2AC

Advantage 1
2AC---Miscalc---!
Advantage 2
2AC---Diplomacy---!
T
 2AC---AT: T-Minerals
A. Development includes commercial and military activity. Prefer contextual evidence
with intent to define.
Alaska Statutes ’22 [Alaska Statutes; January 1; Title 44, “Definitions,” State Government §
44.88.900, [Link]

(1) “Arctic” meansthe area of the state north of the Arctic Circle, north and west of the boundary formed
by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers, all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean, and the
Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas, and the Aleutian Chain;

(2) “Arctic infrastructure development” means

(A) the construction, improvement, rehabilitation, or expansion of a facility

(i) in the Arctic to aid in development or meet emergency response needs; or

(ii) in
the state if the construction, improvement, rehabilitation, or expansion supports or furthers the
development of a facility in the Arctic; or

(B) the
purchase, construction, improvement, rehabilitation, or expansion of a shore-based plant, facility,
equipment, or assets used in support of a fishery in the Arctic.

(6) “development project” has the meaning given to “project” in (13)(A) and (D)--(H) of this section;

(12) “plant” or “facility” means

real property, whether above or below mean high water, or an interest in
it, and the buildings, improvements, and structures constructed or to be constructed on or in it, and may
include roads, fixtures, machinery, and equipment on it or in it, and tangible personal property, regardless of
whether the tangible personal property is attached to or connected with real property, if the owner has agreed
not to remove the tangible personal property permanently from the state for the period the authority sets; “plant” or “facility” does not include
work in process or stock in trade;

(13) “project” means

(A) a
plant or facility used or intended for use in connection with making, processing, preparing,
transporting, or producing in any manner, goods, products, or substances of any kind or nature or in connection with
developing or utilizing a natural resource, or extracting, smelting, transporting, converting, assembling,
or producing in any manner, minerals, raw materials, chemicals, compounds, alloys, fibers, commodities
and materials, products, or substances of any kind or nature;
(B) a plant or facility used or intended for use in connection with a business enterprise;

(C) commercial activity by a business enterprise;

(D) a plant or facility demonstrating technological advances of new methods and procedures and prototype commercial applications for the
exploration, development, production, transportation, conversion, and use of energy resources;

(E) infrastructure for a new tourism destination facility or for the expansion of a tourism destination facility; in this subparagraph, “tourism
destination facility” does not include a hotel or other overnight lodging facility;

(F) a plant or facility, other than a plant or facility described in (D) of this paragraph, for the generation, transmission, development,
transportation, conversion, or use of energy resources;
(G) a plant or facility that enhances, provides for, or promotes economic
development with respect to transportation,
communications, community public purposes, technical innovations, prototype commercial applications of intellectual
property, or research;

(H) a plant or facility used or intended for use as a federal facility, including a United States military, national guard, or
coast guard facility;

(I) infrastructure for an area that is designated as a military facility zone under AS 26.30;
Canada CP
 2AC---AT: [X] CP---T/S
‘Should’ refers to the future.
Brown ’8 [Mary Ann Brown; May 14; Judge on the Court of Appeals of Iowa; Westlaw, “In re Est. of
Guthrie,” 752 N.W.2d 452]

Brock and Kaitlyn look to the

word “should” in the phrase “in the event any of my children should predecease me” and claim the
district court improperly found the word looked
to the future. They claim the word should be interpreted as the
past tense of “shall” to imply a duty or obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed.1990). Looking at the
phrase as a whole, however, rather than at a single word, we determine the phrase is considering
possible future events. See In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa [Link].1996) (noting we must ascertain a testator's
intent from the entire will).

And its not certain

White ’26 [Warren L; January 8; Judge on the Springfield Court of Appeals of Missouri; Westlaw,
“Hubbard v. Turner Department Store Co.,” 220 [Link]. 95]

3 The verb “should” has various shades of meaning . In its ordinary meaning it does not express
certainty as the word “will” sometimes does . In the telegram under consideration it seems to be used in the sense that,
from the anticipated profits, plaintiff might receive a bonus of $25 to $50 per month. It is nothing more than an expression of opinion, with no
definite assurance that such would be the result. The expression, “twenty–five to fifty dollars per month extra,” adds nothing to the certainty or
definiteness of the proposal but is merely suggestive. The whole expression, “a part of profits that should mean from twenty–five to fifty dollars
per month extra, to our minds cannot possibly be construed as guaranty or an unconditional promise to pay a minimum of $25 per month or a
maximum of $50 per month out of the profits, in addition to the agreed salary. It is merely suggestive. Moreover, no method is provided for
determining what the share of plaintiff in the profits might be; no per cent. is named. Whether net or gross profits or whether profits from the
whole store or only the furniture department, were to be the basis of settlement, is all left to conjecture. There is no stipulation as to when
settlements were to be made, which, obviously, might be either weekly, monthly, annually, or whenever the employment should cease. The
expression in the telegram, “if you want to come and work hard, we will take care of you in good shape,” avails plaintiff nothing from the
standpoint of law. The whole telegram is one well calculated to mislead, whether deliberate or not. Morally, defendant was under some
obligation to increase plaintiff's salary in the event the concern prospered and plaintiff worked hard; but, legally, we are confronted with an
insurmountable obstacle in so far as affording relief to plaintiff is concerned. It is an elemental and fundamental rule of law that a contract, to
be valid, “must be certain and unequivocal in its essential terms, either within itself or by reference to some other agreement or matter.” 6 R. C.
L. 644; 9 Cyc. 245; 18 R. C. L. 494; Burks v. Stam, 65 Mo. App. 455; Blaine v. Knapp & Co., 140 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; United Press v. New York
Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527, 53 L. R. A. 288; Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 111 N. E. 822, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 758.

