RUAS, SOL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2.

0, 2026

Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2026

[Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indica]

—IN THE MATTER BETWEEN—

Dr. AYAAN MEHRA & ANR......................................................................... PETITIONER

VERSUS

REPUBLIC OF INDICA & ORS.................................................................. RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO

THE HON’BLE BENCH OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

– MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT -

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

[Link] PARTICULARS [Link].

1 Index Of Authorities 3
2 Table Of Cases 4
3 List Of Abbreviations 6
4 Statement of Jurisdiction 7
5 Statement Of Facts 8
6 Statement Of Issues 9
7 Summary Of Arguments 10
8 DETAILED ARGUMENTS 12
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN ITS 12
PRESENT FORM AND WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE LOCUS
STANDI TO CHALLENGE THE MEASURES COLLECTIVELY?
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DIRECTIVE OF THE ECI IS 15
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS A LAWFUL RESTRICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 19(2) AND WITHIN THE ECI'S CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
UNDER ARTICLE 324?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ACTIVATION OF THE NETRA-GRID 19

PROGRAMME BY THE MHA VIOLATES ARTICLES 19 AND 21,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, OR WHETHER IT CONSTITUTES
A LAWFUL SURVEILLANCE MECHANISM UNDER THE IT ACT AND THE
AMENDED IT RULES, 2021?

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY (SYNTHETIC MEDIA) 22

ORDINANCE, 2026 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ORDINANCE-MAKING POWER UNDER ARTICLE 123 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, OR WHETHER IT AMOUNTS TO A COLOURABLE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER?

ISSUE 5: WHETHER THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THE 25

REGISTRATION OF THE FIR AND THE SEIZURE OF THE DEVICE,
VIOLATES ARTICLE 14, 19, AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND THE
RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL?

ISSUE 6: WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL 27

COMMUNICATION DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, COMPRISING THE
ECI DIRECTIVE, THE ORDINANCE, AND THE NETRA-GRID OPERATION,
INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY AFFECT THE BASIC STRUCTURE
OF THE CONSTITUTION BY UNDERMINING FREE AND FAIR
ELECTIONS?

9 PRAYER 30

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES:

[Link]. AUTHORITY
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
1.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
2.

3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (PROCEDURE AND

SAFEGUARDS FOR INTERCEPTION, MONITORING AND
DECRYPTION OF INFORMATION) RULES, 2009

4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES

AND DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) AMENDMENT RULES,
2026
5. DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023

6. BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

7. BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023

8. BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023

9. REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1951

10. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

11. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

12. INDIAN TELEGRAPH ACT, 1885

13. MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS:

[Link]. AUTHORITY

1. EUROPEAN UNION ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACT, 2024 (REGULATION (EU)

2024/1689)

2. G7 HIROSHIMA AI PROCESS (2023)

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TABLE OF CASES

[Link]. CASE TITLE CITATION

1. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

2. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC

2299

3. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405

4. Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India (2021) 2 SCC 427

5. Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294

1992 SUPP (1)

6. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal SCC
335

7. Romila Thapar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC

753

8. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar (1976) 1 SCC 671

9. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378

10. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248

11. Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 204

12. BRIJ BHUSHAN V. STATE OF DELHI AIR 1950 SC 129

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13. ANURADHA BHASIN V. UNION OF INDIA (2020) 3 SCC 637

14. Virendra v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 896

15. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1

16. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574

17. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 788

18. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301

19. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC

600

20. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1

(1993) SUPP 4
21. Union of India v. W.N. Chadha SCC
260

22. Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226

23. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1

24. Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) 9 SCC 501

25. MODERN DENTAL COLLEGE V. STATE OF MADHYA (2016) 7 SCC 353

PRADESH

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
ART. ARTICLE
BNS BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023
BNSS BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023
BSA BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023
CRPC CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
DPDP ACT DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023
ECI ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDICA
EU EUROPEAN UNION
FIR FIRST INFORMATION REPORT
IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
IT ACT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
IT RULES INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES AND
DIGITAL
MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2021
MCC MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT
MHA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
MLAT MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY
R/W READ WITH
RPA REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1951
S. / SS. SECTION / SECTIONS
SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
SC SUPREME COURT
SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SUPP. SUPPLEMENTARY
UOI UNION OF INDIA
V. VERSUS
WAVV (SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM REFERENCED IN THE PROPOSITION)
W.E.F. WITH EFFECT FROM
W.R.T. WITH REFERENCE TO
WRIT PET. WRIT PETITION

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioners have preferred the present Writ Petition under Article 321 of the Constitution
of Indica before this Hon'ble Court. The Respondents respectfully submit that while this
Hon'ble Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain the petition, the same is not maintainable in
its entirety for the following reasons:

First, with respect to the challenge to the criminal investigation and the First Information
Report registered by the State of Dakshin Pradesh, the settled law in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 3352, and Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, (2021) 2 SCC
4273, establishes that the jurisdiction under Article 324 is not ordinarily exercisable to quash an
FIR or stall a criminal investigation at its nascent stage when alternate remedies under Section
528 of BNSS5 are available. The Respondents respectfully submit that the jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble Court, if at all to be exercised, should be confined to the substantial constitutional
questions alone.

