■> DDB-1120-12-79

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SOVIET TANK REGIMENT TACTICS

'"»«iwurya,^

<DTIC USERS ONLY"

MAY 1979
 SOVIET TANK REGIMENT TACTICS

DDB-1120-12-79

Information Cutoff Date: 1 August 1978

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document

prepared by the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division,
Directorate for Intelligence Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Author: Lt Col A.E. Hemesley Q.L.R.

Ground Forces Branch,
Tactics and Organization Section
 PREFACE

This study is intended as an unclassified reference document for use

by officers undergoing command, staff, and advanced tactical training.
Its secondary purpose is to serve as a guide to Soviet medium tank
tactics for intelligence staff officers in the field, and for those
engaged in war games.

The study examines the combat organizations, tactical concepts,

deployment drills and logistical support systems of a Soviet medium tank
regiment in the European theater of operations. Some background
information on command and control, training, and communications systems
of the medium tank regiment is included. Major equipment in use is
illustrated throughout the text. The tactical diagrams depicted in this
study are intended to illustrate concepts and are not to scale. Actual
frontages and depths of units and formations on the ground depend on the
weather, terrain, and specific tactical situation.

Acknowledgement is given for the assistance provided by Major

Timothy L. Felker and Major D. J. Beatty.

The tactics of tank and motorized rifle units below regimental level
are examined in the following unclassified documents:

Soviet Tank Company Tactics, DDI-1120-129-76, May 1976

Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics, DDI-1120-10-77, August 1977

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company, DDI-1100-77-76, October 1976

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion, DDB-1100-197-78, September

1978

Readers interested in tactics for fighting in urban areas can refer to

Soviet Military Operations in Built-up Areas, DDI-1100-155-77, July
1977.

Addressees are requested to forward information which will

supplement or correct this report. Questions and comments should be
referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-1B4),
Washington, D.C. 20301.

in
(Reverse Blank)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

X
SUMMARY *
CHAPTER 1 - ROLE AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES |
Section A - Role of Soviet Armor
Section B - Staff Responsibilities

CHAPTER 2 - ORGANIZATION ' ]4

Section A - Outline Organization :"..
Section B - Maneuver Elements —
Section C - Combat Support
Section D - Service Support
23
CHAPTER 3 - COMMAND AND CONTROL
29
CHAPTER 4 - TRAINING
33
CHAPTER 5 - TACTICAL MOVEMENT
39
CHAPTER 6 - RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ;

CHAPTER 7 - THE OFFENSIVE ^3

Section A - Concepts
Section B - Offensive Operations
Section C - Meeting Engagement
56
Section D - Attack on a Hastily Prepared Defensive Position CO
J
Section E - Breakthrough Operations °
Section F - Pursuit y-
Section G - Water Obstacle Crossing ^
Section H - Crossing Minefields

CHAPTER 8 - DEFENSE /WITHDRAWAL

Section A - Concepts
Section B - Covering Force Area
Section C - Main Battle Area ^4
Section D - The Tactical Withdrawal
Section E - Counterattack
81
CHAPTER 9 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF TANK REGIMENT OPERATIONS
85
CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSIONS
 APPENDIX

Page

Soviet Conventional Symbols 89

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure
1. Regimental Headquarters Staff — 2
2. General Headquarters Organization 9
3. Regimental Organization Chart 10
4. Tank Battalions 13
5. Motorized Rifle Company 14
6. Antiaircaft Missile and Artillery Battery 15
16
7. Reconnaissance Company
Engineer Company
9. Signal Company
10. Chemical Defense Company ~~~I~~_ 20
21
11. Maintenance Company „„
12. Medical Company
13. Motor Transport Company 22
14. Representative Command Radio Net Diagram 26
15. Tank Regiment Deployment, Column to Assault Line 37
40
16. Divisional Reconnaissance Resources Zones
17. Shallow Envelopment 45
46
18. Deep Envelopment
51
19. Tank Regiment Frontal Attack
20. The Meeting Engagement—Deployment 52
21. The Meeting Engagement 54
22. Typical Divisional Breakthrough Sectors (Conventional) — ^8
23. Typical Divisional Breakthrough Sectors (Conventional) — 59
24. Deployment of a Tank Regiment for Attack in Nuclear War - 61
25. The Pursuit Concept 63
26. River-Crossing Schematic Showing Different Types of
Crossing Sites 67
27. Tank Regiment Frontages and Depths in Defense 73
28. Tank Battalion Deployment in Defense 75

Table

1. Tasks of Officers in the Staff Group 5

2. Task Organization in a Meeting Engagement 53
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Water-Crossing Methods 66

vi
 Page

Photography
Traditional massed tank attack x
BMPs of the MR Company }®
12
SA-9 GASKIN 12
Reconnaissance BMP-note the wider turrent than on the
infantry model (left) 17
1 Q
xo
PMR-3 Mechanical Minelayer
19
MTU-20 T54-55 tank-launched class 60 bridge
TMM truck-launched class 50 bridge 1"
BRDM-2RKh NBC reconnaissance vehicle £1
BTR 60 regimental command vehicle 24
28
T-62—still the most common tank in WP forces
30
T-64—heavier gun; an improvement on the T62
T-72—the latest Soviet tank with improved fire control,
armor, and the T-64 main gun 31
Air defense on the march 36
BMP and MC messengers of reconnaissance company 38
122-mm SP provides close support artillery, which is
49
able to keep up with tanks
152-mm SP from divisional artillery povides heavier
support 49
T-62 snorkels 65
Mine plows are issued to one in three tanks 69
Mine plows/roller combination ' 70
SAGGER ATGW on each MR Company BMP 76
Theater movement is provided by MAZ-537 and rail 79
Refueling 81
84
Reemphasis of combined-arms operations 88

vii
(Reverse Blank)
 SUMMARY

A Soviet tank regiment is organized into a headquarters, maneuver

elements, combat support units, and service support units. The
headquarters is manned by a staff divided into four functional groups.
The work of these groups is coordinated by a chief of staff who acts as
second-in-command of the regiment when necessary. The regimental
commander controls operations through his staff by means of radio and
carefully rehearsed combat formations and drills. The commander
personally supervises training and combat operations.

In combat the tank regiment is reinforced by divisional units,

especially artillery units, to undertake a wide variety of missions.
The tank regiment is organized and trained primarily for offensive
operations. In meeting engagements, the tank regiment is usually
tasked to locate and destroy advancing enemy columns. For offensive
operations, the tank regiment trains to destroy the continuity of the
enemy defense by penetrating and widening a gap created by either
nuclear fire, or by conventional artillery and combined arms assault.
In pursuit, the Soviets plan to take advantage of the tank regiment's
mobility to maintain contact with and overrun the withdrawing enemy.
In defense, the regiment is deployed to slow the enemy's approach
through the covering force area, and during combat in the main battle
area it is employed in an antitank role and as a counterattack force.
In retreat, the Soviets plan to employ the tank regiment in the
covering force. Although night operations are stressed in the Soviet
Army, night training as practiced is not commensurate with their
doctrine.

A tank regiment has limited organic logistic support and,

therefore, normally operates as part of the division. Only a small
reserve of ammunition, POL, and combat supplies is carried in the
vehicles which accompany maneuver elements. The remainder is under
divisional control. Vehicle recovery and repair and medical services
are initiated by regimental units, but major repair work and surgical
treatment facilities are at division.

The organization of the tank regiment is sound, except that it has

no organic self-propelled artillery and only one company of infantry.
Tank regiment commanders are well trained, and most have the necessary
skill and initiative to translate sound concepts into effective
tactical maneuvers.

ix
f%%- ' ' ■'- ■$
 CHAPTER 1

ROLE AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

Section A - Role of Soviet Armor

1. GENERAL

Soviet military leaders have long recognized the mobility, firepower,

and shock action potential of tank forces. In the late 1920s and early
1930s, they tested foreign-armored vehicles and experimented with armored
units at the joint USSR-German tank school in Kazan. A Military Academy
of Mechanization and Motorization was established near Moscow in 1932, and
subsequently, a mechanized army was established under the direction of
Marshal Tukhachevski. By 1935 the Soviet Union possessed the largest
tank force in the world. Marshal Tukhachevski patterned Soviet concepts
after those advanced by the British military thinkers Major General
J.F.C. Fuller and Sir Basil Liddel-Hart. Soviet tank units were based on
the organization of the British experimental brigade. Unfortunately from
a Soviet standpoint, following Tukhachevski's liquidation, Stalin accepted
poor advice concerning tank unit effectiveness in the Spanish Civil War
and dispersed this enormous force among infantry units. There was no
time to reconstitute it in the opening days of the German invasion.
Nonetheless, the research and development of tanks had progressed to the
stage where the Soviet T-34/85 emerged as one of the finest medium tanks
of the Second World War. The KV series heavy tanks also were superior to
comparable foreign tanks during the early phases of the war.

2. POST WORLD WAR II

In 1954 the World War II type divisions were reorganized to form the
basis of the present motorized rifle and tank divisions. Both are in
effect tank-heavy. The motorized rifle division, with its additional
infantry, is better balanced for heavy fighting and setpiece attacks
in the close country of West Europe. The tank division is more suited to
fast-moving warfare against a fragmented enemy force. Since 1964, the
doctrine,, organization, and training of Soviet divisions and regiments
have increasingly stressed combined arms operations. A number of
articles appeared in the Western press following the October 1973 Middle
East War which forecast the demise of the tank as a viable weapon system.
The mass use of infantry-manned antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) was seen
by some Western analysts as being the complete answer to the tank. This
view has been rejected by the Soviets, who see the initial Arab success on
the Suez front as the result of Israeli overconfidence and lack of infantry
and artillery support rather than a revolution in antitank tactics.
Nevertheless, since the war, the Soviets have integrated a motorized
rifle company into tank regiments of tank divisions as a step
toward a better balanced combined arms unit. As yet, tank regiments of
motorized rifle divisions have no motorized rifle company.

3. CURRENT CONCEPTS AND ROLE

Soviet concepts emphasize maneuver and the rapid concentration of

force in the sectors of main influence that offer the best prospects for
advance. Mechanized forces—particularly tanks—provide this capability
in both conventional and nuclear battle conditions. Soviet doctrine
calls for an average daily rate of advance of 60 to 80 kilometers in
nuclear operations and 30 to 50 kilometers per day in conventional
conditions. The Soviet tank arm is specifically designed to achieve
goals set by this doctrine. It is at tank regiment level that the
tactics are applied to implement these concepts. Thus, the role of
Soviet armor is to exploit nuclear, chemical, and conventional strikes
to overcome enemy defenses with high rates of advance and crush the
enemy's will to resist by rapid maneuver deep in his rear areas.

COMMANDER

DEPUTY
COMMANDER

DEPUTY DEPUTY SPECIAL

STAFF DEPUTY CHIEFS OF
COMMANDER COMMANDER SECTION
GROUP COMMANDER ARMS AND
FOR FOR REAR FOR POLITICAL
TECHNICAL SERVICES
SERVICES AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS

FIGURE 1. REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS STAFF

 Section B - Staff Responsibilities

1. GENERAL

The regimental headquarters consists of a commander (usually a

colonel or lieutenant colonel, although majors are in command of some
regiments) and a staff consisting of a chief of staff, his staff group,
and four other functional groups, each headed by a deputy commander or
the chief of the organic or attached support arm or service. Figure 1
shows this organization in outline. Note that the Special Section is a
political security detachment and is not of tactical significance.

The deputy commander, offset in the diagram, has garrison and

training responsibilities. He does not accompany the regiment on
mobilization, but remains in the garrison as commander of a newly
forming unit. His position is not further discussed in this report.
The commander also has the advice of the Chiefs of Arms and Services.
These officers usually are majors and captains and have dual functions.
Their primary task is to command the combat and service support
subunits.

2. THE COMMAND GROUP

a. General

The commander, the chief of staff, and the deputy commanders

for technical affairs, rear services, and political affairs form the
command group. Their responsibilities are set out below. The command
group comprises the senior staff officers in the regiment. The
commander draws a major part of his decisionmaking input from them.

b. The Commander

The commander usually is a colonel or a lieutenant colonel. He

is most likely to be in his middle thirties or early forties and to
have had advanced tactical training at one of the higher military
academies. He is expected to maintain strict control over subordinate
commanders; to inspect frequently the various training, administrative,
and equipment maintenance aspects of his command in garrison; and to
set a high personal example. The regimental commander has considerable
prerogatives in the way in which he organizes operations and executes
his tactical mission. In combat, he has his own tank.
 c. Chief of Staff

The chief of staff is usually a lieutenant colonel, a graduate

of one of the higher military academies, and in his early thirties. He
is the operational second-in-command of the regiment and is the only
officer who may issue written orders in the commander's name. The
chief of staff is responsible for mobilization readiness and troop
control. He coordinates the work of the four functional staff groups
and refines and presents to the commander the information which is
required for decisionmaking. In combat, the chief of staff is mounted
in an armored command vehicle, usually a BTR-60PB. Should the
commander become a casualty, the chief of staff assumes temporary
command of the regiment.

d. Deputy Commander for Political Affairs

The deputy commander for political affairs most often is a

major or lieutenant colonel. He has a dual reporting responsibility—
to the regimental commander and through him to the deputy for political
affairs at division headquarters. It is the political deputy
commander's responsibility to conduct political activities directed at
insuring full combat readiness, military discipline, and high morale.
He directs the work of political and Komsomol activists, is responsible
for indoctrinating the troops in the political goals and implications
of tactical operations, and supervises recreational services for the
unit. At the same time, he is a fully trained combat officer capable
of leading troops in action. During combat he rides in the armored
command vehicle, a BTR-60PB.

e. Party Secretary

The party secretary is an officer who is at least a captain and

is responsible for all the party affairs. He holds meetings attended
by his party workers who may be any rank. He reports directly to the
political deputy of the divisional commander and can bypass the
regimental commander. His role is to insure the political reliability
of the regiment.

f. Deputy Commander for Technical Affairs

The deputy commander for technical affairs is normally a major

or lieutenant colonel and a graduate engineer. He is responsible to
the commander for the serviceability and maintenance of the armored and
automotive equipment in the regiment. He is the direct superior of the
technical officers who are found in each tactical subunit down to
Company level. He supervises the company commander of the maintenance
company, who, during combat, organizes the recovery, repair, or
evacuation of disabled armored vehicles. In addition to his other
duties, the technical deputy is responsible for the military and
specialist training of all technical troops in the regiment.

g. Deputy Commander for Rear Services

The deputy commander for rear services, normally a major or

lieutenant colonel, is responsible for the resupply of regimental units
both in garrison and in the field with fuel, food, clothing, and
equipment. During combat operations he commands the rear area control
point.

3. FUNCTIONAL STAFF GROUPS

The regimental staff is organized into four functional groups.

These are supplemented by an ad hoc group of advisers called the chiefs
of arms and services. The following paragraphs set out the composition
and tasks of the functional groups during their tactical employment.

4. STAFF GROUP

The staff group is directly subordinate to the chief of staff and

comprises the assistant chiefs of staff for operations, intelligence,
communications, and personnel. Table 1 shows the rank and
responsibilities of each of these officers. The staff group also
includes a finance officer, a cryptographic officer, a headquarters
commandant who controls the general headquarters administration, and
each officer's enlisted assistants.