Certainty is key, otherwise hostile vessels will still appear---That’s Elliot-Meisel.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>
Climate change is a reality that both nations – as well as the world – must come to terms with, must mitigate, and must include in any plans for
continental security. Further, the climate’s unpredictable nature means that the countries will need to have contingency plans in place for years
of impassable ice, years of light ice, procedures to monitor, patrol, protect, defend, explore, enforce regulations, and carry out search and
rescue operations sooner than later. There is no denying the need for polar-capable icebreakers, and they will remain an important component
of the Canadian and the United States’ fleets. The proposed
expansion of polar icebreakers by both countries is a
positive sign- not because there should be competition between the two nations in the Arctic, but rather that the icebreakers
provide an expanded fleet for cooperation and collaboration. At present, neither country has adequate icebreaker
capabilities for the Arctic waters year-round, and the presence of either country’s Polar icebreakers is years away. As they are built, the model
of the past could be a template for the future. Kikkert and Lackenbauer rightly argue that the expanded
“fleets mean the two
countries will be in a strong position to expand upon [their] long co-operative tradition …. To share best
practices and lessons learned…. [and to] closely co-ordinate where vessels are located [to provide] maximum
coverage and domain awareness in the North America Arctic.” 145 It is true that “to perform unexpected tasks on a handshake
requires clear, positive and consistent communications and close interoperability.” But even if a “handshake
[is] the essence of Canadian-American relations” in the Passage,146 it is insufficient in the current state of
the world’s increased partisanship, competitive nationalism, non-Arctic states and non-state actors in the Arctic, and
climate change. The issue of the Northwest Passage needs to be resolved. The imperative is now.

The plan’s strong signal is key, otherwise it dilutes Canada’s capabilities by still forcing
a sovereignty vs security tradeoff---That’s Huebert.
<<FOR REFERENCE>>

So, to be clear, there may be a limited problem

of the American revisiting the Northwest Passage issue—that will be a
sovereignty problem. But it will be a bilateral diplomatic issue between Canada and U.S. But the magnitude of the
problem—even if it happened—pales when considering the possibility of the breakdown of the nuclear
deterrent system that has been the ultimate guarantee of Canadian security since the 1950s.

In the public’s mind, the loss of control of some elements of very limited international arctic shipping
because of American action may be galling to our sense of national entitlement, but it cannot be compared
to the disaster that would befall Canada if our enemies came to believe that they can successfully attack the
United States through us. That is the core security issue that faces Canada. The energy needed to meet this
threat cannot be diluted with a conflation with issues surrounding Arctic Sovereignty.
 2AC---AT: Inducement---T/S
Canada fails on their own. The perm fills the gap.
Spafford ’24 [Andrew, Samantha Olson; former program administrator for the Energy, Economics, and
Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Breaking Defense; “The melting
fortress: The United States, Canada, and the race against time in the Arctic,”
[Link]
against-time-in-the-arctic/] wally

The problem: One of those key partners, Canada, is by its own admission unprepared to face the Arctic
challenge. Unless the US works quickly to help fill that gap, it means American interests in the Arctic are going to be at
risk moving forward.

Historically, the United States has been protected by the operational challenges of waging an Arctic offensive in frigid conditions. But the
growing prospect of a “Blue Arctic,” ice-free for months out of the year, could allow a great power adversary to deploy military assets right in
America’s backyard for the first time in history. Already, Russian and Chinese warships have been seen patrolling together off the coast of
Alaska in unprecedented numbers. As the US military’s former top commander for the Arctic, Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy said, the region is
“no longer a fortress wall” and we must be prepared to defend it.

In the Arctic, Russia

is not a “pacing threat” as China is in the Indo-Pacific; it is well ahead of the United
States. Russia controls nearly 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean’s coastline and has built countless bases
across the region. Washington, meanwhile, only maintains six bases and five of them are outside of the Arctic Circle in southern Alaska.
As of 2023, the United States Coast Guard possessed only five icebreakers or ice-capable patrol ships which are critical to maintaining a
presence in the Arctic. Moscow, meanwhile, has 57 such vessels. It will be years before the American icebreaking fleet is large enough to
effectively support large-scale US operations.

