Equality

The earliest use of the term ‘equal’, still widely adopted in everyday language, was to refer to identical
physical characteristics. In this sense, two cups can be said to contain ‘equal’ quantities of water; a runner
is said to ‘equal’ the 100-metre world record; and the price of a bottle of expensive wine may ‘equal’ the
cost of a television set. In political theory, however, a clear distinction is made between equality and ideas
such as ‘uniformity’ and ‘sameness’. Although some critics of equality have tried to ease their task by
reducing equality to simple uniformity, linking it thereby to regimentation and social engineering, no
serious political thinker has ever advocated absolute equality in all things. Equality is not the enemy of
human diversity, nor is its goal to make everyone alike. Indeed, egalitarians (from the French égalité) may
accept the uniqueness of each human individual, and perhaps also acknowledge that people are born with
different talents, skills, attributes and so on. Their goal, though, is to establish the legal, political or social
conditions in which people would be able to enjoy equally worthwhile and satisfying lives. Equality, in
other words, is not about blanket uniformity, but rather is about ‘levelling’ those conditions of social
existence which are thought to be crucial to human well-being. However, equality is in danger of
degenerating into a mere political slogan unless we are able to answer the question ‘equality of what?’ In
what should people be equal, when, how, where and why?
There are as many forms of equality as there are ways of comparing the conditions of human existence.
It is thus possible to talk about moral equality, legal equality, political equality, social equality, sexual
equality, racial equality and so on. Moreover, the principle of equality has assumed a number of forms, the
most significant of which have been formal equality, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.
Although the ideas of equal opportunities and equal outcome developed out of an original commitment to
formal equality, there are times when they point in very different directions. For instance, supporters of
legal equality may roundly denounce equality of opportunities when this implies discrimination in favour
of the poor or disadvantaged. Similarly, advocates of social equality may attack the notion of equal
opportunities on the grounds that it amounts to the right to be unequal. Egalitarianism thus encompasses a
broad range of views, and its political character has been the subject of deep disagreement.

Formal equality
The earliest notion of equality to have had an impact on political thought is what may be called
‘foundational’ equality, suggesting that all people are equal by virtue of their shared human essence. Such
an idea arose out of the natural rights theories that dominated political thought in the seventeenth and
eighteenth

centuries. The American Declaration of Independence (1776), for example, declares simply that, ‘All men
are created equal’, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen (1789) states that, ‘Men
are born and remain free and equal in rights’. However, what form of equality did such high-sounding
declarations endorse? They certainly did not constitute descriptive statements about the human condition,
as the eighteenth century was a period of ingrained privilege and stark social inequality. Rather, these were
normative assertions about the moral worth of each human life. Human beings are ‘equal’ in the simple
sense that they are all ‘human’. They are ‘born’ or ‘created’ equal; they are equal ‘in the sight of God’. But
what does this form of equality imply in practice?
In the early modern period, foundational equality was most definitely not associated with the idea of
equal opportunities, still less with any notion of equal wealth and social position. Thinkers such as John
Locke (see p. 255) saw no contradiction in endorsing the idea that ‘all men are created equal’ at the same
time as defending absolute property rights and the restriction of the franchise to property owners – to say
nothing of the exclusion of the entire female sex from the category of ‘human beings’. ‘Men’ are equal
only in the sense that all human beings are invested with identical natural rights, however these might be
defined. The idea that all human beings are possessors of equal rights is the basis of what is usually called
‘formal’ equality. Formal equality implies that, by virtue of their common humanity, each person is entitled
to be treated equally by the rules of social practice. As such, it is a procedural rule which grants each
person equal freedom to act however they may choose and to make of their lives whatever they are capable
of doing, without regard to the opportunities, resources or wealth they start with.
The most obvious, and perhaps most important, manifestation of formal equality is the principle of legal
equality, or ‘equality before the law’. This holds that the law should treat each person as an individual,
showing no regard to their social background, religion, race, colour, gender and so forth. Justice, in this
sense, should be ‘blind’ to all factors other than those relevant to the case before the court, and notably the
evidence presented. Legal equality is thus the cornerstone of the rule of law, discussed in Chapter 7. The
principle of formal equality is, however, essentially negative: it is very largely confined to the task of
eradicating special privileges. This was evident in the fact that calls for formal equality were first made in
the hope of breaking down the hierarchy of ranks and orders which had survived from feudal times; its
enemy was aristocratic privilege. It also explains why formal equality meets with near-universal approval,
enjoying support from conservatives (see p. 258) and liberals (see p. 18) no less than from socialists.
Indeed, this is one form of equality that is seldom thought to need justification: privileges granted to one
class of persons on grounds of ‘accidents of birth’ such as gender, colour, creed or religion, are now widely
regarded as simple bigotry or irrational prejudice.

