he post has just arrived and in it a very nice surprise, the

discovery that Jacques Seguela, one-time adviser to President

Mitterrand, now close confidant of President and Madame
Sarkozy (indeed he intoduced them), and something of a legend
in French political communications, has dedicated his latest book
to little old moi. With apologies for the missing accents here and in
the French bits of the long posting which follows - the dedication
to 'Le Pouvoir dans la Peau' (Power in the skin) reads 'A Alastair
Campbell, mon spin doctor prefere' (three missing accents in one
word - mes excuses sinceres). So what did I do for this honour,
you are asking? Well, perhaps the fact that he asked me to read
his book, and write a 'postface' assessment both of his writing and
of the issues he covers, and the fact that I said yes, has
something to do with it. He says some blushmakingly kind things
in his 'preface to the postface', which I will have to leave to French
readers of the whole thing (published by Plon). But for the largely
Anglophone visitors of this blog, I thought some of you might like
to read the said 'postface' in English (apart from the bits where I
quote direct from his book). I hope all those students who write
asking for help with dissertations will find something quotable in it.
Meanwhile I am off to Norway for a conference and a meeting with
the Norwegian Labour Party. I'm looking forward to being in the
country with the highest 'human development index' in the world,
and which showed such a mature response to the recent
massacre of Oslo and Utoya. Here is the postface to Le Pouvoir
dans la Peau Jacques Seguela writes about political campaigns
and communications not merely as an expert analyst, but as an
experienced practitioner. Hence his latest book contains both
insights worth heeding, but also enlivening tales of his own
experience. He is observer and participant; outsider looking in,
and insider looking out. There is much to look at, not least in
France with a Presidential election looming, and the outcome far
from easy to predict. We live in a world defined by the pace of
change, and whilst the velocity of that change has not always
impacted upon our political institutions, many of which would
remain recognisable to figures of history, it most certainly has
impacted upon political communications. As Seguela writes: ‘En 5
ans le monde de la communication a plus evolue que dans les
cents dernieres annees. ' Google, Youtube, Twitter, Facebook
have quickly entered our language and changed the way we
communicate, live our private lives, do business, do politics.
People do not believe politicians as much as they once did. Nor
do they believe the media. So who do we believe? We believe
each other. The power and the political potential of social
networks flows from that reality. Though fiercely modern in their
application, social networks in some ways take us back to the
politics of the village square. They are an electronic word of
mouth on a sometimes global scale. This has changed the way
people interact with each other and with their politicians. My first
campaign as spokesman and strategist for Tony Blair was in
1997, three years in the planning after he had become leader of
the Opposition Labour Party. Some of the principles of strategy
we applied back then would certainly apply to a modern day
election. But their tactical execution almost certainly would not.
Politicians and their strategists have to adapt to change as well as
lead it. Seguela gives some interesting insights into those who
have adapted well, and those who have done less well. He clearly
adores former President Lula of Brazil and you can feel his
yearning for a French leader who can somehow combine
hard-headed strategy with human empathy in the same way as a
man who left office with satisfaction ratings of 87percent. Seguela
probably remains best known in political circles for his role
advising Francois Mitterrand. Yet wheras I am 'tribal Labour', and
could not imagine supporting a Conservative Party candidate in
the UK, Seguela came out as a major supporter of Nicolas
Sarkozy. I wonder if one of the reasons was not a frustration that
large parts of the left in France remain eternally suspicious of
modern communications techniques and styles which, frankly, no
modern leader in a modern democracy can ignore. How he or she
adapts to, or uses, them is up to them. But you cannot stand
aside and imagine the world has not changed. If Lula is a star of
this book, so too is Barack Obama. American elections are of
enormous interest to all political campaign junkies, a category in
which both Seguela and I would almost certainly qualify. Much is
made of Obama's use of the internet, a relatively new
phenomenon in historical terms and one the young Senator used
brilliantly in his quest to become President. Yet though it was an
accurate expression of his modernity, underpinning its use were
some very old-fashioned campaign principles. He used it to turn
supporters into activists who both gave funds and also took his
campaign materials and ideas and ran their own campaigns for
him. Somehow he managed to make one of the most
professional, most disciplined and best funded campaigns in
history look like an enormous act of democratic participation. It
was less command and control - the model we certainly adopted
in 1997 and 2001, Labour's two landslide victories, easing off a
little for our third win in 2005 - than 'inspire and empower.' 'Yes
we can' not 'yes I can'. His supporters were more than supporters.
