Liner Operations

Learning Outcomes

Upon the successful completion of this module, you should be able to:

 Explain the importance of liner services.

 Outline the different types of liner ships used in shipping.

 Identify some liner service strategies and how they are applied.

 Outline the multi-trade strategies used in shipping today.

 Discuss some liner shipping regulations.

 Discuss the impact of mega container ships in shipping.

Introduction liner operators,

A liner service is a fleet of ships, with a common ownership or management, which provide a fixed service, at regular
intervals, between named ports, and offer transport to any goods in the catchment area served by those ports and
ready for transit by their sailing dates. A fixed itinerary, inclusion in a regular service, and the obligation to accept cargo
from all comers and to sail, whether filled or not, on the date fixed by a published schedule are what distinguish the liner
from the tramp. (A short history of the worlds shipping industry, Fayle)

A combination of fixed prices and inflexible compacity leaves liner companies with a pricing problem which has
dominated the industry since it started. The conference system, developed in the mid 1870's, was the industries first
attempt to deal with the pricing problem. The liner companies were in a much better position to form a cartel to fix rates
so that in the words of John Sawyer, "The companies may not ruin eachother". By the early 1970's there were more than
360 conferences with memberships from 2-40 shipping lines.
Liner shipping companies, referred to as liner operators, are the key players in facilitating international container
movements. They provide regular, reliable shipping services for shippers big or small at predictable freight rates. This
particular section will focus on liner operators, container ship types, liner strategies, and the current regulatory
environment. The graph given shows the top 10 liner operators as of Jan 2006

Types of Liner Ships

The ships used in the liner sector have changed radically from the traditional liner ships of the WWII era to the highly
sophisticated fully cellular container ships of today. The earlier container ships were all of the converted type. Over the
years, their size has increased tremendously. Generally, they are classed based on the number of 20ft containers (TEUs)
they can carry.
The current limitations imposed by the Panama Canal plays a key role in the size of the ships used. A Panamax ship is the
biggest ship that can safely transit through the canal whereas a post-Panamax is too big to do so. There is an increasing
tendency to build huge post-Panamax ships today. The biggest container ship today is Emma Maersk which has a
carrying capacity of anywhere from 11,500 to 13,000 TEUs. Reportedly, major shipyards have blueprints to build
container ships that can carry 15-18,000 TEUs.

Emma Maersk is 397 meters in length. Powered by a main engine that has 109,000 horsepower, it has a top speed of
more than 25.5 knots.
Built in Denmark, the vessel started its maiden voyage on sept 8,2006.

The larger container ships that call only a limited number of load and discharge ports are referred to as mother ships.
Feeder ships are smaller ships that transship the containers to or from the larger ports to the smaller ports in the region.
Liner Service Strategies

What do they do?

Liner Strategies

Liner shipping companies are adopting innovative strategies to bring down their operating costs and enhance their
fleet productivity. The essence of these strategies consists of co-operative operations through joint services and slot
agreements with other carriers.
Many liner operators are focusing on refining individual service patterns. There are two basic approaches in this regard.

 Cut down shipping schedules by reducing port calls; provide fast port-to-port service and use lower number of
ships

 Create linkage between services using multi-trade operations and minimize the container imbalance, thereby
reducing the number of ships required

The various multi-trade strategies used today are:

 Parallel linkages

 Non-parallel linkages

 Network linkages

Liner Routes

Non-parallel linkages are further categorized into Butterfly, Single Pendulum and Double Pendulum.

