ARTICLE 4

Chapter Il • State and Nationalism in the

Contemporary Caribbean

1 have frawûled cYt!f}'where in your seo of the Cl1ribbCQn . . . From Haiti

to BarlMdos, to MartiniquB and Guadeloupe, and 1 know what l am
speaking about.. You are ail togc/her, in flH! S<tmB boat, sailing the
same \incertain seo ci tiu7Iship and race unimporfant, feeblc fittle
labe/s compared 10 the mesSlIgc tha! my sPirit brings to me; that of the
position and predicament whicll His/ory /lIlS imposed upon you.. l
saw it (iTS! with the dance .. tlTe mcrenguil in Haiti, the beguine in
Martinique and roda )' 1 hcar, de mon oreille mOIte, the eeha of calypsoes
(rom Trinidad, ]amaica, St. Lucia, Dominicd and the [agendary Guiam1.
. Il l' flO accident tllol the seo wlziclz separa/es your lands rruJkes no
difference to the rh ythm of yom body.
Père Labat, l743

T he quest to [Link] the ",te .nd th i" [Link]~ .n.~tion

#
. are oounClupinextnca6 y Wlt the Carib~e~n~ple) wish to exer­
cisë controTOver- fficir -sôcieticS' and their destinies~ As comp1etely
artlficial socicticS-indëlililyst:3mped with the pervasive legacies of
imperialism, coloni31ism, an d slavery, the Caribbean $ocieties have
had an inordinate difficulty in creating and maintaining a shong, co­
 pB THE CA lt lBB8AN STATf: AND NATIONALISM
Pl
besive nat ional sensibility. Sorne exist as precariously viable political in sclf-de6n itioll or even in how others may ehoose ta view th em­
entities in a milieu of scaree resources and marginal administrative and a veritable nightmare for st:J tistician s, demographcrs, and espe·
skills. The models of deveJopment for other states and n:l lions sim­ ciall y Ihose obsesscd with color and race. Nothing in the C arîbbean
ply do not easily fit the Ca ribbean cxperience. is simple. Bipolar contrasts rarely exist. Things tend ta be placed
T he long. tortuous struggle to dism3ntl e imperialism, Qvercome along a Ruid spectrum, and Ihe local speech richly refl ects this grad ·
colon ialism, and crea te independent states or forge cohesive nations uated variety. ~ven the term "Caribbean" can be subjeet to various
has produced bittcrsweet results throughout the C aribbean . As the political and geographical definiti ollS.
twentieth century ends, ail the various Caribbean states nod them­ The ethnie am3Jg3 m that th e peopl e o f the United States crudely
selves in difficult situations. rn many cases, they haye secmed..J:b,e and si mply ca tegorized as "bla ck" or " wl~e" was, Olt the very least,

\, e:~istence of the ~n maitV'areas fhey have conclusivek..esta b·

l~shed ..:!~L~---g.h thev have not yet neces­
sarily_~tal:~]jshcd..J!.S.2llS en sus·on ,J,yha t represen,tcçe ~ Without
always tripartite in the Caribbea n . C olor and race were never simple
watert ight categories in themselves but rather charac teristics that
blended with others 10 produce changeable categories. Because their
1
\ doubt, they have created an identity--or had one raIS upon th em. origins are so diverse, when the Caribbean peopl es do designate them­
But the confiden ce that these goals-state, nationalism, identi ty­ selves, they do so in confusing. someti mes hyphenated, blends rather
would provide the panacea for the good life is wan ing. TIl e dism3n· than in sharpl y distinguishable elemen ts polarized as si mply blac,"­
tling of imperialism shattered the vague prospect of a common or white, African, Asian, American Indian, or European .
regional nationalism, even among those comn\Unities not divided by No I:wo censuses o f th e Jamaican government provide identical
language or culture. Th e fragm entation has endured weil into the categories for racial designation s of the popul ation. In 1960, the
twentieth century as the emergence of mini-states shoy.'s no cessatiOn categories were: African, Afro-European, East Indian, Afro ·East ln ­
with the desires o f M ontserrat and Aruba ta seek their own ind e­ dian, C hinese, European, Afro-C hinese, Syrian, and O ther. E xcept
pendent status. The cruel current iron y is that havin g struggled to for th e category labcled, "Syrian ," there was some obvious geographi .
throw off the asphyxiating bonds of imperialism and colonialîsm, the cal logic ta th e designation . In 1970, however, the ca tegories were
region find s bath its stability and its viability threatened by a num­ changed ta n~ad: Negro-Black, Amerindian, East Jndian, Portuguese,
ber of insidious forces. But before examining these, it is worth look­ C hinese, W hite, M ixed , Syrian / Lebanese, Olher, and Not Slated .
ing at Ule fr~~ent ed regign. Most census returns for th e region do not provide the type of meticu,
The Caribbean reality at the end of the twen tieth een tury is tan· lous breakdown offered by the Jamaican example.
tal lzingly difficul t to define. In many ways, it is a uniquc are:!. : in its Ind eed, most Caribbean census return S fail to design ate race, al·
history, in its ethnie composition , and in its pattern of political evolu­ though race, color, and c1ass are powerful sta tus indicalors through­
tion . The nea rly thirty million inhabitants scattered across hundreds out the region . Fi~~s~d~.!.!!ti on t~ the Cubans were an ~
of islands and the main land enclaves of Belize, Guyana, Suriname, "Afro·Latin people" reflected th e realily but nevertheless shocked
and French Cuiana cepresent an eclectic blend of almost aU the quite a few Cuban s. P~l e in the C aribbe<tn prefer not 10 talk. open!Y+1 L
peopl es and cultures of the world. The languages they have inherited about race and cQlor. TIlis has not made either national sentimen t h
th ey have made their O\\'n-enriching and re·forming them ta express oc national identity easy and d eal·cut. As Roberta Johnson stales in
and reBect theu individuality, their kaleidoscopic past, and their the par ticular context of the Puerto Rican situation, "[Link] i.s
ethnic mosaic. Th e region is like a prism with light passing through­ n ~o a polit y [bu ~§~~.9..!!Jhc fçsling..Qf...l:Leing· part of a
whateve[ enters is transfonned . This leads ta enormous impcecision people, of bt>[Link] PucrtORican ." As elsewhere, the Puerto Rican s are
~- '.
 STA't1:: ANI) NAT I ONA I . I$ I'«
l'O
TKE CAR I BBEAN >u
a mosaÎc o f ethnie group~. She goes on to describ~hO,\!..[Link] Rican tion myths, of co urse, required a comman sense of the regianaI ms.
tory, and transmîtting tha t was far tram e.u y. Having lost the great
\\ cul~'!.~e is 3. C?,!g!q~~ra!e __Q(i~rts and -~i!! institutions aru ll
majority of its indigenous inhabitants, th e various intrusive ethnie
f\, il1Jported; yet [Link] is a strong. _romantic atlachmef1~ to the island,
:md cultural components of th e modern Ca ribbean simply Iried to
esp:?l~l!y amor:g .th e dias~communi !>" '1'0 a greater or Jesser
degree, this has a1so been the situation for th e Test of the Ca ribbean. appropriale and expand their views on the majority. Withollt con­
trolling political power, that was not easil y accompl ished. Commu­
The [Link] task of J~~)~a<krs_oLtb.e...p!llitically..[Link]:p_e.n.dmLSt3 tes
nit y, aiter all, has never becn an Integral part of the Caribbean e~­
~ is to conve!t tl:t':""': 'r0.!!!!1ntic [Link]:hrocn~l:O.-:l-..c~o f perience. It should not be surprising, th crefore. Ihat the notion of
1\ na...[Link] identity . nationalism ShOllld carry a variety of meanings throllghollt the Carib.
Norman Manley, in a moving introduction wri lten in
per­ bean. Jt is part of the historicall egacy of the region. The Caribbean
\11~ popular natiollalist navels of the Jamaiean author
po­ peoples clid not ail arrive al a common point by a corn mon rOll te.
", ceptively captivated the experiences as weil as the
Indeed, politics as weil as society throughout the Caribbean seem
litica! and intellectualleadership in the modem Ca ribbean :
to move along a I1llid spectTllm . 11lis was true of the initial settler
The ncw birth of JamaiCl in 1938 did many things, but one and exploi tation societies, and it rtmained true of the Jegacies they
thing [Link] out Ji\.:e a brigh t iight: the National Movement
left in the CaribbC'<ln. Whil e sorne of these territories retain ecl so rne
brought with il a gre... t upsurge of creative eneTgy . We suddenly
discovered tha! there was a place to which we belonged, and elements of their founding seUler commun ities, m:gur succllmbecl ta
the harshdtu1t.i4ing~~i2erien,Ç~ploit;)tiQ!I plan .
1
when the dead hand of colonialism was !ifted a {reedom of spi rit
was re\eased and the desert flowered. Our best young men tatiô~y based on shwerv. SeUler societies retained, in many
plungeà oeep into the lives of the people and came up \Vith cases, Ole institunonal molds and cultural norms through which a
pocms and paintings and with vivid and power!u! OOo\;s. va riant nationalism found $Ome glliding fOOts. Among the latger en.
lt was :1 strange worM they discovered; strange. most of ail, in
the lact that it was not a world whete different cultures had tities-in Bermuda, Cuba, the Dominic:1O Republic, Puerto Rico,
blended in ta a single signi6cant paltem, but a world divided and and Ma ltinique-a critical mass al Europeans existed to staff these
split in a manner as peculiar as it W3S d« p·scated_ lt was not insti tutions and to plOlIide cultural continuity and an elite consensus
just a question of coloUl, Ilor yet of rich and poor; it was a 0 0 cultllral, if Ilot political, matters. TIlese descendants of Europeans.'
mattel 01 differcnccs that involved widely different accept:mces tried to main Iain and prop~ te a mytil"ïilattliëli ·SOëIëtlëS-\Vou14.
and rejcctions of values, differenl Interpretat ions 01 ,eality. the
evenfiJàll y be the cultural mi~f2,cosms~of .European socie1ies. They
use 01 identical words io express different concepts and under·
rièôilstTue-œ&-a sorCot European polity but failed ~o infuse it with
standings.
the type of legitimacy that ensured its vital conliouily. The EUTO ' '.
Ali of these lIa rÎous differences ta which Manley referred had to be
hanuon [Link] before the foundation myths hom which national iden ­
pea~~4ed cultural ~i~~rogantly Ihought_~they ' muId aomin~tc ~
pôlltlcaI power forever, anârlle"'niàsscs, through sorne vague DarWin - r. '
l
tity draws its sustenallce could be successfull y inculca ted among the isrî rinci le, \VOtiTOevëilfiïally fà(J~- or "accultûra.(e·ÜË',;';.cr-Th at Il! i
. pllblic. C~eati~iRd~t state was one way to begill the id not work out, owever, as th e ethnie chauvinism of tlle nin e. ,\
\ \\, process ofli'a"rmonizin the vanouS sen tim ents and athfude5 th3t teenth cen tury Illmped togelher alllhose nol 3ctual1y barn in E Ulope
~\\! musfëv<"ll_ua Iy b~ thcsize? in a natiC1îlal sentim<.iït"1'h"'it,"there­ as "inferior peoples." The ne\\' euphemism was "0;ilization," ana it
fore; \vasthe worI: of the early n:a tioJ\aITsts . ~ïië[Link] con­ had strong connotations of the induslrial society. ­
sensus on the notion of the state became the essential found3tion By the c!1d of the nineteenth century. it was less easy 10 ma intain
myth for individual groups of Caribbean peopl es. C reating founda­
v
--
~
:'1
3"
THE. CA RIOB}!;A""

