NEBOSH HSE Certificate in

Process Safety Management

October 2023 specification

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 1: Process safety leadership
Learning outcomes:
1.1 Advise on the difference between process safety and personal safety.
1.2 Advise on the importance of leadership in assigning roles, responsibilities and resources to
improve safety standards and positively influence organisational culture.
1.3 Advise on the importance of organisational learning from lessons learned; accident and
incident investigations; benchmarking standards; and sources of process safety information.
1.4 Understand how ‘change’ should be managed to effectively reduce risks to people and
plant.
1.5 Help their organisation to understand the importance of worker and contractor
consultation.
1.6 Advise on the importance of competence and training.
Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Process safety vs. personal safety

What do you understand by the term ‘process
safety’?
How does this differ from personal safety?
Personal safety vs. process safety

Personal safety Process safety

Prevention of incidents causing Blend of engineering and
injuries to individuals; management skills;
Applicable in all workplaces. Prevention or mitigation of
catastrophic failures;
High-hazard industries.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms

Process safety management

‘A blend of engineering and management skills
focused on preventing catastrophic accidents and
near misses, particularly structural collapse,
explosions, fires and toxic releases associated
with loss of containment of energy or dangerous
substances such as chemicals and petroleum
products’ (Institution of Chemical Engineers
definition adapted from the Center for Chemical
Process Safety publication 'Guidelines for
Process Safety Metrics')
 Key terms

Process safety management system

‘An organisation’s management system intended
to prevent major incidents arising out of the
production, storage and handling of dangerous
substances’ (adapted from the Health and Safety
Executive’s HSG254: Developing process safety
indicators: A step-by-step guide for chemical and
major hazard industries)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence
 Hazard and risk awareness of
leadership teams
• In process safety, leaders need to be:
• Competent and actively engaged
• In possession of facts and data as decision
makers
• Aware of the hazards and risk potential of
their plant and sites throughout their life cycle:

Design Commissioning Operations Decommissioning

.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Board level commitment

Board level commitment to process safety is
often achieved by being visible.
What practical measures can board members
take to reinforce the importance of process
safety?
Board level visibility
Board level visibility is essential to promote process safety and influence
organisational culture positively.

Practical measures can include:

• Leading by example (e.g. wearing PPE)

• Following site rules
• Providing resource for site and projects
• Supporting the risk assessment process
• Carrying out site visits
• Asking questions

STUDENT USE ONLY

Process safety responsibilities
• Everyone has a role to play in process safety.
• Roles need to be clearly defined.
• Competency and accountability is a must:

Safety
Managers Engineers Workers
professionals
• Allocate • Design and • Advise and • Follow
resources maintain guide safety
procedures
 Reasons for holding to account
those with PSM responsibilities
• High potential consequences, if fail to carry out responsibilities
adequately
• Encourages engagement
• Look for root causes
• Need to avoid a blame culture.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Responsibilities at senior leadership
level
CEOs and leaders assure their organisation’s competence to manage the hazards of
its operations. They must:

• Ask critical questions

• Ensure competence at all levels
• Ensure continual development of expertise (e.g. new law, technology)
• Provide adequate resources and time for risk analysis
• Provide training and scenario planning
• Listen to process experts
• Ensure the organisation manages/reviews contractors and third party
competency;
• Communicate effectively.
 Provision of adequate resources
Appropriate resources need to be made available to ensure high PSM
standards and organisational competency is in place.
Appropriate resources can be:

Human Financial Physical

Under-resourcing process safety is very risky!

STUDENT USE ONLY

Meaning and reasons for establishing
process safety objectives and targets
• Effective organisations will establish a clear set of objectives (overarching
process safety aims) and targets (short term goals), shared organisation-
wide.
• Objectives and targets are essential for:
• Identifying safety critical controls and actions
• To ensure operations are running as intended
• To ensure existing controls are robust
• To ensure the overall site is under control.
Process safety objectives and targets
1. Establish overall
objectives

2. Set targets
4. Review regularly
(stepping stones)

3. Monitor progress
of leading and lagging
indicators

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Continuous improvement
Why might process safety be considered a
continuous improvement process?
Suggest practical ways in which organisations
can seek to improve.
Continuous
improvement
Organisational change
• New processes and products
• New operational conditions.
Technology changes
• New equipment available.
Change in standards
• Benchmarking to other organisations
• Legislation and guidance changes.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence
 Activity

Organisational learning
Think of a recent process safety incident that has
occurred in your workplace
What was the most significant in terms of
harm/injury?
What had the greatest potential for injury?
Do you think you learnt all you could from the
incident?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Learning lessons from incidents
• Investigate based on the potential AND the actual consequences.
• Do not downplay the incident as a near-miss.
• Incidents not investigated could happen again with more serious
consequences.

Example: Chemical reaction causes pipes to heat up.

If ignored as a near miss and not investigated, could
result in a chemical release and serious injuries.
Key terms

Immediate cause Root cause

Unsafe act or Underlying
condition that lead circumstances that
to consequences allowed immediate
(harm, damage cause to happen.
etc). e.g. management or
e.g. spillage, systems failures.
failure of a vessel,
removed guard.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Root causes
A flammable liquid has overflowed from a vessel
during the filling operation.
The liquid is transferred via a pump to a vessel where
it is metered in based on the transfer time and pump
speed.
Suggest reasons (root causes) for the incident.
Activity: root causes
 Pump changed for a higher rate
 No/failure to maintain plant and
equipment
 No automatic cut off
 Poor initial risk assessment
 Process changes (e.g. bigger batches
than design intent.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Reasons for investigating accidents and
incidents
• To identify root causes of the incident
• To help prevent the incident happening again
• To update risk assessments
• To document/record the details for future use
• To meet any legal requirements to report and investigate
• To enable patterns and trends to be discovered.
• Demonstrates a desire to improve and learn lessons; improve morale
• To determine if any disciplinary actions are needed.
Benefits of investigating accidents and
incidents
• Causes can be addressed through revised risk assessments
• Fewer serious events should occur
• Achievement of legal compliance
• To assist with any civil claims
• Workers will feel valued
• Hot spots/repeat issues can be addressed through identifying patterns or trends
• Any disciplinary action will be fair.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Retention of
corporate knowledge
Avoidance of ‘corporate
amnesia’:
• Retain information formally
rather than relying on
individuals, such as:
• Lessons learnt
• Decisions
• Designs, etc.
Arrangements for sharing lessons
with other organisations
• Looking internally for lessons learned is limiting, due to rarity of
major incidents occurring within one organisation.
• Similar organisations with similar processes and control
arrangements may have had major incidents or near misses that
your organisation has not come across yet.
• Process safety regulators and industry groups actively encourage
information sharing in this way.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Purpose of benchmarking
Useful for implementing or improving organisational procedures.
Comparing an organisation against:
• Another similar organisation
• A national standard (e.g. HSE accident statistics publication
• An operational standard.
Examples of benchmarking sources:
• Performance indicators (e.g. loss of containment incident data)
• Management of change information
• Permits-to-work
• Behavioural observation programme information.
 Activity

Lessons learned and benchmarking

How do you share the lessons learnt from incidents
within your organisation?
Is it a two-way process (ie do you also hear about
incidents)?
Who do you benchmark against?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Sources of process safety
management information
• Process safety management information is necessary for
the safe operation and maintenance of process plant and
should be:

Easily
Documented Reliable Current
available
Internal and
external sources
Internal External
• Safety data sheets (SDS) • EU Directives
• Inspection, audit and investigation reports • Great Britain's Health and Safety Executive
• Maintenance records (HSE)
• Process design criteria • US Occupational Safety and Health
• Process flow diagrams (PFD) Administration (OSHA)
• Safe operating procedures (SOPs) • Harmonised European standards
• Piping and instrument diagrams • British standards
• Process control systems • International Labour Organisation (ILO)
• Relief system design • Chemical Safety Board
• Fire detection and protection plans. • Hydrogen tools
• Trade associations/professional bodies (e.g.
IChemE and the Energy Institute).

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Sources of PSM information

Think about the sources of information available in
your organisation to assist in process safety
management.
Are they documented, reliable, current and easily
available to the people who need to use them?
 Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence

STUDENT USE ONLY

What is management of change (MOC)?
• Formally documented process developed to identify
required modifications
• Authorises changes before they are implemented
• Ensures relevant safety (and process) considerations
have been made:
‒ Hazard and risk analysis.
The MOC process
Produce document detailing changes

Carry out risk assessment (hazard and risk

analysis)

Get authorisation for changes from

competent person and senior management

Document and record changes

Consult, inform and train those affected

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Failure of MOC process

Watch a video on the Flixborough disaster (1974),
which illustrates how incidents can occur due to
poor decision-making and a poor MOC process.
Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Consultation
What do we mean by consultation and how is it
different to informing?
How do you consult with workers?
 Key terms

Consultation
The two-way exchange of information between
parties, in this case between employer and
worker. This is different from and far more effective
than the one-way exchange when people
are simply ‘informed’ of a decision that has already
been taken.