POSITION RANK RESPONSIBLE FOR

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations Major Planning operations; liaison and training; serving as the Deputy
Chief of Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Captain Planning reconnaissance missions; collecting, evaluating, and
or Major disseminating tactical intelligence; Commanding the regimental
reconnaissance company.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications Captain Establishment and maintenance of communications; Supervision
of serving of signal equipment; Management of the regimental
post office; Command of the regimental signal company.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel Major Maintaining statistical records on personnel, equipment and
prisoners of war; Processing replacement leave, and awards and
decorations.

TABLE 1. TASKS OF OFFICERS IN THE STAFF GROUP

5. STAFF GROUP TASKS

The staff group is responsible to the commander, through the chief

of staff, for providing information on which command decisions are made
and for formulating orders based on those decisions. Specific staff
tasks are:

a. To plan, organize, and assign reconnaissance missions and to

collect, evaluate, and disseminate tactical intelligence.

b. To collect terrain and meteorological information.

c. To post friendly force location data and control troop

movement.
d. To issue warning and operations orders.

e. To formulate a communications plan and issue communications

instructions.

f. To ready troops for a nuclear exchange.

g. To establish control points and organize traffic control,

h. To verify the execution of combat orders and instructions.

6. CHIEFS OF ARMS AND SERVICES

The chiefs of organic and attached arms and services form an ad hoc
group to advise the commander on matters within their expertise. These
officers are the commanders of the combat and service units which are
assigned to the regiment for a particular operation. This group
includes representation from the following types of units:

Antiaircraft Defense

Artillery

Reconnaissance

Chemical Defense

Engineers

Signal

Maintenance Service

Supply Services

Medical Services

Finance Service

Note that officers in this group head, or are members of, other staff
groups. 6
I. TECHNICAL AFFAIRS GROUP

The deputy commander for technical affairs, usually a lieutenant

colonel and a graduate engineer, is responsible for maintenance of the
regiment's equipment and for the recovery, repair, or evacuation of
damaged equipment from the battlefield. He directs the commander of
the maintenance company.

8. REAR SERVICE GROUP

The deputy commander for rear services is responsible for

supervising and coordinating all regimental logistic activity. He
commands the regiment's rear area, and exercises staff supervision over
a number of major and minor administrative units including the
following:

a. Commander of the Transport Company

This officer is usually a major, serves as the commander's

adviser on transport affairs, commands the motor transport company, and
is responsible for provision, maintenance, and combat organization of
motor transport.

b. Chief of Fuel and Lubricants Supply

This officer is responsible for the storage and resupply of all

POL stock. He organizes depots for POL storage, establishes fire
prevention measures for each depot, checks POL stocks, and gives
technical advice as required.

c. Armaments Officer

This artillery major or captain is located at the rear control

post. He is responsible for the serviceability of all weapons. He
supervises the work of the weapon technicians in the ordnance
maintenance platoon.

d. Artillery Ammunition Officer

This artillery captain is responsible for the requisition and

issue of all types of ammunition. He supervises the ammunition supply
point which is staffed by members of the ammunition supply platoon. He
maintains liaison with artillery supply officers of attached artillery.

e. Chief of Food Supply

Usually a praporshchik (a rank roughly equivalent to warrant

officer), the chief of food supply is responsible for the procurement,
receipt, storage, and distribution of food. He directs the work of
field kitchens and supervises the maintenance of cooking equipment.
7
 f. Chief of Clothing and Equipment Supply

This noncommissioned officer is responsible for the storage, issue,

and repair of clothing and individual equipment.

9. POLITICAL SECTION
The deputy commander for political affairs is a major or lieutenant
colonel and is in the command group. His staff consists of one officer,
sometimes called a "propagandist," an officer as Komsomol secretary, a
regimental club chief (usually a praporshchik), and a clerk. The group
controls political and Komsomol activities in the regiment. Although
organizationally subordinate to the regimental commander, the political
section also receives direction from the political deputy commander at
division headquarters. The tasks of the political group are to cultivate
party and patriotic loyalty, to foster morale, and to educate
regimental personnel of all ranks in political theory. Figure 2 shows
the key personnel in regimental headquarters and their associated staff
groups.
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 TANK
REGIMENT

MOTORIZED
REGIMENTAL TANK RIFLE
HEADQUARTERS BATTALION COMPANY

COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS

T T
ANTI-AIRCRAFT RECONNAISSANCE COMBAT MAINTENANCE CHEMICAL
SIGNAL
MISSILE AND COMPANY ENGINEER COMPANY DEFENSE
COMPANY
ARTILLERY COMPANY COMPANY
BATTERY

REAR SERVICES

MOTOR SUPPLY
MEDICAL
TRANSPORT AND
COMPANY
COMPANY SERVICE
PLATOON

FIGURE 3. REGIMENT ORGANIZATION CHART

v.-v;»

BMPs of the MR Company.

10
 CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATION

Section A - Outline Organization

1. OUTLINE ORGANIZATION

The tank regiment is composed of maneuver elements, combat support

units, and service support units. Major components are shown in figure
3.

2. SUPPORT

The Soviets frequently augment combat and service support units with
attachments from division and occasionally from army and even front
assets. The introduction of self-propelled artillery has enabled the
Soviets to provide indirect fire support units with mobility comparable
to tanks. Tank regiments often require additional infantry support over
and above that provided by the one organic motorized rifle company.
Their amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle (BMP) is designed to
operate with tanks. The BMP, which carries an infantry squad, can
provide considerable support in either offensive or defensive operations
with its 73-mm smoothbore gun, coaxial machinegun, and SAGGER antitank
guided missile.

3. ENDURANCE

Soviet tanks have a good capability for long-range operations.

Their cruising range with auxiliary fuel tanks is in excess of 500
kilometers. They carry some 40 rounds of ammunition for their main gun.
In the event of intense rates of fire or sustained operations, however,
the regimental service support units require considerable backup from
higher echelon.

4. INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS

The tank regiment has a limited capability for short-term

independent operations, but it normally fights as part of a division,
and its organization reflects this fact.

11
 ZSU-23-4.

UNCLASSIFIED

SA-9GASKIN.

12
 Section B - Maneuver Elements

GENERAL

The maneuver elements of the tank regiment consist of three tank

battalions and a motorized rifle company. There is no organic field
artillery in a tank regiment. Artillery may be attached to the tank
regiment from the division. Additional artillery support is available
from army and front. In recent years there has been an increase in the
amount of self-propelled (SP) artillery in the Soviet ground forces.
Armored elements are expected more frequently to have attached self-
propelled artillery, especially when the regiment is in the lead echelon
of the division.

2. TANK BATTALION

There are three tank battalions in each tank regiment, Their

organization is shown in figure 4.

The battalion has 31 medium tanks, 10 in each company and 1 for the
battalion commander. In each battalion, there is a BRDM-series armored
scoutcar for use as a battalion command vehicle, a BTR command vehicle,
and an armored recovery vehicle. The supply and maintenance platoon and
medical section are mounted in soft-skinned vehicles. Each tank has a
VHF radio, and battalion and company command vehicles have HF and VHF
sets. Note that the tank battalions in motorized rifle regiments have
40 tanks, with each company having 13 tanks.

TANK
BATTALION

TANK LOGISTIC REPAIR, MEDICAL

BATTALION
COMPANY SUPPORT SHOP SECTION
HEADQUARTERS
PLATOON

FIGURE 4. TANK BATTALIONS

13
3. MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY

A motorized rifle company has recently been added to many tank

regiments. This addition gave a limited capability to combat the threat
of ground-fired antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and reduces the
possibility of ambush when passing through difficult terrain. The
motorized rifle company is mounted in 10 BMPs. Each BMP mounts a SAGGER
ATGM launcher, a 73-mm antitank gun, and a 7.62-mm machinegun. The
potential of this infantry element is reduced by its size and frequent
employment role. A single company is insufficient for most likely
tasks, so its inclusion may be the precursor of a motorized rifle
battalion becoming organic to tank regiments, at least in the tank
divisions. The organization of a motorized rifle company is outlined
below in figure 5.

MOTORIZED
RIFLE
COMPANY

COMPANY MOTORIZED
HEADQUARTERS RIFLE
PLATOON

FIGURE 5. MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY

The tactics, training, and equipment of the motorized rifle company

are described in detail in The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company, DDI-1100-
77-76, October 1976.

14
 Section C - Combat Support

1. GENERAL

Combat support units of the regiment are tasked to provide "combat"

support to maneuver subunits as distinct from "logistic" support. See
figure 3 for the organization chart. Combat support unit commanders
give advice on operational matters to the regimental commanders. Their
work is coordinated through the chief of staff.

2. ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE AND ARTILLERY BATTERY

The tank regiment's antiaircraft defense consists of a platoon of

four 23-mm quad self-propelled antiaircraft machinegun ZSU-23-4s
(AAMGs) with onboard radar and a platoon of four SA-9 low-altitude
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The battery is controlled from an air
defense command post mounted in one of the armored command vehicles.
The organization of the battery is shown in figure 6.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT
MISSILE AND
ARTILLERY BATTERY

BATTERY ZSU-23-4 SA-9 MAINTENANCE TRANSPORT

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON PLATOON SECTION SECTION
TWO ACVS FOUR AAGMS FOUR SAMS

FIGURE 6. ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE AND ARTILLERY BATTERY

The ZSU-23-4 has an effective range of 2,500 to 3,000 meters and

can engage helicopters to a maximum range of 3,500 meters. Its onboard
radar can pick up targets and its AAMGs engage them while the vehicle
is moving at speeds up to 25 km/h. The ZSU-23-4s normally operate in
pairs. In offensive operations, when the regiment shifts into combat
formation, the AAMGs follow the tanks and APCs at a distance of some
400 meters, with 200 meters between vehicles. In defense they normally
are assigned the mission of area protection covering likely attack
patterns with control centered on regimental headquarters. Note the
ZSU-23-4 is not amphibious and cannot snorkel; it must be ferried
across water obstacles it cannot ford. The SA-9 low-altitude SAM (NATO
codename GASKIN) is mounted on a BRDM-2A. The weapon has an effective
range of 7 kilometers. In both offensive and defensive operations, the
system is used primarily to protect the regimental headquarters.
During an attack the system is located some 1 to 3 kilometers from the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to allow it to cover the
assaulting tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) from attack by
helicopter gunships. Air defense warnings are broadcast on the R311
radio receivers which are held by battalion-size combat arms units.

15
3. RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

The primary task of the reconnaissance company is to provide up-to-

date, accurate tactical intelligence on the regimental area of
operations. Reconnaissance missions are organized by the staff to
collect information which is vital to executing the regiment's mission.
These operations are designed to supplement the information gathered by
divisional ground reconnaissance units and the various technical
information-gathering units at division level and above. The
organization of a reconnaissance company is shown in figure 7.

RECONNAISSANCE
COMPANY (ONE BRDM)

COMPANY BMP SCOUT

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON
(ONE BRDM-2) (4 BMP)

SCOUT CAR SCOUT SECTION RADAR

PLATOON (THREE RECONNAISSANCE
(THREE BRDM-2) MOTORCYCLES) SECTION (ONE MAN.
PORTABLE RADAR,
PSNR-1)

FIGURE 7. RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

The reconnaissance company's amphibious PT-76 light tanks are being

replaced by the BMP. The reconnaissance company operates from 20 to 50
kilometers forward of the regiment's lead elements during offensive
operations. Reconnaissance patrols normally consist of two to three
vehicles. Information is passed back to regimental staff and maneuver
units by radio and augmented by written messages and schematics
dispatched by motorcycle messengers. During fast-moving operations, a
tank unit may be tasked to undertake reconnaissance in force. Because
of their mobility and fire power, tank units are suited for this
mission. For details see Soviet Tactical Intelligence and
Reconnaissance, DDI-1100-148-77, February 1977.

4. ENGINEER COMPANY

Engineer equipment held at regimental level provides a limited

capability for armored vehicles and trucks to cross minor water
obstacles. Additional equipment from divisional units is available to
accomplish specific missions. An engineer company is organized into a
small headquarters and three functional platoons as shown in figure 8.

16
 ENGINEER
COMPANY

COMPANY SAPPER BRIDGE TECHNICAL

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON

FIGURE 8. ENGINEER COMPANY

a. Sapper Platoon

Tank regiments have a limited amount of organic minelaying

equipment. The regiment's sapper platoon is equipped with three towed
devices which emplace mines either on the surface of the ground or in a
predug trench. Armored tracked minelayers frequently are attached to
the regiment from higher units. The Soviets also have the capability
to lay mines by helicopters, using a chute device.

b. Bridge Platoon

The bridge platoon has three tank-launched bridges (MTU) and

four truck-launched bridges (TMM). The MTU assault bridge is mounted
on a T54/55 chassis and can span a 12.3-meter gap. The MTU-20 tank-
launched bridge, now being introduced into service, will span a 20-
meter gap. The TMM bridge has a set of four 10.5-meter spans from
which a 42-meter class 60 bridge can be constructed in 20 to 40
minutes. Soviet regiments are also receiving the Czechoslovak-designed
scissors bridge (MT-55), with an electronic control system which
permits the bridge to be emplaced in 1.5 minutes. This class 50 bridge
can span a 17-meter gap. Tank- or truck-launched bridges also are used

»lÄ^MUNCLASSIFI

Reconnaissance BMP - note the wider turret than on the infantry model (left).
17
 PMR-3 mechanical minelayer.

to supplement ponton bridges or to span the gap left in a partially

destroyed permanent structure.

c. Technical Platoon

The technical platoon has sections which hold the technical

equipment of the company and a preparation section which is used to
construct entrance and exit points for bridging equipment. Frogmen are
sometimes allocated to the technical section from the divisional
engineer battalion.

18
T- <w 'v^Wm,

MTU-20 T-54/55 tank-launched class 60 bridge.

' r'

TMM truck-launched class 50 bridge.

19
5. SIGNAL COMPANY

The signal company is responsible for providing communications for

the regimental headquarters and for the maintenance and support of
uninterrupted communications during operations. Radios from the
company can be allocated to supplement those of maneuver elements when
required. The organization of the company is outlined in figure 9.

In addition to providing radio and wire communications, some signal

companies have motorcycle messengers. The company does minor repairs
to tank radios.

SIGNAL
COMPANY

COMPANY RADIO WIRE/TELEPHONE

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON PLATOON

FIGURE 9. SIGNAL COMPANY

6. CHEMICAL DEFENSE COMPANY

Chemical defense is closely coordinated by division headquarters.

The chemical defense company is responsible for detecting, analyzing,
and marking areas of chemical and radiological contamination. In this
role, the company, using BRDM-2 RKh vehicles, operates with the
reconnaissance company to monitor contaminated areas ahead of friendly
forces. In defensive operations, the company establishes chemical and
radiological monitoring posts. It also has a vehicle decontamination
mission. For this purpose, it has four decontamination vehicles. The
organization of the company is shown in figure 10.

CHEMICAL
DEFENSE
COMPANY

COMPANY CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION

HEADQUARTERS RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
PLATOON

FIGURE 10. CHEMICAL DEFENSE COMPANY

20
 BRDM-2RKh NBC reconnaissance vehicle.
7. MAINTENANCE COMPANY

Each regiment has a maintenance company of five platoons and a

support section which specialize in tank, wheeled vehicle, ordnance,
recovery, and electrical repair. The principle of forward repair is
adopted for maintenance in tank units. Soviet doctrine calls for only
the simplest repairs to be accomplished during an offensive; thus,
these platoons are expected to provide only emergency field repairs,
minor repairs, and routine maintenance during combat. Still, the
capability of these units is substantial. For example, the company is
equipped with five or six armored recovery vehicles (ARVs) and sets up
two or three "shops" to make the required repairs. These mobile
workshops are deployed as closely as possible to the battle area. The
maintenance company organization is shown in figure 11.

