ETHICS

Ethics comes from the Greek word ethos which means “custom”. At times, Ethics is also
called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy because the word moral comes from the Latin term
mos (singular) or mores (plural) which means “custom”. Hence, generally speaking, “ethical”
and “moral” and/or “ethics and “morality” can be used interchangeably. But to establish
distinction between the two, morality points to something personal and normative, whereas
ethics is the standards of “good and bad” distinguished by a certain community or social
setting.
For example, your local community may think abortion is immoral, and you personally
may agree with that. However, the distinction can be useful if your local community has no
strong feelings about abortion, but you consider abortion immoral on a personal level. By these
definitions of the terms, your morality would contradict the ethics of your community.

It is also important to consider how the two terms have been used in discourse in different
fields so that we can consider the connotations of both terms. For example, morality has a
Christian connotation to many Westerners, since moral theology is prominent in the church.
Similarly, ethics is the term used in conjunction with business, medicine, or law. In these cases,
ethics serves as a personal code of conduct for people working in those fields, and the ethics
themselves are often highly debated and contentious.

ETHICS AS A SCIENCE

Ethics is defined as the practical science of the morality of human act.

Ethics is a science = it is a complete and systematically arranged body or data, which

relate to the morality of human conduct, and it presents the reasons which show these data to be
true
.
It is a practical science = it presents data, which directly imply and indicate
rules/directions for human conduct. If the data of a science enrich the mind without directly
implying rules or directions, the science is called speculative. A speculative science presents
truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be acted upon.

It is a science of human conduct = it simply treats of human act or any action done by
the agent/doer. “Human acts make human conduct”.

It is the science of morality of human conduct = it studies human activity to determine

what it must be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason.

What is the Material Object of Ethics?

Material object refers to the subject matter of the science, i.e. human acts or human
conduct. Any action done by a moral agent, such as the act of telling the truth, helping others in
distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving other’s trespasses, including malicious deeds, such as
killing, stealing and lying, refers to the material object of ethics.

What is the Formal Object of Ethics?

Formal Object refers to the aim or point of view that the science employs in studying or
dealing its material object, i.e. rectitude/morality of human acts. It refers to whether the act
done by the doer is right or wrong, good or bad.

Formal Object Quo refers to the medium by which the science studies its material
object, i.e. human reason.
.
IMPORTANCE OF ETHICS

Ethics employs the marvellous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important
question what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science.
 Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men are regulated, without it
disorder or disharmony prospers.

Ethics provides methods or principles to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong
actions.

DIVISION OF ETHICS

General Ethics presents truth about human acts and from these truths deduces the
general principles of morality.

Special Ethics is applied ethics. It applies the principle of General Ethics in different
departments of human activity, individual and social.

ASSUMPTIONS OF ETHICS

Like any other disciple, ethics proceeds from some basic assumptions. Assumptions are
fundamental beliefs or statements that are accepted to be true without burden of proof or proving.
The two important and most common assumptions are the following:

1. Man is a rational being. This means that man is rational has a reason and acts with a
purpose. Unlike brutes, they merely act out of instinct and reflex.

2. Man is free. Ethics assumes that man is free to act according to his will and he has the
power to act, speak, or think if he chooses to restraint.

FORMS OF ETHICAL ANALYSIS

1. Descriptive = aims to discover what moral beliefs are held by a given society, social
group or social organization

2. Normative = examines the standard for the rightness or wrongness of actions. It deals
with what makes an action right or wrong

Major Normative Ethics

1. Teleological Ethics (Consequentialist) = maintains that the morality of an action is

determined solely by its consequences.

Ex: Utilitarianism judges consequences by a “greatest good for the greatest number”
standard. Hedonism, on the other hand, says something is “good” if the consequence
produces pleasure or avoids pain.

2. Deontological Ethics (Non-consequentialist) = assert that the morality of an action

depends on its intrinsic nature, its motives or its rules and principles.

3. Authoritarian Ethics = appeals the morality of an action to authority force in

determining what constitute right from wrong, good from bad, moral from immoral.

4. Theological Ethics = holds that the will of God determines the rightness and wrongness
of an act

5. Legalistic Ethics = determines right from wrong, based on a body of clearly state and
well-documented body of laws.

6. Situational Ethics = asserts that the morality of an action depends on the situation and
not the application of moral laws to the case.
 In general, Ethics is about matters such as the good thing that we should pursue and the bad
thing that we should avoid; the right ways in which we could or should act and the wrongs ways
of acting. It is about what is acceptable and unacceptable in human behaviour.