STUDENT USE ONLY

When consultation is needed
 Introducing changes that affect health and safety (new
plant/processes/work methods, etc.)
 When implementing new technology
 When appointing safety advisers
 Development of training plans
 Reviewing health and safety performance
 Learning lessons from incidents and near misses.
Benefits and limitations of consultion
Benefits Limitations
• Improves relationships with
workers and contractors • Not all matters can be consulted
on
• Demonstrates management
commitment to process safety • Takes time (which might not be
available)
• Improves safety culture
• Poor consultation processes are
• Gains co-operation from workers worse than no consultation!
• Harnesses workers’ practical
knowledge.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Consultation groups
Safety committees Discussion Safety circles
Worker and groups Informal
management Volunteers ideassharing
representatives, interested in a group who
facilitates two-way topic discuss safety
communications matters

Departmental meetings Email and web forums

Health and safety agenda Helps engagement with
item/discussions allow workers based remotely or
workers to voice concerns who work outside core
hours
Why include
workers?
• Gives accurate picture of how Management must prioritise
tasks are being carried out worker engagement
• Enables practical suggestions for • Management participation
improvements and control demonstrates commitment
measures • Schedule meetings and
• Less resistance to procedural activities, ensure workers
change are given time to attend
• Incident investigations carried out • Hold people accountable.
more thoroughly and accurately.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 1: Process safety leadership
1.1 Process safety management meaning

1.2 Process safety leadership

1.3 Organisational learning

1.4 Management of change

1.5 Worker engagement

1.6 Competence
Key terms

Competence
The ability to undertake responsibilities and to
perform activities to a relevant standard, as
necessary, to ensure process safety and prevent major
accidents. Competence is a combination
of knowledge skills and experience and requires a
willingness and reliability that work activities will be
undertaken in accordance with agreed standards,
rules and procedures.

STUDENT USE ONLY

The role of competence in safe
working and behaviours
Training in how to do the job safely is essential
‒ Operational procedures
‒ Emergency procedures and specialist training
Benefits of training:
• Understand role so work more safely
• Train to standards
• Correct work methods used
• Higher productivity from fewer mistakes
• Workers feel valued.
Competency management

Example of a training matrix:

STUDENT USE ONLY

Competency management
Assess
Build emergency
competency as
Establish policy management
an ongoing
skills
process

Determine
Gain ownership
minimum Maintain and
and
competency develop skills
commitment
standards

Analyse skill Continually

Recruit workers
gaps development
Process safety training
At all levels:
‒ Process safety leaders;
‒ Managers/supervisors/designers/safety advisers/newly
qualified managers
‒ Operators and technicians

Training to include:

Non-standard
Standard Emergency
operations (e.g.
operations training.
shut-down)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Competency matrix
Develop a health and safety competency matrix
for the following roles on a chemical plant:
• Operator
• Shift leader
• Plant manager
Element 1:
summary
1.1 Process safety management
meaning
1.2 Process safety leadership
1.3 Organisational learning
1.4 Management of change
1.5 Worker engagement
1.6 Competence.

STUDENT USE ONLY

NEBOSH HSE Certificate in

Process Safety Management

October 2023 specification

 Element 2: Management of process risk
Learning outcomes:
2.1 Understand the purpose and importance of establishing a process safety
management system.
2.2 Recognise common risk management techniques to reduce process
safety risk.
2.3 Understand what effective asset management, plant maintenance and
inspection strategies would consider.
2.4 Understand the essential nature of permit-to-work systems, and the key
features that they should contain.
2.5 Recognise how shift handovers should be safely managed.
2.6 Help their organisation manage contractors.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

Reasons for developing a PSMS
Legal/compliance
Moral reasons Business reasons
reasons
• Avoidance of • Often a clear • Avoids losses
incidents and legal associated with
disasters requirement disasters
• Societal • Industry best • Avoids loss of
expectations practice production from
• Duty of care • May be internal incidents
company • Meet business
standards objectives

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Business reasons for PSMS

Watch a video on the Deepwater Horizon
disaster (2010) as an illustration of the
business reasons for having an effective
process safety management system.
.
 Key elements of PSMS
Management of
Strong leadership Hazard analysis
Change

Detailed Understand
Sets direction and
understanding of consequences
determines
process hazards before changes
culture
and risks are made

Operation within Competence

design intent management

Under all
conditions
Ongoing training
including start-up
and maintenance (Continued)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key elements of PSMS
Control of Emergency
Asset integrity
contractors response

Control of Maintenance Foreseeable

selection and (planned and incidents, eg loss
activities breakdown) of containment

Performance
Incident recording
monitoring and
and investigation
auditing
Leading and
Investigation to
lagging indicators
learn lessons
reviewed
Key elements of
PSMS - PDCA Plan
• Health and safety policy
• Health and safety planning.
Do
• Implementation and
operation.
Check
• Checking and corrective
actions.
Act
• Management review
• Continual improvement.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Licence to operate
• Application made to regulators to
run process.
• Supply a ‘safety case’ during
application:
• High hazards identified
• Major accident risks identified
and controlled
• Risks controlled to as low as
reasonably practicable
(ALARP).
 Major accident prevention policy
(MAPP)
• To provide a general statement on how the organisation will prevent major
accidents from occurring.
• Contains:
• Roles and responsibilities
• Identification of major accident hazards
• Operational control measures
• Emergency plans (on and off site)
• Monitoring process
• Auditing process.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms
Leading indicators Lagging indicators
Proactive measurements Reactive measures that
of conditions that look at failures, such as
monitor process safety the number of injuries,
before something goes near misses and spills
wrong and to see if which are reported, or
things are operating as
intended. excursions where plant is
operated outside of the
intended operational
envelope.
 Development and implementation of
Performance Safety Indicators (PSIs)
• Determine what can go wrong in the process and
identify risk controls to prevent such incidents.
• Establish lagging indicators to measure failure of
these risk controls.
• Establish critical actions for each risk control
system and develop leading indicators to monitor
whether these are working.
• Monitor and review indicators.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Leading and lagging process safety
performance indicators (PSIs)
Checks and balances to determine how well the site is
managing process safety. Effective indicators of process safety:

Leading indicators Lagging indicators

• Proactive measures of conditions • Measures of failure

• Identify problems before harm • Examples: near-miss data, number
occurs of loss of containment incidents
• Examples: percentage of plant
equipment inspections completed;
percentage of fault trending
carried out to schedule.
Key terms

Auditing
A systematic, objective, critical
evaluation of how well an
organisation’s management
system is performing by examining
evidence.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Auditing compliance
Audits:
• Are proactive
• Check health and safety is managed
• Check controls are in place and working
• Identify areas for improvement which
can then feed new health and safety
plans – continual improvement.
Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Hazard vs. risk

What do you understand by the term “hazard”?
How do we determine the level of risk?
Key terms
Hazard Risk
Something with the The likelihood of
potential to cause harm, potential harm from that
which can include hazard being realised,
articles, substances, plant resulting in
or machinery, methods consequences.
of work, the working
environment and other
aspects of work
organisation.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Risk assessments: Purpose, use and
proportionality
• Essential in the management of safety in workplaces
• Identifies hazards and evaluates risks by considering the
likelihood and severity of harm occurring
• Risk controls are identified, which reduce the risk to an
acceptable level
• Need to be fit for purpose - should be proportionate to
the risks involved (focus on controlling higher risk
hazards, rather than less significant hazards).
General risk assessments
Basic risk assessment process follows the HSE’s approach.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Advanced risk assessments

Adapted from: Offshore Information Sheet 3/2006

- Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore
Installations
 Qualitative, semi-quantitative and
quantitative risk assessments
Qualitative (Q)
• Determined as low, medium or
high risks
Semi-Quantitative (SQ)
• Determined within ranges
Quantitative (QRA)
• Fully calculated based on data.

Adapted from: Offshore Information Sheet 3/2006

- Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore
Installations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Barrier models
• There are barriers
between hazard and loss
• An incident only occurs
when there is failure in
each barrier
• Sometimes known as the
‘Swiss cheese model’
(James Reason)
• When the holes line up
there is an accident (i.e.
the ‘hazard is realised’).
The application of risk
management tools
• Most effective tools are initially considered at concept and
design stage.

• Before start-up, a more complete risk assessment should

be carried out.

• Additional controls may be needed during unusual process

activities, eg start-up and shut-down.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Hazard realisation
• Hazard realisation requires the assessor to look at worst-
case scenarios.
• Once these are understood, controls can be implemented in
the form of barriers.
• These barriers can then be placed between the initiator
(triggering event) and the potential consequences to either
prevent or reduce the outcome.
• When drawn together, this is known as a ‘bowtie’ diagram.
 Bowtie Model

Image from
‘Offshore
information
sheet No.
3/2006 guidance
on risk
assessment for
offshore
installations,
HSE, 2006

STUDENT USE ONLY

Hazard and operability study
(HAZOP)
• Multidisciplinary team approach
• Breaks process into nodes (small chunks)
• Agree parameters to be studied:
• e.g. flow, pressure, temperature, etc.
• Agree guidewords to be used:
• e.g. more, less, no, reverse.
• Combine guidewords with parameters to create
‘deviations’:
• more flow, less flow, no flow, etc.
• Identify potential causes and controls.
 Tabular format
• The HAZOP findings are recorded in a tabular format and
retained as evidence of the study.
• For illustrative purposes, the extract of a domestic shower
HAZOP below helps demonstrate the process:

STUDENT USE ONLY

Hazard identification (HAZID)
• Multi-disciplinary team approach
• Brainstorming process
• May involve a walkthrough
• Identifies hazards to feed the risk
assessment process
• Structured by keywords.
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

STUDENT USE ONLY

What-if analysis
• Assessor uses risk realisation to identify the true potential of
the incident
• For example, loss of containment of a flammable liquid could
potentially result in fire, explosion,
damage, injury and fatality,
even if these are not the outcomes
of a particular incident.
 Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA)
• Requires a multidisciplinary team to identify:
• Failure modes (ways it can fail)
• Effects (of the failure)
• Severity (impact to the ‘customer’)
• Cause (of the failure mode)
• Occurrence (chance of it happening)
• Detection (what is in place to spot it)
• Determine risk priority (Risk Priority Number: severity ×
occurrence × detection)
• Recommended actions to be taken, by whom and by when.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Concept of ALARP
• ALARP = as low as reasonably practicable
• Cannot reduce all risk to zero.
• Introduce controls to reduce risk to lowest level achievable without
incurring disproportionate costs:
‒ Some flexibility in how to achieve;
‒ Balance risk vs cost/time/effort.
• Guidance provides information on what is considered ALARP.
 Hierarchy of controls
Inherent safety.

