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lai

LEARNING FROM THE CONFUCIANS:

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

A distinguishing characteristic of Confucianism is its emphasis on

learning as a key element in moral self-cultivation. The early Confu-
cians, Confucius (551–479 BCE), Mencius (385?–12? BCE), and Xunzi
( ) (310?–219? BCE), discussed learning in significant detail. The
texts associated with these figures attend to different ways of learning
for self-development. They emphasized xue ( ), which relates to the
gathering of information and knowledge, especially about human
conduct and behavior. One comes by such information through listen-
ing (wen) ( ) and watching ( jian) ( ) (e.g., Analects 2:181), and
through reading classical texts such as the Classic of Odes (Shijing)
( ) and the Record of Rites (Liji) ( ). In addition to xue, the
early Confucian texts also emphasize the place of reflection (si) ( )
(e.g., Analects 2:15, at 79) in the cultivation of the self.
There is an important distinction between these two primary
aspects of learning, xue and si. While xue relates to observing, gather-
ing, and collating of details of past and current practices and beliefs, si
is reflective, requiring a person to stand back, as it were, from received
information.2 In this article, I demonstrate that early Confucian phi-
losophy understands xue and si as integrated parts of the cultivation
process. Both are important right through a person’s development:
Learning informs reflection, and reflection guides further learning
(Analects 2:15, at 79; 15:31, at 190). In this discussion, I focus primarily
on the Analects, while drawing from or commenting on the Mencius
and Xunzi where appropriate.
An important issue in discussions of Confucian self-cultivation is the
role of the past, that is, of ancient wisdoms, traditions, and practices, in
Confucian thinking. Appealing to the past seems to be a characteristic
feature of the Confucian tradition, one that opponents of Confucian
thought (including the Mohists, Legalists, and Daoists) were keen to
reject. In briefly examining some of their arguments, I seek to demon-
strate that these other thinkers made an incorrect assumption about
the Confucians’ use of the past. While the Confucians appealed to the

KARYN L. LAI, Senior Lecturer, School of Philosophy, University of New South Wales.
Specialities: early Confucianism and Daoism, Confucian ethics, and environmental ethics.
E-mail: [Link]@[Link]
© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy
98 karyn l. lai

past selectively and creatively (i.e., they drew on aspects of the past
when it suited their arguments), the other thinkers believed that the
Confucians appealed to the past as authoritative, in other words, that
they appealed to the past as unquestionable authority. In philosophical
terms, the other thinkers accused the Confucians of fallacious appeal to
tradition. I suggest that the Confucian appeal to tradition is more
nuanced than these other thinkers give it credit for.
Following these discussions, I explore how thinking about and
reflecting on the past can enhance the moral development of a person.
My discussions here have been influenced and inspired by Antonio S.
Cua’s work in moral philosophy, especially his work on moral devel-
opment. There are three sections in this article: the first sets out a
number of ways in which the past figures in the early Confucian texts,
the second examines a number of criticisms advanced by thinkers
of other persuasions, and the third suggests how the Confucian
references to the past may shed light on how we think about moral
development.

I. The Role of the Past in Confucian Moral Thinking

One of the most significant indications of Confucius’ respect for the

past is his claim that he was a transmitter rather than an innovator
(Analects 7:1, at 111). This statement is important because it provides
clues to the scope and nature of the concepts of antiquity and inno-
vation in Confucian thought. What was Confucius transmitting, in his
view? Was it the actions and practices of former sages or their com-
mitment to humanity? Was it the traditional ritual forms of the former
Zhou ( ) (1122–249 BCE) period? Or was it the ideas or ideals in the
ancient texts such as the Odes? In this section, I explore a number of
ways in which the past is evoked, in the ways of ancient sages, li ( )
(ritual forms that guide behavior), and reading and understanding
classical texts.

1. The Ways of the Ancient Sages

In the Analects, Confucius upholds the way of life during the earlier
part of the Zhou period when Zhou Gong ( ) (ca. eleventh
century BCE) was in power; he makes rhetorical remarks about his
dreams of Zhou Gong (7:5, at 111–12; 8:20, at 124–25). He also ideal-
izes the commitment and achievements of the legendary sage rulers
Yao ( ), Shun ( ), and Yu ( ). The Analects makes a number of
references to these sage rulers specifically with regard to their adher-
ence to Heaven (tian) ( ) as their model (8:19, at 124; 20:1, at 226–
 learning from the confucians 99

27), devotion to gods and spirits of ancestors (8:21, at 125), their

frugality in personal affairs and lavishness in ceremonial ritual (8:21,
at 125), effective and nonassertive government (15:5, at 185), and their
moral leadership and commitment to the common people (8:19, at
124; 20:1, at 226–27). The text also enumerates a number of practical
projects initiated by the sages, such as the construction of canals and
irrigation channels (8:21, at 125). These references to the commitment
and achievements of the sage-rulers are examples of the Confucian
ideal of benevolent government (renzheng) ( ) that seeks to bring
benefits to the common people.
There are many similar references to sage kings in the Mencius,
including especially those that articulate the ruler’s commitment to
the welfare of the people (Mencius 1A:7, 1B:4, 4B:5, 4B:28).3 In his
discussions, Mencius draws liberally on selected details from the past
to illustrate his conception of ideal, benevolent government. The text
provides some elaborate detail of government administration and
benevolent treatment of the people (see especially Mencius 6B, at
263–85). Mencius also provides many negative examples of what
those in power should not do.
Like Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi appeals to examples of para-
digmatic as well as deplorable behavior. However, Xunzi explicitly
contemplates how these appeals function in argumentation. For
example, he notes that appeals to li should draw from the recent
rather than more distant past because of the “difficulty of acquiring
accurate information about the past.”4 Among the three early Con-
fucians, Xunzi appears most concerned about the issue of historical
accuracy.5 It would appear that perhaps Confucius and Mencius were
more lax about precision, even though Confucius did consider how
the past might be revised (e.g., Analects 2:11, at 78).
In Mencius’ discussions, the examples from the past are injected
with evaluative content; the passage on Jie ( ) and Zhou ( ), two
ineffective kings, is just one of many such references:
Mencius said, “It was through losing the people that Chieh [Jie] and
Tchou [Zhou] lost the Empire, and through losing the people’s hearts
that they lost the people. There is a way to win the Empire; win the
people and you will win the Empire. There is a way to win the people;
win their hearts and you will win the people. . . . The people turn to
the benevolent as water flows downwards . . . thus Chieh and Tchou
drove the people to T’ang [Tang] and King Wu.” (Mencius 4A:9, at
159)

