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The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology

Kristina Rolin

Episteme / Volume 3 / Issue 1-2 / June 2006, pp 125 - 136

DOI: 10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.125, Published online: 03 January 2012

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Kristina Rolin (2006). The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. Episteme, 3, pp 125-136 doi:10.3366/
epi.2006.3.1-2.125

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 Kristina Rolin

The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology

abstract
Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis
of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate
perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by
other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge
is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas
the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality
enables one to judge some perspectives as better than others, the situated knowledge
thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial.
I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the
bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the
thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis.

Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology is an ambitious and controversial

attempt to argue that diversity among inquirers is an epistemic advantage to a community
of inquirers. According to Harding, epistemic advantage accrues not to just any kind of
diversity but to diversity with respect to the social positions of inquirers and participants
in their studies. Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology advances the claim that those
who are unprivileged with respect to their social positions are likely to be privileged with
respect to gaining knowledge of social reality. According to Harding, unprivileged social
positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than
perspectives generated by other social positions (Harding 1991, 121; see also pages 138 and
141). I call this claim the thesis of epistemic privilege. The thesis of epistemic privilege is
connected to a particular conception of objectivity, “strong objectivity,” which is the view
that objective research starts from the lives of unprivileged groups (Harding 1991, 150;
see also page 142). Diversity with respect to social positions is beneficial for knowledge-
seeking communities because there are many ways of being unprivileged. As Harding
explains, “the subject of feminist knowledge – the agent of these less partial and distorted
descriptions and explanations – must be multiple and even contradictory” (1991, 284).
The thesis of epistemic privilege has been criticized on two grounds. One objection
is that Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology does not provide any standards of
epistemic justification that enable one to judge some socially grounded perspectives
as better than others. Another objection is that there is no evidence in support of the
thesis of epistemic privilege. These two objections are connected. As long as it is not