In addition to rapidly scaling up its force posture, Russia has also conducted unprecedented naval exercises and harassed American fishing
vessels in Arctic waters. Moscow has begun to assert its control over newly expanded shipping lanes through the Arctic like the Northern Sea
Route (NSR), declaring certain parts of this route to be internal Russian waters with an aim towards regulating shipping that passes through it.

In the future, Russia may try to expand its control over other Arctic waters closer to the United States and present a direct threat to the
homeland and to US operations in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The United States Navy’s top Arctic commander, Adm. Daryl Caudle fears that
Moscow may try to create its own “‘nine-dashed line’ around the North Pole.”

Indisputably, the United States is ill-equipped to face the Arctic challenge alone. To maintain security
and stability, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly emphasized the role of
regional allies and partners as “the core of DoD’s strategy for the Arctic.” Canada remains at the top of
the list, but Ottawa’s ability to rise to the occasion has been called into question by experts and officials
alike. Canada’s own Minister of National Defense Bill Blair infamously remarked that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)’s recruiting problems
have sent the organization into a “death spiral.” Meanwhile, Former Vice Admiral Mark Norman described Canada’s military readiness as
“borderline atrocious.”

China trade deal and Greenland kill negotiations.

Price and Gillies 26 [MICHELLE L. PRICE covers the White House. She previously covered the 2024
presidential campaign and politics, government and other news in New York, Nevada, Utah and Arizona.
She is based in Washington; and ROB GILLIES, Chief of Bureau for The Associated Press in Canada.
"Trump threatens Canada with 100% tariff over its China trade deal, escalates feud with Carney", 1-24-
2026, [Link]
deal-escalates-feud-prime-minister-mark-carney/18465052/, accessed 4-8-2026] /vzhu

WASHINGTON -- President
Donald Trump on Saturday threatened to impose a 100% tariff on goods imported
from Canada if America's northern neighbor went ahead with its China trade deal, intensifying a feud
with Prime Minister Mark Carney, a rising voice in the West's pushback to Trump's new world order.
Trump said in a social media post that if Carney "thinks he is going to make Canada a 'Drop Off Port' for
China to send goods and products into the United States, he is sorely mistaken."
It was unclear when Trump might impose the threatened tariff. He said in the post it would happen "immediately" if Canada made a deal with China, which Carney
did a week earlier, drawing initial praise from the president.

The White House did not offer any additional details.

While Trump has waged a trade war over the past year, Canada forged ahead with its own deal to lower
tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in return for lower import taxes on Canadian farm products . At the time,
Trump said that agreement was what Carney "should be doing and it's a good thing for him to sign a trade deal."

Dominic LeBlanc, Canada's minister responsible for trade with the United States, said Canada and China had resolved "several important trade issues" but there was
no pursuit of a free-trade agreement.

Trump's threat came amid an escalating war of words with Carney as the Republican president's push to
acquire Greenland strained the NATO alliance. Trump had commented while in Davos, Switzerland, this
week that "Canada lives because of the United States." Carney shot back that his nation can be an
example that the world does not have to bend toward autocratic tendencies. "Canada doesn't live
because of the United States. Canada thrives because we are Canadian," he said.

Trump later revoked his invitation to Carney to join the president's "Board of Peace" that he is forming to try to
resolve global conflicts.

Trump's push to acquire Greenland has come after he has repeatedly needled Canada over its
sovereignty and suggested it also be absorbed the United States as a 51st state. He posted an altered
image on social media this week showing a map of the United States that included Canada, Venezuela,
Greenland and Cuba as part of its territory.

In his message Saturday, Trump

continued his provocations by calling Canada's leader "Governor Carney." Trump
had used the same nickname for Carney's predecessor, Justin Trudeau, and his first use of it toward Carney was
the latest mark of their soured relationship.

Daniel Béland, a political science professor at McGill University in Montreal, said "there was a sense Trump showed more
respect for Carney than for Trudeau. Now, after Carney's visit to China and, even more, his widely celebrated Davos

speech, which clearly outshined and upset Trump, the gloves are off."
Carney has emerged as a leader of a movement for countries to find ways to link up and counter the U.S. under Trump. Speaking in Davos before Trump, Carney
said, "Middle powers must act together because if you are not at the table, you are on the menu" and he warned about coercion by great powers - without
mentioning Trump's name. The prime minister received widespread praise and attention for his remarks, upstaging Trump at the World Economic Forum.

The prime minister even spoke of a "rupture" between the U.S. under Trump and its Western allies that would never be repaired.

Trump, in his Truth Social post Saturday, also said that "China will eat Canada alive, completely devour it, including the destruction of their businesses, social fabric,
and general way of life." In a later post, the president said: "The last thing the World needs is to have China take over Canada. It's NOT going to happen, or even
come close to happening!"

Carney has not yet reached a deal with Trump to reduce some of the tariffs that he has imposed on key
sectors of the Canadian economy. But Canada has been protected by the heaviest impact of Trump's tariffs by the Canada-U.S.-Mexico
Agreement. That trade agreement is up for a review this year.

