Southern Youth Model United Nations

2025/2026

Study Guide
International Court of Justice

SYMUN 2025/2026 | Galle, Sri Lanka

5th of April
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SYMUN ’26

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)

STUDY GUIDE

MANDATE
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. Its mandate is defined by the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ.

1. Contentious Jurisdiction

The Court has the authority to settle legal disputes submitted to it by States. In
contentious cases, the Court:

● determines the facts of the dispute

● identifies and applies the relevant rules of international law

● issues binding judgments that create legal obligations for the parties
involved

Only States may be parties in contentious proceedings, and the Court may exercise
jurisdiction only when the States concerned have consented to it.

2. Advisory Jurisdiction

The Court has the authority to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to
it by:

● the UN General Assembly

● the UN Security Council

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● other UN organs and specialized agencies that have been granted

permission by the General Assembly

Advisory opinions are not legally binding, but they carry great legal weight and
moral authority.

3. Sources of Law

When deciding a case, the Court applies the following sources as listed in Article
38 of its Statute:

● international conventions and treaties

● international custom
● general principles of law recognized by civilized nations

● judicial decisions and the writings of publicists as subsidiary means

4. Judicial Independence

Judges of the Court act independently and cannot represent their national
governments. Judges are expected to actively engage through questioning during
proceedings.

5. Limits of the Mandate

The Court:
● does not try individuals or impose criminal liability
● does not enforce its own judgments
● cannot hear a contentious case without State consent

● cannot decide political questions, although legal issues may arise from
a political context.

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BACKGROUND
The Israel–Palestine conflict, one of the world’s longest unresolved disputes, traces
its roots to the end of the British Mandate in 1948 and the competing national
aspirations that followed. Decades of war, displacement, and failed negotiations
have shaped the modern realities of Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel, with periodic
escalations reinforcing the conflict’s complexity.

A major turning point occurred on 7 October 2023, when Hamas carried out
large-scale attacks on Israel, resulting in significant civilian casualties and
hostage-taking. Israel launched extensive military operations in Gaza in response,
citing its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The
fighting that followed has led to widespread destruction, severe humanitarian
crises, and renewed international scrutiny.

Today, the legal questions raised span two distinct areas of international law:

Jus ad bellum — the legality of the resort to force; and​

Jus in bello — the legality of how hostilities are conducted once conflict has
begun.

These dual legal dimensions form the basis of the ICJ proceedings at SYMUN
2025, where delegates are asked to assess both the lawfulness of the initial use of
force and the conduct of parties during the conflict, applying the UN Charter, the
Geneva Conventions, and customary international law.

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AGENDA: LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE (PALESTINE V.

ISRAEL)

2. Introduction to the Case at Hand

The Israel–Palestine conflict is one of the longest-running disputes before the

international community, rooted in competing claims to territory, sovereignty, and
security.

The most recent escalation followed the 7 October 2023 attacks carried out by
Hamas, resulting in mass civilian casualties and the taking of hostages. Israel
responded with large-scale military operations in Gaza, invoking its inherent
right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The situation has raised core questions of jus ad bellum:

- Does the 7 October attack constitute an “armed attack” triggering

Article 51?
- Does Israel’s response meet the standards of necessity and
proportionality?
- Do prolonged occupation, blockade, and retaliatory measures amount
to unlawful use of force or collective punishment?
- Can armed groups operating from territory claimed by Palestine be
attributed to a State for the purposes of state responsibility?

- Can a State exercise self-defence against attacks by a non-State actor

when the territorial State is “unable or unwilling” to prevent such attacks,
and how does the occupation affect that analysis?

The Court has previously addressed aspects of the conflict:

- 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion – prohibition on acquisition of territory

by force.
- 19 July 2024 Advisory Opinion – legal consequences of Israel’s
policies and practices in the OPT.

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- 22 October 2025 Advisory Opinion – obligations regarding the

presence and activities of UN and other international agencies in the
OPT.

- South Africa v. Israel – ongoing contentious proceedings (provisional

measures on plausible risk of genocide, orders in 2024).

The present case invites delegates, sitting as the full Court, to examine the
application of the UN Charter, customary international law, and ARSIWA to
the use of force by all relevant actors since 7 October 2023.