They were an active part of the campaign, and of the message.
The key to this was something that had nothing to do with
politicians and everything to do with science, technology and the
internet. Ask me who has had the most influence on campaigns in
recent times and I might be tempted to reply Tim Berners-Lee, the
man credited with gifting the web to the world. Its implications
have been far reaching in virtually all aspects of our lives, politics
and political campaigns foremost. The new household brand
names of the cyber era have not replaced good policy work,
messaging and organisation. But they have become essential
components of the execution of them in the campaign.
Mainstream conventional media remains important and influential,
not least because, bizarrely, in most democracies the
broadcasters continue to let the press set their agenda for them.
But a candidate who tries to stand against the tide of new media
will be making a big mistake, and missing big opportunities. If it
has changed so much in the last five years, how much more will it
change in the next five years? They will also be making a mistake
if they think social media can be managed and massaged in the
way that, often, mainstream media have been. The key - on this I
agree totally with Seguela - is authenticity. And that should be
good news for authentic political leaders and an authenticity
hungry public alike. The public tend to get to the point of an
election. Seguela has an interesting account of the last UK
election and in particular the first ever televised Leaders' Debates.
Though I had worked on three campaigns for Tony Blair, I am
sufficiently tribally Labour to have answered a call from his
successor, Gordon Brown, to go back to help him for his first
election campaign as leader in 2011. One of the roles I ended up
playing was that of David Cameron in Brown's preparatory
sessions for the TV debates. These debates mattered, that much
was sure. Election planning for Blair, I had always been doubtful
about the benefit of such debates in a Parliamentary democracy
where our leaders meet each other week in week out in the
crucible of the House of Commons. I was worried the media
would make them all about themselves, and that the policy issues
would be drowned out. So it proved. Yet in a way the public did
get to the point they wanted to. They did not particularly want
Labour back after 13 years in power. They did not particularly
yearn for David Cameron and a Conservative Party unsure about
its direction. So the third party leader emerged through the
middle. Nick Clegg was judged the clear winner by the instant
reactions of public and media alike. For a few days he seemed
impregnable. Yet come the vote, he did not make a huge
breakthrough. It was only because neither Labour nor the Tories
could get over the line that Clegg ended up as deputy Prime
Minister in a coalition government. The country had not been able
to make its mind up, delivered a muddled result and asked the
leaders to sort it out. The leader who came first and the leader
who came third did a deal to do so. I think Seguela is too kind to
Cameron. Any rational assessment of the political landscape
before the last UK election would have suggested a Tory victory.
Labour in power a long time; the economic crash; a Parliament
dominated by a scandal involving MPs' expenses; Iraq back in the
news because of the official Inquiry; Afghanistan not going well;
the press even more strongly in favour of a Tory win than they had
been for a Labour win in 1997, and vicious about Brown. Also the
Tories had big money to spend on the campaign and Labour did
not. Yet Cameron could not secure a majority. Why not? There is
no simple answer. The wonder of democracy lies in millions of
people having their own experiences, impressions and
judgements before deciding how to cast their vote. But the
strategist in me says the simple answer is that Cameron lacked
real strategic clarity. I think Sequela would agree that for all the
changes that technological and mediatic change has forced upon
political campaigns, strategy remains the key. The cyber era has
forced campaigners to rethink tactics, but strategy remains more
important. He and I are clearly in agreement that John McCain's
appointment of Sarah Palin as running mate, for example, was a
tactical masterstroke, but a strategic catastrophe. Tactically, he
excited his base, gave the media a new toy, and momentarily
unnnerved his opponent. Strategically he blew a hole through the
two central planks of his campaign - experience, and being
different from George Bush. In putting tactics before strategy, he
broke one of the golden rules of campaigning. Strategists like
rules. We like points of principle to act as anchors. I like the rules
in Seguela's Chapter 5. On vote pour une idee. Pas pour une
ideologie. On vote pour soi. Pas pour son candidat. On vote pour
un homme. Pas pour un parti. On vote pour le professionalisme.
