DISARMAMENT &

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEE
 AGENDUM

Deliberation Upon the Ogaden Crisis with Special Emphasis on Territorial

Sovereignty and Regional Stability in the Horn of Africa, 1977.
Freeze Date- 29th October, 1977

EXECUTIVE BOARD

Rajveer Kumar Pruthi +91 9007977777 Chairperson

rajveerkumarpruthi@[Link]

Devesh Beriwala +91 9903723413 Co-Vice

deveshberiwala@[Link] Chairperson

Swarnabh Brahma +91 7439944631 Co-Vice

swarnabh2010@[Link] Chairperson

Renesh Das +91 9083012000 Rapporteur

reneshdas9@[Link]
 INDEX
TOPIC PAGE NO
Chairperson’s Address 01 - 02
About the UNGA-DISEC 03 - 04
Colonial partition of the Somali territories 05
Somali Territories Under Various Powers 06 - 08
British occupation of the Ogaden during World War II 09
Timeline of Events during the Formation of the Somali Republic 10
Timeline of Events during the Formation of Ethiopia 11
Shifta Conflict and Regional Somali Nationalism 12
First Somali-Ethiopian Border War (1964) 13
Ethiopian Revolution and Collapse of the Monarchy 14
Military coup in Somalia (1969) 15-16
Somali Irredentism and Ogaden's Incorporation into Ethiopia 17 - 18
Beginning of Conventional Interstate War 19-21
Battle of Jijiga 22-24
Capture of Gode and Southern Ogaden Operation 25
Shift in Alliances and Preparations 26-30
Battle of Dire Dawa 31-33
Derg Revolution in Ethiopia 34
Ethiopian Political Upheaval due to the Derg 35
Concept of Greater Somalia 36
TOPIC PAGE NO
Ethiopian Militarization of the Ogaden after the 1974 Revolution 37
Cold War Struggle for Strategic Maritime Routes 38
The Truman Doctrine and Containment Policy (1947) 39
Eisenhower Doctrine 40-41
McCarthyism and the Red Scare 42-44
Formation of the Organization of African Unity 45-46
Domino Theory in Africa 47-48
Militaries of the Ogaden Crisis 49-50
The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 51
Ethiopian Insurgent Groups 52-58
Role of arms trasnfer in exacerbating the conflict 59-60
Millitarisation of the Horn of Africa 61-62
Effect of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution 63-64
Berbera naval base 65
Kagnew Station 66
Message from the Executive board 67
Citations 68-69
CHAIRPERSON ADDRESS

Greetings Delegates,
It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the United Nations General Assembly, Disarmament
and International Security Committee at Bosco Model United Nations’ 26. In this committee, we
gather here to deliberate what perhaps remains a chilling testament to the volatility of Cold War
politics and the razor-thin line between survival and annihilation - the Ogaden Crisis, with the
Freeze date for this committee being - 29th October,1977.

The discussion on the Ogaden Crisis thus revolves around the impossibility of realizing sustainable
peace and cooperation in Africa whilst maintaining territorial integrity at all costs. It also recognises
the role of diplomacy, regional organisations, and international law as instruments for settling border
disputes and attaining long-term peaceful coexistence in Africa.

The committee will be assisted by the Rapporteur​ Renesh Das. Serving as the Joint-Secretary of the
Young Entrepreneur Group at Don Bosco Park Circus, he often deceives people by his authentic
Bengali over innocent looks but when he takes up the mic, he is bound to make you believe that he
is a first timer(in the EB). Jokes apart, Renesh is among the most researched and approachable
members of the executive board.

The Co-Vice Chairpersons of this committee shall be Devesh Beriwal(l)a and Swarnabh Brahma.
Devesh, who serves as the Vice-President of the Young Entrepreneur group at Don Bosco Park
Circus can also be called as the ‘finance minister’ of the executive board. You can often find him
getting scolded by his seniors or being kicked out of meetings for making mistakes worse than a first
timer but even after all this he is among the most hardworking people one can come across, working
for hours without taking a single break. Swarnabh on the other hand with the worst hairstyle in the
secretariat can be usually seen in the school canteen begging for free iced tea, serves as the
backbone of the executive board. Swarnabh is someone who can easily make any allotment relevant
in any committee and somehow always manages to make people aware of his unconditional love for
fish. Page No. | 01
I, Rajveer Kumar Pruthi, the President of the Young Entrepreneur Group at Don Bosco Park Circus,
shall be serving as the Secretary General for this edition of Bosco MUN and the Chairperson for this
committee.

As delegates of DISEC, you are entrusted with the formidable responsibility of addressing these
challenges. The committee expects diplomacy of the highest order,diplomacy that transcends
rhetoric and culminates in meaningful action. Remember that in this committee, every statement
carries weight, every alliance influences outcomes, and every directive has the potential to alter the
course of history.

Happy Researching and All the Best!

Regards
Rajveer Kumar Pruthi,
Chairperson of the United Nations General Assembly Disarmament and International Security
Committee,
The Eleventh Secretariat,
Bosco MUN2026.

Page No. | 02
ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE

Functions and Powers of the General Assembly

The Assembly makes recommendations to States on international issues within its competence. It
has also taken actions across all pillars of the United Nations, including with regard to political,
economic, humanitarian, social and legal matters. The General Assembly recommends to Member
States concerning international questions coming within the scope of the activities of the United
Nations as defined in its Charter. The Assembly provides a forum for discussion and deliberation
regarding political, economic, social, humanitarian, legal, and administrative matters, and passes
resolutions to enhance international cooperation and the gradual development of international law.
The General Assembly’s activities were concentrated on the maintenance of international peace and
security, the process of decolonization, international cooperation, protection of human rights, and
disarmament and the peaceful use of outer space. A wide variety of agenda items and resolutions
were adopted in order to strengthen cooperation between the Member States.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly may:
Consider and approve the United Nations budget and establish the financial assessments of
Member States.
Elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of other United
Nations councils and organs and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, appoint the
Secretary-General.
Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining
international peace and security, including disarmament.
Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where the Security
Council is currently discussing a dispute or situation, make recommendations on it.
Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any questions within the
scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations.
Page No. | 03
 Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the
development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in the economic, social, humanitarian,
cultural, educational, and health fields.
Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair friendly
relations among countries.
Consider reports from the Security Council and other United Nations organs.

Mandate of DISEC
Disarmament and arms control: Reflection of all issues to do with disarmament and arms control,
and non-proliferation of weapons and other arms, such as nuclear arms, chemical arms, biological
arms, and conventional [Link] and Security (International): Discussion of threats to peace, and
recommendations on cooperative actions to promote stability at the regional and international levels.
Liaison with other agencies: Collaborates closely with the United Nations Disarmament
Commission (UNDC) and the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD), to provide
coherence to the disarmament machinery of the UN Supervision of principles of security: Examines
the broad principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security and prescribes
appropriate measures to avert conflict or to resolve any disagreement peacefully.
Special Sessions: Prepares recommendations at UNGA Special Sessions on Disarmament, which
have traditionally defined the context of the world's arms

Working Methods
With time, DISEC has reorganised its agenda to enhance effectiveness and prevent duplication with
the Security Council. Key reforms include: Streamlining of topics with agenda rationalization
(Resolution 2837 (XXVI), 1971). Better working procedures (Resolution 684 (VII) of 1952,
Resolution 362 (IV) of 1949) in order to ensure discussions are more focused. Integration of
formalised work programmes and schedules at the beginning of each session.
DISEC is the only Main Committee of the GA authorized by Rule 58 (a) of the rules of procedure of
the GA to have coverage over verbatim records. It also webcasts its meetings in the six official UN
languages, which is transparent and reachable.
Page No. | 04
Colonial partition of the Somali territories

The Colonial Era in the Somali peninsula did not just begin by chance. It was largely triggered
by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, with further expansion between 1884 and the 1900s.
This maritime milestone transformed the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden into one of the world’s
most vital trade routes, connecting Europe directly to [Link] the longest coastline in Africa,
Somalia occupied a strategic position where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean.
Consequently, European powers viewed Somali territory as essential for their economic and
military interests. The Somali peninsula became a battlefield for France, Italy, and Great
Britain around the middle of the 1800s. Under the direction of the emperors Tewodros II,
Yohannes IV, and Menilek II, Egypt and later Ethiopia expanded and solidified their spheres of
influence across the African continent. After the British coaling facility at Aden on the short
route to India was established in 1839, Britain became interested in the northern Somali coast.
Meat imports from the nearby Somali coast were essential to the Aden garrison. In 1862,
France acquired Obock on the coast of Afar in search of its own coaling station. Later, it
moved eastward and established the port of Djibouti in Somalia.

Berlin Conference of 1884 - 1885

The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 was the diplomatic conference that institutionalized the
contention of "effective occupation," which obliged European nations at first to genuinely lay
claim to territory to legitimize their empires and effectively separated the Somali promontory.
In the face of this potential shift in power, many European nations rushed to seize their Horn of
Africa lands away from Somalian officials completely to fortify strategic naval outposts like
Britain's station in Aden, as well as command access for international trade lanes through the
Suez Canal. Britain, France, Italy, and Abyssinia pieced the ethnically and culturally
homogenous Somali homeland into five separate territories by unscrupulously creating
"protection" arrangements between local clan chiefs and secret border deals with Emperor
Menelik II of Ethiopia.

Page No. | 05
Somali Territories Under Various Powers

Somali territory had been split up among the following by the start of the 20th century:

Italy (Italian Somaliland)

-Administrative authority, which had been held by the colonial office since 1905, was
progressively reinstated in the protectorate after 1920. The Sayyid's uprising had created less
disturbance in Italian Somaliland, where the Italians had been progressively gaining control of the
region, and the first fascist governor's appointment in 1923 signaled the beginning of a new active
period in the colony's history. The port of Kismaayo and Jubaland were given up by Britain two
years later, and the two northern Italian protectorates were securely absorbed in 1926 following a
fierce military campaign. Fruit plantations were established along the Shabeelle and Jubba valleys
were promoted as Italian settlements. Italian penetration into Ethiopia was made easier by the fact
that, despite agreements from 1897 and 1908 defining the border with Ethiopia, this border remained
undefined, with the exception of a region of around 18 miles (29 km) delineated in 1910. At the
Welwel oasis in the eastern portion of the Ogaden, which is claimed by both Italy and Ethiopia, an
Ethiopian patrol and an Italian garrison engaged in combat in the well-known Welwel incident in
late 1934. The Ethiopian and Italian Somali regions were united under the framework of Italy's brief
East African empire following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-1936. The province of
Somalia was formerly known as Italian Somaliland.

Britain (British Somaliland)

-Formerly a British protectorate, British Somaliland is situated in eastern Africa on the southern
shore of the Gulf of Aden. It was a strong Arab sultanate during the Middle Ages before
disintegrating in the seventeenth century. When a religious uprising headed by Maxamed Cabdulle
Xasan endangered the British Somaliland protectorate administration's modest rule, these
arrangements had barely been finished. A member of the Ḥaliḥiyyah religious order, this Somali
sheikh belonged to the Ogaden tribe and lived east of the protectorate. The British referred to him as
the Mad Mullah. He initially assisted the authorities and soon gained widespread recognition for his
knowledge, devoutness, and mediationilities. But in 1899, Sheikh Maxamed got into a small
argument with the government and clashed with the newly founded Christian mission. Page No. | 06
These two occurrences served as the catalyst for the present Ethiopian and European expansion as
well as the Sudanese Mahdi's example, which quickly led to a significant uprising in Somalia.

Ethiopia (Ogaden area)

-Somali-speaking nomadic pastoralists live in the area, which has a generally low population
density. Although there are oil and gas resources in the Ogaden, regional instability has hindered
development. Ethiopia and the Italian protectorate of Somaliland both claimed the Ogaden in the
late 19th century. After defeating the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in the north in 1896, Ethiopian
Emperor Menilek II used his army to blockade the Italians in the east by occupying the Ogaden.
But there was still disagreement over the boundaries. Early in the 1930s, Italy took control of the
Welwel (Walwal) oasis. In 1935, it began a full-scale invasion of the Ogaden from Somaliland.
Ethiopia, including the Ogaden, was declared to be a part of Italian East Africa the next year

France (French Somaliland/Djibouti)

-In 1856, M. Lambert, the consular agent at Aden at the time, was given the task of investigating
the possibilities of securing territory for a French station near Aden. This marked the beginning of
French activity on the Somali coast. He proposed the purchase of Obok, and on March 11, 1862, the
Danakil chiefs gave France the harbor and the surrounding plain in exchange for 50,500 francs. A
survey of the harbor was conducted in 1864, but France was too preoccupied with other matters to
give the coast much thought. French Somaliland was formally established in 1896 when the ruler
and elders of the Issa clan signed treaties with the French. Fortunately for France, Menelik, the
Emperor of Ethiopia, was keen to free himself from the limitations on his freedom of action
imposed by the quasi-protectorate claimed by Italy under the Treaty of May 2, 1889. He quickly
showed that he was prepared to use French support against any potential Italian incursions.

British East Africa, later Kenya (Northern Frontier District)

Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, which used to be part of British EastAfrica, became
one of those ongoing irritations between Kenya and the Somali Republic. The NFD was largely
populated by ethnic Somalis, so when Somalia gained independence in 1960, the Somali
government kind of pushed this whole “Greater Somalia” line, with the aim of bringing together all
Page No. | 07
Somali-settled areas across the Horn of Africa. That included the NFD, the Ogaden region of
Ethiopia and French Somaliland, which is basically Djibouti. Before Kenya became independent in
1963, British inquiries suggested that most of the Somali population in the NFD wanted to link up
with Somalia, yet Britain chose to keep the territory inside Kenya. And that choice kinda fed into the
Shifta War, where insurgents supported by Somalia battled Kenyan security forces, trying to break
away from Kenya and then connect up with Somalia.