Elimination

Substitution
Segregation and spacing of
process and plant
Engineering

Administrative
Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE)
Emergency response

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

 Integrity standards

• Consideration of relevant standards at design stage, to

ensure it easily maintainable and inspectable
• Standards ensure safety and integrity
• For example:
• ISO standards
• Welding standards
• Pipe pressure ratings.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms
Asset Asset integrity
An item of equipment or The ability of an asset to
an area of production operate as intended
plant. effectively and efficiently
over its entire lifespan
whilst ensuring the
health and safety of
those exposed to it,
including the
environment.
Activity

Asset integrity
An organisation does not currently have a process to
manage and maintain the integrity of plant and
process equipment.
What arguments could you use to convince the
management that such a system is needed?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Consequences of failing to
manage the integrity of assets
• Damaged, wearing or defective equipment can
fail and cause leaks
• Equipment failure can impact plant safety and
productivity
• Safety systems may fail to operate
• Breakdown maintenance is expensive and less
effective than preventative maintenance
• Corrosion can weaken pipe walls and tank
bodies, leading to leaks of hazardous materials
and compromised structural integrity.
Key terms
ATEX
‘ATEX’ is commonly used to refer to the two EU
directives that control explosive atmospheres.
ATEX-approved equipment that is suitable for use
in an explosive atmosphere is given a symbol which
is shown below.

STUDENT USE ONLY

For example, in potentially
Selection of flammable atmospheres where
equipment for the vapour or dust can result in fire
or explosion, ATEX approved
operating equipment must be used:
environment
Considerations include:
• Flammable atmospheres
• Wet conditions
• Harsh environments (e.g.
salty atmospheres)
• Corrosive chemicals.
 Asset integrity through the lifecycle
1. Design 2. Procurement, 3. Commissioning
Designed to be safe. construction Standards checked and
installation and testing signed off.
Build completed
correctly.

4. Operations 5. Modifications 6. Decommissioning

Operate within design Planned and assessed Safe removal from
intent; maintenance first. operations.
and inspection.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Plant maintenance documentation

• Records must be kept for plant inspection,

maintenance, aging, life extension and
obsolescence
• Some are legally required (e.g. the statutory
records of pressure systems)
• Can be paper or electronic; must be traceable.
Risk-based maintenance and
inspection strategies
Three types:

Planned preventive Condition Breakdown/failure-

maintenance monitoring based maintenance

MUST retain records for all!

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Maintenance activities
Which maintenance activities are carried
out in your organisation?
Fit them into the three maintenance types.
The importance and reasons for risk-
based calibration of instrumentation
• An essential activity in the process industries
• The consequences of neglecting to maintain calibration can cause:
• Failure to meet the quality system
• Safety risks for employees and customers
• Poor product quality and loss of reputation
• Failure to comply with legislation, causing the loss of the
license to operate
• Unexpected downtime
• Economic losses.

STUDENT USE ONLY

The importance and reasons for risk-
based calibration of instrumentation
• The accuracy of measurement instruments drift over time
• Users must check instruments periodically to see if they have
drifted and make adjustments as necessary
• Process owners should take a risk-based approach (SFARP) to
establishing calibration and inspection criteria.
 Activity

Calibration of instrumentation
Give some examples of essential
instrumentation in your workplace.
Would workers die or be injured if the
instrument did not read correctly?
.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

Key terms
Permit-to-work Permit-to-work
system A document (printed or
a formal, documented digital) that is used as
procedure that forms part of the permit-to-
part of a safe system of work system – it
work. It is commonly specifies the work to be
used for high-risk work done and the
and it documents
measures to reduce risks, precautions to be taken
such as isolations. to ensure the worker’s
safety while doing it.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Purpose and effective use of a
permit-to-work (PTW) system
• Used in high-risk activities
• Part of a safe system of work
• Communicates hazards and controls to user
• Links to:
• Risk assessment and task/job safety analysis (used to
identify hazards and plan precautions);
• Method statements (describes how the work will be done
safely, step by step).
 Activity

Importance of a permit-to-work system

Watch a video on the Piper Alpha (1988)
incident to help illustrate the consequences
of failing to manage permits-to-work
correctly
.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key features of a permit-to-work
Assesses and controls interfaces with adjacent plant and workers.
Usually contains:

Duration of work
(date and time the Identification of Isolations and
Scope of work
permit is valid hazards other controls
to/from)

Emergency Permit acceptance

Links to other
controls and and cancellations
permits
specific controls requirements
Interfaces with adjacent plant/
simultaneous operations
• Permit issuer must consider potential impact of works on
adjacent plant equipment, and vice versa.
• If the installation has duty and stand-by plant, then controls
must be in place to ensure that these are not worked on
simultaneously.
• Can be achieved by issuing permits from a central issuing
authority or location.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Interfaces with contractors
• Permit-to-work process protects both contractors and
workers; both should be issued with permits where
appropriate.
• Contractors may need to take additional measures (e.g.
induction training).
• Permits should always be issued by the organisation.
 Types of permit-to-work
• Types of permit include:
• Isolation permit/general permit to work
• Hot work permit
• Cold work
• Electrical work
• Confined space.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Benefits and limitations of
electronic permit-to-work systems
Benefits Limitations
• Reduces paperwork and on-site storage • Sign-off may take longer due to the
required need to log into a secure system
• More secure, backed-up storage system • Risk of copying and pasting
• Easier to alter permits information from previous permits
• Automatic and validated data entry • Lack of access in software failure or
• Can make it easier to identify hazards and power outage
risks • Risk of remote sign-off without
• Flags if two conflicting jobs scheduled for seeing work area affected
the same time • Potential cyber security issues
• Easier to audit and review the overall • Potential for user error
permit-to-work system
• Issued in consistent format.
 Benefits and limitations of paper-
based permit-to-work systems
Benefits Limitations
• Can be quicker to sign off permits by hand • Time-consuming producing
• Easily displayed in a central location paperwork
• More likely to be written independently • Lots of on-site storage required
without copying and pasting sections from • Less secure – can accidentally lose
similar permits physical copies of permits
• Workers will be on site when given the • More administrative work required
permit copy, so can see the tasks and to write out permits
associated risks there and then • More likelihood of human error
than with an electronic permit-to-
work system.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Circumstances when a PTW is not
required
Not all work requires a permit, such as if the activities:
• Are not on live process plant
• Do not require isolation or disconnection
• Do not fall under the other permit activity definitions (i.e.
are not hot work, confined space, etc.)
Another safe system of work may be more appropriate.
Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Shift handover communication

What should be communicated at a shift
handover?
How can shift handovers be made more
effective?
.
Importance of shift handover
Importance of safe shift handover
• Transfer of critical information to the incoming shift.
• Failure to do so can have devastating consequences (e.g. Piper
Alpha)
Two-way communication and joint responsibility
• Joint responsibility of both outgoing and incoming shift leaders.
• Needs time to be done properly.
Competence
• Workers carrying out shift handovers must:
- Have the right level of technical knowledge, expertise
- Be able to communicate effectively.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Shift handover requirements
Shift handover must be:
 Given the highest priority
 Conducted face to face
 Carried out using accurate verbal and written communication
(handover logs are useful)
 Based on information needs of incoming workers
 Given as much time as necessary.
 Typical information shared at shift
handover
The main issues communicated include:
• Operational status of the plant
• Emergency situations or incidents
• Any safety issues
• Maintenance activities underway/planned
• Permit-to-work details, especially those still open
• Operational issues for the incoming shift (e.g. production plans)
• Planned receipt of hazardous material deliveries
• Any drills or exercises planned
• Physical demonstration of plant state

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 2: Management of process risk
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies

2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system

2.5 Safe shift handover

2.6 Contractor management

Key terms
Contractor
An individual or organisation paid to
deliver a service without being directly
employed.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Scale and identification of contractor use within
the process industries
• Widely used in the process industries for:
• Additional manpower and labour
• Specialist skills (e.g. designers, welders, etc.)

Give examples of contractors you

encounter in your workplace.
.
 Activity

Contractor selection
Identify factors that could be considered
when selecting a contractor and assessing
their suitability for use on site.
(These might be in a contractor approval
checklist).

STUDENT USE ONLY

Contractor selection
• Assessed for suitability using criteria including:
• Experience in the type of work
• Trained in specific safety requirements of the
environment
• Suitability of the organisation’s health and safety
policy
• Quality of their risk assessments
• Suitability of method statements
• Accident history, including near-miss reporting.
Periodic review of contractor safety
performance
• Essential to ensure:
‒ Working to agreed standards
‒ Compliance with documentation
• The review may include:
‒ Site inspections
‒ Safety tours
‒ Meetings to review performance and check compliance with
information provided at tender stage

STUDENT USE ONLY

Contractor Induction
Client obliged to advise workers on site-specific risks and procedures,
including:

Sign in/out Emergency Specific site

Site rules
procedures procedures hazards

Permit-to- Accident Near miss and

PPE
work reporting hazard
requirements
requirements procedures reporting
 Siting of contractor
accommodation
Process operators evaluate all newly sited structures under MOC
and include in the overall PHA.
Temporary accommodation should be based on exclusion zones for
areas where explosions are possible.
All occupied trailers should be located outside of vulnerable areas,
(even if they are moved beyond the facility’s boundary).

STUDENT USE ONLY

Housing of
contractors
Consideration given to the safe
location of contractors on site:
• Facilities and amenities
required
• Located away from high-
hazard areas.
Contractor supervision
Ownership of contractor activities:
• Include contractors in process risk assessments and safe
systems of work
• Clearly identified person
responsible for approval and
day-to-day contractor management
(e.g. site supervisor)
• Contractors should know who their
client contact is.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Auditing contractor performance
Before work starts
• Initial assessment of paperwork.

