Implementation of ECtHR Judgments — Study Guide Article 46 · Protocol 11 · Protocol 14

STUDY GUIDE

Implementation of Judgments of the

European Court of Human Rights
Article 46 ECHR · Protocol No. 11 · Protocol No. 14

European Human Rights Law

Advanced Study Edition

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1. Introduction and Historical Context

1.1 The Origins of the Convention System

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), drafted under the auspices of the newly
formed Council of Europe, was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered
into force on 3 September 1953. Its drafting was directly motivated by the catastrophic human
rights violations of the Second World War and the desire to create a binding international
framework that would prevent their recurrence. The ten founding member states — Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — committed themselves not only to
recognising the rights enumerated in the Convention, but to establishing an enforcement
mechanism: a radical innovation in international law, which had previously been characterised
by state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs.
From its inception, the Convention system contained an important structural feature that
distinguishes it from most international human rights treaties: individual petition. Although initially
optional, the right of individuals to bring complaints directly before an international body
challenged the traditional Westphalian conception of international law as governing relations
between states alone. Over the following decades, the system evolved dramatically in response
to changing political realities, the enlargement of the Council of Europe, and the explosion in
applications.

1.2 The Problem of Implementation: Why It Matters

A court judgment that goes unenforced is a hollow instrument. In domestic legal systems, the
coercive power of the state — bailiffs, contempt proceedings, police enforcement — ensures that
court orders are generally obeyed. The international system lacks such mechanisms. Instead, it
relies on a combination of legal obligation, political pressure, reputational incentives, and the
shared interest of states in maintaining a functioning legal order.
In the context of the ECHR, the implementation of judgments is the crucial second phase of the
enforcement process. The first phase — the adjudication of complaints by the European Court
of Human Rights — establishes that a violation has occurred and, where appropriate, awards
just satisfaction to the victim. The second phase — implementation — requires the respondent
state to take concrete steps to remedy the violation, compensate the applicant, and prevent
similar violations in the future. This second phase is often the more difficult and politically fraught
of the two.
Why implementation matters can be summarised as follows: First, without implementation,
individual victims are denied effective redress. A judgment in their favour becomes worthless if
the state ignores it. Second, structural violations — those that arise from legislative or
administrative frameworks rather than individual acts — will continue to generate new victims if
left unremedied. This creates a self-defeating cycle: victims file applications, the Court issues
judgments, the state fails to implement, more victims are created, and the Court is overwhelmed
with repetitive cases. Third, the credibility and legitimacy of the entire Convention system depend
on the reasonable expectation that judgments will be complied with. If states routinely ignore
unfavourable judgments, the system loses its deterrent effect and its moral authority.

1.3 The Scale of Non-Implementation

The scale of the implementation challenge is considerable. Since 1959, the Court has delivered
tens of thousands of judgments. A substantial proportion of these remain pending before the
Committee of Ministers awaiting full implementation. As of recent annual reports, over 8,000
cases remain under supervision, with several hundred designated as "leading cases" reflecting

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structural or systemic problems. States such as Russia (prior to its exclusion in 2022), Turkey,
Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, and Italy have historically accounted for large proportions of the
pending caseload. The problem is not uniform: many states have excellent compliance records,
implementing judgments promptly and thoroughly; others have chronic difficulties with particular
categories of cases.
These statistics reflect not only failures of political will, but also the genuine complexity of
implementation: some violations arise from deeply embedded systemic problems that require
sustained political effort, legislative reform, financial investment, and cultural change — none of
which can be accomplished overnight.

1.4 Sources and Methodology

This study guide draws on the text of the ECHR and its Protocols, the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the
execution of judgments (Rules of the Committee of Ministers adopted in 2006 and subsequently
revised), the annual reports of the Committee of Ministers on supervision of the execution of
judgments, the HUDOC-EXEC database of execution information, and leading secondary
literature on European human rights law.

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2. Article 46 ECHR: Binding Force and Execution of

Judgments

2.1 The Text and Structure of Article 46

Article 46 of the Convention, as currently in force (incorporating the amendments introduced by
Protocol No. 14), reads:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the
Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall
be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 3.
If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a
final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer
the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral
decision shall require a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to
sit on the Committee. 4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High
Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party,
it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a
majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee,
refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation
under paragraph 1. 5. If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the
case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If
the Court finds no violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of
Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case.

2.2 Article 46(1): The Obligation to Abide by Judgments

2.2.1 Nature and Scope of the Obligation

Article 46(1) establishes the fundamental obligation of the Contracting Parties: they "undertake
to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties." This deceptively
simple formulation encapsulates several important legal principles.
Inter partes effect: The obligation is expressly limited to the parties to the case. A judgment
finding a violation by State A does not formally bind State B, even if State B has identical
legislation or practice. This contrasts with the erga omnes character of treaty obligations in
general. However, the Court's case law has persuasive authority for all member states: the
Convention organs and the Court expect states to draw lessons from adverse judgments against
other states and to reform their law and practice accordingly, even absent a formal obligation.
The Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly regularly call on member states to
review their legislation in light of the Court's case law.
Finality: The obligation applies to "final" judgments. Pursuant to Article 44, a judgment of a
Chamber becomes final when (a) the parties declare that they will not request referral to the
Grand Chamber; (b) three months after the judgment, if referral has not been requested; or (c)
the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects a referral request. Grand Chamber judgments are always
final. Until a judgment is final, it is not yet transmitted to the Committee of Ministers for
supervision.
Obligation of result, not means: Article 46(1) prescribes the outcome (compliance with the
judgment) but leaves the means to the discretion of the respondent state. This reflects the
principle of subsidiarity: states have constitutional, legislative, and administrative autonomy. A
state may comply with a judgment by legislative reform, administrative practice change, judicial
reinterpretation of existing law, creation of new remedies, or a combination of these. The
Committee of Ministers and the Court itself respect this discretion, though they will scrutinise

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whether the chosen means are actually effective in remedying the violation and preventing
recurrence.
Content of the obligation: The obligation encompasses both the operative provisions of the
judgment (the dispositif) and the reasoning, insofar as the reasoning identifies the nature and
source of the violation. The Committee of Ministers has consistently held that states must
understand and address the root cause of the violation, not merely the surface manifestation. A
state that pays just satisfaction but does nothing to address the structural deficiency that caused
the violation has not fully complied with Article 46(1).

2.2.2 Who Bears the Obligation?

The obligation is borne by the "High Contracting Party" as a whole — that is, the state in its
entirety, not merely the branch of government responsible for the violation. This has important
implications: if a violation arises from a judicial decision, the executive cannot simply order the
courts to change their approach (this would itself raise rule of law concerns). Instead, the state
may need to create mechanisms for the reopening of proceedings, enact legislation clarifying the
applicable law, or take other measures that respect the separation of powers. Similarly, if a
violation arises from legislation, the executive cannot unilaterally change primary legislation and
must instead work through the parliamentary process.
Federal states face particular challenges: if a violation arises from the legislation or practice of a
constituent state or province, the federal government must ensure that the constituent entity takes
remedial action, even if the federal government itself has no direct power to compel this. The
European Court has consistently held that federal or constitutional structures within states are no
excuse for non-implementation.

