‘The rise of an organised left

directly caused the breakdown of

NOVEMBER 27, 2009

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 STUDENT ID: 081404078
Salvador Allende shook the world with his victory in 1970 in Chile; never before had a

Marxist leader been democratically elected. However, his presidency only lasted three

years. On the 11th of September 1973 President Allende was violently overthrown in a

coup d’état from La Moneda. After enjoying 40 years of unperturbed democracy, the

military intervention led to the end of democratic rule.

Before answering the question, it is imperative to define the ‘organised left’. An

‘organised left’ in this essay, refers to the Unidad Popular who pursued socialism via

democracy. The rise of an organised left hence directly contributed to the 1973 coup

and the subsequent breakdown of democracy because of various reasons: Allende’s

belief in democracy, the outcome of the 1970 elections, strong Right-wing opposition in

democratic institutions, political polarization, failed economic policy, disparity within

the Unidad Popular, and politicization of the armed forces. Nevertheless, it is crucial to

assess the impact of United States’ involvement as an indirect cause to holistically

analyze how the all factors combined led to the breakdown of democracy in Chile in

1973.

One of the reasons the rise of an organised left in Chile directly led to the breakdown of

democracy was because the idea of socialism via democracy itself is questioned.

Salvador Allende blindly and strongly believed in a democratic path to socialism. This

contradicted fundamental Marxist theory, as “Marx proclaimed that proletarian

revolution was inevitable, and predicted that it would occur through a spontaneous

uprising aimed at seizing control of the means of production” (Heywood 54). Neither

the Soviet Union, nor Cuba, nor China went through a democratic process to achieve

socialism. As Allende lived most of his political life during the forty years of

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democracy, which even Europeans envied, he was strongly attached to those democratic

values. Also, as he was democratically elected, he thought that he would be able to

achieve socialism through democratic institutions without encountering the amount of

opposition he actually faced. Allende strongly wanted to pioneer the achievement of

socialism through democratic means, a task we now know with the benefit of hindsight,

was difficult and one of the major causes of the 1973 coup.

One of the reasons why socialism via democratic institutions was not possible is evident

from the 1970 elections. The organised left was popular enough to attain victory in the

1970 elections, but that did not necessarily mean it achieved support of the majority.

There was a tripartite political division in Chile at this time. Undoubtedly, Allende won

the 1970 elections, but just by a mere 1.4% advantage over the runner up. “His vote

total was 36.3%, Alessandri got 34.9%, and Tomic only 27.8%” (Skidmore and Smith

127). Firstly, this implied that Allende did not have the support of the majority of the

population but only the support of about a third of the population. Secondly, it meant

that the Unidad Popular would hold only 40% of the seats in Congress, which created

massive legislative problems during Allende’s tenure. Lastly, it meant that most of the

governmental institutions would boycott the Unidad Popular’s policies. These were

manifested in the three years following the 1970 elections. Allende, stumbling upon

numerous obstacles, found it very difficult to implement his policies legally.

The Right-wing not only stubbornly refused to compromise with the Unidad Popular’s

agenda, but also did everything in their power to hinder Allende’s presidency. Firstly,

the Unidad Popular met resistance at many levels, especially in the democratic

institutions, because it did not have the vote of the majority. As the laws that the Unidad

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Popular passed contradicted the Right-wing economically, politically and socially, they

refused to pass any of them. The only decree which they did not strongly oppose was

that of nationalizing copper. This weakened the Unidad Popular’s democratic power in

Chile. Secondly, the judiciary was also clearly hostile to Allende’s policies as it was

staffed with Right-wingers. The controller-general disagreed with many of the laws the

Unidad Popular wanted to pass, which left Allende the only alternative of attaining the

signatures of all the Cabinet ministers, in order to stipulate the law. Because of this the

Unidad Popular was heavily criticised by the opposition. Lastly, the Right-wing was

also involved in social movements. They supported strikes and were part of Fatherland

and Liberty. For example they were very active in the October 1972 strike when 70,000

trucks and thousands of buses stop circulating. The Rightists did all they could to

facilitate the decline of the Unidad Popular. They were very successful as they managed

to create more chaos and propagate anti-Allende sentiments. The organised left was

therefore weakened by the Right-wing in two main ways: it was boycotted in the

democratic institutions, and it proliferate civil disobedience.

The rise of an organised left also led to the breakdown of democracy in Chile in the

1970s because of the polarization of politics. “Political polarization affected society to

an extreme degree” (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 98). In 1972, a stronger

Right-wing opposition developed as a result of the alliance of the Christian Democratic

Party with the National Party. Even though the Christian Democratic Party’s vote in

Congress in 1970 was crucial to Allende’s accession to power, due to the failed

economic policy of the Unidad Popular during the next two years, the Christian

Democratic Party finally opted for the opposition. In late 1972, frustrated with Unidad

Popular’s progress, the opposition condemned both the Unidad Popular’s policies and

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democracy in Chile. Both the Unidad Popular and their Right-wing opposition used

propaganda to gain support from the middle classes, as the middle classes played a

momentous role in maintaining Allende as president. On one hand, Leftists portrayed

the Rightists as robbers violently stripping the middle classes off every penny they

have. On the other hand, Rightists scared the middle classes with the prospects of a

despotic Communist state in Chile. It should be noted however that the Right had a

slight advantage over the Left because of the anti-Communist propaganda that the

United States had been spreading post-1945. Therefore the middle classes, out of fear of

a Communist military takeover, backed the opposition in the strikes of 1972 and 1973.