The Respondents, however, without prejudice to the above preliminary submission, address
the Constitution Bench on the merits of all challenges raised.

1
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
2
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 335 (India).
3
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, (2021) 2 S.C.C. 427, 444 (India).
4
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
5
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, § 528 (India).

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

The Republic of Indica conducted the 2026 General Elections, during which political parties
extensively used AI-assisted campaign tools and digital outreach platforms. On 18 February
2026, a 47-second video surfaced on social media platforms, particularly WAVV, allegedly
showing Dr. Ayaan Mehra accepting cash and threatening unrest if his party lost the election.

Within six hours, the video crossed 60 million views, leading to incidents of public disorder in
six districts across two States. Platform analysis indicated coordinated amplification through
newly created accounts.

II. CONFLICTING FORENSIC FINDINGS AND INVESTIGATION

On 19 February 2026, conflicting forensic reports emerged regarding the authenticity of the
video. While one laboratory termed it “highly likely” to be synthetic, government experts
sought further examination, and another report described it as a “hybrid reconstruction.”

On 21 February 2026, the State of Dakshin Pradesh registered an FIR against unknown persons
for conspiracy, digital impersonation, IT Act offences, and promotion of enmity.

Later, it was revealed that one private report relied on fabricated metadata, and a senior WAVV
officer alleged institutional pressure behind earlier statements.

III. GOVERNMENT AND REGULATORY RESPONSE

On 20 February 2026, the Election Commission of Indica directed immediate removal of the
video, temporary pre-clearance of political video content, and mandatory provenance labelling
of political advertisements.

Simultaneously, the Ministry of Home Affairs activated the NETRA-GRID programme,

requiring intermediaries and telecom providers to share real-time metadata and algorithmic
indicators of coordinated inauthentic activity.

On 25 February 2026, the President promulgated the Electoral Integrity (Synthetic Media)
Ordinance, 2026, to address synthetic political media during elections.

The Supreme Court has referred the consolidated matters to a Constitution Bench for
adjudication.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN ITS PRESENT

FORM AND WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE LOCUS STANDI TO
CHALLENGE THE MEASURES COLLECTIVELY?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DIRECTIVE OF THE ECI IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS A LAWFUL RESTRICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 19(2) AND WITHIN THE ECI'S CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
UNDER ARTICLE 324?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE ACTIVATION OF THE NETRA-GRID PROGRAMME BY THE

MHA VIOLATES ARTICLES 19 AND 21, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, OR WHETHER IT CONSTITUTES A LAWFUL SURVEILLANCE
MECHANISM UNDER THE IT ACT AND THE AMENDED IT RULES, 2021?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY (SYNTHETIC MEDIA)

ORDINANCE, 2026 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ORDINANCE-MAKING POWER UNDER ARTICLE 123 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, OR WHETHER IT AMOUNTS TO A COLOURABLE

ISSUE 5

WHETHER THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THE

REGISTRATION OF THE FIR AND THE SEIZURE OF THE DEVICE,
VIOLATES ARTICLE 14, 19, AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING
THE RIGHT AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND THE RIGHT TO FAIR

ISSUE 6

WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL

COMMUNICATION DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, COMPRISING THE
ECI DIRECTIVE, THE ORDINANCE, AND THE NETRA-GRID OPERATION,
INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY AFFECT THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY UNDERMINING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1:

The challenge to the criminal investigation is not maintainable under Article 32 in the face of
alternate remedies. The law is settled that Article 32 is not a substitute for Section 482 CrPC
(Section 528 BNSS). Further, the Digital Liberty Forum lacks direct personal injury from the
measures challenged.

ISSUE 2:

The Election Commission's plenary powers under Article 324 are sui generis and have been
upheld by this Court as extending to all measures necessary for the conduct of free and fair
elections. The directive is a temporary, targeted, and proportionate measure justified by the
imminent threat to electoral integrity. The pre-clearance requirement is not prior restraint in
the classical sense; it is a temporary verification mechanism. The provenance labelling
requirement does not restrict content but merely ensures transparency.

ISSUE 3:

The NETRA-GRID programme targets coordinated inauthentic activity and synthetic influence
operations. The IT Act, the IT Rules 2021 as amended in 2026, and the DPDP Act provide an
adequate statutory basis. The collection of metadata for election security purposes is
proportionate. The Puttaswamy judgment itself held that privacy is not absolute and may be
restricted on the grounds of legitimate State interest, necessity, and proportionality.

ISSUE 4:

The Electoral Integrity (Synthetic Media) Ordinance, 2026, is a valid exercise of the President's
power under Article 123. The situation was one of urgency as the election was underway,
Parliament was not in session, and there was no existing legislative framework specifically
addressing synthetic political media. The Ordinance does not bypass or seek to replace
Parliament but fills a demonstrable legislative vacuum. It does not violate the basic structure.