In the fall, the

Canadian province of Ontario aired an anti-tariff ad in the U.S. that prompted Trump to end trade talks with Canada.
The television ad used the words of former President Ronald Reagan to criticize U.S. tariffs. Trump
pledged to increase tariffs on imports
of Canadian goods by an extra 10%. He did not follow through.
As for China, Canada had initially mirrored the United States by putting a 100% tariff on electric vehicles from Beijing and a 25% tariff on steel and aluminum. China
had responded by imposing 100% import taxes on Canadian canola oil and meal and 25% on pork and seafood.
But as Trump's pursued pressure tactics, Canada's
foreign policy has been less aligned with the U.S., creating an
opening for an improved relationship with China. Carney made the tariff announcement earlier this month during a visit to Beijing.

Inducements cause blackmailing and more aggression.

Graeme Davis 16, University of Leeds; and Robert Johns, University of Essex, 2016, “The domestic
consequences of international over-cooperation,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 33, No.
4, [Link]

engagement strategies
A second area of disapproval relates particularly to transformative or unconditional engagement. Mastaduno (2003) suggests that

associated with diffuse reciprocity can increase the likelihood of the state being blackmailed by an
adversary. If benefits are sent to encourage a general transformation in behaviour, rather than for a specific quid pro quo,
the target state may subsequently demand further benefits as a condition for maintaining good behaviour . The public may
recognize this potential for blackmail, or believe that they have been bullied into sending resources to a potential enemy.

Fails---any signal of sovereignty causes Trump to literally send warships---That’s

Griffiths.
<<FOR REFERENCE>>

It is hard to see the report as setting up anything other than a clear collision course with Canadian
sovereignty by subordinating diplomatic caution and historical precedent to newly defined strategic
necessities. Specifically, it provides the formal justification for the U.S. to execute a Freedom of
Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the Northwest Passage without Canada’s consent, thereby undoing
Ottawa’s internal waters claim.

Since the U.S. routinely uses FONOPs globally to challenge “excessive maritime claims” by allies, partners, and
competitors alike, and given the strategy’s emphasis on quickly re-shoring the defence industrial base and maintaining dominance, delaying this
assertion risks, in the estimation of the Trump administration, allowing
competing powers to set an unfavourable
precedent in the Arctic. This strategic urgency ensures that an American FONOP is now more, not less, likely,
and is something that could happen sooner, not later.

The core dilemma for Canada is that its reliance on integrated defence cooperation with the U.S.
inevitably diminishes its ability to maintain independent operational control over its own territory. This reality,
coupled with Washington’s unilateral assertions, reinforces the cynical but correct observation that the
report marks another important step toward reducing Canada to a strategic appendage of the U.S., or in
the more direct and clarifying language of the president, a “51st state.”

Only the perm solves, 1NC Axworthy concedes cooperation is key---inserted below.
1NC Axworthy ’23 [Thomas; May 16; Secretary General of the InterAction Council, Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen’s
University, M.A. from Queen’s University, B.A. from the University of Winnipeg; Policy, “The Arctic: A Core Canadian Interest,”
[Link] era

Northern capabilities to identify, track and destroy potential missile and bomber attacks are not only essential for Canada’s security, but equally
so for US security. If Canadian-American relations are Canada’s number one priority, then the place to start is to
by jointly managing
ensure that we use our vast Arctic territory to enhance American military security

and contributing to the common defence through NORAD. Upgrading

the North Warning System is an indication that common sense has at last prevailed in Ottawa.
Russia Relations DA
 2AC---Russian Relations [Diplomacy] T/S
2. It’s too late to drive a ‘wedge’ between the RCA.
Stephen Blank ’22 [June 2022; Stephen Blank, PhD, Senior Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency. “Russia, China and the Arctic:
Birth of an Alliance?” Global Asia, Volume 17, Issue 2;
[Link]
blank] $G

In fact, there are good reasons, if we judgefrom statements by high-ranking Russian and Chinese officials, to believe
that the Sino-Russian entente may already be an alliance in fact, if not in law (i.e. no binding treaty). Putin has recently
commented that Sino-Russian relations have reached “unprecedented heights” based on trade and economic co-
operation, joint collaboration on aircraft manufacturing, lunar scientific research, environmental
protection, cultural and people-to-people exchanges. And this does not include the military-to-military co-
operation listed here. The relations are, he noted, evolving in “lockstep with the times,” and that co-ordination in world
affairs will increase. In 2018, Putin said he did not rule out an alliance but observed that while it is theoretically possible, it is not necessary
because their relationship is better than an alliance. In 2019, he even admitted that the scope of multi-dimensional co-operation equated to an
alliance with China. While China’s posture on Ukraine indicates the need for some revision of that stance, not much change is needed, nor is
that revision permanent. Even though Moscow remains wary about Beijing’s intentions in the Arctic — for example, scuttling Chinese plans to
construct a deep-water port in Arkhangelsk — this entente
is very much real and growing. It therefore seems quite
unlikely, as some Western analysts have argued, that Washington will be able to drive wedges between
these governments given the degree of Sino-Russian intimacy.