Pas pour l'amateurisme. On vote pour un projet pas pour le rejet.
On vote pour le coeur. Pas pour le rancoeur. On vote pour le futur.
Pas pour le passe. On vote pour le bcbg. Pas pour le bling bling.
It is charmingly French that he illuminates the rule about voting for
le couer pas pour le rancour to a tale of love and sex. 'Si votre
femme vous trompe, ce n'est pas en couvrant d'insulte son amant
que vous le reconquerez. Mais en lui redonnant envie de vous. La
mecanique electorale est le meme, se faire elire c'est se faire
preferer.' That may seem glib. But politics is a human business. It
is about feelings as well as policies, emotion as well as reason.
People often talk about their political leaders as though in a
relationship with them. 'He's not listening ... Why on earth did he
do that? ... I've gone off him ... Oh, I still like him deep down.'
Political leaders sometimes talk of the people in the same way.
How many times did I sit in the back of a car with Tony Blair, or fly
over Britain in a ‘plane and he would look down and say 'God, I
wish I knew what they were thinking ... Do they still like us?' Back
at the time of our first landslide, talk of the country 'falling in love'
with Blair was widespread. Today, the biggest accusations of
betrayal against Blair will often come from those who 'fell in love'
most deeply at the outset of his leadership. Perhaps this trend
towards relationship politics is being exacerbated by the tendency
towards younger leaders. Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy, Merkel -
these are people who came to power much younger than their
counterparts down the centuries. Seguela, a man of a certain age,
remains fascinated by youth and its impact. The brand manager in
him can barely disguise his glee that Coca Cola, the drink of the
young trendy, is 130 years old. You can sense the excitement he
felt on meeting the young Americans - not born when Seguela
was advising Mitterrand - who had developed Obama's digital
strategy and so helped deliver a mailing list of 13m people. The
focus on youth also dominates his analysis of the political
consequences of the economic crash whose impact runs through
these pages, and offers some fascinating factoids - half of all
Europeans are over 50, whilst three quarters of Algerians are
under 25. There are as many people under 30 in China as in
Russia, the US and Australia combined, and in India twice as
many as in China. That too is a powerful force of global change,
and will have its impact on Western politics of the future. As to
what it all means for the next French elections, I don't know. But
this book provides part of the backdrop, economic and political. It
should make interesting reading for anyone involved in that
campaign. Whilst clearly still of the view Sarkozy was and is the
right choice for France, (though the polls at the time of writing
indicate he is in a minority) he throws out ideas and challenges for
right and left alike. As traditional lines are drawn, careful reading
might provoke candidates and parties to see that they should
always be looking to the next new ideas, not merely repackaging
the last new, let alone the old. I was in Paris recently as a guest of
the left think tank, Terra Nova, and met politicians, advisors,
militants, experts, journalists and bloggers. I came away with
some strong impressions. Firstly, virtually everyone told me that
President Sarkozy was hugely unpopular, and his ratings as low
as it was possible to go. Yet many of the same people told me he
could still win. They know he relishes a campaign. They suspect
he may have learned from some mistakes. Incumbency is a
powerful weapon. A comeback is a powerful narrative. And they
worried that with the President so unpopular, the economy
sluggish, social issues raw, and the left in power in many parts of
France, the PS should have been doing far better in the polls (to
which, incidentally, French politicians and media pay far too much
attention.) Of course this was pre selection of a PS candidate.