MAINTENANCE
COMPANY

COMPANY TANK/TRACKED MOTOR VEHICLE ORDNANCE

HEADQUARTERS REPAIR PLATOON REPAIR PLATOON REPAIR PLATOON

SPECIAL SUPPORT
RECOVERY
REPAIR SECTION
PLATOON
PLATOON"

"NOTE 1. Performs electrical repairs.

FIGURE 11. MAINTENANCE COMPANY

21
 Section D - Service Support

GENERAL

The Soviet tank regiment relies heavily on division for rear

service support. While the tank regiment's organic capability is
limited, it does have service support units for immediate needs. A
brief description and outline organization follows.

2. MEDICAL COMPANY

The medical company is responsible for the collection, evacuation,

and some of the treatment of sick or wounded personnel. Admissions and
dispositions to medical facilities are handled by a subsection. The
principal mission of this unit in combat is the classification and
evacuation of wounded personnel to field hospitals. The unit has a
small supply section. Figure 12 shows the organization.

MEDICAL
COMPANY

COMPANY ADMISSIONS TREATMEN COLLECTION SUPPLY AND

HEADQUARTERS AND SECTION AND EVALUATION SERVICE
DISPOSITION SECTION SECTION
SECTION

FIGURE 12. MEDICAL COMPANY

3. MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY
The motor transport company provides transport for the resupply of
POL and ammunition to the regiment. The company has a limited ability
to carry out its own maintenance; all except "current" (organizational)
repairs are carried out by the maintenance company. Figure 13 shows
the organization.

MOTOR
TRANSPORT
COMPANY

COMPANY AMMUNITION POL SUPPLY AND

HEADQUARTERS SUPPLY PLATOON MAINTENANCE
PLATOON SECTION

FIGURE 13. MOTOR TRANSPORT

4. SUPPLY AND SERVICE PLATOON

Clothing and field ration services are grouped under a platoon

headquarters. At present, most field kitchens are trailer- or truck-
mounted, although some have been on tracked amphibious vehicles. While
the meals are basic, Soviet field kitchens have the capability to
transport prepared hot food in sealed thermos containers. Tank crews
carry canned rations for combat operations. Several days of emergency
supplies are maintained for all personnel.
22
 CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. COMMAND CONCEPTS

The regimental commander is personally responsible for the

administrative, political training, and operational standards of his
command. In any aspect of military or political performance, the
failure of a subordinate is considered directly attributable to the
failure of command supervision. This leads to a marked lack of
initiative displayed by junior officer ranks of the Soviet Army. At the
regimental level and above, commanders are more apt to exercise
initiative. Regimental commanders are well trained in military arts and
sciences, and from available evidence, it appears they exert
considerable influence in tactical troop exercises. They personally
conduct frequent inspections of administrative and maintenance
activities and take a direct hand in the supervision of all training.

The Soviets require commanders to position themselves well forward

so as to personally observe and control the battle. In contact, the
commander influences the battle from his command observation post, which
is a command tank in offensive operations; this is facilitated by the
fact that Soviet tank units normally deploy on a front sufficiently
narrow to allow control. The regimental commander develops the fire
support plan with the advice of the attached artillery commander.
Requests for additional fire support are channeled through the
regimental commander. Flexibility, then, lies chiefly in the speed with
which the regimental commander can exploit his personal control and, as
a result, affect the flow of combat.

2. COMMAND STRUCTURE

The headquarters of the tank regiment operates in two groups known

as the command post and the rear control post. When the commander is in
his tank forward of the command post, he is said to occupy a command
observation post. When artillery units are attached to the tank
regiment, additional observation posts are established by artillery
observers and representatives from the regimental headquarters.

a. Command Post

The command post consists of up to five armored vehicles,

including the commander's tank. It is staffed by the chief of staff,
the deputy commander for political affairs, the assistant chiefs of
staff for operations, intelligence, and communications, and the

23
BTR-60PA - regimental command vehicle.

24
Commanders of the regimental engineer and chemical defense units. These
staff officers are supported by radio operators, clerks, and drivers.
The commanders of the attached artillery units, mounted in their own
vehicles, normally are located with the regimental command post. The
command post moves in tactical bounds up to 5 kilometers behind the
forward echelon. When in position, the command post is camouflaged and
dispersed, usually in a 400-meter square.

b. Rear Control Post

The rear control post consists of one or two vehicles and is

commanded by the deputy commander for rear services. He is aided by the
commanders of service support units as required. The deputy commander
for rear services is responsible for organizing administrative and
logistic support of regimental operations from the rear control post.
This involves the receipt and supply of arms, ammunition, POL, food, and
minor equipment. The rear control point also maintains staff control of
vehicle and manpower replacements; maintenance, repair, and recovery of
vehicles; medical services; and personnel services. During combat
operations, the rear control point is expected to operate some 15
kilometers behind forward echelons. Ammunition supply for attached
artillery is coordinated by an officer from the artillery unit who is
located in the rear control post for this purpose.

3. COMMUNICATIONS

The tank regiment uses four separate types of communications systems

to maintain troop control. These are radio, telephone, messenger
(motorcycle/helicopter), and audio and visual signals. Responsibility
for establishing communications with subordinate, attached, and support
units is with the regimental headquarters. Communications between
lateral units of equal size are established from right to left. If
communications are lost during operations, all units out of contact
attempt to reestablish them.

The Soviets stress the need for strict radio security. Regulations
emphasize the necessity of compliance with radio procedures and the need
for radio silence before contact with the enemy. Crossing of control
points is monitored by the higher staff. Cipher, call signs, and code-
words are employed to reduce the likelihood of giving information of
tactical value to the enemy. Communications are not normally initiated
below company command level.

The chief of communications is responsible for the production of

communications plans and instructions for specific operations. Radio-
relay stations are organized by regiment for units on independent

25
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26
operations or those located a long distance from headquarters. It is
standard procedure to provide communications from regimental
headquarters to company level to allow for the continuance of operations
if the intervening (battalion) commander becomes a casualty.

4. RADIO NETS

A wide variety of radio sets are used in a Soviet regiment, and it

is not unusual for similar units to be equipped with different types of
radios. The command net usually operates on VHF with an alternate net
maintained on HF. Maneuver units, combat support units, and attached
combat units are on the command net, though maneuver companies usually
maintain a listening watch. Service support units are controlled by the
rear control post on an administrative net. A nuclear, biological,
chemical (NBC) and air warning net is maintained at all headquarters
from front to division. The regimental headquarters and maneuver unit
headquarters have receivers operating on this net. A so-called "staff
net" operates direct links between the regimental commander, the
regimental headquarters, the reconnaissance company, and the anti- .
aircraft battery. Lateral communications are coordinated by the chief
for communications. Variations in these nets can be expected to meet
specific communications requirements. A representative command net
diagram is shown in figure 14.

5. DECISIONMAKING

After receiving a mission from the division commander, the

regimental commander makes an estimate of the situation. He is assisted
by the regimental staff. A warning order is sent to subordinate units.
Intelligence on the enemy and information on friendly units is also
disseminated at this time. After the factors have been weighed and the
courses of action examined, the regimental commander makes his decisions
on the deployment of maneuver units and allocation of fire support.
Frequently, details are marked on a map from which the staff formulates
written combat orders. If time and the tactical situation allow,
commanders prefer to give orders at a meeting of subordinate commanders.
Orientation and reconnaissance is then carried out from an observation
point if possible. If rapid deployment is necessary, orders are given
by radio and backed up by schematics which are delivered to subordinate
commanders by either motorcycle messengers or helicopter.

6. CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS

During the development of operations, the regimental commander

controls his unit by issuing his combat instructions over the radio.

27
These are fragmentary orders or directives used to change, supplement,
or elaborate initial combat orders in response to changes in the
tactical situation. Soviet doctrine and exercises emphasize the need
for maneuver units to be updated constantly on available tactical
intelligence; intelligence information flows continually in both
directions on the regimental net.

T-62 - still the most common tank in WP forces.

28
 CHAPTER 4

TRAINING

1. PREINDUCTION TRAINING

Military training for the Soviet tank soldier begins before

induction. The 1967 law governing military service in the USSR requires
all males under 18 years of age to take 140 hours of classroom
instruction in military topics. This includes familiarization training
with weapons and equipment. After induction, tank troops are given 6
months' specialist training as tank commanders, driver mechanics, or
gunners. Loaders receive only on-the-job training. While cross-
training between specialties is not the rule, some units are known to
make some attempt at it.

2. BASIC TRAINING

Tank troops train intensively in the basic skills of driving and

gunnery. Training, although repetitive, is realistic, and the use of
simulators gives maximum opportunity for "hands-on" training. Tank
commanders at company level receive adequate training to handle their
vehicles in conditions requiring the rapid changes of formation called
for in the Soviet deployment drills. The Soviet tank driver-mechanic is
well drilled in operating the tank under training conditions. The
amount of ammunition fired by gunners, however, is limited. This,
together with the skill required in range estimation in the T-62 and
earlier medium tanks, is a significant handicap which, to some extent,
has been overcome in the T-64/72 models.

3. UNIT TRAINING

After new conscripts have acquired basic skills, unit training

progresses through crew, platoon, company, and battalion levels. In
most tank battalions, fresh conscripts are allotted to insure an equal
distribution of experience throughout the unit. Training normally
consists of a series of long road marches followed by a tactical
deployment which requires a series of changes through march, movement-
to-contact, and combat formations. Gunnery training is of the "straight
downrange" type and is not usually practiced by larger than company-size
elements. Normally subcaliber ammunition is used in the main gun for
training. Full-caliber firing is restricted for each tank crew. This
training is sometimes carried out with motorized rifle units.

4. FORMATION TRAINING

The climax of the training year is normally a regimental or division

29
 TURRET TURNED (A *»8ä
TO TRAVEL POSITION '«5*

^^^4. I

*"«*<IWieW»*Sfffi

T-64 SIX SMALL, STAiPED ROAD WHEELS

12.7mm MACMNEGUN CAN BE FIRED

FROM INSIDE TURRET

EXHAUST VENTS
AT REAR

NEW SNORKEL CARRIED

ON BACK OF TURRET

3&*>V IR LIGHT TO LEFT

MAIN GUN

T-64 - heavier gun; an improvement on the T-62.

30
 NEW 12.7mm MACHINEGUN
FIRED'FROM OPEN HATCH

DIE-CAST IDLER WHEEL

IR LIGHT TO RIGHT

SIX LARGE. DIE-CAST ROAD WHEELS

VENTS ON
REAR DECK

T-62 TYPE SNORKEL ^

CARRIED ON LEFT J^
REAR OF TURRET

ieoak»1"»

T-72
Uttu^
T-72 - the largest Soviet tank with improved fire control,
armor and the T-62 main gun.
31
exercise. These exercises take place in areas with ample maneuver space
and sometimes with sophisticated target arrays. Division exercises are
less frequent than regimental exercises because of the great expense
involved. Exercises normally open with an alert followed by a long road
march to the training area. Major exercises involve tank units in all
phases of tactical operations including river crossings, which are
practiced frequently.

5. NIGHT TRAINING

Some 30 to 40 percent of all field training is supposed to be

conducted at night. However, most of this night training consists of
road marches and gunnery practice. There is little evidence that tank
units larger than company size practice combat formations at night.
Because of the difficulties of using an active infrared (IR) source for
target acquisition, tanks often use white light and the daytime sight to
pick up and engage targets.

6. ATTITUDE TO TRAINING

Soviet tankers appear to enjoy field training. Apart from the job
satisfaction gained from training in their combat role, field training
affords a break from the routine of barracks life and the monotony of
daily maintenance of combat vehicles. The Soviet soldier is hardy and
is used to living under rigorous field conditions. Tactical training
gives him the opportunity to display his prowess and skill and earn
leave. Although Soviet tactical deployment drills are simple, they
require a high degree of teamwork. It is not surprising, then, that
training is repetitive.

7. INITIATIVE OF COMMANDERS

The lack of experience and limited initiative allowed junior

officers at battalion and company level is a serious problem in many
tank units. Certainly, the nature of the Soviet system itself and the
fact that the ground forces have not fought for a generation are at the
root of the problem. The initiative of junior leaders is stifled by
highly centralized control of tactical operations and strict supervision
of all training by regimental commanders. Additionally, some junior
officers in tank companies hold reserve commissions and lack a
background of intensive command training.

32
 CHAPTER 5

TACTICAL MOVEMENT

1. GENERAL

The tank regiment normally operates as part of a tank or motorized

rifle division. Soviet doctrine calls for high rates of movement while
maintaining a deployment balance which allows the rapid commitment of
the unit into combat. The regiment moves under cover of darkness or in
conditions of limited visibility whenever possible. Populated areas are
bypassed to avoid traffic congestion, but roads are used to maintain a
high speed. Areas contaminated by radiation or chemicals are avoided
unless it is imperative for tactical reasons to cross them. In the
latter case, they are crossed with the greatest possible speed. When
practicable, long-distance movement is made on tank transporters or
railway flatcars to save track wear.

2. PHASES OF A TACTICAL MARCH

A tactical march may be divided into a number of phases:

a. Preparation and planning

The planning and preparation of a tactical march begins as soon

as the order is received from division. The staff issues a warning
order containing the following basic information:

(1) Purpose of the march, stated as a mission.

(2) Direction of movement.

(3) Start point and departure time. This information allows

basic unit planning to proceed. Route reconnaissance is done. Vehicles
are prepared for combat or movement during this phase of the operation.
If the operation involves a passage of lines, a staff officer may carry
out reconnaissance and liaison to coordinate the regiment's movement
through friendly formations.

b. Reconnaissance

A route reconnaissance is made when time and the tactical

situation allow. This is carried out by the regiment's reconnaissance
company. The purpose is to select suitable routes parallel to the axis
of advance and to identify suitable halt areas which provide

33
concealment. Topographical and terrain information is relayed back to
the chief of staff. Reconnaissance is carried out both forward and to
the rear of the FEBA. Traffic regulators mark the march route behind
the FEBA and carry out policing duties at critical points along the
route.

c. Engineer

Engineer work may be required before or during a tactical march

to insure the rapid and unobstructed movement of the regiment. An
engineer officer may accompany the reconnaissance company in any phase
of the operation to give advance warning of required engineer work to
the staff.

d. Issuance of the Movement Order

-**■ ■ - ■ in — ■■ ■ ■ ■

After making his reconnaissance, the regimental commander issues

a movement order with the following information:

(1) Enemy situation.

(2) March objective.

(3) Route(s) to be used by the regiment.

(4) Task organization and formation.

(5) Possible enemy courses of action.

(6) Actions upon contact with the enemy.

(7) Duration of the march.

(8) Rate of movement.

(9) Start point, control points, and times for passing them.

(10) Locations for halts and refueling.

(11) Composition of maintenance train.

(12) Communications procedures.

(13) Warning signals for enemy attack.

(14) Missions for regimental reconnaissance units.

34
 (15) Location and disposition of adjacent units.

(16) Location of the regimental commander and deputy commander.