4. Treaty Trap. Russia violates them routinely, and China wants no part.
Edelman ’25 [Eric S. Edelman; Counselor At The Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Undersecretary Of Defense For Policy In The George W. Bush Administration, and U.S. Ambassador To
Turkey And Finland; 6-3-2025; "No New START"; Foreign Affairs; [Link]
states/no-new-start] KL
For the past century, arms control agreements have been used to constrain threats posed by potential aggressor nations. But for the most part,
these agreements have worked only when none of the signatories harbored aggressive intent. Where
there was such intent, arms control treaties have been covertly or overtly violated or channeled arms
competition into areas that were not limited. The naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s offer a case in point: they limited
capital ships but excluded submarines, allowing a robust competition in the latter. And by the 1930s, some of the parties, particularly Nazi
Germany, merely pretended to abide by treaty limits. In more recent decades, the Soviet Union and now Russia have been repeat offenders. In
the 1970s, the Soviet Union violated the Biological Weapons Convention shortly after its signing, and then went on to violate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in the 1980s.

Since coming to power in Russia, Putin has violated nine separate arms control agreements and now
appears ready to skirt two more: the State Department’s most recent arms control compliance report
notes that Putin is following his Soviet predecessors in contravening the Biological Weapons Convention by
maintaining “an offensive biological warfare program,” and after intelligence reports indicated Russia may be planning to put a
nuclear weapon into Earth’s orbit, Russia vetoed a UN resolution reaffirming the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, by
deliberately taking reckless actions such as cutting in front of U.S. naval and air forces, Putin’s military
routinely ignores the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the Reagan-era Prevention of Dangerous
Military Activities Agreement, which both sought to regulate militaries’ conduct in order to avoid accidents
that could lead to inadvertent escalation or miscalculation. Given these willful and continuing violations, the
prospect of negotiating a meaningful arms control deal with Putin under the best of circumstances is far-
fetched. Add to the calculus that Moscow’s forces have stepped up attacks on Ukrainian cities even as
Putin gives rhetorical support to peace talks, and it beggars belief that Russia would engage in good-
faith arms control negotiations over the next year.

In the near term, nuclear discussions between Washington and Beijing seem similarly improbable. China, for its part,
regards any willingness to engage in arms control as a sign of weakness, and it views the transparency and
verification process that would presumably undergird such an accord as intrusive and akin to
espionage. When the first Trump administration proposed such talks, the Chinese Foreign Ministry described the proposal as “neither
serious nor sincere.” Beijing is also unlikely to contemplate any arms control agreement until it has reached
parity with Russia and the United States, which is, according to the Defense Department’s China Military Power Report, a decade
away.
In the absence of changes in the leadership in Moscow and Beijing, the United States is not likely to see a new nuclear arms control treaty
anytime soon. This is disappointing, of course, but arms control is not—and can never be—a substitute for strong deterrence policies and
posture. History clearly shows that building strategic nuclear forces creates painful defense dilemmas for adversaries and is the surest formula
both for protecting the United States and its allies and for ultimately getting adversaries to the negotiating table. Unilateral restraint has never
succeeded in doing that, nor has continuing to abide by outdated agreements that cannot ensure future security.

6. Statements from Trump and Putin are empty gesturing. Putin would pocket
concessions.
Rabechault ’25 [Mathieu Rabechault; Journaliste AFP Aéronautique, industries de défense, espace; 1-
30-2025; "'Not interested': Analysts sceptical about US, Russia nuclear talks"; France 24;
[Link]
nuclear-talks] KL

The United States and Russia have pledged their readiness to resume nuclear disarmament talks after years
of confrontation, but analysts are sceptical that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin can or even want to reach a breakthrough new
agreement.

Days after returning to the White House for a second term, Trump said he would like to see "denuclearisation" and called for China to join the
talks between Russia and the United States, the world's two biggest nuclear powers.

The Kremlin immediately confirmed its interest in launching talks "as soon as possible", saying last week that French and British nuclear weapon
stockpiles should also be taken into account.

But China has indicated it is not interested at this stage, while analysts dismissed the US and Russian
statements as posturing.

Moscow in particular has no interest in reducing its arsenal of nuclear warheads as its invasion of Ukraine is
set to enter its fourth year next month, analysts say, suspecting Putin sees any potential future talks as an
attempt to break out of Western isolation and even try to negotiate the fate of Ukraine.
The last remaining strategic arms control agreement between Russia and the United States is set to expire in a year.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, an organisation which informs the public about threats to humankind, appears to also be deeply sceptical.

The scientists on Tuesday shifted their "doomsday" clock to 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been.

- 'Redistribution of influence' -

"It's hard to imagine China, Russia or the United States undertaking the exacting negotiations required at this point in good faith," said Adam
Mount, a nuclear expert at the Federation of American Scientists.
"Donald Trump thinks of himself as a deal maker, but historically hasn't had the patience, proficiency, or
credibility," he said, adding that most people in the Trump administration are "arms control skeptics".
Maxim Starchak, a fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University in Canada, said Moscow's statements should
not be taken at face value.