During the work

• Monitoring working practices

After completion
• Review performance, including accident history (to be
carried out between client and contractor).
 Contractor responsibilities
• Plan, manage and monitor all work carried out by themselves/workers
• Assess the risks to those affected by their work and implement controls
• Ensure their workers have the expertise, knowledge and skills required
• Provide relevant and necessary information to the client (e.g. method
statements)
• Ensure their workers have been through a site induction
• Provide appropriate supervision, information, instructions and training for their
workers
• Work to their clients’ policies and procedures
• Report to the client on the progress of work and any hazards/incidents

STUDENT USE ONLY

Handover to client
• Hand back of plant and equipment.
• Handover of building or installations arising from
project.
• Information handed over includes:
• Operation and maintenance manuals
• Pipework and instrumentation diagrams
• Updated layout plans, including location of services
• Design specifications
• As-built drawings.
Element 2: summary
2.1 Establishing a process safety management system
2.2 Risk management techniques used within the process
industries
2.3 Asset management and maintenance strategies
2.4 Role, purpose and features of a permit-to-work system
2.5 Safe shift handover
2.6 Contractor management

STUDENT USE ONLY

NEBOSH HSE Certificate Process

Safety Management

October 2023 specification

 Element 3: Process safety hazard control
Learning outcomes:
3.1 Advise how operating procedures should be written and applied.
3.2 Recognise suitable control measures for an organisation’s start-up and shut-down
processes.
3.3 Understand the importance of performance standards for safety critical systems and
equipment.
3.4 Recognise hazards associated with the use of steam and water in the process industries;
and suitable control measures to reduce risk.
3.5 Recognise hazards associated with the use of electricity and static electricity in the process
industries; and suitable control measures to reduce risk.
3.6 Recognise the risks associated with dangerous substances in the process industries.
3.7 Recognise hazards associated with chemical reactions; and suitable protective measures to
mitigate the consequences of a thermal runaway reaction.
3.8 Recognise hazards associated with bulk storage of dangerous substances; and suitable
control measures to reduce risk.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations
 Safe operating envelope (SOE)
• Defines boundaries of a controlled reaction
• The optimised conditions which keep the process
under control
• Operating outside this ‘envelope’ is unsafe
• Typical parameters used to define boundary:
– Pressure
– Temperature
– Flow rate

STUDENT USE ONLY

SOE parameters
Monomer Cooling Coils
Feed

Cooling Water to Sewer

Example 1
Cooling
Water In

TC
Thermocouple
 Unloading
SOE parameters

Unloading
stations

stations
Ammonia Phosphoric
~

~
Solution Acid storage
L1 Storage tank Tank L1
F1 F1
Example 2
Outdoors
Enclosed
Work area
Diammonium phosphate (DAP)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Loading
~ Dap storage tank stations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Purpose of standard
operating
procedures (SOPs)
• Inform operator about the process
safety hazards
• Describe the control system
• Describe standard operating
conditions (including allowable
range/excursions).
 Types of SOPs
• Start-up/shut-down
• Plant and equipment maintenance and modifications/changes
• Responding to alarms tripping and emergencies
• Filling/emptying/charging of vessels, pipelines and reactors
• Responding to unplanned deviations and ‘abnormal
operations’.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Who is involved in developing SOPs?

Operators

Maintenance team
contractors

Design/engineering team
 Activity

Developing SOPs
What are the reasons for involving
operators in the writing of procedures?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Operator involvement in developing
SOPs
• To ensure the procedure matches what is done
• Involving operators increases acceptance and following of
procedures
• Creates a sense of ownership
• Reduces the likelihood for errors occurring

NB - Not every relevant operator will be able to participate in the

drafting as there is a limitation of the effectiveness of individual
performance.
What should be included within SOPs?
• Purpose of the operation/process
• Plant/equipment/materials being used
• Process steps – who, what, where, how, why
• Hazards and risks, controls required and order in which applied
• Pictures, photos, drawings, flowcharts, checklists
• Authorisation of workers to undertake procedure
• PPE requirements
• Availability/accessibility of spare parts, together with the
necessary standard.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Requirements for procedures
to be clearly understood
 Draft, trial and revise the procedure until it’s clear and easily
followed
 Include operators in the drafting
 Involve someone not familiar with the procedure to
demonstrate it can be followed
 Explain not only ‘what’ and ‘how’, but also ‘why’.
Ensuring SOPs remain current and
accurate
• Report and analyse all deviations from the expected process
parameters
• Undertake programmed reviews and oversight of actual practice
(observation or retrospective analysis, such as quality of end
product)
• Careful checking and monitoring of the safety instrumented
systems (linked to risk-based inspection)
• Review of MOC reports, inspection records and reports
• Review frequency of maintenance on safety-critical plant and
equipment.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Ensuring SOPs remain current and
accurate
Variations are indicative of potential loss of the safety envelope.
They can be detected by:
• Assessment of defect complaints
• Product out of specification
• Reports on deviations in the process
• Variations in yield
• Raw material records
• Adverse event reports.
 Limitations of SOPs
Factors that affect operators’ ability to follow SOPs:

Time pressure Workload Staffing levels Training

Supervision Human fallibility Technical issues

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Consequences of not following SOPs

When procedures aren’t fully understood,
disasters can happen.
Watch the video of incident at the West
Fertiliser Company in Texas.
 Consequences of deviating from
operating procedures

• Organisational drift
• Major disaster for both
operators, plant and the
organisation’s reputation.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Importance of responding to alarms
• Near melt-down of nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island in 1979 -
operators took 2.5 hrs to understand the problem
• BP Texas City 2005 – tired and poorly trained operators
• Alarms vital for managing process control plants and monitoring
operational integrity
• Essential that operators are trained, confident and well-rehearsed in
the required actions to take in the event of an alarm activating
• Should reduce unplanned downtime, increase levels of process
safety, improve operator effectiveness and produce better process
performance.
Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Types of start-up and shut-down
• Follows pre-determined, controlled sequence,
planned in advance
Planned • Linked to product supply and assessment of plant
requirements

• Often requires only part of plant

• Can be dangerous due to absence of plan
Unplanned • The nature for the required shut-down will have a
direct impact on the issues to be addressed.
Types of start-up and shut-down
• Very high risk, unplanned shut-down (no pre-shut-
down review)
Emergency • When a hazardous situation develops (out of
normal scope). No stages, difficult to use checklists
• Relies on human factors

• Usually a type of planned start-up/shut-down that

requires staged processes (can take several days)
Staged • Start-ups: progressive process implementation
• All planned shut-downs are generally staged to
prevent impact on operations

• When an issue has been raised, but an assessment

Delayed is made to control the situation until shut-down is
allowed to proceed

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Start-up and shut-down

Why do you think both start-up and shut-down
are potentially dangerous processes?
Pre-start-up safety
review
Factors to consider • Electrical testing/functional
• Management of change (MOC) tests/energising
• Pressure testing and gauge control • Operation and calibration of alarms
setting and relief valves
• Instruments calibration and
• Safety systems all operational
functional test
• Mechanical preparation • Loading of chemicals
• Chemical cleaning instructions • Loading of catalyst
• Physical cleaning instructions • Heaters drying
• Chemical boil out of steam
• Mechanical restoration
generation facilities
• Machinery run-in • Visual inspection
• Tightness testing • Training on new plant/equipment.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Alarms
• Must be in full working order
• Assist the operator to identify abnormal, hazardous
and unsafe plant and process conditions
• Operators must be able to identify, understand and
respond to alarms appropriately
• Consider:
– Do they require an operator response?
– How are they presented to the operator?
 Software and control systems
• Must be fully operational during start-up and shut-down
processes
• Provide essential monitoring and recording information on plant
status
• Can support or initiate start-up or shut-down procedures
• Control systems may also enable operators to see whether the
process is steady/change of state with plant or nearby equipment.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Plant shut-down
• MUST follow shut-down procedures
• Consider adjacent plant/associated services
• Shut-down procedures training and communications required
• May be residual product in pipework
• Temperature/pressure may need to be neutralised
• Inerting/flushing of process components
• Management of change consideration
• SOP for isolation and quarantine of plant
• Check plant in safe state – structural and physical
• Alternative controls must be in place where others turned off. Check all controls.
Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Performance standards
What is a ‘performance standard’ for a safety
critical system or item of equipment?
Why are performance standards needed?
What are the sources of performance
standards?
Key terms

Performance standard (PS)

This is the general terms used to mean an agreed standard
that is set and against which actual performance is
measured and judged. Various models and methods are
used for setting performance standards in process safety.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms

Safety-critical element (SCE)

“Such parts of an installation and such of its plant
(including computer programmes), or any part thereof:
1. The failure of which could cause or contribute
substantially to; or
2. A purpose of which is to prevent, or limit the effect of a
major accident.”
 Reasons for
performance
standards
• Necessary to ensure the safety of • Used as the basis for managing the
an asset hazard through the life cycle of the
plant/installation
• To ensure that Safety Critical
Elements will perform according to • Provide assurance that critical risk
the design criteria and
expectations control systems will remain suitable
and continue to function for their
• Each SCE is assessed and intended purpose.
interdependencies/interactions
examined.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms
Process hazard FARSI
analysis (PHA) A model for
performance standards,
A systematic analysis of
the hazards (and their which can be described
potential causes and in terms of its
consequences) relevant functionality, availability,
to a particular process. reliability, survivability
This may use one or and interdependency
more specific techniques (usually abbreviated to
such as HAZOP, What-if ‘FARSI’).
of FMEA.
Key terms
Probability of failure on Mean time between
demand (PFD) Failure (MTBF)
This is the probability that This is the calculated
a component will fail to average time that
perform its safety function elapses between failures
at the time it is needed. of a system, equipment
Note that a component or a component. This is
may have more than one
safety function/mode of used in relation to
operation and the PFD may predicted failures of
be different for each of repairable systems.
these functions.