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 Kristina Rolin
clear what standards of epistemic justification allow one to judge some socially grounded
perspectives as better than others, it is not clear either what kind of evidence we should
expect in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. Let me explain each objection.
The first objection is raised by Louise Antony (1993) and Helen Longino (1999).
They argue that the thesis of epistemic privilege is undermined by another thesis in
Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology, the thesis that all scientific knowledge is
socially situated (Harding 1991, 11; see also pages 119 and 142). I call this the situated
knowledge thesis (see also Wylie 2003, 31). The thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the
assumption that there is a standard of impartiality that enables one to judge some socially
grounded perspectives as “less partial and distorted” than others. The situated knowledge
thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge claims are
partial in virtue of being grounded on a particular perspective on social reality. As Helen
Longino explains, in order to argue that some socially grounded perspectives are better
than others, a standpoint epistemologist would have to be able to identify privileged
perspectives from a non-interested position, but according to standpoint epistemology,
there is no such position (1999, 338; see also Hekman 2000, 24). Louise Antony calls the
tension between the thesis of epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis a “bias
paradox” (1993, 188-189). In claiming that all knowledge is partial, feminist standpoint
epistemology challenges the very notion of impartiality. But by undermining the notion
of impartiality, feminist standpoint epistemology is in danger of losing its critical edge
(Antony 1993, 189).
In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991) Harding is aware of the bias paradox.
Instead of abandoning either the thesis of epistemic privilege or the situated knowledge
thesis, she tries to solve the bias paradox by introducing a distinction between cultural
and epistemological relativism. She claims that “a strong notion of objectivity requires
a commitment to acknowledge the historical character of every belief or set of beliefs
– a commitment to cultural, sociological, historical relativism” (Harding 1991, 156). And
she adds that “it also requires that judgmental or epistemological relativism be rejected”
(Harding 1991, 156). However, Harding’s attempt to solve the paradox is not successful
because the distinction between cultural and epistemological relativism begs the
question of what standards of epistemic justification enable her to reject epistemological
relativism. Instead of articulating such standards, Harding insists that feminist standpoint
epistemology should reject the assumption that there is a “view from nowhere” (Harding
1991, 311). Moreover, Harding is reluctant to say that the goal of scientific inquiry is truth
or empirical success. Instead, she suggests that scientific inquiry should progress “away
from falsity rather than toward truth” (1991, 185).
Let me turn to the second objection, the claim that there is no evidence to support
the thesis of epistemic privilege. This objection is raised by Cassandra Pinnick (1994
and 2005). Pinnick suggests that the thesis of epistemic privilege should be understood
as an empirical hypothesis and she claims that feminist literature “describes no effort to
accumulate the kind of empirical data that could easily resolve matters in favor of the
feminists” (Pinnick 1994, 653; see also Hekman 2000, 23). Ten years after the publication
of her critical paper in Philosophy of Science, Pinnick (2005) claims that the thesis of
epistemic privilege still remains without evidence to support it.
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 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
It is not fair to claim that there is no effort to argue for the thesis of epistemic privilege
in Harding’s Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Harding presents seven claims in support
of the thesis of epistemic privilege: (1) Women’s lives have been devalued and neglected
as starting points for scientific research and as the generators of evidence for or against
knowledge claims (Harding 1991, 121). (2) Women are “strangers” to the social order
(Harding 1991, 124). (3) Women’s oppression gives them fewer interests in ignorance about
the social order (Harding 1991, 125). (4) Women can come to understand hidden aspects
of social relations between the genders and the institutions that support these relations
by means of struggles to change them (Harding 1991, 127). (5) Women’s perspective is
from everyday life (Harding 1991, 128). (6) Women’s perspective comes from mediating
ideological dualisms: nature versus culture (Harding 1991, 130). (7) Women researchers
are “outsiders within” (Harding 1991, 131).
However, Harding’s arguments fail to be convincing for two reasons. One reason is
that the universal extension of her claims about women undermines their plausibility.
Certainly, we can think of counter-examples to each claim, for example, women whose
lives have not been devalued, women who are not strangers to the social order, or women
who have an interest in ignorance about social order, and so on. But even if the extension
of Harding’s claims about women is narrowed down, her arguments fail to be convincing
for another reason. The reason is that it is not clear how these seven claims support the
thesis of epistemic privilege, the claim that women’s social positions, insofar as they are
unprivileged, are likely to generate better perspectives on social reality than other social
positions. More specifically, it is not clear what is meant by a perspective in feminist
standpoint epistemology. As long as it is not clear what a socially grounded perspective
is and what the relevant alternatives are, the thesis of epistemic privilege lacks empirical
content.
In this paper I propose a solution to the bias paradox as it concerns feminist standpoint
epistemology. In the first section I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic
justification dissolves the bias paradox because it enables one to assess the relative merits
of socially grounded perspectives without evoking the image of a “view from nowhere.”
In the second section I argue that contextualism provides an answer to the question of
what kind of evidence we should expect in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege.
I show that it is possible to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege by
identifying an assumption or a set of assumptions that manifests a socially grounded
perspective in scientific inquiry. Given the scope of the paper, it is not possible to settle
the case in favor or against the thesis of epistemic privilege. My aim is rather to illustrate
by means of an example what kind of evidence is relevant for the thesis of epistemic
privilege.