"Russia is not interested in arms control, it is interested in the redistribution of influence in Europe," Starchak said.

"The so-called arms control negotiations are a way for Moscow to achieve negotiations on broad issues
of European security," he added.

"It
is important for Putin to show that he is not against negotiations, and in the end declare that the
United States has failed them."

9. Viewing “communication alone” as solvent leads to miscalc---it breeds false

confidence---divergent interests
Steve Lambakis 17, National security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and
policy studies, (Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Security;
[Link]

There is no evidence to suggest that building a common diplomatic framework for dealing with activities
in space and focusing on dialogue in peacetime can give us a plausible route to the assurances we are
seeking or the prevention of provocative actions. Establishing rules of the road in space will work with
some, but only for those who see decisive value in obeying rules rather than violating them when
necessary or convenient. Rules may cut down on the instances where accidents or misunderstandings in space might lead others to see
those same actions as provocative, and this of course is a good thing. Everything in the rule-making business, however,
hinges on the assumption that rules can be enforced, and that we are dealing with rational actors who
have a stake in the current system and are willing to accept the commitments they have made, even
when inconvenient and potentially costly. The contrary is generally the experience in international relations. International rules
typically, at best, are seen as useful and, correspondingly, commitments are kept until a country feels the need to take contrary steps to
support important goals, to include moving militarily in space, if needed.

Iran, for example, has a history of engaging in terrorism and military intimidation, to include the support of terrorist groups and the use of small
boats to harass U.S. warships, and Iranian-backed Houthi rebels to launch missile attacks from Yemen against U.S. Navy ships in the Persian
Gulf. Such attacks indicate the degree to which fear of U.S. retaliation (i.e., deterrence) has declined in the Middle East, especially if those
attacks are restrained and brief.271 Based on this track record, it is conceivable that Iran could use similar intimidation tactics against U.S. or
allied satellites, especially in times of crisis, and especially if those tactics involved reversible effects. That is, we might assume such behavior
unless the United States is able to bolster its space deterrent by announcing credible punishments in response to this type of aggression.

Those who believe that China will follow “rules of the road” when the stakes are high need only look
at China’s disdainful response to international legal findings against it with regard to its islandmaking
activities in the East China Sea, or its aggressive behavior in proximity to U.S. vessels on the high seas. In
2015, the Chinese Navy acted provocatively toward the U.S. Navy, simulating a missile attack. According to U.S. Representative Randy Forbes,
“coming on the heels of antisatellite and other demonstrations, this latest incident should be a reminder
of the destabilizing course that China is on and the challenges we face in maintaining a stable military
balance in the Asia-Pacific region.” 272 Russia also is used to engaging in provocative behavior and
brinkmanship. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “Russia has also significantly increased the scale,
number and range of provocative flights by nuclear-capable bombers across much of the globe . From Japan
to Gibraltar. From Crete to California. And from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.”273
There is an approach to protecting U.S. space systems that touts the “process of dialogue with the
national space security community to discuss priorities and concerns.”274 This approach, called “strategic restraint,”
is focused on diplomacy and “signaling,” to convince others, “particularly China and Russia,” to “take a step back” and reevaluate their own
goals. “Even without a reciprocal move on the part of the two near-peer competitors in space, however,” this argument goes, “the United
States will benefit internally by taking the time to seriously reassess its space security house.” Essentially, strategic restraint means doing very
little, if anything, to shore up deterrence with the support of military power while conversing with countries who have shown little interest in
backing away from their own military space agendas (agendas that have evolved despite very little military space activity by the United States).
This space diplomacy would strive to establish norms and rules that sharply delineate acceptable and unacceptable behavior and may strive to
ban space arms (which may be defined in a way to impede missile defense capabilities). The
effort to manage and control
confidently developments in space would involve dialogue with China and Russia with the goal of
providing “mutual assurance measures” that reduce the risks of misconceptions, and “breakers” (or “circuit
breakers”) to turn off the escalation of activity leading to war.

Prevention of war in space is a desirable goal. Today, no nation has more to lose by such a confrontation than the United
States. The question is, will the emphasis on preventing wars in space fuel the conditions for space
confrontations? While some might argue that issuing private demarches and undertaking trust-building
exercises with countries such as China, North Korea and Iran might help teach them about the highly
adverse consequences of using a kinetic ASAT and avoiding inadvertent conflict,275 steps taken to
educate the other side or build confidence and trust (i.e., information exchanges, notifications, crisis communications
channels, warnings, demarcations, consultative mechanisms, shared space situational awareness, development of best practices in space)
only work when both sides want the same thing. If they are truly interested in avoiding a situation that
could escalate into a larger conflict, then improved communications and education are good steps to
take.