(17) Line of departure (if the regiment is advancing toward a

known enemy position).

(18) Command succession.

This information is issued orally to battalion and other unit

commanders who in turn issue their own movement orders.

e. Execution of March

Task organization of the regiment depends on mission and

terrain. Soviet commanders are trained to consider the following
factors in any march:

(1) March Security - When conducting a tactical march, the tank

regiment organizes to provide security during the march and to faci-
litate the shift to combat formation upon contact with the enemy.
Accordingly, the regiment forms the following elements: a combat
reconnaissance patrol, advance guard, main body, flank patrols, and rear
guard.

,(2) Control Measures - In order to control the movement of the

regiment during the march, the commander establishes and includes in his
march order certain control measures. Each battalion is assigned an
assembly area, where it makes preparations for the march. The regimental
subunits move out of their assembly areas and pass the start point at
designated times. Units move along the march route, which is a specific
line of advance. When movement on a particular route is impractical,
such as in very rugged terrain, the regiment may be assigned an axis of
advance. The advancing subunits are then allowed to deviate laterally,
as long as they remain within, designated boundaries. The speed of
movement is maintained with the use of control (or regulation) points,
which are easily identifiable terrain features (roads, small streams,
etc.). They are located at various distances along the route and are
expressed in time. Control points are normally designated for every 2
or 3 hours of movement and are usually manned by traffic regulators and
members of the regimental staff.

(3) Speed and Intervals Between Tanks - The rate of column

movement depends on a variety of factors: mission, enemy situation,
conditions of the march route, weather, time of day, and condition of

35
the troops and vehicles. Average desirable speed is 20 to 30 km/hr
during the day and 15 to 20 km/hr at night. When traveling on hard-
surfaced roads, the regiment can attain a rate of 30 to 35 km/hr.
Distance between vehicles increases with speed of the column; at very
low speeds it is some 20 to 30 meters. Likewise, the interval is
lengthened during movement over dusty roads, sharp inclines, icy
surfaces, or through NBC areas, when the tanks spread out in order to
decrease the amount of contaminated dust collected by following
vehicles.

(4) Halts - Halts made during the march give the troops a
chance to rest and to refuel and service the vehicles. Short halts of
30 minutes are called every 2 to 3 hours. During marches of 1 or more
days' duration, the regiment normally takes a long halt of 2 to 4 hours
sometime during the second half of each day. In freezing weather, long
halts are not taken.

(5) Antiaircraft Defense - The Soviets have self-propelled anti-

aircraft (AA) guns and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that are able to
move with supported tank units. During the march, the AA battery
normally is segmented into firing elements and distributed throughout
the regiment. Air lookouts are detailed, AA units and designated tanks
engage the enemy aircraft with AAMGs. Units fire from the march or at a
momentary halt. The battery also sends out its own reconnaissance
patrol to select firing positions; it operates with the advance guard.

•'• *Ül\

Air defense on the march.

36
 ©

KEY -"»XT? ©
© "© NO. KEY COMPOSITION

1. Reconnaissance Patrol One tank platoon

2. Leadmarch security detachment Reinforced tank company

© 3.
4.
Flank security detachment
Main body element
Each one tank platoon
Two tank battalions
5. Main body element Regimental headquarters
6. Service Support unit Logistic elements
7.
© Rear march security detachment One tank company

Stage 1. OUT OF CONTACT

Regiment in battalion columns.

<-> <-> Stage 2 CONTACT

Reconnaissance patrol and lead march
security detachment in contact have
moved on line. Remainder of unit
deploys into company and later platoon
columns while moving to the flank of
the enemy position.

-XTÖ
■G3
Stage 3. ASSAULT
Lead march security detachment (one
reinforced tank company) gives fire sup-
port from tanks and the regiment's
motorized rifle company. Recon-
naissance patrol moves into column.
Tank battaions assault from a Hank in
© combat formation (line/. Rear march
security detachment becomes 2nd.
Echelon of the assault.

FIGURE 15. TANK REGIMENT DEPLOYMENT-COLUMN TO ASSAULT LINE

37
 (6) Passive Defense Measures - To minimize the risk of enemy
observation and attack during the march, Soviet doctrine calls for the
employment of passive defense measures. Units are expected to maintain
radio silence and are to break it only upon engaging the enemy. Prior
to enemy contact, they maintain communications with signal flags and
messengers. Light, camouflage, and concealment discipline are stressed,
but implementation is uneven. Performance in these areas varies with
the unit and depends largely on the initiative and ingenuity of the
commander.

f. Conclusion of March

The march is completed when the regiment moves either into an

assembly area or into combat.

3. FORMATIONS

Soviet tank units move in column or line, depending on the tactical

situation and terrain. In general, when out of contact with the enemy,
Soviet units move in battalion, company, or platoon columns. That is, a
regiment may move with two forward battalions on parallel routes.
Within each of these battalions, the companies also can be expected to
move along parallel routes when road nets permit. By NATO standards,
the regiment moves on a narrow front. When tank units make contact with
the enemy, they move into line formation so that all tanks can fire.
Figure 15 shows the stages of a tank regiment deploying from a column
into an assault line.

r«*|Ä

BMP and MC messengers of reconnaissance company.

38
 CHAPTER 6

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

1. CONCEPTS

Soviet doctrine specifies that commanders are to conduct

reconnaissance continuously. In the tank regiment, the concept is to
gain tactical information essential to the execution of the regiment's
mission. This is done within the overall intelligence plan coordinated
from higher headquarters, which may task regimental assets accordingly
and which receives data gained by regimental units. The reconnaissance
company, maneuver units, or both may carry out this task. Regimental
reconnaissance operations complement tactical intelligence provided by
the divisional staff from information gathered by:

a. Long-range reconnaissance patrols.

b. Electronic reconnaissance units.

c. Aerial reconnaissance elements.

d. Artillery, engineer, and chemical defense reconnaissance

detachments of higher units.

The reconnaissance carried out by regimental units is by ground

observation. Exercise scenarios often include requirements for
developing detailed information on the enemy down to company
strongpoints and particularly stress the importance of locating
artillery positions. Intelligence information is transmitted either on
the special reconnaissance net to the regimental staff or on the command
net to regimental maneuver and supporting artillery units. During
offensive operations, response time to this low-level information
theoretically amounts to the time it takes to deploy the main body;
during defensive operations, the response time is limited only by the
time it takes to engage targets.

A regiment may be ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force. The

Soviets conduct this type of operation as a coordinated offensive action
up to 30 kilometers in advance of the remainder of the division with the
intention of forcing the enemy to disclose his positions, strength, and
weapons systems. Such missions are ordered by a division commander when
other tactical intelligence-gathering methods have failed.

Operations involving the crossing of obstacles are undertaken only

after reconnnaissance has been made. Special or technical engineer,
artillery, and chemical information from the regimental area of

39
operations is collected by officer specialists attached to patrols.

2. AREA AND DEPTH OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATION

Division reconnaissance units provide much of the tactical

information on which the tank regiment bases its operations. The area
and depth of reconnaissance in regimental and divisional offensive
operations are shown in figure 16. Soviet tactical intelligence and
reconnaissance operations are detailed in Soviet Tactical Intelligence
and Reconnaissance, DDI-1100-148-77, February 1977.

50 to
100 kms

20 to
50 kms

t ®

Zone of operations of battalion reconnaissance patrols Zone of operations of divisional reconnaissance battalion

(2 to 3 kms). (maximum theoretical range).

Zone of operations of reconnaissance groups. Zone of operations of technical reconnaissance means

(drones, radar intercept, etc)

Zone of operations of long range reconnaissance (ground,

Zone of operations of regimental reconnaissance companies.
visual, photo, and technical reconnaissance).

FIGURE 16. DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES ZONES

40
 3. RECONNAISSANCE BY MANEUVER UNITS

The Soviets frequently employ a reinforced tank company in a

reconnaissance role during field training exercises. Reinforcement
typically is by a motorized rifle platoon, an engineer squad, and a
chemical defense detachment. Usual missions are to reconnoiter the
terrain, to monitor possible or known NBC hazards, and to collect
tactical intelligence. Patrols consist of three or four vehicles
operating up to 10 kilometers apart and 15 to 30 kilometers in front of
the regiment. Movement before contact with the enemy is on'roads at
maximum speed in platoon column. Information is radioed back as it
becomes available. Any required special communications are provided by
the regiment's signal unit. Once contact is made with the enemy, the
tanks and infantry combat vehicles move by bounds covering each other.
A tank company employed in a reconnaissance role attempts to bypass
observed enemy positions. Ambushes are planned to capture enemy
personnel and equipment for intelligence purposes. Further information
on tank companies used in a reconnaissance role may be found in chapter
9 of Soviet Tank Company Tactics, DDI-1120-129-76, May 1976.

4. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

A reconnaissance in force in regimental strength may be expected at

the outset of operations when the Soviets are attempting to determine
the extent of enemy deployment, and during an enemy's withdrawal from
his forward positions. During a reconnaissance in force, the regiment
deploys in the same formation it uses in a meeting engagement. A
reinforced tank battalion is usually employed as the advance guard. Its
inherent mobility and firepower allow rapid shifts in the thrust of the
main effort. Doctrine calls for the regiment's main body rapidly to
exploit successes by the advance guard in penetrating the enemy's
defenses.

5. COMMANDER AND STAFF RECONNAISSANCE

A tactical reconnaissance is conducted to obtain information on the

enemy, terrain, and the area of impending action that is necessary to
support the regiment's combat operations. Such reconnaissance is
planned by commanders and staffs to the depth of their combat mission.
In general, the conduct of reconnaissance is dependent on the nature of
the enemy defense. A commander's ground reconnaissance is carried out
prior to planning an attack or is accomplished in order to verify on
the terrain, decisions already made through map reconnaissance and
missions already assigned to troops. He is accompanied, when possible,
by the battalion and supporting arms commanders. A specially detailed
officer conducts reconnaissance to refine information about the enemy
and the terrain in the zone of action, to establish the position of
friendly troops and adjacent units, and to verify contradictory data on
the situation. This officer, frequently the regiment's assistant chief
or staff for operations, may arrange for a passage of lines and
coordinate fire support requests from units in contact. A photographic
reconnaissance may be conducted from air or ground level to acquire
information concerning enemy installations and positions and the nature
of the terrain.

41
6. RECONNAISSANCE DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

When in defense, the tank regiment receives the greater part of its
tactical intelligence from units at front and army levels and from the
division reconnaissance battalion using battlefield surveillance
equipment. This information is supplemented by patrols sent out by the
regimental reconnaissance units, tank ambushes, and raids. Soviet
tactical concepts stress the need for continuous acquisition of
intelligence by multiple means. Regimental reconnaissance and maneuver
units may be expected to cover open flanks and dead space. Enemy unit
and equipment identification may be made by mounting up to company-size
raids to capture enemy personnel and equipment.

7. RECONNAISSANCE CRITICISM

The Soviets openly emphasize importance of tactical reconnaissance.

Articles in the Soviet military press continually stress it. Criticism
seems as frequent as praise. Battalion and company commanders who do
not try to update and expand on the tactical information coming from
regiment bear the brunt of the severest criticism. In any event, Soviet
tactical reconnaissance concepts and doctrine are sound. While some
units in their field training display serious shortcomings m_
reconnaissance operations, the Soviets have identified the major
problems. They discuss needs and corrective actions with surprising
sophistication and candor. Further improvements in unit performance are
expected.

42
 CHAPTER 7

THE OFFENSIVE

Section A - Concepts

1. OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE

The Soviet concept of tactical operations is based on seizing and

maintaining the initiative. Combined arms operations are considered
crucial to success. Soviet military theorists expect mechanized units
to advance 30 to 50 kilometers per day in conventional operations and up
to 80 kilometers per day in a nuclear environment. Operations are to be
"continuous," day and night, regardless of weather conditions. The
Soviets consider that the offensive affords the attacker the advantage
of selecting the direction, time, and method of combat. They appreciate
the fact that the attacker does not necessarily need numerical
superiority in manpower or equipment as long as he makes effective use
of supporting nuclear or conventional fire and rapid maneuver against
the enemy's flanks and rear areas.

2. PENETRATION OF ENEMY DEFENSES

The Soviets expect enemy defensive positions to be concentrated into

a series of strongpoints around which mobile reserves can operate.
They plan to use conventional or nuclear fire to create gaps between
strong points. Fast-moving mobile forces can then penetrate enemy
defenses and in the exploitation phase destroy the enemy's divisional
reserves before he has time to restore the FEBA or counterattack.

3. ROLE OF TANK UNITS

Once a gap has been created, tanks play the major role. Tank
regiments of tank divisions penetrate and exploit the penetration of the
enemy defense. Objectives are enemy reserves, nuclear weapon delivery
systems, and command and control facilities. The concept is one of
relentless offensive action rather than taking and holding terrain. In
an operation conducted by a motorized rifle division, the doctrine
requires that tank regiments normally are employed as complete regiments
whether in the first or second echelon or as division reserves.
Motorized rifle regiments have their own organic tank battalion for
armored support.

4. OBJECT OF MANEUVER

The Soviets define tactical maneuver as the movement of units and

massing of conventional and/or nuclear firepower to create an

43
advantageous grouping of force for the execution of a tactical mission.
This definition is similar to that used by US and NATO armies, but
Soviet application of the concept is markedly different. The Soviets
stress the need for concentration of fire and speed of movement; they
accept the consequent risk of moving whole battalions in close
formation. The Soviets do not use the US and NATO practice of
conducting fire and maneuver within battalions. Their tactical doctrine
identifies a number of specific objectives of maneuver:

a. Exploit the results of nuclear strikes.

b. Increase combat efforts along the main axis of attack.
c. Shift troops to a new axis of attack.
d. Bypass NBC-contaminated areas.
e. Engage advancing enemy reserves.
f. Withdraw own troops from overwhelming enemy strikes.
g. Replace depleted battalions with fresh troops,
h. Encircle enemy forces.
i. Interdict enemy withdrawal.
j. Seize advantageous positions.
k. Destroy enemy nuclear ammunition depots.

5. MANEUVER IN COMBAT

a. Envelopment

The two principal forms of maneuver employed by the tank

regiment are the envelopment (shallow or deep; see figures 17, 18), and
the frontal attack. The intent of shallow envelopment is to
attack the enemy flank or immediate rear. The aim of deep envelopment
is to attack the enemy deep in his rear area. When using either
maneuver, the tank regiment attempts to split the enemy into small
groups and destroy him piecemeal. A tank regiment conducting deep
envelopment acts independently of the division and operates out~"of the
range of normal artillery support. The depth of its penetration can be
15 kilometers or more. A common tactic is for the main body of the tank
regiment to conduct a deep envelopment, while a portion of the division
pins down the enemy in front. The deep envelopment may be used in
connection with an airborne landing. Frontal attack may be employed
against an enemy force which has been neutralized or suppressed by
nuclear or conventional fire.

b. Maneuver with Fire

In a reinforced tank regiment, supporting artillery units

execute maneuver with fire. This consists of massing nuclear or
conventional fire against enemy nuclear delivery means, conventional
artillery weapons, and troop dispositions. It is also used to cover the
exposed flanks and gaps between formations of Soviet units.

