barge. An overall ATB combination FMEA is to be carried out as per
Section 4-9-4 of the Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels. The FMEA is to demonstrate
that the integrated system will ‘fail-safe’, and that essential services in operation will not be lost or
degraded.

9.2.4 Position Reference Systems

In addition to position reference systems and associated sensors required in Subsection 5/11,
deviation of heading between the barge and associated towing vessel is to be considered. Analysis
of heading deviation that may exist between the barge and associated towing vessel and the effect
on the dynamic position capabilities is to be submitted.

9.2.5 Emergency Shutdown System

9.2.5(a) General
The general emergency shutdown philosophy for the vessel and the effect of the emergency
shutdown system on the redundancy of the DP system is to be carefully considered.

Risks associated with technical faults and inadvertent operations of the emergency shutdown
system are to be considered. Each vessel is to develop a detailed plan for recovery and restoration
of operation after operation of each level of ESD.

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ESD Stations that can enable a total vessel shutdown are not to be located in locations which are
unmanned under normal operations except in the backup DP Control Station, if provided. Where
ESD stations are provided at unmanned locations, the total unit ESD (complete shutdown) is to be
protected from unauthorized personnel or not be available at these unmanned locations.

9.2.5(b) ESD Operations Manual

i) The ESD Operation Manual describes the ESD system and unit specific operational
guidelines.
ii) The ESD Operation Manual is to define the ESD levels and provide a list of equipment or
areas that are affected by the different ESD levels. Also, the manual is to indicate which ESD
levels are available at each ESD station. Further, the manual is to provide instructions on how
to reset the affected systems after each ESD.
iii) The descriptions and instructions in the ESD Operation Manual are not to conflict with the
WCFDI identified in the DP FMEA.
iv) The ESD Operation Manual is to be included or referenced in the DP and cargo operating
manual, as applicable.
v) Where shutdown groups are initiated automatically (e.g. automatic shutdowns related to cargo
operations), a ESD System Cause and Effect Chart shall relate ESD shutdown groups of
equipment and areas on both the barge(s) and associated towing vessel.
9.2.6 DP Operations Manual
In addition to the requirements of Subsection 2/13 of this Guide, the DP Operations Manual for an
ATB is to address operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP
system.

The articulated coupling systems may allow for vertical movement within the notch without
completely disconnecting the two vessels during cargo transfer operations and station keeping
operations. Consideration may also be given to operational methods and ballasting procedures
proposed as an alternative for limiting the vertical loads imposed by the connection. These
procedures are to be included in the DP operations manual and maintained on both the towing
vessel and barge.

In association with 10/9.3.6 of this Guide, where the barge is issued an unmanned service load
line, the DP Operations Manual is to reflect the barge is to operate with a freeboard not less than
the calculated freeboard as a manned vessel.

The DP operations manual is to be kept onboard both the tug and barge, and they are to be
available for review by the Surveyor during periodic surveys of the vessel to maintain the
associated DPS notation.

9.2.7 Maintenance Plan

An ATB is to have a maintenance plan that specifically addresses maintenance of the DP system,
equipment and support systems on both the tug and barge.

Planned maintenance is to address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping
capabilities. This is to include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers, bus-tie
circuit breakers, and other power distribution and control equipment associated with the DPS.
Maintenance is to include regular cleaning, calibration, and testing of equipment as outlined in
manufacturers’ recommendations and industry guidelines.

Records of planned and unplanned maintenance are to be kept in an auditable format, either hard
copy or appropriate electronic format. These records are to include vendor service records as well
as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. These records are to be kept onboard both the tug

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and barge, and they are to be available for review by the Surveyor during periodic surveys of the
vessel to maintain the associated DPS notation.

9.3 Barge
9.3.1 Bilge Level Monitoring
Where a machinery space is located below main deck, means to detect excessive rise of bilge
water in the bilges or bilge wells is to be provided and alarmed (refer to 10/ 9.2.2 Table 1). The
arrangements including the number of sensors and locations are to be such that accumulation of
bilge water may be detected at the various angles of barge’s heel and trim.

9.3.2 Fire Detection System

A fire detection system is to be provided for machinery spaces on the barge. Indication of the fire
detection is to be provided at DP control stations. The fire detection system is to be in accordance
with 4-7-3/11 of the Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels.

9.3.3 Fire Protection

The fixed fire extinguishing fire protection required by 2/5.5 of this Guide is to protect internal
combustion machinery spaces associated with DPS operations.

9.3.4 Lighting
Enclosed spaces associated with DP operations are to be provided with lighting and provided with
backup power supply for a period of at least 90 minutes.

9.3.5 Passage of Crew

i) Bulwarks and/or guardrails complying with Section 3-2-10 of the Rules for Building and
Classing Steel Barges are to be provided.
ii) Secondary crew protection at or near the centerline in accordance with the International
Load Line Convention 1966, Regulation 25-1.

Special consideration may be given to Flag Administration alternative requirements.

9.3.6 Load Line and Stability

Further to 5-3-1/21.5.1 of the Rules for Building and Classing Steel Barges, the barge while
conducting DP Operations, is to operate with a freeboard not less than the calculated freeboard as
a manned vessel in accordance with the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 as
amended. The barge is to be fitted with the features as required by the International Convention
on Load Lines, 1966 as amended, for a manned vessel. All intact and damage (where applicable)
stability requirements are to be taken into account when assigning the freeboard.

Special consideration may be given to Flag Administration alternative requirements.

The level of manning required for the tug and barge falls outside the scope of Class and is to be
determined by the Flag Administration.

9.3.7 Life Saving Appliances and Equipment

Provide the following measures for the maximum number of personnel to be on the barge during
DP operations:

i) Survival Craft (Refer to 3-5-3/3 of the Rules for Building and Classing Steel Barges)
ii) Personal Life-Saving Appliances (Refer to 3-5-3/9 of the Rules for Building and Classing
Steel Barges)

Special consideration may be given to Flag Administration alternative requirements.