2.3 Article 46(2): Supervisory Role of the Committee of Ministers

2.3.1 The Committee of Ministers as Supervisory Body

Article 46(2) provides that final judgments "shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers,
which shall supervise its execution." The Committee of Ministers (CM) is the executive body of
the Council of Europe, composed of the Foreign Ministers of all member states or, in practice,
their permanent representatives (known as Ambassadors or Permanent Representatives) seated
in Strasbourg. In its human rights supervision function, the CM meets in its "DH" (droits de
l'homme / human rights) configuration, usually four times per year.
The supervisory function of the CM is distinct from its political functions in other contexts. When
acting under Article 46(2), the CM is performing a quasi-judicial supervisory role, though it
remains fundamentally a political body composed of state representatives. This dual character
— political body with quasi-judicial function — creates both strengths and tensions: the CM can
exert diplomatic pressure that a purely judicial body cannot, but it is also susceptible to political
considerations that a purely judicial body would be insulated from.

2.3.2 The Department for the Execution of Judgments

The practical work of supervision is supported by the Department for the Execution of Judgments
(the "Department"), a unit within the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. The Department:
• Maintains the HUDOC-EXEC database, a publicly accessible repository of all information
related to the execution of ECtHR judgments, including action plans, action reports,
interim and final resolutions, and CM decisions.
• Prepares documents for the CM's DH sessions, including "Notes" analysing the adequacy
of measures taken by respondent states and "Memoranda" on complex or systemic
issues.
• Engages in bilateral dialogue with governments, providing legal advice and technical
assistance on implementation measures.

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• Organises thematic seminars and country-specific meetings to address systemic

implementation challenges.
• Publishes annual reports on the supervision of the execution of judgments, providing
statistical and qualitative overviews of the implementation landscape.

The Department does not take formal decisions — those are reserved for the CM — but its
analyses and recommendations are highly influential in practice.

2.3.3 The Supervision Process: Step by Step

The supervision process under Article 46(2) unfolds as follows:
1. The Court's Registry transmits the final judgment to the CM once it has become final.
2. The case is registered in the CM's supervision system and classified under either
Enhanced or Standard Supervision (see Section 7 below).
3. The respondent state is required to submit an Action Plan within six months of the
transmission of the judgment. The Action Plan sets out the measures the state intends to
take and a proposed timeline for implementation.
4. The CM (through the Department) reviews the Action Plan and may request additional
information, raise questions, or indicate areas of concern.
5. The state provides periodic updates, and the CM may adopt Interim Resolutions calling
for specific action or expressing concern about progress.
6. When the state considers that all required measures have been taken, it submits an
Action Report describing what has been done.
7. The CM reviews the Action Report, takes into account any submissions from the applicant
or NGOs, and, if satisfied, adopts a Final Resolution closing the case.

2.3.4 Final and Interim Resolutions

Interim Resolutions are adopted by the CM when it wishes to record progress made (or lack
thereof), indicate specific measures required, or express concern about the state of
implementation. They are public documents and carry political and reputational weight. They may
be adopted at any stage of the supervision process and are particularly used in Enhanced
Supervision cases where there is persistent non-compliance or urgency.
Final Resolutions are adopted when the CM is satisfied that all necessary measures have been
taken. Adoption of a Final Resolution closes the case in the CM's supervision system. If new
information emerges subsequently indicating that implementation was in fact incomplete, the CM
can in principle reopen its examination, though this is rare in practice.

2.4 Article 46(3): Referral for Interpretation

2.4.1 The Mechanism and Its Purpose

Article 46(3), inserted by Protocol No. 14, introduces a novel mechanism: the CM may refer a
question of interpretation of a judgment to the Court where it considers that supervision of the
execution is hindered by a problem of interpretation. This provision recognises a practical
difficulty that can arise in the implementation process: the parties may disagree not about the
facts of what the state has done, but about what the judgment actually requires.
Prior to this provision, such interpretive disputes had to be resolved by the CM itself, using its
own legal capacity. The CM could request advisory opinions from the Court under other
provisions, but had no formal mechanism specifically for the interpretation of judgments in the
execution context. Article 46(3) fills this gap.

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2.4.2 Procedure and Conditions

The conditions for a referral under Article 46(3) are:
• A final judgment of the Court must be under supervision by the CM.
• A problem of interpretation must be hindering the supervision of execution — not
merely complicating it or making it more complex.
• A two-thirds majority of representatives entitled to sit on the CM is required for the
referral decision. This ensures the mechanism is not used lightly and requires a
substantial consensus.

The Court responds to a referral under Article 46(3) by issuing a ruling on the question of
interpretation. This ruling is not a new judgment on the merits — it does not re-examine the facts
or reconsider the violation finding. It is a purely interpretive ruling that clarifies what the original
judgment means. The ruling is binding on the parties and must be applied by the CM in its
supervision.
Article 46(3) referrals have been used sparingly since Protocol 14 entered into force, but the
mechanism represents an important safety valve in the system, preventing the CM from being
paralysed by interpretive disputes.

2.5 Article 46(4): Infringement Proceedings

2.5.1 Overview and Legal Nature
Article 46(4) is, in the architecture of the Convention enforcement system, the most legally
significant innovation of Protocol No. 14. It creates what is commonly referred to as the
"infringement procedure" or, more colloquially, the "nuclear option" — the mechanism by which
the CM can refer a case back to the Court where a state is found to have refused to abide by a
judgment.
The legal nature of Article 46(4) proceedings is sui generis. They are not a new application under
Article 34; they do not concern a new alleged violation of a substantive Convention right. Rather,
they concern a violation of the procedural-institutional obligation under Article 46(1) — the
obligation to abide by the Court's judgments. The Court, in an Article 46(4) case, does not re-
examine the merits; it determines whether the state has, by its conduct subsequent to the original
judgment, failed to discharge its obligation to comply.

2.5.2 Conditions for Referral

Four conditions must be cumulatively satisfied before the CM can refer a case under Article 46(4):
8. A final judgment establishing a violation. There must be an existing, final judgment of
the Court (or a former Commission/CM decision under the old system) finding a violation
and imposing an obligation on the respondent state.
9. The state must "refuse to abide by" the judgment. The threshold is high: "refusal"
implies active or persistent non-compliance, a conscious decision not to implement rather
than merely slow or incomplete implementation. The CM must assess the totality of the
state's conduct: has it taken any steps? Has it provided explanations? Is there a credible
roadmap for compliance? Or has it simply ignored the judgment, openly challenged the
Court's authority, or taken measures that are clearly inadequate?
10. Formal notice must have been served on the respondent state. This gives the state a
final opportunity to respond and demonstrate compliance before the matter is escalated.
The requirement of formal notice reflects the seriousness of the step and the preference
for diplomatic resolution.

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11. A two-thirds majority of CM representatives entitled to sit on the Committee must vote
for the referral. This supermajority requirement is a high threshold, ensuring that
infringement proceedings are initiated only where there is broad consensus among
member states that a serious breach of the Convention system has occurred.

2.5.3 Procedure before the Grand Chamber

Once referred under Article 46(4), the case is assigned to the Grand Chamber of the Court. The
proceedings are adversarial in character: the respondent state and the CM appear as parties.
Other interested parties — the applicant in the original case, third-party governments, NGOs —
may be given leave to intervene.
The Grand Chamber then delivers a judgment determining whether the state has failed to fulf il
its obligation under Article 46(1). This is a binary determination — the Court finds either a violation
or no violation of Article 46(1).
If a violation is found (Article 46(5)): The Court refers the case back to the CM for consideration
of measures to be taken. The Convention does not specify what measures the CM may adopt in
response to an Article 46(4) finding; the ultimate sanction under the Statute of the Council of
Europe would be suspension or expulsion from the Organisation (Article 8 of the Statute), but
this is an extreme measure that has been used only once, against Russia in 2022.
If no violation is found (Article 46(5)): The Court refers the case back to the CM, which closes
its examination of the case. This outcome is possible if, by the time of the Grand Chamber
hearing, the state has taken sufficient steps to comply.