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ISSUE 5:

The registration of an FIR does not violate any fundamental right. Cognisable offences have
been disclosed on the face of the facts. Chain of custody defects are evidentiary questions for
the trial court. Judicial interference at this stage would set a dangerous precedent of shielding
electoral manipulation from criminal accountability.

ISSUE 6:

The doctrine of free and fair elections as part of the basic structure does not mean freedom
from regulation of disinformation. It means the freedom of the voter to exercise an informed
choice. That very freedom is undermined by synthetic deepfake media. The impugned
measures, being temporary and targeted, do not destroy but preserve the basic structure.

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DETAILED ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN ITS PRESENT

FORM AND WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE LOCUS STANDI TO
CHALLENGE THE MEASURES COLLECTIVELY?

1.1 CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IS PREMATURE

1.1.1 It is a foundational principle of Indian constitutional law that the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction under Article 32 6
should not be exercised when adequate alternative
remedies exist. This Court in Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 7537,
reiterated that interference with criminal investigations under Article 328 requires an
exceptional case of demonstrated violation of fundamental rights, not merely the
registration of an FIR.

1.1.2 In Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India9, this Court, in a Constitution Bench
context, observed:

“[Link] hold that it would be inappropriate for the court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution for the purpose of quashing
FIR No. 164 of 2020 under investigation at N.M Joshi Marg Police station in
mumbai. [...]”

“[...] We should not be construed as holding that a petition under Article 32 is

not maintainable. But when the High Court has the power under Section 482,
there is no reason to by-pass the procedure under the CrPC. We see no
exceptional grounds or reasons to entertain this petition under Article 32. There
is a clear distinction between the maintainability of a petition and whether it
should be entertained. [...]”

1.1.3 The Petitioners have invoked Article 3210 directly, bypassing not merely the High Court
but also the remedy under Section 528 OF BNSS11 (Then Section 48212 of the CrPC)
before the competent criminal court.

6
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
7
Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753, ¶ 30.
8
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
9
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, (2020) 14 SCC 12, ¶ 57.
10
INDIA CONST. art. 32
11
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, § 528, INDIA CODE (2023)
12
Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974, § 482, INDIA CODE (1974).

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1.1.4 In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal13, this Court laid down the categories in which
criminal proceedings may be quashed:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of

the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law C enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions telating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the d process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and suffi- ciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to
give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials,
if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investi- gation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.

(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach

13
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 335 (India).

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a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.

(7) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institu- tion and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(8) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”

1.1.5 None of those categories is attracted here: the FIR discloses prima facie cognisable
offences under the IT Act (Sections 66, 66C, 66D)14, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(Sections 318, 353, 196)15, and the Representation of the People Act16. The source of
the video has not been identified, the investigation is ongoing, and the evidence is being
gathered.

1.1.6 The Respondents submit that the challenge to the criminal investigation is not only
premature but strategically motivated to obstruct the investigation into a potential large-
scale electoral interference operation.

1.2 LOCUS STANDI OF DIGITAL LIBERTY FORUM

1.2.1 The Respondents submit that for the maintainability of the present Writ Petition, the
Petitioners must satisfy the 'Aggrieved Person' test as established in Jasbhai Motibhai
Desai v. Roshan Kumar (1976)17. The Digital Liberty Forum has failed to demonstrate
any direct, personal legal injury or a 'prejudicial affectation' of its own rights. In a writ
jurisdiction, a generalised challenge to the Ordinance and the NETRA-GRID, absent a
specific instance of surveillance targeting the Petitioner, renders the Forum a mere
'meddlesome interloper' with no standing to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court.

14
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, §§ 66, 66C, 66D (India).
15
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, No. 45 of 2023, §§ 196, 318, 353 (India).
16
Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951 (India).
17
Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671.

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1.2.2 In light of the principles settled in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar (1976)18,
The joinder of the Digital Liberty Forum alongside Dr. Mehra does not cure the defect
of locus standi. Since Dr. Mehra fails to show a singular, crystallized injury resulting
from the impugned measures, and the Forum is an entity with no personal stake in the
enforcement of the Ordinance, both are 'strangers' to the cause of action. This Court has
consistently held that it will not exercise its discretion to assist a 'busybody' who seeks
to interfere in administrative actions that do not directly infringe upon their specific
legal character.

2. WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DIRECTIVE OF THE ECI IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS A LAWFUL RESTRICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 19(2) AND WITHIN THE ECI'S CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
UNDER ARTICLE 324?

2.1 PLENARY POWERS OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION UNDER ARTICLE

324

2.1.1 Article 324 19

of the Constitution of Indica vests in the Election Commission the
"superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for,
and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State."
This Court has consistently held that the powers of the ECI under Article 32420 are
plenary and are not limited to what is expressly stated in the statute.
2.1.2 In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms,21 this Court held:

“26. [...] Further, Article 324 operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation
and the words "superintendence, direction and control" as well as "conduct of
all elections" are the broadest terms. The silence of statute has no exclusionary
ellect except where it flows from necessary implication. [...]”