a contextualist theory of epistemic justification

In this section, I argue that the bias paradox is generated by a foundationalist theory
of epistemic justification and it dissolves as soon as we adopt a contextualist theory of
epistemic justification. First, I explain what a contextualist theory of epistemic justification
is and how it differs from a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. Second, I
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 Kristina Rolin
argue that the bias paradox is rooted in a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification.
Third, I argue that the bias paradox dissolves as soon as we adopt a contextualist theory
of epistemic justification because a contextualist theory of epistemic justification enables
one to assess the relative merits of socially grounded perspectives without evoking the
image of a “view from nowhere.”
As Michael Williams defines it, a contextualist theory of epistemic justification is the
view that epistemic justification takes place in a context of assumptions that function as
default entitlements (2001, 226-227). A contextualist theory of epistemic justification
includes two further assumptions. One assumption is that default entitlements can be
articulated and challenged, but only by a recontextualization that involves assumptions
of its own (Williams 2001, 227). Another assumption is that recontextualization can go
on indefinitely. As Williams explains, this is the open-endedness of inquiry, not a vicious
regress of justification (2001, 227).
At first glance, contextualism may appear to be a form of epistemic relativism, which
holds that epistemic justification is relative to some framework of assumptions. I call
this form of epistemic relativism “framework-relativism.” However, contextualism is not
framework-relativism because default entitlements are not plain assumptions. Default
entitlements are adopted with a commitment to defend them when they are challenged
with contrary evidence or other arguments. As Williams explains, contextualism implies
a default and challenge model of epistemic justification (2001, 25). In a default and
challenge model, an entitlement to one’s belief is the default position but one has a duty
to defend or revise one’s belief as soon as it is challenged with appropriate arguments
(Williams 2001, 25 and 149). So, whereas both contextualism and framework-relativism
hold the view that epistemic justification is relative to some context, only framework-
relativism holds the view that contexts are “frameworks of ultimate commitments”
(2001, 224-225). In contextualism, no context includes ultimate commitments that are
beyond criticism (Williams 2001, 226-227). When someone challenges an assumption
that functions as a default entitlement, an inquiry is shifted to another context where
the challenged assumption is either defended, modified, or abandoned (Williams 2001,
227). The person who challenges a default entitlement has a duty to carry the burden of
proof. This means that she has to refer to another context of default entitlements. This is
the process of recontextualization.
Foundationalism is the view that a belief is justified if and only if it is either itself basic
or inferentially connected (in some appropriate way) to other justified beliefs (Williams
2001, 164). Foundationalism makes two further assumptions. The first assumption is that
there are basic beliefs, that is, beliefs that are in some sense justifiably held without resting
on further evidence (Williams 2001, 164). The second assumption is that there are beliefs
that in virtue of their content are fitted to play the role of basic beliefs (Williams 2001,
164). Contextualism is consistent with the first assumption, the view that there are beliefs
that are justified without resting on further evidence. However, contextualism rejects the
second assumption, the view that some beliefs are basic beliefs in virtue of their content
alone. In contextualism, those beliefs that are justified without resting on further evidence
have this epistemic status in virtue of functioning as default entitlements, not in virtue
of their content alone. Therefore, these beliefs are more appropriately called default
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 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
entitlements than basic beliefs. Moreover, whereas basic beliefs in foundationalism are
assumed to be basic in every context of inquiry, default entitlements in contextualism
are not assumed to have this epistemic status in every context. Some default entitlements
may be cross-contextual but their epistemic status is nevertheless context-dependent.
Let me turn to the question of how the bias paradox is related to a foundationalist
theory of epistemic justification. Recall that the bias paradox is the tension between the
thesis of epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis. The thesis of epistemic
privilege relies on the assumption that there is a standard of impartiality which enables
one to claim that some socially grounded perspectives are better than others. The situated
knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge
claims are partial. I argue that there is a contradiction between the thesis of epistemic
privilege and the situated knowledge thesis if a standard of impartiality is understood in
accordance with a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. By this I mean that
a standard of impartiality is understood to involve basic beliefs. Clearly, the basic beliefs
of foundationalism are not situated knowledge claims because they are basic in virtue
of their content and they have this epistemic status in every context of inquiry. They are
non-situated knowledge claims. Thus, it is impossible to reconcile the view that there
are basic beliefs with the claim that all knowledge is situated. And therefore, if we adopt
foundationalism, there is a contradiction between the thesis of epistemic privilege and
the situated knowledge thesis.
However, if we adopt contextualism, then the bias paradox dissolves. In contextualism,
a standard of impartiality is provided by some context of default entitlements. Default
entitlements cannot be identified on the basis of their content alone. They may be
empirical beliefs which have not been contested so far. Or they may be epistemic values
such empirical adequacy, internal coherence, consistency with well-established bodies of
knowledge, and explanatory power. Or they may be moral and social values which are
relevant for epistemic justification. Moral and social values can be relevant for epistemic
justification insofar as they give a reason to consider certain kinds of evidence as relevant
for a hypothesis or a theory (Longino 1990; Anderson 1995 and 2004). The crucial thing
is that default assumptions are adopted with a commitment to defend them when they
are challenged with contrary evidence or other arguments. Even though some default
assumptions may be cross-contextual, they are not assumed to function as default
entitlements in every context of inquiry. Thus, they are situated knowledge claims. And
therefore, if we adopt contextualism, there is no contradiction between the thesis of
epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis.
The image of a “view from nowhere” is also a reflection of foundationalism since a “view
from nowhere” is best thought of as a set of basic beliefs, beliefs that have this epistemic
status in every context of inquiry. Thus, foundationalism gives rise to a dilemma which
suggests that we have to choose between two alternatives, either framework-relativism (the
view that epistemic justification is relative to some framework of assumptions) or a “view
from nowhere.” This is the dilemma that Harding struggles with when she aims to reject
both epistemological relativism (Harding 1991, 156) and a “view from nowhere” (Harding
1991, 311). Contextualism reveals that this dilemma is false. We do not have to choose
between these two alternatives because there is a third alternative. A third alternative
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 Kristina Rolin
is the view that epistemic justification is relative to a context of default entitlements. A
context of default entitlements provides some standards of epistemic justification which
enable one to assess the relative merits of two or more socially grounded perspectives.
A context of default entitlements is not just another framework of assumptions. The
reason for this is that default entitlements are adopted with a commitment to defend
or revise them when they are challenged with contrary evidence or other arguments.
A context of default assumptions is not a “view from nowhere” either. The reason for
this is that default assumptions are not the basic beliefs of foundationalism. Therefore,
contextualism enables one to assess the relative merits of socially grounded perspectives
without referring to a “view from nowhere.” The bias paradox is not a paradox at all.

