Transitions to Democracy in Developing

Nations
Democracy transition in developing countries is not just a new phase of development which
follows on from the experience of democracy transition undergone by developed nations. On the
contrary, it is much more complex in nature as most developing countries have been expected to
do a number of things simultaneously, including creating political institutions, ensuring the rule
of law, alleviating poverty, handling issues of ethnicity or religion, as well as overcoming
colonial or authoritarian pasts. While in developed nations democracy usually followed
statehood, a functioning market economy, bureaucracy, and nationalism, the case of many
developing nations is different as they undertake their transition toward democracy amidst weak
institutions, inequality, fragile nationhood, and influential elites who have concerns about losing
their privileges.

Another significant problem is the weakness of rule of law and political institutions. The
existence of democracy is not only about having regular elections. It requires the establishment
of independent and fair courts, electoral commissions, parliaments, police, media, and civil
services. According to O’Donnell (1996), one reason why many young democracies do not have
stable consolidations is that while formal democratic institutions may be established, these
institutions lack mechanisms for regulating the misuse of political power. Therefore, elected
leaders could use their power to suppress their opponents, bias the courts in their favor, and
silence the press. This results in “electoral democracy” but not real democratic governance. Take,
for instance, the many post-colonial nations in Africa and Asia, where elections take place
regularly, but the governing party uses the power of the state to dominate elections. In the case of
Kenya, following the multi-party elections in the 1990s, the resumption of elections does not
mean that the country automatically sheds patronage politics, ethnic politics, and state
interference in the political process.

Moreover, economic inequality also obstructs democratization in developing countries.

Economic inequality creates risks for the ruling elite since it can provoke redistribution of assets,
taxation, social security, and public goods. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) emphasize that
political institutions emerge from the conflict between the elites and the mass population over
political and economic dominance. The elites' concern about their financial resources leads them
to opt for military dictatorship, electoral manipulation, clientelism, and resistance to changes. On
the other hand, the poor become reliant on financial support since they need urgent help rather
than structural help. Latin America provides an excellent example. Even though there is huge
inequality and dominance of elite society, Brazil and Argentina managed to have their
democracy. Another case study is South Africa. The abolition of apartheid resulted in a fresh
democratic constitution. Nonetheless, severe economic disparity emerged. In such a way,
democracy should cater for political inclusion and economic transformation.

Historical legacy also plays an important role in explaining why developing nations experience
different challenges related to democracy. While many developed nations have established their
state institutions for centuries, many developing nations have their boundaries, bureaucracies,
and legal system under the shadow of colonial administration. The government in the colonial
regime usually had the motive of extracting and controlling rather than governing effectively.
According to Acemoglu et al., 2002, the long-term impact of such colonial institutions on
development varied, depending largely on the nature of those institutions. The legacy of colonial
institutions impacted the practice of democracy in the form of centralized power and lack of
local accountability, which was evident in the case of developing countries. Nigeria is an
excellent example of how colonialism by Britain brought together people of various faiths and
tribes into one nation-state; after independence, the political situation was characterized by
regionalism, military dictatorships, and oil revenues.

Power struggles within states also hinder the transition process to democracy. In a number of
developing nations, the military, bureaucratic system, business elite, religious institutions, and
family dynasties hold more sway than the elected government bodies. Although some form of
voting is established, these institutions will retain their powers from behind the scenes. Some
researchers identify this form of governance as "competitive authoritarianism" since there is a
voting mechanism, but it is clearly rigged in favor of incumbent governments. Pakistan stands as
a good example, having conducted numerous elections while still retaining the power of the
military in matters of policy formation and security concerns. This means that democracy in
Pakistan is somewhat weak due to a lack of control of state affairs by the elected government
officials.

Additional complications arise from ethno-religious divisions. In established democratic

countries, the formation of a strong sense of national identity was done prior to the advent of
democracy. But for most emerging democracies, the electoral process starts in the midst of
uncertainty where the people have not yet developed faith in their government and in one
another. As posited by Linz and Stepan (1996), democracy involves the existence of an effective
state apparatus and the formation of a political community. In some instances, the perception
among citizens may be that they are being pitted against one another. For example, in Nigeria’s
Muslim vs. Christians and north vs. south, Kenyan ethnic political parties, and Sri Lankan
Sinhala-Tamil conflict, politics based on identity has hampered democratic transformation.
Political mobilization in this case is motivated not by policy issues, but out of fear.

The developing nations also encounter the issue of compressed transition. Most of the time,
western democracies took their own time transitioning into full-blown democracy from
monarchy or oligarchy. The developing nations are supposed to follow all democratic principles
right from the beginning and are subjected to immense international pressure as well as an
economic or social crisis while adopting them. Carothers (2002) has criticized the notion that
every country which is shedding its authoritarian rule is necessarily transitioning towards
democracy. Several states continue to linger on the “gray zone” – they neither fit in the category
of autocracy nor of democracy. Tunisia following the Arab Spring is one such nation which was
regarded as the success story emerging out of the wave of revolutions back then. Because of the
economic frustration, political rivalry and lack of institutional framework, President Kais Saied
was able to establish dominance. According to Reuters, the Constitution of Tunisia 2022
considerably empowered the president, leading to a possible democratic reversal (Reuters, 2022).

In conclusion, the transition to democracy in developing countries is a complex process for

several reasons. It takes place in a situation that differs vastly from the situation in developed
democracies when they were undergoing their respective transitions. Transition requires that
democracy be built while the state is simultaneously created. Poor rule of law, weak institutions,
inequality, legacy of colonization, military control or elite control, and ethnic and religious
conflict complicate democracy far beyond mere electoral processes. Ultimately, it involves
creating a political system wherein power can be transferred smoothly, rights are respected, and
citizens have faith in the political institutions rather than in ethnic groups or the military.

References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and
institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117(4), 1231–1294. [Link]

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy.
Cambridge University Press.

Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold
War. Cambridge University Press.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press.

O’Donnell, G. (1996). Illusions about consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7(2), 34–51.

Reuters. (2022, July 26). Tunisian officials say new constitution passed in vote with low turnout.
Reuters.