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The level of manning required for the barge and associated towing vessel are outside the scope of
Class and is to be determined by the Flag Administration. Exemptions granted by or instructions
received from the Flag Administration based on the operation distance from shore and number of
persons on board and other emergency procedures will be considered by ABS.

9.4 Surveys
9.4.1 General
The provisions in this Section are requirements for obtaining and maintenance of classification of
DPS notations (Refer to 10/9.1). These requirements are in addition to the provisions noted in
Section 7 of this guide. See the ABS Rules for Survey After Construction (Part 7) for further
detailed requirements.

Both the barge and associated towing vessel are to be connected to demonstrate compliance. In
cases where either the towing vessel or barge request a DPS notation as an independent vessel in
addition to an ATB combination, the independent vessel is to demonstrate compliance in addition
to demonstrating compliance an ATB combination.

9.4.2 Surveys During Construction

Surveys are to be carried out on both the barge and associated towing vessel during construction,
installation, and testing of the asset at the builder’s yard/facility, including required onboard
testing and trials.

DP system initial tests are to be conducted as per Section 7 of this Guide.

9.4.3 Surveys After Construction

Surveys after construction for dynamic positioning are to be in accordance with the 7-9-6/3 as
contained in the ABS Rules for Survey After Construction (Part 7). Both the barge and associated
towing vessel are to be connected to demonstrate compliance.

The barge and associated towing vessel is to be operated to demonstrate that the automatic and
remote control systems have been maintained properly and are in good working order. The
operational testing is to be carried out to the Surveyor’s satisfaction.

Records of planned and unplanned maintenance are to be kept in an auditable format, either hard
copy orappropriate electronic format. These records are to include vendor service records as well
as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. These records are to be kept onboard for the
period specified by the Owner, and are to be available for review by the Surveyor during periodic
surveys of the vessel to maintain the DPS related notation.

9.4.4 Documentation
The following documents are to be confirmed onboard the barge and associated towing vessel as
applicable:

● General Arrangements of Combined ATB Unit

● DP Operation Manual
● ESD Operation Manual
● Maintenance Plan

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SECTION 11 Other Optional Notations (1 November 2013)

1 Introduction
Software is one of the essential components in a computer-based DP system that DP vessels heavily rely
on. For DPS-2 and DPS-3 notations, although FMEA and proving sea trial are required for the
verification of the DP control system and DP power management system, the scope of the testing and
verification of the software for the systems are very limited.

The ABS Guide for Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM) provides criteria for higher level
requirements on the verification of the software.
®
The ABS Guide for Software Systems Verification - ABS CyberSafety Volume 4 (SSV Guide) provides
criteria on the verification of Systems. The criteria provided covers verification of the hardware and logic,
including software.

Compliance with the procedures and criteria given in these Guides may result in the granting of the
optional notations that signify the software functionality for the system.

An Owner interested in seeking these notations can refer to the mentioned two Guides for detailed
requirements. This Section provides a brief introduction about the application of the mentioned Guides for
DP systems.

3 Integrated Software Quality Management for DP System

The Integrated Software Quality Management Guide's ISQM process monitors the development and then
verifies the software installation on the facility. ISQM provides a process covering the software
development life cycle from development to retirement of the control system.

The ISQM process is applicable to any system that relies on software. The scope of the ISQM varies with
the complexity of the system. It is most beneficial for an integrated system since difficulties can arise in
the interfaces and during the integrations.

The scope of the ISQM for the DP system includes the DP control system, DP power system, thruster
control system and necessary auxiliaries if operated through software.

Upon verification of compliance with the requirements indicated in the Guide, the classification notation
ISQM may be assigned to selected systems.

5 System Verification for DP System

The SSV Guide provides a process for Hardware-In-the-Loop verification of the system(s) software. SSV is
a subset of ISQM with a focus on software verification and may be requested with ABS’ ISQM or alone.
The optional System Verification Notation may be assigned to a vessel or facility. For a DP system, the
®
ABS Guide for Software Systems Verification - ABS CyberSafety Volume 4 provides specifics for DP
control systems.

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APPENDIX 1 Available Thrust Assessment

1 General
This Appendix provides guidelines for the determination of the thrust generated by various types of
thrusters ( A1/3 and A1/11). It also addresses the interactions of thrusters (thruster-thruster, thruster-hull,
thruster-current, A1/5, A1/7 and A1/9) which often result in a reduction of the available thrust.

The available thrust from this Appendix may be used for preliminary studies for the design of the DP
system. Manufacturer’s test data of full scale or suitable model test for the thrust output of thrusters are to
be used whenever possible for further verification.

3 Thrust at Bollard Pull

The achievable bollard pull for a thruster is basic data for the DP system performance assessment. The
graphs below indicate the available bollard pull for typical thruster configurations (including conventional
main propulsion arrangements), for propellers with nozzles and open propellers. The propeller disk area
load is the ratio of the thrust per motor input power in kN/kW and the motor power per propeller disk area
A = D2π/4, in m2.

For open propellers, the following equation can be used to calculate the available bollard pull thrust (the
units of measure are in SI (MKS and US) systems, respectively):

T 0 = K · (P · D)2/3

where

T0 = bollard pull, in N (kgf, lbf)

P = propeller power, in kW (PS, hp)

D = propeller diameter, in m (m, ft)

K = 848 (70.4, 70.3)

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FIGURE 1
Open Propellers

For ducted propellers, the following equation can be used to calculate the available bollard pull thrust:

T 0 = K · (P · D)2/3

where

T0 = bollard pull, in N (kgf, lbf)

P = propeller power, in kW (PS, hp)

D = propeller diameter, in m (m, ft)

K = 1250 (103.8, 103.7)

FIGURE 2
Ducted Propellers

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5 Thruster-Thruster Interaction
The reduction of the thrust output due to thruster-thruster interaction may depend on the following

i) Distance between the thrusters,

ii) Azimuth of the thrusters,
iii) Diameter of the thruster propeller,
iv) Thruster load,
v) Thruster design/configuration (i.e., degree of tilt of the propeller and/or nozzle axis).