MODULE 2.0:
HUMAN ACTS

HUMAN ACT IN ITSELF

Human Act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man. It is an act
performed with advertence and motive, an act determined by the free will. Such an act alone is
proper to man as man for he is rational, that is to say, he has understanding and free willing. In a
wide sense, the term human act means any sort of activity, internal or external, bodily or
spiritual, performed by a human being.

What makes an act human?

Human Acts are those performed by a person who is acting knowingly, freely, and
wilfully. These actions are deliberate, intentional, or voluntary.
 Act is done knowingly when the doer is conscious and aware of the reason and
the consequence of his actions.
 Act is done freely when the doer acts by his own initiative and choice without
being forced to do so by another person or situation.
 Act is done wilfully when the doer consents to the act, accepting it as his own,
and assumes accountability/responsibility for its consequences.

Examples of Human Acts:

the act of telling the truth, helping others in distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving
other’s trespasses, including malicious deeds, such as killing, stealing and lying, etc.
All of these acts become human acts because they are performed knowingly, freely and
wilfully the doer himself/herself.
Therefore, Human Acts are acts only proper to man because of all animals ( man as
rational animal), he alone has knowledge and freedom of will. They are acts which, we are
conscious, are under our control and for which we are responsible.
*Only human acts have moral significance.
*A human person is the source of a willed action.
*Moral acts are willed acts, moral acts are identified with human acts.
*Moral action is willed action and morally good actions arise from a good will

“A man is what his human acts make him”

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN ACT AND ACT OF MAN

Human Act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man.
Examples:
the act of telling the truth, helping others in distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving
other’s trespasses, including malicious deeds, such as killing, stealing and lying, etc.

Act of Man is an act performed by human beings without advertence or without the
exercise of free choice. In other words, act of man refers to the involuntary, intuitive or reflex
acts exhibited by a man.
Examples:
the blinking of the eye, the beating of the heart, sneezing, yawning, breathing, and the like.

Note: Sometimes acts of man become human acts by the advertence and consent of the
human agent.
For instance, my eyes fall upon an indecent sight, or upon a page of obscene reading
material. The act of seeing and even of reading and understanding the words is an act of man;
but it becomes a human act the moment I deliberately consent to look or to read.

CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS

I. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts

1. Elicited Acts – acts that begin and are perfected in the will itself or begin in the will
and are perfected by other faculties under the control of the will.

a. Wish – the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a thing
without, whether this thing be realizable (attainable) or not.

Ex: I wish or I should like to go to Europe

b. Intention – the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regard as

realizable (attainable), whether the thing is actually done or not.

Ex: I am going to Europe next summer

c. Consent – the acceptance of the will of the means necessary to carry out
intention; further intention of doing what is necessary to realize the first or main
intention.

Ex: If I intend to go to Europe, I consent to the necessary preparation for the

journey.

d. Election – the selection of the will of the precise means to be employed in

carrying out an intention.

Ex: While I may go to Europe either by ship or by plane, I cannot go by both

simultaneously, but must elect or select one of the means. By election I choose to
sail on a certain day, from a certain port.

e. Use – the employment by the will of powers (body, mind or both) to carry out its
intention by the means elected.

Ex: If I ride a plane going to Europe, and elect sleep the whole duration of the
trip, I exercise the will-act of use by putting my body in motion or not ( by staying
awake or asleep inside the plane)

f. Fruition – the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will’s act of satisfaction
in intention fulfilled

2. Commanded Acts – acts that do not find their adequate cause in the simple will act, but
are perfected by the action of mental or bodily powers under the control of the will or
under orders from the will.

a. Internal – acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will.
Examples: acts performed mentally such as reasoning, imagining,
remembering and reflecting.
 b. External – acts affected by bodily powers under command of the will.
Examples: acts performed bodily, such as walking, dancing, talking
and writing.

c. Mixed – acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental powers.
Example: Study, which involves use of intellect, and use of eyes in
reading the lesson.
To further illustrate:
I intend to go to my room and study (Elicited Act)
I walk to my room, turn on the light, sit at my desk, take down a book,
turn to the lesson, bend my eyes upon the page (Commanded Acts)

II. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason

Human Acts are either in agreement or in disagreement with the dictates of reason, and
this relation (agreement and disagreement) with reason constitutes their morality. On the score of
morality, human acts are:
1. Good – when they are in harmony with the dictates of right reason.