STUDENT USE ONLY

The FARSI model
Functionality
• The task the particular element is required to perform
• The standard it needs to perform to
• How the performance can be measured
Availability
• Proportion of time it needs to be available (and capable) to perform
• Will it perform under the conditions which are expected?
Reliability
• How likely is it to operate (or fail to operate) on demand
• Active systems can be assigned target values (e.g. no more than 1%
downtime for individual detectors in any 12 month period)
• Safety integrity level (SIL) value used to specify safety integrity
needs for safety instrumented systems (SISs)
The FARSI model
Survivability

• Operate under specified conditions, particularly post-event

• E.g. fire and gas system shall survive fire or explosion for as long as
the temporary refuge is protected for

Interdependency

• Do other systems require to be functional for it to operate?

• Fire/smoke detection system have a dependency on ‘emergency
power’ and an interaction with ‘HVAC dampers’
• Requires power to operate

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Performance standards
What are the interactions/dependencies in
each of the following cases:
• Blowdown?
• Deluge?
• Emergency shut-down?
Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Uses of steam in the processing industries

Outline five main uses of steam in your
organisation.
 Uses of steam within the
processing industries
As a source of heating (direct or indirect) for spaces and
processes:

• Steam for heating at positive pressure used in food

processing factories, refineries and chemical plants

• Saturated steam: heating source for process fluid

heat exchangers, reboilers, reactors, combustion air
pre-heaters and other types of heat transfer
equipment

• Steam humidification is used in space heating

systems.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Uses of steam within the processing industries

Separation of vapour
Motive power to drive
Move liquid and gas streams
equipment (e.g. Cleaning
streams in piping (e.g. ‘steam stripping’
turbines)
in distillation towers)

Sterilisation - in
Wetting - in processes requiring Atomising - injecting steam into
processes for
humidification or moistening of fluids atomises the fluid and
microbiological
materials increases surface area (e.g. flare
control (e.g. food,
(e.g. production areas using pellets) stacks and other burners)
pharmaceuticals)
 Properties of saturated steam
• Produced at the boiling point of water (which depends on
pressure)
• Visible, eg vapour coming from a boiling kettle
• Releases its heat immediately (more efficient than hot water)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Properties of saturated steam
• Condensate formation:
– Steam still wet (3-5% of water may be entrained in the
steam)
– Reduces heat efficiency
– Problems for pipe work and reactor vessel
– Condensate has to be removed as near to the point of use
as possible by steam traps
– Sometimes known as ‘wet steam’.
 Properties of superheated steam
• Made from saturated steam subjected to further pressure
and heat
• An invisible gas
• Temperature of > 200°C
• Rapidly releases heat
• Does not produce condensate when it meets air or surfaces.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Steam hazards and controls
Water in steam lines (water
Thermal expansion Vacuum formation
hammer)
• Can lead to pipe or vessel • Cooling creates condensate • When water in a pipeline
rupture (volume reduction) leading strikes a fixed object under
• Controlled by building to vacuum formation high pressure - pressure
flexibility into pipelines, • Controlled by ‘vacuum shock imparts vibrations
adding design features such breakers’ in steam lines to • Mild cases - pipe movement
as bellows to allow material equalize pressure/ensure and knocking noise
to expand without rupturing. sufficient pressure to (hammer); worst cases - pipe
discharge condensation. fracture, loss of contents
• Controlled by good design of
pipework and process
controls; removal of
condensate; maintaining
steam traps and drainage
etc.
 Water hazards and controls
Vacuum formation during Cooling towers – Legionella and
Hydrostatic testing and weight
draining operations water-fog:
• Draining without proper • Used for final proof testing to • Legionella bacteria grows in
venting can create (partial) identify leaks - possible water temperatures between
vacuum/vessel vacuum formation when water 20°C and 60°CR
collapse/deformation drained; corrosion from water • Risk of disease if water
• Controlled through ‘vacuum contaminants droplets containing legionella
breaker’ valves. • Controlled by ensuring SOP for are inhaled. Cooling towers
venting, draining and removal generate aerosols from hot
of hazardous conditions; water/high air flow (water fog)
pressurising vessel with water • Controlled with biocide
• Or use of weight method - treatment; removing nutrients
measure weight of water from water; controlling water
retained and expelled when temperature; use of drift
the pressure is released, to eliminators to prevent water
calculate the degree by which spread, etc.
the vessel itself expanded.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Inert gases
Noble
gases –
• Colourless and odourless Helium,
• Generally unreactive (except in rare Neon,
Argon
occasions)
• Used to exclude oxygen
• Very good fire and explosion Other gases –
suppressants Nitrogen (N2)
Carbon
• Main danger is asphyxiation – removing dioxide (CO2)
or reducing oxygen available in air.
Inerting/purging
• Applied to reduce/remove Uses:
oxygen (in air) – the air is forced • To prevent any fire or explosive
out. Important to ensure that: atmosphere from forming by removing
– All the air is removed air (oxygen) in the system
– Overspill of the inerting gas • Reaction processes: to displace oxygen
is controlled and create a non-explosive
atmosphere
– Assessment made of the • During maintenance: to remove
likelihood of any flammable material and ensure
electrostatic effects that oxygen/flammable mixtures do not
might compromise the area arise.
as fluids are removed or
gases discharged.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Typical uses of inert gas
• Inerting equipment to prevent flammable
atmospheres
• Preparing equipment for maintenance by
purging out hydrocarbons
• Removing air/oxygen in equipment before
start-up
• Blanketing tanks to prevent the ingress of air
• Certain welding operations
• Decommissioning equipment to prevent the
‘rusting’ process
• Instrument air back-up.
Inerting/purging hazards and risks
• Creates non-breathable atmosphere (displaces oxygen)
• Nitrogen differentially replaces carbon dioxide which prevents
the breathing reflex
• Low temperatures - potential for serious cold burns:
– Gaseous N2 and CO2 are liquid when compressed (CO2 -
20°C, N2 - 210°C);
– Need to insulate storage vessels and pipe work to protect
from the danger of direct contact with people as well as
to maintain temperature.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Blanketing of storage tanks
• Addition of an inert gas into the head space of a tank
(Nitrogen most commonly used)
• Removes risk of flammable or explosive atmosphere as the
tank is being filled (or emptied, air entering via vents)
• An oxygen rich head space is left above the liquid in the tank.
 Fire-fighting agent
• Inert gases extinguish fire by replacing the
oxygen
• Risk of exposure to asphyxiating
atmospheres
• Typically:
– CO2 used in office areas and on some plant
– 52% N2, 40% Argon, 8% CO2 mixture for
industrial and process plant.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Pipeline freezing operations
• N2 often used as a coolant because of its very low
temperature
• Injecting liquid N2 in a blanket around a pipe
freezes the contents allowing:
– Maintenance
– Alterations
– Repair work.
• Cost effective and relatively easy.
 Activity

Inert gases: hazards

Hazards of asphyxiation and burns.
Pipe freezing.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Nitrogen use as back-up
instrument air
• Valve and process operated pneumatically may in some
circumstances also be operated by Nitrogen
• Dry and readily available
• Will not support fire/explosion
• Ensure safety of workers and pipe work is protected.
• Oxygen level detectors may be required in work areas to alert
workers in the event of a Nitrogen leak (which will reduce
Oxygen levels).
Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Principles of electricity
Electricity – the flow of electrons along or
through a conducting medium such as a
copper wire.

Voltage - ‘pushes’ electrons around the circuit,

measured in volts (V).

Current - flow of electrons created when a

voltage is applied across a circuit. Measured in
amperes (‘amps’) (I).

Resistance - the ease (or otherwise) of flow of

electricity. Measured in ohms (Ω).
 Ohms law
• Potential difference of voltage, current and resistance related
by the Ohm’s law equation:

V=IxR V
I=V/R
I X R

STUDENT USE ONLY

Types of current
• Direct current (DC): • Alternating current (AC):
– Current flows in one – Current that changes
direction with a constant direction periodically (in
voltage polarity (same phases moving in both
difference between each end directions along the wire)
of the wire) along with its voltage
– Used in short distance polarity
applications (e.g. batteries). – For applications requiring
greater power (operates
effectively over much longer
distances).
 Electrical hazards
Depends on:

Path electricity
Voltage Frequency takes through
the body

Duration Resistance Current flow

STUDENT USE ONLY

Impact on the body
0.5 – 2mA Threshold of perception
2-10mA Painful sensation
10 – 25mA Inability to let go. Danger of asphyxiation
25 – 80mA Loss of consciousness from heart
or respiratory failure
80 – 2000mA Ventricular fibrillation , (erratic heart functioning)
burns at point of contact

2000mA and above Cardiac arrest, burning of internal organs and

tissues leading to death
 Electric arcs and sparks
• Occurs when two conductors are
separated when carrying a charge:
– Break in the circuit can result
in the current jumping from
one conductor to the other
(e.g. a switch mechanism or a
short circuiting of a power
supply line).
• Can be extremely violent -
extreme heat + bright light.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Electric arcs and sparks: hazards and
risks
• Risk to workers in the vicinity

• Explosion (ignition of
flammable atmosphere)

• Risk of serious damage to

equipment and the power
distribution system

• Ignition of any volatiles,

dusts, clothing.
 Activity

Electrical arcing
Watch the following videos on arcing:
Arc flash demonstration.
Arc flash accident.