2.5.4 The Ilgar Mammadov Case: A Case Study in Article 46(4)

The most significant use of Article 46(4) to date arose in the case of Ilgar Mammadov v.
Azerbaijan, and merits detailed examination as the paradigmatic illustration of how infringement
proceedings work in practice.
Background: Ilgar Mammadov was a prominent Azerbaijani political opposition figure and
blogger who was arrested in February 2013 in the immediate aftermath of his reporting on anti-
government protests. He was charged with incitement to violence and other offences. The real
motive for his arrest, the Court found, was to silence him as a critic of the government.
The 2014 Judgment: In Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (22 May 2014), the Court found violations
of Articles 5(1) (right to liberty), 5(4) (right to judicial review of detention), and — significantly —
Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, finding that the restrictions on his liberty were applied for
purposes other than those prescribed by the Convention. An Article 18 finding is rare and serious:
it means the Court is satisfied that the real purpose of the detention was improper — in this case,
silencing political opposition.
Non-Implementation: Azerbaijan failed to release Mammadov and failed to take measures to
implement the judgment. The CM placed the case under Enhanced Supervision. Years passed.
Mammadov was convicted at domestic trial in March 2014 and sentenced to seven years'
imprisonment. The CM adopted Interim Resolutions in December 2014 and September 2017,
expressing grave concern and finding that Azerbaijan had failed to take the necessary measures.
Article 46(4) Referral: In December 2017, the CM referred the case to the Grand Chamber
under Article 46(4). This was a historic step — the first time the infringement procedure had been
used. Formal notice was served on Azerbaijan, which had failed to respond adequately.
The Grand Chamber's 2019 Judgment: On 29 May 2019, the Grand Chamber delivered its
judgment in the Article 46(4) case. It found, by sixteen votes to one, that Azerbaijan had failed to
fulfil its obligation under Article 46(1). The Grand Chamber noted that Mammadov had by then
been released (in August 2018, following a presidential pardon — not an acquittal) but found that
Azerbaijan had not taken sufficient measures to erase the consequences of the violations and
that the criminal proceedings against him remained ongoing.

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Legacy: The Mammadov case established that Article 46(4) is a functional mechanism, not
merely a theoretical one. It demonstrated that the CM can and will use infringement proceedings
in cases of persistent, politically motivated non-compliance, and that the Grand Chamber will
conduct rigorous scrutiny of states' compliance record.
A second significant Article 46(4) case concerns Kavala v. Turkey (judgment, 2019), where the
Court found violations of Articles 5 and 18 in connection with the detention of a prominent civil
society figure. Turkey's persistent failure to release Kavala led the CM to initiate Article 46(4)
proceedings, which became entangled with a major diplomatic crisis between Turkey and the
Council of Europe.

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3. Protocol No. 11 (1998): The Structural Reform

3.1 Background and Rationale

By the late 1980s, the Convention system was straining under the pressure of its own success.
The original system, established in 1950 and operational from the late 1950s, had been designed
for a small club of Western European liberal democracies. The dramatic events of 1989 — the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe — led
to a rapid enlargement of the Council of Europe. By the mid-1990s, states such as Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states, and the states of the former
Soviet Union had joined the Convention system, bringing with them populations with no tradition
of ECHR compliance, legal systems in transition, and, in many cases, deeply entrenched human
rights problems.
The result was a surge in applications that the existing institutional structure — a part-time
Commission, a part-time Court, and a Committee of Ministers with adjudicatory as well as
supervisory functions — was simply unable to manage. Backlogs grew to alarming levels, and
the average time from application to final judgment stretched to many years. The credibility of the
system as a genuine remedial mechanism was in jeopardy.
The response was Protocol No. 11, adopted in May 1994 and entering into force on 1 November
1998. It was the most radical structural reform in the history of the Convention, fundamentally
restructuring the institutional architecture of the system.

3.2 The Pre-Protocol 11 System

Understanding Protocol No. 11's significance requires understanding what it replaced. The
original system comprised three bodies:

3.2.1 The European Commission of Human Rights

The Commission was a part-time body whose primary functions were:
• Filtering applications for admissibility — the vast majority of applications were declared
inadmissible by the Commission without referral to the Court.
• Fact-finding — the Commission could conduct on-site investigations and take evidence.
• Attempting friendly settlement between the applicant and the respondent government.
• Drafting opinions on the merits, which were transmitted to the Committee of Ministers and
to the Court.

The Commission was composed of one national per member state but members sat in their
personal capacity, not as state representatives. They were elected by the CM for six-year terms.

3.2.2 The European Court of Human Rights (Pre-1998)

The original Court was also a part-time body. It had jurisdiction only over cases referred to it by
the Commission or by a state — individuals could not bring cases directly to the Court. In cases
where the Court was not seised, the Committee of Ministers itself took the binding decision on
whether a violation had occurred. This gave the CM a quasi-judicial function that blurred the
separation between the political and judicial dimensions of the system.

3.2.3 The Committee of Ministers (Pre-1998)

In addition to its supervisory role under what was then Article 54, the CM adjudicated cases not
referred to the Court, deciding by a two-thirds majority whether a violation had occurred. This

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hybrid function was widely criticised as inappropriate for a political body and as insufficiently
protective of the independence and impartiality that judicial determination requires.

3.3 Key Changes Introduced by Protocol No. 11

3.3.1 Abolition of the Commission

Protocol No. 11 abolished the European Commission of Human Rights entirely. Its admissibility-
filtering function, fact-finding functions, and attempts at friendly settlement were all absorbed by
the new, permanent Court. The entire system was consolidated into a single judicial institution.

3.3.2 The Permanent, Full-Time Court

The most fundamental change was the creation of a new, permanent, full-time Court replacing
both the part-time Court and the Commission. Judges were to sit in their personal capacity,
elected by the Parliamentary Assembly for six-year terms (subsequently changed to nine-year
non-renewable terms by Protocol No. 15). The Court was organised into:
• Committees of three judges: with power to declare applications inadmissible
(subsequently expanded by Protocol 14 to also decide certain cases on the merits).
• Chambers of seven judges: the standard formation for consideration of both
admissibility and merits of most cases.
• Grand Chamber of seventeen judges: for the most important cases, including referrals
from Chambers and, subsequently, cases referred under Article 46(4).

3.3.3 Mandatory Right of Individual Petition

Before Protocol 11, the right of individual petition under then-Article 25 was optional: states could
accept it by separate declaration. A significant number of states had not done so, and those that
had could theoretically withdraw. Protocol 11 made the right of individual petition automatic and
compulsory for all states parties to the Convention. This was a transformative change: it
converted the Convention from a primarily inter-state mechanism with an optional individual
complaints procedure into a genuine instrument of individual human rights protection.
The practical consequence was enormous: the volume of individual applications increased
dramatically, placing pressure on the new Court's capacity from the moment it began operation
in November 1998.

3.3.4 Elimination of the CM's Adjudicatory Function

Protocol No. 11 removed the Committee of Ministers' quasi-judicial function of deciding on
violations in cases not referred to the Court. The CM's role became exclusively supervisory under
Article 46(2). This was widely welcomed as a clearer separation between the political and judicial
functions of the system.