44
 3rd tank battalion
carries out close
envelopment

o
oo
1st tank battalion y^ Tank
in firing position 2nd battalion
in firing position

Tank regiment
on the march

FIGURE 17. SHALLOW ENVELOPMENT

45
84
Enemy flank position
under artillery fire

o
v
-—'
u
i N-1* in
Ay. ^ ""
i ■
1st tank battalion
action against
forward battalion

FIGURE 18. DEEP ENVELOPMENT

46
6. ECHELONS AND RESERVES

The terms "first and second echelon" and "reserve" are often misused
in studies of Soviet tactics. These terms are used throughout this
study with the following meaning:

a. The first echelon consists of up to two-thirds of the total

force. It is the first part of the unit to be committed during an
operation.

b. The second echelon, when created, normally consists of up to

a third of the total force. It receives a tactical mission
simultaneously with the first echelon. The second-echelon commander,
upon receiving his mission, acts independently of the first echelon. He
watches the course of combat and is responsible for the commitment of
his unit as ordered by the regimental commander or, on occasion, on his
own initiative while keeping his commander informed. The task of the
second echelon is to intensify the force of attack of the first echelon.

c. A reserve, when created in addition to a second echelon, is

usually about one-ninth of the total force. When there is no second
echelon, the reserve may be up to one-third of the total force. The
force does not receive an initial mission and is committed to battle
only on order of the regimental commander.

7. FORWARD DETACHMENTS

Frequent mention is made of a forward detachment in Soviet military

journals. This is usually shown as being up to reinforced battalion
strength. A forward detachment, if formed, would probably follow the
reconnaissance element. Its mission is to secure key terrain so as to
facilitate the deployment of the main force. It conducts its operations
in accordance with the doctrine that relates to its size. For company-
size forward detachments, see Soviet Tank Company Tactics, DDI-1120-129-
76 May 1976, and for battalion-size, see Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics,
DDI-1120-10-77, August 1977.

Section B - Offensive Operations

1. NUCLEAR FIRE PLANNING

Decision on the use of nuclear weapons is a crucial factor in the

planning and preparation of offensive operations. The use of nuclear
weapons alters the basis of maneuver and allows the regiment to operate
on a broader front than in conventional operations. Soviet doctrine
calls for nuclear weapons to be used against enemy nuclear weapon

47
delivery means, troop concentrations, reserves, artillery positions,
'headquarters and communications centers, logistic units, and
installations. More important from a tactical viewpoint is that nuclear
weapons would be used to create gaps in enemy defensive systems. The
Soviets consider the following specific points when analyzing nuclear
targets:

a. Type of weapon required for the desired effect: yield,

height, ground zero, and time of burst.
b. Safety measures for friendly troops.
c. Estimate of enemy losses.
d. Requirement to notify adjacent units of potential
contaminated areas.

Nuclear weapons probably are allocated first at front and then at

army levels. Each division could then select its own targets which, in
turn, probably would have to be confirmed by higher headquarters. At
regimental level, the key planning factor is the time at which advance
elements of the regiment cross the nuclear safety line. This is the
time from which the remainder of the operation is based.

2. ARTILLERY PREPARATION

If nuclear weapons are not used, artillery preparation is likely to

be intensive. In setpiece assaults, the tank regiment receives from 25
to 40 minutes of artillery fire from supporting artillery units.
Priority targets are enemy artillery and antitank systems. The goal is
to suppress completely the enemy elements in the area of the planned
penetration. The preparation is planned at divisional level since there
is no artillery organic to the tank regiment.

3. STAFF PLANNING

Once the regimental commander has completed his estimate of the

situation and made his reconnaissance, the following key decisions are
given to the staff as the basis for further planning:

a. Information on enemy strength and dispositions, including

obstacle zones and the approaches to the enemy position.
b. The mission of the regiment.
c. Axis for the attack and breakthrough sector.
d. Tasks of supporting arms.
e. Nuclear targets and the nuclear safety line.
f. Location of artillery; coordination of fire plans.
g. Coordination with adjacent units.
h. Movement routes, control lines of deployment, and gaps
through obstacles.
i. Location of control points on the route forward.

48
122-mm SP provides close support artillery which is able to keep up with tanks.

^Qm&iMBM^)^
■ - 'Ü ""*^ ^ii^ÄÄi*- •'

152-mm SPfrom divisional artillery provides heavier support.

49
 The combat orders are then worked out in detail by the staff. Route
reconnaissance is made by subordinate staff officers and control points
are coordinated on the ground. Whenever possible, the regimental
commander issues his orders orally.

4. ORDERS

When issuing his orders to the battalion commanders, the regimental

commander assigns immediate objectives for each battalion and gives
directions for continuing the advance. In addition to assigning
missions, the regimental commander specifies attachments and
detachments. It is the regimental commander who gives such details as
when and where battalions will deploy into company and platoon column
and line. The regimental commander also gives details of the artillery
fire plan, which usually will be a timed program. The final part of the
order gives coordination details and includes control measures.

5. CONTROL

In a setpiece attack, the commander and staff establish control

measures to regulate the regiment's advance to contact. Assembly areas
are designated approximately 8 to 12 kilometers from the FEBA. The
assembly area is a preparation and organization site located away from
population centers. The regiment's movement from assembly areas through
start points and along march routes or axes of advance is monitored by
staff officers and traffic regulators. The Soviets anticipate that
their advance elements will be able to drive in the enemy's
reconnaissance screen, and thus allow the main body of the tank regiment
to reach the line of deployment unimpeded. When the tank battalions
reach the line of deployment, about 4 to 6 kilometers from the enemy
front line, they deploy into a companies-on-line (approach march)
formation. The line of deployment is chosen so as to be out of range of
enemy antitank guided missiles, direct artillery, and tank fire. At
about 1.5 to 4 kilometers from the enemy lines, the tank battalions
cross the line of attack, deploying into platoons online (combat
formation). Whenever possible, the line of attack is designated behind
a terrain feature so that the battalions are covered from enemy
observation as they deploy. The Soviets consider the axis of main
attack the most important control measure for the offensive. It
designates their main efforts. The particular axis chosen depends on a
number of factors: mission, strength and structure of enemy defense,
terrain conditions, and disposition of friendly troops.

6. FRONTAGE AND DEPTH

In a movement to contact, the tank regiment is assigned a sector of

responsibility up to 10 kilometers wide. When conducting actual

50
offensive operations, however, the regiment may engage the enemy along
an attack frontage as narrow as 2 to 4 kilometers, depending upon pre-
vailing conditions. The regiment's immediate objective is normally the
enemy battalion strongpoints about 4 to 6 kilomenters beyond the enemy
FEBA; the depth of its subsequent objective is the immediate objective
of the division (12 to 15 kilometers) (figure 19).

DIRECTION OF FURTHER
ATTACK OFTHETANK REGIMENT

SUBSEQUENT MISSION
_J OFTHETANK REGIMENT

rrr
rnrr-11 '"'riTiTiTTTTf I

s IMMEDIATE MISSION OF
THE TANK REGIMENT )

vIT _-J-f\

)
friTTP° '

2ND TANK BATTALION 1

c
TWO MOTOR RIFLE
COMPANIES

>

NOTE: In this example the tank regiment

s
has been reinforced with an 3RD TANK BATTALION
additional two MR. companies.

FIGURE 19. TANK REGIMENT FRONTAL ATTACK

51
 Section C - The Meeting Engagement

1. CONCEPT

The Soviets define the meeting engagement as combat between opposing

columns rapidly advancing toward each other and coming into contact
while simultaneously trying to accomplish specific offensive missions-
Meeting engagements are most likely to occur:

a. At the outbreak of hostilities when the enemy has been

surprised and is attempting to deploy into forward defensive areas.
b. During an advance to contact by Soviet forces.
c. After a breakthrough between the Soviet breakthough force
and the enemy reserves moving into a counterattack to halt the penetra-
tion.
d. During pursuit operations as the enemy is withdrawing.
e. With counterattacks during conduct of defense.

The Soviets believe that in the meeting engagement the first side to
deploy and attack with fire support has a decisive advantage. They
stress the importance of maneuver. The tank regiment attempts to attack
the enemy on his flank by either shallow or deep envelopment. Frontal
assault is used only when terrain or time restrictions preclude maneuver.
A major part of tactical training time is devoted to practice of this
operation at both battalion and regimental levels.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Typical task organization for a tank regiment in a meeting engage-

ment is shown in table 2. Deployment is as shown in figure 20.

.FLANK SECURITY

I« i i
LEAD i A
J MARCH £ A^^^^^
.COMBAT

^SECURITY ^ADVANCE ^ SEC

DETACHMENT ' GUARD ^ MAIN

'REGIMENTAL ^LANK SECURITY

RECONNAISSANCE

FIGURE 20. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT-DEPLOYMENT

52
 ELEMENT COMPOSITION TASK

Regimental Reconnaissance Regimental Reconnaissance Move forward between regimental

Company boundaries - and locate enemy
positions and provide information
on the terrain

Forward Elements

Combat Reconnaissance Patrol One tank platoon Move down axis and update
regimental reconnaissance
company's information on enemy
and terrain

Lead March Security One tank Company (less one platoon) Move down and clear the axis
Detachment One motorized rifle platoon
One artillery battery (attached for
movement)
An engineer squad
A chemical defense detachment

Advance Guard One tank battalion (less one company) Ensure the unobstructed advance
One motorized company (less one the regiment down the axis
platoon)

Main Body A tank regiment (less one tank Destroy enemy within regiment's
battalion and one motorized rifle boundaries of advance
company)

Rear and Flank Security One tank platoon each Flank and rear protection
Detachments

Deployment is as shown in Figure

TABLE 2. TASK ORGANIZATION IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

3. CONDUCT OF THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

The sequence of action in the meeting engagement is shown in the

following subparagraphs and figure 21.

a. Location of the enemy by divisional or regimental reconn-

aissance forces.

53
 Stage 1. Enemy column is identified by divisional
reconnaissance and decision before a meeting
engagement is made.

lb) (c)

Stage 2.

Regimental reconnaissance company

monitors enemy movement
Combat reconnaissance patrol makes con-
tact.
Lead march security detachment closes with
enemy column.
Decision is made to assault enemy right flank
with main body of tank regiment.

>x
Id
v-0-*^'-' r>l
CD CD

[HO]

v^r *4rlw 31
Stege 5. flank for initial assaults on enemy main body.
fe,/ Regimental reconnaissance company con- The Soviets consider that by rapid movement
tinues to monitor movements of enemy reser- it is possible for a battalion to take on an
ves. enemy three times its size.
(h) Lead march security element maneuvers into Id) Attached artillery moves into position.
firing position. le) Soviet main body begins maneuver to right
fc) Remainder of advance party maneuvers to left flank.

*+%■**

Stage 4. Advance party, stopped by a superior enemy

fa) Enemy forward units have moved into hasty force, continues to give fire in support of main
defensive positions while tank units continue body.
to move forward. Id) Tank regiment main body (two battalions +)
lb) Regimental reconnaissance company assaults enemy right rear under cover of tank
monitors movement of enemy rear units. and artillery fire (at e).

FIGURE 21. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

54
 b. Decision to initiate a meeting engagement, taken by the
division or regimental commander.
c. Contact made by regimental reconnaissance combat patrols and
reported to regimental headquarters.
d. Selection of the point of contact by the regimental
commander.
e. Initiation of combat action by advance guard.
f. Maneuver and assault by main body.

4. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

The meeting engagement ends when either force adopts a new tactic,
e.g., when one or other goes into a deliberate defensive position, or is
forced to mount a deliberate attack.

5. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The main advantages and disadvantages of the meeting engagement may

be summarized as follows:

a. Advantages

(1) The Soviets consider they can achieve success over a

superior force by concentrated firepower, shock action, and use of
surprise.

(2) Ammunition expenditure is less than in an assault on a

prepared position.

(3) Little time is wasted in continuing the advance.

b. Disadvantages

(1) Little time is available for coordination of artillery,

supporting tank fire, or target analysis if nuclear weapons are to be
used.

(2) The operation requires use of considerable initiative

by junior commanders who are not used to independent action.

(3) NATO forces' advance-to-contact drills stress "balance"

rather than speed; the Soviets may, therefore, run into a well-
coordinated defense if NATO reconnaissance has been effective.

55
 Section D - Attack on a Hastily Prepared Defensive Position

1. CONCEPT

The Soviets characterize an enemy hastily prepared defensive

position as one lacking stability and balance. This is the result of:

a. The enemy still moving into position and, therefore, lacking

mutual direct fire support.
b. The absence of coordinated indirect fire.
c. Inadequate engineer preparation of the defensive position,
minefields, and demolitions.
d. Insufficient time to establish secure communications leading
to a lack of effective control.
e. Being forced to place the defensive position on less than
ideal terrain.

The tank regiment, with its mobility and shock effect, is ideally
suited for an assault mounted from the line of march against a hastily
prepared defensive position. In such operations, a tank regiment is
employed in the first echelon. In close combat, the tank regiment is
joined by following units as quickly as possible to give it the combat
power to penetrate the enemy position in depth.

2. DOCTRINE

According to Soviet doctrine, hastily prepared enemy positions are

most likely to be encountered in the following circumstances:

a. At the onset of military operations, as enemy advance

elements are initially moving into defensive positions.
b. During enemy covering force operations.
c. Upon inconclusive or unsuccessful meeting engagements.
d. During enemy withdrawal operations.

3. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

a. Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance missions by technical units and ground

observation elements are mounted to establish the enemy's location,
strength, disposition, fire support systems, and barriers.

b. Decisionmaking and Control

The decision to assault and the issuance of orders for an attack

on a hasty defensive position are made during the advance to contact.

56
As the move forward progresses, short combat instructions are radioed to
tank regiment commanders by the division commander. The regimental
commanders may move with the division commander and relay orders and
coordination details to their regiments on the basis of tactical
intelligence received from reconnaissance and advance elements. Control
details are limited to matters concerning the axis of advance, combat
tasks, and reinforcement by regimental or divisional units.

c. Control Points

Traffic control units move at the head of regimental columns and

guide tank battalions by a series of control points established as the
regiment moves forward.

4. EXECUTION

Assault drills for use against hastily prepared defensive positions

are those already described in the analysis of the meeting engagement.
According to Soviet data, second-echelon regiments add pressure either
through the lead regiment's position or close to its flanks. Attacks by
second echelons are made from the line of march with an attack frontage
of about 4 kilometers. Normally, the assault is made after an intensive
10-minute artillery preparation. Such attacks usually are conducted in
at least two echelons. On occasion, the regiment's battalions may be
deployed in three assault lines. This allows for a greater fire
concentration to saturate the enemy's defensive position and prevent its
stabilization.

5. FIRE SUPPORT

The Soviets use conventional artillery and airstrikes to support the

assault. All units in range reinforce the fire of assaulting elements.
Nuclear and chemical weapons, if authorized for use, would be
coordinated by the higher commands.

6. AIRBORNE AND AIRLANDED SUPPORT

If the Soviets have local air superiority, their tactical doctrine

calls for the employment of airborne and airlanded parties beyond the
FEBA during this operation.