Here, Mencius makes an evaluative judgment about the shortcomings

of Jie and Zhou. We cannot tell from this passage whether the causal
connections he makes, regarding the fundamental role of benevolence
in good government, are accurate reports of what actually happened
100 karyn l. lai

during the time of Jie and Zhou. As studies such as David Nivison’s
“Mengzi as Philosopher of History” show many of Mencius’ refer-
ences to historical figures and events are grossly inaccurate.6 Nivison
does not speculate on Mencius’ reasons for misreporting history,
although he notes that, as a result of his investigation he does not trust
Mencius’ details about historical situations and events.
Xunzi’s references to “historical examples” are not dissimilar from
Mencius’. For example, in his discussion of physiognomy, Xunzi
argues against the increasingly popular practice of fortune-telling
based on a person’s physiognomy. He draws on examples of the past
to substantiate his argument that a person’s physical features have no
relation to his or her moral goodness or achievements:

When a person’s principles are upright and his heart obeys them,
although his physiognomy be repulsive, yet if his heart and principles
are good, his physiognomy will not hinder him from being a superior
man . . . the physiognomy of Confucius was such that his face was
like a rumpled square; the physiognomy of Duke Chou [Zhou] was
such that his body was like a broken tree. (Xunzi,“Chapter 5:Against
Physiognomy” [“Fei Xiang” ])7

When we consider Xunzi’s argumentation here, it is quite clear that

his primary concern is to cite these “examples” as illustrations of his
view. Citations of history, of this sort, abound in the early Confucian
texts. This feature of Confucian argumentation is closely linked to the
didactic preoccupations of the Confucians: their references to histori-
cal examples are for the purpose of demonstrating a particular point
rather than to report or cite historical situations accurately. Hence, it
begs the question to refer to these references to former sage kings as
“historical” in nature, as if the Confucians were reporting on particu-
lar situations in the past.
The creative use of examples to strengthen one’s argument was a
dominant style of argumentation in this early period of Chinese
thought. In fact, it persisted right through to the Warring States (475–
221 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) periods. For example, two
major histories of the Han period, Shiji (Records of the Grand His-
torian) ( ) and the Qian Hanshu (History of the Former Han
Dynasty) ( ), articulated a sense of respect for the past and its
traditions, but more importantly, they were partly historical and partly
didactic. Burton Watson comments on the nature of historical texts
during the Han period:

The function of history . . . is twofold: to impart tradition and to

provide edifying moral examples as embodied in the classics. These
two traditions, one recording the words and deeds of history, the
 learning from the confucians 101

other illustrating moral principles through historical incidents, run

through all Chinese historiography.8

While mindful that Watson was referring to historical texts of a later

period, it is not out of place to suggest that the early Confucians
shared these objectives when they referred to examples of people in
the past. Hence, with regard to appeals to history, the early Confucian
texts are informative in that they allow readers to understand certain
principles and how these may be manifest, rather than accurate
records. Their discussions of examples indicate their value commit-
ments; they also allow us some insights into their reasoning and argu-
mentative methods. References to the ways of the sages are used
primarily for didactic and illustrative purposes.

2. Social Ritual and Elegant Expressions of Self

The issue of li ( ), social ritual, is much more complex because it
covers the question of conduct not only for sages but for people more
generally, including those in ordinary contexts (e.g., responding to
one’s teacher or father).As we would expect, a topic of this magnitude
has been extensively discussed in the commentary and secondary
literature on Confucianism. Indeed, the topic of li and its place in
Confucianism appears to have been a divisive issue among the first-
generation disciples of Confucius.9 The connection between li and ren
( ) (humaneness, benevolence) continues as a theme in contempo-
rary debates by scholars including Antonio Cua, Herbert Fingarette,
Tu Wei-ming, Phillip Ivanhoe, and Shun Kwong-loi.
Li has a range of meanings in the early Confucian texts. In its
broadest sense, the term refers to the normative behavioral codes that
are an integral part of the ethos of a society. These behavioral codes
are articulated more specifically in particular relationships including
those of parent–child, teacher–student, ruler–subject, and ruler–
official (Analects 1:2, at 71; 2:5, at 77; 3:18, at 86; 3:19, at 86; 12:5, at
154). These specific prescriptions help to maintain consistency in
interactions and are therefore a basic feature of social life. In this, the
widest sense of li, the concept encapsulates aspects of a living cultural
tradition: understanding existing social, cultural, and moral norms is a
prerequisite for an individual’s participation in society. In addition,
insofar as li facilitate interactions between people, they are an impor-
tant factor in smooth exchanges that can have an aesthetic compo-
nent. There are many allusions to the aesthetic quality of ritual forms
in the Confucian texts.10 In broad terms, li provide a fundamental
social infrastructure within which individuals express themselves and
interact with others; in Analects 9:29 (at 132), the Confucian ren
(benevolent) person is at ease (buyou) ( ).
102 karyn l. lai

A second conception of li focuses on its function in restraining

human excesses by regulating behavior. In this case, li are externally
regulated norms of behavior that help to maintain hierarchy and rank
in relational interactions, both at the personal as well as more public
domains. With regard to this function, li are understood as outwardly
observable expressions of deference and respect, and of human affect
more generally. However, there is no guarantee that fulfillment of
behavioral forms accurately reflects a person’s emotions and the
central concern here is the civilizing function of social ritual. Con-
fucius seems to think of ritual in this way in his conversation with
Zaiwo ( ) regarding the requirements of the traditional three-year
mourning period (Analects 17:21, at 208–10). When Zaiwo challenges
the necessity of following through with the customary prescriptions,
Confucius did not require external conformity but turned the ques-
tion to one of inner commitment:

. . . The Master replied, “Would you then be comfortable eating fine

rice and wearing colorful brocade?”
“I would indeed,” responded Zaiwo.
“If you are comfortable, then do it,” said the Master.
“When exemplary persons ( junzi) are in the mourning shed, it is
because they can find no relish in fine-tasting food, no pleasure in the
sound of music, and no comfort in their usual lodgings, that they do
not abbreviate the mourning period to one year. Now if you are
comfortable with these things, then by all means, enjoy them.” (Ana-
lects 17:21, at 209)

Confucius’ response to Zaiwo reflects an awareness of the futility

of mere behavioral conformity. However, the view in the Analects is
not consistent as some other passages emphasize the maintenance of
ritual form (e.g., 3:17, at 86). Among the early Confucians, Xunzi’s
discussions on li are most extensive as he was concerned about its
civilizing and transforming effects (see, e.g., his chapters “Xiushen”
〈 〉, at 24–3211 and “Li Lun” 〈 〉, at 89–111). In the “Li Lun”
chapter, Xunzi presents a hypothetical, state-of-nature justification
for li:

What is the origin of rites [li]? I reply, human beings are born with
desires, and when they do not achieve their desires, they cannot but
seek the means to do so. If their seeking knows no limit or degree,
they cannot but contend with one another. . . . The ancient kings
hated chaos and therefore established rites and rightness [yi ] in
order to limit it, to nurture people’s desires, and to give them a means
of satisfaction. They saw to it that desires did not exhaust material
things and that material things did not fall short of desires. Thus both
desires and things were supported and satisfied, and this was the
origin of rites. (Xunzi, trans. Bloom, in De Bary and Bloom, Sources
of Chinese Tradition, 174–75)
 learning from the confucians 103

In this passage, Xunzi emphasizes the restraining function of li.