3.4 Impact on Implementation

Protocol No. 11 significantly affected the implementation landscape. By substantially increasing
the volume of judgments — as more cases reached the Court and the Court's efficiency improved
— it created greater demand on the CM's supervision capacity. At the same time, by
concentrating all judicial functions in a single body, it produced more consistent and authoritative
jurisprudence, making it easier to identify systemic problems and required general measures.
The period following Protocol 11's entry into force saw a rapid build-up of the Court's backlog and
the emergence of the structural problems that Protocol No. 14 would seek to address. It also saw
the development of the pilot judgment procedure (initially as a matter of judicial practice, later
formalised in the Rules of Court) as a response to the phenomenon of repetitive applications
arising from structural violations.

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4. Protocol No. 14 (2010): Reinforcing the System

4.1 The Crisis That Prompted Reform

By the early 2000s, the Court created by Protocol 11 was itself in crisis. Applications were flooding
in at a rate far exceeding the Court's capacity to decide them. In 2004, the Court received over
40,000 new applications and had over 80,000 pending. By 2011, the pending caseload had grown
to nearly 160,000. The system was in danger of collapse under its own weight.
Analysis of the caseload revealed that the overwhelming majority of applications — estimated at
around 90% — were clearly inadmissible. Of admissible cases, a large proportion were "clone"
or repetitive cases arising from the same structural violations as cases that had already been
decided. The Court was spending enormous resources on cases that should never have reached
Strasbourg, either because they were inadmissible or because they were simply repetitions of
already-decided issues.
Protocol No. 14 was adopted in May 2004. However, Russia alone refused to ratify it for six years,
citing concerns about the independence of the single-judge formation and the impact on Russia's
interests. A provisional measure — Protocol No. 14bis (2009) — applied some of the reforms to
states that had ratified Protocol 14, pending universal ratification. Russia ultimately ratified
Protocol No. 14 in February 2010, and it entered into force on 1 June 2010.

4.2 Key Procedural Reforms

4.2.1 Single-Judge Formation

Protocol No. 14 introduced the single-judge formation, allowing a judge sitting alone (assisted by
non-judicial rapporteurs from the Registry) to declare an application inadmissible or strike it out
where the decision can be taken without further examination. This dramatically accelerated the
processing of clearly inadmissible applications, which had previously required at least a three-
judge Committee.
A crucial safeguard was built in: a single judge may not rule on applications against the state in
respect of which that judge was elected. This prevents any appearance of bias or conflict of
interest.

4.2.2 New Admissibility Criterion: Significant Disadvantage

Article 35(3)(b) ECHR was amended to add a new, fourth admissibility criterion: the Court may
declare inadmissible any application where the applicant has not suffered a "significant
disadvantage." The rationale was to allow the Court to reject trivial or low-impact cases and
concentrate its resources on cases involving serious violations.
Two safeguard conditions limit the application of this criterion:
• Respect for human rights requires examination: If the underlying question is one of
principle, even a case involving little prejudice to the individual applicant may be
admissible on this ground.
• The case has been duly considered by a domestic tribunal: The "significant disadvantage"
criterion cannot be used to dismiss cases where the applicant has never had access to
effective domestic proceedings.

The "significant disadvantage" criterion has been applied in a substantial number of cases since
2010, particularly in cases involving minor procedural irregularities, small sums of money, or de
minimis restrictions on rights. Its application has been controversial in some cases, with critics
arguing that even small violations reflect underlying systemic problems that should be addressed.

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4.2.3 Expanded Competence of Three-Judge Committees

Before Protocol 14, three-judge Committees could only declare applications inadmissible.
Protocol 14 expanded their competence to allow Committees to give judgments on the merits as
well, in cases raising a well-established issue in the Court's case law — i.e., repetitive cases
where there is already clear applicable law. This has been transformative in the processing of
clone cases arising from structural violations, allowing the Court to decide large numbers of such
cases efficiently without convening a full seven-judge Chamber for each.

4.2.4 Amendments to Article 46: The Core Implementation Reforms

As analysed in detail in Section 2 above, Protocol No. 14's most significant contribution to the
implementation framework was the addition of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 to Article 46, introducing
the interpretation referral mechanism and infringement proceedings. These changes reflected a
recognition that the existing Article 46 framework — the obligation to abide by judgments,
supervised by the CM — was insufficient to deal with cases of persistent, wilful non-compliance.

4.2.5 Time Limit for Applications

Protocol No. 14 did not change the six-month time limit for applications, but it did make a technical
amendment to Article 35 to reflect the expanded single-judge competence. The time limit was
subsequently reduced from six to four months by Protocol No. 15 (in force August 2021).

4.3 Subsequent Reforms: Protocols 15 and 16

4.3.1 Protocol No. 15 (2021)

Protocol No. 15, which entered into force on 1 August 2021, made further adjustments to the
Convention:
• Subsidiarity and margin of appreciation: A reference to the principle of subsidiarity
and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was inserted into the Preamble of the
Convention. This reflects the political desire of some states to emphasise that primary
responsibility for human rights protection lies with member states and that the Court's role
is supervisory, not primary.
• Reduction of time limit: The time limit for lodging applications under Article 35 was
reduced from six to four months. This applies to applications made after the Protocol's
entry into force.
• Removal of the parties' right to object to referral to Grand Chamber: Previously, a
party could object to a Chamber's proposal to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand
Chamber. This veto has been removed, facilitating the development of Grand Chamber
case law on important questions.
• Age limit for judges: The requirement that candidates for judicial office be under 65 at
the date of the list's submission to the Parliamentary Assembly was removed.

4.3.2 Protocol No. 16 (2018)

Protocol No. 16, which entered into force on 1 August 2018 for the states that have ratified it (not
universally in force), introduces a new mechanism: the highest courts and tribunals of Contracting
Parties may request advisory opinions from the Grand Chamber on questions of principle relating
to the interpretation or application of the Convention. This is distinct from a referral of a case —
it is a pure advisory function, and the advisory opinion is not binding, though it carries great
authority.
Protocol 16 is significant for implementation because it allows the highest domestic courts to seek
clarity from the Grand Chamber before issuing final judgments, reducing the likelihood of
violations and the need for Strasbourg applications. It strengthens the "dialogue" between
national courts and the ECtHR.

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5. Types of Measures Required for Implementation

5.1 The Principle of Restitutio in Integrum

The starting point for understanding what implementation requires is the principle of restitutio in
integrum: restoration of the situation to what it was before the violation. This principle, well-
established in general international law (articulated by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Chorzów Factory case), provides that states are obliged, insofar as possible, to
restore the status quo ante — the situation that would have existed had the violation not occurred.
In practice, full restitution is often impossible: time cannot be reversed, a period of wrongful
imprisonment cannot be given back, a marriage forcibly ended cannot be undone as if it never
happened. Where restitution is impossible, the obligation shifts to equivalent redress —
compensation that places the applicant, as far as money can do so, in the position they would
have been in absent the violation.

5.2 Individual Measures

Individual measures are steps directed at remedying the specific consequences of the violation
suffered by the applicant in the case before the Court. The leading cases and the practice of the
CM identify the following categories:

5.2.1 Payment of Just Satisfaction

Where the Court has awarded just satisfaction under Article 41, the respondent state must pay
the awarded sum within the time limit specified in the judgment (normally three months from the
date on which the judgment becomes final). If payment is late, interest accrues at the rate
specified in the judgment (typically based on the European Central Bank's marginal lending rate
plus a percentage point).
Failure to pay just satisfaction is the most straightforward form of non-compliance and is taken
seriously by the CM. States in financial difficulty may seek extensions, but simple failure to pay
when resources are available is treated as a clear breach of Article 46(1).

