Notes IP
Notes IP
Expression
Baker v Selden
Doctrine:
Facts:
Charles Selden took the steps for obtraining copyright of a book which
exhibited and explained a system of bookkeeping. In later years he took the
copyright of several other cases which expanded on the system.
Selden sued author Charles Baker copyright infringement alleging that Baker
“makes and uses account books arranged on substantially the same system”
(Finish later)
Joaquin v. Drilon
Doctrine:
Facts:
Bikram Yoga
Doctrine:
“any idea,procedure, process, system, method of
operation,concept,principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
isdescribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” –
uncopyrightable
Facts:
Republic v. Tupaz
Doctrine:
The copyright of a derivative work solely belongs to the person who fixes an
idea into a tangible medium of expression. The law on copyright only
protects the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. Thus, one who merely
contributes concepts or ideas is not deemed an author.
Facts:
PNP collaborated with Tupaz IV to create the new designs of the PNP cap
device and badge. The new design was approved for production. In the public
bidding for the procurement of the new PNP cap devices and badges, El Oro,
Tupaz’s company, submitted the second highest bid price but was still
awarded the contract after they presented certificates of copyright
registration over the PNP cap device and badge issued in favor of Tupaz. No
other manufacturer attempted to produce the PNP cap device and badge
bearing the new designs for fear of copyright infringement. PNP then
requested the National Library, and later on the RTC, to cancel said
certificates of copyright. El Oro and Tupaz alleged that El Oro is the exclusive
and official engraver of Philippine heraldry items since 1953 and that Tupaz's
ancestor, Jose T. Tupaz, Jr., developed the original designs on which said
present designs were based. Hence, El Oro owned the copyright over the
new designs and was allegedly the only qualified bidde
Doctrine:
Intended or actual use in industry of an article eligible for copyright does not
bar or invalidate its registration.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
(a) The successive Copyright Acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and
the practice of the Copyright Office show that "works of art" and
"reproductions of works of art" were intended by Congress to include the
authority to copyright such statuettes. Pp. 347 U. S. 208-214.
(b) That the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, may be patentable does
not bar their copyright as works of art. Pp. 347 U. S. 215-217.
(c) The intended or actual use in industry of an article eligible for copyright
does not bar or invalidate its registration. P. 347 U. S. 218.
Brandir
Doctrine
Facts
Olano v. Eng Co
Doctrine:
The only instance when a useful article may be the subject of copyright
protection is when it incorporates a design element that is physically or
conceptually separable from the underlying product. This means that the
utilitarian article can function without the design element. In such an
instance, the design element is eligible for copyright protection.
Facts:
Issue:
Is the hatch door copyrightable
Ruling:
The only instance when a useful article may be the subject of copyright
protection is when it incorporates a design element that is physically or
conceptually separable from the underlying product. This means that the
utilitarian article can function without the design element. In such an
instance, the design element is eligible for copyright protection
EC's hatch doors bore no design elements that are physically and
conceptually separable, independent and distinguishable from the hatch
door itself. The allegedly distinct set of hinges and distinct jamb, were
related and necessary hence, not physically or conceptually separable from
the hatch door's utilitarian function as an apparatus for emergency egress.
Without them, the hatch door will not function.
Star Athletica:
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that a feature incorporated into the design
of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature can be
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the
useful article and would qualify as a protectable work if imagined
independently.
Facts:
Varsity Brands designed and sold cheerleading uniforms and held copyrights
for two-dimensional designs on these uniforms. Varsity sued Star Athletica
for copyright infringement, claiming that Star Athletica copied their designs.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Star Athletica, ruling that
the designs were not copyrightable because they could not be separated
from the functional aspects of the uniforms. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the designs were separable and
therefore eligible for copyright protection because they could exist
independently as art. The case was then brought before the U.S. Supreme
Court to resolve the issue of separability in copyright law and determine
whether Varsity's designs were eligible for copyright protection.
Issue
The main issue was whether the designs on Varsity Brands' cheerleading
uniforms could be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms, thus making them
eligible for copyright protection
Facts
The original Rodin sculpture had been in the public domain prior to
Alva Studios obtaining a copyright for its reproduction.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants copied its work and marketed
it through retail operations.
The court found that the plaintiff had established a valid copyright
based on the originality and skill involved in its reproduction process.
Issue
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the plaintiff was entitled to the injunctive relief it sought.
Rule
Reasoning
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
reasoned that the plaintiff successfully demonstrated originality in its
reproduction of Rodin's "Hand of God," which involved significant skill
in reducing the size without losing the original's detail.
The court noted that the defendants had engaged in actual copying of
the plaintiff’s work, which did not constitute an original interpretation.
The court emphasized that the plaintiff had a valid copyright due to the
artistic and skilled process involved in creating its work.