“ [...] It is settled that the power of the Commission is plenary in character in

exercise thereof. In a statutory provisions or rules, it is known that every
contingency could not be foreseen or anticipated with precision, therefore,

18
Ibid.
19
INDIA CONST. art. 324.
20
Ibid.
21 Union of India v. Ass’n for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294 (India).

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Commission can cope with situation where the field is unoccupied by issuing
necessary orders.”

2.1.3 In In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner22, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that:

“92. [..] Article 329(b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges to electoral

steps taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the
process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the
resultArticle 329(b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges to electoral steps
taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the
process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the result”

“Election, in this context, has a very wide connotation commencing from the
Presidential notification calling upon the electorate to elect and culminating in
the final declaration of the returned candidate.”

2.1.4 The viral dissemination of a deepfake video depicting the prime ministerial candidate
of a major coalition accepting bribes and threatening civil unrest, 48 hours before
polling, squarely falls within the category of threats to electoral integrity that the ECI
is constitutionally mandated to address. The situation was unprecedented in scale and
urgency. The content had been viewed 60 million times and had already caused civil
disturbances in six districts.

2.1.5 The Respondents submit that the ECI's directive was issued in the exercise of its plenary
constitutional powers under Article 32423, backed by the IT Rules 202124 as amended.
The reasoned intimation was issued by a specially authorised officer of the prescribed
rank, satisfying the procedural requirements of the amended Rules. The directive is not
an ad hoc exercise of power but is squarely within the institutional mandate of the ECI
to ensure that voters exercise their franchise free from the distortion of synthetic
political disinformation.

22
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Comm’r, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 405 (India).
23
INDIA CONST. art. 324.
24
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, pt. II, sec. 3(i) (Feb. 25, 2021), as amended

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2.2 THE PRE-CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT IS NOT PRIOR RESTRAINT

2.2.1 The doctrine of prior restraint has been applied in India with considerable nuance. The
seminal pronouncements in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi25, established that pre-
censorship of content is presumptively unconstitutional, subject to the exceptions in
Article 19(2)26.

2.2.2 However, the Respondents submit that the pre-clearance requirement in the ECI
directive is distinguishable from the unconstitutional prior restraint condemned in those
cases in three material respects:

(a) Temporality: The impugned requirement was limited only to the duration necessary
to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and did not operate indefinitely.
In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India27, held that restrictions on communication,
including internet shutdowns, must be "temporary" and "proportionate to the situation."
The directive satisfies this standard.

(b) Specificity: The requirement was confined to "political video content" uploaded
during the election period. It was not a blanket prohibition on political speech. The
category of "political video" in the context of a deepfake crisis is a well-defined,
identifiable category.

(c) Mechanism: The pre-clearance was to be effected through an ECI-empanelled

verification mechanism, not through government censorship. It is analogous to the
"disclaimers and disclosures" regime for political advertisements under Rule 7 of the
Model Code of Conduct 28
, which has never been successfully challenged as prior
restraint.

2.2.3 In Virendra v. State of Punjab29, this Court upheld a pre-publication restriction when:

“15. […]A power the exercise of which is conditioned by the positive

requirement of the existence of the satisfaction of the authority as to the
necessity for making the order for the specific purposes mentioned in the section
and the effect of the exercise of which is to remain in operation for a limited

25
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 (India).
26
INDIA CONST. art. 19(2).
27 Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 S.C.C. 637 (India).
28
Election Commission of India, Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties and Candidates
(India).
29
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896 (India).

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period only and is liable to be modified or rescinded upon a

representation.[…]”

2.2.4 The Respondents submit that Shreya Singhal30 struck down Section 66A31 of the IT Act
because it was vague, overbroad, and had no nexus with any of the grounds in Article
19(2) 32
. The ECI directive, in contrast, is temporally limited, precisely defined,
procedurally grounded, and directly connected to the constitutionally recognised
ground of "public order" and the specific constitutional mandate under Article 32433.
The Shreya Singhal34 ratio is not applicable.

2.2.5 Further, in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram35, this Court held that the anticipated
reaction of the audience cannot ordinarily be the basis for censorship, but also held that
where there is a proximate causal connection between the speech and the public
disorder, restriction is permissible. In the present case, the video had already caused
public disorder in six districts.

2.3 PROVENANCE LABELLING OBLIGATIONS

2.3.1 The mandatory provenance and authenticity labelling requirement for political
advertisements and campaign videos does not restrict speech; rather, it regulates the
manner of speech. This Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India36, held that
regulations on the manner of speech are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny than
content-based restrictions.

2.3.2 The provenance labelling requirement is analogous to the mandatory disclaimer

requirements under Section 127A of the Representation of the People Act, 195137,
which require all election pamphlets and posters to carry the name and address of the
publisher and printer. These requirements have never been invalidated as
unconstitutional. The labelling requirement here merely extends this logic to the digital
context.