Even though the conflict mostly cooled off after the 1967 Arusha Memorandum, Somalia never truly
dropped the claim, not officially at least. By the middle of the 1970s, though, President Siad Barre
adjusted the whole military and political attention toward the Ethiopian Ogaden, treating it as the
more reachable phase in making Greater Somalia happen. So, yes, the NFD still carried weight, like
a symbolic piece of Somali nationalist longing, but it was more like a supporting actor n Somalia’s
plan right before the Ogaden War of 1977.

The Somali population was divided into several colonies and nations as a result of the division.
Colonial powers drew artificial borders that split families, clans, and trade networks. Many Somalis
called for the unification of all Somali-inhabited areas under a single country known as "Greater
Somalia" following Somalia's independence in 1960.

Page No. | 08
British occupation of the Ogaden during World War II

British Ogaden, also known as the British Military Administration in Ogaden and Haud, was in place
from 1941 to 1955. Following the East African Campaign in 1941, the British took control of
Ogaden and then only the Haud. The British intended to create a unified state by uniting British
Ogaden with their colony in Somalia and the former Italian province of Somaliland. British people
in particular advocated this idea. Haile Selassie, however, had made a number of territorial demands
during the British administration period. Although his requests for the annexation of former Italian
Somaliland may have been a ploy, he was serious about the annexation of Eritrea and the return of
Ethiopian territories in the Ogaden.

The British, who preferred a distinct Eritrean country and a Greater Somalia under their authority,
disregarded these pleas. However, this strategy was dropped following ongoing Ethiopian
discussions and pressure from the United States. The former Somaliland colony of Italy, establishing
a single political entity. British people in particular advocated this idea. Haile Selassie, however, had
made a number of territorial demands during the British administration period. Although his requests
for the annexation of former Italian Somaliland may have been a ploy, he was serious about the
annexation of Eritrea and the return of Ethiopian territories in the Ogaden. It wasn't until 1955 that
Ethiopia was returned to its internationally recognized boundaries from 1935, before the Italian
invasion, that the process of undoing the ravages of World War II on Ethiopia came to a conclusion.
In 1948, the British gave Ethiopia Ogaden, and in 1955, they gave up their remaining authority over
Haud.

Numerous appeals and violent insurgencies were made in an attempt to overturn the decision to
transfer Ogaden to Ethiopia once it was made public. The 21st century has seen the continuation of
the Addis Ababa self-determination movement. The Ogaden area during World War II. As part of the
larger East African battle against Italian forces, the British soldiers controlled a crucial region mostly
inhabited by ethnic Somalis. After defeating colonial forces in 1941, British and Commonwealth
forces seized control of much of the Horn of Africa, including neighboring Somali regions and
Italian Somaliland.
Page No. | 09
Timeline of Events during the Formation of the Somali Republic

British Somaliland gained independence from the United Kingdom after

26 June 1960 being a British colony since 1887. The area briefly became the
sovereign State of Somaliland.

Under a United Nations trusteeship agreement, Italian Somaliland

1 June 1960 became independent of Italy. It merged with the former British
Somaliland on the same day.

Italian and British Somalilands were united to form the Somali

Republic. Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, the nation's first president,
1 July 1960 worked to bring together the Somali-speaking populations living in
neighboring areas, including Djibouti, Ogaden (Ethiopia), and the
Northern Frontier District (Kenya).

The Somali Republic's constitution was approved by a nationwide vote.

Political disputes between the northern and southern areas persisted
20 July 1961
despite the constitution's goals of establishing a democratic government
and bolstering national unity.

Page No. | 10
Timeline of Events during the Formation of Ethiopia

Britain handed over the administration of the Ogaden region

to Ethiopia, thereby increasing Ethiopia's control over the
1954
Somali inhabited area. Later on, Somalia protested against
this transfer of territory.

After the formation of the Somali Republic, the new

government implemented the policy of Greater Somalia,
1 July 1960
which sought to unite all Somali speaking people including
those in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

First Ethiopian-Somali War started over the territory of

1964 Ogaden. While a cease-fire was achieved, both countries did
not give up their territorial ambitions.

Ethiopian Revolution brought about the fall of Emperor

Haile Selassie's rule, and the military junta named Derg
1974
assumed the power. The resulting political turmoil prompted
Somalia to claim its right to Ogaden.

Ogaden War was initiated after the invasion of the Ogaden

July 1977 region by Somalia for its unification with the Somali state.
The Somali army occupied a large part of the area.

Ethiopian forces successfully recaptured the Ogaden region,

March 1978 forcing Somalia to withdraw. The war ended with Ethiopia
maintaining sovereignty over the territory

Page No. | 11
Shifta Conflict and Regional Somali Nationalism

Rise of the “Greater Somalia” idea (1960)

After the Somali Republic was formed in 1960, the Somali government started talking about
“Greater Somalia,” you know, kinda pushing to pull together all Somali-speaking people who were
in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, Djibouti, and Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (NFD), like it was
supposed to be just one country.

Growing tensions in Northern Kenya (1962)

People who were Somali living in Kenya’s Northern Frontier District wanted to separate from
Kenya then join Somalia instead. Political groups, and also a whole load of local leaders, backed
Somali nationalism in a really intense way.

Independence of Kenya (1963)

When Kenya gained independence on 12 December 1963, the British government kept the Northern
Frontier District under Kenyan control, even if Somali communities asked to join Somalia. That
decision, it basically poured fuel on the fire of Somali nationalists.

Shifta War (1963-1967)

The Shifta conflict really began in 1963, between the Kenyan government and Somali insurgents,
who were called “Shifta.” Those fighters, with support from Somalia, carried out guerrilla raids in
northern Kenya intending to unite with Somalia. Kenya then responded with military operations,
plus emergency laws, and it got ugly fast.

Arusha Memorandum (1967)

Things slowly cooled down after African leaders stepped in to mediate. In 1967, Somalia and Kenya
signed the Arusha Memorandum, so Somalia agreed to cut back its support for the insurgency. That
helped de-escalate the tensions a bit.

Page No. | 12
First Somali-Ethiopian Border War (1964)

The First Somali-Ethiopian Border War was a 1964 conflict that took place between Somalia and
Ethiopia over the territory of the Ogaden region. Ogaden is a region that was largely inhabited by
ethnic Somalis, however it had somehow come under Ethiopian rule. Following Somalia's
independence in 1960, a concept known as "Greater Somalia" was championed by officials; the idea
was that this would unify all Somali-speaking territory in the Horn of Africa and this was the
concept that drove the desire to unite Ogaden with Somalia. Tensions rose further when the Somali
government supported nationalist Somali movements, as well as insurgencies within Ethiopia.

Early 1964
In the early months of 1964 border clashes evolved into a full-blown war between Somali and
Ethiopian troops along the border. Ethiopia claimed Somalia sought to destabilise the region, while
Somalia alleged that they were simply protecting ethnic Somalis residing under Ethiopian rule. The
conflict left many people injured or dead, destabilising the Horn of Africa further, and raised fears
that the conflict might spill out and initiate a larger regional war in the near future.

March 1964
Due to mediation attempts from the Organisation of African Unity, as well as assistance from other
African countries, a cease-fire was later agreed in March 1964. Though no major border shifts were
achieved as a result of the conflict, a heightened level of hostility remained between Ethiopia and
Somalia and created grounds for further conflict to take place in the future-

The Ethiopian Revolution was a major, complicated political uprising in the country that began in
early 1974 and ended in March 1975 with the abolishment of the long-ruling Solomonic monarchy.
It brought down the entire feudalistic empire, and paved the way for approximately twenty years of
military-Marxist rule in the country.

Page No. | 13
Ethiopian Revolution and Collapse of the Monarchy

Early 1970s
In the early 1970s, the absolute rule of Emperor Haile Selassie became further removed from the
needs of the people and began to cause severe shortages; the old feudalistic system gave most of the
peasants little to no land and as a result much of their crop yields was surrendered to the landed
aristocracy. Internal tension boiled over with the Wollo famine in 1973, however this was mostly
denied or downplayed by the government.

The Uprising (1974)

In February 1974, the country was brought to a halt as workers and teachers began striking and
protests erupted due to the increasing price of food and fuel. Soldiers were demanding higher pay
and respect, and were supported in their requests by a group of soldiers, policemen and territorial
forces, which was led by the military council known as the Derg. Over the following year, the Derg
systematically dismantled the government and removed ministers, exposing corruption within the
royal court.

September 1974
Emperor Haile Selassie was officially removed from power, marking the end of over 3,000 years of
monarchy in the country.

March 1975
The monarchy was formally abolished, and Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed as the country's
ideology.

August 1975
Haile Selassie died under unknown circumstances while being detained by the military.

Page No. | 14
Military coup in Somalia (1969)

Somalia gained independence from the British and Italians in 1960, however the newly established
democracy was short-lived, succumbing to high levels of corruption, bitter inter-clan rivalries, and
economic problems. The final act that precipitated the coup occurred when the President of Somalia
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated by one of his bodyguards on a visit to the north town of
Las Anod on the 15th October 1969. Following the assassination, a bitter and corrupted battle of
power took place within the parliament, fighting to appoint a successor, thus causing a power
vacuum. Just six days after the assassination, the Somali National Army, supported by the police
force, launched a clean and precise coup in which troops stormed and seized major government
buildings, communications centers, and transport hubs in Mogadishu, the capital.

Rise of Mengistu and the Red Terror

Mengistu Haile Mariam, the unknown, mid-level soldier who became Ethiopia's unaccountable
Marxist strongman, probably staged one of the bloodiest political ascensions in African history. He
appeared to be swept into power by a tsunami of popular revolution, military mutiny and incredibly
vicious internal purges and that together redefined the Horn of Africa while also throwing the
Eritrean War of Independence into high gear.

Early 1974
Ethiopia was already fracturing from the strain of retaining its ancient imperial constitution under
aging Emperor Haile Selassie. Widespread corruption, the sluggish economy, soaring inflation and
an ignored Wollo famine all provoked massive civil protests, student riots, and labor strikes, and as
the regime looked weakened, junior officers and privates within the armed forces all over Ethiopia
mutinied, citing poor pay and conditions.

September 12, 1974

The Derg began dismantling the imperial apparatus with what was known as a 'creeping coup' of
gradually arresting the Emperor's close ministers and advisors. On September 12, 1974 the Derg
officially deposed the aging Emperor and the end of the Solomonic dynasty.
Page No. | 15
Lacking popular appeal the junior officers installed a generally popular aristocratic General, Aman
Andom, as their puppet Head of State.

August 1975
Emperor Haile Selassie died in the palace dungeon under highly suspicious circumstances and there
was ample evidence that Mengistu either ordered his death or directly executed him by smothering
him with a pillow. The elimination of the last significant opposition within the Derg would come in a
palace gun battle on February 3, 1977, where General Tafari Benti, who had taken over as the
nominal Chairman after Andom and was attempting to rein in Mengistu’s increasing power, was shot
dead by Mengistu’s loyalists along with several other leading Derg officials in a fierce firefight
within the Grand Palace in Addis Ababa.

Following the palace shootout Mengistu effectively became chairman of the Derg and immediate
dictator of Ethiopia, immediately drawing the nation into the orbit of the Soviet Union and
instigating a radical Marxist-Leninist model for the country. In order to eliminate the civilian left-
wing opposition, mainly the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), he initiated a state-
sponsored massacre on the street and branded the Red Terror (Qey Shibir). This started at a rally in
Meskel Square in a spectacle involving smashing red bottles to signify his enemies' blood, and
continued throughout the period of 1977 and 1978 with somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000
Ethiopians killed, tortured or imprisoned.

Page No. | 16
Somali Irredentism and Ogaden's Incorporation into Ethiopia

The partitioning of Somali-inhabited lands among colonial powers and Ethiopia in the Scramble for
Africa of the late 19th Century saw the Ogaden placed under Ethiopian rule and adjacent regions
incorporated into British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, and parts of north
Kenya. The creation of five different states dividing ethnic Somalis created an issue of post-colonial
irredentist reunification. When British and Italian Somaliland became independent and united on
July 1, 1960, forming the Somali Republic, leaders articulated a call for a "Greater Somalia" where
all ethnically Somali-speaking regions including the Ogaden were unified under a single state based
upon linguistic, cultural, and nomadic pastoralist kinship ties that superseded imposed borders.
Addis Ababa, however, claimed historical rights to the Ogaden since its annexation during Menelik
II’s imperial expansion of the 1890s, considering Somali appeals to be territorial integrity concerns
and not authentic desires for ethnic self-determination.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie bolstered Ethiopian administrative rule in the
Ogaden by incorporating it into Hararghe Province, investing in infrastructure to assert control over
this politically contested territory where Somali resistance to Ethiopian rule probably had increased
sharply in recent years. Selassie himself toured the area in 1956 to mollify any lingering discontent
and increase loyalty to the Ethiopian state and on July 1959 he formally broke down administrative
control in the region by dividing the Ogaden into administrative awrajas (districts) to more
effectively control and tax its predominantly pastoral economy.

Somalia’s numerous diplomatic initiatives calling for unification with or a referendum over the
Ogaden were dismissed, as Ethiopia insisted on maintaining its historical possession and sovereignty
over the region and on preventing any referenda that could establish a precedent for future secession.
Both the 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the 1964 Cairo Declaration
strongly defended the immutability of colonial boundaries a principle which Somalia fiercely
opposed due to the arbitrary divisions of ethnic Somalis it engendered. The overwhelming majority
of the people inhabiting the Ogaden were, and remain, ethnic Somalis; by the early 1960s estimates
for the size of the nomadic herding population ranged between 1 and 2 million herders who
belonged to groups such as the Ogaden Darod. Page No. | 17
The conflict reached its zenith when the Somali supported guerilla raids into the Ogaden and border
clashes which involved exchange of artillery fire and Ethiopian counter-attacks. It resulted in the
exhaustion of the resources of both sides. The war continued until a ceasefire was brokered in April
by Sudan and the OAU, a stalemate resulting, which left border territorial boundaries unchanged,
though demonstrating Ethiopia's superiority over Somalis' conventional forces over their guerilla
adversaries, and the volatility of the border area.