the question of evidence

Next, I turn to the question of what counts as evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic
privilege. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are
likely to generate better perspectives on social reality than other social positions. In
order to give empirical content to this thesis we have to specify what a socially grounded
perspective is and what the relevant alternatives are to which we compare it. In this
section I introduce a case study to argue that we can identify an assumption that manifests
inquirers’ perspective on a subject matter of inquiry as well as a relevant alternative
against which we can assess the relative merits of a socially grounded perspective. Also, I
argue that the perspective chosen in my example is better than the alternative perspective
and I present a contextualist analysis of my argument.
My example is a study on gender discrimination in the academia. The study is authored
by my colleagues Saija Katila and Susan Meriläinen at Helsinki School of Economics
and it has been published in a journal Gender, Work and Organization in 1999. The
title of the paper is “A serious researcher or just another nice girl? Doing gender in a
male-dominated scientific community.” The major thesis of the paper is that women
academics encounter subtle forms of discrimination which maintain gender inequalities
in the academia systematically if unintentionally. The authors’ aim is not so much to
seek extensive evidence for this general hypothesis as to give empirical content to the
theoretical notion of “subtle forms of discrimination” by arguing that certain incidents
they themselves have encountered fall into this category. The paper is a qualitative study
that could function as a preliminary step towards a quantitative study which aims to test
a general hypothesis.
In this study a socially grounded perspective is manifested in the choice of the
key concept of the study, the notion of “subtle forms of discrimination.” By subtle
forms of gender discrimination Katila and Meriläinen refer to those forms of gender
discrimination that are embedded in everyday practices and are not widely recognized as
harmful (1999, 165). Yet they are forms of gender discrimination insofar as their impact
on women academics’ motivation and self-confidence is negative (Katila and Meriläinen
1999, 167). For example, subtle forms of gender discrimination include such phenomena
as drawing attention to women’s gender in an inappropriate way in a professional context
and showing less respect for female scholars than male scholars (Katila and Meriläinen
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 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
1999, 167-168). The authors’ choice of the concept of “subtle forms of discrimination”
reflects a socially grounded perspective because the choice is motivated by their feminist
values. The authors emphasize that their study is part of their attempt to reform everyday
practices in academic organizations (Katila and Meriläinen 1999, 165). However, their
argument for the claim that women academics face subtle forms of discrimination is
based on their evidence. The authors’ evidence consists of seven narratives which are
constructed of incidents that have occurred to them during one academic year (Katila and
Meriläinen 1999, 166). Feminist values do not determine whether there is any evidence of
subtle forms of gender discrimination. Nor do they determine how much such evidence
can be found. Instead, feminist values function as a reason to consider certain kind of
evidence as relevant for a study on gender discrimination. This is why it is appropriate to
say that feminist values ground a perspective on gender discrimination, whereas it is not
appropriate to say that they ground a hypothesis on gender discrimination.
In order to show how this case study supports the thesis of epistemic privilege, it
is necessary to compare Katila’s and Meriläinen’s perspective on gender discrimination
to a relevant alternative. Such an alternative can be found in a classic study on gender
discrimination in the academia, Jonathan Cole’s book Fair Science: Women in the Scientific
Community (1987), first published in 1979. Cole makes a distinction between two kinds
of stratification process in science, a process of discrimination and a process of self-
selection (1987, 13). He argues that unequal numbers of men and women in the sciences
are not sufficient evidence of gender discrimination because unequal numbers can result
from a process of self-selection (1987, 13). It is possible that women are underrepresented
in the sciences simply because they do not pursue careers in the sciences or they are
not sufficiently persistent in this pursuit. Cole defines discrimination as “residual sex
inequality” (1987, 50). By this he means that discrimination is the amount of inequality
that cannot be explained by gender differences in scientific education and productivity.
Cole assumes that insofar as there are gender differences in scientific education and
productivity, they result from processes of self-selection. This assumption functions as a
default entitlement in his study since he does not present any evidence in its support. The
major result in Cole’s study is that unequal numbers of men and women in the sciences
are for most part an outcome of self-selection rather than discrimination (1987, 86).
I argue that the perspective chosen by Katila and Meriläinen (1999) twenty years
