Module 4

REPRESENTATION AND
ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Human memory does not store information
randomly. Instead, the mind organizes information
in a structured way so that it can be understood,
retrieved, and used quickly. This organization
mainly happens through concepts and categories,
which form the basis of knowledge representation.
1. Concept and Categorization
Concept
Medin (1989) defined a concept as:
“An idea that includes all that is characteristically
associated with it. In other words, a concept is a
mental representation of some object, event, or
pattern that has stored in it much of the knowledge
typically thought relevant to that object, event, or
pattern.” For example, would include information
to the effect that a dog is an animal, has four legs
and a tail, has a reputation as “man’s best friend,”
is a common pet, and so on.

Category
A category is a class of similar objects or entities
that share either:
 An essential core feature, or
  Similar perceptual, biological, or functional
properties
Example:
All science subjects belong to the category
“science.”

Importance of Concepts and

Categorization
 Concepts help organize knowledge in the mind.
 Categorization helps us create mental groups
or “buckets.”
 It helps us recognize new things by relating
them to familiar categories.
 Categorization also helps us make predictions
and respond appropriately to new situations.

Theoretical Descriptions of the Nature of

Concepts
The Classical View of Concepts
 The classical view was the dominant theory in
psychology until the 1970s.
 It originates from the ideas of Aristotle.
 According to this view, all members of a
concept share certain fundamental features.
Necessary and Sufficient Features
 The classical view states that features are:
 o Individually necessary
o Collectively sufficient
Individually Necessary
 A feature is individually necessary if every
example of the concept must have that
feature.
 Example:
o A triangle must have three sides.
o If something does not have three sides, it
cannot be a triangle.
Collectively Sufficient
 A group of features is collectively sufficient
if anything that has all those features
automatically belongs to the concept.
 Example:
o “Three sides” + “closed geometric figure” =
triangle
o Any figure with both features is considered a
triangle.

Implications of the Classical View

[Link] are lists of features
o Concepts represent general properties of
objects.
o They are not specific examples, but abstract
descriptions.
 [Link] membership is clear
o Something either belongs to the category or
it does not.
o There are no intermediate cases.
[Link] members are equal
o Every member of the category is equally good.
o For example, in this view, all triangles are
equally valid triangles.

Challenges to the Classical View

Research by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues
questioned the classical theory.
Typicality Effect
 Rosch found that people think some members
of a category are better examples than others.
Example:
 Robin and sparrow → very typical birds
 Chicken, penguin, ostrich → less typical birds
This shows that people think some birds are “more
bird-like” than others.
Evidence Supporting Typicality
[Link] Verification Tasks
 People respond faster to sentences like:
o “A robin is a bird”
  Compared to:
o “A chicken is a bird”
[Link] Examples
 When asked to list examples of a category,
people usually list typical examples first.
[Link] Priming Studies
 Typical category members produce stronger
priming effects than less typical ones.
Evidence Against the Classical View
Research by Michael McCloskey and Sam
Glucksberg showed problems with the classical
theory.
Their Experiment
 Participants were asked whether certain items
belong to a category.
Example:
 “Does chair belong to the category furniture?”
Findings
[Link] disagreed about atypical items
 Example: bookends as furniture
[Link] gave inconsistent answers
 The same person sometimes gave different
answers in different sessions
[Link] do not have clear boundaries
  Membership is not always definite
[Link] cannot easily list necessary and sufficient
features
 Even when asked directly, most people cannot
produce complete feature lists for categories.

The Nature of Concepts

The Prototype View
 The Prototype View is a way of understanding
how people think about concepts.
 It is a theory in psychology that explains how
people organize concepts in their mind.
 The Prototype View says that people group
things together based on a picture of what is
typical for that group called a prototype.
 We do not use rules to decide what belongs in
a group.
 Instead we compare things to this mental
picture to figure out if they fit in.
What is a Prototype?

A prototype is the example of a group of things.

Example:
If we think about birds our prototype might be
something like a sparrow or a pigeon.
Typical birds have wings can fly, have feathers
and are medium-sized.
Some birds are very typical, like robins.
Others, like ostriches are not as typical because
they cannot fly.
Penguins are less typical but they are still
[Link] shows that the groups we make are
not always clear cut.

Key Features of The Prototype View

[Link] decide what group something belongs to by

thinking about how similar it’s to our mental
picture.
We ask ourselves: How similar is it to what I
think of as an example?

[Link] things in a group are examples than

others.
For instance apples and mangoes are fruits.
Olives are not as typical.
We can identify examples faster than less typical
ones and this is called the typicality effect.