The following paragraphs describe the thrust reductions for two principal identical thruster configurations.

5.1 In Line Tandem Condition

A1/5.1 FIGURE 3 depicts thrusters in line tandem configuration. The rear thruster operates directly
downstream of the other thruster in open water.

FIGURE 3
Thrusters Configuration in Tandem Condition

The thrust reduction ratio t defined below for the downstream thruster can be calculated as follows:
2
x/D 3
t = T/T0 = 1 − 0 . 75

where

x = distance between the two thrusters, in m (m, ft)

D = thruster diameter, in m (m, ft)

T0 = bollard pull thrust in open water, in N (kgf, lbf)

T = thrust of the downstream thruster, in N (kgf, lbf)

t = thrust reduction ratio

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FIGURE 4
Thrust Reduction of the Downstream Thruster in Open Water

5.3 Upstream Thruster Turned Tandem Configuration

A1/5.3 FIGURE 5 depicts the thruster in upstream turned tandem configuration.

FIGURE 5
Thrusters Configuration in Tandem Condition Turning the Upstream Thruster

The thrust reduction ratio t defined below for the downstream thruster considering steering angles of the
upstream thruster can be calculated as follows:

ϕ3
tϕ = t + 1 − t
130/t3 + ϕ3

where

ϕ = steering angle, in degrees

t = thrust reduction ratio at zero steering angle
tϕ = thrust reduction ratio at steering angle, ϕ

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FIGURE 6
Thrust Reduction of the Downstream Thruster Considering Steering Angles
of the Upstream Thruster

5.5 Forbidden Zones

Forbidden zones, sometimes called barred sectors, may be utilized in thruster control to avoid excessive
loss due to thruster-thruster interactions. That can be achieved by limiting certain orientations of azimuth
thrusters.

The forbidden zones can be calculated using a simple algorithm based on the thruster-thruster interaction
effect presented above. The range of the zones shown in A1/5.5 TABLE 1 depends on the distance between
the thrusters and their diameters, and it could be determined by the following method:
Td
ϕf is the angle which minimizes the value of tϕ · cos ϕ 0o < ϕ < 45o

where

ϕf = range of forbidden zone, in degrees

Td = demanded thrust, in N (kgf, lbf)

tϕ = thruster reduction ratio at steering angle ϕ

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FIGURE 7
Range of Forbidden Zone

TABLE 1
Range of Forbidden Zone for Different x/D

x/D Angle x/D Angle x/D Angle

(degrees) (degrees) (degrees)

1 30 6 17.8 11 14.2

2 26.3 7 16.8 12 13.8

3 22.8 8 16 13 13.3

4 20.6 9 15.3 14 13

5 19 10 14.7 15 12.6

In A1/5.5 FIGURE 7 and A1/5.5 TABLE 1, x is the distance between the two thrusters and D is thruster
diameter.

7 Thruster-Hull Interaction
This Subsection provides the methods for the calculation of thrust degradation due to thruster-hull
interaction. Consideration of thruster tilt is also provided.

7.1 Friction
Thrust degradation due to hull friction is related to the length and breadth of the downstream flow along
the hull. The graph below can be used for the assessment of the thrust reduction ratio tf due to the hull
friction.

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FIGURE 8
Thrust Reduction Ratio due to Hull Friction

7.3 Coanda Effect

The Coanda effect is related to the bilge radius and the length of the flow underneath the hull. If no
detailed data available, the thrust reduction ratio tc due to Coanda effect can be taken as 97%.

7.5 Pontoon Blockage (1 November 2013)

The blockage of the downstream flow due to presence of the pontoon occurs when a downstream is
orientated towards the pontoon, such as the downstream of a thruster on one pontoon is directed towards
the opposite pontoon. The reduction of the thrust output due to the pontoon blockage can be calculated
using the formula below.
LP
tp = 0 . 8K · 55

where

tp = thrust reduction ratio due to pontoon blockage, not greater than 1

Lp = length of the downstream centerline between two pontoons, in m (ft)

K = 1 (0.305)

7.7 Tilted Thruster/Nozzle

A tilted thruster can improve the thrust output.

For the tilt angle range from 0 to 8 degrees, the following equation can be applied to determine the
improvement of thrust reduction ratio:

t h = tf · tc · tp + (1 – tf · tc · tp) · C

where

th = total thrust reduction ratio of thruster-hull interaction

tf = thrust reduction ratio due to friction

tc = thrust reduction ratio due to Coanda effect

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tp = thrust reduction ratio due to pontoon blockage

C = tilt thruster correction factor

FIGURE 9
Correction Factor, C, as the Function of the Tilt Angle of the Propeller Shaft

9 Thruster-Current Interaction
Current inflow may reduce thrust output of the thrusters and the reduction of the thrust can be calculated
using the graphs or equations given below for ducted or open propellers at current speeds between 0 - 2
m/s.

FIGURE 10
Thrust Ratio for Ducted Propellers

For ducted propellers with current speed ranges from 0 to 2 m/s, the following equation can be applied:

EFC = 1 – (K1/PA)0.25 · K2 · VC

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where

EFC = thrust reduction ratio due to current

VC = current speed, in m/s (m/s, ft/s)

PA = propeller disk area load, in kW/m2 (PS/m2, hp/ft2)

K1 = 400 (544, 50)

K2 = 0.11 (0.11, 0.034)

FIGURE 11
Thrust Ratio for Open Propellers

For open propellers with current speed in the range from 0 to 2 m/s, the following equation can be applied:

EFC = 1 – (K1/PA)0.28 · K2 · VC

where

EFC = thrust reduction ratio due to current

VC = current speed, in m/s (m/s, ft/s)

PA = propeller disk area load, in kW/m2 (PS/m2, hp/ft2)

K1 = 10 (136, 1.25)

K2 = 0.11 (0.11, 0.034)

11 Tunnel Thrusters
The available thrust generated by a tunnel thruster is highly affected by the tunnel installation, location,
and the geometry and configuration of the hull. The assessment of the tunnel thruster performance is to be
based on axial flow pump hydrodynamics, not on marine propeller theories. If no data are available, the
available thrust of a tunnel thruster can be estimated according to the following procedure which is based
on axial flow pump theory adapted to the specific conditions of tunnel thrusters.