Container Shipping Alliances

Container shipping industry moves over 95% of all manufactured goods in the world. This business is largely controlled by
15 companies, the majority of them being European and Asian entities. Most of these line companies additionally
accelerated their operations by pooling and forming giant maritime cargo shipping alliances. These alliances, both as
cargo capacity and lines number - have grown; it is very similar to the way the airline companies operate today.
Among the benefits for the allied container shipping lines are cost savings, increased efficiency, lower prices of goods
for the consumers, lower freight rates and cheaper services. There is also a positive effect on cargo ports. Usually, the
alliance-shared ships are the fleet's largest container carriers. This poses challenges for many cargo ports, but also
presents opportunities for growth. The volume of movement for large-capacity box ships can reach up to 10,000 moves
per vessel, and not every cargo terminal can manage such volumes. It means that only the most efficient ports are
going to benefit from the alliance backed operations

Container Shipping Alliances

G6 Alliance

World's largest "G6 Alliance" includes the shipping lines Hapag-Lloyd, Hyundai, APL, MOL, NYK, OOCL. G6 is operating
exclusively on the Far East-Europe route. It was formed in December 2011, merging the pre-existing "The Grand Alliance"
(Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, OOCL) with the "New World Alliance" (NOL, MOL, Hyundai).

CKYHE Alliance

"CKYHE Alliance" includes the shipping lines COSCO, K-Line, Yang-Ming, Hanjin, Evergreen.

2M Alliance

"2M Alliance" was formed in January 2015. It includes the shipping lines APM-Maersk and MSC.

OCEAN Alliance

"OCEAN Alliance" was formed in January 2015. It includes the shipping lines CMA-CGM, COSCO, OOCL, Evergreen.
Ocean 3 allied ships operate on the following trade routes: Transpacific (weekly services), Asia-Europe (4 routes), Asia-
Mediterranean (4 services), and Asia-North America - to East Coast USA (1 service via Suez Canal) and Asia-Gulf of
Mexico (1 service, also with Suez Canal transition).
THE Alliance

"THE Alliance" was created in May 2016 (starting operations in May 2017). It includes the shipping lines NYK, Hanjin,
Hapag-Lloyd, K-Line, Mitsui OSK, Yang-Ming. It covers all major shipping trade lanes - Asia-Mediterranean, Asia-Middle
East (Persian Gulf and Red Sea), Asia-North America (West Coast and East Coast) and Transatlantic (between Europe
and the Americas). The new shipping alliance has combined capacity of approximately 3,5 million TEUs, which is 18% of
the global containership capacity. Its fleet has 620+ vessels. There is a possibility UASC also to join THE Alliance, thus
increasing its overall capacity to over 4 million TEUs.
THE Alliance was joined by Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM) in July 2016. Currently, HMM operates 124 vessels (85 of
which chartered). As of 2018, THE Alliance shipping conglomerate provides 33 services (all East-West lanes) with
combined fleet of over 250 modern box ships, dedicated Middle East loops, and regularly serves 81 ports in Asia, Middle
East, India, Europe, Central and North America. The list of all 33 services consists of 8 Asia-Europe (3 Mediterranean, 5
Northern Europe). 16 Trans-Pacific, 7 North Atlantic loops, 2 Middle East loops.

ONE Alliance

"ONE Alliance" includes 3 Japanese companies (MOL, NYK, K-Line) merged into "Ocean Network Express" (abbrev ONE),
starting operations on Apr 1, 2018. ONE shipping company (established on July 7, 2017) has combined fleet capacity
1,44 million TEUs and offers 85 world service loops linking over 200 major seaports.

CMA CGM and COSCO Alliance

A new shipping alliance of mega proportions is in the making. CMA CGM and COSCO are leading efforts to set up a
new container shipping partnership, also seeking to rope-in the lines Evergreen and OOCL. If successful, this plan could
potentially split up 3 of the current 4 alliances and would radically alter the current marine shipping industry leaving in
the lurch the 8 remaining container cargo carriers of the alliances G6, CKYHE and Ocean Three. CMA CGM stated it will
pull APL out of G6 once the French company completes the APL's acquisition in the 2016's second half. CMA CGM
hopes that COSCO-CSCL will join it in a new carrier alliance partnership.