after the publication of Cole’s book is superior to Cole’s (1987) perspective on gender
discrimination for two reasons. One reason is that the concept of “subtle forms of
discrimination” extends the study of gender discrimination to social processes that
fall outside the scope of Cole’s study. Cole’s concept of discrimination as “residual sex
inequality” focuses on hiring and promotion as situations where gender discrimination
can take place. It casts a shadow on those social processes that generate gender differences
in scientific education and productivity by influencing women’s motivation, confidence
in their capabilities, opportunities for collaboration, and resources for research. Katila’s
and Meriläinen’s choice of the concept of “subtle forms of discrimination” indicates
that they do not consider the issue of gender discrimination to have been settled by the
result of Cole’s study, the claim that unequal numbers of men and women in the sciences
are an outcome of self-selection rather than discrimination. Instead, they challenge
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 Kristina Rolin
the assumption that gender differences in scientific education and productivity are an
outcome of self-selection by arguing that they themselves have encountered subtle forms
of gender discrimination. After this challenge, Cole’s assumption can no longer function
as a default entitlement since it is possible that gender differences in scientific education
and productivity are not only an outcome of self-selection but also an outcome of
subtle forms of discrimination. Thus, Katila and Meriläinen shift the debate on gender
discrimination to another context where the category of relevant evidence is wider than
it is in Cole’s study, including not only evidence on gender differences in hiring and
promotion but also evidence on those social processes that generate gender differences
in scientific education and productivity.
Another reason why Katila’s and Meriläinen’s (1999) perspective is superior to Cole’s
(1987) perspective is that the former gives a more complex and accurate account of
agency and responsibility than the latter. Cole’s concept of discrimination as “residual
sex inequality” locates agency and responsibility for gender discrimination at those who
are in charge of hiring and promotion. Similarly, the concept of “self-selection” locates
agency and responsibility for gender differences in scientific education and productivity
in women who are assumed to lack motivation and persistence for a career in the sciences.
Katila’s and Meriläinen’s concept of “subtle forms of discrimination” introduces a more
complex distribution of agency and responsibility. “Subtle forms of discrimination” are
an unintended outcome of certain actions and social arrangements, and their impact on
women academics depends on how women interpret and analyze these events. Gender
discrimination is understood as an outcome of a complex process of interaction where
there are neither malicious agents nor helpless victims of discrimination. Insofar as
there are subtle forms of gender discrimination, this complex account of agency and
responsibility is more accurate than Cole’s account. A complex and more accurate
account of agency and responsibility is better than a simple and less accurate one because
it serves better the practical goal of inquiry, in this case, the goal of applying research
results to reform everyday practices in academic organizations. A complex and accurate
account serves this practical goal better because it challenges all participants to reflect on
their behavior without blaming a single instance for gender discrimination.
Let me summarize the argument I have presented so far. I have argued that it is possible
to identify an assumption that manifests a socially grounded perspective in scientific
inquiry. However, this requires that we focus on a particular subject matter of inquiry. In
my example a socially grounded perspective can be identified with the decision to prefer
one concept of gender discrimination over an alternative concept. In other examples a
socially grounded perspective could be manifested in other kinds of decision. But in order
to make sense of socially grounded perspectives, we have to specify “perspective on what.”
Also, specifying a subject matter of inquiry is necessary for us to determine the set of
relevant alternatives against which we can assess the relative merits of a socially grounded
perspective. In my case study, I have picked up only one relevant alternative, the concept
of discrimination as “residual sex inequality,” to function as a contrast to the concept
of “subtle forms of discrimination.” Moreover, specifying a subject matter of inquiry
helps one determine what ways of being unprivileged are relevant for inquiry. Academic
women in Finland have many privileges but they can be unprivileged with respect to
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 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
certain resources in certain situations. Katila’s and Meriläinen’s (1999) perspective on
gender discrimination is generated from a social position which is privileged with respect
to some resources (e.g., being white and a member of a dominant ethnic group) and
unprivileged with respect to other resources (e.g., not receiving recognition for one’s
work). Thus, in order to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, we
have to focus on a particular subject matter of inquiry.