Being concerned about the impacts of selfishness and greed, Xunzi
suggests that, without regulation, human society will be in ruins.
Because of his view regarding the negative effects of unrestrained
human behaviors, Xunzi has commonly been misinterpreted as
holding the view that human beings are inherently (by nature) evil
(xing e [ ]: this phrase is also a title of one of his chapters).12 In
fact, we should focus on the positive outcomes of interactions tem-
pered by li: without restraint, brothers will vie for property, but in
cultivating li and yi ( ), they will even yield to strangers (“Xing E” in
Xunzi, at 157–72). Xunzi believed that human desires and expecta-
tions are malleable: he discusses this especially in his chapter on
sagely government (“Wang Zhi” 〈 〉, at 33–55). Interestingly, there
is no equivalent emphasis in the Mencius on the regulation of human
behaviors and desires, and this may be due in part to Mencius’ ideal-
istic belief in the potency of benevolence in government, that it is
sufficient to effect wider ethical reform.
In spite of the apparent pessimism in Xunzi’s philosophy, he does
believe that human desires and expectations can be shaped by nor-
mative forces (see also Analects 19:22, at 223). In another of his
passages, Xunzi eloquently expresses what may be attained by regu-
lation according to li:

Rites trim what is too long and stretch out what is too short, eliminate
surplus and repair deficiency, extend the forms of love and reverence,
and step by step bring to fulfillment the beauties of proper conduct.
Beauty and ugliness, music and weeping, joy and sorrow are oppo-
sites, and yet rites make use of them all, bringing forth and employing
each in its turn. (“Li Lun” in Xunzi, at 100)

Here, Xunzi alludes to another function of li, and that is to

nurture—to “bring forth”—human emotions. This third use of li is
clearly more ambitious than the second one which aims only at
restraint, although the two functions are not [Link] we have
previously noted, Mencius, being more idealistic about Confucian
benevolent government, focuses on li not so much in terms of its
restraining function but its nurturing one. For Mencius, li, together
with ren, yi (rightness or righteousness),13 and zhi ( ) (wisdom), are
expressions of what is innate in the human mind-heart (xin) ( ):

The heart [xin] of compassion is the germ of benevolence [ren]; the

heart of shame, of dutifulness [yi]; the heart of courtesy and modesty,
of observance of the rites [li]; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom
[zhi]. Man has these four germs just as he has four limbs. . . . If a man
is able to develop all these four germs that he possesses, it will be like
a fire starting up or a spring coming through. (Mencius 2A:6, at 73).
104 karyn l. lai

While Xunzi believes that regulation by li is primarily the initiative

of enlightened government, Mencius holds that the origin of li is the
human mind-heart, awaiting development in human relationships. For
Mencius, li help in the expression of human emotion; in the passage
above, courtesy (ci) ( ) and modesty (rang) ( ) are the roots of li. In
the Analects, li are also conceived of in terms of expressions of human
sentiment. However, there, li cover a broader range of emotions; the
concept refers more generally to respect and appropriate sentiment
(3:12, at 85; 3:26, at 88; 8:21, at 125; 17:11, at 206). According to our
discussion so far, li are instrumental in that they encapsulate human
feeling and facilitate its expression according to what is deemed ap-
propriate within particular communities at particular points in [Link]
say that li are instrumental in this sense is not to say that it is secon-
dary in importance (to ren) but that it is necessary to relational inter-
action, just as ren is. Indeed, the implicit suggestion in Analects 12:1 (at
152) is that one becomes a cultivated person of ren through constant
practice of li ritual forms. In other words, both the interactive transac-
tion and human feeling are necessary components of human life.
This is one of the distinguishing features of Confucian philosophy:
both in terms of how we conceptualize the self, and of life in its
concrete, lived realities, there is no dichotomy between “inner” moral
commitment and “outer” expression. Elegant and polished expres-
sions of the self are not mere “external” comportment; they are con-
stitutive of a person’s character and moral commitment. Antonio Cua
articulates how ritual form and moral character are integrated in
Confucian thought:
[In Confucian ethics and traditional Chinese culture,] [t]he charac-
teristic concern with the form of proper behavior is still present.
However, the form stressed is not just a matter of fitting into an
established social structure or set of distinctions, nor is it a matter of
methodic procedure that facilitates the satisfaction of the agent’s
desires and wishes, rather, it involves the elegant form (wen) for the
expression of ethical character.14,15
According to this view, li, ritual forms, are required for self-expression
and further development of an individual. In simple terms, we might
say that li are part of the acculturation process whereby people
become familiar with the accepted norms of the society they are part
of. Yet, if we are to understand Confucian thought more thoroughly,
ritual behavior is no mere artifact. There would have been some
awareness of this theme around Confucius’ time, as the issue is
expressly noted in Analects 12:18:
Ji Zicheng inquired “[Junzi] are determined by nothing other than
the quality of their basic disposition (zhi) ( ); what need do they
have of further refinement (wen) ( )?
 learning from the confucians 105

Zigong ( ) replied, “It is a shame that the gentleman [fuzi: an

official] has spoken thus about the [junzi] . . . Refinement is no dif-
ferent from one’s basic disposition; one’s basic disposition is no dif-
ferent from refinement. The skin of the tiger or leopard, shorn of its
hair, is no different from the dog or sheep.” (155)

Ji Zicheng represents the critic’s voice that the Confucian focus on

ritual forms was misdirected. This passage reveals the Confucian con-
ception of self as a social being whose life is deeply integrated with the
lives of others. Interactions and relationships are not secondary and
superimposed on what is basic and more “natural”; sociality is central
to human life and its meaning. Mencius developed this aspect of
Confucian philosophy, making it very clear that relationships are
an integral part of human nature and human life (Mencius 3B:9, at
139–45).
We have seen in our discussion of li three of its different, though
not incompatible, functions. In fact, the three functions may be viewed
progressively, each one being more subtle and complex than the pre-
vious. At the first, most basic level, li are the behavioral norms and
ethos that enable a society to function well—some might say to func-
tion at all. In other words, li assist in the tasks of maintaining a
society’s ethos and of socialization of individuals. At the second level,
li are a critical part of civil society; here we may think of the functions
of li in terms of the concept of civilization. They enhance social life
and human relationships, making for smooth transactions. Third, li
allow for the articulation of the self, as well as the application of an
individual’s commitments, in ways that are understood and appropri-
ately interpreted by others.
In summary, the concept of li (social ritual) pertains to aspects of
cultural tradition—the ethos, so to speak—of a society at a given time.
Because li embody and affirm the cultural traditions of a society, they
encompass aspects of the past that may continue to shape the present.
In understanding the concept of li, we also begin to appreciate how
the Confucian tradition emphasizes the situatedness of the human
individual and the historicity of society’s norms. An individual is in
part a product of a particular socio-historical context; it is due to this
that Confucian thought is sometimes deemed conservative.16
A commitment to ritual form and elegant expressions of the self
requires practice in those forms and cultivation in skills of self-
expression. Because Confucian philosophy takes the relational self as
its starting point, it sees a very tight connection between moral com-
mitment and practice, that is, one’s moral commitment is realized in
and through one’s interactions with others. A key concept here is xin
( ), often translated as “sincerity” or “trustworthiness,” although it
is perhaps more accurately conceived in terms of “concordance
106 karyn l. lai

between commitment, word, and deed.” The Confucian tradition

focuses not only on what benevolence is, but how it is manifest in the
life of individuals in society. Understanding the commitment to
humanity (ren) within the wider environment, appreciating the cul-
tural (wen , le )17 and ritual forms (li) of a particular place and
time, and knowing how appropriately to express oneself in inter-
actions with others,18 are integral and intertwined aspects of the
Confucian vision.19