2. Evil – when they are in opposition to these dictates.

3. Indifferent – when they stand in no positive relation to the dictate of reason. Indifferent
human acts exist in theory but not as a matter of practical experience. A human act that is
indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the circumstances which affect its
performance, especially the end, motive or purpose in view of the agent.

CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT (What makes an act a human?)

In order that an act be human, it must possess three essential qualities:
1. Knowledge – advertence of what the moral agent is doing, thinking or willing;
deliberation about the means to perform an action and about the end to be achieved;
awareness and consciousness of the conditions and implications of our actions.

No human act is possible without knowledge.

(I cannot will to love and serve God if I do not know God.)

2. Freedom – the power to choose between two or more courses of action without being
forced to take one or the other by anything except our own will.
Every human act must be free.
3. Voluntariness – a formal quality of human act, and for it to be present, there must
ordinarily be knowledge and freedom of the agent. In other words, actions are voluntary
if they are will-acted upon.
Voluntary act is synonymous to human act.

To further illustrate:

A Catholic is aware that today is Sunday and that he has obligation of hearing Mass (knowledge)

He is free to attend Mass or to stay away;

to perform the duty or leave in unperformed. (freedom).

He wills to do or not to do his duty and to hear mass (voluntariness)

Evaluation: EXERCISE 1.0

Name: _______________________________________ DATE: ______________

Course & Year: _______________________________ CAMPUS: ___________

Human Act or Act of Man. Write your answer before the number.

_____________________ 1. Satisfyingly watching a movie/series

_____________________ 2. Automatic Circulation of the blood

_____________________ 3. Sharing spare resources with others

_____________________ 4. Praying intimately and sincerely

_____________________ 5. Spontaneous closing of the eyes while sleeping

_____________________ 6. Engaging in social media (like Facebook and Youtube)

_____________________ 7. Doing household chores

_____________________ 8. Regular digestion of food in the stomach

_____________________ 9. Studying different modules

_____________________ 10. Complaining about complicated lessons.

References:

Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018). Ethics:
Foundations for Moral Valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
Glenn, P. (2013). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. USA: Literary Licensing, LLC
Shafer-Landau, R. (2017). The Fundamentals of Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press.
MODULE 2.1 THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACT

I. KINDS OR DEGREE OF VOLUNTARINESS

1. Perfect and Imperfect

a. Perfect Voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent fully knows
and fully intends the act.
 Full knowledge and full consent.

b. Imperfect Voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the agent’s

knowledge, intention or both.
 Partial knowledge and partial consent.
Example: A deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; a person who signs
away some rights in a contract without fully realizing what the consequences of
signing away those rights could be.
2. Simple and Conditional

a. Simple Voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the agent

likes or dislikes doing it.

b. Conditional Voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to do something other

than that which he is actually doing, but doing it with repugnance or dislike. In
other words, when a person is forced by circumstance to perform an act which he
would not do under normal condition is subject to conditional voluntariness.

Example: The commander of a distressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable goods
overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is simply voluntary. Still he dislikes doing it,
and would not do it if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He wishes to keep the
goods, but throws them away. This act is what we call conditional voluntary.

3. Direct and Indirect

a. Direct Voluntariness (Voluntary in se) is present in a human act willed in itself.

It is when the act is intended for its own sake, either as a means or as an end.
e.g. He who intends to go to the party in order to drink with friends wills both the
going to the party and the drinking with friends. Both acts, therefore, are directly
voluntary.
b. Indirect Voluntariness (Voluntary in causa) is present in that human act which
is the foreseen result of another act directly willed. It is an act which is not
intended for its own sake but which merely follows as a regrettable consequence
of an action directly willed.
e.g. Throwing precious cargoes from a sinking boat to save lives of passengers.
Here the throwing and losing of the cargoes is not desired or intended. It comes
as a consequence of saving the lives of passenger.

Example: A man kills a rabbit for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as means to
an end to be achieved, that is to have something to eat for dinner. This is what we call direct
voluntariness. Now suppose the rabbit was a tame animal that had played about the man’s
grounds and had given his children pleasure. The man knows that by killing the rabbit he will
deprive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This, indeed, he does not directly will,
but, inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequence of his directly willed act, he wills it indirectly,
or on its cause. In other words, he direct wills the cause of his children’s sorrow, and thus
indirectly wills the sorrow itself.