Liner Shipping Regulation

Economic regulation has been a key aspect of liner shipping right from its formative years because of the role of what
are referred to as liner conferences, also referred to as liner cartels. These agreements, ostensibly a collusive practice
violating monopoly rules, has a long history and is discussed briefly next

Mega Container Ships and their Costs

Ever bigger container ships inspire awe and fascination, and are one of the hottest topics in maritime transport.
They are also a headache for ports and terminals – mainly because of their vast size. Now at up to 400 metres long,
these ships are longer than Eiffel Tower (301 metres).
This size increase has been exponential; ships doubled in volume in 20 years between 1975 and 1995, and then almost
doubled again in the following decade, doubling yet again between 2005 and 2015.
And it is not over yet. Plans are afoot to continue increase size to 21100 TEU by 2018.
Mega Container Ships

Container ships are the work-horses of the globalized economy: although they represent only one-eighth of the total
world fleet they are essential for the transport of consumer goods around the world. Container ships have grown bigger
at a rapid pace over the last decades, faster than any other ship type. In one decade, the average capacity of a
container ship has doubled.
The largest container ship at this moment can carry 19200 containers but ships with a capacity of more than 21000
containers have been ordered and will be operational in 2018. Larger container ships have generated cost savings for
carriers, decreased maritime transport costs and as such facilitated global trade in the past. However, larger ships
require adaptations of infrastructure, equipment and cause larger peaks in container traffic in ports, with wide-ranging
impacts.

The Demand for Mega-Ships

The development of ever larger ships is driven by the search of economies of scale by shipping companies. Considering
that the container shipping industry is mainly driven by price competition – and not very differentiated with respect to
other aspects – the decision by one shipping line to increase ship size leads to a wave of similar decisions by competing
shipping lines in order not to “stay behind” by not reaping the same economies of scale.
The result is a wave of investments in new very large containerships that might make sense from the perspective of an
individual company vis-à-vis its main competitors, but less so for an industry as whole, as it results in growth of fleet
capacity that is not in line with demand.

Trends in Different Shipping Sectors

Container ships are the largest ships in the world, at least with regards to length. The overall length (LOA) of the largest
container ship is 400 metres, this is longer than the maximum length of current tankers (380 m), bulk carriers (362 m) or
cruise ships (360 m). However, container ships have smaller drafts than tankers and bulk carriers, which consequently
have higher ship volumes (GT) and weight carrying capacity (dwt). Some of the oil tankers of the past were longer than
current container ships (LOA of 458 m), but these oil tankers are no longer in use and have been demolished or found
alternative uses.
The size of container ships has been growing at a faster pace than all other ship types. The average container ship size
up (in dead weight tonnes) over 1996-2015 was 90%, this was 55% for bulk carriers and 21% for tankers. Other ship types,
such as Ro/Ro-ships and passenger and cruise ships also grew at much more moderate growth rates, whereas the
average size of general cargo ships actually declined.
The growth rate of containership size has accelerated over the last decade. It took one decade to double the average
container ship capacity from 1500 to 3000 TEU, but almost 30 years to get to 1500 TEU. This has been driven by large
increases in the maximum capacity of container ships, especially in the last decade. These increases in maximum
capacity have accelerated the growth of the average ship capacity. The average age of newly built container vessels
had been oscillating around approximately 3400 TEU between 2001 and 2008, but increased significantly since then
reaching a mean of 5800 between 2009 and 2013. The average size of a newly built containership has soared to
approximately 8000 TEUs in 2015.

Development of Container Ship Size

Both maximum and average size of containerships will grow over the coming years. This can be concluded from the
ship orders that have already been placed for ships that are currently under construction and will be delivered over the
years 2015-2018. Many shipping lines that have no container ships of at least 18000 TEU capacity are now ordering new
ships, that will over the coming years break new capacity records – that will likely not last very long. In April 2015, the
orderbook included 52 ships with capacity larger than 18000 TEU was 52. Following the delivery of the Triple E-ships in
2013, shipping lines have ordered ships with larger nominal capacity; with the current record in terms of TEU capacity
being the 21100 TEU ships ordered by OOCL.

