REVIEW: NIGERIA’S ROLE IN WEST AFRICAN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(CHAPTER 12)
Introduction
Chapter 12, titled “Nigeria and Conflict Resolution in Africa,” examines
Nigeria’s historical and contemporary involvement in conflict resolution within the
West African sub-region. The chapter primarily focuses on Nigeria’s military and
diplomatic interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire, framing these
actions as integral to its Afrocentric foreign policy. This review critically analyses the
chapter’s arguments, focusing on Nigeria’s motivations, the mechanisms of its
interventions, and the varying perspectives on their efficacy and implications.
The Afrocentric Foreign Policy and Manifestations of National
Power
The chapter establishes Nigeria’s prominent role in West African affairs,
attributing its influence not to economic wealth on a global scale, but to its substantial
national power attributes, including its demographic size, geographical position, and
natural resources (Weiss, 1993). This forms the bedrock of Nigeria’s Afrocentric
foreign policy — a doctrine asserting that Africa’s interests are intrinsically linked to
Nigeria’s national interests. The underlying rationale, as the chapter explains, is that
instability within the West African sub-region inevitably generates negative externalities
for Nigeria, such as refugee flows, proliferation of illicit arms, and economic
disruptions, thereby necessitating proactive engagement (Ochoche, 1997).
Interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia
The chapter provides detailed accounts of Nigeria’s interventions in Sierra Leone
and Liberia, primarily through the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In Sierra Leone, Nigeria led ECOMOG forces to
restore the democratically elected government of President Tejan Kabbah following its
overthrow by a military junta led by Major John Koroma. In February 1998, a Nigerian-
led intervention force launched an air and artillery offensive against the junta, and on
March 10, 1998, President Kabbah returned from exile in Guinea. However, the
country again erupted into civil war in January 1999, underscoring the protracted nature
of the crisis.
The chapter acknowledges a significant irony in Nigeria’s actions: the
intervention to restore democracy in Sierra Leone was spearheaded by a Nigerian
military regime under General Sani Abacha, who himself had seized power through a
coup. The chapter suggests that such interventions were driven by a complex interplay
of factors, including the defence of core foreign policy values, the protection of
Nigerian citizens and economic interests, and the prevention of regional conflict
contagion (Vogt, 1998: 106). It also notes that personal relationships between Nigerian
leaders and those in conflict-affected states may have influenced these decisions, one
of which is notably, General Babangida’s personal ties with President Samuel Doe of
Liberia (Adeola, 2002: 18). The Nigerian government justified its lead role by citing an
existing ECOWAS mandate, a bilateral defence agreement with the Kabbah
government, and broad international support for the restoration of democratic rule
(Ronald, 2003).
Intervention in Côte D’ivoire
Nigeria’s engagement in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict, which commenced in 2002,
demonstrates a shift towards more diplomatic and mediatory approaches, though
military contributions remained significant. Nigeria reaffirmed its solidarity with the
Ivorian government and actively led a six-nation mediation group comprising Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Togo, to establish contact with rebel forces and pursue
a peaceful resolution. This led to the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement of October
17, 2002, and the Lomé Agreement of November 1, 2002 (Riel, 2007).
Under President Obasanjo, Nigeria undertook numerous diplomatic missions
across West Africa and participated in key summits of the African Union and
ECOWAS (George, 2012). Nigeria’s intervention in the second Ivorian conflict
following the 2011 presidential election further underscored its policy to defend
democracy and uphold the ECOWAS protocol on democracy and good governance,
which mandates zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government (Almas,
2007).
Liberal and Radical Perspectives on Nigeria’s Interventions
The chapter delineates two primary theoretical lenses through which Nigeria’s
interventions can be analysed.
From the liberal perspective, Nigeria’s foreign policy is rooted in Section 19 of
its 1999 Constitution, which mandates the promotion of economic development,
integration, and peace in Africa and globally. Liberal scholars such as Maduekwe (2008),
Gambari (2010), and Guba (2007) argue that Nigeria’s intervention was based on the
belief that unresolved conflicts in neighbouring states produce spillover effects that
threaten Nigeria’s own security and economic prosperity. Gambari (2010: 4) explicitly
links the lack of sustainable development in Africa to the proliferation of conflicts,
arguing that regional peace support operations are essential for economic progress and
stability.
From the radical perspective, scholars such as Dike (2010) and Ngalim (2007)
question the legal and moral justification for Nigeria’s intervention, arguing that the
Ivorian conflict was a domestic affair that did not warrant external military
involvement. The chapter also engages the broader critique, raised by Al-Hassan (2008),
that Nigeria’s national interest is determined by political elites whose personal interests
are projected as the national interest, side-lining the welfare of the average Nigerian.
Radical critics further contend that Nigeria’s interventions have come at significant
human and financial cost, with funds that could have addressed domestic
underdevelopment channelled into foreign peacekeeping operations (Al-Hassan, 2008;
Eke, 2009; Idumange, 2011).
Critical Analysis
The chapter effectively outlines Nigeria’s rationale and operational history in
West African conflict resolution. However, a more rigorous critical engagement would
benefit from a deeper interrogation of the paradox it identifies: the intervention to
restore democracy in Sierra Leone was led by a military regime that itself came to power
unconstitutionally. The chapter acknowledges this irony but does not fully examine its
implications for the legitimacy and long-term effectiveness of ECOMOG’s operations.
Additionally, the chapter’s treatment of the radical perspective particularly the
domestic costs of Nigeria’s interventions could be more systematically developed.
While scholars like Al-Hassan (2008), Eke (2009), and Idumange (2011) are cited in
passing, their arguments about the misalignment between Nigeria’s foreign policy
expenditure and domestic welfare deserve greater analytical weight. The chapter also
briefly notes resentment among some West African leaders regarding Nigeria’s
unilateral tendencies, a point that warrants further elaboration in any comprehensive
assessment of Nigeria’s hegemonic role in the sub-region.
Conclusion
Chapter 12 provides a substantive overview of Nigeria’s pivotal role in conflict
resolution within West Africa, framing its interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Côte d’Ivoire as central to its Afrocentric foreign policy. The chapter successfully
demonstrates that for Nigeria, regional peacekeeping is inextricably linked to national
security and economic stability. A critical reading, however, reveals the necessity of
balancing the liberal justifications for these interventions against the radical critiques
concerning their domestic costs and the tensions inherent in Nigeria’s position as a
regional hegemon. The chapter nonetheless remains an essential text for understanding
the multifaceted nature of Nigeria’s geopolitical strategy and the enduring challenges of
maintaining peace and security in the West African sub-region.
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