5.2.2 Reopening of Domestic Proceedings

Where the violation was found in the context of domestic legal proceedings — most commonly
criminal proceedings — individual redress may require the reopening of those proceedings. A
criminal conviction reached in violation of Article 6 (fair trial), for instance, may need to be
quashed and the case retried.
Many Council of Europe member states have amended their procedural codes specifically to
create mechanisms for reopening proceedings following an adverse ECtHR judgment. The
Committee of Ministers has consistently recommended that member states establish such
procedures where they do not already exist. The absence of a reopening mechanism is itself
considered a structural implementation problem.

5.2.3 Release from Detention

Where the Court has found a violation of Article 5 (right to liberty) arising from ongoing detention
— for example, where detention is found to be arbitrary, unlawful, or in violation of procedural
guarantees — the most important individual measure is the immediate release of the applicant,
or at minimum, a review of their continued detention by a domestic court applying Convention
standards.
Release cases are among the most urgent in the CM's supervision system and are invariably
placed under Enhanced Supervision. The CM has on several occasions expressed grave

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concern where states have failed to release applicants despite adverse ECtHR judgments (as in
the Mammadov case).

5.2.4 Other Individual Measures

Depending on the nature of the violation, individual measures may also include:
• Erasure or expungement of criminal records where the underlying conviction was
reached in violation of the Convention.
• Reinstatement to employment, public office, or professional status where dismissal
or disbarment violated Convention rights (see, e.g., Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, where
the Ukrainian Supreme Court judge's dismissal was found to violate Article 6 and Article
8, requiring his reinstatement).
• Return of property or documents unlawfully seized, or compensation where return is
impossible.
• Residence or immigration measures where the applicant faces ongoing deportation or
expulsion that would violate Article 3 (prohibition of torture/inhuman treatment) or Article
8 (family/private life).
• Lifting of travel bans, asset freezes, or other ongoing restrictions imposed in
violation of the Convention.

5.3 General Measures

General measures are directed at preventing future violations — that is, at ensuring that the
structural causes of the violation are addressed so that other persons in similar situations do not
suffer the same fate. These are often the most demanding and politically significant aspects of
implementation.

5.3.1 Legislative Reform

Where a violation arises from primary or secondary legislation that is incompatible with the
Convention, legislative reform is typically required. This is the most direct form of general
measure: the offending provision is amended, repealed, or supplemented in a way that brings
the law into conformity with Convention standards.
Legislative reform requires parliamentary action, which is subject to constitutional processes and
timetables. The executive cannot always guarantee or expedite legislative reform, and may need
to negotiate with coalition partners or opposition parties. This creates genuine delays that are not
always attributable to bad faith on the part of the respondent state, but which the CM must
nonetheless monitor.

5.3.2 Change in Judicial Interpretation

Sometimes the legislative text is compatible with the Convention in the abstract, but has been
interpreted and applied by domestic courts in an incompatible way. In such cases, general
measures may consist of changing judicial practice — through guidance from higher courts,
through the publication and dissemination of the ECtHR's judgment, or (in some systems)
through legislative clarification of the correct interpretation.
Changing judicial practice is particularly gradual: domestic courts are independent and cannot
simply be instructed to interpret the law differently by the executive. The change must percolate
through the judicial hierarchy over time, as higher courts adjust their case law and lower courts
follow. This process can take years.

5.3.3 Administrative and Regulatory Reform

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Where a violation arises from the practice of administrative authorities — police conduct, prison
management, immigration administration, social services decisions — general measures may
require:
• Revision of administrative regulations, guidelines, or internal instructions.
• Training programmes for officials in Convention standards.
• Creation of independent oversight mechanisms.
• Reform of complaint or review procedures.
• Changes to the allocation of resources (e.g., hiring additional prison staff, reducing
prisoner numbers through early release or reduced use of remand detention).

5.3.4 Creation of Effective Domestic Remedies

Where the Court has found a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) — or where the
absence of an effective domestic remedy has itself contributed to the violation — a particularly
important general measure is the creation of such a remedy. The principle of subsidiarity requires
that domestic law provide effective means of redress for Convention violations, so that individuals
do not need to travel the long road to Strasbourg for every complaint.
The leading case in this area is Burdov v. Russia (No. 2) (2009), a pilot judgment in which the
Court found a systemic problem of non-enforcement of domestic court judgments against the
state and required Russia to create an effective domestic remedy — combining a compensatory
remedy for existing victims and a preventive remedy for ongoing non-enforcement. Russia
subsequently introduced the relevant legislation, though its practical effectiveness remained
contested.

5.4 Just Satisfaction Under Article 41

Article 41 provides: "If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."

5.4.1 Pecuniary Damage

The Court may award compensation for actual financial losses causally connected to the
violation. This includes lost earnings, medical costs, loss of property value, and other quantifiable
economic harm. The causal connection between the violation and the pecuniary harm must be
established — the Court will not award speculative or remote losses.

5.4.2 Non-Pecuniary Damage

The Court may award compensation for non-pecuniary damage — distress, anxiety, suffering,
loss of dignity, and other non-financial consequences of the violation. Such awards are made on
an equitable basis, as their precise monetary equivalent cannot be calculated. The Court takes
into account the nature and severity of the violation, the period of time over which it occurred,
and the applicant's personal circumstances.

5.4.3 Costs and Expenses

The Court may also award reimbursement of legal costs and expenses incurred before the Court
itself and, where necessarily and actually incurred in connection with the violation, before
domestic courts. The applicant must demonstrate that costs were actually incurred and were
reasonable in amount.

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6. Supervision Procedures: Enhanced and Standard

6.1 The Two-Track System

Since 2011, the Committee of Ministers has operated a formal two-track supervision system —
Enhanced Supervision and Standard Supervision — to manage its workload and allocate
resources proportionately to the complexity and urgency of cases.

6.2 Enhanced Supervision

Enhanced Supervision is applied to cases that require closer and more frequent monitoring. The
CM's Rules provide that cases are placed under Enhanced Supervision when they involve one
or more of the following:
• Urgent individual measures: Cases where the applicant is at continued risk — for
example, where the applicant remains in detention found to violate Article 5, faces
ongoing deportation risk, or is in danger of irreversible harm.
• Pilot judgments: Cases where the Court has identified a structural or systemic problem
and issued a pilot judgment (see Section 7).
• Inter-state cases: Cases brought by one Contracting Party against another, which
typically involve particularly serious violations or politically sensitive issues.
• Leading cases: Cases that identify a new or widespread structural problem not yet
subject to supervision, which will serve as the reference point for a group of similar cases.
• Cases requiring urgent general measures: Where the violation indicates an ongoing
systemic problem requiring immediate structural reform.

Under Enhanced Supervision, the respondent state is required to submit an Action Plan within
six months and must provide regular updates. The CM examines the case at each of its DH
sessions, and the Department prepares detailed analysis documents. Interim Resolutions may
be adopted where progress is unsatisfactory. The process is intensive and involves close bilateral
dialogue between the Department and the national authorities responsible for implementation.

6.3 Standard Supervision

Standard Supervision applies to repetitive cases — cases raising the same issue as a case
already under Enhanced Supervision, and where the measures required are the same as those
being monitored in the leading case. The rationale is that once the general measures required to
address a structural violation have been identified in the leading case, it is unnecessary to monitor
each clone case with the same level of intensity.
Standard Supervision cases are grouped together and monitored collectively. The CM reviews
them periodically and may close them as a group once the general measures implemented in
connection with the leading case are assessed as adequate. Individual measures in Standard
Supervision cases must still be verified, but the focus of monitoring is on the general measures
that address the structural problem.

6.4 Action Plans and Action Reports

Action Plans are the primary vehicle through which respondent states communicate their
implementation intentions to the CM. An Action Plan should:
• Identify the specific measures the state intends to take (both individual and general).
• Provide a timeline for each measure.