Ethiopia's multi-ethnic imperial superstructure, where individual regions, their identities subordinate
to Amhara domination, contrasted with Somali clan-based solidarity, which placed primacy on
ethnic homogeneity instead of federal accommodation, thereby laying the ground for continued
minor rebellions without settlement of Somali irredentist demands.

Early Resistance Movements (1960s)

In 1963 the Ogaden's indigenous Somali clans, resentful of Ethiopian administration including tax
policies and Emperor Haile Selassie's cultural integration efforts revolted against the empire.
Starting in eastern territories like Hodayot on June 16th, insurgency protesting centralization was
launched in ways that hindered the traditionally nomadic lifestyle, unsupported by substantial
armament or any unified leadership, relying instead on relatively localized clan-based guerrilla
tactics unable to overcome superior Ethiopian forces. Haile Selassie's government responded with
decisive measures; army troops put down the revolt by 1964 through extreme brutality, not only
reestablishing imperial rule but intensifying Somali grievances. Measures were taken, including
greater presence of security personnel and investment in infrastructure—most notoriously road
building to bind the Ogaden to Ethiopia and consolidate governance, a process portrayed by the
Ethiopians as national cohesion and the Somalis as an imposition of a state they had no part in
constructing. Somali authorities in Mogadishu provided little more than rhetorical solidarity and
some clandestine support without significant influence over the insurgents, illustrating their
detachment from state-supported irredentism. Minimal territorial advancement resulted from the
unsuccessful revolts; persistent low-level instability followed, without large-scale escalation. Somali
pleas for border redrawings to the Organization of African Unity proved fruitless due to the
Organization's endorsement of colonial boundaries, which shifted Somali frustration to more
militarized actions in subsequent years.
Page No. | 18
Beginning of Conventional Interstate War

The 1970s were a period of intense military and political strife throughout Africa. Cold War politics
complicated issues as Cubans, Soviets, and Americans supported their allies with foreign aid,
weapons, and troops. The Soviet bloc supported leftist independence movements fighting against
Portuguese colonial regimes in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. White minority
governments in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa were also embroiled in wars with
Africans seeking majority rule. South Africa invaded Angola in 1975 to defeat the new Marxist
government. Cuban president Fidel Castro sent soldiers to assist the Angolan government in
repelling the invasion. South Africa also entered into an intense period of domestic struggle that
eventually resulted in diplomatic isolation and the overthrow of the apartheid regime. The American
government walked an ideological and racial tightrope while trying to wean African governments
from leftist tendencies. Ethiopia was also the scene of protracted military and social conflict.
Emperor Haile Selassie was a longtime American ally, and Ethiopia was the largest recipient of
American aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States expended more than $180 million in military
assistance between 1946 and 1972. It also maintained a major communications base in the Red Sea
port of Asmara. More than twenty-five hundred Ethiopian military men had received advanced
training in the United States. In addition, the Americans were extensively involved in Ethiopia’s
education and communications infrastructure. However, Selassie presided over an autocratic and
increasingly out-of-touch regime. A devastating famine in 1973 and extensive government
corruption undermined his authority. A wave of student and worker strikes shook the country as the
Ethiopian people sought greater freedom to address their problems. Selassie’s fate was sealed when
the military became disloyal. The army began to take control of the country after organizing a
coordinating committee known as the Dergue (also spelled Derg or Darg). The armed forces
imprisoned many members of the government and aristocracy. Selassie himself was removed from
the palace on September 12, 1974. The former emperor died in 1975 under mysterious
circumstances. The military junta also adopted Marxism as its philosophy. Meanwhile, Lieutenant
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam was beginning to emerge as the dominant figure in the Dergue.
This ideological shift and a long chain of human rights abuses eventually forced the Americans to
reduce their military aid to their longtime ally.
Page No. | 19
Mengistu went to Moscow in a December, 1976, trip, during which he arranged for a $385 million
arms agreement. The Carter administration ended all arms sales to the military government, and in
retaliation the Dergue dramatically scaled back its diplomatic relations with the United [Link]
Somalis, on the other hand, had accepted Soviet aid in 1962, when their army began to be trained
and equipped by the Soviet Union. General Muhammad Siad Barre became president in 1969 via a
military coup, and the Soviets increased their aid program. The Soviet Union countered the
American bases in Ethiopia with an air force base near the Somali capital of Mogadishu, a naval
base in Berbera, and a communications facility in Kismayu. The Soviets and Somalia signed a
friendship treaty in 1974. The turmoil in Ethiopia encouraged General Siad Barre to take advantage
of perceived Ethiopian weakness. Siad Barre had long wanted to incorporate the Ogaden into
Greater Somalia. In order to facilitate these plans, the Somali government trained and armed a
guerrilla group called the Western.

Selassie’s fate was sealed when the military became disloyal. The army began to take control of the
country after organizing a coordinating committee known as the Dergue (also spelled Derg or Darg).
The armed forces imprisoned many members of the government and aristocracy. Selassie himself
was removed from the palace on September 12, 1974. The former emperor died in 1975 under
mysterious circumstances. The military junta also adopted Marxism as its philosophy. Meanwhile,
Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam was beginning to emerge as the dominant figure in the
Dergue. This ideological shift and a long chain of human rights abuses eventually forced the
Americans to reduce their military aid to their longtime ally. Mengistu went to Moscow in a
December, 1976, trip, during which he arranged for a $385 million arms agreement. The Carter
administration ended all arms sales to the military government, and in retaliation the Dergue
dramatically scaled back its diplomatic relations with the United [Link] Somalis, on the other
hand, had accepted Soviet aid in 1962, when their army began to be trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union. General Muhammad Siad Barre became president in 1969 via a military coup, and the
Soviets increased their aid program. The Soviet Union countered the American bases in Ethiopia
with an air force base near the Somali capital of Mogadishu, a naval base in Berbera, and a
communications facility in Kismayu.

Page No. | 20
The Soviets and Somalia signed a friendship treaty in 1974. The turmoil in Ethiopia encouraged
General Siad Barre to take advantage of perceived Ethiopian weakness. Siad Barre had long wanted
to incorporate the Ogaden into Greater Somalia. In order to facilitate these plans, the Somali
government trained and armed a guerrilla group called the Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF), which became very active among the ethnic Somali population in the Ogaden. The group
staged hit-and-run attacks against the Ethiopian army and other symbols of government authority.
The Ethiopian government appealed to the patriotism of the populace, and a vast militia (variously
estimated at between 100,000 and 300,000) was recruited to fight alongside the regular military.
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev saw an opportunity to extend his influence and began overtures to
the Ethiopians. This gambit infuriated the Somalis, who had been allies with the Soviet Union for
fifteen years. Soviet-supplied jets, helicopters, tanks, artillery, rockets, armored personnel carriers,
and other munitions rejuvenated the Ethiopian war effort.

The Ogaden War, also referred to as the Somali invasion of Ogaden, was a military conflict from
July 1977 in which the Somali Democratic Republic, under President Mohamed Siad Barre,
launched a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region, a semi-arid territory of approximately
327,000 square kilometers predominantly populated by ethnic Somalis, to annex it in pursuit of
irredentist goals for a unified Greater Somalia encompassing all Somali-inhabited areas. Somalia's
offensive capitalized on Ethiopia's severe internal disarray after the 1974 revolution, which had
toppled Emperor Haile Selassie and installed the Marxist Derg regime under Mengistu Haile
Mariam; Somali regular army units, and supported by Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)
guerrillas, rapidly overran poorly defended Ethiopian positions, capturing major centers like Jijiga
and Gode by October 1977 and threatening Harar and Dire Dawa.

Page No. | 21
Battle of Jijiga

The Somali offensive in the Ogaden region, launched on July 13, 1977, saw initial engagements
around Jijiga intensify in early September as Somali National Army (SNA) units, supported by
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) guerrillas, pressed against Ethiopian defenses. The WSLF,
leveraging prior guerrilla activities in the area, conducted harassing attacks to distract and weaken
Ethiopian garrisons, enabling SNA motorized infantry and armor to isolate isolated units through
double-envelopment tactics. Ethiopian forces, part of the broader 3rd Infantry Division deployment
in the region, faced low morale amid the Derg regime's internal purges and logistical shortages,
which hampered coordinated resistance.

Somali advances benefited from superior Soviet-supplied equipment, including T-54 and T-55 tanks
in several battalions, outmatching Ethiopia's lighter M-41 and M-60 armor in open terrain
engagements. Overall SNA commitment in the Ogaden numbered approximately 25,000 troops,
including mechanized and infantry battalions, which executed rapid maneuvers to exploit Ethiopian
disarray following earlier losses in Dire Dawa and Gode. By mid-September, these combined efforts
overwhelmed Jijiga's garrison, with the town falling to SNA and WSLF forces on September 12.

The capture of Jijiga provided Somalis control over the Kara Marda Pass, a critical route through the
mountains linking to Dire Dawa and Harar, thereby severing key Ethiopian supply lines and shifting
momentum on the eastern front. This success stemmed from Somalia's pre-war military buildup and
Ethiopia's transitional instability, rather than decisive tactical innovations, though WSLF integration
amplified Somali operational flexibility. Ethiopian counterattacks, limited by air strikes and
fragmented command, failed to dislodge the occupiers immediately, allowing Somali consolidation.

Somali forces, comprising regular Somali National Army units and Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF) guerrillas, launched a major assault on Jijiga starting on September 2, 1977, employing
heavy artillery barrages, rocket fire, and air support from MiG fighters alongside mechanized
infantry and infiltration tactics to exploit gaps in Ethiopian defenses.

Page No. | 22
This offensive capitalized on Somalia's numerical superiority, estimated at several thousand troops
against a disorganized Ethiopian garrison weakened by prior retreats and internal purges following
the 1974 revolution. Ethiopian defenders, lacking adequate artillery and air cover, mounted initial
resistance but suffered from low morale and logistical shortages, as military units had been
decimated by executions and desertions under the Derg regime.

By September 5, Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam personally led a counterattack that
temporarily recaptured parts of the town, but Somali reinforcements overwhelmed the position,
leading to the full fall of Jijiga on September 12, 1977. The capture marked a pivotal Somali victory,
securing control over a strategic railhead and gateway to the Ethiopian highlands, with reports from
the WSLF claiming around 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers killed in the fighting, though Somali losses
were lighter due to superior firepower and coordination.

Ethiopian forces, facing encirclement and ammunition depletion, executed a disorganized

withdrawal eastward toward the Karamara Pass and Dire Dawa, abandoning significant equipment
including tanks and artillery pieces amid chaotic retreats that exacerbated the Derg's command
breakdowns. This retreat, confirmed by contemporary accounts as occurring around mid-September,
allowed Somali and WSLF elements to consolidate holdings in over 90% of the Ogaden region by
late September, shifting the war's momentum temporarily in Somalia's favor.

In the First Battle of Jijiga in September 1977, Ethiopian forces suffered heavy human losses, with
the 69th Brigade reduced from several thousand to approximately 500 men by the time it engaged
near the town due to prior attrition and combat casualties. Somali forces also incurred significant
casualties during the intense fighting and subsequent Ethiopian counterattacks before the town's fall
on September 12. Material losses were substantial for Ethiopia, including many of the 75 tanks and
71 armored personnel carriers destroyed since the war's onset in July, with a large portion
attributable to engagements around Jijiga. By September 5, Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam
personally led a counterattack that temporarily recaptured parts of the town, but Somali
reinforcements overwhelmed the position, leading to the full fall of Jijiga on September 12, 1977.

Page No. | 23
The capture marked a pivotal Somali victory, securing control over a strategic railhead and gateway
to the Ethiopian highlands, with reports from the WSLF claiming around 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers
killed in the fighting, though Somali losses were lighter due to superior firepower and coordination.

Ethiopian forces, facing encirclement and ammunition depletion, executed a disorganized

withdrawal eastward toward the Karamara Pass and Dire Dawa, abandoning significant equipment
including tanks and artillery pieces amid chaotic retreats that exacerbated the Derg's command
breakdowns. This retreat, confirmed by contemporary accounts as occurring around mid-September,
allowed Somali and WSLF elements to consolidate holdings in over 90% of the Ogaden region by
late September, shifting the war's momentum temporarily in Somalia's favor.

In the First Battle of Jijiga in September 1977, Ethiopian forces suffered heavy human losses, with
the 69th Brigade reduced from several thousand to approximately 500 men by the time it engaged
near the town due to prior attrition and combat casualties. Somali forces also incurred significant
casualties during the intense fighting and subsequent Ethiopian counterattacks before the town's fall
on September 12. Material losses were substantial for Ethiopia, including many of the 75 tanks and
71 armored personnel carriers destroyed since the war's onset in July, with a large portion
attributable to engagements around Jijiga.

Page No. | 24
Capture of Gode and Southern Ogaden Operation

The Ogaden War, also referred to as the Somali invasion of Ogaden, was a military conflict which
started in July 1977 in which the Somali Democratic Republic, under President Mohamed Siad
Barre, launched a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region, a semi-arid territory of
approximately 327,000 square kilometers predominantly populated by ethnic Somalis, to annex it in
pursuit of irredentist goals for a unified Greater Somalia encompassing all Somali-inhabited areas.
Somalia's offensive capitalized on Ethiopia's severe internal disarray after the 1974 revolution,
which had toppled Emperor Haile Selassie and installed the Marxist Derg regime under Mengistu
Haile Mariam; Somali regular army units, and supported by the Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF) guerrillas, rapidly overran poorly defended Ethiopian positions, capturing major centers
like Jijiga and Gode by October 1977 and threatening Harar and Dire Dawa.