This considerably contributed in creating the grounds for General Pinochet’s takeover in

September 1973.

The Unidad Popular were united by the idea of achieving a socialist state, however,

disparity within the party tarnished its image, portraying it as being divided and weak.

“One of the main ideological differences which existed between the Communists and

Socialists concerned the nature of Chile’s socialist revolution” (Faúndez 194). On one

hand the moderates argued that it was of crucial importance to have a majority in

favour. They believed in achieving socialism through democratic institutions because

Chile lacked the geopolitical conditions for an armed revolution. According to them, the

first step was to unite the proletariat and for that reason they would even negotiate with

the Christian Democrats. They considered the massive landowners, industrialists and

bankers to be their enemies. On the other hand, the radicals believed that social

revolution was the only possible path to socialism. They hoped for a natural revolution

of the masses versus the exploiting oligarchy. Unlike the moderates, they did not trust

anybody but the proletariat. Having achieved democratic victory to them meant that it

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was time for armed struggle against the oppressor. Evidently, with only 36.3 % of the

peoples support we know that this is not true. Also it is important to point out that the

Unidad Popular was comprised of both, Socialists and Communists. Despite the strong

competition between them prior to the 1950s, they merged together in the 1950s for the

common cause of Socialism. However, in the 1970s, differing standpoints began to

emerge, which led to problems within the party. Disunity within the party gave the

opposition the opportunity to exploit this weakness. Often, the Unidad Popular was

criticized for this unclear stance, lack of organization, and powerless governance.

Allende’s economic policies led to hyperinflation and social devastation in 1972 and

1973. This was one of the factors that contributed the most to the breakdown of

democracy in the 1970s in Chile. As historian Gabriel Smirnow stated: “the economic

crisis was no secondary rupture of the constitutional system” (Smirnow 164). The

economic policies of the Unidad Popular aimed to achieve stability which would

complement their political goal of increasing middle-class vote. Their policies of

increasing salaries and freezing prices only managed to achieve stability on a short term

basis. In 1971 the situation was far more stable than it was in 1970, 1972, or 1973. In

1972 people felt the impact of the economic policies put into effect by the Unidad

Popular in 1970. Colossal inflation, scarcity of supplies, and the creation of a huge

black market were some of the results. Despite being put through economic unrest and

turmoil, the people continued to support the Unidad Popular. This is apparent in the

March 1973 vote. The economy was on the verge of crumbling but 44% of the people

still remained loyal to Salvador Allende. The middle classes however began supporting

the opposition as they began to fear the prospect of an oppressive Communist rule,

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following the economic crisis. This is one of the reasons why the strikes in 1972 and

1973 became violent.

Another significant factor that helped build momentum for the breakdown of democracy

in the 1970s in Chile was the changes within the armed forces and the lack of control

over it. The armed forces, even before the 1970 elections were involved in the process

of becoming politicized. General Roberto Viaux, one of the key players in the CIA-

backed Schneider plot was involved, along with soldiers at the Tacna Regiment in the

capital, in the takeover of facilities whilst protesting about their low salaries, and lack of

equipment. Also, the armed forces were well prepared to face communist threats. The

anti-Communist campaign that the United States led in the Americas prepared the

armed forces to resort to a coup in case of danger. Moreover, the United States began

preparing Latin American armies in counterinsurgency procedures. During the years of

Allende’s presidency, both the Right and the United States are to blame for the military

interference. “The right saw Allende’s impending presidency as a grave threat, and

some militant members especially within the army, began conspiring to block him”

(Skidmore and Smith 127). The United States and the Right-wing army officers

attempted a coup, sometimes referred to as Track I, in 1970. Also, General Schneider’s

assassination just proved that the armed forces had the potential to stage a golpe de

estado. Furthermore, it was clear that the Right-wing and the United States were

responsible for strikes, violence and chaos that set the grounds for a military takeover

leading to the 1973 military coup. Even though the Right and the United States are to

blame for the most of it, Allende and the Left are also contributed to politicizing the

armed forces. The Unidad Popular’s idea of forming a civil-military cabinet to put an

end to the October 1972 uprisings catalyzed the process of politicization, and now the

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military was involved in policy making. As Allende and the Unidad Popular believed in

the fact that the government-military hierarchy would be maintained, they did not think

it was necessary to intervene in the military.