57
 Section E - Breakthrough Operations
1. CONCEPTS

The Soviet concept of the breakthrough operation envisages the

destruction of an enemy force in prepared positions in a small sector of
the FEBA, and subsequent penetration and reduction of positions in
depth. Breakthrough operations are conducted as a last resort by concen-
trations of maneuver elements and firepower at selected points. The
Soviets seek to establish decisive superiority in the breakthrough sector
while maintaining pressure all along the enemy's front. Tank regiments
take part in breakthroughs as part of a divisional operation. Each
regiment normally is organized into two echelons for the operation, and
is reinforced with engineer and motorized rifle troops. Battalions in
turn may be organized in one or two echelons. A division may attempt to
break through in one or more sectors within its zone of responsibility.
In either case, the attack generally is led by tanks. Frontages depend
to some extent on mission, enemy, terrain, weather, and troops available
(METT). Figures 22 and 23 show typical divisional nonnuclear break-
through scenarios.
ATTACK FORMATION AND FRONTAGES OF FIRST ECHELON BATTALIONS

ATTACK ZONE

10KM

3'/2KM 3KM 3% KM -*>T

BREAKTHROUGH ;
SECTOR

j c

C 2KM 2KM .IK KM

0-^-0 0-^-01 0-^H> 0-H I 0-*H> , <H^-0

? s
FIGURE 22. TYPICAL DIVISIONAL BREAKTHROUGH SECTORS (CONVENTIONAL)

58
2. FIRE SUPPORT

Division artillery is augmented from army and front units for the
breakthrough of a prepared defensive position. The Soviet doctrine
envisions 60 to 100 tubes per kilometer of front. This figure includes
all indirect fire weapons and is probably applicable to the MRD. Against
a weak defense such a concentration may not be deemed necessary. Neutral-
ization fire is planned to last 25 to 40 minutes. Areas for conventional
neutralization fire may extend 1,000 to 1,500 meters on either side
of each breakthrough sector. Under nuclear conditions there would be
greater dispersion with wider attack frontages. The role of the tank
regiment would be to exploit the effects of nuclear strikes. Artillery
fire is routinely supplemented by airstrikes against immediate objectives
and on targets in rear areas. Fire planning is directed mainly against
enemy nuclear delivery means, headquarters, and the enemy's forward
positions, with secondary missions to open gaps in obstacles and mine-
fields and to destroy fortifications. The second attack echelon is
further supported by artillery fire on targets located by the first.

ATTACK FORMATION AND FRONTAGES OF FIRST ECHELON BATTALIONS

ATTACK ZONE

c 8 KM

2KM 2KM

3
oJ_o 0-M> 0~M> <H-0 0-N> C0-M>
0^-0

FIGURE 23. TYPICAL DIVISIONAL BREAKTHROUGH SECTORS (CONVENTIONAL)

59
3. INITIAL DEPLOYMENT

The tank regiment may conduct its breakthrough operation either

from a position of direct contact with the enemy or, preferably, from
the march. In the latter case, the regiment launches the operation
from an assembly area at least 20 kilometers from the enemy FEBA. If
possible, the regiment moves into this assembly area under cover of
darkness or poor visibility. Reconnaissance and engineer preparation
of the route is begun 2 or 3 hours before forward movement of the main
body. Routes forward are marked by colored tags and traffic regulators
manning control points. Light and radio discipline in the assembly
area receive heavy emphasis in their doctrine.

4. TASK ORGANIZATION

There is no set pattern for reinforcement of the tank regiment in a

breakthrough operation. The units involved depend on the type of
division as well as the specific mission and the enemy and friendly
situations. In general, however, Soviet exercise activity shows that
self-propelled and antiaircraft artillery frequently accompany
attacking units. Also, the motorized rifle company may be attached to
a tank battalion. Infantry attack on foot or mounted (depending on the
situation) and follow the tanks as closely as possible. The infantry
task is to destroy antitank guided missiles and clear pockets of ground
troops still effective after the artillery preparation. They may also
be required to clear, by hand, enemy mines and obstacles, or the
regiment may be augmented with combat engineers specifically for this
task. When antitank fire is particularly effective, the infantry
precedes the tanks and attacks dismounted.

5. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

After crossing the line of deployment, normally the forward edge of

the assembly area, the tank regiment moves through march, precombat,
and combat formations, deploying along preplanned lines. The tank
units in the first-echelon attempt to breach the enemy FEBA and to
fragment the enemy's defense for subsequent destruction by the second
echelon. Tanks open concentrated fire on any targets which have
survived the artillery preparation. The tank regiment's second echelon
passes through gaps between first-echelon positions to destroy enemy
elements which have been isolated in the assault. If the first-echelon
meets heavy resistance, the second echelon may be required to assist it
to complete its mission. Tactical reserves of reinforced platoon
strength are usually created at. battalion level. The deployment of the
tank regiment during an attack operation in nuclear war is shown in
figure 24.

6. EXPLOITATION

The Soviets recognize that the advance of regimental elements may

be uneven and, thus, they place a high priority on securing flanks to

60
 t DEPLOYMENT LINES DEPLOYMENT LINES DEPLOYMENT LINES
BffO 1.5 KM FROM ENEMY FEBA Y1.5 TO 4 KMS FROM ENEMY FEBA 14 TO 6 KILOMETERS FROM ENEMY FEBA
DEPLOYMENT INTO COMBAT FORMATION ERtpYMENT INTO PLATOON COLUMNS DEPLOYMENT-JNTO COMPANY COLUMN

:NT LIN
ENEMY FEBA).
TANK REGIMENT
MOVES INTO
BA ITALION COLUMNS

(at First echelon battalions in column

lb) Regimental headquarters
Id Second echelon battalion in column
(not shown in subsequent deployment)
fdl Regimental reconnaissance units
(el Initial targets for artillery preparation

FIGURE 24. DEPLOYMENT OF A TANK REGIMENT FOR ATTACK IN NUCLEAR WAR

61
protect against possible enemy counterattacks. The regiment then moves
against its subsequent objectives—artillery positions, reserve forces,
and nuclear weapons. The second echelon completes the destruction or
capture of enemy forces, eliminating any remaining strongpoints
bypassed by the first echelon and consolidating the regiment's
position. If the enemy begins to organize a withdrawal after the
breakthrough, the regiment immediately begins pursuit operations.
Similarly, the regiment takes up the pursuit at- the outset of offensive
operations if the enemy has been sufficiently disrupted by nuclear or
artillery preparatory fire.

Section F - Pursuit

1. CONCEPT

"A pursuit operation is an attack on a withdrawing enemy for the

purpose of final destruction (or capture) of his forces."* The Soviets
stress the pursuit as a combined arms operation, fully integrating
maneuver and concentration of firepower. The use of nuclear weapons in
depth against withdrawing forces is emphasized, as is the possibility
that the enemy may try to delay his pursuers by using nuclear weapons to
create contaminated areas. At the first signs of enemy withdrawal, tank
battalions move to the pursuit without waiting for an order from the
regimental commander. In order to speed the pursuit and enhance
control, battalions try to conduct the operation in parallel columns; if
this is not possible or practical, they are trained to conduct the
pursuit in the attack formation. Normally a division deploys a tank-
heavy forward detachment of regimental strength which moves ahead of the
main body by 40 to 60 kilometers. The remainder of the division
conducts direct and parallel pursuit with the aim of encircling the
withdrawing enemy (figure 25).

2. INITIATION OF PURSUIT

The Soviets consider the following indications of an enemy

withdrawal to be sufficient evidence for the initiation o'f a regimental
pursuit operation:

a. Intensified movement of fighting vehicles and equipment from

front to rear.

b. A general reduction of direct tire from across the line of

contact.

c. Counterattacks by small units.

* From The Offensive, by A.A. Sidorenko.

62
FIGURE 25. THE PURSUIT CONCEPT

63
 d. The advance of reserves (for possible use as a rearguard).

e. Preparation of bridges and roads for demolition.

f. A sudden and concealed break from contact.

3. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

The tactics and formations of a tank regiment in pursuit are similar

to those for the meeting engagement. A forward detachment, usually of
reinforced tank battalion strength, operates up to 30 kilometers forward
of the regiment's main body. This detachment has limited combat
endurance and is intended to seize key terrain on the enemy axis of
withdrawal rather than destroying enemy columns. Possible objectives
include:

a. Bridges and crossing sites over water obstacles.

b. Defiles and passes formed by terrain or built-up areas.

c. Airfields.

d. Dominant terrain features.

When possible, both the forward detachment and main body move on roads
to maintain the momentum of the operation. Divisional artillery units
are allocated to forward regiments with command partially decentralized;
batteries move well forward in the supported units' battalion columns.
During pursuit operations, reconnaissance efforts necessarily should be
intensified. Thus, regimental reconnaissance troops may be reinforced
by tank companies. The pursuit is a dynamic operation calling for
considerably more initiative and decentralization than is normal in
Soviet tactics.

Section G - Water Obstacle Crossing

1. CONCEPTS

In Soviet tactical doctrine, crossing a water obstacle is considered

a routine but difficult operation. Tactical units spend a great amount
of time in training for such operations. By Soviet calculation,
military forces operating in Europe would encounter water obstacles with
the following frequency:

a. Up to 100 meters wide—every 35 to 60 kilometers.

b. Between 100 and 300 meters—every 100 to 150 kilometers.

c. Greater than 300 meters—every 250 to 300 kilometers.

64
The tank regiment's bridging capacity is based upon the Soviet estimate
that approximately 60 percent of the water obstacles in northwest Europe
are less than 20 meters wide.

2. DEFINITION

The Soviet concept defines two types of crossing operations:

a. "Water crossing" (overcoming an obstacle without enemy

resistance).

b. "Assault crossing" or "forcing a water obstacle" (surmounting a

defended obstacle). "Water crossings" are of logistical importance but,
for the purpose of this study, are not considered tactical. This section
deals only with assault crossings.
3. PREPARATION

At most crossing sites, preparation of entry and/or exit points is

necessary. This may take considerably more time than the actual crossing
since most Soviet fighting vehicles have some capability to negotiate
water obstacles. Soviet medium tanks can snorkel across obstacles up to
5.5 meters deep. On the other hand, the Soviet armored infantry combat
vehicle (BMP), armored personnel carrier (BTR-60PB), armored
reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM), tactical reconnaissance tank (PT-76), and
122-mm self-propelled howitzer (M-1974) are amphibious.

It", i"";

T-62 snorkels.

BRIDGE EQUIPMENT

Tank regiments have the ability to cross gaps up to 40 meters wide

with the TMM Class 60 truck-mounted bridge. This consists of four 10.5-
meter bridge sections and is usable where there are good entry and exit
sites or hard banks. The TMM bridge can be positioned in about 30

65
 minutes. Three T-55 MTU Class 50 tank bridge layers are held in the
engineer companies of tank regiments. These will span a 17.8-meter gap
and can be emplaced in a matter of minutes. Heavier crossing equipment
may be attached from divisional assets. (See Tactics of the Soviet
Ground Forces, DDI-1100-123-76, July 1976, For Official Use Only, for
details.)
5. CROSSING METHODS

The method a tank regiment uses to cross a water obstacle depends

on a number of factors, including:

a. The hydrographic condition of the obstacle such as width,

depth, current, and volume of flow.

b. The condition of the riverbanks, the riverbed, and entry and

exit sites.

c. Weather conditions.

d. Availability of bridges, ferries, and crossing sites.

e. Enemy observation and defense of the obstacle.

f. The regiment's task in the crossing.

Soviet doctrinal writing stresses that, in either an assault crossing or

a simple crossing, a combination of methods may be necessary for
success. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages which are
summarized in table 3.
SERIAL METHODS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

1. Permanent Bridges Permits rapid crossing of heavy (1) Insecure until a bridgehead is
volume of traffic. established.
42) Vulnerable to enemy nuclear artillery
strike.
(3) Usually in built-up areas which restrict
deployment.

2. Combat Engineer Permit rapid crossing of the (1) As for 1(d) (1) and (2).
Bridges; Tank Bridges obstacle. (2) Time taken to prepare tanks and erect
bridge can be lengthy.

3. Ferries Usually require only a short time (1) As for 1(d) (1) and 1(d) (2).
for preparation of bank entries (2) A very slow method of crossing
and exits. requiring considerable logistical effort.

4. Fording, Snorkeling, or (1) Allows quick crossing of (1) Upto 1V4 hours required for preparation
Amphibious Crossing obstacle. of snorkeling vehicles.
(2) Avoids concentration of (2) Some work required on far bank to
vehicles on the obstacle. make snorkeling tanks ready for prolong
(3) Units can cross from the line -ed combat.
of march and in adverse (3) Elaborate control methods required.
weather conditions. (4) For hydrographic reasons not all
(4) Units can cross on a broad obstacles are suitable for these types of
front. crossings
(5) Require a very high standard of vehicle
maintenance and training.

TABLE 3. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF WATER OBSTACLE CROSSING METHODS

66
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67
6. PREPARATION FOR AN ASSAULT CROSSING

Frequently, the initial reconnaissance of a water obstacle is

conducted by divisional reconnaissance units. Regimental reconnaissance
units accompanied by engineer and chemical defense specialists carry out
a detailed survey of the designated crossing area before the arrival of
the regiment. Patrols search for enemy observation points and firing
positions overlooking the sites in order that they may be neutralized or
blanketed with smoke during the assault phase.

7. CONTROL

Orders for the crossing are issued in an assembly area or as the

regiment moves forward to the obstacle. Tactical considerations often
are outweighed by technical factors. An elaborate control system is
required at each crossing site. (Figure 26 shows the organization for a
number of different types of crossing sites.) An engineer or technical
officer serves as crossing commander at each site and makes a recovery
plan for vehicles which fail to cross under their own power. Mine
clearance is conducted by combat engineers. Tank regiments set up
special command posts on the near and far banks for detailed control of
subunits passing through the crossing site.

8. CONDUCT OF THE ASSAULT CROSSING

Organization for an assault crossing is similar to that for a

meeting engagement. The advance guard consists of up to a tank
battalion reinforced with motorized rifle, artillery, and antiaircraft
units. Its mission is to destroy enemy screening forces on the near
bank and cross the obstacle at the predetermined site by fording,
snorkeling, or swimming. After overcoming the enemy force on the
opposite bank, the advance guard continues to clear the far side up to a
depth of 3 or 4 kilometers. The main body of the tank regiment
arrives at the water obstacle as soon as possible after the advance
guard has secured the far bank. Tanks and infantry combat vehicles
cross by the fastest method. If tanks are to cross by snorkeling,
preparations take place as far as 1.5 kilometers from the obstacle; they
are able to fire their guns immediately after snorkeling, but a short
unsealing period—approximately 20 minutes—is required before they are
ready for protracted operations. During the assault crossing, direct
fire is provided by tanks in firing positions to support elements
negotiating the obstacle. Regimental support groups follow maneuver and
combat support units. As soon as practicable, engineers place ferries
into operation or emplace ponton or submerged bridges. The assault
phase of the crossing is regarded as being over when the enemy can no
longer conduct observed artillery fire or direct surveillance of the
site.

9. CAUTIONARY NOTE

During exercises—particularly those in which NATO observers are

present—the Soviets make a point of demonstrating their ability to
cross a water obstacle with great speed. After rehearsals, they
68
consistently *ake impressive showings, completing ^a regimentat erossing
of a sizable obstacle in 2 or 3 hours. Nonetheless, an assault crossing
by a unit the size of a regiment is a complicated operation. Under
fire, reconnoitering and crossing can be extremely difficult even when
conducted by well-trained troops. An actual opposed crossing could take
5 to 7 hours or longer. (For further details, refer to Soviet and
Warsaw Pact River Crossing: Doctrine and Capabilities, DDI-1150-13-77,
May 1977.)