The tide turned with Ethiopia's receipt of extensive Soviet logistical support including over $1
billion in arms and a Cuban intervention force of about 15,000-17,000 troops, enabling a
mechanized counteroffensive from January 1978 that exploited Somali supply line vulnerabilities
and overextension, culminating in the recapture of Jijiga in March and the complete expulsion of
Somali forces from the Ogaden.

Casualties were substantial, with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 Ethiopian deaths
(including from famine and purges) and probably 6,000-25,000 Somali military losses, alongside
hundreds of thousands displaced; the war's outcome reinforced African territorial integrity norms
under the Organization of African Unity, which condemned Somalia's aggression, while triggering a
Cold War superpower pivot. Somalia abandoned Soviet ties for U.S. alignment, and Ethiopia
deepened its Marxist orientation. Defining characteristics include Somalia's tactical initial
superiority through mobile warfare and Barre's miscalculation of Ethiopia's resilience and external
backing, as well as ongoing controversies over the invasion's framing as ethnic self-determination
versus territorial violation, with post-war Somali resentment contributing to Barre's regime
instability and enduring Horn of Africa tensions.
Page No. | 25
Shift in Alliances and Preparations

Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban Realignment
Following the rapid Somali advances and the fall of Jijiga in September 1977, Ethiopian leader
Mengistu Haile Mariam accelerated alignment with the Soviet Union, leveraging prior diplomatic
overtures. In May 1977, Mengistu visited Moscow and signed agreements establishing formal
economic and military cooperation between Ethiopia and the USSR. This groundwork facilitated a
pivotal secret meeting between Mengistu and Soviet officials on October 30–31, 1977, where
Moscow committed to substantial support for Ethiopia amid its territorial losses. The Soviet Union,
which had maintained a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia since 1974, shifted
allegiance decisively after the July 1977 invasion. By August 1977, Moscow publicly endorsed
Ethiopia and suspended arms deliveries to Somalia, prioritizing Ethiopia's larger population,
strategic Red Sea position, and Mengistu's deepening commitment to Marxism-Leninism as factors
outweighing prior Somali ties.

Somali Defensive Posture

Following the successful capture of Jijiga on September 12, 1977, Somali National Army (SNA)
forces under the command of generals like Abdullahi Ahmed Irro shifted from rapid offensive
maneuvers to fortifying captured territories, including Jijiga, Dire Dawa, and Gode, amid
lengthening supply lines vulnerable to Ethiopian interdiction and guerrilla harassment. This
defensive reconfiguration involved deploying SNA regulars, supplemented by Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) irregulars, into static positions emphasizing urban strongpoints and
elevated terrain advantages in the arid Ogaden landscape. Key elements included entrenching
infantry brigades such as the 3rd, 4th, and 6th along perimeter defenses, positioning T-54/55 tank
battalions (around 60-90 operational vehicles by late 1977) on commanding heights for anti-tank
roles, and emplacing Soviet-supplied artillery and anti-aircraft guns to counter anticipated aerial
threats.

Ethiopian Political Upheaval Under the Derg

The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution originated from military mutinies beginning January 12, 1974, in
Page No. | 26
Negele, triggered by soldiers' protests against inadequate pay, food shortages, and the government's
inadequate response to the 1972–1975 Wollo famine, which caused widespread starvation in
northern provinces. These unrests escalated into a broader coup, deposing Emperor Haile Selassie I
on September 12, 1974, and installing the Derg, a Coordinating Committee of junior and mid-level
officers, as the Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Derg rapidly adopted a Marxist-
Leninist ideology, enacting land reforms, nationalizations, and villagization programs to consolidate
power, but this ideological shift exacerbated internal divisions and economic collapse.

By February 1977, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam had purged rivals within the Derg,
assuming unchallenged leadership through assassinations and arrests, marking the onset of one-man
rule. His regime intensified the Red Terror, an urban counterinsurgency campaign launched in 1976
and peaking in 1977-1978, targeting opposition groups like the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Party (EPRP) for their assassinations of Derg officials. Mengistu publicly endorsed mass violence in
an April 17, 1977, speech, leading to waves of executions: at least 2,500 in April–May 1977, 3,000
to 4,000 in October 1977, and around 5,000 in Addis Ababa from December 1977 to February 1978,
with additional provincial killings pushing confirmed deaths over 10,000 and estimates into tens of
thousands including detentions and disappearances. These purges eroded military cohesion, as
officers and units suspected of disloyalty were decimated, fostering mutinies and desertions that
crippled command structures.

Compounding this fragility, the Derg diverted substantial resources to the Eritrean War of
Independence, where by 1977 Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) forces controlled
significant portions of the territory, requiring Ethiopian commitments to be dedicated towards that
problem. Economic strains from recurring famines and ideological resource reallocations further
strained logistics, leaving peripheral regions like the Ogaden defended by severely understrength
garrisons of a few thousand troops amid ongoing insurgent activity. Ethnic policies under the
imperial and early Derg eras, emphasizing Amhara cultural dominance and imposing heavy taxation
on Somali pastoralists' seasonal migrations into Haud grazing lands, had long bred resentment
among Ogaden Somalis, who faced restrictions on nomadic practices and forced assimilation, as
documented in pre-invasion assessments.
Page No. | 27
Somali Strategic Calculations and Military Buildup

Siad Barre, Somalia's president since 1969, assessed Ethiopia's post-1974 revolutionary chaos under
the Derg as a fleeting opportunity to realize irredentist ambitions for a Greater Somalia
encompassing the ethnic Somali-majority Ogaden region. The Ethiopian military's preoccupation
with suppressing Eritrean secessionists, coupled with domestic mutinies, failed agricultural
collectivization, and widespread famines that halved livestock herds by 1976, led Barre to conclude
that Addis Ababa lacked the capacity for effective defence. He anticipated a rapid fait accompli
occupation, leveraging the Somali National Army's (SNA) superiority to preempt any Ethiopian
reconquest efforts and protect co-ethnic populations from centralizing policies.

Under a 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, Somalia received
extensive military aid that equipped the SNA with over 100 T-55 tanks, MiG-21 fighters, and
artillery systems by mid-1977, elevating its mechanised capabilities far beyond Ethiopia's
fragmented forces. Parallel covert operations supported the Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF), with Somali arms and training flowing to guerrillas since the early 1970s; by early 1977,
this escalated to deploying around 3,000 SNA regulars disguised as insurgents, swelling WSLF
ranks. Barre mobilised an SNA invasion force, concentrated near the border with armour and air
support for a blitz toward Jijiga and Harar. Somali doctrine portrayed the buildup as a defensive
necessity against Ethiopian irredentist threats, yet it rested on overconfidence in Soviet non-
interference despite Moscow's explicit warnings against escalation. This misjudgment ignored
signals of Soviet hedging toward Ethiopia, prioritising ideological alignment with Mengistu Haile
Mariam over Barre's nationalism.

nitial Somali Advances (July-September 1977)

The Somali National Army (SNA) initiated its invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region on July 12,
1977, launching a coordinated offensive with two main prongs: a primary mechanized force
advancing northeast toward the strategic town of Jijiga. and a secondary column pushing east toward
Dire Dawa and Harar to disrupt Ethiopian supply lines.
Page No. | 28
This surprise assault capitalized on Ethiopia's post-revolutionary disarray under the Derg regime,
where internal purges and logistical breakdowns left garrisons isolated and undermanned in the arid
[Link] forces, bolstered by approximately 25,000 troops equipped with Soviet-supplied T-
54/55 tanks and artillery, advanced rapidly through southern Ogaden towns like Gode and Warder
with minimal resistance, securing over 60% of the region by late July. Their tactical superiority in
armored mobility overwhelmed scattered Ethiopian defenders, whose communications and
reinforcements were crippled by poor infrastructure and low morale amid the Derg's political
upheavals. Initial air operations favored the SNA, with MiG-21 fighters providing cover against
Ethiopia's disorganized response, though Somali doctrine emphasized ground blitzkrieg over
prolonged aerial dominance.

Collaboration with the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) enhanced these gains, as local
irregulars offered intelligence, guided columns through familiar terrain, and reportedly received
popular support from ethnic Somalis who viewed the incursion as liberation from Ethiopian rule. By
early September, the main prong captured Jijiga after encircling its defenders, prompting Ethiopian
admissions of SNA control over roughly 90% of the Ogaden amid collapsing forward positions.
These advances reflected not only military proficiency but also the exploiting of Ethiopia's systemic
vulnerabilities, with Somali leadership claiming widespread ethnic solidarity as a force multiplier.

Somali forces achieved early successes in capturing key settlements in the Ogaden region during
July 1977, including Gode on July 25 after intense artillery and air bombardment overwhelmed the
defending Ethiopian Fifth Infantry Brigade, which suffered near-total annihilation with most
personnel killed or unaccounted for. Similarly, Degah Bur fell to Somali advances between July 13
and August 8, as the Ethiopian Eleventh Infantry Brigade withdrew under withering fire, enabling
Somali control over lowland areas favorable to mechanized [Link] assault on Jijiga in early
September 1977 represented the peak of Somali momentum, with attacks commencing on
September 2 using MiG aircraft, artillery, and rockets; the town fell on September 12 after Ethiopian
defenders, lacking adequate air cover and artillery, were overwhelmed despite a

Page No. | 29
brief counterattack on September 5 that inflicted heavy Somali casualties. This capture, a symbolic
blow coinciding with Ethiopia's revolution anniversary, showcased Somali determination but came
at high cost, with prolonged fighting depleting reserves and stalling further advances into more
defensible highland positions around Harar. Ethiopian resilience, rooted in fortified defenses and
local militia resolve, highlighted causal vulnerabilities in Somali operations, where heroism in
assault gave way to attrition.

A critical turning point occurred at Dire Dawa, where Somali forces launched a major assault on
August 17, 1977, aiming to sever Ethiopian supply routes but failed due to effective Ethiopian air
support that destroyed 16 Somali T-55 tanks and rallied defenders including the Fifth Militia
Division for a counterattack. The siege's collapse underscored Somali overextension, with supply
lines stretching over 700 km through hostile territory vulnerable to interdiction, compounded by
inadequate reinforcements and equipment maintenance in rugged conditions. These factors, rather
than decisive Ethiopian superiority at the time, empirically halted Somali momentum, shifting the
conflict toward logistical stalemate despite narratives of unyielding Somali irredentist valor.

Page No. | 30
Battle of Dire Dawa

The Battle of Dire Dawa (17 July - 17 August 1977) consisted of a series of clashes during the
Ogaden War in which Somali regular army units, supported by Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF) insurgents, launched assaults to capture the Ethiopian city of Dire Dawa from defending
Ethiopian forces, including regular brigades and militia divisions. The city, a major industrial and
transportation hub with rail links to the port of Djibouti and key army supply depots, represented a
strategic prize whose fall could have severed Ethiopian logistics to the eastern front and crippled
national supply lines. Initial Somali attacks on 17 July, involving motorized battalions advancing
from the Aysha front, were repelled by Ethiopian units such as the 24th Nebula Brigade and
supporting artillery, inflicting heavier casualties on the attackers. A larger Somali offensive on 17-18
August, featuring two motorized brigades, a tank battalion, and artillery, initially gained ground but
faltered under Ethiopian counterattacks bolstered by U.S.-supplied F-5 jet strikes that destroyed
numerous T-55 tanks and forced a Somali retreat, leaving behind abandoned equipment.

The Ogaden region, encompassing approximately 327,000 square kilometers in southeastern

Ethiopia, has historically been populated predominantly by ethnic Somalis, a demographic reality
stemming from nomadic pastoralist migrations and solidified under Ethiopian imperial control
following the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty and subsequent colonial partitions. Somalia's
independence from Britain in 1960 crystallized irredentist aspirations under pan-Somalist ideology,
which sought a "Greater Somalia" uniting Somali-inhabited territories including the Ogaden, French
Somaliland (later Djibouti), and Kenya's Northern Frontier District; this led to recurrent border
skirmishes, culminating in the 1964 Ethio-Somali War involving over 40,000 troops and mediated to
a ceasefire by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). By the 1970s, Somalia under President
Siad Barre covertly supported Ogaden insurgents via the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF),
founded in 1975 and comprising around 5,000-10,000 fighters by early 1977, who initiated guerrilla
operations against Ethiopian garrisons in February 1977 amid escalating cross-border infiltrations.
Concurrently, Ethiopia's Derg military junta, which seized power in the 1974 revolution deposing
Emperor Haile Selassie, grappled with profound internal fractures: the army, reduced from 45,000
effective troops in 1974 to fragmented.
Page No. | 31
units by 1977 due to mutinies, purges under the 1976-1978 Red Terror (claiming 500,000 lives),
concurrent wars in Eritrea and Tigray, and famine, rendering it unable to secure peripheral regions
like the Ogaden.

These dynamics prompted Barre's regime to escalate from proxy support to direct intervention,
launching a conventional invasion on July 13, 1977, with Somali regular forces, augmented by
WSLF militias, exploiting Ethiopia's disarray to seize key towns like Jijiga by late July and control
over 60% of the Ogaden within weeks. The incursion, initially opportunistic amid Somalia's rift with
the Soviet Union (which pivoted to arming Ethiopia with $1 billion in aid and 15,000 Cuban troops
by late 1977), reflected Barre's calculation of a swift victory before international repercussions,
though OAU condemnation and Ethiopia's eventual counteroffensive shifted the conflict's trajectory.