[Link] groups we make are not always clear cut.

The Prototype View says that groups are flexible
and it is not always easy to say what belongs and
what does [Link] Rosch developed The
Prototype View in the 1970s. Her work showed
that people think some things are examples of a
group than others and they react faster to typical
examples.
Inshort, The Prototype View says that we think
about concepts as average examples and we
decide what group something belongs to based
on how similar it is, to that example.

EXEMPLARS
The mind forms ideas by keeping particular
instances in memory. These stored instances go
by the name of EXEMPLARS. Instead of building
abstract definitions, this perspective claims our
thinking relies on concrete past encounters.
Close similarity guides judgments when meeting
something new. What matters is resemblance to
known examples, not idealized versions. People
do not blend prior events into one general image.
Stored memories of actual situations shape how
things get sorted later. The idea here turns away
from summary-like concepts entirely.
Recognition happens through comparison, not
rules. Specificity remains central, even when
facing unfamiliar inputs. Mental categories grow
from experience, case by case. Not every
instance gets smoothed out into a prototype.
Familiar moments reappear when making sense
of fresh ones. Thinking leans on what was really
encountered before. Generalizations form
indirectly, if they appear at all. Memory holds the
pieces that classification uses afterward.
One way to think about how people understand
“dog” is through specific animals they have met.
For instance, there might be Fido – a golden
retriever whose ears hang low. Another could be
Rover, spotted and without a tail. Then comes
Precious, tiny, dressed up, nails colored, adorned
with a ribbon. Memory keeps each as its own
distinct case. Facing a strange animal later on,
someone doesn’t measure it against some
perfect mental image of dogness. Now imagine
matching a new experience against past ones
already kept in memory. When it looks very
much like several of those earlier cases, the mind
labels it a dog. Rather than building one perfect
mental image, this method skips generalizing
altogether. Think of it as recognition by
familiarity, not by fitting into a mold. Each known
example stays distinct, influencing judgment
based on closeness. There is no single summary
standing in for all others here.
A learner enrolled in an abnormal psychology
class reviews four detailed cases involving
people experiencing depression. Some time
afterward, they come across a piece about a
woman struggling with emotional difficulties –
though no clear label is given. Using the
exemplar method, recognition happens when her
traits feel familiar, much like one of the prior
examples already studied. Her pattern also
stands apart from others seen before, say, those
linked to anxiety-related conditions. One way to
approach this is through comparison with past
examples already held in memory. Rather than
defining clear rules or building an average
example, judgment happens differently. A match
forms when current experience lines up with
earlier ones kept intact. What matters most is
how closely the present situation resembles
those prior cases. Decisions emerge from these
likenesses, not abstract checklists.
People often struggle to list essential traits of
categories – this happens because such traits do
not exist in rigid form. Instead, sorting things into
groups relies more on resemblance to familiar
examples already held in memory. When faced
with odd or borderline cases, confusion arises
since these can resemble samples from multiple
classes. Sometimes they simply fail to match any
known example closely. Stored memories shape
judgments more than fixed definitions ever
could. A single red tomato might echo traits seen
in oranges or apples – yet share features with
squash or even beets. Because of these shared
qualities, sorting becomes less straightforward at
times, taking longer to resolve.
One key feature of the exemplar method
involves how typicality plays a role. Often,
common examples get saved more readily
compared to rare ones – alternatively, they might
match up closely with numerous existing records,
perhaps even both. This stronger resemblance
means individuals handle data on usual cases
quicker. Searching for details about an average
group member tends to bring back nearly
identical past entries without delay. What stands
out is how speed increases when familiar
patterns appear. A sparrow often feels familiar,
since its traits line up well with typical birds
people know; that match speeds recognition.
Penguins, on the other hand, stand out – fewer
shared qualities mean extra mental effort is
needed to place them within the bird category.
One solid piece of evidence backs the exemplar
model well. Looking at a standard experiment,
Evan Heit and Lawrence Barsalou in 1996 tested
if human thinking about broad groups like animal
fits patterns tied to specific instances. The first
task had subjects write down the initial thing
they thought of when given lower-tier types –
say, amphibian, bird, or insect. Then another set
of individuals judged how closely those
mentioned cases matched the general idea of an
animal. These raters also assessed how central
each smaller group felt within the broader notion
of being an animal.
Though the team pulled together various data
points, they built a formula estimating how
typical each common category felt using how
often examples appeared along with their rated
familiarity. Take insect: people mentioned bee
quite regularly, yet almost never brought up
Japanese beetle. From these patterns – how
frequent an example showed up and how
strongly it represented its group – it became
possible to identify which animal groups stood
out as most representative. In turn, the match
between real-world judgments and what the
model forecast reached r = +.92, showing nearly
perfect alignment. Not every creature weighed
equally in people’s minds – mammals often stood
out, while microbes faded into the background.
Once rare examples got set aside, the statistical
link weakened sharply, showing that familiar
cases matter just as much as unusual ones when
forming ideas about groups.
Even so, the exemplar method faces drawbacks.
Memory might overflow – too many examples
piling up across too many groups. Without a
filter, each experience saved would slow retrieval
down. Which moments turn into lasting
references remains unclear. Activation during
sorting tasks lacks a solid account. Details about
selection stay vague. Still, certain researchers
argue the exemplar method fits better when
dealing with smaller groups. On the flip side,
handling vast collections might lean toward
prototype-style thinking. Truth is, human minds
likely blend both styles at once. Specific
examples live alongside generalized ideas within
a single concept. Daily sorting tasks probably pull
from either mode depending on context. Each
system supports the other without needing strict
separation.