Achievements of diplomacy, and strategic restraint, are never the last words when it comes to strategic
competition. If there are no steps taken to prepare for the breakdown of deterrence or diplomacy,
then there is no margin for error at all. This approach, in other words, is high risk. Indeed, Admiral Cecil
Haney has concluded that “despite our efforts, a future conflict may start, or extend, into space.” 276 In
other words, it is important not to handcuff agencies within the state responsible for responding militarily to possible aggression against U.S.
space interests.
Primacy K
 2AC---Settler Colonialism---T/L
1. Framework. Weigh the 1AC against a competitive opportunity cost. The K must
defend causal links, uniqueness, and solvency. Any other model collapses clash and
fairness by sidestepping the burden of rejoinder.
Multipolarity is a recipe for instability – institution collapse and cultural differences
sparks war
Latham & Yu 24 – Andrew Latham is a Professor of International Relations and Political Theory, and
Special Advisor to the President at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. Raymond Yu is a former
researcher at Macalester College and now a graduate student in International Relations at the University
of Chicago. [“Opinion – Is Multipolarity Destined to Destabilize the World?”, E-International Relations,
December 12, 2024, [Link]
the-world/] CH

One of the key challenges of multipolarity is that international institutions often struggle to keep pace
with fragmented power structures. The United Nations and the European Union were designed for a world of shared
commitments, yet as powers prioritize their national interests, these institutions become less effective. For
example, during the Syrian Civil War, competing agendas among states sidelined multilateral solutions , and within the
EU, countries like Hungary and Germany have diverged from collective policy to protect their national interests. A concert of powers would
recognize these limitations, providing a forum where the most influential states negotiate directly, balancing interests without expecting all
actors to adhere to a universal standard.

Multipolarity also fosters a new kind of cultural competition, as rising powers assert their own values and priorities.
China’s actions in the South China Sea, for example, are rooted in a drive to assert regional dominance,
while Turkey’s military actions against Kurdish groups showcase how national interests often override broader
stability. In a concert of powers framework, restraint would mean that each power respects the core interests of the others, avoiding
policies that provoke antagonism. A multipolar system without restraint risks escalating these cultural and
territorial conflicts, but a concert approach could mitigate such dangers by emphasizing pragmatic boundaries. Another
destabilizing factor in multipolarity is the tendency of states to legitimize their rule by framing external powers
as threats. Turkey’s balancing between NATO and BRICS, for example, strengthens its regional influence
while casting Western alliances in a skeptical light. China’s rhetoric about sovereignty in Taiwan and the South China Sea
consolidates nationalist support by framing foreign powers as existential threats. A concert of powers approach, however, would
encourage transparency and dialogue among the leading states, reducing the need for adversarial posturing and helping to maintain stability.

6. It greenlights authoritarianism and human rights abuses

Hall 23 – Natasha Hall is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy
Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. [“Breaking Point: Human Rights in a
Multipolar World”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 30, 2023,
[Link]
%20authoritarians%20and%20warlords,this%20is%20a%20global%20problem.] CH

Would-be authoritarians and warlords saw a successful playbook for a new multipolar era. Authoritarian
actors could once again play great powers off one another and threaten widening instability to garner
support. Collaboration between these actors metastasized authoritarianism and violence. Between 2016 and
2021, the number of countries moving toward authoritarianism was twice those that were moving towards democracy. Fueled by
external sponsorship, over 50 civil wars are raging across the world, almost 50 percent more civil wars than in 2001.
Two billion people—a quarter of the global population—now live in conflict-affected areas.

Renewed global rivalry brings respect for human rights norms to a breaking point. Domestic human rights
violations in the Cold War era were often dismissed as collateral damage in an age of great power competition
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Today, the rivalry is even messier with China and Russia exploring
their own interests, often in opposition to U.S. interests. Other countries are not content with picking sides and can
even further fuel civil conflicts and human rights violations to expand power and influence.

And this
is a global problem. Despite the “civil” characterization of these conflicts and crackdowns, what is clear in
the case of Syria and increasing violence throughout the world, is that these internal matters do not
remain internal or even regional. International actors invariably intervene, persecuted populations
emigrate, and authoritarian tactics spread.

Reps don’t shape reality.

Shim 14 David Shim 14. Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University
of Groningen, Netherlands. 2014. “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is Believing.” Routledge, pg. 25-26.

However, particular
representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance,
proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect' would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making
circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also, Dauber 2001; Eisensee/Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998. 2005;

Robinson 1999, 2001). There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention , in
which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David
Perlmutter (1998: l), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which
dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the
formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions
and values (see also, Domke ct ah 2002; Perlmutter 2005). Yet, it should also be noted that visuals function as
unquestioned referents in international politics when underlining the necessity of such specific policy practices as
sanctions, deterrents and/or military cooperation. A good example of this is satellite imagery, which plays a pivotal role in the surveillance and assessment of
missile or nuclear proliferation activities by so-called 'rogue states' like Iran and North Korea. Regarded as providing compelling evidence

about the stage of development of nuclear facilities or about the collaboration between suspect states, satellite
images point to a nexus between visuality, knowledge and international politics wherein this way of seeing
consequently enables governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take informed political action. In sum, the visual provides the