Somali Offensive in Eastern Ethiopia

The Somali offensive in eastern Ethiopia commenced as part of the broader Ogaden War invasion on
July 13, 1977, when the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by the Western Somali Liberation
Front (WSLF), launched coordinated attacks across the border to seize the Ogaden region, which
Somalia claimed based on ethnic Somali majorities there. Prior to the conventional phase, WSLF
guerrillas numbering 35,000 to 63,000 fighters armed with rifles, machine guns, and rockets had
conducted disruptive operations since early 1976, ambushing convoys, destroying infrastructure like
the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway on June 1, 1977, and isolating Ethiopian garrisons in rural areas
by mid-1977. These actions, backed by Somali training and supplies, eroded Ethiopian control and
set the stage for the SNA's mechanized thrust, exploiting Ethiopia's post-revolutionary disarray,
including military purges and the loss of U.S. aid.

In the initial conventional surge from July 13 to early August 1977, Somalia deployed approximately
70,000 troops, 250 tanks (primarily T-55s), 350 armored personnel carriers, 40 fighter aircraft, and
600 artillery pieces against Ethiopia's fragmented eastern forces of about four understrength brigades
equipped with outdated tanks. The SNA advanced rapidly across 700 kilometers, employing artillery
barrages, air strikes, and infiltrations to capture lowland towns with minimal resistance; key gains
included Gode on July 25, Degehabur, Kebridehar, and Elkere by August 8, securing roughly
350,000 square kilometres and isolating Ethiopian units. Page No. | 32
This phase leveraged Somalia's Soviet supplied advantages in armor and mobility, though early
setbacks like 300 casualties at Gode highlighted vulnerabilities in overextended supply lines from
Mogadishu. By late August, Somali and WSLF forces controlled up to 90% of the Ogaden, turning
attention to strategic highland objectives like Dire Dawa

The push toward Dire Dawa in mid-August 1977 involved two SNA motorized brigades, a tank
battalion, artillery, and rocket units advancing from the northeast via Harewa, aiming to envelop
Ethiopian defenses concentrated southeastward and disrupt supply routes. Supported by WSLF
irregulars for intelligence and flanking, the offensive sought to exploit tactical passes like Kara
Mardan but encountered logistical strains from inadequate transport and emerging Soviet shifts in
aid toward Ethiopia. The Dire Dawa approach stalled against Ethiopian militia and regular units,
foreshadowing intensified clashes while Somali high command redirected some efforts to Harar
amid mounting [Link] the spring of 1977, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF),
backed by Somali training, arms, and funding, escalated guerrilla infiltration into Ethiopia's Ogaden
region, capturing much of the countryside in Bale province and the lowland areas by May. These
irregular forces disrupted Ethiopian infrastructure, including the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, and
provided intelligence that informed Somali planning.

On July 13, 1977, following the severance of diplomatic ties, the Somali National Army (SNA),
equipped with Soviet armour, artillery, and aircraft, launched a coordinated conventional invasion
alongside WSLF militiamen, overwhelming the disorganised Ethiopian garrisons, weakened by
internal purges and commitments elsewhere. Employing combined-arms tactics, Somali forces
advanced rapidly across the desert, covering up to 700 kilometres and isolating Ethiopian units
through WSLF interdictions of supply lines. By early September 1977, Somali and WSLF units had
secured approximately 90% of the Ogaden, including key communication hubs and towns such as
Jijiga (captured September 12 after fierce fighting) and southern outposts like Riambiro and
Harrawa. This positioned Somali forces to envelop Harar and Dire Dawa, Ethiopia's remaining
strongholds in the east, initiating siege operations and artillery barrages by late September, though
advances slowed due to mountainous terrain and lengthening supply lines.

Page No. | 33
Derg Revolution in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 is a very direct and important condition relevant to the Ogaden
war. Essentially without the revolution - the course of the war that the world saw by October, 1974
would not have taken place. The revolution was an accumulatory cause of a number of factors such
as - the 1973 Wollo famine, the 1973 oil crisis, inflation, and deep popular discontent with the
imperial government's failure to undertake meaningful economic and political reform. What
followed this period was described regionally as a “creeping coup” - a process which took place
between February and September 1974 - during which the Derg, a military committee which was
drawn from 109 private, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers below the rank of lieutenant
colonel virtually destroyed the imperial state’s institutions before formally deposing Haile Selassie
on 12 September 1974.

The revolution’s consequences for the Ogaden war can be considered as a threefold aspect (for better
understanding) - Firstly, it destroyed the aspect of cohesion between the Ethiopian armed forces at a
moment when Somalia was consolidating over its Soviet-supplied military capacity, essentially
creating a window of vulnerability. Secondly, the Derg’s adoption of the Marxist-Leninist policies
essentially alienated Ethiopia’s main Western patron - the United States of America whose relations
with Addis Abada grew colder through 1974-1977. Thirdly, the revolution triggered certain
insurgencies in the areas of Eritrea, Tigray, Begemder and the Ogaden as well, that made the Derg
face and defend a mult-front crisis - which was impossible without foreign support which led to
Soviet support in 1977 as an existential necessary. Thus, resulting in Soviet patronage virtually being
the only option to the Derg.

Page No. | 34
Ethiopian Political Upheaval Under the Derg

The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution originated from military mutinies beginning January 12, 1974, in
Negele, triggered by soldiers' protests against inadequate pay, food shortages, and the government's
inadequate response to the 1972-1975 Wollo famine, which caused widespread starvation in
northern provinces. These unrests escalated into a broader coup, deposing Emperor Haile Selassie I
on September 12, 1974, and installing the Derg a Coordinating Committee of junior and mid-level
officers as the Provisional Military Administrative Council. The Derg rapidly adopted a Marxist-
Leninist ideology, enacting land reforms, nationalizations, and villagization programs to consolidate
power, but this ideological shift exacerbated internal divisions and economic collapse.

By February 1977, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam had purged rivals within the Derg,
assuming unchallenged leadership through alleged assassinations and arrests, marking the onset of
one-man rule. His regime intensified the Red Terror, an urban counterinsurgency campaign
launched in 1976 and peaking in 1977-1978, allegedly targeting opposition groups like the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) for their assassinations of Derg officials. Mengistu publicly
endorsed mass violence in an April 17, 1977, speech, leading to waves of executions: at least 2,500
in April–May 1977, 3,000–4,000 in October 1977, and around 5,000 in Addis Ababa from
December 1977 to February 1978, with additional provincial killings pushing confirmed deaths over
10,000 and estimates into tens of thousands including detentions and disappearances. These purges
eroded military cohesion, as officers and units suspected of disloyalty were decimated, fostering
mutinies and desertions that crippled command structures.

Compounding this fragility, the Derg diverted substantial resources to the Eritrean War of
Independence, where by 1977 Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) forces controlled
approximately 90% of the territory, requiring Ethiopian commitments in major 1979 offensives
alone. Economic strains from recurring famines and ideological resource reallocations further
strained logistics, leaving peripheral regions like the Ogaden defended by severely understrength
garrisons of a few thousand troops amid ongoing insurgent activity.

Page No. | 35
Concept of Greater Somalia

Somali nationalism emerged in its modern form during the 1940s, amid the decline of colonial rule
in the Horn of Africa, with the Somali Youth League (SYL) advocating for the unification of ethnic
Somali territories fragmented by European partition. The SYL, founded in 1943, promoted pan-
Somalism through peaceful anti-colonial agitation, emphasizing the cultural, linguistic, and clan-
based unity of Somalis divided among British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland
(now Djibouti), Ethiopia's Ogaden region, and Kenya's Northern Frontier District. This irredentist
vision, often termed the "Five Points of the Star," sought self-determination for approximately 3-4
million ethnic Somalis living outside the core Somali territories under foreign administration, based
on shared nomadic pastoralist traditions and the Somali language

Following Somalia's independence in 1960, irredentist aspirations intensified, culminating in the

1964 Ethiopian-Somali Border War, where Somali irregulars supported ethnic Somalis in the
Ogaden, leading to clashes from February to April that ended in a ceasefire mediated by the
Organization of African Unity, without territorial gains for Somalia. The conflict highlighted the
tension between Somali claims of ethnic liberation and Ethiopian assertions of territorial integrity
within post-colonial borders, with Somalia's defeat underscoring the limits of early military
adventurism against a larger neighbor. Siad Barre's bloodless coup on October 21, 1969, elevated
the Greater Somalia project as a cornerstone of state ideology, framing it as an anti-imperialist
struggle to liberate Somalis from "neo-colonial" rule in adjacent territories.

Barre's regime, declaring a socialist-oriented "Scientific Socialism," institutionalized pan-Somalism

through education, propaganda, and military doctrine, portraying the Ogaden home to an estimated
1-2 million ethnic Somalis as historically Somali land unjustly annexed by Ethiopia in the late 19th
century. This narrative drew on empirical distributions of Somali clans, such as the Darod and
Hawiye, predominant in the Ogaden and Kenya's northeast, to justify unification [Link]
neighboring perspectives, however, the Greater Somalia agenda appeared expansionist, threatening
regional stability by challenging the inviolability of colonial-era frontiers endorsed by African states
at independence. .
Page No. | 36
Ethiopian Militarization of the Ogaden after the 1974 Revolution

In the aftermath of the Ethiopian Revolution, the newly formed military regime, the Derg, drastically
altered Ethiopia’s stance on the region of Ogaden by making it more of a national security issue than
anything else. Fearing that an increasing number of attacks conducted by WSLF supported by
Somalia could threaten the integrity of Ethiopia, the military regime greatly increased its military
force in the region.

Extra troops were sent to strategically placed owns like Jijiga, Degehabur, Gode, and Kebri Dahar
while checkpoints, fortified camps, an border patrols were set up in order to ensure no movements
from Somalia.

Counterinsurgency operations were conducted on a much larger scale than before as military
searched and destroyed rebel bases and transported goods. The government took strict measures for
ecurity issues in terms of curfews, restrictions of movement, detaining of WSLF supporters,
confiscating of livestock and supplies from local villages thought to support the insurgency. Some
villages accused of supporting the rebels were allegedly punished with forced
relocation and/or destruction of property

This situation was aggravated in July 1977 by a full-scale invasion of the Ogaden by the Somali
National Army along with the WSLF. It marked the transition of this struggle from guerrilla warfare
to conventional warfare between the states. As a counter-measure, the Derg raised new military-
economic resources, fortified defense of important cities including Jijiga, Dire Dawa, and Harar, and
made greater efforts to secure the lines of communications and military infrastructure. Nevertheless,
despite these efforts, Somalia and WSLF managed to conquer vast territories in the Ogaden during
the first weeks of the war. Thus, most of the Ogaden, except for Ethiopia's strongholds, was out of
control of Ethiopian government.

Page No. | 37
Cold War Struggle for Strategic Maritime Routes

Control of the maritime channels was another important but little mentioned facet of the Cold War.
Control over key waterways meant control over oil, troop supply lines, and military power
projection. Because Africa's extended coastline covers a number of the world's most vital shipping
lanes, the continent was in a key position in global maritime politics, although seldom explicitly
mentioned.

Major regions include-

● The Suez Canal: blockage of the canal during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973-75 led to
longer sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope, raising the strategic importance of southern
Africa.

● The Cape Route: NATO fears centered on potential Soviet dominance over southern Africa and
particularly Angola and Mozambique, raising concerns over possible seizure of or intervention in oil
tanker routes around the Cape of Good Hope. This would grant considerable leverage over Western
European energy supply.

● The Red Sea and Horn of Africa: control over the Bab el-Mandeb strait would effectively control
access from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Thus, control over Djibouti,
Yemen, Somalia, and Ethiopia was important.

● Indian Ocean: the US developed Diego Garcia as a major naval base, and while the Soviets
maintained a presence at Aden (South Yemen), they sought access to ports such as Berbera in
Somalia, and later on, some ports in Mozambique.

Page No. | 38
The Truman Doctrine and Containment Policy (1947)

With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would
provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from
external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign
policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the
United States, to one of possible intervent ion in far away conflicts.

The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of
Congress on March 12, 1947. The immediate cause for the speech was a recent announcement by
the British Government that, as of March 31, it would no longer provide military and economic
assistance to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek Communist Party. Truman
asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists. He also asked Congress
to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British
aid.

In light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the appearance of Soviet
meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs, the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece provided the
necessary catalyst for the Truman Administration to reorient American foreign policy. Accordingly,
in his speech, President Truman requested that Congress provide $400,000,000 worth of aid to both
the Greek and Turkish Governments and support the dispatch of American civilian and military
personnel and equipment to the region. Truman justified his request on two grounds. He argued that
a Communist victory in the Greek Civil War would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which
would undermine the political stability of the Middle East. This could not be allowed in light of the
region’s immense strategic importance to U.S. national security. Truman also argued that the United
States was compelled to assist “free peoples” in their struggles against “totalitarian regimes,”
because the spread of authoritarianism would “undermine the foundations of international peace and
hence the security of the United States.” In the words of the Truman Doctrine, it became “the policy
of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.”
Page No. | 39
Eisenhower Doctrine

President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, and Congress
approved it in March of the same year. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request
American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed
aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorising
the commitment of U.S. forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political
independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation
controlled by international communism.”