I have also argued that the perspective chosen in my example is better than the
alternative perspective. In the first part of my argument I appealed to the epistemic
value of empirical adequacy. I argued that the two concepts of discrimination imply
different conceptions of relevant evidence of gender discrimination in academia. The
concept of discrimination as “residual sex inequality” implies that evidence on gender
differences in hiring and promotion is relevant for determining whether there is gender
discrimination in academia. The concept of “subtle forms of discrimination” implies
a wider conception of relevant evidence, including not only evidence on hiring and
promotion but also evidence on those social processes that generate gender differences
in scientific education and productivity. The concept of discrimination as “residual sex
inequality” with its narrow conception of relevant evidence is empirically adequate only
as long as one assumes that gender differences in scientific education and productivity
are an outcome of self-selection and not of discrimination. As soon as this assumption is
challenged, the debate on gender discrimination shifts to another context of epistemic
justification where a wider conception of relevant evidence is empirically more adequate
than a narrow one.
In the second part of my argument I appealed to moral and social values. I argued
that the concept of subtle forms of discrimination is better than the alternative concept
because it enables inquirers to give a more complex and accurate account of agency and
responsibility than the alternative concept. Consequently, it serves better the practical
goal of reforming everyday practices in academic organizations. In this part of the
argument, the moral and social values are equality and the idea that social scientific
research should be useful for social reform. These values are shared not only by Katila
and Meriläinen (1999) but also by Cole (1987).
The argument I have presented in this section is an illustration of how contextualism
can be used to define what counts as evidence for the thesis of epistemic privilege. In the
previous section I argued that contextualism liberates us from the assumption that we
have to evoke “a view from nowhere” in order to be able to compare two or more socially
grounded perspectives. In order to compare socially grounded perspectives, we have to
specify a context of epistemic justification, not to pretend that our arguments reflect
“a view from nowhere.” This is precisely what I have done in this section. First, I have
specified a context of epistemic justification by focusing on a particular subject matter of
inquiry, gender discrimination in the academia. This move enables me to give empirical
content to the thesis of epistemic privilege. Second, I have specified a context of epistemic
justification further by appealing to certain values in my argument, the epistemic value
of empirical adequacy, the moral value of equality, and the idea that social scientific
research should serve social reform. These three values function as default entitlements
in my argument for the claim that the perspective chosen in my example is better than
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the alternative perspective. These values could be defended or revised in case they are
challenged with appropriate arguments. Therefore, my argument is consistent with
contextualism. In contextualism, the relative merits of socially grounded perspectives
are necessarily evaluated in some context of default entitlements. No one is expected to
defend the thesis of epistemic privilege in all contexts of epistemic justification.
The controversy on feminist standpoint epistemology is not only about the question
of whether there is or is not evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege; it is
also about the question of what kind of evidence is relevant for the thesis of epistemic
privilege. When Pinnick (2005) claims that there is no evidence to support the thesis of
epistemic privilege, she seems to expect that feminist epistemologists present extensive
data about the relative numbers of women in scientific communities and the success of
these communities in achieving their cognitive ends. As she explains, “we have no data
that would test the strength of the hypothesis as asserting a causal relationship between
women and cognitive ends” (Pinnick 2005, 108). In light of this conception of relevant
evidence, it may seem that a contextually grounded case study, like the one I have
presented in this section, is not much of evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic
privilege, but as Pinnick says, mere “anecdotal reportage” (2005, 114).
Pinnick’s (2005) conception of relevant evidence rests on an assumption that I have
challenged in this section. This assumption is that it is not relevant to pay attention to
the content of any particular socially grounded perspective when we test the thesis of
epistemic privilege.1 In this section I have challenged this assumption by presenting a
case study where it is relevant to specify the content of a socially grounded perspective
in order to be able to decide whether the case study supports the thesis of epistemic
privilege. In terms of contextualism, this challenge means that Pinnick’s conception of
relevant evidence does not function as a default entitlement. Therefore, it should not
be assumed at the outset that contextually grounded case studies, like the one I have
presented here, are mere “anecdotes.”