the m ylh o f white superiority in the exploita tion COIOL\ies- although

S TAT f; A ND KATTONAL tSM
)li

gion to con fu se e thn ie a nd geographical tenus. Race Îs therefort' 'i)

~ "'- il was always tried. C.:~ tht! resÎs tauce of the BI~.,.Carib.s. in defin ed both in terms o r geographieal origin as '1";11 as color. The Y;
~~ \ DominiC3, the defeat of th eneh soldiers in Haîti, and the va rious second observation is tha t in 1928 the white sector represented by
') :?' Mar~ the dÎrector o f the Institute of Jamaica accoun ted for less than ;
~. ~ \ w~i.!Sin the Caribb~afl5~[Link] overpower ,nonwhj tçs under
<t,, - ' .. t.-.rough2..ut the regio!,! had shattered the myth that
pelcent o f the popula tion of the island. n,is s~ t, however,
;-~> aoy and in ail circumst~~$:.Jlut minori ty stalus merely reinforced controlled both the economic and the politicalstruetures. ~Y.
:; ~ a~gffie local wll ites the prevail ing European view that the Afri· dcasticalJy reshucturing t~: .~îa l base of po.1itical power and blover.
~ cans were savages al WO l st a nd " unCÎvil ited" at best. Indeed, one th rowiiïglliè=-~Ioniàrël ite <:Qulcl an open, democra tie! and rnerÎto­
result of the succcsdui Hailian war of independenee \Vas precisely CTatic socic:..,t:x be created. Political change, then, a$Sumcd in the
to decry the do lruction of "civilizalioo" in the fonner French colony. Caribbean a c1early messi:mic quality a mong the masses. ~n. e sta te
l n 1928, the nume rically small, predominantly white Jamaican would deliver justice and oon eet wrongs and reward the supportclS
elile still pre tended that they represented the sole repository of cul­ o f benevolent change. Pol itical ind epend~e k on the qU<llities
t ure and spokc contemptuously of the overwhelming ma jority of the o f secular messianism. The érea lion of the state ad ta take rece· '\
inhabitants in unabashedly racist terms. Consider the description of dence over t he orma hon 0 ...!.. e -;;ation tfiëreby Imparting to Car!b- :
Jamaica tha t appeared in ]amaicCl in 1928: A Handbook of Informa· bean ' po I l ûdî as clsc\V ere in tiOi\"'iiiërica) a l'articula r
tion for Visitors dnd Intending Residents witl! sorne Account of the quali!y-,a ~nchant for th ~rticulate, messîanict ~ud illo- tn>~~po· . ~
Cotony's History ,vritten by the En glish expatriate director of the )i~i? ll eader ,

