mathematical object is an abstract concept arising in mathematics.
[1] Typically, a
mathematical object can be a value that can be assigned to a symbol, and therefore can
be involved in formulas. Commonly encountered mathematical objects
include numbers, expressions, shapes, functions, and sets. Mathematical objects can
be very complex; for example, theorems, proofs, and even formal theories are
considered as mathematical objects in proof theory.
In philosophy of mathematics, the concept of "mathematical objects" touches on topics
of existence, identity, and the nature of reality.[2] In metaphysics, objects are often
considered entities that possess properties and can stand in various relations to one
another.[3] Philosophers debate whether mathematical objects have an independent
existence outside of human thought (realism), or if their existence is dependent on
mental constructs or language (idealism and nominalism). Objects can range from
the concrete: such as physical objects usually studied in applied mathematics, to
the abstract, studied in pure mathematics. What constitutes an "object" is foundational
to many areas of philosophy, from ontology (the study of being) to epistemology (the
study of knowledge). In mathematics, objects are often seen as entities that exist
independently of the physical world, raising questions about their ontological status.[4]
[5]
There are varying schools of thought which offer different perspectives on the matter,
and many famous mathematicians and philosophers each have differing opinions on
which is more correct.[6]
In philosophy of mathematics
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Quine-Putnam indispensability
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Quine-Putnam indispensability is an argument for the existence of mathematical objects
based on their unreasonable effectiveness in the natural sciences. Every branch of
science relies largely on large and often vastly different areas of mathematics.
From physics' use of Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics and differential
geometry in general relativity to biology's use of chaos
theory and combinatorics (see mathematical biology), not only does mathematics help
with predictions, it allows these areas to have an elegant language to express these
ideas. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how areas like quantum mechanics and general
relativity could have developed without their assistance from mathematics, and
therefore, one could argue that mathematics is indispensable to these theories. It is
because of this unreasonable effectiveness and indispensability of mathematics that
philosophers Willard Quine and Hilary Putnam argue that we should believe the
mathematical objects for which these theories depend actually exist, that is, we ought to
have an ontological commitment to them. The argument is described by the
following syllogism:[7]
(Premise 1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that
are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(Premise 2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(Conclusion) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
This argument resonates with a philosophy in applied
mathematics called naturalism[8] (or sometimes predicativism)[9]which states that the
only authoritative standards on existence are those of science.
Schools of thought
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Platonism
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Plato depicted in The School of Athens by Raphael Sanzio
Platonism asserts that mathematical objects are seen as real, abstract entities that exist
independently of human thought, often in some Platonic realm. Just as physical
objects like electrons and planets exist, so do numbers and sets. And just
as statements about electrons and planets are true or false as these objects contain
perfectly objective properties, so are statements about numbers and sets.
Mathematicians discover these objects rather than invent them.[10][11] (See
also: Mathematical Platonism)
Some notable platonists include:
Plato: The ancient Greek philosopher who, though not a mathematician, laid the
groundwork for Platonism by positing the existence of an abstract realm of
perfect forms or ideas, which influenced later thinkers in mathematics.
Kurt Gödel: A 20th-century logician and mathematician, Gödel was a strong
proponent of mathematical Platonism, and his work in model theory was a major
influence on modern platonism
Roger Penrose: A contemporary mathematical physicist, Penrose has argued for a
Platonic view of mathematics, suggesting that mathematical truths exist in a realm of
abstract reality that we discover.[12]
Nominalism
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Nominalism denies the independent existence of mathematical objects. Instead, it
suggests that they are merely convenient fictions or shorthand for describing
relationships and structures within our language and theories. Under this view,
mathematical objects do not have an existence beyond the symbols and concepts we
use.[13][14]
Some notable nominalists include:
Nelson Goodman: A philosopher known for his work in the philosophy of science
and nominalism. He argued against the existence of abstract objects, proposing
instead that mathematical objects are merely a product of our linguistic and symbolic
conventions.
Hartry Field: A contemporary philosopher who has developed the form of
nominalism called "fictionalism," which argues that mathematical statements are
useful fictions that do not correspond to any actual abstract objects.[15]
Logicism
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Logicism asserts that all mathematical truths can be reduced to logical truths, and
all objects forming the subject matter of those branches of mathematics are logical
objects. In other words, mathematics is fundamentally a branch of logic, and all
mathematical concepts, theorems, and truths can be derived from purely logical
principles and definitions. Logicism faced challenges, particularly with the Russillian
axioms, the Multiplicative axiom (now called the Axiom of Choice) and his Axiom of
Infinity, and later with the discovery of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which showed
that any sufficiently powerful formal system (like those used to express arithmetic)
cannot be both complete and consistent. This meant that not all mathematical truths
could be derived purely from a logical system, undermining the logicist program.[16]
Some notable logicists include:
Gottlob Frege: Frege is often regarded as the founder of logicism. In his
work, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arithmetic), Frege attempted to
show that arithmetic could be derived from logical axioms. He developed a formal
system that aimed to express all of arithmetic in terms of logic. Frege's work laid the
groundwork for much of modern logic and was highly influential, though it
encountered difficulties, most notably Russell's paradox, which revealed
inconsistencies in Frege's system.[17]
Bertrand Russell: Russell, along with Alfred North Whitehead, further developed
logicism in their monumental work Principia Mathematica. They attempted to derive
all of mathematics from a set of logical axioms, using a type theory to avoid the
paradoxes that Frege's system encountered. Although Principia Mathematica was
enormously influential, the effort to reduce all of mathematics to logic was ultimately
seen as incomplete. However, it did advance the development of mathematical
logic and analytic philosophy