Nevertheless, many regard formal equality as a very limited notion, one which, if left on its own, may be
incapable of fostering genuine equality. This is what the French novelist Anatole France sought to convey
when in The Red Lily (1894) he ridiculed ‘the majestic equality of the law which forbids rich and poor
alike to steal bread and to sleep under bridges’. The limitations of formal equality can be seen in relation to
both racial and sexual equality. Formal equality requires that no one should be disadvantaged on grounds of
their race or gender, and would be consistent, for instance, with laws prohibiting such discrimination.
However, merely to ban racial discrimination does not necessarily counter culturally ingrained or
‘institutionalized’ racism, nor does it address the economic or social disadvantages from which racial
minorities may suffer. Karl Marx (see p. 317) examined this problem in his essay ‘On the Jewish Question’
([1844] 1967). Marx belittled attempts to bring about Jewish ‘political emancipation’ through the
acquisition of equal civil rights and liberties, advocating instead ‘human emancipation’, the emancipation
not only of the Jews but of all people from the tyranny of class oppression. Marxists have thus portrayed
legal equality as ‘market’ or ‘bourgeois’ equality, arguing that it operates as little more than a façade,
serving to disguise the reality of exploitation and economic inequality.
The struggle for sexual equality has also involved the call for legal equality, or ‘equal rights’. Early
feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft (see p. 272) and J. S. Mill (see p. 241), for instance, based their
arguments on liberal individualism, holding that gender is irrelevant to public life because each ‘person’ is
entitled to the same rights in education, law, politics and so on. Wollstonecraft thus argued that women
should be judged as human beings, regardless of the ‘distinction of sex’. However, although women have
gone a long way to achieving formal equality with men in many modern societies, significant cultural,
social and political inequalities persist. Many modern feminists have, as a result, moved beyond the idea of
equal rights and endorsed more radical notions of equality. Socialist feminists, for example, seek to bring
about the advancement of women largely through social equality. They highlight the economic inequalities
which enable men to be ‘breadwinners’ while women may remain either unwaged housewives or be
confined to low-paid and poor-status occupations. Radical feminists, for their part, argue that formal
equality is inadequate because it applies only to public life and ignores the fact that patriarchy, ‘rule by the
male’, is rooted in the unequal structure of family and personal life.

Equality of opportunity
The more radical notion of equal opportunities is often thought to have followed naturally from the idea of
formal equality. Despite links between the two, they can have very different implications, and, as will
become apparent later, a consis-

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT (1759–97)

 British social theorist and feminist. Drawn into radical politics by the French
Revolution, Wollstonecraft was part of a creative and intellectual circle that
included her husband, the anarchist William Godwin (see p. 313). She died
giving birth to her daughter, Mary, who later married the poet Shelley and wrote
Frankenstein.