Institute of Jamaica, FranK C uudall , and p ublished by the West Political1y, the contemporary Caribbean community faHs into three
India Comm ittee in London in 19 28 : categories : nom inally ind;.pendent ~~, a~~i a ted sta tes, a!!.,Sl cle- I
pendencies. 1'he critenâlor this d ivision of convellicnce are legal a nd
11\e races inhabiting the W est Indies today are a few native ln· pOl'tîè3.fâ nd do not reAect c10sely the rea lity o f their power rela·
diaus ( British, Scotch Isicl. Irish and Welsh and Ihei, descen· tions in world a lTairs since no Caribbe:m sta te is, or can become,
dants). Flcnch. a lev.' CTcoie ( i.e.. \>oro in the Wt;st Indies),
absolutely îndependent. The îndependent, or sovereign , sta tes a re
Sp3n ish . Crt.'Ole, ncgloes Isic), laboureTS hom India, Chinese,
who in Jam3iea :ne lapidly developillg as a trading c1ass, and Ihe Antigua and Barbuda (l9~h). the Bahamas (19ï3), Barbados (1966),
CTeole descendants of these Indians :md Chinese, Portugllese, Bel ize (1981), C uba (U)02), Dominica (1978), the Dominican Republic
who originally camc hom Madt:ila, a kw Syrians, who came as (1865), Crenada ( 1974), Guya na ( 1<)66), Haiti (180<1 ). Ja ma ica
tradcrs, and a large Ilumbel of mi xed r2ce of negro Isic1 and Eu­
10J>C'ln in valying shades, h om Samba ( tllfce·quarter black) to
( 1 ~::'). SI. Kitts- Nevis (1983), St. Lucia ( 1977), St. V incent and i
the Grenadines (1979), Surin ame (1975), and Trinidad and Tobago 1
those in whorn the straÎn Îs impercept ible, and a small number
( l ~::') . Altogether, more tha n ::.8 million of the P.5 million people
the result 01 connections bctween negroes (sic) and coolies, ln·
dians and negrot:s [sic} , and E\lIopeans and Indians . . .. The of the Ca ribbean live in these nom inally indcpcnden.!.>sta tes, ne.
Negro race has al presenl gone b\lt a short way on Ill(: palh ta eounting for more than 86 percent o f the total rcgional population .
[Link] . Thc individuals :lU: slill as children, childlil;e in thcir The asS<f~es include A:?ba and thc Nether1a~d~ An1i11es
bdief and flith. Once gain Iheir confidence and Ihey will lrust (étlffÇ20, Bonaire, SabaJ-St. Eustatius, a nd 'St. Mathn), ail self.
implicitly.... Crolilude ÎJ, il i$ la be rcarro. not l strong point.
govéfiimg sl1l1èSi"ssoéiated w'iththeN~tht:lrands;- F.iè;;~h _9uian_a,
'l'wo observatiolls Illay be made about the above sta teml-'nt. The Guadeloupe, and Ma rti.!!.~~~~, oversc::as departO]ell~ of ,F:rane<:; alld
fi rs! is thal il bdrayed a tt.1lclcncy still p revalent throughout the rc· -- -- -
P uerto Ric"O,'"an Associated Free State, or Commonwealth, associated
 T H E CAJl.IDS2AN ST."TE AN D NAT I ONAI. I SM
J'f Fi

with the United States of America. The associated states .:Iccount tems În the Ca ribbean seldom oonfonn to the Iînguislic or cultun)
b"àùndaries. ._.­ . . --.
fo;-;Jightly more than four million people. or 13 percen t of the IC'
gional [Link], although Puerto Rico alone accounts for morc Will! the exceplion of ,[Link]îti, and Surî[Link] the indepen .
than thrte million of that subtotal. Finally. ther~arc the deecndel\: dent sta tes ail have free, open, amrcompelitive e1ect ions al more
~f varÎOUS sorts : ~ B.s,rmuda. the British Y irgin Islands, or less regular intervals. Shong Iwo·party sys len}s e:\:i~t În ~maîca,
~!Xman 1sIall~•. MoSo:a.t....thu..U!kU!!.d G~s J~ and Puerlo Rico, Barbados, and the Dominican Republîc, and al least
the D.S. Virgin Islands. Wîth slightly more than zoo,OOO persons, one dominant party ex ists in the otheT$. Regardless of the system, the
thé$e dependencle5 accOunt for Jess than 1 pelcen t of the regional region has produced an unusual nllmber of charismatic, caudilio-styJe
population. politician s: GS0,lgÇ,Price În .13~; Lxnden Pindling in th~lUas.}
1,\1(' The linguistic divisions do not correspond ncatl r with the political Fulgencio Batîs..!!' and ~Çw:m..in .9!ka; Alex~ Bust~e, \
1~{\fr:lgr:nentation~re are four ma jor language groups~.Fn i~iS-the r%rman Ma nley, Michael Manley, and Edward ~a iRiJ.a maica
'\ m2jor language in ~", [Link];? 2nd the 0 in' :.[Link]. F~ier 3~d Jean ·Claude Duvalier. in :iiti. LujL\'[~Z
lTogether these thrce stOl ccount for more than 61 percent of the Marin in _Puerto Rico; Ra Las!..[Link], Joaqu in a ~uerl andd~\
reg~l population . nglish îs the major language ln An~ An· B~sch io the D omin ican RWblici. Vere Bird in An!igua; Ç.ran tlc)'
tiS~~!1iâ":ljJ. ~~a~s, Belî,ze. Bermud3~ .~e~ti~ VGgrô

!
Adams and Errol Ba!!~ B~ckls; Efi[ÇiiUyâ ndl\~~ri~e_Bisl~op
[Link],". D~nica, Ç[Link].~S;uyan§,-J3îna,cil..!."""'Montsetl"!!, S~ts, i~ 9:9ada; êfiC [Link] in ·üjnida.d; and F2 rbes Bumhall!, and
SI. Lu~ia. SI. Vincent and the Crena,iIines, T!i!l~d and T~bag~ the Cheddi Iagan in u)'ana..The appeal of the ca udillo throughout
Turks and Caicos 1s1ands,.:-1!q~!J.S~_Virgin.. lsla nds. Allogèther these the region should not be surprising. The colonial experience carrioo
r eighleen states and territories account for slightly more tha~9;percen~f wilh il shang elements of authoritarian rule invested in governors,
the [Link])ilLpo~n (and a number less Ihan the popu a IOn 01 e govelllors·general, and captains·general. T ht: reprcsentalive assemblies
DO"minican Republic aIOne).®:endc~is the official language of the de· of the British lerrÎtorics until the middle of Ihe IwcntÎelh celltury
partments of French GuÎana, Gua e ouee, Martinique, and Haiti . llu:se \Vere oligarchicjlnd, as far as Ihe majority of the people \Vere COn.
units combinéa acco"Unt fo~ercent of tI!e Caribbean popuGii2n- al. cerned, never huly represented their interests. Thc new nal ionalist
though Haïti alone accounls for 1 S percent of thal total. ~ is politicians esta blished their legilimacy by papular acccptance. They
\ one of the official languages of ~,!lb3J the ~~herlands Anti~es. and not only had 10 be popular, they also !lad 10 be populîsl.