The Eisenhower Administration’s decision to issue this doctrine was motivated in part by an increase
in Arab hostility toward the West and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez
Crisis of 1956. The Suez Crisis, which had resulted in military mobilisation by Great Britain, France,
and Israel as well as United Nations action against Egypt, had encouraged pan-Arab sentiment in the
Middle East and elevated the popularity and influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
President Eisenhower believed that, as a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the
Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had
allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria,
and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the
United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical
nationalism would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western
interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain
[Link] first real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat
was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion. Lebanon’s President, Camille Chamoun,
requested assistance from the United States in order to prevent attacks from Chamoun’s political rivals,
some of whom had communist leanings and ties to Syria and Egypt. Eisenhower responded to
Chamoun’s request by sending U.S. troops into Lebanon to help maintain order. Although Eisenhower
never directly invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American action in Lebanon was meant not only
to help Chamoun’s Government against its political opponents, but also to send a signal to the Soviet
Union that it would act to protect its interests in the Middle East.
Page No. | 40
The Eisenhower doctrine is contextually very significant for the Ogaden war as a clear institutional
articulation of the containment logic that governed American strategic behaviour across the conflict
period. Although Eisenhower promised military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country this
principle (if seen without the geographic application) established a regional application - any power
vacuum created by the withdrawal or collapse of a Western-aligned presence would be filled by
Soviet influence unless the United States tried to prevent it.

The contextualising link to the Ogaden war is very precise. The Eisenhower Doctrine proposed that
the US fills the vacuum with economic or military aid - the very same logic had framed the
American policy towards Ethiopia for the preceding two decades. The USA had maintained a
significant military and arguably, economic presence in Ethiopia since the 1950s while operating the
Kagnew communications station in Asmara strategically and providing aid to Haile Selassie's
government. After the expulsion of American advisors in April, 1977 and the Derg’s pivot towards
the USSR - it had created the exact vacuum that the doctrine had been designed to prevent and the
faliure of the Carter administration to contest the vacuum. Thus, the Eisenhower Doctrine
contextualises the Ogaden war by establishing the expectation of counter intervention against the
Soviet influence in strategic regions especially in Ethiopia - an expectation whose non-fullfilment in
the Horn was experienced in Washington with a strong and critical note.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Ogaden war was in fact a broader part of the globally
acclaimed ‘Cold War’ and a following precedent or a lineage of how the various aspects of this
particular period can influence a particular dispute - which may not even be geographical proximal
in nature but driven completely by the global stage and international politics that were, arguably,
peak during the said time period.

Page No. | 41
McCarthyism and the Red Scare

In the early 1950s, American leaders repeatedly told the public that they should be fearful of
subversive Communist influence in their lives. Communists could be lurking anywhere, using their
positions as school teachers, college professors, labor organizers, artists, or journalists to aid the
program of world Communist domination. This paranoia about the internal Communist threat what
we call the Red Scare—reached a fever pitch between 1950 and 1954, when Senator Joe McCarthy
of Wisconsin, a right-wing Republican, launched a series of highly publicized probes into alleged
Communist penetration of the State Department, the White House, the Treasury, and even the US
Army. During Eisenhower’s first two years in office, McCarthy’s shrieking denunciations and fear-
mongering created a climate of fear and suspicion across the country. No one dared tangle with
McCarthy for fear of being labeled disloyal.

It has long been a subject of debate among historians: Why didn’t Eisenhower do more to confront
McCarthy? Journalists, intellectuals, and even many of Eisenhower’s friends and close advisers
agonized over what they saw as Ike’s timid approach to McCarthyism. Despite his popularity and
his enormous political capital, they believed, Ike refused to engage directly with McCarthy. By
avoiding the Red-hunting senator, some have argued, Eisenhower allowed McCarthyism to continue
unchecked.

By contrast, later scholars working from the documentary record perceived a design in Eisenhower’s
strategy with McCarthy. Ike adopted an “indirect approach.” Instead of going right at McCarthy,
Eisenhower worked behind the scenes to undercut and stymie the senator and his attacks. The
political scientist Fred Greenstein, for example, argued that Eisenhower’s handling of McCarthy
provides evidence of a “hidden hand” approach to government. In this interpretation, Ike rode above
the fray of politics while secretly pulling levers and using White House influence to obstruct
McCarthy and his allies. Late in his first presidential campaign, Eisenhower excised a defense of
General George C. Marshall from a speech he gave in McCarthy's home state of Wisconsin. He
addressed the issue more abstractly, stating, "The right to question a man's judgment carries with it
no automatic right to question his honor."
Page No. | 42
Looking at all the evidence, the clearest conclusion is that Eisenhower did not want to confront Joe
McCarthy at all. And during 1953, he tried to avoid the whole issue, hoping the Senate would
silence the explosive senator. McCarthy was a Republican, after all, and many fellow senators
supported him. Ike needed to keep his party unified to pass bills in other areas; battling McCarthy
would only stir up a civil war inside the GOP.

Furthermore, Eisenhower did not want to appear “soft” on the problem of internal subversion. There
had, after all, been real spies who penetrated into the State Department, notably Alger Hiss. And
Communist agents had stolen classified secrets from the wartime Manhattan Project that built the
atomic bomb. When Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were condemned to die in the electric chair as
punishment for their theft of atomic secrets, Eisenhower did not for a moment consider granting
them clemency. On June 19, 1953, they were both put to death.

But at the start of 1954, the picture changed. Joe McCarthy turned his investigatory resources on the
US Army and on members of the administration itself. Eisenhower had no choice but to fight back.
The first move the White House made was to try to discredit the men around McCarthy, notably the
lawyer Roy Cohn, who was leading the investigation, and Cohn’s assistant David Schine, who had
recently been drafted into the Army.

The Army compiled a damaging dossier of dirt on Cohn, showing that he used threats and
intimidation to demand that Schine be given plum assignments and easy duty. The White House
leaked this dossier to the press and Congress. McCarthy and Cohn now stood accused of abuse of
power. Ike went one step further. In order to close down McCarthy’s reckless use of subpoenas to
compel witnesses to testify before his committee, Eisenhower invoked executive privilege. In this
May 17, 1954 memo to the Secretary of Defense, Eisenhower ordered, “You will instruct employees
of your Department that in all of their appearances before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Operations regarding the inquiry now before it, they are not to testify to any such
conversations or communications or to produce any such documents or reproductions. This principle
must be maintained regardless of who would be benefitted by such disclosures.”
Page No. | 43
In May 1954, Ike simply said that administration officials and all executive branch employees would
ignore any call from McCarthy to testify. Eisenhower explained his action, declaring that “it is
essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the executive branch be in a
position to be completely candid in advising each other on official matters,” without those
conversations being subject to Congressional scrutiny.

It was a bold and daring move, and it worked. McCarthy, his credibility in tatters and now starved of
witnesses, hit a brick wall and his fellow senators turned against him. In early December 1954, the
Senate passed a motion of condemnation, in a vote of 67 to 22. McCarthy was ruined—and within
three years he was dead from alcohol abuse. The era of McCarthyism was over. Ike had helped bring
it to a bitter end.

McCarthyism are arguably the most important context that can be taken into regard to understand
the broader aspect of the agenda - more specifically the political constraints within which the
American policy towards Ogaden was formed.

The direct contextualising link to the Ogaden war lies in the specifics of the Carter administration in
1977. The loss of Ethiopia as a US ally of 22 years to Soviet-Cuban influence produced the similar
kind of pressure that McCarthyism had institutionalised: the charge that the administration had been
passive in the face of communist expansion in Africa. After a few years of over-estimating the
communist threat under McCarthy - America spent decades essentially under-estimating it, and the
Ogaden War fell in the period where the pendulum was perceived to swing back. Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s hawkish response to the Soviet-Cuban intervention - his insistence that it violated the
spirit of détente and demanded a firm American counter drew directly on this political opinion. On
the other hand - Secretary of State, Vance’s more concerned position reflected the post McCarthy
suspicion or politically, ‘caution’ about the costs involved in ideological over-reaction. The Red
Scare, thus contextualises the Ogaden war not as a military precedent but as a precedent of a
domestic ideological framework within which the American authorities were compelled to work

Page No. | 44
Formation of the Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity was formed as an attempt of cooperation and unity between
African nations. Its charter of 1963 is a document that embodies the desires of newly independent
African nations as well as practical considerations related to their political unification. The creation
of the OAU occurred in the midst of a broader phenomenon of African resistance to the domination
of Europeans. It should be noted that this phenomenon was taking place both in Africa itself as well
as in the African Diaspora - communities of people of African descent who live outside of Africa.
African Diaspora was created as a result of transatlantic slave trade when many enslaved Africans
were taken to Americas. Gradually it became a driving force behind the development of Pan-
Africanism which promoted solidarity of people of African descent and self-determination of
Africans. Its famous slogan was "Africa for the Africans."

The emergence of Pan-Africanism can be attributed to literary as well as political movements. While
the former reflected the plight of colonialism, racism, and African identity in the form of poetry by
Claude McKay, Langston Hughes, Raphael Ernest Grail Armattoe, Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar
Senghor, and Léon Damas, among other poets, and also in prose by Majola Agbebi, John Edward
Bruce, and Edward Blyden, the latter was focused on the theme of African emancipation, self-
government, and the abolition of European colonialism. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 raised the
profile of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became a key figure in Pan-African politics. One more
influence on Pan-Africanism came from the Bandung Conference of 1955, in which the principles of
human rights, anti-colonialism, and cooperation of the countries that gained their independence were
stressed. The representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and
Tunisia attended a meeting held in Accra, Ghana. They criticized colonialism, apartheid of South
Africa, French occupation of Algeria, and supported the cooperation of the African countries in their
foreign policy. African unity during 1960-1961 was influenced by varying opinions concerning the
speed and methods of integration in Africa. Twelve countries namely Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta formed the Brazzaville Group in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Page No. | 45
They supported independence of Mauritania, peaceful settlement of the Congo crisis and termination
of the war in Algeria.

Eight countries including the Provisional Government of Algeria, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea
(Conakry), Libya, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic formed the Casablanca Group in
January 1961. The Casablanca Group supported Morocco in its claim to Mauritania, recognized
Antoine Gizenga’s government in the Congo (Kinshasa) and called for immediate independence of
Algeria. In May 1961, the Brazzaville Group along with Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia formed the Monrovia Group. The Monrovia Group maintained
most of the policies of the Brazzaville Group.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It
united the members of Monrovia and Casablanca Group except Ceylon and other states like
Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, Sudan, Tanganyika, and Uganda. The conference was
organized by Emperor Haile Selassie I and attended by many leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah,
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Julius K. Nyerere, and
William V. S. Tubman. Many issues related to the organization such as its name, conference
procedure, voting system, structure of the General Secretariat and Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation, and Arbitration, official languages, ratification of charter, and admission procedure
were discussed before the adoption of the OAU Charter. The OAU Charter includes a preamble and
thirty-three articles. The preamble explains the principles, objectives, and aspirations of the member
states. The OAU is defined as the organization of sovereign governments in the charter. The OAU
also stresses the principle of self-determination in the preamble. The charter also gives emphasis to
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, including maintenance of
existing international frontiers inherited at independence. The approach focused on political stability
while taking into consideration the frontiers demarcated during the colonial era. Four main
institutions were established by the OAU Charter. These included the Assembly of Heads of States
and Governments that formulated and coordinated the policies of the organization, in addition to
evaluating its performance. It convened once per year but could hold extraordinary meetings when
needed. Each member had only one vote, with two-thirds constituting the quorum.

Page No. | 46
Domino Theory in Africa

The Domino Theory, as described by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954, suggested that
if one state succumbed to communist ideology, other states would become communists in much the
same way as when a row of dominoes falls. The theory gained relevance during the era of rapid
decolonization as it was applied to Africa, becoming a major factor in the foreign policy of certain
Western states.

In the broader scheme of things during the Cold War period, Western nations, specifically the
United States, Britain and France, regarded many of the emerging nations of Africa as politically
and economically vulnerable to the influence of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.
Therefore, the policies adopted by these nations attempted to contain communism in Africa, major
events which also took place include-

● Following the death of Patrice Lumumba, the socialist figure who was regarded with fear by the
US government as a possible future Soviet protégé in 1961, Zaire (as it was then, now known as the
DRC) formed a template of US aid under Mobutu Sese Seko.

● The disintegration of empires would become one of the most spectacular of all domino crises in
Africa; in the wake of Portuguese withdrawal, the contest between the three competing groups
(MPLA, FNLA, UNITA) for control of Angola (now the major producer of oil, possibly the most
important nation at that point), US versus USSR, Cuban and Chinese intervention and South African
occupation.

● In Mozambique, FRELIMO was a nationalist group which was painted as a communist threat and
was destabilised through Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) and apartheid South African action.

● Ethiopia was a "domino" on its own right; US forces stationed at Kagnew Station in Asmara were
there to stop the spread of Soviet influence in the Horn shakes fist angrily, so hot after reading the
Middle East.
Page No. | 47
The Ogaden War in 1977 was simply the embodiment of the Domino Theory being played out on
live television. The military government of Ethiopia’s Derg had initially aligned with the United
States before 1974. But from then onwards, the Derg had begun aligning itself towards a Soviet
orientation. That is when the Americans truly freaked out. They decided to switch sides to back
Somalia’s regime led by Siad Barre, which is pretty weird considering Somalia itself is attacking
Ethiopia. The whole plan was aimed at making sure the Horn of Africa remained off-limits to the
Soviets and did not become their stronghold. Behind the curtains was this fear of the possible
establishment of an Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban axis that could possibly spread communist influence
downwards towards Kenya and beyond, essentially destabilising the entire region through this row
of dominoes.