3. Reading and Reflecting on the Odes

The Odes is a classical text comprising approximately three
hundred poems, parts of which had been written during the earlier
part of the Zhou period. The Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi refer
liberally to the Odes in their discussions, seeming to cite Odes as a
voice of authority from the earlier Zhou tradition, and appealing to
its poems to provide support for particular arguments. In the Xunzi,
there are also some discussions about how the Odes are important in
cultivation. In the chapter “Quan Xue” (〈 〉, at 15–23) in the
Xunzi, the Odes and three other classic texts, the Record of Rites
(Liji), the Classic of History (Shujing) ( ), and the Record of
Music (Yueji) ( ), are essential elements of a complete program
in self-cultivation. According to this chapter in the Xunzi, one must
read and reflect on these classics, and practise and cultivate li in one’s
interactions, in order to appreciate the comprehensive nature of the
Confucian vision.
The references to the Odes in the Analects are most interesting
because there are emphatic discussions about how the Odes are
important in moral life. From its passages, we may identify three
functions of the Odes. First, they allow insights into the diversity of life
and human experiences. These experiences are more varied than
those that any one individual will experience over a lifetime. Hence,
the classics, more generally, are repositories of information about the
past,20 about the experiences of different [Link] are the material
that a diligent person would sift through to understand more about
his or her world. In this way, the Odes are an important resource in
decision-making (Analects 13:5, at 163).
The Odes also help in situating the self: The poems provide for
acquaintance and familiarity with aspects of tradition. In Analects
16:13 (at 200–1), we are told that reading the Odes helps one to
“speak” (yan) ( ). Here, we should reflect on the implicit reference
to language and the factors that underlie discourse and interaction. In
order to speak in a language, one must grasp the meanings and struc-
tures in language. These are, for the most part, embodied in language
 learning from the confucians 107

use, and it is in understanding how language is used by different

speakers in different contexts that one is able to use it appropriately
to express oneself. In the same way that language provides a context
for linguistic self-expression, aspects of tradition define the locus
within which individuals express themselves and relate to others. In
being acquainted with the Odes and similar classics, one is better able
to appreciate how earlier norms and conceptual frameworks have
shaped the present. In the same passage, the learner, Boyu ( ), has
acquired fluidity and ease in self-expression after he has studied the
Odes.
Analects 17:9 (at 206) expressly sets out the different ways in
which the Odes contributes to the development of reflective capaci-
ties: They inspire (xing) ( ), help to develop powers of observation
(guan) ( ), encourage sociability (qun) ( ), and improve one’s
critical skills (yuan) ( ). The Odes also help to develop one’s ability
for clarification and discrimination, that is, to understand words
(names) and their applications. Ames and Rosemont translate this
paragraph with an insightful practical slant: “[the Odes] instills in
you a broad vocabulary for making distinctions in the world around
you” (Analects 17:9, at 206). We know how these reflective skills
may be manifest when, on two occasions, Confucius praises his dis-
ciples for their application of specific odes to illuminate their inter-
pretation of issues they were deliberating on (Analects 1:15, at 75;
3:8, at 83–84)). We should examine the passage 1:15 with some care:
Zigong said: “What do you think of the saying: ‘Poor but not inferior;
rich but not superior’?” The Master replied: “Not bad, but not as
good as ‘Poor but enjoying the way (dao) ( ); rich but loving ritual
propriety (li) ( ).’ ”
Zigong said: “The Book of Songs [the Odes] states:
Like bone carved and polished,
Like jade cut and ground.
Is this not what you have in mind?”
The Master said: “Zigong, it is only with the likes of you then that
I can discuss the Songs! On the basis of what has been said, you know
what is yet to come.” (75)
Zigong demonstrates the ability to extract the meaning of the poem,
and creatively to apply it to an existing situation. While li are impor-
tant to a person’s cultivation in practical ways, the role of the Odes,
and other texts like it, are important for developing critical skills. This
passage focuses on how he uses wisdom from the past (wang) ( ) to
shed light on what is to come (lai) ( ). This is an indication that there
is some depth and complexity in the Confucian appeal to the past,
which we will examine in greater detail in the final section. In the next
section, we turn to criticisms of the Confucian reliance on past
wisdoms, traditions, and practices.
108 karyn l. lai

II. The Rejection of the Past

In this section, I discuss a selection of criticisms advanced by other

thinkers against the Confucian use of the past. The aim is to capture a
range of reasons for their rejection of the authority of tradition and
the past more generally, rather than to produce an exhaustive list of
the discussions in this area.

1. Mohist Philosophy
Mozi ( ) (480?–380? BCE) attacked a number of themes that
were central to Confucianism, including its promotion of relation-
ships, men of cultivation, ritual, and music. Mozi’s rejection of anti-
quity was unsystematic. In his own arguments, he sometimes appeals
to the past. For example, he upholds the frugality of the ancient sages
in his rejection of extravagance (“Indulgence in Excess” in Mozi, sec.
6).21 There, Mozi argues that the ways of these ancient sages are to be
emulated. Yet, in its rejection of Confucianism, the Mozi dismisses
appeals to tradition:
The Confucian says, “The cultivated person must follow the ancients
in speech and dress so as to manifest humaneness.” We say, “That
which is deemed ancient in speech and dress were once modern; the
ancients who spoke that way and dressed that way were not consid-
ered cultivated men. Are you saying that one must wear the dress of
a man who is not cultivated, and speak the speech of a man who is not
cultivated, in order to manifest humaneness?” (My translation)22

This argument is interesting because it both raises an interesting point

and commits a reasoning fallacy. The argument asserts that, because
the Confucians are committed to the “ancients” for its own sake, they
are therefore committed to a program of noncultivation because
many of the ancients were not concerned about cultivation. This is a
straw person fallacy as it attributes to the Confucians a claim that is
not theirs. On the other hand, however, the argument makes an
important comment on appeals to tradition: it points out that what is
now traditional (gu) ( ) was once current (xin) ( ).An appeal to the
past cannot be justified on its own grounds. In other words, if we were
to ask the Confucians—or, for that matter, anyone else—their basis
for appealing to the past, an answer such as “because the sages in the
past said that should be so” would result in an infinite regress of
appeals to the past. In thinking about the regress, we would immedi-
ately realize that, as the Mohists point out, the past was once the
present. An appeal to the past must be justified on some other basis.
The Mohist criticism of appeals to the past is an important one
relating to the dynamics of argumentation. In the passage above, it
 learning from the confucians 109

objects to Confucianism on the basis that the latter looks to the past
mindlessly, slavishly adhering to its dictates and norms. However, we
have seen that, for the most part, when the Confucians refer to the
past, these function as illustrative examples within their own argu-
ments. When Mencius and Xunzi appeal to the past—whether in
reference to the ways of the sages or texts such as the Odes, they use
them creatively and selectively, rather than as authoritative guides
that determine how life in the present should be lived.