\
Suri':lël~ togelher .accounting for slightly more thanE @ce!ÎÙof But there is another aspect 10 the inordillate respect given to po.
the reg-onal population. lilicalleaders in the region. In the ea rl y modem period, the notion of
the stale, especially among the iIIiterate masse$, was \....eak. In politi.
, Further confusing the linguistic map. sorne units are16TITilAuafl or
1p-oIylinguaT:\Puerto Ri~ is officîally bilingual in E~..!2h /andSpanish . cÎzing the masses, the natiOl13 list politicians inculca led the belief tl13t
E~l1s1~~'J'a"anes~.!.!nd S}[Link] Togo are spoken in ~~~~.I.I.!.e. a reno ..-ated polity would red ress the indignities, Ihe margin3lîty, and
... English, Seanish,:ma""Papiamento are included in the official lan.
gU;ges of the ~herl:mds Antilles. A~includes PapiamC!!!o as
the negleet of the previous period . In common \Vifh most of Latin
AmerÎca and much of the Third \.Vorld, politics and political pa rtici.
~.

one of ils official languages. And a r~.baSed C,eole is widely pation În the Ca rÎbbea.n represen ted an operatioual mea ns to a con.
crete end. The modern slale \Vas in vested with the pcrsona l qualities
""
spoken in !i!j!i:!Dd mutually ill tellî ·b e in CuasieJouee, Martinique.
, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia. n ua e, of eou,nc. has littlc rcle· of the great palt61l, the priest, or the plantation owner. It \Vas sup.
VâîlC~ to ~Jitfcil cultUTS· .p~I~_,..JOCi
.... .
:II , and e<:onomic e9....!:A/ WVr
1A ... posed to guide and nurture and protee!. The caudillo rcpresen led the
 TH!; CAI\IBSEAN ST,\TE A NO N'A 'rlO NA 1.. 1 SM :;1­
1,6

embodiment of the modem stale and was expected to behave as a populations. At the same time, these needs wele increasÎng as the
just mediator between classes, factions, groups, and Înterests. Political region e,(perienced a general population explosion. Th e solution to
~

\mep..[Link]~. tcnded to tun Jess O} [Link].d~ologicallines th :ln along these multiple problems was seen in a numbcr of changes Împle.
f çrsonallines. The politicized masses in Jamaica that promised in the mented du ring and arter the Second World \Var. Govemments
940$ to follow Bustamante until Ihey died, the jibaros that Te· sought to become more reprcsen tative and more legitimate, with the
sponded fanatically to the appeaJ of MuMz Mado in Puerto Rico in expansion of the franchise .!Od a broac1cning of the participant groups.
the 19Sos, and the revolunonaries that enthusiastically supported Trade union s and political parties were legitimized and brought into
the administrative process. The fr anchise was cxtended to all adult s

~
Ul Fidel Castro in the 1<)605 \Vere ail co[!6dent tbat the ,promised poliO..
~,[Link]~s would al~ perso~?~ly change theJ.!jlY.c:s . Thal, in large over the age of twen ly·one. This, in effcct , crea led a nev.> alliance of
me:tsure, accounu for the polilica \ longevity of the ideologically op· upper-, middle-, and \Vorking-c1ass participants who captured state
posed Juan Bosch and Joaquln Balaguer in the Domini~n Republic. power and redirected it la serve the goals of the alliance. Ta expand
80th ha ve accumulated such a large, strong contingent of followers the economy, new development schemes \Vele advoca ted, designed
who share their contrasting vision of the new society th::lt younger to expand employment resources. Thesc schemes almast ail centerecl
politicians 6nd it difficult to carve out a. place in the system. around increased industrialization comparable to th at ta'king place in
Indeed, Caribbean masses tended to interpret the changes to their Puerto Rico in the 19405 and 1950$ under Mmioz Marin's tenure.
societies as the d irect results of the benevolent or mal evolen t actions The [Link].o.s..c yea~r.!..!vas mainly on tfônomic rest[uctuôûi11~'
wilh a ~!oac1e r purpose:..,pfomotm nahonar identit , national e- .
nli
of their leaden. The charismatîc leaders aroused, appealed tOI and
artj..<:!!lated the exp'ëêtatioQS of the--!!lasses but in 50 doing expressed
theJimits ta charismatic leadershÎ}? For popular disappointmen t te·
s io~d . politicaun.d..[Link] in cpen en~. Smce foreigners sup'
plie<! the capital fOf th is devclopment, it \\las commonly referred to as
sults in the imriil:--diatë~nsfer of pub lic affection and loyalty. This "industrializa tion by in vitation ." The new Caribbean leaders not ç)oI Y~

t~..2l'.!:::' p,;odt~ wa~~pDi;h,,1 ~.

particular political environment also complicated the process of po. sought to expand the economic basëbu t also ta reoroer ffië" dis~ibu .
litical succession. For whether or not th e le:lders fulfilled the expecta· tian of nationa l wealth and fO.$~in ~!!..o~overjhe O\[Link]· '
tions of the masses, the changes in the historical cÎrcumstances indi­ ' ndllo. of the u:ate. In Il';,
cll ied that new political mobilization would have to be based on new IX!wer [Link]:ua'Rle G;ll economic control and 50cial justice.
str:ltegies. The bitter economic e:xpericnce of Ule 1970$ was lethal for -The years imm ediatel;' foiio~vrng th~ Sec~~d-World W-;;-saw an
the practice of charismatic poli tics . overaU increase in world trad e, ,Incl as tmding nations, the Caribbean
Charismatic, persona1Îst political leadership in the Caribbean cor­ participat ed . The economies grew significantly for nearl>' two deçades,
responded to a period of severe cris is in the political, economic, : l nd and in sorne cases growth WOlS impressive. The Puerto Rican expe­
social structures of the Caribbeao _It was a transitional phase. In the rience ha s alread y been exa m ined under "Operation Bootstrap_" ln
191 0$ and 1930s, the politiC31 systems ail faced serious threats hom other Olreas of Ihe Ca ribbean. [Link] industrialîzat ion
the restless masses. Civil unrest \Vas widespTead. The intellectuaHy also scored equally substantial gains_The case of Jamaica illustra tes
bankrupt, socially myopic govemo~, adminislTators, and oligarchs the trend. At the end of the war, agricultural products-sugar. rum,
had lest their confidence ta rule. The Depression exposed the inheren t bananas, citrus, tobacco, ginger, pimenta, coffet:, and rocoa- reprc­
inadequacy of agricultural.o:port economies ta raise the total incomes sented the entire range of lamaiean experts. Between 1943 and 1951 ,
of the local populations. Covemments, even if they c:[Link] ta, had the number of manufacturing plants in Jamaica increascd from 36,
difficulty 6nding sufficient revenue ta service the needs of the local ta 627, and the work. (oree in creased from 14,37 3 to 23,0<)8- But the