STUDENT USE ONLY

How arcs/sparks occur during normal
operations
• High-voltage switch rooms and panels • Low-voltage systems may be at greater
risk as the automatic circuit breaker
• Defective/poorly wired cabling and
may not be designed to act as fast as
connections
that on high and very high voltage
• Operation of relays installations.
• Incorrect use of tools • Failures in switches
• Adopting incorrect procedures resulting • Accumulation of dust and debris,
in shorting or bypassing of safety especially in medium and high-voltage
controls (live working especially) systems in contact areas may result in
arcing
• Condensation and corrosion
• Poor or faulty design and installation.
 Electrostatic charges
• Charge builds up on the surface of a non-conducting material which
is then dissipated by discharging it to a conducting material
• May be created by pressing two materials together (if materials are
of the right type):
– Electrons pulled from the surface of one of them onto the other
– A static charge is then created (one surface becomes + and one
–)
• More efficient to rub two surfaces together ‘tribocharging’.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Electrostatic charges
• Non-conductors give up or attract electrons relatively easily so that
when exposed to heat, pressure or friction electrons will be
released or absorbed
• Material then becomes either negatively or positively charged
depending on whether it has absorbed or given up electrons
• In this condition the material now represents a potential difference
to the surroundings which then creates a potential for sparking to
occur as the charge is dissipated
• In an explosive or flammable atmosphere, the discharging spark
may have sufficient energy to ignite it.
Electrostatic – other methods
of creation
• Applying heat to a material at one point causes the electrons to
Pyroelectric effect move and one surface becomes positively charged and the other
negatively

Piezoelectric effect • Stress applied to certain crystals creates a charge

• Placing charged material near to a conductor (or non-conductor)

Inducing a charge which allows its electrons to move freely. The charged material
induces a charge in the originally uncharged material

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Static in process settings

How can static charge occur in process
settings?
Give some examples of how it can happen.
Types of static - spark discharges

STUDENT USE ONLY

Types of static - corona discharge
Types of static - brush discharge

STUDENT USE ONLY

Types of static - propagating
brush discharge
 Types of static - conical pile
discharge (Maurer discharge)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Types of static - streaming current
charge
• Develops in flowing liquids in pipes (friction)
• Contact enables electron exchange to take place
• Liquid picks up a charge which is then moved through the
pipe as the liquid flows, accumulating charge on the way
• Insulating liquids unable to dissipate charge back through the
liquid and will discharge when coming into contact with air or
another conductor.
 Typical situations that generate
electrostatic charge
Pouring solids and
Movement on Transporting
liquids into
conveyer belts materials
containers

Walking in
Sieving and
Agitation and insulated shoes/on
grinding
stirring an insulated
operations
surface

STUDENT USE ONLY

Control of electrostatic charges
through bonding and grounding
• Fixed objects - provide a permanent connection from the plant,
structure, etc to earth
• Moveable objects (such a filling bins) - ‘flying’ lead attached to the bin
which is then clipped onto an earthing connection at the point of use
• Both require a good connection – eg not covered in dust and debris
• Where direct earthing not possible, eg liquids in glass-lined pipe or
containers, use a tantalum plug in the line or by dipping an earth lead
extended to the bottom of the container.
 Activity

Planning for power outages

What consequences might a sudden power
outage have on an installation such as a
refinery or large chemical plant?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Power outages
TWO approaches to consider:

Uninterrupted Power Generator – for

Supply (UPS) – for longer outages (often
short time outages, in tandem with the
up to an hour UPS)
 UPS
• Takes power (AC), stores it in a battery (DC) via a rectifier and
then passes it back through an inverter (which restores the
DC to AC) and then back into the distribution system
• Three approaches:

Line
Offline Online
interactive

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

UPS
Watch Uninterrupted power supply (UPS)
videos.
Generators • Fixed generators:
– Can be installed to match the
• Portable generators: expected total load or partial
required load of the plant
– Can be used before the UPS
ceases to function – Dead time between start of the
outage and start up of the
– Matched to the power
generators
requirement of the equipment
to which they are to be – Power surges.
connected
– Kept on site or hired in TWO critical aspects with generators:
– Safety procedures to ensure the - Maintenance and testing
- Ensure adequate fuel supplies are
safe connection and
available
disconnection in energised
systems.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations
 Activity

Physical forms of dangerous substances

There are three basic physical states in which
substances can exist:
- Gas
- Liquid;
- Solid
In groups – agree descriptions of the characteristics of
each of these states.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Physical forms of dangerous
substances
Substances can
• Change state
• Co-exist in more than one state
• Have different forms (e.g. dust vs. lump)
For example, water can be a:
• Gas (superheated steam)
• Liquid (at STP)
• Solid (ice).
 How form affects risk potential -
gases
• Fire and/or explosions:
– Flammable gases/vapours form
explosive mixtures with air even at
low concentrations
• Harm to human health and/or damage
to materials
– Asphyxiants (e.g. N2, CO2)
– Corrosive (e.g. NH3, Cl2)

STUDENT USE ONLY

How form affects risk potential -
liquids
• Much easier to contain a release (e.g. by bunding) than it is
for gases)
• Fire and/or explosion:
– Fire spread through liquid flow (fuels and solvents)
• Harm to humans, plant and the environment:
– Acids, alkalis, etc.
 How form affects risk potential -
solids
• Risk depends on shape, form and size:
– Large size harder to ignite/explode/react
– Smaller size (eg dusts, powders) much easier to
ignite/react
• Finely divided metals are highly dangerous, eg exposure of
aluminium powder to water
• Dusts mixed with air present a very large surface area
creating a flammable atmosphere (e.g. sieving operations)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Explosive substances
Risk of exploding in the right mixture with
oxygen (air) if sufficient energy is available

Explosive substances have very low

minimum ignition energies

The energy may be created by heat, shock or

electric charge (such as electrostatic friction)
 Oxidising substances
• Add oxygen to other substances
• They easily ‘oxidise’ susceptible substances (e.g. metals,
metal hydrides and organics) and create conditions for a fire
to occur or make a fire worse
• Examples of common oxidising agents: nitric acid,
hypochlorites (halogen) and hydrogen peroxide.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms

Flashpoint
The lowest temperature at which sufficient vapour is given
off to ‘flash’, i.e. ignite momentarily (not continue to
burn), when a source of ignition is applied to that vapour.
 Flammable liquids
Flammable
Condition
liquid category

1 Flashpoint < 23°C AND Initial boiling point ≤35°C

2 Flashpoint < 23°C AND Initial boiling point >35°C

Flashpoint ≥23°C AND Initial boiling point ≤60°C

3
(i.e. flashpoint between 23°C and 60°C inclusive)

4 Flashpoint >60°C AND ≤93°C

STUDENT USE ONLY

Flammable gases
Flammable gas
Classification
category

1 Extremely flammable

2 Flammable
Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Reaction hazards
What is a chemical reaction?
What affects how quickly a reaction takes
place (or whether it happens at all)?
 Effect of temperature

STUDENT USE ONLY

Effect of pressure
 Effect of catalysts

STUDENT USE ONLY

Exothermic and endothermic
reactions

Endothermic (less
Exothermic (very common) common) Takes in heat
Produces heat (e.g. from the surroundings (e.g.
combustion reaction) reaction between ‘vinegar’
and ‘washing soda’)
 Thermal runaway reaction

STUDENT USE ONLY

Thermal runaway reaction - causes
• Incorrect vessel charging:
– Incorrect reactants
– Incorrect volumes of reactants
– Wrong specification of raw materials (impurities)
• Incorrect use of catalysts
• Poor/failed temperature control
• Poor/failed mixing
• Loss of power (which affects critical controls)
• Maintenance failures
 Thermal runaway reaction -
consequences
• Venting or dumping of product and materials
• Loss of production and probably damage to equipment
• Unintended chemical reactions, such as decomposition or
other runaway reactions
• Vessel over-pressure:
‒ Catastrophic rupture – missiles, etc
‒ Loss of containment – toxics, flammables (fire/explosion)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Thermal runaway reaction - consequences

The Seveso incident in Italy – 10 July 1976
 Thermal runaway reaction -
protective measures

• Containment within the reactor

• Crash cooling
• Drowning and quenching of reactor
• Emergency venting/dumping of
reactants.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 3: Process safety hazard control
3.1 Operating procedures
3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
3.3 Safety critical performance standards
3.4 Utilities
3.5 Electricity and static electricity
3.6 Dangerous Substances
3.7 Reaction hazards
3.8 Bulk storage operations
 Tanks
Eight types of tanks used to store liquids

Fixed-roof tanks Domed external

External floating Internal floating
(atmospheric floating roof
roof tanks roof tanks
tanks) tanks

Liquefied
Variable vapour
Horizontal tanks Pressure tanks Natural Gas
space tanks
(LNG) tanks

STUDENT USE ONLY

Overfilling
Overfilling leads to:
• Fluid overflows and escapes (to potential ignition sources –
fire and explosion risk)
• Liquid released through the vents intended for vapour
• Overpressurisation of tank which then ruptures.

Typically due to:

• Operators unaware of the level in the tank
• Instrumentation failure in automatic filling systems.
 Effects of vacuum

• Created during tank emptying or draining

• Tank will deform and/or collapse

• Use of vacuum breaker valves - loss of pressure in the

headspace above the liquid is compensated when the tank is
emptied.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Overloading of foundations
Typically a combination of: • Ensure solid concrete
• Loading exerted when (relatively light) foundation/circular ring beam
tank is filled with liquid: foundation
– Density of liquids varies/weight • Design: tank design, construction and
may be significantly different from foundation suitable for intended
product to product contents.
• Use of anchor bolts (e.g. where expect
– Tank base may deform when
high winds).
filled/emptied.
• Ground instability (soft/liable to
movement):
– Loss of contents.
 Failure modes for tank shells and
associated pipework
Metals used for tanks and pipelines may fail, for example:

Thermal Brittle
Creep Stress
shock fracture

STUDENT USE ONLY

Creep
• Gradual extension of material under a steady tensile stress,
more likely to occur at higher temperatures
• Tank or pipe may deform and eventually fracture
• Tensile strength and elasticity decrease with increasing
temperature, which means that creep is more likely to occur
at higher temperatures.
 Stress
• Stress (loading on a
material) causes strain
(deformation of material).
• Materials fall into two
categories:
– Ductile - moves under strain
– Brittle - breaks under strain.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Stress
• Stress/loading exerted by:
– The contents
– Temperature changes
– Variations in loading.