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• Identify the responsible national authorities.

• Address any obstacles to implementation and explain how they will be overcome.

Action Reports are submitted when the state considers that all required measures have been
taken. They provide a detailed account of what has been done and invite the CM to close the
case. The CM reviews the Action Report against its own analysis and, if satisfied, adopts a Final
Resolution.

6.5 The Role of Applicants and NGOs in Supervision

The supervision process is not purely bilateral between the respondent state and the CM. The
Rules of the CM allow applicants (and, with the CM's agreement, NGOs and national human
rights institutions) to submit information to the CM relevant to the implementation of judgments
in which they have an interest. This "third party" input can be valuable in cases where the state's
account of its implementation measures may be incomplete or misleading.
The Department for the Execution of Judgments takes this information into account in its
analyses, though it conducts its own independent assessment. The CM can and does request
clarification from the respondent state in light of information provided by applicants or NGOs.

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7. The Pilot Judgment Procedure

7.1 Origins and Legal Basis

The pilot judgment procedure was not established in the Convention text or the original Rules of
Court but emerged from judicial practice as a response to the phenomenon of mass applications
arising from structural violations. The first case to use it explicitly was Broniowski v. Poland
(Grand Chamber, 22 June 2004), in which the Court identified a systemic dysfunction in Polish
law relating to property rights of persons whose pre-war properties east of the Bug River had
been lost to what was then the Soviet Union.
The procedure was subsequently codified in Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, which came into effect
in March 2011. Rule 61 provides the formal framework for pilot judgments, though the Court
retains discretion as to when and how to use it.

7.2 The Mechanism

The pilot judgment procedure operates as follows:
12. Selection of pilot case: The Court selects one or a small number of applications that are
representative of a large group raising the same or similar issues. The applicants in the
pilot case may have been waiting for a long time; they benefit from an expedited
procedure.
13. Identification of structural problem: The pilot judgment explicitly identifies the systemic
or structural dysfunction in domestic law or practice that gives rise to the violations.
14. Indication of general measures: The judgment indicates, with varying degrees of
specificity, the general measures required to address the structural problem. In some
cases, the Court is prescriptive (requiring, for instance, the creation of a specific type of
remedy); in others, it leaves the state more discretion.
15. Adjournment of related cases: The Court may decide to adjourn — effectively freeze
— the examination of similar pending applications for a defined period, giving the state
an opportunity to implement general measures before those cases are decided. This
reduces the Court's workload while the structural problem is being addressed.
16. Deadline for compliance: The pilot judgment may set a time limit within which the state
must implement the required measures. This creates an explicit deadline and gives the
process urgency.
17. Resumption of adjourned cases: If the state fails to comply within the deadline, the
Court resumes examination of the adjourned cases and decides them on the merits,
applying the same principles as the pilot judgment.

7.3 Leading Examples

Case State Structural Problem Measures Required

Broniowski v. Poland Poland Property restitution — Legislative reform creating effective
(2004) Bug River claimants restitution mechanism
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland Rent control legislation Amendment of rent control laws;
Poland (2006) restricting landlords' compensation for losses
property rights
Burdov v. Russia (No. Russia Systematic non- Creation of effective domestic remedy
2) (2009) enforcement of (compensatory + preventive)

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Case State Structural Problem Measures Required

domestic court
judgments vs. state
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey Property rights of Establishment of compensation
Turkey (2005) displaced Greek mechanism in northern Cyprus
Cypriots in northern
Cyprus
Rumpf v. Germany Germany Excessive length of civil Creation of effective domestic remedy
(2010) and administrative for length-of-proceedings violations
proceedings
W.D. v. Belgium Belgium Detention of mentally ill Structural reform of forensic
(2016) offenders in prisons psychiatry system; interim individual
without therapeutic measures
facilities
Torreggiani v. Italy Italy Prison overcrowding — Reduction of prison population;
(2013) violation of Article 3 creation of preventive and
compensatory remedies

7.4 Quasi-Pilot Judgments

The Court sometimes identifies a structural problem and signals the need for general measures
without formally invoking the pilot judgment procedure. These are sometimes called "quasi-pilot"
or "leading" judgments. They do not trigger the formal adjournment of related cases or the
deadline mechanism of Rule 61, but they communicate to the state — and to the CM supervising
execution — that the violation is systemic and requires structural remedies, not just individual
redress.

7.5 Effectiveness and Limitations

The pilot judgment procedure has been successful in many cases in accelerating structural
reform and reducing caseload. Where states have engaged constructively — as Poland did in
the Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska cases — the procedure can lead to genuine systemic
change and the resumption and eventual closure of thousands of related cases.
However, the procedure has limitations. Its success depends entirely on state cooperation: if the
state fails to implement the required general measures within the deadline, the Court must
resume examining the adjourned cases and decide them individually — which does nothing to
address the underlying structural problem. The procedure also places a burden on the pilot case
applicants, who may wait years while the state implements structural reforms that delay the final
resolution of their own cases.

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8. Challenges in Implementation

8.1 Structural and Systemic Challenges

The most difficult implementation challenges are those arising from structural or systemic
problems — deficiencies in law, policy, or institutional design that generate repeated violations
across large numbers of cases. Structural problems typically require:
• Political will at the highest level of government.
• Engagement of multiple branches of government (executive, legislative, and sometimes
judicial).
• Significant financial resources.
• Sustained effort over time.

Examples of structural problems that have proved particularly resistant to implementation

include: prison overcrowding (many states); length of judicial proceedings (particularly Italy,
Poland, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine); non-enforcement of domestic court judgments against the
state (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova); detention conditions (Russia, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria);
freedom of expression and political rights (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia); and property rights in
post-conflict contexts (Turkey/Cyprus, Ukraine/Russia re Crimea).

8.2 Political Will and Sensitive Issues

Some violations touch on politically sensitive issues where governments are reluctant to
implement judgments because of domestic political considerations. Classic examples include:
• Prisoner voting rights (UK): The Court's judgment in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2)
(2005), finding that a blanket ban on prisoner voting violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
(right to free elections), was politically toxic in the United Kingdom. Successive UK
governments refused to implement the judgment for over a decade, and the House of
Commons voted overwhelmingly against any reform. This became a cause célèbre in
debates about the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the Convention
system. A minimal reform was eventually adopted (allowing some prisoners sentenced to
short terms to vote), but the full implementation of the judgment remains contested.
• Rights of same-sex couples and LGBTQ+ persons (multiple states): Judgments
requiring recognition of same-sex partnerships or equal rights for LGBTQ+ persons face
resistance in states where public opinion or political majorities are opposed to such rights.
• Rights of ethnic minorities, Roma, and migrants: Judgments requiring states to
address systemic discrimination against marginalised groups, to provide services in
minority languages, or to improve conditions in immigration detention face both political
resistance and practical implementation challenges.
• Counter-terrorism and national security: Judgments imposing obligations on states in
areas they consider central to national security — surveillance, detention without trial,
extraordinary rendition — face particular resistance, as governments invoke national
security justifications.

8.3 Federal and Devolved Systems

In states with federal or devolved constitutional structures, implementation may require action
not only by the central government but by constituent states, provinces, or devolved
administrations. The respondent state before the Court is always the federal or central state,
which bears the implementation obligation in international law. However, the central government
may have limited power under domestic constitutional law to compel action by constituent

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entities. This creates a gap between international obligation and domestic constitutional reality
that must be navigated carefully.