1
 ST ... TE ANO "'o\T I ONAL 1 SM ; 19
TH!!. C" .. IB 8EA\'I
J.8
employmen t objectives. Despite he:tvy [Link] emigra nou­
factories were smaH, employing relatively (ew individ uals. The average accoun ting far approxima tely JO percent of the natural population
factory employed 36.8 workers in 1951, compa red with 39·<\ in 19'\3- increase during th e period -indus trial employ ment wOlS proporlionaUy
The sa me sort of expansion took place in Barbados and Trinida d . no bel ter in the lif:os than in the 19405. Belween 1950 and 1963. ac­
In the 195 , th e extract ive industrics- bamd te in Jamaica, Haiti, cording ta Jay M:mdle, "Trinidad and Tobago's labor force increased
05
the Domin ica Republic, and Guya na and petroleum in T rin idad­ by ncarly 100,000 , whereas jobs in the country's dominant sugar and
ll
and tempora ry priee increases among the traditio na! agricu\tuta\ c!(· petroleum sectors had declîned over the sa01e years by about 3,800."
ports boosted national production and productivity and rcinforced ln }aOlaica, sorne thirleen thausan d new jobs were crea led by indus·
the vÎew that the econom ies were expanding. l1le regional devdap trialization between 1956 and 1()68, but the labor fQlce llad increased
·
melltal economists were delighted and self-congratula tory, but their by 325,000 d uring the sa me period. Worse for the govemm en t and
emotional respons e was premature. the econamy, the sugar industr y had elîminated about ten thousand
Like the puerto RiC::ln case under "Operation Bootstrap," things jobs duting those thirteen yea rs. Nowhe re in the Caribbea.n did in·
did not work out in the C;lribbean in the long run quite as they had dustrialization provide the sustained volume of new jobs 10 take up
been plan . On the positivc side, indust rializa tion, especia1\y the slaek resulting froOl the decline În the agricultural sector. Puerto
ned
[Link] manufactures, did result in marked increasC5 in Rico achieved the most success ful industrial·sector employmen t, wl lh
the gross domestic products, with a beneficial impact on national and about 35 percent a f ilS laboT force employed in manufacturillg by
pet capita incomes. A look at the changes in sorne available nationa
l IqSo. At the same time, the worl: fOlce in agriculture had shrunk
10
per capita incomes benveen 19S7 and 1980 illustra te the metsure of 3 percen\. Cuba, the Dominicall Republic, and T rinidad mallagoo to
economic growth. The Bahamas, Barbado5, puerto Rico, and Trini· peak al about 20 percent of thei r labor forces in înd ustry; while the
dad and Tobago were high pcrformers . Using constan t ]()S7 US. best that Jamaica could do by 1980 was 15·Z percent. And to com·
dollars, the per capita in come of the Ballamas by IqSo had increased p'icate matters, Ihe new industrial jobs were oft en taken by full-lim e
from $4 to $I ,57l; that of Barbados, hom $:?oo to $1,57 1 ; th~t of workers previously employed in the agricultural sectOL Onl y Haïti
00
puerto Rico, hom $S63 to $1 ,433; and tl,at of Trinida d and Tobago and th e Dominican Repùblic continue<:! ta have 50 percent or more
,
from. $4:2.3 ta $~,o&. Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican of the labot fo rce in agricul ture in 1980. \Vhile relatively higher in
Republic were moderate petfonners during that same period , with in­ ­
dustrial wages le<! ta an incr(!3se in agricultura\ \l'ages, the latter
crements fa r short of their regional colleagues. Guyana increased its lagged sa f:lr bchind that many 1051 :lny desi re for work in agriculture.
per capita incerne from $135 ta $pS; Jamaica, hom $3 1 9 to $490; th Agricultu re decHned as a contrib ulory sector to the gross domeslic
e
Dominica Republic, hem $139 ta $S43; and Haiti, from $10S to producls, forcing more people off the land and into the cities, th ereby
$13 . Until the mid- ta late I~S, wages kept pace with the inflation
n
8 in creasing the need for expenditures of the centul governmcnts Oll
mtes, indieating that werkers were, on the WllOle, better off in the needy social services and police protection . In .some cases, the expan·
lqOOs than they \Vere in the 1940s. Morcov er, increa sed national in-~ sion of tourism and oth er, mainl)' informaI, economic activities offset
cOrnes and locally determined national priorities had rcsulted in con­ the steep decline in agricul tural employment and productivity. With
siderable pub\ic expenditure on the esscntia l social seIVices- cduca­ the excep tion of Puerto Rico and Haiti, mosl Caribbean manufactur·
tion , public hea\th care, roads, housing , and supp\em ental nutritional
ing is geared mainl)' 10 serve sm ail domestic or limitcd regional mar­
suppOrt. But even as t'he good times rolled along, the negatives loomed
kets. ln any case, manufacturing seldom cxceeded 25 percent of the
large-, sorne could not have been forcseen. gross domestic products in IC)So.
In the first place, industrializ<ltioo lailed ta ac complisl1 the expecteù
po
THE CARIBSEAN

By the late 1970s, unemployment WOlS a major problem throughout

the Caribbean. The prospect was bleakest for the newly educated
~
u.J
U "/
O! ~ ·"' ·~ ~ ~ '§f
.
j
~ E~
, ,"

young people ready to join the labor market. The unfortunate situa­
:J ~301<fl 3...J ,t
~ il9<1-'31!»t, "S/1I '"
tion in ail the Caribbean states was that unemployment grew abso· ~

lutely during the 19705, and the standard of living declined for the
~

u .. ·0 •
DDID~"1t.1II
~ %
:;;: t' ~ III

; ~ g3 8 ~
<JJ
-:' EU~,,
Il ~ ~
population as a whole. Industrialization sim ply did not cope \Vith the o
z JJ&.ï<J8&l~ :
pressures of normal population increases. Ali the eeonomic lllodeis of • ' p ".'
o III oute Dd>li
",#'s ~ ~ ~~ ~"> ..~
j.\ ~3,,·JJ
deve10pment pursued failed to resolve the problem of rising unem­ u
~

ployment rates. With the exception of Cuba (where the unemploy­

ment in their socialist economy stood at 3-4 percent in 1<)80), by the
end of the 1980s the unemployment figures ranged between 10 and
§
. '
~ '·'~'i
.
40 percent of the potential labor forces. These rates were generally g ~~'i ,t;~~:>:
higher than those normally prevailing bcfore the Implementation of o
.~
s:!!l.,
~M 8
the indus trial schemes in the 1940S and after. By the 1970s, too, the
~ "'"
••
relief valves provided by emigration, mainly to Europe, Canada, and
the United States-or even intraregionally to Cuba, the Bahamas, the
~
~ ..
~~c
u "'lQ
.i ,. ~
Dominican Republic, and Trinidad-had been legally closed off. Un­
employment and underemployment were particularly rife among
urban groups, thereby aggravating the social problems of politieal ~,.8 , a, i
unrest, nareoties abuse, and narcoties trafficking. The construction of , ,":\. .
'~
g à
(j
factories and housing esta tes on land formerly farmed, fallowed, or .;1"-.....,. :2
~JI" . .
grazed praduced a corollary of inereased urban siums. Caribbean ~"T-
r...
. ./
j
~~:
cities became the magnetic reservoir of the impoverished, the landless,
the jobless, the politically powerless, the frustrated, and the marginal f -<t>
by ail measures, mueh like the pattern elsewhere throughout Latin
America.
Between the 19605 and the 1980s, the region experienced a raller­
coaster economy that left it more vulnerable to international forces ~
-.
~:

~
than it had ever been. The performance of the local economies flue­
tuated in tandem with international trade. The optimistic economy
outlook of the 1960s gave way to pessimism in the 1980s, The general ,,
o•
mood of rising expectations of the earlier period cbanged drastically
to one of widespread disappointment and discontent. ,• o
Between UP1 and 1970, inflation rates in the region averaged a ~
'"
'~