It is clear that the organised left directly led to the breakdown of democracy in Chile in

the 1970s because of Allende’s faith in democracy, the product of the 1970 elections,

strong Right-wing resistance in democratic institutions, political polarization, Unidad

Popular’s economic policy, divisions within the Unidad Popular, and politicization of

the armed forces. However, along with the rise of an organized left, the collapse of

democracy in Chile can also be indirectly attributed to the involvement of the United

States. The involvement of the United States was indirect in the policies they used to

first impede Allende from assuming power, and second, to prevent him from

consolidating this power. The methods used were financial aid to Allende’s opponents,

CIA involvement in Track I and Track II, and the United States’ use of their

international power to cut off economic assistance to Chile. “The United States assumed

the role of protector of all the republics as a result of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. She

became the dominant power in the American continents” (Khanna 2). Anybody that

posed a threat to the United States national or international security would have to

succumb to United States intervention.

Amidst the Cold War, the United States wished for stability and friendly governments

in the international political arena. Even though the Nixon administration sought a

strategy of détente with the Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger worried about unfriendly

governments and political transformation everywhere else. They were anxious about the

prospect of Allende in power. “The Communist party’s ideological discourse mainly

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seemed to follow the international Communist movement” (Garretón 31). That’s why

they saw Chile as such a threat; sometimes even more of a threat than Cuba. This was

particularly because of the Allende’s policy of realizing socialism through democratic

means, “especially its impact in Latin America, the backyard of the United States”

(Oppenheim 104). Due to this, they were involved in Chile even before the 1970

elections.

Firstly, United States’ involvement can be seen as indirect because they funded the

opposition through the CIA. According to the 1975 Church Commission Report, the

United States spent $8 million USD in the period from 1970 to 1973 in Chile. This can

be first seen in the 1964 elections where they financed more than half of Eduardo Frei’s

campaign with $2,700,000 USD. Whether this made the leader of the Christian

Democratic Party win the election or not is still contentious, but it definitely contributed

to his victory. This financial aid was used as anti-Communist propaganda, especially in

the newspaper “El Mercurio” scaring people with the prospects of becoming another

Cuba. Similarly, the United States also funded the opposition in the 1970 elections, but

there was a difference. Unlike the 1964 election where the Christian Democratic Party

merged with the Radicals, they now ran for the elections alone. However, it cannot be

denied that the Soviet Union funded Salvador Allende’s campaign in 1970 with

$400,000 USD and also gave him a $50,000 USD subsidy. All of these combined gave

Allende the upper hand in the 1970s elections. The United States did not only provide

financial aid for the 1964 and 1970 elections, but also funded the anti-leftist propaganda

scheme throughout Allende’s presidency.

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Secondly, the United States had two plans to prevent Allende from consolidating power

in Chile, Track I and Track II. Even though Allende won the 1970 elections his

presidency was not assured because he did not have the majority of the votes. The

United States therefore tried to prevent Allende from assuming power constitutionally.

Track I consisted in bribing the Congress to vote for either Alessandri or Frei. If any of

these two were elected, Allende would have lost his chance to assume presidency. It is

unclear how much effort the United States put in this plan, but it is clear that their

involvement was indirect. Track II consisted of the CIA working with the Right-wing

army officers to plot a coup. The CIA claimed that their involvement was very limited.

Nevertheless, what is clear and accessible to the public is the fact that they supplied the

Right-wing officers with weapons and money. Both these strategies failed but the

United States’ indirect involvement was clear.

Lastly, the United States cut down the economic aid they provided Chile with and also

used its influence to prevent Chile from receiving foreign economic aid. This indirect

effort affected Chile’s economy greatly. The only aid that the United States was

providing was the one for the Chilean armed forces. It is not surprising that the United

States reduced Chile’s aid economically in 1967 from providing them with $260 million

USD to only lending them $3.8 million USD in 1973. Chile had antagonized the United

States, especially by acting against the interests of Anaconda, ITT and Kenecott, by

nationalizing most companies. International loaning organizations cut down their aid to

Chile from $93.8 million USD in 1967 to $9.4million USD in 1973. These created

severe economic issues in Chile. It definitely contributed indirectly to setting the ground

which facilitated Pinochet’s take over. “Strikes and counterdemonstrations had further

slowed an economy already hit by hyperinflation and capital flight” (Skidmore and

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Smith 131). It is therefore clear that the reduction in loans from the United States and

international organizations had a devastating impact on Chile’s economy.

It is evident that the breakdown of democracy in Chile was as a result of the cumulative

effect of direct and indirect factors. It is difficult to pinpoint which of the factors are

related to the breakdown of democracy in the 1970s in Chile, but it is even more

complicated to point out which had a direct or indirect impact, as the effects of direct

and indirect factors were intertwined. Nevertheless, the argument above illustrates how

on one hand the rise of an organised left directly led to the collapse of democracy due to

Allende’s devotion to democracy, the outcome of the 1970 elections, strong Right-wing

hostility in democratic institutions, political polarization, Unidad Popular’s economic

policy, dissection of the Unidad Popular into moderates and radicals, and involvement

of the armed forces in politics. On the other hand, it shows how United States’

involvement indirectly affected the breakdown of democracy by providing financial

help to Allende’s rivals, CIA’s contribution in Track I and Track II, and the United

States’ use of their global supremacy to cut off economic aid to Chile. These factors in

conjunction created a socio-political and economic environment that led to the ultimate

breakdown of democracy.

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