4. Positive and Negative

 a. Positive Voluntariness is present in a human act of doing or performing.
e.g. Going on a walk
b. Negative Voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting or refraining from
doing.
e.g. Refraining from talking
A Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (positive voluntariness).
A Catholic deliberately misses Mass on Sunday (negative voluntariness)

5. Actual, Virtual, Habitual and Interpretative

a. Actual Voluntariness is present in a human act willed here and now.

b. Virtual Voluntariness is present in a human act done as a result of a formerly

elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now or forgotten.

c. Habitual Voluntariness is present in a human act done in harmony with, but not
as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention.

d. Interpretative Voluntariness is that voluntariness which, in the judgment of

prudence and common sense, would be actually present if opportunity or ability
for it were given
Examples:

(a) A man makes the morning offering. He actually, here and now, intends to live for
God, and to serve Him in all thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of
offering is an actual intention; it is a will-act in which there is actual voluntariness.

(b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it.
Nevertheless, his day is without sin which would contradict his pious intention, and
we say that the power or virtue of the intention endures, and that, as a result of the
intention, all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for God. The
man takes breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends time in
recreation, etc. in all these acts he has no actual (“here and now”) intention of doing
them for God, but he has the virtual intention of so doing them. Hence all the acts that
the man performs throughout the day – even those that are in themselves acts of man
– are human acts if service by reason of their virtual voluntariness.

(c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic Years pass, and he does not
carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken suddenly ill, and lies
unconscious at death’s door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of receiving
the sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and unrevoked, and
the man is said to have habitual intention for that act. The act, however, is not the
result of the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of that intention cannot
reasonably be presumed to endure throughout a long period of neglect and
unfulfillment. For, if one makes an intention of doing a thing, and fails to do it
throughout years of continues opportunity for its accomplishment, it is obvious that
the virtue or power of the original intention is null. Still, as long as the original
intention is not revoked, it remains with its author, and his worn, so to speak, like a
forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless actively to produce a result, but
remaining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind. It is a mark of habitual
voluntariness.
 (d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No
knowledge is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of
receiving the sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered. Here
the act or receiving the sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with the will of
the recipient, so that, if he could but know its great value, he would certainly wish to
receive it. Thus is his will interpreted by sound common-sense. In the act of receiving
the sacrament the man said to have an interpretative intention. Such an intention,
then, is an intention that may be prudently presumed, not indeed as present, but as an
intention that would be present, but as an intention that would be present if proper
knowledge and freedom were available to him in whom it is presumed. Similarly,
infants are baptized, and the receiving of the sacraments is in them a human act, by
reason of interpretative voluntariness. Again, the small boy who has literally to be
carried to school and kept there against his will, has an interpretative intention of
going to school. For parents and teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the
value of schooling, he would certainly will to attend.

II. Indirect Voluntariness

Indirect Voluntariness or Voluntariness in Cause is present in that human act is an

effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed.
Human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that, since the will
controls such acts, the will is responsible for them. In other words, human acts are imputable
(worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment.)
Now the moment we bring together the matters of indirect voluntariness and imputability,
two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The questions are:
1. When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?
2. When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good
another one evil? (Principle of Double Effect)

When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?

a. The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way.

b. The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil
effect.
c. The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the effect.

Examples: Applying the principles on the following cases:

(a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous
language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly enough, that he
hates intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and scandal. Nevertheless,
he drinks liquor and the foreseen evils occur. How far is Michael responsible for these
evil effects? When does he incur their guilt?

(b) John says, “If I go to the meeting and hear Jones say sharp things about our party, I know
I’ll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones career that I alone
know. John goes to the meeting: the evil of detraction follows. Determine John’s
responsibility, and the moment at which his guilt is imputed to him.

(c) Mary knows that by persistent company keeping with a non-Catholic she will encourage
the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the consequent danger of an invalid
marriage: for Jane idolize Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes, foolishly
 but sincerely, that she herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the danger in
which Jane is placed through her example. Nevertheless, she persists. Jane imitates, and
eventually commits the sin of an attempted marriage outside the Church. How far is Mary
to blame? Why?
(d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by prudent persons against attendance at a secular
university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers to his faith.
He declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends the university
gradually loses his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At what time does his
lapse become imputable to him? Why?

(e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forgetting to set the alarm. Before falling asleep
he recalls the omission, but he does not rise top adjust the clock. He knows that he is a
very heavy sleeper, and that he will probably not awake in time for Mass on Sunday. This
is precisely what happens. When does Timothy incur the guilt of missing Mass? Why?