~
manageable 3.4 percent per annum, ranging from abolit 2 percent in
the Dominican Republic to 6 percent in the Bahamas. The improved 0':
 THE CARIBBEAN STATE AND NAl"IONALI S U ,­
pl
proportions of national inca rnes. But industrialiution and urbanil:
economic performances .registered by Caribbean states ""ere achieved
tion also had other ecanomic consequences (or the region . Slowly th
largely by concentrating on exportable agricultural commodities, min­
region began ta consume what it did Ilo t produce. Whil e most s(
iog for raw materials sh ippcd abroad, and import-substituting manu­
cieties were se\f-sllfficient in food hefore 1940, on ly C uba remainc
fa ctures that prospered on finishing matcrials imported from abroad .
so in lC)88. Food imports ranged between 6 and n percent of all in
Expanded eœnomies: allowed govemmcn ts ta achieve much and
ports in the region , grea tl y compounding the urgcnt necd (or har
promise more. currencies by the local states. Part of the very high public and privat
Ouring the 1<)OOs. the generall y expanding economies allowed fO[
indebtedness of the region in the \;t te 19705 resulted hom the foo
heavy investment on housing, education, and social services at both
tradc. Policies designed to reduce high ex temal îndebtedness by fI
the public and private le\'els. Govemmen ts be<:ame the single largest
ducing imports had widespread effects throughout the Caribbean wif
employer of labor. In Puerto Rico, governOlent employment aCÇ()unted
severe polîhcal repercussions, such as the food rÎots În the Dominical
for 24 percent of the active labor force in 1985, ln Jamaica, the goy.
Republîc in 1981 that resulted in seventy persons killed, two hundre.
eromen t employed 18 percent of the active labor force, amounting to
wounded, and more than fOUI thousand arrested. The narTOw e<'(
about 33 percent of ail the wage earners in the country. 11le pattern
nom ic base of the Ca ribbean countrîes Ienders them èonstantly vul
\Vas the same in Trinidad, where the goveroment employed one out
nerable to fluctuations În intemational in terest rates, as weil as cal
of every three wage eamers, and the total WOlS about lO percent of the
culated atlempts by Înternal and extemal forces to destabî lîze thei
active labor force. The concentration of employment in the service
sovereign tyand theÎr îndepelldence.
sectoI also reAected the expansion of the tourist and trading sectOIS.
Ec~ robl ems obviausly strongly influenced the political sil
In l~ employment in services accounted fOI 84 percent of the labor
uation throughout the Caribbëan, Poli tics and politicians lïaVë ·beeJ
force in the Bahamas, 6-J percent in Barbados, 59 percent in both the
ju<lged more:. b>:_~he!r a~!lit)~ r esp~nd crea tivelt...ta tnebasic ::.n(
Dom inican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago, 5::! percent in G uy·
Îmmeoiatc-eronomÎc challen8;es tha ~y' their underl yin gïa e6~ 0
ana, 49 percent in Jamaica, :md 20 percent in Puerto Rico. The high
pOlitïat1-pnnciplés.""But pol icies and politicians Jemain circutnscribel
public-sector employment frustrated attempts ta redoce the overal\
\vii:hin veryn arrow operation::.1 limits. Cha nging the basic economi4
size of the public sector in the difficult economic years of the carly
cons traints of the slate are extremely [Link], as the Jamaita caS4
19 and incre3sed the general level of disenchantmen t with sorne
80s proved in the 19705 and 1980s. Rhetoric and prom ises beaT little Tela
governments. The shaIp deçline in commodity prices and hade in the
tionship to practice and performancc. Po!itics becom es more style
late 19705 resulted in shaflJ increases in inflation rates between IqSo
than substance.
and IqSS. As major employers of labor and major actors in the econ­
Despite Edwa rd Seaga's constant criticism of form er Prim e Minis
amies, the govemments llad few options but to borrow heavily from
ter Michael Manley's -'socialist" eCOllomic policies in Jamaica du ring
abroad. By the lq80s, national indebtedness bccame a heavy burden,
the la te 1970s, by the end of his term of office in the late lqSos, he
with 5ubstantial proportions of scarce hard currency channeled into
had not altered man y of the basic thrusts of his predecessor. lamai
interest payments. c<lns ~)' voted in 1980 for better fiscal m:anagcf!l enT.ïlol
'~,. Cr~!.:r~n.~:.S'~~.[Link]
t gr~te~~ic ~nde~~y.·M:'~L&.o.v~mments commerce inevitably meant
horrowed lmShly
fro.1l! t!lC avallabfe pool of money recycled fiOlfnfîe petrol eum export­
fu~dealagit&s:_~ange_ After nine yea rs;-theqalnaican_econ.
orny WolS not manifestly in better shape than in 1980, with th e Inter·
ing_stat<;~· in lhe-niiâ-;970~·tO fund·~ê1.1~~~liaTlilredto bear fr uit. national Monet<lfy Fund establishing the po licy guidelines. In 1989.
i\Ianley and the Peoples National party return ed ta office, muting
By the 1980s, repayment of interest on thosc loans aOsâibeëfSizeable
 TIIE CARTBBEAN STATR AND NA l"I ONAL 1 SM
3'. i:;

their longstanding criticism of the constraints of the Fund. For his problems of public hea lth, un employment, illiteraq'. and inequitable
part, Manley's preeledion promises held none of the former lofty lan­ resource and w€:Ilth distribution inlluenced Jamaica (under rvrichacl
guage of "democratic socialism" and a "new economic arder." Rather, Manle)"s "democratic socialist society," 1972-1<)80) and Curana
it WolS an ambiguous consolation to ··put people 6rst." In much the (under Forhes Burnham's "cooperative socialist republic," 19ïD­
sa me way, in 1959 "Che" Guevara and Fidel Cas tro promised that by 1985) , as weIl as th e short-lived People's Revolutionary Covernment 01
following a socialist path. they would m3ke Cuba th e economic sh ow­ Maurice Bishop in· Grenada between 1979 and 1983. Not ail Calib.
place of the Caribbean and Latin Am erica. For a brief period, they bean governmenls, however, found the Cuban model attractive. Both
even thought of reducing the dependence on sugar production. Yet in the government of Barbados und er 1. M. C. M. "Tom" Adams (1971­
Hjh, Cuba was producing more sugar than ever before and \Vas 1985) an d the govcm men t of Trinidad and Tobago under Eric Wil .
lame\y trying ta implement a modifie<! version of the Puerto Rican Iiams (1956-11)181) were CClUtiOUS and correct in their relations with
development model of the 19Sos. The test o f political efficiency rests Cuba. The govemments of E ugenia C harles in Dominica, Mi lton
in the reality and perceptions of economic performance. Cato in St. V incent, and Vere Bird in Antigua were consistently criti­
Consciously or unconsciously, the contemporary Caribbea.n states cal and somelimes depreC3tory.
follow three economic model.1. of drv&opment~ The ~ soCÎalist While the Cuban model undoubtedly removed the disconcerting
model is~(ated with the Soviet and Eiit-Europeaneron. discrepancy between Ihe richest and poo(esl sectors of the society and
amies and carries on a large portion of its commerce th rough barter providcd a more equitable redistribution ol r€Sources, il was no more
[Link]. The second model is found in Puerto Rico, the French attractive and duplicable than the Puerto Rican model of the 1950s.
Antilles, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antill es . There the economies ft also had some pronounced h:tndicaps. it has been implemented al
ar!,. .extensions ?l..1a~J......J:I enl capitalist econom ·~hëllnited a very high cast to individual liberties, and il was totally unacceptable
States, Fran ce, and the Netherlan $. e }'l -.~~ tries ta operate to th e United Stat es of Ame(ica. In the 19&>5, other weaknesses ap­
as pub~-cum·priv3h: ente'E!ise mixtures_ of the o:her two and is peared in the Cuban mode\. 111e major one was the inability to pro­
highly de~endent on cxtemal aid-loans, grants, and special trading vide self·sustaining economic growth.
arrangen~ents \Vith the United Sta tes, Canada, or th e European com­ During the laie '970s, when th e region \vas convulsing with the
munity. No ideal type has emerged from among these three generally enormous economic consequences of the energy crises produced by
3ccep ted models of sociopolitical reconstruction-socialist Cuba \Vith sudden upward priee changes ordered by the Organization of Petro­
its highly centralized [Link] system; the integrated nee-enter­ leum Exporting Countries, Cuba WolS cushioned by its relationship to
prise economies of Puerto Rico, the NeLherlands Antilles, and the the Soviet Un ion. Cuba bought 97 percent of its petroleum needs
French [Link]; or the mixed version of Jamaica. the Dominic:an from th e Soviet Union al about onc-thi rd the going world priee. lt
Republic, and the others. No model is perfectly tlpplictlble on a re­ sold about 45 percent of ils suga r to the Soviet bloc al priees th at
gional basis. Some systems have generated more satisfactory r€Sults in sometimes ranged as high as five timc=s the world free-market priee.
sorne <lreas at the expense of others . But no Caribbean state has yet It sold 75 percent of its nickel to the Soviet Union al guaranteed pre­
achieved an enviable degree of social and economic developmen t by mium prices. And it periodiC111y arranged low-interest loan s and
the end of the twenticth century. granls from the Soviet Union. Ahogether, the direct :md indirect
For a short lime, it was felt that the Cub:m mode} provided a poui­ eronomic subsidy to the Cubans amounted to between $3 billion
ble [Link]. Its success in overcoming sorne pervasive Caribbean and $-1 billion per year, or approxima tel y $300 for every Cuban citizen
 THE CAIUBBEAN STA'TE .... ND NATION .... L rSM
)'6 F