8.4 Resource Constraints

Structural implementation of judgments often requires substantial investment. Reducing prison
overcrowding requires either building new prisons, reducing sentences, increasing use of non-
custodial measures, or a combination — all of which have costs. Improving length-of-proceedings
requires hiring more judges, court staff, and perhaps restructuring court procedures. Creating
effective domestic remedies requires legislation, institutional design, and potentially substantial
compensation funds. States facing economic difficulties or budgetary constraints may genuinely
struggle to meet these obligations in the short term.
The CM has accepted that resource constraints can explain, though not excuse, delays in
implementation of general measures. It has recognised that states may need time to build the
capacity to implement structural reforms and has accepted phased implementation plans.
However, it expects states to demonstrate genuine commitment and measurable progress.

8.5 The Caseload Crisis and Repetitive Applications

The implementation system is under severe strain from the sheer volume of cases pending before
the CM. When structural problems remain unaddressed, victims continue to suffer violations and
file applications. The Court issues repetitive judgments, the CM acquires repetitive cases, and
the system is overwhelmed. This creates a feedback loop that can only be broken by effective
implementation of general measures in leading cases.
The pilot judgment procedure addresses this problem at the Court's end, by adjourning related
applications. But the CM's supervision system still must track tens of thousands of pending cases
awaiting implementation of the same general measures. The administrative burden is enormous,
and there are genuine questions about whether the CM has the resources and expertise to
exercise meaningful supervision across such a vast caseload.

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9. The Role of Key Actors in Implementation

9.1 National Parliaments

National parliaments are indispensable actors in implementation where legislative reform is
required. Only parliaments can enact or amend primary legislation. The Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 1823 (2011) on "National parliaments:
guarantors of human rights in Europe," which called on national parliaments to establish
dedicated parliamentary oversight mechanisms to monitor compliance with ECtHR judgments.
Several member states have created parliamentary committees or sub-committees specifically
responsible for monitoring implementation of ECtHR judgments and scrutinising government
action plans. The United Kingdom's Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) is a leading
example of such oversight in practice. These parliamentary mechanisms help to ensure that
implementation is not left entirely to the executive and that there is democratic accountability for
delays or failures.

9.2 Domestic Courts

Domestic courts play a dual role in implementation. First, they may be the vehicles through which
individual measures are delivered — reopening proceedings, reviewing detention, applying
Convention standards in renewed proceedings. Second, they may need to change their
interpretive approach to ensure that domestic law is applied in a Convention-compatible manner.
The relationship between domestic courts and the ECtHR is complex. In some systems (notably
the United Kingdom under the Human Rights Act 1998), domestic courts are required to "take
into account" ECtHR case law but are not formally bound by it. In other systems, the Convention
is directly applicable and takes precedence over conflicting domestic law. The degree to which
domestic courts actively engage with and apply ECtHR case law varies considerably across
member states.
Protocol No. 16 (in force for ratifying states since 2018) enhances the role of domestic courts in
the implementation process by allowing the highest courts to seek advisory opinions from the
Grand Chamber, enabling a genuine pre-emptive "dialogue" that can prevent violations before
they occur.

9.3 The Commissioner for Human Rights

The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights is an independent, non-judicial
institution established in 1999. The Commissioner:
• Conducts country visits and publishes reports on member states' human rights
compliance, including on the implementation of ECtHR judgments.
• Has standing to submit written comments and participate in hearings before the Grand
Chamber under Article 36(3) of the Convention (as amended by Protocol 14).
• Engages in dialogue with governments on systemic implementation issues.
• Issues recommendations and thematic reports that can influence the direction of both
state policy and the Court's case law.

9.4 Civil Society and NGOs

Non-governmental organisations play an important role in the implementation process,
particularly through:

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• Third-party interventions: NGOs may apply to the Court to submit written observations
as third parties under Article 36(2) in cases raising issues within their expertise.
• Information to the CM: NGOs may submit information to the CM during supervision
proceedings, alerting it to inadequacies in states' implementation measures or to ongoing
violations affecting new victims.
• Monitoring and reporting: NGOs conduct independent monitoring of states' compliance
with ECtHR judgments and publish reports that can influence the CM's assessment.
• Litigation support: NGOs assist individual applicants in enforcing judgments before
domestic courts and in bringing follow-up applications to the ECtHR where
implementation remains incomplete.

9.5 The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE)

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), composed of representatives of
national parliaments, exercises political oversight over implementation through its Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights. The Committee:
• Produces regular reports on the implementation of ECtHR judgments, identifying states
with chronic non-compliance and thematic patterns of non-implementation.
• Adopts resolutions calling on states to take specific measures and on the CM to exercise
more robust supervision.
• Conducts monitoring procedures for states that face persistent compliance challenges.
• Has powers under the Statute of the Council of Europe to recommend the suspension of
a state's voting rights or expulsion in extreme cases.

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10. Landmark Cases and Their Implementation

Implementation
Case State Core Violation Outcome
Challenge
Hirst v. UK (No. 2) UK Blanket ban on Intense domestic Partial reform
(2005) prisoner voting — political resistance; after 10+ years;
Art. 3 Prot. 1 parliamentary ongoing
sovereignty debate controversy
Broniowski v. Poland Poland Property rights — Complex legislative Legislation
(2004) Bug River claimants reform affecting enacted; leading
80,000+ people pilot judgment
success
M.S.S. v. Belgium & BE/GR Asylum conditions; Systemic deficiencies Ongoing
Greece (2011) return of applicant to in Greek asylum systemic reform
Greece — Arts. 3, system; EU Dublin in Greece;
13 Regulation significant
jurisprudential
impact
Ilgar Mammadov v. AZ Politically motivated Political will; refusal Released 2018;
Azerbaijan (2014/2019) detention — Arts. 5, to release; Art. 46(4) Art. 46(4)
18 referral violation found
2019
Oleksandr Volkov v. UA Dismissal of Required Reinstated after
Ukraine (2013) Supreme Court reinstatement of a protracted
judge — Arts. 6, 8 sitting judge; judicial supervision
independence
Torreggiani v. Italy IT Prison overcrowding Structural Significant
(2013) — Art. 3 (pilot overcrowding; reforms;
judgment) creation of domestic domestic remedy
remedy created;
caseload
reduced
Kavala v. Turkey TR Politically motivated Persistent refusal to Ongoing; major
(2019) detention — Arts. 5, release; Art. 46(4) diplomatic crisis
18 proceedings initiated between Turkey
and CoE
Vinter v. UK (2013) UK Whole life sentences Required review Legislation and
with no prospect of mechanism for life guidance issued;
release — Art. 3 sentences ongoing judicial
application