conclusions
For a long time feminist standpoint epistemology has relied on the power of visual and
spatial images such as “perspectives” and “standpoints.” The very term “standpoint”
evokes an image of a position where one stands and views the object of inquiry from a
particular “perspective” (Pohlhaus 2002, 288). Even though this image has been fruitful
in feminist epistemology, it is time to acknowledge that it creates more problems than it
solves. One problem is that it imports a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification
into feminist epistemology. The visual and spatial image of a “standpoint” easily leads
us into thinking that we need a “view from nowhere” in order to be able to compare
different perspectives. I have argued that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification
offers an alternative to a “view from nowhere.” A context of default entitlements provides
a “situated” standard of impartiality that enables us to assess the relative merits of two or
more socially grounded perspectives. Another problem generated by visual and spatial
images is that it is not clear what we assess when we assess socially grounded perspectives.
I have argued that it is possible to identify and evaluate an assumption that manifests
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 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology
a socially grounded perspective. This requires that we specify a context of epistemic
justification.
I have not yet said anything about standpoints and how they differ from perspectives.
So, let me explain what a standpoint is in a contextualist theory of epistemic justification.
In contextualism, epistemic justification takes place in a context of default entitlements.
In any context, some assumptions are likely to function as default entitlements simply in
virtue of the fact that no one has yet challenged them in an appropriate way. This may be
due to the fact that scientific communities are dispersed in institutions and societies that
have limited the access of many social groups into scientific education and profession in
many ways. Contextualism suggests that opening a community to wider participation
as well as to outside criticism increases the likelihood that some default assumptions are
challenged in appropriate ways. The more diversity there is in a scientific community,
the more likely it is that its default assumptions are challenged, and consequently either
defended, modified, or abandoned. So, I suggest that a standpoint is a commitment to
diversity in a scientific community.
To summarize, a socially grounded perspective is not simply a view from a social
position. It is a matter of doing research with certain moral and social values. Also a
standpoint involves moral and social values, but moral and social values have a different
function in a standpoint from the one they have in a socially grounded perspective.
A standpoint is a matter of building scientific communities which are committed to
diversity and responsive to criticism coming from other communities. So, whereas a
socially grounded perspective is something that an individual can realize in her inquiry,
a standpoint is a community achievement.2