2. Legalist Philosophy
The Legalists claimed that because Confucianism appealed to the
past, it failed to adapt to the needs of the present. Han Fei (ca. 280–33
BCE), the most prominent thinker in the Legalist tradition, argued
that the growth in population, from ancient times to the present, was
a primary factor that necessitated a change in standards. In his essay
the “Five Vermin,” Han Fei concedes that Confucian ren-and-li gov-
ernment might have been effective in ancient times; however, that was
no longer applicable:
In the age of remote antiquity, human beings were few while birds
and beasts were many . . . [now] people have become numerous and
supplies scanty . . . people quarrel so much that . . . disorder is inevi-
table . . . the sage, considering quantity and deliberating upon scar-
city and abundance, governs accordingly. So it is no charity to inflict
light punishments nor is it any cruelty to enforce severe penalties: the
practice is simply in accordance with the custom of the age. Thus,
circumstances change with the age and measures change according to
circumstances. (Han Fei Zi, “Chapter 49: Five Vermin,” at vol. II: 273,
277–78)23

The break in tradition was a critical step in the establishment of the

Legalist program. In order to install rule by penal law ( fa) ( ), the
Legalists had to denounce the viability of benevolent government.
Being keenly aware of the incompatibility between a benevolent
government and one that sought primarily to maintain its power, Han
Fei claimed that Confucian benevolent government undermined rule
by fa (Han Fei Zi, “Chapter 7: The Two Handles,” at vol. I: 46–50;
“Chapter 19: On Pretensions and Heresies,” at vol. I: 156–68). He
described their incompatibility in his anecdote of maodun ( )
(which is still popular today), of a man who promoted his spears (mao
[ ]) and shields (dun [ ]) by claiming that his spears could penetrate
anything, and that nothing could penetrate his shields (Han Fei Zi,
“Chapter 40: Nan Shi,” at vol. II: 199–206).
The Legalist rejection of appeals to the past was intertwined with
their preoccupation with the maintenance of the power of the sover-
110 karyn l. lai

eign. From the point of view of this central concern, there was only one
source of authority; the common people were not to have an indepen-
dent vantage point, whether from tradition or elsewhere, from which to
reflect on the affairs of the state. The most thorough method of
eliminating criticism of the sovereign was to restrict learning:
. . . in the state of the enlightened sovereign there is no literature
written on bamboo slips, but the law is the only teaching; there are no
quoted sayings of the early kings, but the magistrates are the only
instructors. . . . (Han Fei Zi, “Chapter 49: Five Vermin,” at vol. II: 291)

The argument of the Legalists, that the optimal style of government

depends in part on social and historical contingencies, is at first glance
a credible one. It makes sense that different organizational styles are
better suited to different population sizes. They disagreed with the
Confucians more extensively, regarding the aims of government, and
not merely in relation to its methods or styles. More importantly, their
rejection of antiquity was grounded in their concern to quell dissent.
The problem, from their point of view, was not antiquity as such, but
rather anything that challenged the ruler’s authority. The Legalists
have not successfully established an argument against appeals to the
[Link] heart of their argument is that, given that Confucian benevo-
lent government and Legalist fa are incompatible, and given that they
(the Legalists) uphold fa, the Confucian paradigm cannot stand.

3. The Philosophy of the Zhuangzi

The Daoist text Zhuangzi is disdainful of conventional pursuits. It
advocates great wisdom (dazhi) ( ) in contrast to the small,
conventional wisdoms (xiaozhi) ( ) held by most people and, as
proposed by thinkers of other persuasions (Zhuangzi, chap. 2).24
Zhuangzi sets up contrasts between the two: “Great understanding is
broad and unhurried; little understanding is cramped and busy. Great
words are clear and limpid; little words are shrill and quarrelsome”
(Zhuangzi, chap. 3).25 Small knowledge is preoccupied with trivialities
but, more importantly, it also restricts the perspective of the person
who is guided by it. There is an illuminating description of a person
who is caught up in the flow of convention:
Sometimes clashing with things, sometimes bending before them, he
runs his course like a galloping steed, and nothing can stop him. Is he
not pathetic? Sweating and laboring to the end of his days and never
seeing his accomplishment, utterly exhausting himself and never
knowing where to look for rest—can you help pitying him? . . . Man’s
life has always been a muddle like this. (Zhuangzi, chap. 2; trans.
Watson, Chuang Tzu, 33)
 learning from the confucians 111

The fraught life of this man who is driven by convention—

unreflective, restless, ill at ease—is drastically different from the life
guided by great wisdom. In the Zhuangzi text, great wisdom is asso-
ciated with having a certain “knack,” rather than a conventionally
defined notion of benefit, worth or correctness. On the whole, the text
focuses on more subjective and intuitive learning, at times mystical
and perhaps spiritual.26 These features are important aspects of
wisdom in the Zhuangzi, both in content and method: because
wisdom consists in transcendence of conventional values, one
approaches or attains it in ways that are nonconventional.
In the Zhuangzi, there are a number of examples of how knack is
grasped and how it is manifest. These examples are drawn from ordi-
nary vocations and actions, a far cry from the Confucian men of
wisdom or the Legalist ruler in his supremacy. There is the expert
butcher, Cook Ding ( ) (chap. 3, at 63–64), the wheelwright, Bian
( ), whose craft is inexpressible in words (chap. 13, at 139–40), the
experienced ferryman (chap. 19, at 136–37), the hunchback cicada
catcher (chap. 19, at 138), and the wood carver and his marvelous bell
stands (chap. 19, at 135). According to Schwartz, these craftsmen are
not settled in transcendent awareness, merely going through the
motions of men who live in the world; they are experts in their selected
activities and they engage with the world in all its imperfections.27
They are expert because of their “know-how”: “. . . the Taoist art of
living is a supremely intelligent responsiveness which would be under-
mined by analyzing and choosing . . . grasping the Way is an unver-
balisable ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing that.’”28
Know-how in the Zhuangzi is defined in terms of its contrast with
book-learning. There is striking imagery in the example where the
wheelwright, Bian (the text playfully names the wheelwright “Bian,”
meaning “flat”) challenges Duke Huan ( ), who is reading an old
text. Here, Zhuangzi overturns the roles of the ordinary workman and
the cultivated and learned man. The wheelwright says:
If I chip at a wheel too slowly, the chisel slides and does not grip; if
too fast, it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I
feel it in the hand and respond from the heart, the mouth cannot put
it into words, there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey
to my son and which my son cannot learn from me. This is how
through my seventy years I have grown old chipping at wheels. The
men of old and their untransmittable message are dead. Then what
my lord is reading is the dregs of the men of old, isn’t it? (Zhuangzi,
chap. 2, at 140)