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FIGURE 12
Dimensions of Transverse Tunnel Thrusters (1 November 2013)

11.1 Simplified Method (1 November 2013)

At the preliminary design phase of a project, a simplified equation, provided below, for the calculation of
available thrust can be used, which is based on typical average tunnel thruster configurations.

T = 3 ρ · π · K · P · ηp · DT 2
TL

where

T = thrust, in N (kgf, lbf)

ρ = mass density of seawater

= 1025 kg/m3 SI and MKS units

3
= 63.9 lb/ft US units

K = 1000 (24, 97.2)

P = power at the tunnel thruster propeller, in kW (PS, hp)

= P mot · ηTG

P = motor output power, in kW (PS, hp)

mot

η TG = efficiency of the thruster gear

= 0.95

ηp = efficiency of the propeller (impeller)

= 0.8

DT = tunnel diameter, in m (m, ft)

TL = 1.65 for tunnels of average length, no grids, hull angle δ = 70 degrees, and conical tunnel entries

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11.3 Detailed Method

When more information is available at the later design stage for tunnel thrusters, the detailed method
described below can be used.

11.3.1 Thrust Loss Factor (1 November 2013)

i) Hydrodynamic loss caused by the tunnel entry/exit geometry

E = 0.1 for rounded entry/exit shape

E = 0.25 for conical entry shape

E = 0.5 for sharp entry

FIGURE 13
Tunnel Configuration

ii) Venturi effect loss factor

V = 0.15 (Typical value for tunnel thruster)

iii) Friction loss factor

R = CF · A · LT/DT

where

CF = coefficient of friction assuming exposed weld seams and minor marine growth on surfaces

= 0.05

A = factor for the increased velocity inside the tunnel due to the thruster gear housing

= 1 + LG/LT{1/[1 – (DG/DT1)2]2(1 – DG/DT1) – 1}

LG, LT, DG, and DT are as given in A1/11 FIGURE 12.

iv) Loss due to protective bars

This applies to tunnels equipped with protective bars (grids) at the openings.

G = K · SF · [AG/(DT2 · π/4 – AG)]4/3

where

SF = grid shape factor (seeA1/[Link] FIGURE 14)

AG = projected grid area in m2 (m2, ft2)

DT = tunnel diameter in m (m, ft)

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FIGURE 14
Protective Bars Cross Section

v) Loss due to hull inclination

H = 0.3 · cos (δ) + 0.2 · cos2 (δ)

where

H = influence of the hull angle

δ = in degrees (shown in A1/11.3.1.i FIGURE 13)

vi) Total loss factor

TL = 1 + E + V + R + G + H
11.3.2 Available Thrust (1 November 2013)
For tunnel thrusters, the following equations can be used to calculate the available thrust:

T = 3 ρ · π · K · P · ηp · DT 2
TL

where

T = thrust in N (kgf, lbf)

ρ = mass density of seawater

= 1025 kg/m3 [SI and MKS units]

= 63.9 lb/ft3 [US units]

P = power at the tunnel thruster propeller, in kW (PS, hp)

= P mot · ηTG

P = motor output power, in kW (PS, hp)

mot

η TG = efficiency of the thruster gear

= 0.95

ηP = efficiency of the propeller (impeller)

= 0.8

DT = tunnel diameter, in m (m, ft)

TL = total loss factor

K = 1000 (24, 97.2)

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APPENDIX 2 Rudder Forces

For vessels with conventional propulsion arrangements, the propeller jet and its interaction with the rudder
can be used to develop transverse forces in the stern of the vessel in lieu of thrusters during dynamic
positioning operations.

The following graphs can be used for the estimate of achievable rudder forces in transverse and
longitudinal (ahead) direction for rudder with different nozzle configurations. Manufacturer’s test data of
full scale or suitable model test for the rudder forces are to be used whenever possible for further
verification.

FIGURE 1
High-performance Rudder

FIGURE 2
Steerable Nozzle with Flap

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Appendix 2 Rudder Forces A2

FIGURE 3
Steerable Nozzle with Fixed Fin

FIGURE 4
Conventional Rudder

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APPENDIX 3 Abbreviations and References

1 Abbreviations (1 March 2021)

ABS: American Bureau of Shipping

API: American Petroleum Institute

ASOG Activity Specific Operating Guidelines

AVR: Automatic Voltage Regulator

CAM: Critical Activity Mode

CAMO Critical Activity Mode of Operation

CPP: Controllable Pitch Propeller

DGNSS: Differential Global Navigation Satellite System

DP: Dynamic Positioning

DPCS Dynamic Positioning Control Systems

DPO: DP Operator

ECR: Engine Control Room

EDS: Emergency Disconnect System

EGP: Enhanced Generator Protection

EHS: Enhanced System

ESD: Emergency Shut Down

ETD: Energy Transformation Device

FMEA: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System

GLONASS: Global Navigation Satellite Systems

GPS: Global Positioning System

HSC High Speed Craft

HVAC: Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

IMCA: International Marine Contractors Association

IMO: International Maritime Organization

ISQM: Integrated Quality Management Guide

KVAR: Kilovolt -Amperes, Reactive

KW: Kilowatt

MODU: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit

MTS: Marine Technology Society

MRU: Motion Reference Unit

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Appendix 3 Abbreviations and References A3