Theoretical Description of natural

concept- Schemata

 The schema concept invoke or invented by

Sir Fredrick Bartlet in 1932. The term schema
usually refers to something larger than
individual concept.
 Schemata (the plural of schema) incorporate
both general knowledge about the world and
information about particular events.
Eg:Your schema for “dog” includes: four legs,
tail, bark, pet animal, etc.

 Bartlet defined schema as an active

organization of past reaction. A schema is
thought to be larger unit of organized
 information used for representory concepts,
events, situvation and action in memory

 Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) schemata viewed

as fundamental building blocks of coginition.
They saw schemata as ‘packet of information’
that contains both variable and fixed part.
 There are two type of schema
1) Variable – Information that can change
Example for dog: Breed
Color
Size
2) Fixed part – Information that are always true
Example for dog:
Mammal
Four legs
Tail

ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN COGINITION

 Perception (how we see things)

 Memory (what we remember)
 Comprehension (understanding stories,
conversations, textbooks)
SCRIPTS

One kind of schema, a schema for routine

events, has been called a script
(Schank & Abelson, 1977).
Example for script:
(Restaurant script)
Enter restaurant
Get menu
Order food
Eat
Pay bill

THEORETICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE

NATURE OF CONCEPTS -THE
KNOWLEDGE BASED VIEW

A number of cognitive psychologists (Keil, 1989;

Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy & Medin, 1985)
have argued that concepts have much more to
do with people’s knowledge and worldviews than
previously recognized. Murphy and Medin (1985)
suggested that the relationship between a
concept and examples of the concept is
analogous to the relationship between a theory
and data supporting that theory.
When a person classifies objects or events, they
do not simply compare physical features of
objects with stored [Link], the
person uses his or her knowledge of how the
concept is organized to justify the classification
and to explain why certain instances happen to
go together in the same category. The
knowledge-based view helps explain how an
apparently disparate collection of objects can
form a coherent category in particular
circumstance.
Eg:In everyday life, items such as-
Children,Pets,Photo albums,Family
heirlooms,Cash-They are do not form a natural
category. However, in the context of a house fire,
they become members of the category “things to
save. This category exists because of knowledge
about value, irreplaceability, and emotional
attachment, not physical similarity.

The five approaches to conceptual structure just

reviewed have been them selves categorized into
two major types: similarity-based and
explanation-based (Komatsu, 1992). The
similarity-based category consists of the
classical, prototype, and exemplar views (and
some parts of the schemata/scripts view.

The similarity-based view of categorization states

that people classify objects mainly by comparing
their observable features and grouping items
that look alike, such as using prototypes or past
examples to judge similarity. In the explanation-
based view argues that categorization depends
more on meaningful knowledge about an object’s
function, role, or underlying relationships rather
than mere appearance; thus, people may place
items together because they understand why
they belong in the same category.