30
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India).
31
Information Technology Act, 2000, § 66A (India).
32
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India).
33
INDIA CONST. art. 324.
34
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India).
35
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574 (India).
36
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788.
37
Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951, § 127A, INDIA CODE (1951).

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2.3.3 Internationally, the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (2024)38 mandates
disclosure of AI-generated political content. These developments reflect a global
consensus that disclosure of synthetic media is a minimal, necessary, and proportionate
regulatory requirement.

3. WHETHER THE ACTIVATION OF THE NETRA-GRID PROGRAMME BY THE

MHA VIOLATES ARTICLES 19 AND 21, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, OR WHETHER IT CONSTITUTES A LAWFUL SURVEILLANCE
MECHANISM UNDER THE IT ACT AND THE AMENDED IT RULES, 2021?

3.1 NETRA-GRID’S MANDATE

3.1.1 The Petitioners conflate two categorically distinct activities: legitimate political speech
by natural persons, and coordinated inauthentic behaviour by networks of fake accounts
designed to manipulate public perception at scale. NETRA-GRID is directed
exclusively at the latter.

3.1.2 The NETRA-GRID order of the Ministry of Home Affairs sought:

(a) real-time metadata including device identifiers, location signals, account linkage
information, and embedded provenance identifiers;

(b) behavioural amplification metrics; and

(c) algorithmic pattern indicators to identify coordinated inauthentic activity.

None of these three categories constitutes the content of political speech. They are
structural and metadata indicators of inauthentic activity.

3.1.3 In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,39 the nine-Judge Bench unanimously recognised
privacy as a fundamental right under Article 2140. However, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud,
writing for himself and three others, held that privacy is not absolute and may be
restricted by "a law that is just, fair and reasonable," that serves "a legitimate State aim,"
that is "necessary in a democratic society," and that is "proportionate" to the aim
pursued. All four elements are satisfied here.

38
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), 2024 O.J. (L 1689) 1 (EU).
39
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1.
40
INDIA CONST. art. 21.

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3.1.4 The legitimate State aim is the detection and investigation of a large-scale coordinated
synthetic influence operation targeting an ongoing national election, an interest of the
highest constitutional order, touching upon the conduct of free and fair elections under
Articles 32441 and 32642.

3.1.5 The necessity of the measure is established by the fact that: the source of the upload
could not be identified through ordinary means; the amplification was coordinated; the
content had caused actual public disorder; and polling was 48 hours away.

3.1.6 The proportionality of the measure is established by its specificity; it was directed at
metadata about the specific viral content and its amplification network, not at the
general population's communications.

3.1.7 In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India43, this Court upheld telephone
surveillance under the Indian Telegraph Act44 on the grounds of national security and
public order, subject to procedural safeguards. The NETRA-GRID operation similarly
operates within the statutory framework of the IT Act45 and the amended IT Rules46.

3.2 STATUTORY BASIS UNDER IT ACT, 2000, DPDP ACT, 2023 AND IT RULES,
2021 (AS AMENDED IN 2026)

3.2.1 The Information Technology Act, 200047 , as amended, provides a comprehensive

statutory basis for the NETRA-GRID operation. Section 69 of the IT Act48 empowers
the Central Government to issue directions to any intermediary to intercept, monitor, or
decrypt information in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, or for preventing
incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence. Section 69(3) 49
places an
obligation on the intermediary to extend all facilities and technical assistance.

41
Ibid. art. 324.
42
Ibid. art. 326.
43
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 301.
44
Indian Telegraph Act, No. 13 of 1885, Acts of Parliament, 1885 (India).
45
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
46
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, pt. II, sec. 3(i) (Feb. 25, 2021).
47
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
48
Ibid. § 69.
49
Ibid. § 69(3).

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3.2.2 The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring
and Decryption of Information) Rules, 200950, prescribe:

(a) authorisation by an officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary;

(b) prior approval of the competent authority;

(c) review by a Committee within seven days;

(d) destruction of records after sixty days.

These procedural safeguards are analogous to those upheld in PUCL v. Union of India.

3.2.3 Rule 3(1)(b) of the IT Rules 202151 (as amended) imposes obligations on significant
social media intermediaries to publish, information regarding any coordinated
inauthentic behaviour or synthetic content. Rule 4(4)52 (as amended in 2026) mandates
that platforms maintain and provide, upon lawful request, provenance identifiers and
embedded metadata for political content. The NETRA-GRID operation is therefore
directly grounded in these amended Rules.

3.2.4 The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in Section 1753, provides for exemption
from the obligations of the Act where the processing of personal data is necessary for
purposes of "national security" or "prevention of offences." The NETRA-GRID
operation, being directed at investigating a large-scale electoral manipulation operation,
falls squarely within this exemption.

3.2.5 The Respondents further submit that the metadata sought: device identifiers, location
signals, and account linkage information, does not constitute "sensitive personal data"
under the DPDP Act's 54
definitional scheme. Even if it were so characterised, the
national security exemption would apply.