OB: Onboard

OCIMF: Oil Companies International Marine Forum

PMS: Power Management System

PRS: Position Reference System

RPM: Revolution Per Minute

SKP: Station Keeping Performance

SSV: Software System Verification

TAM Task Appropriate Mode

MVR: Marine Vessel Rules

UPS: Uninterruptable Power Supply

WCFDI: Worst Case Failure Design Intent

WCF: Worst Case Failure

WSOG Well-Specific Operating Guidelines

3 References

3.1 ABS Publications (1 March 2021)

ABS Rules for Building and Classing Marine Vessels (Marine Vessel Rules)

ABS Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Units (MOU Rules)

ABS Rules for Survey After Construction (Part 7)

ABS Guide for Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM)

ABS Guide for Software Systems Verification - ABS CyberSafetyTM Volume 4

ABS Guide for Direct Current (DC) Power Distribution Systems for Marine and Offshore Applications

ABS Guide for Use of Lithium Batteries in the Marine and Offshore Industries (Lithium Battery Guide)

ABS Guide for Use of Supercapacitors in the Marine and Offshore Industries (Supercapacitor Guide)

3.3 Other Publications (1 March 2021)

IMO MSC.1 Circular 1580, Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems, 2017

IMO 2000 HSC Code, International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft, 2008 Edition

IMO 2009 MODU Code, Code for the Constriction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units,
2020 Edition

IMCA M 103 Rev I, Guidelines for Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels, 2007

IMCA M 206, A Guide to Electrical Power and Control System, 2010

IMCA M 04/04, Methods of Establishing Safety and Reliability of Dynamic Positioning Systems, 2004

IMCA M 166, Guidance on Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEAs),2002

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Appendix 3 Abbreviations and References A3

IMCA M 178, FMEA Management Guide, 2005

IMCA M 247, Guidance to Identify DP System Components and their Failure Modes

IMCA, Specification for DP Capability Plots, 2000

IEC 60812, Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), 2006

MTS, DP Operation Guidance, 2012

MTS, DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines, 2019 (Draft)

MTS, Technical and Operational Guidance (TECHOP) TECHOP_ODP_17_(D) (C3EL2-Cross-

Connections, Commonality, External Interfaces and Influences) October 2019 (Draft)

MTS, Technical and Operational Guidance (TECHOP) TECHOP_ODP_9_(D) (A Method for The Fault
Ride-Through Capability of DP Vessels with HV Power Plant) May 2015

API RP 2SK, Recommended Practice for Design and Analysis of Stationkeeping Systems for Floating
Structures, 2008

OCIMF, Prediction of Wind and Current Load on VLCCs

OCIMF, Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effects Analysis Assurance Framework Risk-based Guidance,
First edition 2020

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APPENDIX 4 DP Operations Guidance (1 March 2021)

1 Introduction
This Appendix provides DP operations guidance for the safe and effective conduct and management of DP
operations. The guidance is based on the DP Operation Guidance by the Marine Technology Society's
(MTS) DP Technical Committee.

The DP Operation Guidance includes two parts:

Part 1 contains guidance on the management of DP systems for the identified DP themes.

Part 2 contains DP operational guidance in detail in three Appendices:

● Appendix 1-DP MODUs

● Appendix 2-DP Project/Construction Vessels
● Appendix 3-DP Logistics vessels

Part 1 of the DP Operation Guidance addresses the DP themes that, if managed effectively, will contribute
to safe and efficient DP operations. Fourteen important DP operation themes have been identified in Part 1.
Part 2 provides operational guidance in detail on the themes identified in Part 1.

The intent of this Appendix is to present the fourteen identified DP themes and brief discussion on the
themes for the safe and efficient DP operations. Users are recommended to peruse DP Operation Guidance
for details. The DP Operation Guidance provides recommended DP documentation that is to be kept on
board and, where feasible, at the shore-based centers of technical management. The list of the recommend
documents is included in the Appendix 4/5 of this Guide.

3 Themes

3.1 DP Class
DP systems have been grouped into three equipment classes in IMO MSC.1/Circ.1580 and IMO MSC Circ
645, namely DP class 1, DP class 2 and DP class 3, based on the level of redundancy of the components
and systems. Selection of DP equipment class is mainly driven by the intended operations of the DP
vessels. For most operations, DP class 2 notations are recommended. For some operations, such as ROV
support, seismic and survey in open water condition, logistics operations, vessels of lower DP equipment
class notations may be used. The fundamental principal of selecting DP class is to be based on a proper
risk assessment of the operations.

3.2 DP FMEA
The DP vessel’s DP FMEA is the most important technical document and is a requirement to obtain DP
class 2 and 3 notations. The development of the FMEA is to be carried out according to the rules/Guides of
the vessel’s Classification Society. The FMEA is also to comply with the IMO Guidelines and achieve the
standards of detail and analysis of industry guidance, such as related publications by IMCA and OCIMF.
Specific attention is drawn to the Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effects Analysis Assurance
Framework Risk Based Guidance (First Edition 2020) published by OCIMF.

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Key DP personnel, including the vessel Master, DPOs, Engineers and Electricians are to have a detailed
knowledge of the DP FMEA and are to use the information provided to be fully informed about the
capabilities and limitations of the vessel’s DP system.

The results from a DP FMEA, in particular issues related to the vessel’s worst-case failure and significant
single point failures, are to be used in the formulation of operational, emergency response and planning
decisions.

3.3 DP Capability Plots

DP Capability Plots are to be calculated for the vessel according to the rules/Guides of the vessel’s
Classification Society and recognized industry guidelines. The plots are to be provided in a format that is
intuitive to the user on board.

DP Capability Plots may have to be recalculated from time to time during the lifetime of a DP vessel to
account for the changes of the vessel’s conditions, such as changes of onboard equipment and vessel
structures that could affect the environment loads on the vessel or thrust output.