Page No. | 48
Militaries of the Ogaden Crisis

ETHIOPIA SOMALIA

ARMY 48,000 22,000

1 Mech. Division. 6 Tk. Battalions

3 Inf. Divisions 9 Mech. Battalions

1 Airborne Inf. Battalion 5 Inf. Battalions

3 Artillery Battalions 2 Commando Battalions

6 Field & 5 AA Artillery

2 Engineer Battalions
Battalions

7 Armored Battalions ( T
4 Armored Squadrons ( M
34,
60,M 41 Lt, M 113 APCs,
50, 54, 55, BTR40 & 152
AML 240/60)
APCs)

Page No. | 49
AIRCRAFT 36 Combat Aircraft 66 Combat AircrafT

1 Bomber Squadron 1 Bomber Squadron

1 Recce Squadron 1 Fighter Squadron

3 Transport Squadrons 1 Transport Squadron

1 Helicopter Squadron 1 Helicopter Squadron

NAVY Assorted Patrol Boats Assorted Patrol Boats

Page No. | 50
The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was a Somali guerrilla organization founded in 1975
in pursuit of the Ogaden region's separation from Ethiopia and unification with Somalia, as part of
larger irredentist claims to lost Somali territory. With the support of the Siad Barre regime of
Somalia, it engaged in insurgency against Ethiopian forces, an operation that intensified in the wake
of internal unrest in Ethiopia post-1974 revolution. The WSLF was formed at a time when Somalis
sought to "recover their lost lands," asserting that the armed struggle was an effort for self-
determination in the face of Ethiopian centralisation policies. Its forces fought along with Somali
army units in the 1977 Ogaden War, advancing through the territory to take Ethiopian strongholds
such as Jijiga, Harar, and Dire Dawa, and holding over 90% of it briefly-its greatest military
triumph, which relied on a localised, ethnographic understanding of the territory and popular Somali
backing.

During the period from 1975 to 1977, WSLF operations were significantly strengthened, and they
started to gain control over the rural areas, thereby diminishing the power of the Ethiopian regime in
the countryside. The movement developed local support networks providing them with intelligence,
food, shelters, new recruits, and other logistical supplies that made it possible for the movement to
engage in military operations despite the anti-insurgency actions by Ethiopia. Following the rising
tension between Ethiopia and Somalia, WSLF intensified coordination of their activities with the
Somali National Army (SNA). During the full-scale offensive of Somalia on Ogaden in July 1977,
WSLF fighters played an active role as guides and scouts fighting against Ethiopian forces. The
forces of Somalia and WSLF managed to capture several towns in Ogaden, such as Jijiga, Gode,
Degehabur, and Kebri Dahar, and they even threatened the strategically important towns of Harar
and Dire Dawa. At the height of the offensive, they controlled almost 90 percent of Ogaden.

Page No. | 51
Ethiopian Insurgent Groups

Eritrean Liberation Front(ELF)

To understand the origin of the Eritrean Liberation Front - the situation needs to be viewed from a
broader global perspective with special context to the post colonial Horn of Africa. After the defeat
of Italy in World War II the future of the colony of Eritrea was yet to be decided. However, when
the 1948 United Nations Commission failed to agree on a settlement by 1952 had linked Eritrea to
Ethiopia with certain federal [Link] federal arrangement was maintained to keep both
Ethiopian strategic interests and Eritrean individualism intact. However in 1962, Ethiopian Emperor
Haile Selassie unilaterally abolished Eritrea's autonomous status and formally annexed it as a
province of Ethiopia in 1962. In the following years Eritritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) was
formed which eventually gave rise to the ideological successor [Link] Muhammad Adam and
other Eritrean students and intellectuals were responsible for founding the ELF in Cairo ]. They had
reasons for choosing Cairo to establish the ELF, with the reasons being very strategically important -
Egypt under Nasser positioned itself as the leader of pan-Arabism and fighting against imperialism,
aiding liberation movements in Africa and the Middle East.

The organisation structure, of solely ELF, is taken to be important because it is widely argued that
their decline in power was majorly due to a faulty system. One of the first structural decisions taken
by ELF was to establish a zonal command system. The initial four zonal commands of the ELF were
all lowland areas and were primarily composed of Muslims although few Christians had joined the
organisation in the beginning, fearing Muslim domination. Highland Christians began joining ELF
which saw a surge in its membership which prompted the formation of the fifth command, which
was the highland Christian command. This structure was meant to promote regional diversity, but
struggles with internal command and sectarian violence made the unified functioning of ELF
[Link] five zonal commands developed distinct political cultures, local loyalties, and critically
independent access to external patrons, which made unified command difficult.

Page No. | 52
The formal onset of the Eritrean armed struggle can be attributed to one single person - Hamid Idris
Awate. On September 1, 1961, 11 guerrilla fighters led by Awate attacked police posts in the west of
Eritrea, including one on Mount Adal which essentially marked the beginning of the struggle. A
fierce battle had ensued between Awate's fighters and Eritrean police forces which lasted for thirty
minutes and finally ended in a stalemate. Awate, who had served as an Ascari in the Italian colonial
army and received military training in Italy and as a result brought a degree of conventional military
experience to what was otherwise an embryonic guerrilla force.

The structural and ideological tensions led to a major breakaway in 1970 where 3 splinter groups
emerged and later coalesced to form the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. The departing factions
were mainly those dissidents who had grown disillusioned with ELF’s leadership, the perceived
sectarianism and the lack of unity required to function properly. This split was not only
organisational but also hostile in nature where both the factions got entailed into a bitter civil war in
between 1972 and 1974 with the broader struggle against Ethiopia [Link] collapse of Haile
Selassie's regime created an opening for inter-front reconciliation and under popular pressure - ELF
and EPLF negotiated a ceasefire deal in 1974, 2 months after the coup carried out by the Derg Junta.
This ceasefire was driven by recognition across personalities on the Eritrean political spectrum. In
January 1975, the ELF and the EPLF, launched a joint attack on Asmara which was a prelude to a
larger offensive that led to the two fronts to liberate almost 95 per cent of Eritrea. This was the high
point of the ELF's military cooperation with the EPLF, and indeed of the Eritrean independence
movement's territorial gains during the period. The joint offensive demonstrated what coordinated
action between the two organisations was capable of achieving.

By October, 1977, ELF essentially controlled significant territory in Eritrea, particularly in the
highland and the western regions - including localities of Mendefera, Adi Quala, Agordat, and
Tessenei, along with the towns in the Gash-Barka and Anseba regions. Moreover, this placed the
ELF in control of territory that was essentially distinct from EPLF’s zone of control with the latter
being concentrated in the northern coastal belt, with frequent overlapping of regions causing
continued friction. The Eritrean Liberation Movement(ELM) started in 1958 which succeeded the
inclusion of Eritrea as an autonomous region in Ethiopia in 1952. Eventually ELM transformed into
Page No. | 53
the Eritrean Liberation Front(ELF) in 1961 which had a surge in members after Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia unilaterally annexed Eritrea as a province of Ethiopia itself. This act, in the
region, was considered a blatant violation of the terms of the federation which also started as the
foundational grievance for the insurgency group.

However, the ELF experienced profound internal contradictions. Tensions between Muslim and
Christian factions within the ELF, paired with the failure to repel Ethiopia's 1967-1968 counter-
offensive had internally fractured the organisation and caused it to undergo a virtual schism.
Political disputes between competing internal factions and incompetent leadership drove many
young dissidents to leave the ELF entirely, with those who remained, contested for leadership which
at certain times also ended in violent conclusions. Its main objective included-
● To have achieved Eritrea's independence from Ethiopian rule through an armed liberation struggle
following the dissolution of Eritrea's federal autonomy and its annexation by Ethiopia in 1962.
● To have mobilised and organised Eritrean society by building a national liberation movement that
united Eritreans against Ethiopian administration, while expanding its political and military presence
across the country.
● To have established an independent Eritrean state based on national self-determination and
representative governance after the end of Ethiopian control.

Page No. | 54
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front(EPLF)

The dissidents that had left ELP formed the ELF-PLF which in September 1973 transformed in to
EPLF, with Romedan Mohamed Nur as its secretary and Isaias Afwerki as its military commander
both of whom had studied Maoist guerrilla strategy in China in the 1960s. Internal dissent within the
EPLF, backed by accusations of authoritarian practices and military inefficiencies was suppressed
by Isaias, resulting in the execution of eleven members in August 1974 an event that contributed
significantly to the centralisation and security orientation of the organisation. To institutionalise
internal discipline, the EPLF established a new internal security apparatus known as Halewa Sewra
(meaning "Shield of the Revolution" in Tigrinya), as well as a Central Committee to oversee.

Led by Isaias and Ramadan, the EPLF found refuge in the mountains of Sahel, successfully repelling
repeated assaults from the garrison town of Nakfa on a high plateau. In order to avoid repeating the
ELF's organisational errors, the leadership ensured that members received not only military training
but rigorous political education as well. All members received the same education regardless of
background, in order to maintain a sense of internal equality.

The peak of EPLF was from 1975 to October 1977 - when along with ELF, overran much of Eritrea
leaving Asmara, Barentu, and the ports of Assab and Massawa under government control and with
the road between Asmara and Massawa severed, both cities were effectively under siege. An
operational milestone for EPLF is considered on the 25th March, 1977 where the EPLF overran the
Ethiopian garrison at Nafka. This Ethiopian defeat heavily demoralised the state’s troops throughout
the region. In the following months, the EPLF took control of Afabet, Keren, Elabored and
Dekemhare, capturing considerable quantities of weapons. Its main objectives included-
● To ensure that Eritrea gained total independence from the Ethiopian military and political
operations.
● To unite the liberation movement into a cohesive body by instilling discipline among its ranks,
educating members politically, and reducing regionalism, religion, and ethnicity.
● To create an independent state for Eritrea which will have efficient administrative structures to run
liberated areas.
Page No. | 55
Ethiopian Democratic Union(EDU)

The Ethiopian Democratic Union came into existence as a result of the September 1974 revolution,
which brought about a change in the regime after Haile Selassie's reign. To understand how and why
the EDU came to be, what it represents, and whom it represents, one must appreciate the magnitude
of transformations that the Derg placed on society immediately following the coup.

The Derg swiftly implemented a series of changes to dismantle the institutional basis of the imperial
regime. It overthrew the traditional monarchy, seized private land under nationalisation, removed the
traditional nobility from provincial governance, and removed high-ranking military leaders of the
Selassie regime.

These decisions created, within a short period, a large number of displaced people who lost their
political and economic livelihoods, as well as many who lost their own freedom through the Derg's
increased rates of detainment and execution of former officials during the period of 1974-1975.
Therefore, these displaced people were used as the initial pool of members and social base for the
Ethiopian Democratic Union. The EDU was established in the aftermath of the 1974 Ethiopian
revolution and the military coup that followed, led by the Derg and which overthrew Emperor Haile
Selassie in September 1974. It professed a conservative agenda and was established under the
tutelage of Ras Mengesha Seyoum, the hereditary prince of Tigray. Ras Mengesha Seyoum's
biography is absolutely inseparable from EDU's identity, as he was the son of Ras Seyum
Mangasha, the grandson of Ras Mangasha Yohannes and the great-grandson of Emperor Yohannes
IV, the only emperor of the Tigrayan cadet branch of the Solomonic dynasty.

After his father was murdered during the unsuccessful 1960 coup against Sellasie - Mengesha
Seyoum was elevated to the title of the Leul Ras and became Prince and Governor of Tigray,
governing from his capital in Mek'ele until the monarchy was abolished in 1974. His marriage into
the imperial family, his wife being Aida Desta, a granddaughter of Haile Selassie, the father,
cemented his status as the embodiment of the monarchist tradition that EDU sought to represent.
Page No. | 56
In 1974, when the Derg Junta toppled the monarchy, the representatives of the Derg ordered
Mengesha Seyoum to the capital to face charges of corruption. Instead of yielding to his charges, he
fled to the hills, where he helped to found what eventually became the Ethiopian Democratic Union.
His wife, Princess Aida Desta, and his daughter were arrested by the Derg in 1934, which brought in
personal stakes of the struggle for the EDU's principal leader. As a result, their operations and their
dedication were immediate and concrete. A more specific structural detail of the EDU which is
worth attention is the absorption of a pre-existing armed group known as the Teranafit. Originally
the Ternafit was formerly a separate group based in Shire before it merged with EDU. Shire is
basically a town in the western part of Tigray province which is necessarily close to the Sudan
border - which was also strategically exploited as it served as EDU’s principal rear base and
logistical corridor. The merger between the two extensively increased the armed capacity and gave it
a significant degree of a more established local presence. Major objectives include -
● The purpose was to topple the military regime of Derg and remove it from power by armed and
political resistance.
● To restore the political system of constitutionalism, with many members favoring the restoration
of the Ethiopian monarchy or a government based on pre-1974 constitutional traditions.
● To be a voice for opposition forces displaced by the 1974 revolution, including members of the
imperial government, the traditional nobility, and others opposing the policies of the Derg.

Local Anti-Derg Formations

The Tigray People's Liberation Front was founded on 18 February 1975 at Dedebit in northwestern
Tigray, which started with a dozen men. Unlike the Eritrean or the Somali Liberation Front, it did
not seek independence but aimed to overthrow the Central Government and implement its own
version of the Ethiopian Revolution. The ideological foundations were derived from the Tigray
historical memories from the brutally suppressed 1943 Woyane Revolt, along with a synthesis of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine in Tigrayan ethno-nationalism with a notably pro-Albanian socialist
orientation in its early program. Internally, the TPLF's relationship with other opposition movements
was at war. It fought both the conservative EDU and the pan-Ethiopian EPRP in Tigray, at times
cooperating tactically with Derg against the former.
Page No. | 57
Beyond the aforementioned movements mentioned in the study guide, the Derg faced armed
opposition across every administrative region of Ethiopia essentially. The Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), founded in 1973, pursued the total Oromo national liberation and had reorganized itself with
a revised political program by 1976, operating primarily in the Shashar mountains through poorly-
equipped relatives to other movements.

The Afar Liberation Front was born out of the DERK's June 1975 attempt to arrest Sultan Alimirah
Hanfadhe, which provoked armed resistance.