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11. Glossary of Key Terms

Term Definition
Action Plan Document submitted by a respondent state setting out the measures it
intends to take to implement a judgment, together with a proposed timeline
and identification of responsible authorities.
Action Report Document submitted by a state informing the CM that it considers all
necessary implementation measures to have been taken and requesting
closure of the case.
Article 46(4) The infringement procedure provision, inserted by Protocol No. 14, allowing
the CM to refer a case back to the Court where a state refuses to abide by
a judgment.
Committee of The Council of Europe's main executive body, composed of foreign
Ministers (CM) ministers or their deputies, responsible under Art. 46(2) for supervising the
execution of ECtHR judgments.
Department for the The Secretariat unit of the Council of Europe that supports the CM in its
Execution of supervisory role, maintaining HUDOC-EXEC and preparing analysis
Judgments documents.
Enhanced Supervision Intensive CM supervision for cases involving structural problems, urgent
individual measures, pilot judgments, inter-state cases, or leading cases.
Final Resolution CM decision adopted when implementation is considered complete,
formally closing the case in the supervision system.
Grand Chamber The highest formation of the ECtHR (17 judges), handling the most
important cases, referrals from Chambers, and Article 46(4) cases.
HUDOC-EXEC The publicly accessible database of information on the execution of ECtHR
judgments, maintained by the Department for the Execution of Judgments.
Infringement Proceedings under Art. 46(4) initiated by the CM where a state refuses to
Proceedings abide by a final judgment; referred to the Grand Chamber.
Interim Resolution CM decision adopted during supervision, recording progress (or lack
thereof), expressing concern, or calling for specific action.
Just Satisfaction Financial compensation awarded by the Court under Article 41 ECHR,
comprising pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary damage, and legal costs.
Pilot Judgment A judgment (governed by Rule 61 of the Rules of Court) identifying a
structural/systemic problem, indicating general measures, and potentially
adjourning related cases.
Protocol No. 11 The 1998 reform protocol that created a permanent, full-time Court,
abolished the Commission, and made the right of individual petition
compulsory.
Protocol No. 14 The 2010 reform protocol introducing single-judge formations, the
"significant disadvantage" criterion, expanded Committee competence, and
the new Art. 46(3)–(5) mechanisms.
Protocol No. 15 The 2021 reform protocol inserting subsidiarity and margin of appreciation
into the Preamble and reducing the application time limit to four months.
Protocol No. 16 The optional protocol (in force 2018) allowing highest national courts to
request advisory opinions from the Grand Chamber.
Restitutio in integrum The principle of restoring the situation to what it was before the violation,
drawn from general international law.

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Term Definition
Standard Supervision Less intensive CM supervision for repetitive cases that follow a leading
case under Enhanced Supervision.
Subsidiarity The principle that primary responsibility for protecting Convention rights lies
with domestic authorities; the Strasbourg system is the last resort.

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12. Review Questions

12.1 Comprehension Questions

18. What is the inter partes effect of ECtHR judgments under Article 46(1), and what are its
implications for other member states not party to the case?
19. Describe the three distinct categories of measures that a state may be required to take
following an adverse ECtHR judgment.
20. What are the key procedural differences between Enhanced Supervision and Standard
Supervision by the Committee of Ministers?
21. Enumerate the four conditions that must be cumulatively satisfied before the CM can
initiate infringement proceedings under Article 46(4).
22. What institutional changes did Protocol No. 11 introduce, and why were they necessary?
23. Explain the "significant disadvantage" admissibility criterion introduced by Protocol No.
14 and the safeguards limiting its application.
24. What is the legal basis and procedural framework for the pilot judgment procedure? How
does it differ from ordinary judgment execution?
25. Describe the role of the Department for the Execution of Judgments in the supervisory
process.

12.2 Analytical Questions

26. Critically assess the effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers in its supervisory role
under Article 46(2). What structural limitations affect its capacity to ensure compliance?
27. To what extent does the principle of subsidiarity serve as a justification for delayed
implementation, and what are the limits of that justification in the jurisprudence of the
Court and the practice of the CM?
28. Compare and evaluate the various mechanisms available to the Council of Europe system
for dealing with persistent non-compliance by a member state, from diplomatic pressure
to expulsion.
29. How has the expansion of the Council of Europe to include Central and Eastern European
states affected the implementation landscape? What are the particular challenges in
these contexts?
30. Protocol No. 14 was designed to address the caseload crisis of the ECtHR. To what extent
have its reforms succeeded, and what structural problems remain?
31. What is the significance of the distinction between "refusal to abide" (the threshold for Art.
46(4)) and mere delay or incomplete implementation? How should this distinction be
applied in practice?
32. Critically assess the pilot judgment procedure as a tool for managing structural violations.
What are its strengths and what are its inherent limitations?

12.3 Problem Questions

33. State X has been found by the ECtHR to have violated Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment) due to systemic prison overcrowding affecting
approximately 35,000 prisoners. Over 400 similar applications from other prisoners in
State X are pending before the Court. Analyse: (a) what procedure the Court is likely to
apply; (b) what individual and general measures State X is required to take; (c) how the
CM will supervise implementation; and (d) what steps are available if State X fails to
implement within two years.

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34. State Y has been found by the ECtHR to have violated Articles 5(1) and 18 ECHR
because the pre-trial detention of Mr. A, a political activist, was found to have been applied
for purposes other than those prescribed by the Convention. Two years after the judgment
became final, Mr. A remains in detention, convicted at domestic trial in proceedings that
the CM finds inadequate to remedy the violation. State Y argues that the domestic
conviction constitutes a fresh legal basis for detention and that the judgment has been
fully implemented by payment of just satisfaction. Assess: (a) State Y's argument; (b) the
CM's options; and (c) the conditions for and likely outcome of Art. 46(4) referral.
35. The ECtHR has found that State Z's legislation providing for the blanket exclusion of all
persons under guardianship from voting rights violates Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The
CM and State Z disagree about whether a reform that removes the blanket exclusion but
allows courts to impose voting bans on individual guardianship beneficiaries on a case-
by-case basis is sufficient to comply with the judgment. State Z argues this represents
Convention-compliant reform; the CM argues the criteria for imposing bans are too broad
and insufficiently Convention-compliant. What mechanism under Article 46 is available to
resolve this dispute? Describe the procedure and the legal effect of the outcome.

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13. Selected Bibliography and Key Sources

Primary Sources
• European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as amended by Protocols No. 11, 14,
and 15.
• Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR (1994, in force 1998).
• Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR (2004, in force 2010).
• Protocol No. 15 to the ECHR (2013, in force 2021).
• Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR (2013, in force 2018).
• Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments
and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements (2006, as revised).
• Rule 61 of the Rules of Court (Pilot Judgment Procedure).
• Annual Reports of the Committee of Ministers on Supervision of the Execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
• HUDOC-EXEC database: [Link]

Key Cases
• Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004 (first pilot judgment).
• Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005 (prisoner voting).
• Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006 (rent control; friendly
settlement 2008).
• Burdov v. Russia (No. 2), No. 33509/04, 15 January 2009 (non-enforcement of domestic
judgments; pilot).
• M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011 (asylum; systemic
deficiencies).
• Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 and others, 8 January 2013 (prison
overcrowding; pilot).
• Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013 (judicial dismissal).
• Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, No. 15172/13, 22 May 2014; Art. 46(4) judgment, 29 May
2019.
• Kavala v. Turkey, No. 28749/18, 10 December 2019 (politically motivated detention).
• Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom (GC), No. 66069/09 and others, 9 July 2013 (whole
life sentences).

Secondary Literature
• Clements, L. and Mole, N., "European Human Rights: Taking a Case Under the
Convention" (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed.).
• Council of Europe, "Supervision of the Execution of Judgments: Annual Report"
(published annually, Council of Europe Publishing).
• Greer, S., "The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and
Prospects" (Cambridge University Press).
• Harris, D., O'Boyle, M., Bates, E. and Buckley, C., "Law of the European Convention on
Human Rights" (Oxford University Press, 4th ed.).
• Lambert Abdelgawad, E., "The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights" (Council of Europe Publishing, 2nd ed.).

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• Leach, P., "Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights" (Oxford University
Press, 4th ed.).

Online Resources
• HUDOC (ECtHR case law database): [Link]
• HUDOC-EXEC (execution of judgments): [Link]
• Council of Europe Treaty Office: [Link]
• Department for the Execution of Judgments: [Link]
• Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) — Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
reports on implementation.

This study guide is intended for academic use in the study of European human rights law. All treaty texts should be
verified against official Council of Europe sources. Practitioners should consult current case law and CM supervision
records through HUDOC and HUDOC-EXEC.

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