Section H - Crossing Minefields

1. SOVIET DOCTRINE.

Soviet doctrine accepts heavy losses in leading echelons, if a hasty

crossing is necessary and bypass or mine clearance by stealth is
impractical. One of the tasks of divisional and regimental
reconnaissance units is to reconnoiter obstacle belts in objective
areas. In offensive operations against prepared defenses, advance
routes are chosen to expedite the breaching of minefields in suitable
areas. Covert clearance of mines might be attempted by sapper squads of
approximately 10 men under cover of darkness, smoke, or conditions of
limited weather visibility. However, covertly clearing lanes 7 to 8
meters wide for infantry combat vehicles and 9 to 10 meters wide for
tanks is a slow, labor-intensive task. Since the Soviets assign a high
priority to maintaining the momentum of the advance, they normally will
make a hasty crossing.

Mine plows are issued to one in three tanks.

69
 Mine roller.

2. HASTY CROSSING OF MINEFIELDS

If an attack is to be executed against a prepared defense in good

visibility, or time for hand clearance of mines is unavailable, a hasty
crossing of minefields is attempted under heavy fire support from
artillery. The minefield is breached by use of explosives and
mechanical neutralization means. A minefield lane is made for each tank
platoon. During the meeting engagement rocket projected line charges
are fired to destroy mines. Tanks and APCs follow in single file. If a
tank is stopped, the remaining tanks bypass and continue in single file.

3. RATIONALE

One set of mineclearing plows is available for each tank platoon.

Leading echelon tank companies will also have mine rollers from
divisional engineer resources. The equipment available adequately
supports their concept that each platoon is to clear one lane. While
crossing any obstacle covered by fire invites casualties, the Soviets
consider that speed of execution will minimize tank losses in the long
run. -,,
70
 CHAPTER 8

DEFENSE/WITHDRAWAL

Section A - Concepts

1. DOCTRINE

In Soviet doctrine defense is a temporary expedient to be adopted in

the course of offensive operations. It is designed to repel an attack in
one sector while creating favorable conditions for a return to the
offensive. At regimental level, defense has the following specific
tactical aims:

a. To gain time to reinforce or redeploy during the course of

offensive operations.

b. To concentrate maneuver units and firepower in a particular area

to compel an enemy to split his force.

c. To hold critical terrain in order to support other units, or give

the second echelon a firm line of deployment.

d. To weaken a superior force through attrition.

e. To recover tactical "balance" after an unsuccessful operation.

When occupying a prepared defensive position, the regiment normally can
be expected to fight as part of the division rather than independently.

2. MOBILITY

The tank regiment can rapidly take up and vacate temporary defensive
positions. It can quickly concentrate and disperse and employ maneuver
both by movement and fire against an attacking force. After nuclear
strikes, the regiment can readily shift from defense to offense, counter-
attacking across contaminated areas. It would be rare for the Soviets to
sacrifice this mobility by employing a tank division in the first echelon
of defense. Thus, the remainder of this chapter considers the actions of
a regiment which has adopted a defensive position for a short period in
preparation for impending offensive action. Once in position, the tank
regiment must be capable of maintaining operations isolated from other
units. The tank regiment is allocated a defense sector within the
divisional defense zone.

71
3. WITHDRAWAL

Soviet doctrine stresses that withdrawal is not permitted without an

order originating from the higher command. An authorized withdrawal
is designed to achieve the following objectives:

a. To occupy more advantageous terrain.

b. To avoid enemy nuclear or conventional fire.

c. To avoid exposing a flank.

d. To avoid encirclement.

e. To shorten lines of communication.

f. To free men and equipment for an offensive on an alternate

axis.

4. NUCLEAR CONDITIONS

The Soviets emphasize mobility and dispersion in defense—especially

on the nuclear battlefield. Their doctrine calls for each battalion
to deploy in two echelons and defend an area approximately 3 to 5 kilome-
ters wide. Usually battalions create a reserve of their own. Battalions
and companies occupy a series of strongpoints reinforced by engineer
obstacles and artillery fire when time allows. Organic infantry links
positions and provides local defense for tanks. The tank division's
relative lack of organic infantry may in the future be compensated
for by changes in organization to increase organic BMP-mounted motorized
rifle troops to one battalion in each regiment.

Section B - Covering Force Area

1. RECONNAISSANCE

When the terrain and situation allow, division reconnaissance elements

may deploy 50 or more kilometers forward of the division's main defensive
zone. Their mission is to identify enemy axes of advance, tank concen-
trations, and nuclear delivery means. The reconnaissance company of the
tank regiment may deploy 20 or more kilometers forward of the regiment
and is similarly tasked. Longer-range reconnaissance is undertaken by
front and army units.

72
 SECONDARY MAIN TANK
ATTACK THREAT

FRONTAGE UP TO
10 KM.

NOTE: In this example the MR element

has been reinforced to battalion
strength and tasked to defend
terrain unsuitable for tanks.

FIGURE 27. TANK REGIMENT FRONTAGES AND DEPTHS IN DEFENSE

73
2. COMBAT SECURITY

A combat security zone extends some 15 kilometers forward of the main

battle area. Divisional second-echelon units of reinforced battalion
size fight a delaying action in this area under the control of division
headquarters. The aim of these operations is to hinder the advance of
enemy reconnaissance on main axes and force the enemy's forward elements
to deploy. These forward detachments usually break contact before being
attacked by the enemy main body. Further delay is imposed by use of
hastily established minefields and tank ambushes. Armed helicopters may
also be employed in this type of operation.

3. SCREENING FORCES

Screening forces, usually reinforced companies from first-echelon

battalions, operate up to 5 kilometers in front of the main defensive
zone. The purpose of the screen is to confuse the enemy as to the
exact location of the main defenses. In particular, the reconnaissance
and vanguard units of the enemy are deployed in order to force premature
deployment.

Section C - Main Battle Area

1. ECHELONS OF DEFENSE

The tank regiment normally deploys for defense in two echelons,

usually with two reinforced battalions forward and one to give depth.
When a Soviet commander places all three battalions in one echelon, he
frequently employs a reinforced company to give his position depth. In
the two battalions forward configuration, the regiment's frontage is
between 8 and 12 kilometers wide. Attached motorized rifle units cover
the l-to-2-kilometer gaps between tank battalion strongpoints. Figure 27
shows frontages and depths of a typical tank regiment in the defense.

2. BATTALION AND COMPANY STRONGPOINTS

A battalion position is anchored by a series of company strongpoints.

Figure 28 gives a detailed layout of one such battalion position. Each
tank in the regimental defense system is supposed to have at least one,
and if possible two, alternate positions. Also, dummy positions fre-
quently are prepared both by company and battalion. Further details of
that level of defense are given in Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics,
DDI-1120-10-77, August 1977.

74
FIGURE 28. TANK BATTALION IN DEFENSE

75
3. ARTILLERY

Supporting artillery may be given two firing positions. The first

(temporary) position is forward with first-echelon units; the second
(main) position is covered by the second echelon. Normally, ATGM
units are deployed to give flank protection. Soviet doctrine is to
ascertain through combat intelligence when the enemy fire preparation
is due to start. Soviet artillery is then tasked to fire a counter-
preparation just before the enemy artillery opens fire. The enemy
advance is subjected to an increasing intensity of fire from artillery,
indirect firing tanks, and finally direct fire weapons. Barrages are
registered on the forward edge of minefields and ostacles.

4. NUCLEAR STRIKES

Nuclear strikes may be delivered on enemy units in assembly areas or

those forced into kill zones forward of the Soviet FEBA. They may
also be used to prevent enemy movement on the flanks of the Soviet
position. Nuclear warnings are given on the special purpose net.
See the diagram of a representative radio net shown in figure 14.

5. ATGM

The firepower of the tank regiment has been increased by the addition
of a BMP company. This company has 10 BMPs, each mounting a 73-mm machine-
gun with automatic loader and a SAGGER antitank guided missile launcher.
Thus, with the advent of BMP, the antitank capability has been enhanced,
especially if the increment from the divisional MRR is included. Further
details will be available in The Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment, DDB-1110-
79, soon to be published.

SAGGER ATGWoneach MR Company BMP

76
6. DIRECT FIRE

Soviet tanks can effectively engage targets at 2,000 meters with their
main gun and at 800 meters with their heavy machinegun. The BMPs from
attached motorized rifle units mount SAGGER ATGMs, which can deliver
highly effective fire on targets out to 3,000 meters. With their 73-mm
gun, they can place effective fire on targets at 800 to 1,000 meters.
Also, the BMP mounts a light machinegun for use against targets in the
300-to-400-meter range. While the maximum effective ranges of the
tank's main gun and the SAGGER are impressive, the factor of visibility
must be considered. In West Europe terrain visibility seldom exceeds
1,200 meters, and in most areas is significantly less.

7. ENEMY PENETRATION

If the enemy penetrates the forward defensive zone, the tank regiment
tries to force him into preplanned kill zones. Minefields are laid
to canalize enemy movement into such areas. Counterattacks are made
by second-echelon battalions on preplanned routes.

8. DEFENSE AT NIGHT

The following provisions are made for night defensive operations:

a. Night firing positions are selected for each tank and armored
vehicle.

b. Artillery units receive changes to the priority of fire requests.

c. Reconnaissance and combat security units are reinforced.

d. Battlefield illumination plans are drawn up.

e. Consideration is given to protecting troops from flash blindness

if nuclear weapons are to be used.

f. Orientation and recognition points are identified.

g. Recognition signs and target indication measures are briefed.

h. Special attention is given to the marking of lines of deployment

and counterattack routes. After dark, some weapon systems are moved
forward into temporary positions on the FEBA. At least 50 percent of
the troops are supposed to be at full alert. Axes and routes are
reconnoitered and marked to allow rapid movement in counterattacks.
A separate night fire plan is established for the artillery.

77
 Section D - The Tactical Withdrawal

1. DISENGAGEMENT

Soviet doctrine calls for tactical withdrawals to take place either

at night, under conditions of limited visibility, or under cover of
smoke. Heavy artillery and tactical aviation support are planned during a
daytime withdrawal to allow forward companies to disengage from the
enemy. Normally the first echelon companies of first-echelon battalions
hold the FEBA, while the second-echelon battalion maintains its position
and takes over the role of a regimental rear guard. First-echelon
battalions move into column as they pass through the line held by the
second-echelon battalion.

2. CONDUCT OF THE WITHDRAWAL

The regimental main body withdraws in column, on roads where possible,

under cover of a reinforced tank battalion. This rear guard battalion
moves through a series of intermediate positions, operating 5 to 10
kilometers to the rear of the main body. This is the one situation in
which the Soviet tank battalion is known to operate as company-size
maneuver units. See Soviet Tank Battalion Tactics, DDI-1120-10-77,
August 1977.

Section E - Counterattack

1. TASKS

Counterattack is a normal mission for elements of either a motorized

rifle or tank division in defense. Usually this task is carried out
by the division's second-echelon regiment. The regiment's mission is
to attack enemy forces which have penetrated the first-echelon units'
defensive area, or have been dropped or landed in the division zone.

2. COORDINATION

Counterattack routes are planned in advance and, if time allows,

subordinate commanders down to and including company level conduct a
ground reconnaissance. Preplanned fire support (including nuclear
and chemical weapons when authorized) is coordinated with maneuver
units' counterattack plans where possible. First-echelon units provide
direct fire in support of the counterattacking force. Counterattacks
are delivered on narrow frontages, and if possible, against enemy flanks.
Considerable time is spent in coordinating passage of lines with comman-
ders and staffs in first echelons.

3. FOLLOWUP ACTIONS

If the enemy is defeated in the counterattack, the tank regiment

forms a column and initiates pursuit operations. If the counterattacking
force cannot dislodge the enemy, Soviet standard operating procedures
call for it to assume a hasty defensive position as far forward as
possible. -jo
 11
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-n^y^iPi

Up**

Theater movement is provided by MAZ-537 and rail.

79
(Reverse Blank)
 CHAPTER 9

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF TANK REGIMENT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL

The Soviets regard continuous materiel and technical support as being

both an important - duty of commanding officers and a requisite for
successful operations. They plan extensively for the replacement of
large expenditures of materiel, ammunition, and POL required in modern
combat operations. They also stress the need for timely aid for the sick
and wounded and the rapid return to service of damaged equipment and
vehicles.

2. LOGISTIC UNITS

Logistic support of the regiment is divided into two groups. The

materiel, ammunition, and POL for immediate backup of the unit, plus
the medical post and the recovery and evacuation group, usually move
directly behind the first echelon of the regiment. The remaining
logistic transport, reserve ammunition, and POL, plus rations, clothing,
spare parts, and the repair shop move behind the second echelon and
reserves of the regiment.

Refueling.

81
3. RESPONSIBILITIES

The regimental commander has overall responsibility for logistic

support. His two principal assistants are the deputy commander for
rear services and the deputy commander for technical affairs. The
former controls resupply activities, including the procurement and
distribution of POL, rations, and quartermaster equipment. He supervises
the work of the chiefs of fuel and lubricants supply, food supply, motor
transport services, and clothing and equipment supply. During combat
operations, he organizes and controls the regimental supply points. The
deputy commander for technical affairs is responsible for the main-
tenance, repair, and evacuation of regimental vehicles. He establishes
and directs the activities of the regimental repair shop and the repair
and evacuation groups. The two other officers concerned with logistic
matters are the regimental senior surgeon and the chief of rocket
artillery armaments. The senior surgeon is the regiment's chief of
medical services; he sets up and supervises the regimental aid station.
The chief of rocket artillery armaments is responsible for supplying
regimental elements with all types of munitions. The deputy commander
for rear services coordinates regimental logistic support and commands
the rear control point. Technical advice is available to the commander
from the chiefs of arms and services.

4. PRINCIPALS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Regimental logistic activities are conducted according to the

following principles:

a. Centralized planning, with the deputy commander for rear services

coordinating all logistic activity.

b. Standardization of weapons and equipment simplifying maintenance,

repair, and the supply of spare parts.

c. Priorities of resupply emphasizing the distribution of ammunition

first, followed by POL, technical equipment, rations, and nontechnical
equipment.

d. Forward distribution, with the higher echelon being responsible

for distribution of supplies to subordinate levels.

e. Transportation of supplies to subordinate units using all avail-

able means.

f. Exploitation of salvaged resources, including captured and

requisitioned equipment, POL, and rations.

g. Positioning of logistic elements well forward so that tanks can

be resupplied with ammunition and POL directly.

82
5. SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION

Supplies are moved by divisional motor transportation from distribu-

tion points in the rear area to the regimental supply points. During
offensive operations, the regimental supply points are located approxi-
mately 10 kilometers behind forward units. The regiment's motor transport
company delivers munitions, POL, and rations to the subordinate battalions.
The system has some flexibility. Division can bypass regiment and deliver
supplies directly to battalion or to individual tanks to avoid double
handling. Ammunition is requisitioned in "units of fire," a specified
quantity of rounds established for each weapon in the Soviet inventory.
Each weapon in the regiment is assigned a basic load expressed in terms
of units of fire. For example, the unit of fire for the T-62 is 40
rounds. Ammunition and POL are to be delivered at night, whenever
possible.

6. VEHICLE RECOVERY AND REPAIR

Soviet military writings stress that damaged equipment is to be

repaired at the lowest possible echelon and as close to the front
lines as practicable. Priority goes to those vehicles which require
the least work. Repair and maintenance facilities at all three levels—
battalion, regiment, and division—are highly mobile, thus facilitating
rapid repair and return of equipment and vehicles to the users. Only
simple repairs are undertaken at regimental level; badly damaged equipment
is left to divisional or higher level repair facilities.