Many of the Socialists agreed with my analysis that once they had
chosen the candidate, they needed to unite behind that candidate,
resist their historic predilection for factionalism, run a campaign
that was fresh, energetic and based upon a programme totally
focused on the future and one which addressed people's
concerns. They agreed too that the PS could no longer look down
its nose at communication, but had to see it not just as an
essential element of campaigning, but a democratic duty at a time
when people have so many pressures on their lives and living
standards, and concerns about the world around them. But
though they agreed with the analysis, some worried about the
Party’s capacity to deliver upon it. The fear of another defeat
ought to be enough, surely, to deliver on the first and essential
part: unity. As someone on the progressive side of the political
divide, I continue to think the French left's over intellectualisation
of politics, its focus on never-ending debate instead of agreement
around big points and unity behind one accepted leader remains a
problem. I added that I felt the way was wide open for someone to
come along and set out, with total honesty and clarity, the
challenges ahead, the limitations of what one leader or one
country can do, but explain the world and begin to shape
direction. In other words, what I sensed behind the seeming
confusion and rather disgruntled nature of French opinion was a
real desire for leadership of a strategic rather than a tactical
nature. There too, there were concerns, not least because of
memories of the negative impact on Lionel Jospin’s campaign
when he stated – truthfully – that the State could not do
everything. I heard a lot about Marine Le Pen and certainly the
polls tell a good story for the leader of the Front National. She has
certainly shown she can mount a campaign and get the media to
accept a sense of change. When even her enemies refer to as
Marine, rather than the more toxic Le Pen, that is something of a
success. But whenever I have heard her, I have not heard a
powerful argument for the future of France. So France enters a
fascinating period, where not one single person I met predicted
the outcome of either first or second round without at least some
doubt in their eyes. When things are so tight, communications can
make the difference. It is not a dirty word. I don't agree with all of
Seguela’s analysis. I don't accept that only four US presidents
radically changed the country. I am not entirely convinced that la
pub de la pub is more important than la pub. I am not sure that
David Cameron's loss of a child had the political impact Seguela
thinks it did. I think Brits will be also be surprised at the dominant
role he gives in the Tory campaign to his colleague David Jones. I
think he overstates how Sarkozy is seen in the world. I agree with
him that we need to be cautious about the potential abuse of the
internet which has no global governance or regulation to match,
but I'm not sure I agree this risks being 'en bras arme de
l'anarchie'. But it is a book full of understanding of some of the big
themes and the small details required for a successful
campaigning mindset. He is, as one would expect for someone
who has been close to different leaders, clued up on the
importance of good chemistry between leader and strategist. He
understands the importance of body language as well as
language. He knows the importance of emotion as well as reason.
He understands how the web is changing politics. One of my
favourite phrases is that 'life is on the record'. He has a different
way of putting it. 'Le "off" n'existe plus desormais. Tout ce que
vous direz pourra se retourner contre vous.' It is why the whole
'droit d'etre oublie' is emerging as a debate. How many of the
young men and women today filling the web with pictures and
confessions from their private lives may end up running for office
one day, and regretting their openness? On verra. Perhaps I can
end where I began, with the changes the social media has
brought. At the last election Labour did not do poster campaigns.
This was a shame. In previous campaigns we had had some
brilliant posters. But under Gordon Brown, we had very little
money for the campaign. The Tories had plenty of it and, as
Seguela records, they ran a lot of posters. One of their most
expensive billboard campaigns was of a giant photo of Cameron
with an anti-Labour slogan 'we can't go on like this.' Someone
noticed that the Tory leader's face had been airbrushed. This fact
became the source of thousands of tweets. Then someone set up
a website [Link] where people could send their
own, largely anti-Tory, versions of this poster. These were sent in
in their thousands, and many were much better, wittier and more
politically devastating than the original. I'll tell you when I knew
they had wasted their money - when the newspapers carried
photos of one giant poster site which had been defaced ...
Cameron's hair had been replaced with a painted version of Elvis
Presley's hair, and to the slogan 'we can't go on like this' had been
added the words of one of Elvis' most famous songs ... 'with
suspicious minds'. The combination of the internet and wit had
reduced the political impact of a hugely expensive campaign to
zero. That is my final thought as you begin to read Jacques
Seguela’s account. It is a quote from a former colleague, Labour
MP Hazel Blears ... 'Campa