Mental imagery
According to Kosss the mental representation of
a stimuli when the stimuli are not physically
present.
Principles of mental imagery
Frinke introduced 5 principles of mental imagery
[Link] encoding : In implicit encoding, mental
images allows to retrieve the information which
are unintentionally stores.
Example : recalling the number of tables in your
classroom without having counted them
[Link] equivalence : it states that imagery
is functionally equivalent to the perception to
the extend that similar mechanisms in visual
systems are activated while imagined as the
same are actually perceived
Which means mental imagery and perception
activates similar cognitive mechanisms.
Imagining an object activates the parts of the
system which used in actual perception.
Example : when you imagine biting a lemon, you
may almost feel the sourness
[Link] equivalence : It states that spatial
arrangements of the elements of a mental
image corresponds to the way objects or their
parts are arranged on actual physical surfaces
or in actual physical shape.
[Link] equivalence : It states that
imagined transformations and physical
transformation exhibit corresponding dynamic
characteristics and are governed by the same
laws of motion
[Link] equivalence : It states that the
structure of mental images corresponds to that
of actual perceived objects, in the sense that
the structure is coherent, well organized and
can be reorganized and [Link]
complex images take longer to generate
 Example : If you imagine a shape as two
rectangles, it is easier than imagining it as five
small squares.

Criticisms
[Link] knowledge : pylyshyn argued that
imagery tasks reflect participants underlying
and implicit trait knowledge and belief.
[Link] characteristics : Participants may try
to behave in ways that please the
experimenter and results may be influenced by
task, instructions or setup
[Link] expectancy effect : Intons-
peterson showed experimenter beliefs affect
results. Sometimes experimenters
unconsciously give subtle cues to participants

MNEMONICS

Just imagine that when a student who is below

average in studies is required to learn the names
of the 12 cranial nerves in order (olfactory, optic,
oculomotor, trochlear, trigeminal, abducens, facial
etc.). Most probably, she or he will find it difficult to
successfully encode this list. In the absence of any
obvious meaningful relationship among these term,
it is difficult to apply the memory strategies
discussed earlier. Thus Rote rehearsal will become
the only option. Fortunately, there is an alternative
option:Mnemonics.

The preceding discussion demonstrated the

usefulness of strategies related to practice. This
section, as well as the next one on organization,
emphasizes the use of mnemonics (pronounced
“ni-mon-icks,” with a silent initial m). Mnemonics
are mental strategies designed to improve your
memory (Hunter, 2004b). When we use mnemonics
that emphasize imagery, we mentally represent
objects or actions that are not physically present.

Mnemonics Using Organization

Mnemonics devices are method for enhancing
memory. Researchers have found that mnemonics
learning is superior to rote learning (Woethen &
Hunt, 2010; Saber & Johnson, 2008). Among
various mnemonics devices, some of the
strategies- such as acrostic, acronyms, and
narrative methods are designed to make abstract
material more meaningful. Other mnemonic
devices depend on visual imagery.

Acrostics and Acronyms

 Acrostic are phrases in which the first letter of
each word functions as a cue to help you recall the
information to be remembered. Usually these
letters will form a name, motto, or message when
read in sequence. For example, consider the note –
E,G,B,D,E will serve as a cue for retrieval.
A slight variation on Acrostic is the acronym where
– an abbreviation or word formed from the initial
letter of the successive or major parts of a term.
Eg: memories the colour of rainbow in the form:
VIBGYOR .

Narrative Method
Another useful way remember a list of word is “the
narrative story method” or “narrative chaining”. It
involves linking a list of words together to form a
story using fluid, vivid imagery. The narrative
increases the meaningfulness of the words and
links them in a specific order.

Rhymes
Another verbal mnemonic that people often rely on
is rhymes. Rhymes are one of the simplest ways to
boost memory. By rhyming information, our brains
can encode it more easily (“acoustic encoding”).
When we see a rhyme, we break the words into
phonemes-The first step in decoding a word. For
example, if the end of each line ends in a similar
sound, creating a singsong pattern, then it is easier
to remember.

Link method
The link method is a mnemonic that relies on the
power of interactive visual imagery which connects
items in a list, making a chain. Thus, retrieving one
item in the list cues the next item. For instance,
suppose that you need to remember some items to
buy which include: a news magazine, shaving
cream, film, and pens. By visualise a public figure
on the magazine cover shaving with a pen while
being photographed, you can remember all these
items.

Method of Loci
Another visual mnemonic is the method of loci,
which involves taking an imaginary walk along a
familiar path where images of items to be
remembered are associated with certain locations.
The first step of this method is to memorize a
series of loci, or places which is familiar to you
(usually own home or neighborhood). Then imagine
each thing you want to remember in these
locations. When you need to remember the items,
imagine yourself walking along the path. These
imageries will serve as cues for the retrieval of the
images that you formed. Moreover, this method
will help you to remember items in their correct
order because the order is determined by the
sequence of location along the pathway.