3.3 CROSS-BORDER DATA AND INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION

3.3.1 The Petitioners appear to suggest that the inability to access WAVV's servers in Estoria
undermines the lawfulness of the domestic investigation. This submission is untenable.
The State's investigative jurisdiction is grounded in territorial law. The pendency of a

50
Ibid. § 69(3).
51 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, r. 3(1)(b),
Gazette of India, Extraordinary, pt. II, sec. 3(i) (Feb. 25, 2021).
52
Ibid. r. 4(4).
53
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, No. 22 of 2023, § 17, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
54
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, No. 22 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

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Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) or local judicial authorisation request in

Estoria does not suspend the domestic investigation.

3.3.2 Section 75 of the IT Act55 provides that the Act applies to offences committed using a
computer system or network located outside India if the conduct affects a computer,
network, or person in Indica. The viral content was uploaded and disseminated in
Indica, caused harm to public order in Indica, and implicated the electoral process in
Indica. Indica's investigative jurisdiction is beyond question.

3.3.3 The cross-border dimension of the investigation underscores the need for the
investigation.

4. WHETHER THE ELECTORAL INTEGRITY (SYNTHETIC MEDIA)

ORDINANCE, 2026 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ORDINANCE-MAKING POWER UNDER ARTICLE 123 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, OR WHETHER IT AMOUNTS TO A COLOURABLE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER?

4.1 Satisfaction of Article 123 Pre-Conditions

4.1.1 Article 123 of the Constitution of Indica56 empowers the President to promulgate an
Ordinance when: (a) the Houses of Parliament are not in session; and (b) the President
is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action.
Both conditions are satisfied in the present case.

4.1.2 Parliament was not in session at the time of promulgation. This is an undisputed fact
pleaded in the proposition itself. The question of immediate necessity is also clearly
established: there was an ongoing multi-phase General Election; a viral synthetic
deepfake had caused actual civil disorder; no existing legislation specifically addressed
"malicious synthetic political media" in the electoral context; and the election was still
in its final phase.

4.1.3 In D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar57, held that:

“7. […] The power conferred on the Governor to issue Ordinances is in the
nature of an emergency power which is vested in the Governor for taking
immediate action where such action may become necessary at a time when the

55
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 75, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
56
INDIA CONST. art. 123.
57
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 378.

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Legislature is not in Session. The primary law making authority under the
Consti- tution is the Legislature and not the Executive but it is possible that
when the Legislature is not in Session circum- stances may arise which render
it necessary to take immedi- ate action and in such a case in order that public
interest may not suffer by reason of the inability of the Legislature to make law
to deal with the emergent situation, the Gover- nor is vested with the power to
promulgate Ordinances […]”

this Court struck down the practice of repeated re-promulgation of Ordinances as a

fraud on the Constitution because Parliament was being bypassed as a matter of routine.
However, this Court also made clear that the ordinance power itself is legitimate when
used in genuine urgency. The present Ordinance is a one-time response to an
unprecedented crisis, not part of a pattern of executive legislation.

4.1.4 In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India58, this Court held that the ordinance power is subject
to judicial review on the ground of mala fides or when it is clear that the President
could not have been satisfied about the urgency. The Respondents submit that no such
mala fides can be attributed to the promulgation of an Ordinance addressing a
nationally visible crisis of synthetic electoral disinformation that had already resulted
in civil disorder and threatened the integrity of ongoing polling.

4.1.5 In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 59

, this Court held that the President's
satisfaction under Article 7260 is not justiciable except in very limited circumstances.
The same principle applies to Presidential satisfaction under Article 12361. The burden
is on the Petitioners to show that the satisfaction was palpably mala fide or based on
wholly irrelevant grounds.

4.2 LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE AND LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST

4.2.1 Regulation of synthetic political media in elections falls under Entry 72 of List I62
(Elections to Parliament and State Legislatures), Entry 31 of List I63 (Post offices and
telegraphs, telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication),

58
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 S.C.C. 248.
59
Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 S.C.C. 204.
60
Ibid. art. 72.
61
Ibid. art. 123.
62
INDIA CONST. sched. VII, list I, entry 72.
63
Ibid. entry 31.

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and the residuary Entry 97 of List I64. All three entries vest exclusive legislative power
in Parliament.

4.2.2 The Ordinance's definitional scheme, "malicious synthetic political media", is not
vague in the constitutional sense. It is defined by reference to:

(i) the use of AI-based synthesis techniques;

(ii) the depiction of real persons without consent;

(iii) the electoral context; and

(iv) the intent to mislead or create disorder. This fourfold conjunctive definition,
combined with the temporal limitation to the electoral context, provides adequate notice
and prevents overbreadth.

4.2.3 The legitimate State interest in protecting electoral integrity is recognised in the
Constitution itself. Articles 32465 and 32666 impose affirmative obligations on the State
to ensure free and fair elections. Where synthetic media threatens the exercise of the
franchise by manipulating voter perception through disinformation, the State has not
merely a right but a duty to regulate.