Wollstonecraft developed the first systematic feminist critique some 50 years

before the emergence of the female suffrage movement. Her feminism, which
was influenced by Lockean liberalism as well as by the democratic radicalism of
Rousseau (see p. 165), even though she objected to his exclusion of women
from citizenship, was characterized by a belief in reason and a radical humanist
commitment to equality. In A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) she
criticized the structures and practices of British government from the standpoint
of what she called the ‘rights of humanity’. Her best-known work, A Vindication of
the Rights of Women ([1792] 1967), emphasized the equal rights of women on
the basis of the notion of ‘personhood’. She claimed that the ‘distinction of sex’
would become unimportant in political and social life as women gained access to
education and were regarded as rational creatures in their own right. However,
Wollstonecraft’s work did not merely stress civil and political rights but also
developed a more complex analysis of women as the objects and subjects of
desire, and also presented the domestic sphere as a model of community and
social order.
tent application of equality of opportunity may be in danger of violating the principle of formal equality.
The idea of equal opportunities can be found in the writings of Plato (see p. 22), who proposed that social
position should be based strictly on individual ability and effort, and that the educational system should
offer all children an equal chance to realize their talents. The concept is widely endorsed by modern
ideologies and is embraced as a fundamental principle by political parties of almost every shade of opinion.
Social democrats (see p. 276) and modern liberals (see p. 248) believe that equal opportunity is the
cornerstone of social justice, and modern conservatives, late converts to the cause, now extol the virtues of
what they call a ‘classless society’, meaning a society based on individual effort, not, as Marx used the
term, common ownership.
Formal equality focuses on the status people enjoy either as human beings or in the eyes of the law; it
does not address their ‘opportunities’, the circumstances in which they live and the chances or prospects
available to them. Equality of opportunity is concerned principally with initial conditions, with the starting
point of life. Very often sporting metaphors are employed to convey this, such as an ‘equal start’ in life, or
that life should be played on a ‘level playing field’. To confine equality to the initial circumstances of life,
however, can have radically inegalitarian implications. Advocates of equal opportunities do not expect all
runners to finish a race in line together, simply because they left the starting

blocks at the same time. Indeed, in the eyes of many, it is precisely the ‘equal start’ to the race which
legitimizes its unequal outcome, the difference between winning and losing. Unequal performance can be
put down, quite simply, to differences in natural ability. In effect, the principle of equal opportunity implies
an ‘equal opportunity to realize one’s unequal potential’. This notion is based on the belief that there are
two forms of equality, one acceptable, the other unacceptable. Natural inequality, arising from personal
talents, skills, hard work and so on, is considered to be either inevitable or morally ‘right’; people, in this
sense, have a ‘right to be unequal’. However, inequalities that are bred by social circumstances, such as
poverty, homelessness or unemployment, are morally ‘wrong’, because they allow some to start the race of
life halfway down the running track while other competitors may not even have arrived at the stadium.
Equality of opportunity points towards an inegalitarian ideal, but a very particular one: a meritocratic
society. The term meritocracy was coined by Michael Young (1958) to refer to rule by a talented or
intellectual elite, merit being defined as IQ + effort (although Young used the term satirically). In a
meritocratic society, both success and failure are ‘personal’ achievements, reflecting the simple fact that
while some are born with skills and a willingness to work hard, others either lack talent or are lazy. Not
only is such inequality morally justified, but it also provides a powerful incentive to individual effort by
encouraging people to realize whatever talents they may possess. However, the idea of meritocracy relies
heavily on the ability clearly to distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ causes of inequality.
Psychologists such as Hans Eysenck (1973) and Arthur Jensen (1980) championed the cause of natural
inequality and advocated the use of so-called IQ tests which they claimed could measure innate
intelligence. In practice, however, performance in such tests is influenced by a wide range of social and
cultural factors which contaminate any estimate of ‘natural’ ability. Thus, wherever systems of selective
education have been introduced, based on examination, they invariably result in a process of social
selection, which systematically favours children from middle-class homes, whose parents have themselves
usually done well at school. The problem is that if natural talent cannot reliably be disentangled from social
influences the very idea of ‘natural inequality’ may have to be abandoned, and with it the principle of
meritocracy.
The attraction of equality of opportunity is nevertheless potent. In particular, it offers the prospect of
maximizing an equal liberty for all. Equal opportunities means, put simply, the removal of obstacles that
stand in the way of personal development and self-realization, a right that should surely be enjoyed by all
citizens. Many applications of the principle are no longer controversial. It is widely accepted, for instance,
that careers should be open to talent and that promotion should be based on ability. However, some have
argued that a rigorous and consistent application of the principle may lead to widespread state intervention
in social and personal life, threatening individual liberty and perhaps violating