The evidence presented indicated that the defendants' product was a
servile copy of the plaintiff's work, and it lacked the necessary original
treatment to avoid infringement.
Evidence of Infringement
The court assessed the evidence presented regarding the alleged copyright
infringement by the defendants. It noted that the test for infringement is not
merely the presence of similarity between two works but whether the
defendant's work constituted a copy of the plaintiff's copyrighted work. The
court determined that the defendants had engaged in actual copying of the
plaintiff's reproduction, which disqualified their claims of originality. The court
pointed to credible evidence, including expert testimony and comparison of
the works, which indicated that the defendants' product was a servile copy of
the plaintiff's work. The defendants had reportedly sanded down and altered
the plaintiff's reproduction, attempting to create a new version by modifying
its features. The court concluded that these actions constituted infringement
since the defendants did not create an original treatment of the subject but
rather derived their product from the plaintiff's work. Thus, the evidence
strongly supported the plaintiff's claims of copyright infringement.
The court acknowledged that both the original Rodin sculpture and the
version at the Metropolitan Museum of Art were in the public domain.
However, it clarified that the existence of the public domain status of the
original did not grant the defendants the right to infringe upon the plaintiff's
copyright. The court emphasized that copyright law protects the particular
expression of an idea, even if the underlying idea or work is not protected
due to public domain status. Therefore, the defendants could not escape
liability by claiming their work was based on a public domain source if it was
directly copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted reproduction. The court
maintained that the plaintiff's exclusive rights derived from its authorized
reproduction were distinct from the public domain status of the original work.
This principle reinforced the notion that the plaintiff's skill and labor in
creating its reproduction warranted protection against unauthorized copying,
irrespective of the original's public domain status.
The court also evaluated the defendants' marketing practices and their
potential to mislead consumers. It noted that the defendants had advertised
their product as being derived from the work on display at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, which suggested an attempt to misrepresent the source of
their sculpture. This misrepresentation was significant, as it indicated that
the defendants intended to capitalize on the reputation of the plaintiff's
authorized reproductions. The court observed that the plaintiff's work bore a
label indicating its authenticity and the origin of its production, which was
absent in the defendants' product. The lack of proper attribution and the use
of misleading advertising were critical factors in the court's decision, as they
suggested an intent to confuse consumers regarding the provenance of the
sculptures. This deceptive practice contributed to the court's conclusion that
the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief to prevent further infringement
and consumer deception.
Republic v. Tupaz
Doctrine:
The copyright of a derivative work solely belongs to the person who fixes an
idea into a tangible medium of expression. The law on copyright only
protects the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. Thus, one who merely
contributes concepts or ideas is not deemed an author.
Facts:
Assignment
Bayanihan v. BMG
Doctrine:
MY
Doctrine:
Joint work
Rappler vs Bautista
Doctrine:
Neighboring Righs
FILSCA v TAN
D:
F:
FILSCA is a NP association of composers. They own certain songs relevant
here are “Dahil Sayo” “Sapagkat Ikaw ay Akin” etc
Tan is the operator of ASF Restaurant. ASF hires singers to play musical
compisitions without license/permission
FILSCA demanded payment of royalties
Issue:
"The playing of music in dine and dance establishment which was paid for
by the public in purchases of food and drink constituted "performance for
profit" within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been explained that while it is
possible in such establishments for the patrons to purchase their food and
drinks and at the same time dance to the music of the orchestra, the music
is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose of inducing the public
to patronize the establishment and pay for the entertainment in the
purchase of food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business
for profit, and it is public; and the music is performed for profit.
Infringement
Harpr
The main issue was whether The Nation's use of verbatim excerpts
from President Ford's unpublished manuscript constituted a "fair
use" under the Copyright Ac
The U.S. Supreme Court held that The Nation's use of verbatim excerpts from
President Ford's unpublished manuscript did not constitute a "fair use" under
§ 107 of the Copyright Act, thereby reversing the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circui
First, the purpose and character of the use were commercial and intended to
supplant the copyright holder's right of first publication. The unpublished
nature of the manuscript was significant, as the author retained the right to
control its first public appearance. Additionally, the portions used were
qualitatively significant, involving expressive elements that were key to the
work. Lastly, the effect of The Nation's use on the market for the copyrighted
work was substantial, as it led to the cancellation of Time's article and could
harm the potential market for first serialization rights.
Campbell vs Acuff
he District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that
their song was a parody and thus made fair use of the original song
The main issue was whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody of
"Oh, Pretty Woman" constituted fair use under the Copyright Act of
1976.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 2 Live Crew's commercial parody may be
considered fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and
that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis, particularly by giving too much
weight to the commercial nature of the parody.
. The Court emphasized that a parody can claim fair use if it adds new
expression or meaning to the original work and does not merely substitute
for i