This simile suggests that, if it is knack we are concerned about, we will

not be able to acquire that expertise from reading a book. In fact, Bian
points out that he has been unsuccessful teaching his skills to his son.
112 karyn l. lai

Knack cannot be taught through language; it can only be grasped in

practice. Based on this and other metaphors, wisdom in the Zhuangzi
has been described as spontaneous and intuitive. Scholars use such
terms as “illumination,” “awakening,”29 and “gnosis”30 to describe the
nature and mood of its philosophy.
These assessments of the philosophy of the Zhuangzi are gleaned
from careful study and analysis of its themes, interactions with other
philosophies, and its language. However, we need to examine Zhuang-
zi’s use of examples—butchery, carpentry, and more generally of
craftsmanship—to see whether they adequately demonstrate sponta-
neity and intuition. The examples in the Zhuangzi express various
features of craftsmanship: expertly executed, nonreflective, practical,
and habitual. The craft persons in the Zhuangzi are good at what they
do because they have had much practice over the years (Cook Ding
has been butchering for nineteen years (chap. 3, at 63–64); the cicada
catcher has disciplined his body over time (chap. 19, at 138). The
various skills may seem spontaneous because the skilled person does
not stop to reflect on how she might execute her skill. Furthermore,
these skills are not normally acquired through the accumulation of
knowledge and are often inexpressible in words. However, because
they are the result only of extensive practice and learning, they are not
typically the kind of activity we would label “intuitive” or “spontane-
ous.” In fact, if we were to compare these examples of cultivated
skills with the cultivation of the self in Confucian philosophy, there are
many similar features. These include the primacy of practice, the
arduous nature of cultivation, the rigor and intensity with which
the learner or apprentice approaches his or her tasks, and the impres-
sive fluency and beauty of their execution.31 There is, however, one
significant difference between the examples in the Zhuangzi and the
cultivation of the Confucian paradigmatic person and that is that, in
the case of the former, we are discussing skills associated with single
tasks whereas Confucian self-cultivation attends to a number of
integrated aspects of life (such as the relational, ethical, social, and
political).
Yet, there remains in the metaphor of the wheelwright another
point of interest in the context of our discussion. Not only does it
challenge convention, which Confucianism upholds, it also rejects the
Confucian reliance on classical texts. In general, Daoist philosophy
makes a persuasive point that over-reliance on convention and tradi-
tion can stifle spontaneity and initiative in individuals. It is clear from
our analysis that Confucianism emphasizes convention and tradition
as part of its program. The question we need to ask is, does Confucian
philosophy consistently or mostly emphasize tradition at a cost to
individual initiative? In order to consider this issue more fully, we will
 learning from the confucians 113

need to examine the conception, nature, and aims of learning in the

Confucian.

III. Learning the Confucian Way

In Analects 5:22, Confucius is concerned about some of his followers

who are unable to take a critical stance on issues: “. . . with the lofty
elegance of the literatus, they put on a full display of culture, but they
don’t know how to cut and tailor (cai) ( ) it” (101; see also Analects
4:11, at 91; 12:4, at 153; 12:6, at 154; 13:23, at 168–9). The term cai
involves the exercise of judgment to trim and prune.32 Mencius picks
up discussion of this issue (Mencius 7B: 37, at 327–31) and makes a
connection between this passage and a number of others (Analects
13:21, at 168; 17:13, at 207). Analects 13:21 (at 168) emphasizes the
importance of views that are carefully considered, avoiding both the
rash (those who are quick to dismiss the authority of the ancients and
of tradition) and the timid (those who are overly cautious about
attempting different or new ways).
Mencius refers to the case of a person who does not hold to his
value commitments, or perhaps does not have any. Being capricious,
he openly and blindly accepts norms, irrespective of their source, and
is also quick to abandon them when he so chooses (Mencius 7B: 37, at
327–31). Mencius describes this person—who Ames and Rosemont
nickname the “village worthy”—in the following way:
The village worthy would say: “What is the point of the rash scholar’s
grand ambitions? With no relation between word and deed, nor any
between deed and word, I simply say ‘The Ancients this! And the
Ancients that!’ And why the timid scholar’s unsociable airs? Born
into this world, act on behalf of this world. As long as you are good at
it, it’s fine.” At home anywhere, toadying to all around—such is the
village worthy.33

This is one of the clearest statements from the early Confucian texts
of the importance of being thoughtful and cautious about convention.
This takes us back to the utterance by Confucius that he is a trans-
mitter only, and not an innovator, and that he is a follower of antiquity
(haogu) ( ) (Analects 7:1, at 111). How can Confucius be a trans-
mitter only, if he practices and promotes revision and review of the
old: “. . . I learn much, select out of it what works well, and then follow
it. I observe much, and remember it” (Analects 7:28, at 117)? Note
that, in this passage, selection precedes implementation.
The Confucian approach to learning is aptly captured by Levenson
and Schurmann, who describe Confucius as an “innovating tradition-
alist,” as one who used terms from the past but injected them with
114 karyn l. lai

new, moral meaning.34 This description captures the methodology in

the Analects, that is, drawing from the past so that its useful aspects
may be integrated into current situations. The text emphasizes a
passion for learning from a range of sources (xue: 1:1, at 71; 6:3, at
103–4; 6:27, at 109; 7:2, at 111). One listens (wen) and looks ( jian) in
order to learn (2:18, at 79–80; 7:28, at 117). Those who came to inquire
with Confucius were often asking about what they had heard or seen,
and whether they should follow that (e.g., 11:22, at 146–47). Clearly,
the followers of Confucius were not simply abiding by prevailing
norms, past or present. For the Confucians, learning (xue), that is,
information-gathering and knowledge-acquisition, is only a part of
self-cultivation: when Confucius describes his stages of development
(from fifteen to seventy years), xue is the project at the very first stage,
when he was fifteen (2:4, at 76–77).
Learning must be put into practice (xing: 5:14, at 98; 7:3, at 111;
11:22, at 146–47), as well as reflected on (si: 2:15, at 79; 15:31, at 190).
This is the multifaceted process of Confucian self-cultivation: a
person is informed by learning, tested in practice, and guided by
reflection. Analects 2:15 emphasizes the place of both learning and
reflection: The Master said: “Learning without due reflection leads
to perplexity; reflection without learning leads to perilous circum-
stances” (at 79). Both learning and reflection are necessary for the
cultivation of the individual.
Si, reflection, is an integral concept in early Confucian philosophy.35
The concept expresses the importance of reflective contemplation
and critical thinking in ordinary life. In reflecting on one’s experiences
and those of others in the past, one engages in the ethical life of
society at the meta-ethical level, and not merely at the normative
level.36 For an individual to engage in reflection of this sort is to
establish some critical distance from prevailing norms. For the Con-
fucians, reasoning at this level also includes awareness of commit-
ments and how they are manifest in practice (Analects 14:12, at 174;
16:10, at 199; 19:1, at 218). For example, “. . . in countenance [exem-
plary persons] think about [si] cordiality . . . in bearing and attitude
they think about deference . . . in conducting affairs they think about
due respect . . .” (16:10, at 199).
The Confucian exemplary person reflects on, selects, reviews, and
assesses what he or she learns, including from the past. The
expertise—should we say knack—attained through learning, prac-
tice, and reflection allows one to be a keen observer and assessor of
others (guan: 1:11, at 73–74; 2:10, at 78; 4:7, at 90–91). Observations
of the character and behaviors of others not only tell us about those
others, they also have a role in enriching the self: the Master said,
“In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound
 learning from the confucians 115