DPOs are to be fully familiar with the limits given in the DP Capability Plots for the fully intact thruster
configuration, for loss of most effective thruster and for worst case failure.

The DP footprint plots are also to be produced on board. The footprint plots are actual measurements of the
vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration
at the time the plot was taken. DP footprint plots obtained in harsh environment conditions, can provide a
better understanding of the vessel’s actual station keeping performance and limitations. The DP Operation
Guidance Part 2 provides details on how to generate DP footprint plots.

3.4 Position Reference Systems and Sensors

Position reference systems comprise absolute and relative systems. They are to be selected with due
consideration to operational requirements, both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of
deployment and expected performance in working situations.

Owners/ operators are to consider the advantages using higher numbers of and more reliable position
reference systems for the benefit in operational uptime and improved station keeping performance. The DP
Operation Guidance Part 2 and the MTS DP Committee TECHOP_ODP_14_(D) PRS and DPCS
Handling of PRS (Sept 2017) provides detailed guidance and recommendations on absolute and relative
position reference systems for various operations of DP vessels.

3.5 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities

The DP vessel are to be equipped with suitable DP modes and features with due consideration to
operational requirements, both with regard to restrictions caused by the activity and performance criteria
required to execute the activity safely and successfully.

The following control modes are examples relevant to specific DP activities and they are not to be used for
other operations without a detailed understanding of the impacts on station keeping and consequences of a
loss of position:

i) Target Follow: appliable to riser pull in and lifting, ROV support, shuttler offtake, accommodation
support (Note: There are a number of variations on Target Follow and the specificity of the
relative position station keeping demands drives the functional requirements)
ii) Heavy Lift: applicable to lifting
iii) External Force Compensation: applicable to pipelay, riser pull in and lifting,
iv) Weathervane: appliable to shuttle offtake, floating production unit.

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3.6 Trials and Checklists

A range of trials and checklists is to be provided for each DP vessel and implemented as a verification that
the vessel’s DP system complies with and is operated in accordance with, applicable standards and
guidelines. This verification process is to confirm the failure modes and their effects on the systems and
equipment analyzed in the DP FMEA document (to include the Worst-Case Failure) and the vessel’s
station keeping ability following its Worst-Case Failure. A typical list of trials and checklists for a DP dive
support vessel include:
● DP FMEA Proving Trials: A series of tests used to prove the redundancy concept and the expected
effects of failure modes found in the FMEA desktop analysis. These tests are to be conducted
immediately following launching of a new build vessel and following modifications, additions, and
upgrades repairs.
● Endurance Trials: To prove the operation of the DP system under load conditions for at least 4 hours
without significant alarms of the DP system for new build or following system modification.
● Annual DP Trials: Series of tests of fault and failure conditions relevant to the DP System. The tests
are to be designed to prove system redundancy, as defined in the DP FMEA, the elements of
Performance, Protection and Detection that the redundancy concept depends upon, system
performance and equipment functionality, to validate repairs and preventive maintenance, and test the
operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP
system remains fit for purpose. For DP MODUs, the testing maybe conducted on an incremental basis
throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve-month period.
● DP Mobilization Trials: A series of tests to be carried out at the start of a contract, subject to client
requirements, to demonstrate redundancy and functional limitations of the DP system.
● DP Field Arrival Trials: A series of checks and tests that confirm satisfactory performance of the DP
system and verify the set-up mode of operation and DP functions.
● DP Location Set-Up Checklist: A series of checks to demonstrate that the vessel is properly set-up for
the location, in particular the satisfactory performance of the position reference systems.
● Pre-Dive Checklist: A series of checks performed prior to commencing diving operations. Main and
back up communication tests are to be included in this process.
● ECR Checklists: A series of checks and tests that verify that the vessel’s set-up and configuration of
systems and equipment meet the requirements of Critical Activity Mode (CAM) or Task Appropriate
Mode (TAM).
● 500m Checks: A series of checks and tests performed before entering the 500 m zone of an asset in
which set-up mode and functions are verified and confirmed. Approval is then obtained to operate in
close proximity to the asset. Main and back up communication tests are to be included in this process.
● Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist: A series of checks and tests performed by the DPOs to verify and
confirm the setup of the DP system prior to taking over the DP watch.
● Post DP Incident Trials: Tests performed to verify that the corrective/ repair measures taken following
a DP incident have properly addressed the causes of the incident and that the vessel’s DP system is in a
safe and operable condition.( Note the Tests done post DP incident may include a “stress test” where
the equipment is tested at capacity for a defined period ( usually no greater than 15 to 20 minutes))
This is usually followed by a “soak” test or endurance test for up to a couple of hours where heading
and position changes/box moves are carried out to validate satisfactory performance of the DP system.
● Post DP Modification Trials: A series of checks and tests that are used to determine the effects of
modifications and/ or additions on the DP system and the vessel’s subsequent station keeping
performance.

The DP Operation Guidance Part 2 provides detailed guidance notes on the listed trails and checklists for
different DP operations.

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3.7 DP Operations Manuals

A vessel specific DP Operations Manual is to be prepared for each DP vessel. It is the most important
operational document. The DP Operation Guidance provides recommendation for the Operations Manual
including requirements by classes and industry practices.

The manual is to contain sufficiently detailed instruction and guidance to enable the vessel to be operated
safely in DP and safely execute its intended activities. This will include a clear statement on the DP
philosophy for the vessel, the organization, responsibilities and roles of key DP personnel, training, and
competency, watchkeeping and manning, vessel technical data and layout, vessel DP capabilities, operating
limits, operating modes, the planning and preparation of DP operations, DP operating procedures,
emergency procedures, DP incident handling and alert systems and vessel specific trials and checklists that
apply uniquely to the vessel.

The manual is to specifically address operational interfaces between different vendor systems and
equipment to confirm that they are configured and operated properly. This is to include interfaces between
systems and equipment that are not part of the DP system, but which may affect the DP system, such as
Emergency Disconnect Systems (EDS) on MODUs, tensioner systems on Pipe lay vessels, etc.