the principle of formal equality. For example, the family could be regarded as one of the major obstacles to
the achievement of equal opportunities. Through the inheritance of wealth and the provision of different
levels of parental encouragement, social stability and material affluence, the family ensures that people do
not have an equal start in life. To push equality of opportunity to its extreme would mean contemplating the
banning of inheritance and regulating family life through a wide range of compensatory programmes. In
this sense, there may be a trade-off between equality and freedom, with the need for a balance to be struck
between the demand to equalize opportunities on the one hand, and the need to protect individual rights and
freedoms on the other.
One particularly difficult issue which the principle of equal opportunity leads to is that of reverse or
‘positive’ discrimination. This is a policy, in an early form associated with ‘affirmative action’ on race
issues in the USA, which discriminates in favour of disadvantaged groups in the hope of compensating for
past injustices. Such a policy can clearly be justified in terms of equal opportunity. When, in this case,
racial minorities are socially underprivileged, merely to grant them formal equality does not give them a
meaningful opportunity to gain an education, pursue a career or enter political life. This was recognized,
for instance, in the US Supreme Court case Regents of the University of California v Bakke (1978), which
upheld the principle of reverse discrimination in educational admissions. In this sense, reverse
discrimination operates rather like the handicap system in golf to ensure fair and equal competition
between unequal parties. Some argue that this application of the principle amounts to ‘equal but different’
treatment and so conforms to the strictures of formal equality. Others, however, suggest that unequal
treatment, albeit in an attempt to compensate for previous disadvantage, must of necessity violate the
principle of equal rights. In the Bakke case, for example, a student was denied a university place by the
admission of other candidates with poorer educational records than his own.

Equality of outcome
The idea of an equality of outcome is the most radical and controversial face of egalitarianism. Whereas
equal opportunities requires that significant steps are taken towards achieving greater social and economic
equality, far more dramatic changes are necessary if ‘outcomes’ are to be equalized. This is a goal which
uncovers a fundamental ideological divide: socialists, communists and some anarchists regard a high level
of social equality as a fundamental goal, while conservatives and liberals believe that it is immoral or
unnatural.
A concern with ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘opportunities’ shifts attention away from the starting point of life
to its end results, from chances to rewards. Equality of outcome implies that all runners finish the race in
line together,
regardless of their starting point and the speed at which they run. As such, equality of outcomes does not
merely differ from formal equality and equal opportunities but may positively contradict them. Although it
is sometimes unclear whether ‘outcome’ refers to resources or to levels of welfare or fulfilment, the
demand for equal outcomes is most commonly associated with the idea of material or social equality, an
equality of social circumstances, living conditions and possibly even wages. For many, however, material
equality is merely one of a number of desirable goals, and a trade-off must be negotiated between social
equality and concerns such as individual liberty and economic incentives. This was, for instance, reflected
in the stance of J.-J. Rousseau (see p. 165), who, though a keen advocate of private property, proposed that
‘no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself’. This
principle is consistent with the modern idea of a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, which aims to
narrow ‘distributive’ inequalities rather than eradicate them altogether. This results in a theory of relative
equality, which accepts rather that social equality can become ‘excessive’, for example when it discourages
individual effort and hard work.
Fundamentalist socialists, however, have believed a far higher degree of social equality to be both
possible and desirable, and have even, at times, endorsed a theory of absolute equality. A key goal of
Marxism (see p. 75) has therefore been the abolition of the class system brought about by the
collectivization of productive wealth. Perhaps the most famous experiment in such radical egalitarianism
took place in China, under the so-called ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966–69). During this period, not only did
militant Red Guards attack ‘capitalist roaders’ and denounce wage differentials and all forms of privilege
and hierarchy, but even competitive sports like football were banned. Supporters of equality of outcome,
whether in its moderate or radical sense, usually argue that it is the most vital form of equality, since,
without it, other forms of equality are a sham. Equal legal and civil rights are, for example, of little benefit
to citizens who do not possess a secure job, a decent wage, a roof over their head and so on. Moreover, the
doctrine of equal opportunities is commonly used to defend material inequalities by creating the myth that
these reflect ‘natural’ rather than ‘social’ factors. Although defenders of social equality rarely call on the
concept of ‘natural’ equality, they commonly argue that differences among human beings more often result
from unequal treatment by society than they do from unequal natural endowment.
Equality of outcome can also be justified on the grounds that it is a prerequisite for securing individual
liberty. As far as the individual is concerned, a certain level of material prosperity is essential if people are
to lead worthwhile and fulfilled lives, an expectation to which each of us is surely entitled. Rousseau feared
that material inequality would lead, in effect, to the enslavement of the poor and deprive them of both
moral and intellectual autonomy. At the same time, inequality would corrupt the rich, helping to make them
selfish, acquisitive