Key questions for the Court:

1.​ Does the 7 October 2023 attack qualify as an "armed attack" under Article
51, and can it be attributed to a State?
2.​ Is Israel's military response necessary and proportionate under customary
international law?
3.​ Does the ongoing occupation alter the jus ad bellum framework for
self-defence?
4.​ What responsibilities do third States have regarding the use of force in this
context?

3. Past UN Actions

Security Council

● UNSC Resolution 242 (1967) – “Land for Peace” framework.

● Resolution 338 (1973) – Called for ceasefire and negotiations.
● Resolution 1860 (2009) – Immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
● Emergency sessions (2023–25) addressed escalation, humanitarian
access, and civilian protection, though many draft resolutions were
vetoed.
● Resolution 2728 (25 March 2024) – Demanded immediate ceasefire for
Ramadan.
● Resolution 2735 (10 June 2024) – Endorsed a three-phase ceasefire
proposal.

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● Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025) – Authorized an International

Stabilization Force in Gaza.

General Assembly

● ESS-10 – repeated calls for cessation of hostilities, protection of

civilians, and recognition of Palestinian self-determination.
● Resolution A/ES-10/L.33 (11 December 2024) – Demanded ceasefire
in Gaza.

● June 2025 GA resolution – demanded immediate, unconditional, and

permanent ceasefire.

Human Rights Council

● Established several Commissions of Inquiry (2009, 2014, ongoing).

● Resolutions addressing excessive use of force, accountability, and
protection of civilians.
● Legal analysis report on Israel's conduct in Gaza (16 September 2025)
– found violations under international law.
● Special Rapporteur report “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime” (20
October 2025).

● Statement urging States to act on Israeli violations threatening the

fragile Gaza ceasefire (24 November 2025).

International Court of Justice

● 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion – reaffirmed prohibition on acquisition of

territory by force.
● 19 July 2024 Advisory Opinion – declared Israel’s presence in the OPT
unlawful.
● 22 October 2025 Advisory Opinion – obligations regarding UN and
international agencies in the OPT.

● South Africa v. Israel (2024) – provisional measures on humanitarian

concerns; ongoing merits proceedings.

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These actions and judicial findings shape the legal framework but have not settled
the specific jus ad bellum questions arising from the 7 October 2023 attacks and
subsequent military operations, leaving ample scope for the Court’s interpretation.

JURISDICTION AND MERITS OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction is assumed and not contested for the purposes of SYMUN 2025. The
Court proceeds directly to the material and legal merits of the dispute, which
concern two distinct but interconnected bodies of international law:

Jus ad bellum - the legality of the resort to force in the events following 7 October
2023; and

Jus in bello - the legality of the conduct of hostilities by all parties during the
conflict.

The Court must evaluate both sets of claims on the basis of the UN Charter, the
Geneva Conventions, customary international law, and the ICJ’s prior
jurisprudence.

I. Jus ad Bellum – Legality of the Use of Force

1. The Prohibition on the Use of Force (Article 2(4) UN Charter)

Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, all States are prohibited from threatening or
using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other
State. This prohibition is considered a cornerstone of customary international law.
The Court has consistently upheld the strictness of this rule in cases such as
Nicaragua v. United States and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.

The Court must therefore assess whether Israel’s large-scale military operations
following the 7 October 2023 attacks fall within an accepted exception to this
prohibition.

2. Self-Defence Under Article 51

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Israel has invoked its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 following the
Hamas attacks that resulted in mass casualties and hostage-taking. The central
questions for the Court include:

● Whether the 7 October attack constitutes an “armed attack” of the

gravity required to trigger Article 51;
● Whether the attack can be attributed to a State, given that Hamas is a
non-State actor operating in territory claimed by Palestine;

● Whether self-defence may be invoked against a non-State actor when

the territorial State is allegedly “unable or unwilling” to prevent attacks.
This an argument frequently raised but not definitively endorsed by the
ICJ;

ICJ advisory opinions affecting the conflict (2004, 2024, 2025) have reaffirmed the
prohibition of acquiring territory by force and emphasized the applicability of
international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

3. Necessity and Proportionality

Even where an armed attack has occurred, lawful self-defence must meet two
criteria:

1.​ Necessity - force must be required to repel or prevent further attacks;

2.​ Proportionality - the scale, duration, and intensity of the response must be
proportionate to the threat.