4.2.4 The proposition clarifies that "Latest AI Regulations are applicable in above matter."
This necessarily imports the developing framework of AI governance, including the
the IT Rules amendments of 202667, and internationally, the EU AI Act68 and the G7
Hiroshima AI Process69, which collectively recognise the specific risk posed by AI-
generated political content and the obligation of States to regulate it proportionately.

4.3 PROPORTIONALITY OF ORDINANCE PROVISIONS

4.3.1 The proportionality standard as articulated by this Court in Modern Dental College v.
State of Madhya Pradesh70, and subsequently in K.S. Puttaswamy71, requires: (a) a
legitimate aim; (b) a rational connection between the measure and the aim; (c) necessity

64
Ibid. entry 97.
65
INDIA CONST. art. 324.
66
Ibid. art. 326.
67
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026.
68
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), 2024 O.J. (L 1689) 1.
69
G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué, G7 Hiroshima AI Process (May 20, 2023).
70
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 S.C.C. 353.
71
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1.

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(the measure must be the least restrictive means); and (d) proportionality stricto sensu
(the benefits must outweigh the harms).

4.3.2 The Ordinance satisfies each limb:

(a) Legitimate aim: Prevention of synthetic electoral disinformation; protection of free

and fair elections; national security.

(b) Rational connection: The statutory mechanisms for expedited takedown are
rationally connected to the removal of harmful synthetic content from platforms.

(c) Necessity: The measures are the least restrictive in the circumstances. The
Ordinance does not prohibit political speech generally; it targets specifically defined
"malicious synthetic political media." No less restrictive alternative could have been
enacted in time to address the crisis.

(d) Proportionality stricto sensu: large-scale electoral manipulation through AI-

generated disinformation is of the highest constitutional magnitude. The harm imposed
is a requirement of authenticity labelling and potential takedown of specific content,
and is comparatively minimal.

4.3.3 The penal provisions of the Ordinance are directed at "synthetic impersonation in
electoral contexts", which is a specific, identifiable harm. This is not a case of
criminalising political opinion. It is analogous to the criminalisation of "personation at
elections" under Section 171D of the IPC72 (now Section 169 of the BNS73), which has
never been successfully challenged as a violation of political speech rights.

5. WHETHER THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THE

REGISTRATION OF THE FIR AND THE SEIZURE OF THE DEVICE,
VIOLATES ARTICLE 14, 19, AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING
THE RIGHT AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND THE RIGHT TO FAIR
TRIAL?

5.1 CHAIN OF CUSTODY DEFECTS ARE EVIDENTIARY QUESTIONS

5.1.1 The Petitioners raise the issue of the alleged defect in the chain of custody, specifically,
that no sealing was recorded at the time of device seizure and that hash values were

72
Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, § 171D, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
73
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, No. 45 of 2023, § 169, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

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generated only after data transfer to a forensic workstation. This is an evidentiary

objection, not a constitutional one.

5.1.2 In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005)74 & Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v.
Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)75 held that defects in the chain of custody of
electronic evidence go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility as a
constitutional matter, and that the appropriate forum for raising such objections is the
trial court.

5.1.3 The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 76

, deals comprehensively with the
admissibility of electronic evidence in Sections 61–6577. Section 6378 provides that
electronic records are admissible, subject to certification requirements, and outlines the
procedural conditions. Objections to the procedure for the extraction and certification
of electronic evidence are explicitly triable before the trial court.

5.1.4 The Supreme Court's interference with an ongoing investigation based on an

evidentiary objection that has not been agitated before any subordinate forum would be
an extraordinary and unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction that would render the
criminal justice system unworkable.

5.1.5 The Respondents draw this Court's attention to the fact that the allegation of a
compromised chain of custody is self-serving and strategically timed; it emerged
through "defence counsel" and not through any independent finding. This further
underscores that the appropriate forum for testing this allegation is the trial court,
through the machinery of cross-examination and expert evidence.

5.2 FIR Against Unknown Persons is Legally Sustainable

5.2.1 An FIR against "unknown persons" is expressly contemplated under the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 202379, and its predecessor, the Code of Criminal
Procedure80. Registering an FIR against unknown persons is a necessary first step in
the investigation when the identity of the perpetrators is not yet established. The law
does not require the identity of the accused to be known before an FIR is registered.

74
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 S.C.C. 600.
75
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 S.C.C. 1.
76 Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, No. 47 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
77
Ibid. §§ 61–65.
78
Ibid. § 63.
79
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
80
Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

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5.2.2 In Union of India v. W.N. Chadha81, this Court held that

“[Link] investigation is only at an infant stage and it has to go a long way to

collect all the materials. Only after requisite particulars are collected by the
investigating agency, the further course of action would be decided.[…]”

5.2.3 The offences disclosed: criminal conspiracy, cheating by personation through digital
means, IT Act82 offences, public disorder, and promoting enmity are all cognisable
offences. The existence of a cognisable offence disclosed in the complaint obligates the
police to investigate under Section 154 BNSS83. There is no constitutional infirmity in
the registration of the FIR.