to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and iden-

tifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly” (Analects
7:22, at 115–16).
In this light, we can return to the aspects of history and tradition
and their role in Confucian cultivation of self. Based on the preceding
discussion, the past figures in the following ways:
• as examples, to illustrate a point;
• provides knowledge about customs, norms, and traditions;
• alerts individuals to the diversity of situations and the possibili-
ties for action and responses;
• as material to reflect on in one’s development of critical and
reflective skills; and
• as paradigmatic models that exemplify particular virtues.
In brief, the critics of early Confucianism have focused predomi-
nantly on the assumption that the Confucians draw from the past as
authoritative. However, I have shown here that, for the most part, not
only do the Confucians draw on the past selectively, they also advo-
cate reflection on the material gathered from the past. An appropriate
testimony to this claim is from the “Encouraging Learning”
(“Quanxue”) section of the Xunzi text, which eloquently brings
together elements of learning, practice, and reflection in the Confu-
cian vision:

The noble person knows that what is not complete or what is not
pure is unworthy to be called beautiful. Therefore he recites and
reiterates so as to integrate it, reflects [si] and ponders so as to
comprehend it, determines his associations so that he may dwell in it,
and eliminates what is harmful in order to preserve and nourish
it. . . . Therefore he cannot be subverted by power and profit, nor
swayed by the masses and multitudes, nor unsettled by the whole
world. . . . He who holds firm to inner power [de ( ): power, virtue]
is able to order himself; being able to order himself, he can then
respond to others. He who is able to order himself and respond to
others is called the complete man [chengren ( )]. Heaven mani-
fests itself in its brightness; earth manifests itself in its breadth; the
noble person values his completeness. (Xunzi, trans. Bloom, in De
Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 164)

Xunzi presents a picture of the Confucian cultivated person as one

who is careful, observant, learned, disciplined, and thoughtful. This
exemplary person has benefited from the past by using it reflectively
and not blindly. It may now be our turn to learn, thoughtfully, from
these Confucian thinkers of the past.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Sydney, Australia
116 karyn l. lai

Endnotes

I am grateful to Michael Funston, whose comments have helped to shape my arguments

in this article.
1. All references of Confucius’ Analects are taken from Roger Ames and Henry Rose-
mont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballan-
tine, 1998), unless otherwise noted. Subsequent references to the Analects include
page references to this book unless otherwise noted; Analects 2:18 is found at pp.
79–80.
2. See D. C. Lau’s analysis in Confucius: The Analects (Lun Yu), trans. D. C. Lau
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 43–49.
3. All references of Mencius are taken from Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, rev. ed. (Hong
Kong: The Chinese University Press; first published in Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1979), unless otherwise noted. Subsequent references to Mencius include page
references to this book unless otherwise noted; Mencius 1A:7, 1B:4, 4B:5, and 4B: 28
are found in pp. 15–25, 33–37, 175, and 185, respectively.
4. Antonio S. Cua, “Ethical Uses of the Past,” reprinted in Human Nature, Ritual, and
History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy, Studies in Philosophy and the
History of Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005),
94.
5. Ibid., 96.
6. David Nivison, “Mengzi as Philosopher of History,” in Mencius: Contexts and Inter-
pretations, ed. Alan Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 282–304, at
300.
7. The Works of Hsuntze, trans. Homer Dubs (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1928), 67–69.
8. Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 1: From Earliest Times to 1600,
ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999), 368.
9. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Belknap
Press, 1985), 130–34.
10. The discussions which deal more extensively with aesthetic form in Confucianism
include: Antonio S. Cua “Discussions of Li (Propriety): Reflections on an Aspect of
Hsun Tzu’s Ethics,” in Philosophy East and West 29, no. 4 (1979): 373–94; Lauren
Pfister, “Considerations for the Contemporary Revitalization of Confucianism:
Meditations on Te in the Analects,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13, no. 2 (1986):
239–64; Herbert Fingarette, “Human Community as Holy Rite,” in Confucius: The
Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 1–17; Herbert Fingarette,
“The Music of Humanity in the Conversations of Confucius,” Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 10 (1983): 331–56; David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking through
Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), esp. 85–88; and Karyn
L. Lai, Learning from Chinese Philosophies (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006),
esp. 139–56.
11. All references from Xunzi are taken from Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. Burton
Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), unless otherwise noted. Sub-
sequent references to the Xunzi include page references to this book, unless other-
wise noted.
12. An analogy used by Xunzi demonstrates that he did not hold a notion of inherent evil
that might correspond to the Judaeo-Christian conception of original sin. In this
analogy, Xunzi explains: “ritual and rightness are always created by the conscious
activity of the sages; essentially they are not created by human nature. Thus a potter
molds clay and makes a vessel, but the vessel is created by the conscious activity of the
potter and is not created by his human nature . . .” (“Xing E,” in Xunzi, trans. Bloom,
in De Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 181).
13. In the passage below, D. C. Lau translates yi as “dutifulness.” This is an unusual
rendition of yi, which is usually translated as “rightness” or “righteousness,” or even as
“morality.” Lau explains in his introduction to his translation of Confucius’ Analects
that “dutifulness” captures the obligatory nature of morality, especially as “benevo-
 learning from the confucians 117