Delegates must therefore consider whether:

● Israel’s military operations, lasting many months and involving

large-scale destruction, meet these standards;

● Retaliatory actions, prolonged blockade measures, or operations

affecting civilian populations fall outside legitimate self-defence.

This analysis is central to the Court’s jus ad bellum assessment.

4. Ongoing Occupation and Its Relevance to Self-Defence

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An additional complexity arises from the status of the Occupied Palestinian

Territory (OPT). The ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion held Israel’s continued
presence in the OPT unlawful.

The Court must evaluate whether an occupying power can legally claim
self-defence against territory it occupies, or whether the relationship is governed
instead by IHL and the law of occupation.

5. Responsibilities of Third States

The Court may also consider:

● whether arms transfers, financial assistance, or military cooperation

engage third-State responsibility under Articles 16–41 of the Articles on
State Responsibility (ARSIWA);

● the obligation of all States not to aid or assist in the use of force
contrary to the UN Charter.

II. Jus in Bello – International Humanitarian Law Violations

1. Applicability of IHL and the Geneva Conventions

In accordance with the Court’s consistent jurisprudence (2004, 2024, 2025

advisory opinions), IHL applies concurrently with human rights law during armed
conflict.

The hostilities in Gaza since October 2023 therefore fall under:

1.​ Geneva Conventions I–IV (especially GC IV on protection of civilians),

2.​ Additional Protocol I,
3.​ Customary IHL rules (ICRC Study).

2. Core Principles: Distinction, Proportionality, Precautions

The Court must examine whether the parties have complied with the fundamental
IHL principles

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a) Distinction (Article 48 AP I)

Attacks must be directed solely at combatants and military objectives.​

Issues include:

● Strikes on civilian objects (hospitals, schools, shelters, UN facilities),

● Indiscriminate rocket attacks by Hamas on Israeli cities.

b) Proportionality (Article 51(5)(b) AP I)

Even when targeting military objectives, attacks cannot cause expected civilian
harm excessive in relation to anticipated military advantage. Delegates must assess
whether large-scale bombardments in densely populated areas, resulting in high
civilian casualties, meet this requirement.

c) Precautions in Attack (Article 57 AP I)

Parties must take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm, including
warning, evacuation measures, and target verification.

Issues include:

● Evacuation orders to over one million civilians,

● "Humanitarian zones" and their adequacy under IHL,

● Use of heavy munitions in urban environments.

3. Siege, Blockade, and Starvation as a Method of Warfare

The Court must evaluate whether:

● Restrictions on food, water, medical supplies, fuel, and electricity,

● Blockade measures around Gaza,​
constitute starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, prohibited
under Article 54 AP I and customary IHL.

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● UN bodies and Special Rapporteurs (2025 reports) have raised

concerns regarding these practices.

4. Human Shields, Hostage-Taking, and Non-State Actor Obligations

The Court must examine the legality of:

● Hostage-taking (prohibited under GC IV and customary IHL),

● Use of civilian areas or protected structures for military purposes,
● Launching indiscriminate attacks from civilian infrastructure by armed
groups.

● Even though Hamas and other groups are non-State actors, they remain
bound by common Article 3 and customary IHL.

5. Occupation and its IHL Implications

Israel’s status as an occupying power triggers specific obligations under GC IV:

● ensuring welfare of protected persons,

● prohibiting forcible transfers and collective punishment,

● maintaining essential services.

Delegates must consider whether:

● displacement of over two million Palestinians,

● destruction of infrastructure essential for survival,​

are compatible with these duties.

6. Accountability and State Responsibility (ARSIWA)

The Court may evaluate:

● whether violations committed by armed groups can be attributed to

Palestine,

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● whether violations by Israeli military forces constitute internationally

wrongful acts,

● obligations of third States to prevent serious breaches of peremptory

norms (e.g., genocide, war crimes).

Procedural Guidelines :

- Each party may present a maximum of 3–5 pieces of evidence

- The Chair has full discretion in ruling on objections; decisions are final
and not subject to appeal
- Judges are expected to actively participate during questioning
- No new arguments may be introduced during rebuttals
- The Chair may guide deliberations but shall not influence the final
decision

Time Structure :

Opening Statements 3 min each

Evidence presentation 10 min per side

Main submissions 6 mins each

Judicial Questioning 15-20 min

Rebuttals 4 mins each

Closing Statements 2-3 mins

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