The vessel specific manual may also contain generic content, such as company policies, procedures and
standing orders.

The manual is to represent the way the vessel is operated in DP. For complicated power systems and/ or
thruster configurations, it may be useful provide the operator with a thruster and generator operating
strategy (TAGOS) to assist in the decision on what generators and thrusters to use for different
circumstances and different equipment availabilities.

The DP Operation Guidance Part 2includes very details guidance on the development of the vessel
specific DP operations manual with four sections (vessel/rig specific):

i) Section 1 Management of DP Operations (company/rig specific)

ii) Section 2 DP System Description and Operation
iii) Section 3 DP Operations Procedures
iv) Section 4 Organization and Responsibility.

3.8 Activity Operational Planning

In recognizing that exposure to risks manifests itself during vessel operations it is recommended that
activities performed by DP vessels are to be subject to planning and preparation. In planning and preparing
for the activities the following are to be considered and, where appropriate:

● Configuration for the Critical Activity Mode (CAM) (Sometimes also referred to as the Safest Mode
of Operation (SMO)) or, where appropriate, the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM).
● Preparation of the Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG), including onboard discussion with
all relevant stakeholders as part of the pre-project execution/ activity.
● Discussion to be included in pre-project execution readiness checklist.
● Capabilities of the vessel, both intact and residual capability, following Worst Case Failure (WCF).
● Limitations imposed by water depth.
● Consequences of a loss of position and/ or heading.
● Limitations imposed upon operations by residual capability.
● SIMOPS and marine vessel interaction and consequences arising from change of status (Green to
Blue, Yellow or Red).

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● The activity being performed and the necessary time to terminate to bring vessel to a safe position
upon the onset of failure.
● Communication and Notification Protocols.

Activities are to include day to day operations, any specific operation relevant to the design of the vessel,
as well as any unique operations the vessel is called upon to perform.

Appropriate measures are to be in place to clearly identify critical tasks/ operational phases of the activity
and to confirm that the vessel is set up in Safest Mode of Operation and operating within post WCF
capability. Where a decision has been made to operate in a TAM a separate ASOG covering TAM is to be
produced.

3.9 Communications
The vessel is to be equipped with the appropriate primary and secondary equipment needed to
communicate between all parties (stakeholders) whilst carrying out the intended task.

Effective internal and external communications is a key tool to manage risk.

Communications in this context include voice, visual (lights/ displays) and audible means (alarms). Means
of communication are not limited to the above but include integrated IT systems using wireless network
technology that combine communications with other features, including AIS and DGNSS.

Operational specific visual and voice communications are to permit pertinent information flows between
the key operating points as well as to and from assets and/ or other vessels that might be affected by the
operation being carried out.

These operating points may be on board the vessel as well as on other facilities involved with the activity.
Communication protocols are to be set up to provide pertinent information regarding intent, current status
of planned as well as unexpected events during the execution of the activity.

Continuity of communications during foreseeable emergency situations is to be taken into account.

Communications are to be considered when detailing the roles and responsibilities of key personnel during
the planning stages for the intended task, ensuring that a common working language and terminology is
used at all times.

3.10 DP Planned Maintenance

DP vessels are to have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance of
the vessel’s DP system equipment and support systems. The planned maintenance program is to
specifically incorporate a focus on the relevant elements of performance, protection, and detection that the
redundancy concept depends upon (Vessel Specific).

Planned maintenance is to address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping
capabilities. This is to include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers, bus tie breakers, etc.
Maintenance is to include regular cleaning, calibration, and testing of equipment as outlined in
manufacturer’s recommendations and industry guidelines.

Records of planned and unplanned maintenance are to be kept in an auditable format, either hard copy or
appropriate electronic format. These records are to include vendor service records as well as maintenance
performed by vessel personnel. These records are to be kept on board for the period specified by the
owner/ operator.

A minimum number of required critical DP spares are to be maintained on board. The critical spare
inventory is to be monitored via a formal inventory program that is closely linked to the planned
maintenance system. This is to assist in getting back to normal operating condition after equipment failure
or DP incident.

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3.11 DP Incidents
DP vessels are to be provided with and operate appropriate DP incident reporting, investigation and
closing out procedures. This is to be in accordance with vessel owner or operators’ and, if applicable,
clients’ processes. Documented records are to be kept and be capable of auditing.

Where CAM/SMO, TAM and ASOG are used as tools to manage DP operations a suggested approach is
that, apart from the exceptions in the notes below, any reactive change of DP status from GREEN to
YELLOW or RED is to be regarded as a DP incident, and is to be reported, recorded and investigated.

It is recommended that reactive YELLOW and RED DP incidents are investigated as soon as practicable
after the DP incident and, where relevant, trials are carried out as part of the investigation process.

In the event of the occurrence of a DP incident relating to the vessel’s configuration as described in the DP
FMEA and other documents, it is suggested that the FMEA provider is involved in the incident
investigation. This will facilitate lessons learnt to be implemented into the DP FMEA and proving trials
program.
Note: The TECHOP_GEN_03 “Conducting Effective and Comprehensive DP Incident Investigations” 2017 provides
valuable guidance on the conduct of DP Incident Investigations.

3.12 Reporting and Record Keeping

Owners or operators of DP vessels are to have an effective reporting and record keeping system.

There is to be a clear line of reporting DP related items onboard the DP vessel and between each
department and this is to involve key DP personnel. There is also to be a clear line of reporting between the
DP vessel and the company’s shoreside management. DP related records are to be maintained onboard and,
where appropriate, at the company’s premises.

The recommended onboard documents in Appendix 4/5 of this Guide are to be accessible to key DP
personnel and to other interested parties.

DP vessels, on occasion, carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. Records of
these activities including pertinent information from Hazards and Risk Identification (HIRAs) are to be
made and kept onboard for future reference, both for training and familiarization processes as well as for
reference in case of similar project requirements in the future.