The Ethiopian EPRP, entirely distinct from its Eritrean namesake, was a pan-Ethiopian Marxist-
Leninist organization founded in 1972 in West Berlin that rejected the Derg rule and has allegedly
conducted an urban assassination campaign against Derg officials and Misan cadres, and had been
largely destroyed in other cities by August 1977.A minor Eritrean sprinter, the ELF-Popular
Liberation Forces had added a third voice to the already fractured Eritrean theater.

Page No. | 58
Role of arms trasnfer in exacerbating the conflict

Militarisation of the Conflict

Significant numbers of weapons flowed into the Horn of Africa, drastically intensifying the conflict.
Although much of this was provided by foreign powers to both the Ethiopian and Somali armed
forces, a certain amount leaked out onto the illegal arms market through capture from battlefields,
theft and illicit transfers and black market operations. Weak and very long borders of the Horn
region allowed for relatively easy movement of small arms and ammunition, both for governmental
forces as well as militia fighters. Increased proliferation of weapons-especially small arms, machine
guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons-provided a capacity for fighting men to engage in larger and
more sustained military campaigns than perhaps was possible before. The ease with which losses
can be replaced and the capacity to engage opposing forces can be maintained ensured that battle
took place and more people died, in more violent circumstances, and with greater destruction. This
ease of access also meant that small militias and rebel organizations were equipped with the means
to prolong the conflict, raising the potential for what otherwise might have been a confined
territorial dispute into something much bigger.

Support for Insurgent Groups

Fueling Insurgent Groups Illicit arms proved crucial in arming and emboldening groups fighting in
the Ogaden region, an area inhabited predominantly by ethnic Somalis, many of whom called for
greater autonomy from or unification with the Horn of Africa nation of Somalia. The Western
Somali Liberation Front and other organizations exploited covert weapons deliveries, smuggled
arms, and the siphoning off of military equipment from government stocks. The availability of rifles,
automatic weapons, explosives, and other armaments allowed such groups to mount more effective
guerrilla raids on Ethiopian forces. These more capable insurgents were better equipped to carry out
ambushes, attack military positions, disrupt supply lines, and control parts of the countryside. The
constant stream of Weapons facilitated the recruitment of more insurgents as organized armed
groups could outfit newcomers for ongoing fighting, thereby increasing the scope and duration of
the conflict, fueling a local insurgency into an international problem.
Page No. | 59
Escalation Through External Actors
It became an important Cold War arena where the US and the Soviet Union battled to expand their
influence and support aligned regimes. Initially allied with the USSR, Somalia found support from
the latter as Ethiopia, following political changes in the Horn, became one of the leading Soviet
allies, receiving a large influx of weapons from the Soviet Union. While most of this official
military assistance poured through formal channels, such as governments, the massive number of
weapons allegedly being circulated in the area opened a Pandora’s Box of diversions, thefts,
battlefield losses, and unauthorised redistributions of weaponry, all of which were then siphoned
into the informal sector where they became available to local armed actors and insurgents. This, in
turn, reduced the bar to engagement, encouraging previously excluded groups to obtain arms and
participate in the war.

Page No. | 60
Millitarisation of the Horn of Africa

Arms Transfer
Militarisation of the Horn of Africa during the 1960s and 1970s was mainly due to the inflow of
external arms transfer. Unlike other African countries' conflicts, which relied heavily on light-armed
infantry forces, the Ogaden War involved fairly advanced techniques of warfare like tanks, jet
aircraft, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and sophisticated communication systems supplied by
the Cold War powers . Between 1963 and 1977, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
established Somalia as one of the greatest military alliances in Africa. Driven by a desire for
strategic naval access to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, the USSR provided hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of military assistance to Somalia - a part record of which can be seen below
(containing only the main supply)-

MiG-21MF, MiG-17 Fighters, Il-28 Light Bombers,Mil

Airforce Mi-8, Mi-4 Helicopters,Antonov An-24 and An-26
Transports

T-54/T-55 Main Battle Tanks, T-34/85 Tanks, BTR-

Armor and
40, BTR-50, BTR-152 Armored Personnel
Ground
Carriers,BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicles
Vehicles

Artillery BM-21 Grad Rocket Launchers, 122mm and 130mm

and Air Towed Howitzers, ZSU-23-4 Shilka, SA-2 Guideline
defence and SA-3 Goa SAMs

AK-47 and AKM Rifles, RPD and RPK Machine Guns,

Small arms
RPG-2 and RPG-7 Anti-Tank Launchers
Page No. | 61
As was the tradition with Cold War conflicts, Ethiopia followed a completely opposite alignment.
Under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia became one of the largest recipients of American military
assistance in Africa. The United States of America (USA )viewed Ethiopia as strategically valuable
due to its proximity to the Red Sea alongside its communication facilities at Cagnew Station in
Eritrea. During the 1960s and 1970s, the USA was the primary foreign ally of Ethiopia - the USA
supplied Ethiopia with approximately 280 million USD (which, as per the recent conversion rate, is
approx. 3.09 billion USD). The following table shows a list of a part main military supplies given to
Ethiopia(containing only the main supply):-

Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighters,North American

Airforce F-86 Sabres, C-119 Flying Boxcars, C-47
Skytrains, T-28 Trojan Trainers

Armor and Ground M41 Walker Bulldog Tanks, M47 Patton Tanks,
vehicles M113 APCs, M59 APCs, Utility Trucks

M1 Garand, M14 Rifles, M2 Browning Machine

Artillery and
Guns, M1918 BARs, M101 105mm Howitzers,
Infantry weapons
M79 Grenade Launchers & Recoilless Rifles

Page No. | 62
Effect of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution on the militarisation of
the region

The infamous period of ‘almost war’ known as the Cold War - observed multiple proxy wars, such
as the Vietnam War, Cuban Missile Crisis or the Korean War - all of the conflicts had the USA and
USSR on either side of the war, which remained fixed throughout the tenure of the tension. However
for the first time, the Long Twilight Struggle saw a potential deviation from this customary tradition
- in none other than the Ogaden crisis.

In 1974, Ethiopia went under a military coup, overthrowing Emperor Haile Selassie I, mainly driven
by the Derg, which established a Marxist-Leninist state. Following the 1974 revolution, Soviet-
Ethiopian relations strengthened due to their identical ideologies - necessarily shouting for
alternative sources of military and economic support.. In March 1977, Fidel Castro’s attempts to
establish a socialist federation between Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen failed due to
disapproval from Somalia, citing the ongoing Ogaden dispute as the main reason - this further
reinforced Ethiopia’s position as a potential principal ally in the region.

During Mengistu Haile Mariam's May 1977 visit to Moscow, Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation
deepened and military assistance to Addis Ababa increased. When Somalia launched an invasion
into Ogaden in July,1977, the USSR found itself on the very centre of the crossroads, by supporting
both the belligerents with supplies. However, by August 1977, Soviet support for Somalia had been
curtailed while Ethiopia’s military aid the USSR expanded rapidly, which completely shifted the
dynamics of the militarisation of the Horn of Africa. The 1974 revolution and alliance shift
dynamics faced by the USA created a difficult situation for it. For decades, Ethiopia had been one of
the USA’s closest African partners, largely due to the strategic importance of the Kagnew station in
Eritrea. However, the 1974 revolution, which led to the emergence of the Derg, fundamentally
altered the bilateral relations. By 1977, American policymakers were concerned about the Derg's
repression, ideological orientation, and alignment with the Soviet bloc.
Page No. | 63
At the same time, the invasion of Somalia into the Ogaden region made it difficult for the USA to
support them as it would mean support for territorial revisions through force - something which
Washington claims to be against in multiple international forums. As a result, a cautious diplomatic
approach fitted the situation best, considering the conditions.

This apparent shift of alliance was closely monitored by the Arab world, which mainly considered
the Ogaden issue through a lens that placed Ethiopia on the other side, largely due to Somalia’s Arab
League membership, which Ethiopia did not have. As Soviet support slowly moved towards
Ethiopia, the Arab states became increasingly sympathetic to Somalia. Saudi Arabia became one of
the main financial sources of Somalia, fearing that a consolidated Marxist government would
consolidate Soviet control over the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb. Egypt’s concerns were not only
fueled by Cold War politics but a strategic interest in the Nile basin, as a result of which they offered
strategic but limited support to Somalia. The states neighbouring the religion viewed this situation
through a lens of regional security. Kenya was perhaps the most concerned about a Somali victory
due to the controversial Somali expansionist policy of a ‘Greater Somalia’ which included Kenya’s
northern frontier district.

Consequently, Kenya supported Ethiopia's point of view regarding the preservation of existing
borders and welcomed developments that constrained Somali expansion. Sudan, although expressing
concerns about the rising influence of Ethiopia in the region, avoided any direct military
participation. President Jafaar Nimeiry had adopted a staunch anti-communist and a pro-western
orientation after the failed coup attempt in 1971. Djibouti faced even a more delicate situation,
gaining its independence in June 1977, and beyond any doubt, remained neutral. In contrast, South
Yemen, being closely associated with the USSR, became an important regional partner of Ethiopia.

By October 1977, the revolution and an apparent Soviet shift towards Ethiopia did not only reshape
alliances - but also shook the very foundations of the ongoing Cold War politics.

Page No. | 64
Berbera Naval Base

The port city of Bebera, located on the Northern coast of Somalia along the Gulf of Aden, was one
of the most strategically valuable military facilities available outside the Warsaw Pact. Its
importance is not derived from Somalia directly, but its geographical location, which is located near
the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, the narrow maritime chokepoint between the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean. Any nation that possesses access to this corridor can monitor the shipping routes connecting
Europe, the Middle East, East Africa, and Asia.

Following the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1967 Arab Israeli War, the strategic value of the
transit corridors around the Horn of Africa substantially increased. Soviet access to Berbera was
established in the 1963 Soviet-Somali military cooperation agreement. Berbera emerged from a
relatively modest Somali harbour to a highly sophisticated logistical facility which is capable of
carrying out long-range Soviet naval operations effectively serving as the hotpoint of Soviet military
interest and an important contribution to the militarisation of the region. The strategic importance of
Berbera increased mainly when Soviet naval doctrine underwent a change where naval practices
were expanded beyond the traditional European waters to challenge Western influence over
maritime regions. Berbera also provided the USSR with a logistical hub for ships to observe western
naval movements and maintain a presence near vital oil transportation routes linking the Persian
Gulf to global markets

The Soviet relationship with Berbera was further complicated in the Ogaden war. As the Kremlin
was showing tendencies towards a more pro-Ethiopian stance, it made Berbera an asset and a
liability. Supporting Somalia meant alienating the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia, and openly supporting
Ethiopia meant completely losing access to Berbera. Soviet policymakers were trying to navigate
this dilemma as relations with Somalia worsened.

Page No. | 65
Kagnew Station

Ethiopia represented the cornerstone of US policy in the Horn of Africa and no other facility
represented the relation more than the Kagnew Station in Asmara, Eritrea. American access to the
Kagnew station was established by the multiple agreement between USA and Ethiopia under
Emperor Haile Sellasie - Kagnew rose to be one of the most important American centres for
communication and intelligence facilities outside continental America. Kagnew being located at a
relatively high altitude, has exceptional long range radio communication and surveillance. During
the 1950s and 1960s - Kagnew acted as a critical node connecting the USA to European, Middle
Eastern, African and even some Asian countries. At its peak, thousands of military personnel,
technicians and other officials were placed in the Kagnew [Link] the strategic importance
of Kagnew is extended far beyond [Link] (in the Horn of Africa) occupied a
position adjacent to several regions of immense geopolitical importance: the Middle East, the Red
Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean. The United States viewed Ethiopia as a stable
pro-Western partner capable of counterbalancing Soviet influence in these areas. As a result,
Ethiopia became one of the largest recipients of American military assistance in Africa. Thus,
making the Kagnew station the fundamental reason of the militarisation mainly from the American
side

The relationship between Ethiopia and the USA began to deteriorate in early 1970s - as with
advancement in communication technology - strategic importance of Kagnew had decreased,
although still a very important access point of the USA. However after the 1974 revolution in
Ethiopia, the situation worsened. The established Derg undertook multiple policies like
nationalization which conflicted with American interests. By 1977, USA faced a major strategic
dilemma: continuing to support Ethiopia will consolidate a power which is increasingly inclined
towards the USSR and supporting Somalia would indicate support for forced revisions of the border
on the global platform. The developments and the importance of Kagnew show why the USA were
involved in the multiple developments. Although the strategic importance had decreased by the early
1970s, the Kagnew station is still a powerful symbol for long standing US-Ethiopian relations.
Page No. | 66
MESSAGE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

As we stand on the brink of another potential crisis that could wreak havoc on the world again after
1945, the Executive Board would like to remind all delegates of the fragile state of the international
community right now. We expect all delegates to come up with meaningful and plausible solutions
that can actually bring an end to this catastrophe.

The victims should be compensated for, and the criminals should be reminded why international
laws and justice endure and triumph over genocide and war. The freeze date of the committee, 29th
October 1977, has been set for a very specific reason. It has been set so that the committee does not
need to take such measures, which actually took place after that fateful day.

The deadline for the submission of position papers will be the 26th of July, 2026. By 1st August,
11:59 p.m., 3 pre-committee paperworks may be submitted to the email ID given below. The email
ID to which all submissions are to be made is [Link]@[Link].

All the best to all the delegates!

Page No. | 67
CITATIONS

[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
35c7881a57b6/NorthernFrontierDistrictOfKenya
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
imperialism-and-internal-divisions/
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
again/
[Link]
[Link]
and-the-new-cold-war/
[Link]
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[Link] [Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
and-the-enforcement-of-proletarian
internationalism/C85D934D21DBB143DFC242258EEA536
[Link]
and-the-enforcement-of-proletarian
internationalism/C85D934D21DBB143DFC242258EEA5363
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]

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