7. TECHNICAL OBSERVATION POST (TOP)

The deputy commander for technical affairs is responsible for planning

and directing all vehicle repair and recovery operations. This includes
establishing a regimental technical observation post, repair and evacua-
tion groups, a regimental repair shop, and a damaged vehicle collection
point. TOP is the command post for the deputy commander for technical
affairs. From here he controls the evacuation and repair of regimental
vehicles which are damaged during combat and are beyond the capability of
battalion repair teams. The command net is monitored in the TOP.

83
8. REPAIR AND EVACATION GROUPS (REG)

When a tank becomes disabled and cannot be repaired at battalion

level, the regimental TOP dispatches a REG to the site. Priority is
given to clearing vehicles from routes. The regiment can organize
approximately three such REGs. More REGs may be provided by divisional
or higher level. Each REG consists of an armored recovery vehicle
(ARV) and one or two vans with spare parts. The REG is designed to
provide direct support to frontline units by performing on-the-spot
repairs. If the REG cannot repair a disabled tank, its ARV tows the
tank back to the regimental repair shop. Tanks damaged beyond the
repair capability of the regimental repair shop are left at the damaged
vehicle collection point, an area for holding disabled vehicles prior to
their evacuation by division to a higher echelon facility.

ARVT-54-T.

9. MEDICAL SUPPORT

Regiment is the lowest echelon to which doctors are assigned. The

chief medical officer, the regimental senior surgeon, organizes and
directs the activities of the regimental medical point. Staffed by
members of the medical company, this facility is normally located as
close to combat elements as is practicable. Wounded personnel are
evacuated by battalion medical orderlies to the battalion medical points
and from there to the regimental medical point in ambulances organic to
the medical company. Aside from emergency surgery, blood transfusions,
and documentation of casualties, the capabilities of the regimental
medical point are limited (only two doctors and a dentist are present).
Patients are either returned to their units or held for evacuation to
the division medical facility.

84
 CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

1. COMBAT ORGANIZATION

The tank regiment is organized for highly mobile operations designed

to exploit the tank's characteristic firepower, shock action, and
armored protection. The regiment, with supporting artillery, is capable
of limited independent combined arms operations in the European theater.
Normally, the tank regiment operates as part of a tank or motorized rifle
division; its organization enables it to be reinforced by other units.

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

The tank regiment's training and operations are closely supervised

and controlled by its commander. He controls tactical maneuver and
movement by radio or visual signals with the aid of a four-group func-
tional staff. Some staff officers have dual functions; i.e., in addition
to their staff duties, they act in the capacity of commander of
combat support or service support units. The work of the staff is
coordinated by the chief of staff who acts as second-in-command for the
regimental commander when necessary. The chief of staff is the only
officer who is authorized to issue orders in the absence of the commander.
The principal staff elements are:

a. Operations and intelligence (coordinates operations, intelligence,

communications, and personnel matters).

b. Technical (supervises the maintenance, recovery, evacuation, and

repair of the regiment's vehicles).

c. Rear service (has the responsiblility of supervising and coordi-

nating the regiment's logistic requirements).

d. Political (responsible for security and morale; the political

deputy reports to both the regimental commander and his superior political
officer on the divisional staff).

e. The tank regiment commander also has available the advice of

individual subordinate commanders who form an ad hoc group sometimes
referred to collectively as the chiefs of arms and services. The
majority of commanders of Soviet tank regiments possess the requisite
initiative, training, and skill to command their units effectively in
combat. Regimental staffs in general are well organized and fully
capable of coordinating the operation of the regiment. Radio communica-
tions available are adequate to support the Soviet concept of tactical
operations.

85
3. TRAINING
Soviet tank specialist crewmen receive individual skills training
during the first 6 months of their service. Loaders (not considered
specialists) receive only on-the-job training. Gunnery training usually
is conducted at company level. The majority of training above company
level is in tactical movement and rehearsal of rapid changes in forma-
tion—on which the Soviet concept of operations places so much stress.
Some 30 to 40 percent of field training is supposed to take place at
night, but a majority of this is concerned with either individual or march
skills. At least one regimental exercise is held each year. The regiment
may also take part in one or more divisional exercises each year.
Soviet tank crewmen appear to enjoy field training. Within the obvious
limitations imposed by a rapid changeover of conscript crewmen, Soviet
tank regiments are well trained in basic skills. On the other hand,
centralized control at the regimental level dampens the initiative of
junior leaders. Combined arms operations may, therefore, be expected to
show a lack of the high degree of flexibility which they require.

4. TACTICAL MOVEMENT

Soviet tank regiments maneuver by using a series of well-rehearsed

tactical formations. During each phase of operations, the regiment
and its attached and reinforcing units are deployed to provide combat
security and tactical balance within each major element. The purpose
is to allow for rapid concentration of forces and firepower without
extensive planning and to retain a balanced organization and formation
for combat with a minimum of control by radio. In general, Soviet tank
regiments are highly effective in executing tactical movement. However,
the characteristic pattern of their methods may enable an enemy, who is
equipped with good tactical intelligence and target acquisition capability,
to predict Soviet moves. Thus, Soviet concentrations may offer good
nuclear or conventional targets.

5. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

A tank regiment conducts reconnaissance operations both to provide

tactical intelligence for higher level units and to support its own
mission. While the regiment has an organic reconnaissance company, tank
companies frequently are assigned a reconnaissance mission. Officer
specialists usually accompany patrols tasked to collect terrain and
obstacle intelligence. The Soviet tank regiment trains for and is fully
capable of conducting a reconnaissance in force to discover and test
enemy dispositions and strengths or to develop other intelligence. The
need for continuous reconnaissance is a constant theme in Soviet military
writings. It is evident from treatment of the subject that many com-
manders lack either the required understanding or the skills involved in
reconnaissance.

86
6. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The Soviet tank regiment is organized, equipped, and trained for a

primarily offensive role. The meeting engagement is the most dynamic
operation in which the tank regiment is employed. It probably is the
most rehearsed type of operation. In this mission, the tank regiment
is used to destroy the advancing column of an enemy force, which itself
is on the offensive. This mission exploits to the fullest the charac-
teristic strengths of tank units. Also, tank regiments are employed in
deliberate or "breakthrough" attacks. Assaults usually are launched
against an objective which has already been either neutralized or sup-
pressed by conventional or nuclear fire. In such operations, a tank
regiment exploits a gap created by predominantly motorized rifle troops
or nuclear strikes. Exploitation may also be conducted to the flanks or
rear of an enemy defense through a gap created by firepower. Finally,
when the enemy can no longer conduct an organized defense and attempts to
disengage, pursuit operations are initiated to maintain relentless
pressure and destroy the enemy force. Based on their organization,
strength, equipment, and training, Soviet tank regiments have excellent
potential for conducting offensive operations.

7. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In defensive operations, which the Soviets regard as a temporary lull

in the offensive, tank regiments have a dual role. In the covering
force area, tanks use ambush and counterattack tactics to slow advancing
enemy units. In the main battle area, control of the units of a tank
regiment organic to a motorized rifle division is decentralized, and the
subunits themselves are deployed in both the antitank and counterattack
roles. Individual tanks have a number of alternate firing positions and
usually change their location from day to night. Counterattacks are
preplanned and rehearsed. If the tank regiment is in the second defen-
sive echelon of a division, such tasks will be planned for regimental
operations into first-echelon areas. The tank regiment's concentrated
firepower and mobility make it an effective antitank screen in covering
force and withdrawal operations.

8. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The Soviet concept of operations is reflected in the logistic support

of the tank regiment. In the offensive, maneuver elements carry only
basic combat supplies. Divisional units can bypass the regiment's
support system and carry out resupply of battalion size and smaller units
when required. With regard to maintenance, the Soviets are prepared to
replace an entire unit rather than conduct extensive piecemeal repairs or
replacements.

87
9. COMBAT POTENTIAL

The Soviet tank regiment is well organized, equipped, and trained for
offensive operations. In defensive battle it forms an effective counter-
attack force. It is well suited to the flexible and fast-moving opera-
tions expected in the European theater.

Re-emphasis of combined arms operations.

88
 SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLS

Tank. General symbol used to show a

0 tank regardless of type. Moving columns of vehicles showing.

Tanks

Amphibious tank.
APC's

Howitzers
Moving tank.

Command tank.' The horizontal bars

/
5 denote command level and may be
used on any basic symbol. /
+ One bar is for Platoon level. I
\
* Two bars are for Company level.

T Three bars are for Battalion level.

Moving column of tanks showing

projected direction of movement.

APC, general symbol showing an APC

Tanks in march column. Ü regardless of type.

0-^) Tan,ks moving in combat formation.

Moving APC.

v" ~V Tanks on firing line.

Q Amphibious APC.

Tanks, moving in combat formation, showing

primary arc of fire. The arrowed lines can be used Amphibious APC, moving, carrying
to show the left and right limits of primary arc of chemical specialists.
fire by using one line at each extremity.

A
Motorized infantry in defense.
Tank showing primary arc of fire.

X\ /
/ i
s Tank showing secondary arc of fire. Motorized rifle platoon in the attack.

(continued)

89
 SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SYMBOLS

Frontage designated for occupation

by motorized infantry. Light truck.

Fire Trench. •Radio set operating on High Frequency.

viAJJJJi

•Radio set operating on Very High

Area occupied by troops. Symbol inside
circle denotes type and command level
© Frequency.

of unit.
f) Booby trapped mine.

Land line ending in telephone handset.

£_' Anti-personnel mine.

Water crossing commander. Howitzer.

Battalion Deputy Commander in Howitzer unit moving.

command-observation post.
ßm

t___
Direction of main effort.
■1 •Howitzer target area.

Direction of main effort planned •Areas of concentrated tank fire.

-"U™ „«-
< by a commander.

<^> Self propelled gun.

•Note these are not Soviet symbols but

used for convenience.
V Basic symbol indicates radio communications
or direction of radio communications.

90
 DISTRIBUTION BY DIA/RDS-3C

TITLE: SOVIET TANK REGIMENT TACTICS (DDI-1220-12-78)

DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES DIA (Cont'd)

A009 OASD ATOM ENERGY B573 DIA/DB-4E1

A010 AFS COL B579 DIA/DN -2B2
A024 DEF NUCLEAR AGCY B580 DIA/DB -1B6 OPO
A085 NAT DEF UNIVERSITY B581 DIA/DB -IB
Al 04 OASD (CCC&I) B583 DIA/DB -ID
All 5 OACD ISA B584 DIA/DB -1B4 (25)
All 7 OASD (PA&E) B586 DIA/DB -4D1
A310 JCS/J-3 (SP OP DIV) B593 DIA/DB -1G2
A3! 5 JCS/SAGA B594 DIA/DB -IF (2)
A325 JCS/J-3 B597 DIA/DB -1G1
A335 JCS/J-4 B615 DIA/DN -2C
A340 JCS/J-5 MIL SEC B731 DIA/DB -5F
A353 JSTPS B737 DIA/RDS-3B3 (LIB) (5)
A034 DEP SEC DEF B787 DIA/DB -1F3
A097 DIA GRP ANMCC B362 DIA/DB -1B1
Al 02 OSD/DTACCS B364 DIA/DB -1B3
Al 24 OSD NET ASSESSMENT B563 DIA/DB -1E2
Al 37 OSD ISA/MBFR-PP B575 DIA/DB -1
A361 USLO SACLANT B576 DIA/DB -1A
A362 USDOCOLANDSOEAST B582 DIA/DB -IC
A363 USNMR SHAPE B777 DIA/DN -2B1
A368 USRMC/NATO B855 USDAO AUSTRIA
A835 US MIL LN MSN GER B856 USDAO BELGIUM
A916 MAAG IRAN B859 USDAO BULGARIA
B862 USDAO CANADA
B871 USDAO CZECHOSLAVAKA
DIA B872 USDAO DENMARK
B876 USDAO ENGLAND
B040 DIA/DIO B878 USDAO FINLAND
B055 DIA/DT-4B B879 USDAO FRANCE
B080 DIA/SWS B882 USDAU GREECE
B132 DIA/DE-1 B886 USDAO HUNGARY
B134 DIA/DE-2 B892 USDAO ISRAEL
B159 DIA/DT-1A1 B893 USDAO ITALY
B169 DIA/DT-2D B908 USDAO NETHERLANDS
B363 DIA/DB-1B2 B912 USDAO NORWAY
B364 DIA/DB-1B3 (2) B917 USDAO POLAND
B485 DIA/IS B918 USDAO PORTUGAL
B545 DIA/VP B919 USDAO ROMANIA
B565 DIA/DB-1F1 B925 USDAO SPAIN
B566 DIA/DB-1F2 B927 USDAO SWEDEN
B571 DIA/DB-4G1 B880 USDAO GERMANY

DL-1
TITLE: SOVIET TANK REGIMENT TACTICS (DDI-1220-12-78)

DIA (Cont'd) U & S COMMANDS (Cont'd)

B928 USDAO SWITZERLAND J576 COMPHIBGRU 2

B933 USDAO TURKEY
B934 USDAO USSR K005 CINCPAC
B939 USDAO YUGOSLAVIA K007 COMUSJAPAN
K020 COMUSTDC
K115 5TH AF
NAVY K300 IPAC (CODE IC-L)
K505 FICPAC
D008 NISC K658 COMUSNAVPHIL
D150 CMC (INT) (12)
D217 NAVWPNCEN L005 CINCSAC
D218 NRL WASH DC L040 SAC 544TH ARTW
D246 NAVSURFWPNCEN DAHL N005 USREDCOM
D496 DIR SSPO
D900 NFOIO OTHER
D971 0P-009F
D972 0P-009BIP P055 CIA/CRS/ADD/SD (14)
P085 STATE (5)
P090 NSA (5)
AIR FORCE
S030 FRD LIB OF CONG
EOT 6 AFIS/INC
EOT 7 AF/RDQA-W
EOT 8 AF/RDQA-C
E046 7602 AINTELG/INOAA
E053 AF/INAKA
E054 AF/INAKB
E100 TAC (9TH TIS/LDD)
E303 AF/INAP
E408 AFWL
E410 ADTC
E413 ESD
E437 AFIS/INI
E451 AUL/LSE
E500 3420 TCHTG/TTMNL

U & S COMMANDS TOTAL DIA DISTRIBUTION 268 COP]

H005 USCINCEUR
H006 USEUCOM DEFANALCTR
H010 SOTFE (J-3)
H101 USAFE 497RTG (IRC)
H306 DCSI US COM BERLIN
H301 COMBINEDARMSTNGCEN

DL-2
TITLE: SOVIET TANK REGIMENT TACTICS (DDI-1220-12-78)

ARMY DISTRIBUTION

Active Army, ARNG, USAR: To be distributed in accordance with

DA Form 12-9A requirements for Military Intelligence - B (Qty
rgr block No. 337). - 11,000 copies

MARINE CORPS DISTRIBUTION

Distribution code: TBA 2,300 copies

DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY: DIA DISTRIBUTION 268 copies

DIA STOCK J52_ copies
DIA TOTAL 420 copies
ARMY DISTRIBUTION 11,000 copies
MARINE CORPS DISTRIBUTION 2,300 copies
TOTAL PRINT 13,720 copies

«U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 19790—626-835/1678 REGION 3-1

DL-3