Introduction
Ronald Dworkin revolutionized thinking about law, rejecting the vision of dry regulations in
favor of moral coherence. His theory of law as integrity posits that the legal system is not
merely a set of rules but a living structure based on fundamental values. In the Polish context—
from abortion disputes to church-state relations—Dworkin's thought becomes a key tool for
analyzing the legitimacy of power. This article will explain why a judge must sometimes be a
philosopher and how individual rights protect us from the tyranny of the majority.
All-or-nothing vs. weighty rules
The foundation of Dworkin's theory is the distinction between rules and principles. Legal
rules operate in a binary manner: they either apply fully or not at all. An example is Article 148
of the Penal Code – if the conditions for murder are met, the penalty must be imposed. Legal
principles function entirely differently , resembling a compass that guides the course. They do
not "fall" in conflict with other norms, but rather have a weighted dimension . In a given case,
one principle can yield to another without losing its place in the system.
In this approach, individual rights function as trump cards . This means that they take
precedence over general political goals or social utility. If a citizen exercises freedom of
assembly, the state cannot prohibit it merely to improve traffic flow. A trump card overrides the
argument of collective convenience by protecting fundamental human dignity. The process of
selecting the appropriate norm is based on two criteria: fit , or consistency with case law,
and justification , or the identification of the best moral foundation for a given practice.
Judge Hercules finds the only correct answer
Dworkin challenged the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen. Whereas Hart saw
law as a system of rules based on social acceptance and Kelsen as a sterile hierarchy of norms
(Grundnorm), Dworkin incorporated morality into the very definition of law. He established the
ideal interpreter as Judge Hercules —a mythical figure who, thanks to his superhuman intellect,
finds a single correct answer even in the most difficult cases. Hercules does not exercise
discretion but reconstructs the system to present it in its best light.
Hercules' method is constructivist interpretation , which proceeds in three stages: pre-
interpretation (identification of legal material), interpretation (search for moral meaning),
and post-interpretation (reform of practice in light of the principles discovered). This procedure
ensures the integrity of the law and excludes so-called "checkerboard situations"—situations in
which the state applies contradictory standards to similar citizens, undermining trust in the legal
order.
Abortion and Church-State Relations as
"Difficult Issues"
In the Polish reality, Dworkin's concepts allow us to understand so-called hard cases .
The abortion dispute presents a classic conflict of principles: the protection of life and the
autonomy and dignity of women. According to Dworkin, a judge cannot limit himself to the
literal wording of the regulations but must weigh these values, striving for the coherence of the
entire system. Similarly, in church-state relations , integrity requires that the principle of
equality of religions not be sacrificed for the sake of short-term political interests or the
privileges of a single community.
A key distinction here is between the formal validity of a norm and its force of law . A
provision may exist in a code, but if it flagrantly violates the principles of equal care and respect,
it loses its moral legitimacy to be enforced. This idea, supported by the ideas of Lon Fuller (the
internal morality of law) and John Rawls (justice as impartiality), reminds us that the judge's
role in balancing conflicting constitutional principles is the foundation of a democratic state
ruled by law.
Summary
Law, in its most sublime form, is neither a dry record nor a tool of political struggle, but a
constant search for justice. It requires not only intellect but also a profound sense of moral
responsibility for the coherence of the system. In a world where rules seem to give way to
interests, does the integrity of the law still have a chance to become a compass for judges? Or
are we doomed to an endless dance between the letter of the law and its spirit?