acknowledgements
For useful comments I thank Alison Wylie, Alvin Goldman and the participants of the
2006 Episteme conference at the University of Toronto. I am also grateful to Brad Wray
for his comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

references
Anderson, E. (1995). “Knowledge, human interest, and objectivity in feminist epistemology”.
Philosophical Topics 23(2): 27–58.
—— (2004). “Uses of value judgments in science: A general argument, with lessons from a case
study of feminist research on divorce”. Hypatia 19(1): 1–24.
Antony, L. (1993). “Quine as feminist: The radical import of naturalized epistemology”. In L.
Antony and C. Witt (eds.), A mind of one’s own: Feminist essays on reason and objectivity, pp.
185–225. Boulder: Westview Press.
Cole, J. R. (1987). Fair Science: Women in the Scientific Community. New York: Columbia
University Press (first published in 1979 by the Free Press).
Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Hekman, S. (2000). “Truth and method: Feminist standpoint theory revisited”. In C. Allen
and J. A. Howard (eds.), Provoking feminisms, pp. 9–34. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
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 Kristina Rolin
Katila, S. and S. Meriläinen (1999). “A serious researcher or just another nice girl? Doing gender
in a male dominated scientific community”. Gender, Work, Organization 6(3): 163–73.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
—— (1999). “Feminist epistemology”. In J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to
Epistemology, pp. 327–53. Oxford: Blackwell.
Pinnick, C. (1994). “Feminist epistemology: Implications for philosophy of science”. Philosophy
of Science 61: 646–57.
—— (2005). “The failed feminist challenge to ‘fundamental epistemology’.” Science & Education
14: 103–16.
Pohlhaus, G. (2002). “Knowing communities: An investigation of Harding’s standpoint
epistemology.” Social Epistemology 163: 283–93.
Williams, M. (2001). Problems of knowledge: A critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press.
Wylie, A. (2003). “Why standpoint matters”. In R. Figueroa and S. Harding (eds.), Science and
other cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, pp. 26–48. New York and
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notes
1
It seems to me that Pinnick (2005) conflates the thesis of epistemic privilege with another
thesis, the thesis of “automatic epistemic privilege” (see Wylie 2003, 28; italics mine). The
thesis of automatic epistemic privilege is the assumption that women know some things better
simply in virtue of their social position (Wylie 2003, 28). This thesis suggests that we do not
have to pay attention to the content of any particular socially grounded perspective in order
to decide whether socially grounded perspectives adopted by women are better than other
relevant perspectives. As Wylie points out, it is not clear that anyone who has advocated a
feminist standpoint epistemology has endorsed the thesis of automatic epistemic privilege
(2003, 28).
2
My contextualist understanding of “standpoint” is consistent with some claims Harding makes
about standpoints. Harding emphasizes that a standpoint is not the same as the social position
occupied by an inquirer or a participant in her study (1991, 123). She stresses that taking a
standpoint is a matter of moral and political commitment (1991, 126-127). And she suggests
that a standpoint is a collective achievement (1991, 127).

Kristina Rolin is Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics.

Her main areas of research are philosophy of science and epistemology, with emphasis on
social epistemology and feminist epistemology. She has published articles in Philosophy of
Science, Social Epistemology, Perspectives on Science, and Hypatia.

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