Stress failure also due to:

• Stress corrosion - failure which occurs when a metal corrodes
• Hydrogen embrittlement - incursion of hydrogen atoms.
Thermal shock
• Rapid and extreme temperature
changes
• Different parts of the material
expand and heat by different
amounts
• Causes cracking to develop -
failure.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Brittle fracture
• Occurs suddenly under excessive stress
• No or limited elasticity
• Known as ‘snatch’ loading
• Low temperatures can increase risk of
fracture (e.g. materials used for storing and
conveying LPG)
Fatigue failure
• The formation of cracks as a Fatigue fracture is caused by the
result of repeated application combination of:
• Cyclic stress
of loads which individually do
• Tensile stress
not cause failure
• Plastic strain.
• May appear as thermal
fatigue, contact fatigue, Storage tanks fatigue may also be induced
surface or pitting fatigue, by:
subsurface cracking or • Wind load/vibration
subcase fatigue, and • Pump-induced vibration
• Pedestrians walking on/over
corrosion fatigue.
components.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Siting of tanks
What sorts of things would you need to
consider in siting of bulk storage tanks for
dangerous substances?
 Siting of tanks - distance
(from people, property and other
tanks)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Siting of tanks - ventilation
• To allow variation in internal and external pressure during
filling and emptying
• Venting to atmosphere - dispersion of volatiles

Avoid:
• Flammable/explosive mixtures
• Release of toxic vapours
 Filling of tanks
• System for filling a tank should be foolproof (required SIL)
• Speed - tank should be able to
equalise pressures by means of
the designed venting arrangements
• Procedures and equipment
• Competent operators

STUDENT USE ONLY

Overfilling and alarms
• Continuous monitoring to prevent overfilling
• Volume of vessel and content should be known before filling
• Alarms - two alarm trip systems:
– High level alarm (LAH) - normal operational level
exceeded (not a reference point for filling operation)
– High high level (LAHH) - maximum design capacity of the
tank
• If LAHH is exceeded the tank will overpressurise and overflow.
 Road tanker connections
• The mobile nature means
there has to be a temporary
(flexible hose) connection
made between the road
tanker and the storage vessel
• Liquids are pumped between
the two (either using the site
pump or a local one on the
vehicle)
• This brings additional risks.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Road tankers connections - risks
Driving off with hose coupling attached
• Overcome by using breakaway couplings

Static - earth bonding

• Dipping rods should be earthed

Siphoning
• End of the tank filling line below the lowest normal
operating level of the liquid

Splash filling
• Generation of static electricity
 Floating roof tanks
• Roof floats on the top of the liquid inside the tank
• Two types: internal and external
• Advantage: no head space above the liquid:
– Formation of vapour is virtually eliminated
• Emissions to air controlled
• Used for the more flammable liquids which have a
high vapour pressure, low flash point.

STUDENT USE ONLY

External floating roof tank
(EFRT)
Key:
A: Flexible connectors and
valves from foam supply devices
B: Limit chain
C: Float check valve
D: Horizontal supply piping to
continuous linear spreader
nozzles
 Landing the roof
• Typically every 5-10 years (for maintenance)
• Roof of a FRT will be landed – rests on its legs (so 1.5-2m
high)
Hazard:
• As tank is emptied/filled, space fills with vapour/air mixture
(venting is via in-breather/out-breather vents).

STUDENT USE ONLY

Sinking the roof
• Heavy rainfall can result in water loading on the roof
• Sinking may result in loss of buoyancy in the roof due to an
imbalance in the supporting structure
• Incorrect design - if weight of the roof is not supported by the
liquid on which it is floating due to insufficient buoyancy.
 Rim seal fires/failures
• Susceptible part of FRT is the seal between the roof and the
sides of the tank - rim seal
• Double seal - designed to keep water out and vapour in
Fails due to:
Wear and tear Tank movements Wind pressure

Internal pressure
Ground
changes (filling
movement
/emptying)

STUDENT USE ONLY

Rim seal fires/failures
Rim fails
• Rainwater will enter and mix with the contents of tank
• Surface exposed to air possibility of flammable or explosive
mixtures
• Risk of fire
• Fire protection system installed in the roof (e.g. foam
discharge)
• Ignition comes from either:
– Lightning strike
– Localised induced static charge
Fixed roof storage tanks: pressure and vacuum
hazards

STUDENT USE ONLY

Bunding – design/construction
• At least 110% of the total volume of the tank(s)
• Effective to contain any boil over or top loss, and bottom loss and
catastrophic failure
• Allow for access (for inspection, maintenance)
• Allow for rainwater (e.g. drain-off point)
• Maintained (age, deterioration, vegetation, etc.)
• Sealing where pipe work and valves break through wall
• Shut off valves both inside and outside the bund, inner shut off close to the
tank
• Non-return valves on filling lines
• Isolating valves and ROSOVs should be fully functional and fail to safe
• Lines for draining tanks and the valves blanked off.
 Protection from extremes of
weather
• Hot and cold climates: temperature variation will affect tanks.
Hence use of:
– Insulation
– Trace heating

• High wind loadings:

– Distortion can be limited by girding the tank with metal
bands

STUDENT USE ONLY

Lightning strikes
• Can ignite volatiles and cause Control measures:
catastrophic failure - Lightning conductors at the
appropriate attachment points:
• Can create a current which will
• Tank rim
induce sparking some distance
• Roof when it is in a high position
from the strike point
(EFRT)
• Puncture of the tank skin or - Inerting to keep the level of
formation of local hot spots will flammable vapours down
ignite flammable vapours - Ventilation to reduce the
• Floating roof tanks susceptible to hydrocarbons in the air
lightning strike.
Activity

Chemical warehousing
Storage of hazardous substances in
warehouses presents a number of risks, such
as the Allied Colloids fire (1992).
What factors need to be considered when
assessing the potential chemical hazards
present AND their storage requirements?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Chemical warehousing: assessment of
hazards present
Understanding the hazardous nature of the substance(s) to be
stored:
• Form (liquid, solid, powder, dust, etc)
• Physical properties (flammability, pH, etc)
• Relevant reaction chemistry information (e.g. reacts with
water)
• Safety data sheets (SDS) (formerly MSDS)
For substances created and stored on site similar set of
information required.
Chemical warehousing: assessment of
hazards present
• Transportation: in what and by what
• Inventories
• Sources of ignition - including electrostatic - or creation of
flammable /explosive atmospheres
• Topography
– Presence of drainage, water courses, etc
• Vulnerability of buildings
• Temperature effects

STUDENT USE ONLY

Chemical warehousing: siting, location
and security
• Local topography
• Proximity of community buildings, housing, schools, hospitals,
etc.
• Legal requirements for separation distances of specified
materials (e.g. LPG cylinders)
• Routes for receiving and dispensing
• Vehicle movements
• Access for emergency vehicles
• Fire-fighting facilities, eg open water
Chemical warehousing: siting, location
and security
• Trespassers
• Arson
• Stock control
• Authorised people only.
• Windows and other openings
• Security should not compromise fire safety
• Physical controls, eg lockable doors
• Inadvertent incorrect storage of incompatible materials

STUDENT USE ONLY

Chemical warehousing: Minimised
inventories
Inventory management:
Consequences of an • Reduce the total volume of
untoward event: material that is exposed at
• Release any one time
• Spillage • Separating storage so that
• Fire, etc. the possibility of mass
release is avoided
• Just-in-time resupply
• Direct delivery to point of
use.
 Separation and segregation of goods

STUDENT USE ONLY

Chemical warehousing: control of
ignition sources
• Where flammables, identify and control:
– Smoking
– Use of mobile phones
– Fork-lift trucks/vehicles
– Hot work
– Maintenance activities
Element 3:
summary
• 3.1 Operating procedures
• 3.2 Safe start-up and shut-down
• 3.3 Safety critical performance
standards
• 3.4 Utilities
• 3.5 Electricity and static electricity
• 3.6 Dangerous substances
• 3.7 Reaction hazards
• 3.8 Bulk storage operations

STUDENT USE ONLY

NEBOSH HSE Certificate in

Process Safety Management

October 2023
Element 4: Fire and explosion protection
Learning outcomes:

4.1 Recognise fire and explosion hazards within the process industries.

4.2 Recognise suitable control measures to minimise the effects of fire and
explosion in the process industries.

4.3 Recognise dust explosion hazards; and suitable control measures to

prevent and minimise explosion.

4.4 Contribute towards the development and maintenance of an

organisation’s emergency plan.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 4: Fire and explosion protection

4.1 Fire and explosion hazards

4.2 Fire and explosion control

4.3 Dust explosions

4.4 Emergency preparedness

Activity

Heat sources
What heat sources and fuels do you have in
your organisation?