lence does not carry its own moral guarantee” (Confucius: The Analects, 27). We
should, however, note that yi also has a sense of moral evaluation of self. See the
discussions by Kwong-loi Shun, in Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1997), 58–65; and Lai, Learning from Chinese Philosophies,
74–79.
14. Antonio S. Cua, “The Conceptual Framework of Confucian Ethical Thought,” Journal
of Chinese Philosophy 23, no. 2 (1996): 153–74, at 166. Elsewhere, Cua discusses the
importance of tradition in moral life in his examination of concepts such as “form of
life,” “way of life,” and “style of life.” He writes, “The notion of the form of life focuses
on the consensual background of the moral tradition, which renders intelligible the
uses of moral concepts. The notion of a way of life focuses on the coherence and
convergent ways of behavior as congruent with a set of formulable rules of conduct;
while the notion of the style of life draws attention to the diverse qualitative signifi-
cance of the way of life for individual agents.” (See Antonio S. Cua, “Reflections on
Moral Theory and Understanding Moral Traditions,” in Interpreting across Bound-
aries, ed. Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988), 283–84.
15. Herbert Fingarette emphasizes the integration of behavior—performance—and
moral commitment. He notes that “Acts that are li . . . are subtle and intelligent acts
exhibiting more or less sensitivity to context, more or less integrity in perfor-
mance. . . . We distinguish sensitive and intelligent musical performances from dull
and unperceptive ones; and we detect in the performance confidence and integrity, or
perhaps hesitation, conflict, ‘faking,’ ‘sentimentalizing.’ We detect all this in the per-
formance; we do not have to look into the psyche or personality of the performer. It
is all ‘there,’ public.” (See Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, 53.) In break-
ing down this dichotomy, Fingarette suggests that the ethical discussions in Western
philosophy tend to focus on the “inner” psychological self, leading to a neglect of the
“outer” performance of a moral act.
16. See, for example, Kwong-loi Shun’s discussion of “Jen and Li in the Analects” in
Philosophy East and West 43, no. 3 (1993): 457–80, esp. 465–66; 472–73. In his analysis
of the connection between ren and li, Shun preserves the element of conservative
backward pull in revisions of li. Shun’s analysis stands in contrast to the interpretation
of David Hall and Roger Ames in Thinking through Confucius. In their discussion of
li, Hall and Ames state that “. . . just as the ritual actions [li] inherited from the
traditions require appropriation and creative elaboration, so the inherited physical
disposition [ti ] is not definitive, but an achievement informed by the insights of
those who have gone before. It is malleable—wax into which one’s novelty can be
impressed” (Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 101).
17. I use the term “culture” broadly to include wen (script, literature) and le (music).
Music, le, was an important part of Confucian ritual life. In the Confucian texts,
there is a connection between music and moral cultivation (Analects 3:3, at 82; 13:3, at
161–62). There was acceptable music (Analects 7:14, 8:15, and 9:15 at 113–14, 123–24,
and 130, respectively) and degenerate music (Analects 15:11, at 187; 17:18, at 208).
Some of the references to music in the Analects mirror the references to the early
sages. The music associated with decadent and corrupt rulers is also debased. These
are most probably evaluative rather than descriptive. My discussion of the past will
not include an evaluation of music because, while there are references to music of the
past, history or age is not an integral element of music. It is, nevertheless, important
to note that, in the Confucian tradition, music is an important element of cultural
tradition.
18. Karyn L. Lai,“Confucian Moral Cultivation: Some Parallels with Musical Training,” in
The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Perspectives, ed. Kim-Chong
Chong, Sor-Hoon Tan, and Chin Liew Ten (Chicago: Open Court, 2003), 107–39, esp.
111–12.
19. Ibid., 123–30.
20. Hall and Ames discuss two functions of the Odes, one as a “repository of historical
information to be learned [xue]” and the other “a primary source of creative reflection
[si].” See Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius, 64.
118 karyn l. lai

21. In The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, trans. Yi-pao Mei (London: Arthur
Probsthain, 1929), 22–27.
22. The Mohists were keen to reject these aspects of tradition because keeping up with
rituals and music was a cost that society could not afford. Mozi perceived the Con-
fucian project as an elitist preoccupation, attempting merely to preserve exclusive
ritual forms. He argued that the resources required for the maintenance of li
were simply unjustified as they did little more than to detract from economic pro-
ductivity. Refer to “Against Confucianism,” sec. 39; Mozi, in Mo Tzu: Basic Writings,
trans. Burton Watson (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963),
124–36.
23. All references of Han Fei Zi are taken from Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu:A Classic
of Chinese Political Science, trans. Liao Wen-kuei (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1939,
1959), vols. I and II, unless otherwise noted. Subsequent references to the Han Fei Zi
include page references to this book, unless otherwise noted.
24. All references from Zhuangzi are taken from Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, trans.
Angus C. Graham (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), unless otherwise noted. Subsequent
references to the Zhuangzi include page references to this book, unless otherwise
noted. Zhuangzi 2 is found at 48–61.
25. Translated by Burton Watson in Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964), 32.
26. Philip J. Ivanhoe (“Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Tao,” Journal of
the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 4 [1993]: 639–54), Robert Allinson
(Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters
[Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989]), and Lee Yearley (“The Per-
fected Person in the Radical Chuang Tzu,” in Experimental Essays on the Chuang
Tzu, ed. Victor Mair [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986]) suggest that the
philosophy of the Zhuangzi engenders spiritual transformation; Edward Slingerland
understands the philosophy in religious terms (in “Effortless Action: The Chinese
Spiritual Idea of Wu-Wei,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 68, no. 2
[1986]: 293–328), while Benjamin Schwartz (The World of Thought in Ancient China)
and Harold Roth (Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Foundations of
Taoist Mysticism [New York: Columbia University Press, 1989]) understand it in
mystical, perhaps gnostic terms (Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China).
Note that the Zhuangzi is a composite text, with some identifiable strains: Yangist,
Primitivist, Syncretist, and school of Zhuangzi (Angus C. Graham, “How Much of
Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?” in Journal of the American Academy of Reli-
gion 47, no. 3 [1980], thematic issue: 459–501).
27. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 235.
28. Angus C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (Chicago: Open Court, 1989), 186.
29. Lisa Raphals, “Skeptical Strategies in Zhuangzi and Theaetetus,” in Essays on Skep-
ticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 30.
30. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 215–37.
31. Refer to Antonio S. Cua, “Reasonable Action and Confucian Argumentation,”
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1973): 57–75; and Fingarette, “The Music of
Humanity.”
32. Lau, Analects, 79
33. Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, at n. 86, 238–39.
34. Joseph Levenson and Franz Schurmann, China: An Interpretive History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969), 54.
35. It is curious that Ivanhoe makes a firm distinction between the philosophies of
Confucius and Xunzi as emphasizing learning (xue), and that of Mencius as empha-
sizing thinking (si) (in Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Thinking and Learning in Early Confucian-
ism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17, no. 4 [1990]: 473–93, esp. 473–74). Strictly
speaking, Ivanhoe’s distinction that is drawn along the lines of emphasis (i.e., Xunzi
emphasizes xue while Mencius emphasizes si), is not incorrect. However, we should be
careful not to overextend the dichotomy between the two philosophies (refer to the
quotation from Xunzi in the text, at the end of the article, that emphasizes the place
 learning from the confucians 119

of si in the life of the complete person). Furthermore, the passages in the Analects
refer to si as much as they do xue.
36. Refer to Hall and Ames, Thinking through Confucius; Antonio S. Cua, “Tasks of
Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1979): 55–67; Antonio S.
Cua, “Confucian Vision and Human Community,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11,
no. 3 (1984): 227–38; and Fingarette, “The Music of Humanity.”