5.3 NO CASE FOR JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE IN ONGOING INVESTIGATION

5.3.1 This Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India84, held that while judicial oversight of
investigations is constitutionally permissible, the no one should intervene unless where
there is a clear violation of statutory or constitutional rights. No such violation is
established here.

5.3.2 The retraction of the WAVV compliance officer's statement, alleging institutional
pressure, is a matter that will be tested through the legal process, cross-examination,
Section 164 BNSS 85
statements, and evidentiary proceedings. Premature judicial
intervention based on an unverified retraction would not serve the interests of justice.
It would, on the contrary, obstruct the investigation into what appears to be a
sophisticated, coordinated electoral manipulation operation.

5.3.3 The Respondents respectfully submit that the criminal investigation is being pursued
through constitutional means, within the framework of the BNSS86 and the IT Act87,
and does not warrant the extraordinary intervention of this Court at this stage.

6. WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL

COMMUNICATION DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, COMPRISING THE
ECI DIRECTIVE, THE ORDINANCE, AND THE NETRA-GRID OPERATION,

81
Union of India v. W.N. Chadha, 1993 Supp. (4) S.C.C. 260.
82
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India)
83
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, § 154, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
84 Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 S.C.C. 226
85
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, § 164, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
86
Ibid
87
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).

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INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY AFFECT THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF

THE CONSTITUTION BY UNDERMINING FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS?

6.I Free and Fair Elections Do Not Immunise Disinformation

6.1.1 The doctrine of free and fair elections as part of the basic structure of the Constitution
was first articulated in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain88. In that case, the Court struck
down a constitutional amendment that sought to validate a specific election by
retrospective legislation, a direct legislative interference with a specific electoral
outcome. The basic structure doctrine in the electoral context protects the structural
integrity of the democratic process, not the content of individual political
communications.

6.1.2 In Common Cause v. Union of India89, this Court, while recognising the right to vote
as a constitutional right flowing from Article 32690, also held that it must be exercised
based on truthful information about candidates. The right of the voter to receive truthful
information is itself a dimension of free and fair elections. Synthetic deepfake media
that falsely portrays a candidate as corrupt and threatening civil violence is the
antithesis of truthful political communication. It undermines, not exercises, the basic
structure of free and fair elections.

6.1.3 In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms91, this Court directed the ECI
to mandate disclosure of criminal records, financial assets, and educational
qualifications by candidates, on the ground that voters are entitled to accurate
information. If the State is constitutionally obligated to ensure accurate information
about candidates, the regulatory suppression of fabricated synthetic disinformation
about candidates is not merely permissible; it is constitutionally mandated.

6.2 THE STATE'S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IS

ITSELF A BASIC STRUCTURE

6.2.1 Articles 324 92

and 32693 of the Constitution collectively impose on the State an
affirmative obligation to conduct elections in a manner that reflects the genuine will of

88
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp. S.C.C. 1.
89
Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 752.
90
INDIA CONST. art. 326.
91
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294.
92
INDIA CONST. art. 324.
93
Ibid. art. 326.

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the electorate. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner94, this Court
held that :

“113. […] the framers of the Constitution took care to leaving scope for
exercise of residuary power by the Commission, in its own right, as a creature
of the Constitution, in the infinite variety of situations that may emerge from
time to time in such a large democracy as ours. […]”

6.2.2 When a synthetic video, which is potentially a foreign-influenced or politically

motivated deepfake, is distributed at a scale of 60 million views within six hours, two
days before polling in key constituencies, and when it has already caused civil
disturbances in six districts, the State's regulatory response is not a restriction on
political speech. It is the discharge of a constitutional obligation to protect the franchise.

6.2.3 The Respondents submit that the cumulative effect of the ECI directive, the NETRA-
GRID operation, and the Ordinance is not the suppression of political communication
but the preservation of the conditions necessary for democratic choice. The measures
are:

(a) temporary; (b) targeted at a specific identified threat;(c) proportionate to the

urgency; and (d) independently justified by distinct constitutional and statutory bases.
They do not, individually or collectively, constitute a threat to the basic structure.

6.2.4 The Respondents further submit that the basic structure doctrine is a sword to be
wielded against the Legislature and the Executive when they seek to permanently alter
the constitutional foundations of democracy, not a shield to protect coordinated
synthetic disinformation operations from legitimate State regulation. The Petitioners'
reliance on the basic structure is, with great respect, a misapplication of a foundational
constitutional doctrine.

6.2.5 In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India95, this Court held that the State has an
affirmative obligation to counter mob violence and lynch culture, which undermines
constitutional values. By analogy, the State has an affirmative obligation to counter
synthetic electoral disinformation, which is the 21st-century equivalent of electoral
manipulation that threatens the constitutional value of the franchise.

94
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Comm’r, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 405
95
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 S.C.C. 501.

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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in light of issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, it is

humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court to:

I. DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION

AND / OR pass any other order / orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances of the given case and in the light of Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good
Conscience.
And for this act of justice the Respondent shall be duty bound and forever pray.

All of which is submitted with utmost Reverence.

Place : Indica Sd/-

Date : May, 2026. COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT

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