on the island. Despite this consistently high an nual subsidy after the
late 1970s, the Cuban overall economic situation was not significantly
different hom the rest of the region.
­
tries. In the laie 1980s, Cuba, under a charismatic authoritarian gOY·
emmenl, W<lS as o!.th ~l_o~[Link]Ë.. as ~y of [Link] Europe.
Puer~ ico emerge<nrpln a form of colonialism under U.s. jurisdic·
In 19 80, largely for cconomîc reasons, more than l:!.5,OCO Cubans tion as an openl)' dellloc~atic ..po1i~, associatcd cJosdy \Vith the
opted to \cave their country. The gross socialist product of the island United States. Puerto1'fican citizcns ilrc also citizens of the United
Auetuated just likc capitalist systems elsewhere, with a period of nega· States. Tlle Dominican Republic has had an uncasy history. After a
tive growth in the mid-19Sos. The economy was no more diversified chaotic period, it end ured the long dictatorship of the Trujillos. De·
in J9 89 than in 1970 or, for that matter, in 1959· Exports still fell far spi te regular clcctions undet the political system established after the
short of imports in value, creating a growing trade deficit throughout occupation in 1965, the Dominican Republic faces a period of uncer·
the 19 80s . In 1981, the Cuban govemment dedared a change in its tainty. Thc two principal political antagonists in the Dominican Re·
laws to permit a modified version of the Puerto Rican-style incentive public. Juan Bosch (b. 1909) and Josquin Balaguer (b. 1(08), arC the
industrialization but by 19&) had made very little headway in attract· only two politicians with broad popular appea l, and the military is
stronger than any of the political parties .
ing Western finn s.
Cuba's pet capita gross domestic product was not significantly dif· The Dutch·Caribbean empire coll apsed into Aruba, a would·be
ferent from the other CaribbeaJ1 sta tes. 'YVith a [Link] gross do· mini·state seeking its own indepenclence; the Netherlands Antilles, il
mestic praduct of about $1,53~, the Cuban econom)' might have been precarious association enjoying a: special telationship with th e pre·
more buoyant thill1 that of Haiti ($379), Guyana ($7 20 ), Jamaica vious metropolis; and the Republic of Suriname. Both Aruba and the
($I,OH)' and the Dominican Republic ($I,225) -it was Jess so than Netherlands Antilles are attract ive!y coslOopo!itan states. ln the few
Trinidad and Tobago ($:,837)' Barbados ($20,865)' Guadeloupe months prior to the grant of illdcpend ence to Surin:lTne in 1975,
($3, 15 1 ), Martinique ($3,717), Puerto Rico ($4,301 j, the Nether· about 40 percent of the population voluntarily emigrated ta the
lands Antilles ($6,600), the Bahamas ($7,600), and Bermuda Netherla nds . Within (ive ye:u s, the political system IUld totally col·
($ 13,4 21 ). Unemployment, although relatively low by regioual stan· lapsed, and the country was under martial law betwecn 1980 and
dards, began to attrnct attention in the late 19&>s. Moreover, Cuba 1<]88. Elections in that yea r did nothing to restoce democrocy or to
began to aecumulate an incJCasing (oreign debt with Westem money diminish the power o f the commander of the national army, Lieuten·
lenders that surpassed $6 billiOn in 1<)88. Ail these problems tended ant·Colonel Desire Bouterse.
to overshadow the admirable accomplishments of which the Cubans ln 1946, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Cuiana became
overseas depa rtments of France. legislativel)' and administratively on
were justifiably proud in other fi elds.
.\ The frasmented ~st colonial societies in ~roduced
par with any other domestic French department. TIle french Carib·
tU"~
,
Il a varléty oUncoosistent and uoexpec~ed s i ~s. <:oloolal political
traditions 'Or imperî., l culturalJeg;[Link]~LP~ Inadequate pr#ic tors
bean departments balance their budgets only with substantial prder.
enrial subventions from the central govemmen t. Together, the th ree
1\
-
of poutiea! l ii$torY.:ailCiJ.o.d.e_~'Tldencç. 11le Spanish empire produced
----.,.--­
.­ independent states of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto
the
Rico. Ali three followed separate courses after indcpendence. Cuba
departments exported bananas, pineapplc.s, sugar, rum, petroleum
products, shrimp. and timber in 1985 valucd at $'-<)0 million and im·
ported goods valued Olt nea rl)' two billion dollars. Despite substantial
nrst moved in the orbit of the United States from 1902 to 1959 then economic assistance-mueh li\.:.e that of the United States to Puerto
became, for a lime, an unorthodox member of the Soviet·bloc coun· Rico-rumblings of centrifugai discontent spo radically distmb the
pS THE CA1 U 88 E A l'l $ TAT E ANO NA1 'ION
AL I SM
;~
political ambietlce of Guadeloupe party stability or polilical democracy.
. Haiti, the oth er relic o f French· lndeed, they are poor indicators
CaribbC"J.n colonial ism, has bee n of the stat e of politics in any give
m ired in political instability and n territory. Both the intensity of
irredeemabl e poverty for most of its organization and the proportion of
indc pen den t history. the labor force organized in unio ns
The Brit ish Caribbean .......with the la~e
st}lum ber o(j? 2lit ical units, vary [Link] thro ugh out the