(f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday Night. But,
contrary to all his experience, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he
attends very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter? Why?

(g) Again, Timothy deliberately neglects to set the alarm on Saturday night. Again, by an
almost miraculous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday.
But, he reasons, since he has already missed Mass in cause, there is now no obligation
incumbent upon him of attending. He stays at home and does not hear Mass – Here
Timothy was altogether wrong. He willed an evil in cause, and his will-act stopped there.
Through no merit of his own, the cause failed to function as a cause, and he awoke in
time for Mass. Now, by a new and direct will-act he wills to miss Mass. Here is a new
evil, directly willed.

In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect, and
his obligation arises from the very fact that the effect is evil. Why, them, did we list three
conditions for the imputability of evil in cause? Why not simply say that two conditions are
requisite for such imputability, that the agent he able to foresee the evil effect, and that he be free
to avoid the cause? Is not the fact that the effect is evil always a prohibition obliging the agent to
refrain from the cause of that evil? Not always. Sometimes there is a good effect as well as an
evil effect proceeding from a single cause. This brings us to the second question:

When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good
another one evil? (Principle of Double Effect)

a. The evil effect must not precede the good effect. The good effect must not come from the
evil effect. It is never justified to do evil in order to attain something good.
If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good effect,
and is directly willed as such a means.

Fundamental Principle of Ethics: “the end does not justify the means”
= It means that we cannot do evil that good may come of it.
There is no good that can justify the direct willing of evil. However, if a lie – even a
“harmless” lie – will save a life – even an innocent life – the lie may not be told. Notice well that
the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the good effect; we do not
say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either precede the
evil or simultaneously with it. The good effect must outweigh in importance the evil result.

b. There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect.
 If this condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and
the act is prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the reason must
be determined by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in question,
and by the proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil effect.

c. The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must directly intend the good
effect and merely permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.”

If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being
permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always against reason, and
hence against the principle of ethics. But, unless the agent directly wills the good
effect, he is really willing the evil effect – else he has no adequate motive for
performing the act at all.

Examples: Applying the principles on the following cases.

(a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants will
be killed yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the general’s
act allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step towards ending
the war with victory for the just cause – a good effect; and the killing of non-combatants
an evil effect.

(b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy’s country, he
will seriously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. At the
present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy future
supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many a farmer and his family,
but ultimately it will help win a just war. May the general lay waste the farms-lands?

(c) In view of your answer to the foregoing question, would you justify or condemn the
havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea?

(d) A doctor can save a mother’s life by destroying the life of her child. May he do so? Why
not?

(e) A child’s life can be saved by destroying the life of the mother. May this be done? Why
not?

(f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical relief there is none. Life cannot last beyond a
few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and quickly? Why
not?

(g) A student of very frail health has been promised lucrative position upon graduation. He
need the situation to support his aged and impoverished parents. He knows he must study
hard, else he will fail in his examination, lose his degree, and, in consequence will not
secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study may seriously impair his
health. May he study hard and run the risk of permanent infirmity?
MODULE 2.2
MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS

The Modifiers of Human Acts

By the modifiers of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the
essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less perfectly
human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently
diminish the responsibility of the agent.

I. Ignorance is the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. It is a negation of

knowledge. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to be present, the ignorance
is not merely negative but privative.

Thus, ignorance of the higher mathematics in a structural- steel worker is merely

negative; but such ignorance is privative in the architect or engineer who designs steel
structures such as bridges and the framework of buildings.
Ignorance has a positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of knowledge, but
in the presence of what is falsely supposed to knowledge. Thus if I see a stranger in the street,
and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely negative. But if I am
misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him to be a well-known
acquaintance, my state of mind is positive towards him: I have what I judge to be positive
knowledge of his identity. Such positive ignorance is called mistake or error.

1. Ignorance in its Object – a thing which a person may be ignorant.

a. Ignorance of Law – the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule or regulation.

Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local speed
limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the game-
laws forbid such an act. A young Fresh man leaves the campus during noon-recess, not knowing
that his action is a violation of the college rules.
b. Ignorance of Fact – the ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as
forbidden.
Examples: A motorist knows the speed limit, but unknowingly violates it because of an
inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and kills
game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows that he must not leave the campus, but
goes out of bounds through misinformation about the extent of the college property. – Thus,
ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under the
prohibition of a known law.
c. Ignorance of Penalty – the lack of knowledge of the precise sanction affixed to
the law.
Examples: A motorist knowingly violates the speedometer, not knowing that, in that
particular locality, the set punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of which
no amount of money will be accepted. A hunter violates the game-laws, believing that, if
apprehended, he will be merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense is the
revocation of the license to hunt. A freshman wilfully leaves the campus, thinking that he will
escape with an admonition not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his offense is the
suspension of all student-privileges for a period of two weeks.

2. Ignorance in its Subject – in the person in whom ignorance exists.

 a. Vincible Ignorance or Conquerable Ignorance – ignorance that can and should
be supplanted by knowledge and that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary
diligence. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable ignorance.
- It does not destroy or remove voluntariness, nor responsibility.
Acts done in vincible ignorance are still voluntary and the agent is
still responsible for them.
 Crass or Supine – if it be the result of total or nearly total lack of effort to
dispel it.
 Simply Vincible – if some effort worthy the name, but not persevering
and whole-hearted effort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it.
 Affected – if positive effort is made to retain it.
e.g. A Manila resident who violated traffic laws, not knowing of such laws before,
would still be responsible for his act, because his ignorance is vincible. For
ignorance of the law excuses no one.
A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the college rules of
order, is in the state of vincible ignorance in the matter. If he has made no effort, or scarcely any,
to know the rules his ignorance is crass or supine. If he has positively avoided learning the rules
so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may be able to say when taken in violation of
order, “I did not know the rule,” his ignorance is affected. If he has made some inquiries about
the rules, or has tried once or twice, without success, to procure a copy of the rule-book, his
ignorance is simply vincible.
b. Invincible Ignorance – ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot
dispel. This sort of ignorance is attributed to one of two causes: either the person
in whom the ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of
knowledge, or the person who realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort
to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is never the fault of the person in
whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable ignorance.

Two Degrees of Invincible Ignorance:

 Physically – if no human effort can dispel it

 Morality – if such efforts as good and prudent men would expand to
dispel it is found to be ineffective.

To illustrate: A Catholic eats meat, wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here his
ignorance is invincible – even though in itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the nearest
person for the day of the week – and even physically invincible, because no effort can be used
with effect where there is no realization whatever is needed.
To illustrate: A man seeking for a seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds himself
constantly referred in learned books on the subject of economics. After months and months of
searching through libraries and following elusive clues, the man discovers that there is only one
copy of the pamphlet in existence; that this copy is in the library of a recluse who resides in a
foreign country, far across the sea; and that, although one may be permitted to read it, the
pamphlet may neither be borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of invincible ignorance
with regard to the contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not physically invincible, for he
could make a voyage to the land of the recluses, and study the pamphlet in the latter’s library.
Still, the course would involve difficulties and inconveniences out of all proportion to the
importance of the matter about which ignorance exists. We say therefore that the man’s
ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is morally invincible.
 3. Ignorance in its Results (ignorance with reference to acts performed while ignorance
exists.)

a. Antecedent Ignorance – that which precedes all consent of the will

A man, wholly unaware that today is a holy day of obligation, misses Mass. He would certainly
not miss if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is antecedent to his act of missing
Mass, and we say that the act is done through or in consequence of ignorance.
Antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible ignorance.

b. Concomitant Ignorance – the ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act

that would have been performed even if ignorance did not exist.

A nominal Catholic misses the Mass, not unaware that the day is a holy day. Yet, even
had he known, he would have missed mass. His act of missing Mass does not come from
ignorance, but happens in company with his ignorance, and we call the ignorance concomitant.
An act done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary.

c. Consequent Ignorance – that which follows upon an act of the will

Consequent ignorance does not differ from vincible ignorance. A careless Catholic
suspects that the day is a holy day but deliberately refrains from making sure, and does not attend
mass. If he positively avoids knowledge in the matter, his (affected) ignorance is directly willed;
if he fails to acquire knowledge through sheer carelessness, his (crass or supine) ignorance is
indirectly willed.

Principles Regarding Ignorance:

 Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.
 Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
 Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.
 Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases
voluntariness.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: Invincible Ignorance destroy the voluntariness of an act.

Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in its
turn, depends upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then, voluntariness
depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an
inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as its proceeds from invincible
ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. – To
illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact that the day is Friday, eats meat. It
may be both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of
abstinence, it is neither voluntary nor free. The act of eating meat, in so far as it is a violation of
the law of abstinence, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act for
which the agent is responsible. - A further illustration; A Catholic child uses very evil
language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes the
sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry about the past,
yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in invincible ignorance, and
therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is not imputable to the child.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Vincible Ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
 Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lacks of knowledge in the edge. On the contrary, it
supposes knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty of dispelling
ignorance. Hence, the agent has knowledge which bear indirectly upon the act which be performs
in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act
imputable to the agent. – To illustrate: a careless Catholic suspects that the day is Friday, but
fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain; and he eats meat. Now, while the agent does
lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and of
his obligation to acquire knowledge. Failing to make proper effort to dispel his ignorance is, in
some sense, the cause of his violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he wills this violation in
cause. His act has indirect voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.

While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens
voluntariness, makes the act less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The
agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, none the less, he lacks direct and
perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while possessing
voluntariness. Voluntariness is, therefore, impaired or lessened

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way
increases voluntariness.

Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively
fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which is implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct and
perfect, and, in so far, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the other
hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin against a law,
shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist in such sins. It is thus said to increase the
voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to indicate an increased voluntariness in the act that
comes from it.

II. Concupiscence or Passions are psychic responses. They are either tendencies towards
desirable objects, or tendencies away from undesirable objects. They are those bodily
appetites or tendencies which include love, hatred, joy, grief, desire, aversion or horror,
hope, despair, courage or daring, fear and anger.

1. Antecedent – when passions spring into action unstimulated by and any act of the will.
It is an act of man, and not human act. It is therefore a non voluntary act, and the agent is
not responsible for it.

2. Consequent – when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs the passions up or fosters them.
It is the fault of the agent, for it is willed either in itself or in cause. The agent is
responsible for it.

To illustrate: the feeling of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a splendid
landscape; the anger that surges in resentment of unjust and offensive treatment; the first feeling
of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or thought, good or evil; the leaping desire for
revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty; the first feeling of hatred that comes with the thought
or sight of a bitter enemy; the shrinking in aversion from an unpleasant task; the urge to “give
up” in despair in the face of crowding difficulties – all these are examples of antecedent
concupiscence or passion. These movements or bodily appetites become consequent when they
receive the approval of the rational will. Thus, the passion of anger that arises antecedently when
one is insulted, becomes consequent when the feeling is deliberately retained. Thus, the first
movement of pleasure in an unwholesome thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will
consents to retain that thought or fancy.
 Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore a non-
voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concupiscence, however is the
fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, that is, either in itself or in cause.
The agent is, in consequence, responsible for it.

Principles Regarding Concupiscence:

 Antecedent concupiscence lessens but does not remove the voluntariness
or responsibility of an act.
 Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
 Consequent concupiscence however great does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act and may even increase accountability.

FIRST PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.

Some ethicians use “voluntariness” to mean will force, vehemence or intensity of will-
act. These assert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they are right, for
concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from it is more vehement and
intense by reason of the concupiscence. But we do not use the word voluntariness in the sense of
will-force, or will-intensity; we use the term to indicate the human character of an act, the
essence of a human act. We keep human act and voluntary act as synonyms.

We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that come from
it. Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent concupiscence disturbs the
mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon the moral
qualities of an act; hence it impairs the knowledge necessary for perfect voluntariness. Again,
antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and
prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence it impairs
freedom. Therefore, on the score of the both knowledge and freedom, antecedent concupiscence
lessens the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the
agent.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an

act.

Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupiscence, they are not
destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may sin
gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less grave than it
would be if committed, dispassionately and, so to speak, “in cold blood.” To illustrate: Jones,
under the influence of antecedent anger, strikes Smith and injures him seriously. While the
voluntariness of this act is lessened by antecedent concupiscence, and while Jonas is less
responsible than he would be if struck the blow in cold deliberation, still the act is truly
voluntary, and Jones is responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset and disturbed by
strong passion, is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, and does it freely. Passion
may make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not make such control
impossible. If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of agent’s acts impossible,
then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not human acts, but act of man. Here,
however, we speak only of human acts as influenced by antecedent concupiscence.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act.

Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly. Hence the acts that proceed
from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To illustrate: Jonas wishes to be
revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to stir
himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seriously. Here we have
direct voluntariness throughout. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly wills the
anger as a means to the accomplishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with rage at the
moment of performing the act, he is nonetheless doing what he directly willed to do, and his
concupiscence cannot affect the full voluntariness of that act. Again: Smith broods upon wrongs
suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee) that if he continues to
nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to act of violence against the person of Jenkins.
Nevertheless, he continues to brood. He became wild with passion, seeks out Jenkins, and
seriously injures him. Here the anger was directly willed, and the act of violence was willed in
cause with the anger, and in itself at the moment of attack. Even if Smith’s passion was so
vehement as to overwhelm his rational control of his acts, even if, that is to say, the attack itself
did not proceed from Smith as a human act, it was nevertheless willed in cause, and has its
proper voluntariness as such: an indirect voluntariness which is in no wise diminished by
concupiscence.

III. Fear – the shrinking back of the mind from danger. It is the agitation of the mind brought
about by the apprehension of impending evil. It is also the disturbance of the mind a
person who is confronted by a danger to himself or loved ones.
 Difference Between Acting With Fear and Acting Out of Fear
o Acting with fear are actions which are difficult or dangerous just like new
experiences such as speaking in front of a crowd.
o Acting out of fear are actions where in fear causes one to act just like
jumping from the top floor of a burning building.

Principles Regarding Fear:

 An act done with fear is voluntary and is accountable.
 An act done from fear, however great is simply voluntary, although it is
regularly also conditionally involuntary.
PRINCIPLE: An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is
regularly also conditionally involuntary.

The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding from
fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned
voluntariness in that which is performed with fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon taking
valuables from a house at night, proceeds with fear that he may be apprehended; but he does not
commit burglary through or from fear.

An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we speak of a
human act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily insane,
the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an act of man and not a human act. But as
long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from fear are simply voluntary. For
the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that of which he is
afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But the act is also regularly
involuntary in as much as the agent would not perform it in other circumstances; were it not for
the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be performed. To illustrate: A man denies his
faith to escape torture and death. His denial comes from fear. Hence, according to our principle,
the act is simply voluntary, and the man is responsible for the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man
would not have denied his faith except for the influence of fear, we discern a conditional
involuntariness in his act which renders it less sinful than it would be where it done in cold
deliberation, apart from the influence of fear.

The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from it.
Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the influence of
fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although never to such an extent that the
agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape responsibility for his act.

The positive (“statue”) law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from
grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent perform an act that
is against his will, is an invalid act or one that maybe invalidated. Even though such an act is
simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear to stand
as valid and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a gun, or
under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, on positive law, to fulfil the contract.

IV. Violence or Co-action – the external force applied by a free cause for the purpose of
compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will.

Example: the Martyrs suffered violence when they dragged to the altars of idols in the
effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods.

Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not
controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of bodily action, and since this command
is limited or destroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be indirectly affected by
violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make the bodily members offer due
resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such resistance is lacking, in the act done under
violence.
Principles Regarding Violence:
 Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence.

 External acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in

no wise imputable to the agent.

V. Habit – understood as operative habit. It is a lasting readiness and facility, born of

frequent repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner.

Principles of Habit:
 Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always
voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.
Thus, a man who has always endeavoured to speak the truth has a habit of truthfulness,
and it goes against his habit to lie. A man, who has the habit of lying, finds it very easy to falsify
or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when a lie would prove convenient.
Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds profane words slipping from him with great ease
and readiness, while it requires a special watchfulness on his part to avoid uttering them.

PRINCIPLE: Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always
voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.

Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts done
from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in themselves acts of man, the habit itself,
so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to overcome it, is willed as
a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are human acts. To illustrate: John
has the bad habit of using profane language. He is conscious of this fault. Being conscious of it,
he has knowledge of it; and he is free to determine upon overcoming it, or to allow it to endure.
Hence, both knowledge and freedom are present, and there is nothing to balk voluntariness. John
is therefore responsible for the bad habit as much, and, since it is the cause of the profane words
– many of which are uttered without advertence – he is responsible in cause or indirectly for each
profane utterance. Now, if John determines to overcome his evil habit, he disowns it; he wills not
to utter profane speech. But, “He that wills the end wills the means to that end.” Hence, John, to
be honest in his will to reform, must consent to ceaseless watchfulness over his tongue. While his
good intention endures, and while his watchfulness continues, the profane utterances that “slip
out” are acts of man and not human acts, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are
not imputable to John, but the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consent
indirectly to let the habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable, even if they slip
from him unnoticed.