3.13 Competence
DP vessel owners/ operators are to operate a structured competence assurance program that is applied to all
key DP personnel (including shore-based personnel) with special focus on ensuring vessel and task
specific competence.

Vessel specific competency is to, as a minimum, be demonstrated in the following areas:

● Operational modes
● DP FMEA familiarization
● DP Operations Manual familiarization
● Project/ activity requirements
● Contingency plans, modes and drills
● Comprehension and Adherence to the ASOG/WSOG

DPO certification is only one part of the competency assurance process for DPOs. Such certification is
not to be construed as validation of competency.

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Owners / operators are recommended to refer to further formal training programs described in IMCA
M117 “The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel”, comprising the following main features
for electrical and engineering officers, where appropriate.
● High voltage (HV) training
● Power management system (PMS) training
● Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdowns (ESD) training
● DP control system manufacturer’s maintenance training.

M117 also provides guidance on structured onboard familiarization programs for key DP personnel,
covering the steps to take to achieve, maintain and enhance competency in DP operations.

Owners/ operators may consider implementing the IMCA Competence Assurance & Assessment scheme
(IMCA C002 Rev 1, 2003) which provides detailed programs for achieving and assessing the competency
of key DP personnel, including vessel masters, DPOs, chief engineers and engineers in charge of a watch.

3.14 Manning
Vessels are to comply with the statutory requirements for safe manning. Additionally, for DP operations,
manning is to be in accordance with the following.

DP Bridge Crew

When undertaking critical activities in proximity to surface or sub surface structures, two (2) unlimited
DPOs on the bridge capable of operating the vessel both in DP and manual control. Unlimited DPO with a
minimum of 3-year experience on a vessel engaged in similar operations, at least 6 months of which is to
have been on the subject or sister vessel. Experience level is to be documented and auditable.
Note: Client’s may have specific stipulations on whether the Master could be included or excluded to meet the minimum
DP console/Bridge manning requirement.

Engineers

There are to be sufficient licensed engineers on board for all expected operations.

At least one licensed engineer is to be available at all times, is to be on watch during critical activities and
is to have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations.

The engineer is to be fully cognizant of DP operations, familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and
the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel.

In DP 2 or 3 operations, the engineer is to be familiar with the general philosophy of redundancy as it

relates to split mechanical, electrical and auxiliary systems.

Electrician/ Electrical Engineer

If required on board, an electrician is to have appropriate high voltage training/ certification, if applicable
to the vessel. As with vessel engineers, the electrician/ electrical engineer is to have at least 6 months
experience on similar equipment and operations.

The electrician is to be fully cognizant of DP operations, familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document
and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel.

5 Recommended DP Documentation
It is recommended that DP vessel owners/ operators are to maintain the documentation listed below. The
documentation version is to be current and kept on board, in addition, where feasible, at the shore-based

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centers of technical management. Documents that have been superseded are to be clearly marked and kept
separate from current versions.

i) DP System FMEA or FMECA. To be kept up to date, incorporating all modifications and

additions since original study, if not in the document itself, then by other traceable means. All
records to be kept on board.
ii) DP FMEA Proving Trials. To be conducted to prove initial DP FMEA and at other times to prove
modifications and additions to the DP system. DP FMEA Proving Trials are to be repeated every
five years. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. All
records to be kept on board.
iii) Annual DP Trials. To be conducted annually. Findings and recommendations are to be addressed
in accordance with their criticality. Previous trials reports and associated close out documentation
to be kept on board.
iv) DP Capability Plots. Hard copy DP Capability Plots relevant to the vessel’s areas of operations to
be readily accessible to DPOs at the DP control location.
v) DP Footprint Plots. Hard copy DP Footprint Plots to be taken by DPOs and kept on board.
vi) Service reports concerning the DP system. Complete history of service reports to be kept on
board.
vii) Details of all DP related modifications and additions. Records of all DP related modifications and
additions to be kept on board complete with interface and testing information.
viii) Vessel audit reports and DP audits and inspection reports. Complete history of all audit reports,
DP audits and inspection reports, incident findings and close outs to be kept on board.
ix) DP Operations Manual. Vessel Specific DP Operations Manual, to be readily accessible at the DP
control location and used by the DPOs as a reference for conducting DP operations.
x) DP Incident Reports. Records of all DP station keeping and other DP related incidents to be kept
on board, incident investigation records and close outs.
xi) DP Mobilization/ DP Field Arrival/ Trials Procedures (Bridge and Engine Room). Records of DP
Mobilization Trials and DP Field Arrival Checklists to be kept on board for the period set by the
owner/ operator and, where relating to a DP incident permanently stored in retrievable archives.
xii) DP Location and Watchkeeping checklists (Bridge and Engine Room). Records of all DP Location
and Watchkeeping Checklists to be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and,
where relating to a DP incident, permanently stored in retrievable archives.
xiii) DP related drills and emergency response drills. Records of DP related drills and emergency
response drills to be kept on board in retrievable archives.
xiv) DP fault log. Records of all faults related to the DP system to be kept on board permanently in
retrievable archives.
xv) DP data logging. Where the vessel has DP data logging facilities, electronic records are to be kept
on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and, where relating to a DP incident,
permanently stored in retrievable archives.
xvi) DP alarm printer readouts. Hard copy records of the DP alarm printer readout to be kept on board
for the period set by the owner/ operator and, where relating to a DP incident, permanently stored
in retrievable archives.
xvii) DP familiarization and competency records. All records relating to vessel specific DP
familiarization and competency for DPOs, engineers and electricians to be kept on board
permanently in retrievable archives.

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xviii) Résumés of all key DP personnel, copies of certification and qualifications, records of DP
watchkeeping hours to be maintained on board. Original DPO certificates and DP Log Books to be
held by the DPOs onboard the vessel.

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