foundation for knowledge generation and. in doing so, bestows political responses with legitimacy (cf.
Moller 2007). A now famous case-in-point is Colin Powell's PowerPoint presentation at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. In the briefing, the
then US Secretary of State showed satellite images that allegedly proved the existence of Iraqi 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. What was remarkable about Powell's
presentation was that the visual emerged as the primary referent for the US government's casus belli, which, in the words of MacDonald ef ai (2010: 7-8), disclosed
the fact that the 'logic of geopolitical reason is now inseparable from its visual representation' (see also, Campbell 2007c; Der Derian 2001). The
causal
theory of the 'CNN effect', or what Perlmutter (1998: 1) has called above 'visual determinism', misconceives
of how the visual recasts the political realm itself (Hansen 2011). Rather than asking whether an image
caused an intervention, it should be asked instead how the visual has been involved in structuring the
understandings of legitimate action , and how visual representations of different policy options affect
particular security practices (Williams 2003: 527). For instance, many scholars have shown that images can provoke
particularly emotive responses (Bleiker/Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Hariman/Lucaites 2007; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006). Just one example of
the (deliberate) evocation of an emotional reaction is the numerous fundraising campaigns that have been run by different humanitarian aid organizations over the
years, in which imagery plays an essential role (Bell/Carens 2004; Dogra 2007; Manzo 2008).
Our methodology is correct --- offensive realism describes the world.
Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Ph.D.
in international relations from Cornell University, M.A. in international relations from the University of Southern California, former post-
doctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, former Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, [Link]

OFFENSIVE REALISM IN BRIEF In its simplest form, my theory maintains that the
basic structure of the international system
forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of
every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system . In practical
terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world

while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area . The theory begins with five assumptions
about the world, which are all reasonable approximations of reality. First of all, states are the key actors in international
politics, and no higher authority stands above them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the
system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. This is called an anarchic system, as opposed to a
hierarchic one. The next two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions, respectively. All states have offensive military
capabilities, although some have more than others, indeed sometimes many more than others. Capabilities are reasonably
easy to measure because they are largely composed of material objects that can be seen, assessed, and counted. Intentions are a
different matter. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states, because intentions are inside
the heads of leaders and thus virtually impossible to see and difficult to measure. In particular, states can never know with

complete confidence whether another state might have its gun sights on them for one reason or
another . The problem of discerning states’ intentions is especially acute when one ponders their future intentions, since it is almost
impossible to know who the leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will think about foreign policy.
The theory also assumes that states rank survival as their most important goal . This is not to say it is their only goal, for
states invariably have numerous ambitions. However, when push comes to shove, survival trumps all
other goals, basically because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals . Survival
means more than merely maintaining a state’s territorial integrity, although that goal is of fundamental importance; it also means preserving
the autonomy of a state’s policymaking process. Finally, states are assumed to be rational actors, which is to say they
are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival. These assumptions,
when combined, cause states to behave in particular ways. Specifically, in a world where there is some chance—even just

a small one—that other states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military
capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by what I call the “9-1-1” problem—the fact that there is
no night watchman in an anarchic system whom states can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Accordingly, they recognize they
must look out for their own survival, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful. The logic here
is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be

at risk . No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare attack the United States, because it is so much stronger than any of
its neighbors. This reasoning drives great powers to look for opportunities to move the balance of power in their favor, as well as to prevent
other states from gaining power at their expense. The ultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the only great
power in the system. When people talk about hegemony today, they are usually referring to the United States, which is often
described as a global hegemon. However, I do not believe it is possible for any country—including the United States—to achieve global
hegemony. One obstacle to world domination is that it is very difficult to conquer and subdue distant great powers, because of the problems
associated with projecting and sustaining power over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. This problem is less acute when dealing with minor powers, but even so, the power of nationalism makes it extremely difficult to
occupy and rule a hostile country. The paramount goal a great power can attain is regional hegemony, which means dominating one’s
surrounding neighborhood. The United States, for example, is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Although it is plainly the most
powerful state on the planet by far, it is not a global hegemon. Once
a state achieves regional hegemony, it has a further
aim: to prevent other great powers from dominating their geographical regions. In other words, no
regional hegemon wants a peer competitor. The main reason is that regional hegemons—because they are so dominant in
their neighborhood—are free to roam around the globe and interfere in other regions of the world. This situation implies that regional
hegemons are likely to try to cause trouble in each other’s backyard. Thus, any
state that achieves regional hegemony will
want to make sure that no other great power achieves a similar position, freeing that counterpart to
roam into its neighborhood. Most Americans never think about it, but one of the main reasons the United States is able to station
military forces all around the globe and intrude in the politics of virtually every region is that it faces no serious threats in the Western
Hemisphere. If the United States had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much less capable of roaming into distant regions. But if a
rival state achieves regional dominance, the goal will be to end its hegemony as expeditiously as possible. The reason is simple: it is much more
propitious to have two or more great powers in all the other key areas of the world, so that the great powers there will have to worry about
each other and thus be less able to interfere in the distant hegemon’s own backyard. In sum, the best way to survive in
international anarchy is to be the sole regional hegemon .