STUDENT USE ONLY

The fire triangle
 Modes of heat transfer
Conduction Convection Radiation
Transfer through solid Hot fluids rise and cold Transfer of radiant
materials fluids sink, and as this energy from hot objects
happens, heat is spread
upwards from the seat
of the fire

STUDENT USE ONLY

Typical ignition sources in the process industry
Many examples, including:

Processes involving
Naked flames (e.g.
electrical
Sparks as oxyacetylene Hot surfaces
discharges (e.g. arc
welding)
welding)

Mechanical friction Lightning Smoking

 Flammable/explosive ranges

STUDENT USE ONLY

Jet fires
Mechanism
• Continuous, directed spray of
fuel ignited immediately
• Gas, liquid or vapour

Consequences
• ‘Blowtorch’ jet of flame
• Radiated heat
• Can explode
 Pool fires
Mechanism
• Spillage of liquid fuel
• Can be on water
• Vapour ignites above pool

Consequences
• May flow if not contained
• Unburnt fuel may form a vapour cloud which can explode

STUDENT USE ONLY

Boiling liquid expanding vapour cloud
explosion (BLEVE)
External jet fire attack - tank walls heat up

Liquid boils and vaporises, pressure builds – PRV operates

PRV closes, process repeats – vessel weakens and crack
develops

Catastrophic vessel rupture – explosion/secondary fires

Rapid depressurisation of superheated contents - cloud of
fine droplets formed

Consequences - Explosion, secondary fires

Confined vapour cloud explosion (CVCE)
Mechanism
• Flammable vapour builds up within building, vessel, etc
• Ignition occurs
Consequences:

Shockwave Overpressure Heat Missiles

STUDENT USE ONLY

Unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE)

Mechanism
• Flammable vapour
• Ignites before it disperses

Consequences
• Shock waves
• Overpressure
• Heat
 Element 4: Fire and explosion control

4.1 Fire and explosion hazards

4.2 Fire and explosion control

4.3 Dust explosions

4.4 Emergency preparedness

STUDENT USE ONLY

Leak detectors
Operation (for gas/vapour leaks)

• Different types – alarms with chemical sensors; that measure

changes in electrical resistance; infrared sensors

• Initiate investigation or shut-down

• Manual or automatic
 Spot and line detectors
Spot detectors
• Localised detectors installed at a specific point
• Only isolated areas may be covered

Line detectors
• A long cable is installed which can detect heat along its length
• Larger area can be covered

STUDENT USE ONLY

Smoke detectors
Operation:
• Smoke enters chamber
• Light or radiation beam disrupted
• Alarm sounds
 Flame detectors
Operation:
• Flickering or radiation emitted by fire
• Detected by sensor: Visible, ultraviolet (UV) or Infrared
(IR) detectors
• Alarm sounds

STUDENT USE ONLY

Key terms

Active fire protection Passive fire protection

“Equipment, systems and methods, “Coating or cladding

which, following initiation, may be arrangement...which, in the
used to control, mitigate and event of fire, will provide
thermal protection to restrict
extinguish fires”.
the rate at which heat is
transmitted to the object or
“Substances such as chemicals and area being protected”.
petroleum products”. BS EN ISO 13702:1999

Institution of Chemical Engineers definition adapted from the

Center for Chemical Process Safety publication 'Guidelines for
Process Safety Metrics'
 Activity

Active and passive fire detection systems

What types of active and passive fire detection
systems do you have experience of in your
workplace?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Passive fire protection
Prefabricated walls, partitions, Structures made in a factory to
fire doors be assembled on site

Intumescent coatings sprayed

Spray coatings
onto structural steelwork etc

Preformed boards, cladding, wall Fire resistant materials bound

linings, etc into cement etc

Intumescent seals prevent the

Seals and sealants
spread of smoke and fire
Active fire protection
Sprinklers
• Water or foam
• Heat triggers release
• Cools or smothers fire

Gas extinguishing
• Inert gas
• Smothers fire

Need regular testing and maintenance

Can be manual or automatic.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Hazardous area classification and zoning
Flammable vapours Flammable dusts
Zone 0 – present continuously Zone 20 – present continuously
Zone 1 – present occasionally Zone 21 – present occasionally
in normal operations in normal operations
Zone 2 – present for short Zone 22 – present for short
durations and not in normal durations and not in normal
operations operations
 Example

STUDENT USE ONLY

Equipment for use in flammable atmospheres
Electrical and mechanical
• ATEX approved

Electrical equipment categories

• Category 1: Used in Zones 0-20
• Category 2: Used in Zone 1/21 and Zone 2/22
• Category 3: Used in Zone 2/22 ONLY
 Explosion protection systems
Atmosphere control • Maintaining an atmosphere not in flammable range

Pressure relief and explosion

• Designing ‘weak point’ in system
venting

Automatic suppression • Detects pressure rise and injects inert media

Automatic isolation • Detects pressure rise and cuts off supply

• Fine mesh - cools a flame as it passes through

Flame arrestors
• Active and passive isolation

STUDENT USE ONLY

Benefits and limitations of
chemical extinguishing systems
Example: dry powder
Benefits:
• Inert powder smothers fire
• Effective on jet and running pool fires
Limitations:
• Can reignite
• Messy/causes damage
 Benefits and limitations of foam and
inert gas extinguishing systems
Foam Inert gas
Benefits: Benefits:
• Water-based foam smothers • Removes oxygen and
fire smothers fire
• Good for pool fires, not on jet
fires
Limitations: Limitations:
• Can reignite if foam layer is • An asphyxiant so needs
broken stringent controls

STUDENT USE ONLY

Fire protection for tank farms
Water monitors
• High volume water cannon
• Fixed or portable

Sprinklers
• Water or foam

Deluge Systems
• High volume sprinklers
• Cool and shield vessels
 Mitigation of lightning strikes
Lightning rod
• Attached to highest point
• Connected to earth rod by cables
• Directs the electrical discharge to earth

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 4: Fire and explosion protection

4.1 Fire and explosion hazards

4.2 Fire and explosion control

4.3 Dust explosions

4.4 Emergency preparedness

Why dust explosions occur
The dust pentagon

STUDENT USE ONLY

Primary and secondary explosions

Primary Secondary
explosion explosion
• Initial explosion • Often much larger
within the process • Involves dust disturbed
• May disturb dust by the primary
from surfaces explosion
 Activity

Ignition sources
Watch the video “Inferno: Dust explosion at
Imperial Sugar” produced by the Chemical
Safety Board (CSB).
Identify the potential ignition sources and
reasons for the incident.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Prevention of dust explosions
• Identify hazards, risks and controls
Risk assessment • Eliminate dusts at source
• Example, pastes rather than powders

Inerting • Nitrogen blankets

• Minimise fugitive releases

Dust extraction /
• Good housekeeping (vacuum rather than
housekeeping sweep)
Control of ignition • Zoned areas
sources • Selection of appropriate equipment
 Mitigation of dust explosions
Explosion relief • Direct pressure to a safe location
• Minimise damage
venting
Explosion • Contain pressure in vessel
suppression and • Suppress explosion using immersive
containment media

Plant siting and • Locate in open air/away from

occupied areas
construction • Build of weak vent panels

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 4: Fire and explosion protection

4.1 Fire and explosion hazards

4.2 Fire and explosion control

4.3 Dust explosions

4.4 Emergency preparedness

 Purpose of an emergency plan

To control and
manage response
to foreseeable
emergencies.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Development of an emergency plan
Sometimes a legal requirement (e.g. MAPP)

Identify possible Select people (onsite Determine resources

foreseeable scenarios and offsite) to develop needed, based on
and response required the plan likelihood/consequence

Evaluate external Consider onsite and Identify requirements

emergency response offsite medical facilities for onsite/offsite plans
 Activity

Foreseeable emergencies
What foreseeable scenarios might your
organisation need to cover?

STUDENT USE ONLY

Foreseeable emergencies
Depending on the organisation:

Loss of
First aid/medical Fire/explosion containment/toxic
release

Bomb
Outbreak of Flooding or
threat/terrorist
disease adverse weather
incident
 Specialists to develop the plan
On-site
• Engineers
• Workers (process experts)
• Specialists (health and safety, etc)

Off-site
• Regulators
• Local authorities and councils
• Water companies and authorities
• Utility companies
• Emergency services including the police and fire service

STUDENT USE ONLY

Activity

Emergency response resources

You are establishing the onsite
emergency plan for a chemical site.
What resources do you think you might
need to enable an effective emergency
response?
 Resources

AED and
Emergency First aid Spill response
evacuation
control room equipment kits
chair

Telephone and Site maps and Safety data Computer and

radios drain plans sheets printer

STUDENT USE ONLY

Availability of external emergency
response (including medical facilities)
On-site emergency first aid usually adequate.
May need additional response if:
• Specialist hazards (e.g. chemicals)
• Isolated location
• Long response times
 On-site and off-site plans
On-site and off-site plans may be required in law:
• On-site developed and managed by the organisation
• Off-site developed and managed (and implemented)
by the authorities

STUDENT USE ONLY

Content of an emergency plan
Depending on legal requirements, but to include:

Systems for alerting and warning workers onsite, neighbouring facilities and emergency services

Responsibilities in the event of an emergency

Expertise of teams involved in response (internal and external)

Evacuation/shelter arrangements

Emergency shutdown of plant and services

Consideration of vulnerable people

Systems for accounting for workers

Information management and media liaison

Information and communications:

• Real time information about the incident - chronological log
• Hazard information
• Casualty information
• External reports to regulators
Media liaison:
• Need media training
• Usually a prepared statement

STUDENT USE ONLY

Theoretical training
Tabletop exercises
• Trainer-led exercise
• Carried out in accelerated time
• Can simulate different incident response scenarios
• Discuss possible actions
• Respond ‘in theory’
• Identify deficiencies
Competency of response team and commanders
Incident commanders need:
• Leadership experience
• Knowledge of plant
• Good communications skills
Team members:
• Part of the site experience
• Practical skills: First aid, fire-fighting,
rescue, etc.

STUDENT USE ONLY

Practical testing of response
Fire/emergency evacuation drill:
• Trigger alarm
• Test workers and response team (e.g. roll-call and fire wardens)
• Tests familiarity with evacuation routes, havens, shelters, assembly points etc
Response team drill:
• Practical mock-up scenarios
• Led by trainer
• Test actual response
Full-site response drill:
• Full-site evacuation and test
Provision of information to the public
During normal operations:
• Potential incidents
• Possible alarms
• Action to be taken
During an incident:
• Information on the event
• Action to be taken
• May be assisted by authorities

STUDENT USE ONLY

Element 4 summary

4.1 Fire hazards

4.2 Fire and explosion control
4.3 Dust explosions
4.4 Emergency preparedness