-
representst:1;e";ost varie<! P.:gli tica regi on. Nor does a given union
neg ~ of colonialism. The conf}­
den-
M _. --
t expecta
imita te and perpetuate the "W estm
---
tion ~tllaTTh e political systems afte
r ind ependence would
inster mode}" ( Cre at Britain
membership necessarily indicate the
dues . In any case, th e figures are
Rico have the oldes t registered trad
propOrti on of members who pay
quite unreliabl e. Cub a and Puerto
proved unwarranted . O f the lwe ve e unions wi thin the Caribbe:m,
inde penden t states that eme rged with .. history of fonnal organiza tion
alte r 1961. tlû ee- Dgminica. Cm going back to the begi nnin g of
'3lli!...i'-'ld_1)ini dad au.d Tobag~ the twen lieth cen tury. In both case
opte d to become .rçpublics. Ant igua s. the organ ized unions tend to be
:md Oarbuda, th e Ballamas, Bar. independen t of the political parties.
bados. BelÎze, CTenada, Ja~ ~lica, Trinidad and Tobago, wÎth abo ut
St. Kitts·NevÎs, St. Lucia, and St. [Link] the popul:ltion of Jamaiea
Vi nce nt and the C renadines hav and one·six-th the pop ulation of
e remail1ed constitulional monar­ the Dominica n Republic, ha s app
chies, with the queen of England roxi male\y the same num ber of
as the titu union members, but they are dist
q~ is represented by 3 10cal governor-genera fâr"' head of stale. T he than in either of those stat es. \Vhile
ributed in more indi vidual un iOnS
\. Sorne lerritories have unio ns may provide a convenien t
demons tra tcd a consistent suppor accessibl e constit uen cy, they do not
t of democratic principles; others uecessa rily constitute a reliable
have not. In some cases, a strang affil base. Moreover, 3p3 rt from Cub a,
iation e:cists between the politi. orga nized bbo r lepr esen ts a dimin·
cal parties and the trade unions. In ishi ng fract ion of the \vor kers in :lIly
lamaica, bot h major parties, the 5t3te, seldom e:'\ceed ing 40 per.
Peoples National party and the Jam cen t of the labor force. \Vherc da
aica Labour party enioy substan· ta is available, ooly C\.\ba, Jamaica
tial trade."mion bases in the Nat iona and Suriname show mor e than 40 ,
l Wa rler s' Union and the Busta­ percent of the laboT force union­
man te Industtial 'Trades Union resp i2OO. Barbados, Domin ica, Cre nad
eetively. In Barbados, the Ba r­ a, and Trinidad and Tobago range
bados Workers' Union is affiliated between 30 and 39 percent, while
wilh the Democratie Labour part y. Haili and the Dominican Republic
Eric Ga iry's Grenada Uni ted Lab have less than J O percent o f their
our party grew out of his rrade laboT fo rces unionized. The poten­
union, the Cre nada Ma nua\ and .Iial political impact or worker orga
Mental \Vo Tkers Uni on that he nization, llOwever, is muted in th e
organized in. July 1950. Elsewhere, Caribbean milieu, whe re consistent
the experie nce has not been as unemploymenl and underemploy­
commonplace. In Trinid:ld and Tob ment ·have been pronounced reat
ago as weU as in G uya na, the ures since the l~S , In 1985, ten
dom inan t political p:lr ties -the Peo states repor ted unemployment fi gure
ple's Na tional Mo vem ent in Trin i· s in excess of 20 percent of their
dad and the People's Na tion ..1C ong tabo r forces : Anguilla, the Bahama
ress in G uya na- have cstablis hed s, the Dominican Republic, Cre ·
their pelitical dominan ce des pite nada. Guyana, Jamaica, Martinique
limite<! trad e-union affiliati on, In , St. Kitts-Nevis, St. V incent and
the smaller islands, the combinat ion the Crenadines, and Suriname. Nin
of close family and com mun ity c st2tes reperted ro tes between 10
rel:ltions lim it the scope of politica :md 19 percent: An tigua and Bar
l mob iliza tion , thercby inhibiting buda, Barbados, Belize, Dom in ica,
the proper develot>mc nt o f parly poli Fren ch Cui ana , Haiti, the Net her1
tics as PT3cticed Ol t \Vestminster ands Antilles, Puerto Rico , and
or in the larger unit s. In a society Trin idad and Tobago. Patterns of
whe re viTt uall y everyone knows employment org:mi zation, then,
e\'er yone else, sec ret balloting and appea r la bear little relOl. tionship to
objective eval uations are extremely the formai political syst ems and
impractical, if not imp ossible, may be the result o f accidentai hist
Organized workeTs, however, are orieal forccs .
not an essential prerequisite for Th. :Jil itO Il of the people$. ~c
9!ribbean js...one o~ :~n tinual
 TlIE CARIBBEAN
STATE AND NATIONALISM :Hl
JJO
mains true: the Caribbean Feoples "are all together, in the same
strugg!c. It is not, however, a histor of unrelieved despondency or
boat, s:iJing on ~!,:~~:~airu~a ~~~n_d !a~e un ­
c~llg_despâir. ather, ~~.i~~!lj}iStOITlooms rich witlCmàgmfi­ ~tant.' 1 he hmc :Fi as never been more appropria te fo.r the frag- ,
ceE.! ::::~':!I,e!ishments}gainst gre~t~ds as weU a~.significan~es. mented Caribbean community to begin to think seriously and coop-­
But in great struggles, the goal is to win the long war, not surrender
eratively about the welfare of their entire community.
after the first defeat. Failures should oot be confused with inability;
nor should the Jack of opportunity be equated \Vith a lack of vision
or a Jack of will. A region that has produced leaders and thinkers of
the caliber of !'oussaint Louverture, J~ Marti, r~ Ca..ili,o, ~cus
C..,2JXe.y, N~.3.!l Ma~)_ey. A17xa~man te, Eug~.nio }\jaria de
...--. ,...-;--
Aà~è. Err~!J~~!E~.:Y'
-- ---_
Hostos, Luis Muî'toz Marin, Arthur Lew' , Derek \Va1cott, Crantley
G:-.orge _ ~~~i~g, J.. J.. 'J}1omQ1.s;.eo~d­
....

more, C. 1. R. James. Eric Williams, Cheddi jagan , Martin Carter,

FOrDes Burn~ , and C;;;rge Priee has ilieady establiShë<1adTStin~
~fïed tradition of men of ' Ion and will. oreover, both in terms
of the state and the nation, they are a ltêlalively ne\v states and new
soeieties. Only Haiti and the Dominiean Republic have an indepen.
dent history stretching baek to the last eentury. All the other states
are products of the twentieth eentury. And like the polities, the peo·
pIe are l'outhful. \Vith the surges in the population during the roiddle
deeades of the twcnticth century, by 19&) nearly 50 percent of the
regional population \Vas Jess than eighteen years of age. 11te Carib­
bean is a region of youthful vigor-and that ma)' be its greatest asset.
The diverse challenges of the present and the future 100m daunt­
ingly large in the Caribbcan. 111e new times demand new measures
and new ideas as weil as ne\v men of clear vision and strong will. _Th~

\
\hi~to~ical cireumstanc:s ~ the _~eg~<!.~~e always forced it to be a
revolutionary societv, not to destroy or disturb .byLlQ.. S\lIyiye. 'Ine
.I urgê-rléieSoCHl.e~th century marc that revoJutionary tradition
'{llOSt appropriate. The old order has definitely changed, but what is
new is not l'et cleu. Imported panaeeas have mere1y produced taIse
,promises. Mê.YÈ. ~ _ the~~ finally arrive e~cal
'\ solutions fot ..Loca1 l!~.l?l~s . ' le survival of individual CEibbean
1 ;' [Link] Tests not in t1.!~~Jlrsuitof insular options but

, ~tfv~' in regiona\""cooperation on32c~e.J.!.f!ver befoTe attempted. I~opera­

tion lies future possibilities. What Père Labat observed in 1743 Te-