Conclusion
Mnemonics are powerful memory strategies that
improve learning and recall. Techniques such as
Acrostics and Acronyms, Narrative methods,
Rhymes, Link method, and Method of loci make
information more meaningful and organized. By
using mnemonics, students can enhance their
memory performance and achieve better academic
results.

Memory Codes
Coding
Brain doesn’t always store information exactly as it
looks. It often translate it into a format that is
easier to keep alive in mind. A study by R Conrad
(1964) He presented participants with lists of
consonants for later recall although the letters
were presented visually, Participations were likely
to make errors that were similar in sound to the
original stimuli if a P had been presented, and
participants Later miss recalled this stimulus, they
were much more likely to report a letter that
sounded like P than to report a letter that looked
like p (like F) the original presentation was visual,
but participants Apparently were confused by the
sound. Participants were apparently forming a
Mental representation of the stimuli that involved
acoustic rather than the visual properties.
Later work by Baddeley (1966a, 1966b) confirmed
this effect even when the stimuli were words rather
than letters: Similar-sounding words make for Poor
immediate recall, although similar-meaning words
don’t, and the reverse Is true for delayed recall.
Although an acoustic code is not the only one used
in short term memory, researchers have regarded
it as the dominant code used, at least by hearing
adults and older children (Neath & Surprenant,
2003).

Dual Coding Hypothesis

Allan Paivio originated the dual-coding hypothesis
of

Memory to explain the workings of various

mnemonics. According to Paivio, Long-term
memory contains two distinct coding systems (or
codes) for representing information to be stored.
One is verbal, containing information about an
item’s abstract, linguistic meaning. The other
involves imagery: mental pictures of some sort that
represent what the item looks like. Items to
remember can be coded by either verbal labels or
visual images and in some cases both. Ivio’s idea is
that pictures and concrete words give rise to both
verbal labels and visual images; that is, they have
two possible internal codes or mental
representations. Abstract words, in contrast,
typically have only one kind of code or
representation: a verbal label.
One study by Paivio (1965) provided
evidence to support this hypothesis. Participants
were asked to learn one of four lists of noun pairs.
The first list included pairs in which both referred
to concrete objects (for example, Book–table). The
second list included pairs in which the first noun
was Concrete and the second abstract (such as
chair–justice). The third list was the converse of the
second (such as freedom–dress). The fourth
contained pairs of abstract nouns (for example,
beauty–truth).
Paivio (1965) explained the
results as follows. Whenever possible, participants
spontaneously formed visual images of the noun
pairs. The formation was easiest with concrete
nouns. Paivio (1969) assumed that visual imagery,
unlike verbal labeling, increases as a function of
concreteness: the more concrete the noun, the
richer the image and the more elaborated the
internal code. This helps explain why pictures (very
concrete) are often remembered better than words
When items are Coded by both images and verbal
labels (as concrete nouns can be), the Changes of
the learner’s retrieving them are obviously better.
If the learner forgets the verbal label, he or she
might still access the visual image, or vice-versa.
Items coded only by verbal labels are
disadvantaged; if the verbal label Iis s forgotten or
“misplaced,” the learner has less to go on.
Further, Paivio (1969) believed
that the first noun in a pair (called the “stimulus”
noun) serves as a conceptual peg on which the
second (“response”) Noun is hooked. In this sense,
the stimulus noun serves as a “mental anchor,” a
Place to which the representation of the response
noun can be attached. Thus the imaginability of the
first noun is particularly important in improving
memorability, explaining why recall

The Relational-Organizational Hypothesis

Bower (1970b)

Proposed an alternative to the dual-coding

hypothesis that he called the relational-
organizational hypothesis. He believed that
imagery improved memory not because images
are necessarily richer than verbal labels, but
because imagery produces more associations
between the items to be recalled. Bower performed
an experiment to distinguish between the
dualcoding and the relational-organizational
hypotheses. Participants were divided into three
groups, each given different instructions for a
paired-associates learning task. One group was
told to use “overt rote repetition” (that is, to
rehearse aloud); the second, to construct two
images that did not interact and were “separated
in imaginal space”; the third, to construct an
interactive scene of the two words in a pair (p.
530). Results showed that all participants
recognized about 85% of the previously seen
words. However, recall of those words differed
greatly. Those who used rote memorization
recalled about 30% of the paired associates; those
using noninteractive imagery, 27%; and those who
formed interacting images, about 53%. If imagery
simply led to more elaborated coding of the paired
associates, as the dual-coding hypothesis predicts,
then participants in the two conditions that
involved instructions to form two images ought to
have performed similarly.