Biggest Container Ships

The current generation of containerships could be expanded towards a capacity of approximately 22000 TEU, with
micro-optimisation in new ship design, basically creating additional capacity from within an overall hull size very similar
to the Triple-E. These new capacities could for example be reached by adding a top layer and/or an additional
container row. Beyond this barrier, a new generation of container ships would be needed.
The next generation of containerships would need to be sufficiently larger to generate sufficient cost reductions; this
would mean a capacity of at least 24000 TEUs. According to some observers this might require a ship length of 456
metres and a beam of 65 metres. A container vessel with a beam of 65 metres will require a higher gauge steel in its
primary structure, not only increasing new build costs but also adding weight whilst losing space for cargo.
Costs of Container Ships

The three large cost categories of the container shipping industry are the capital-, operation-, and voyage costs. These
respond differently to changes in vessel size.

Capital Costs; The available information indicates that the capital costs for the units exceeding 16000 TEU are actually
not increasing in a linear manner but slightly below that. The new paradigm of going slow thus seems to contradict the
previous fear that the capital costs of larger units would increase super proportionally as a result of a second main
engine being required to maintain the high operation speeds.
Hence, it is fair to say, that the new modus operandi of “slow-steaming” has opened the door for the exploitation of
further economies of scale as far as capital costs are concerned. As a result, it is estimated that the 19000 TEU units
would offer annual savings per TEU-slot (assuming full utilization) of US$ 59 when fully utilized. Assuming a more likely
utilization of 85%, the annual savings per TEU slot of the larger units compared to the previous container ship generation
(15000 TEU), reach US$ 69.

Operation Costs; In terms of operating costs per TEU p.a., we estimate the annual savings when upscaling from 15000
TEU units to 19000 TEU units to be US$ 50 (assuming 85% utilization).

Voyage Costs; The economies of scale of the voyage costs can be reduced to the single biggest cost driver: the
propulsion consumption of the ships. As the speed and consumption patterns of the vessels vary, the daily fuel
consumption at design speed which is known/reported/estimated needs to be standardized to an equivalent voyage
speed in order to allow for a comparison between vessel sizes.
It has been seen how astonishingly fuel efficient the modern 19000 TEU units seem to be, consuming actually less fuel
than some of the first 14000-16000 TEU units which have been ordered and built.

Cost of Transportation and Logistics -- Warehouse to Warehouse

There are cost savings of mega-ships, but these are decreasing and might not even be realized. Doubling the maximum
container ship size over the last decade has reduced total vessel costs per transported container by roughly a third.
However, these cost savings are decreasing with size; the cost savings of the newest generation of container ships are
four to six times smaller than the savings from the previous round of upsizing.
Approximately 60% of the cost savings of the most recent container ships are related to more efficient engines and not
to scale. In addition, mega-ship development and the related container fleet capacity growth has taken place despite
sluggish growth of world containerized seaborne trade.
Although economies of scale allow vessel costs per volume transported to decrease with bigger ships, the on-land costs
of handling those volumes increase. Together, these two costs determine the total costs for the transport chain. At a
certain point increasing ship size becomes sub-optimal as cost savings become marginal. While a doubling of container
ship size reduces costs by a third (vessel costs per TEU), making sea transport cheaper, the savings decrease with
increased size.
To find out where we are on the cost curve, we tried a thought experiment. Imagine that instead of ordering 19000 TEU
ships, shipping companies had ordered 14000 TEU ships giving the same total fleet capacity. In that scenario, land-side
costs would have been approximately $50 lower per transported container.

This might seem little, but it is actually substantial when compared to freight rates for transporting a container from
Shanghai to Rotterdam – now at less than $400 and the thousands of containers ships can carry. Hence, as ship sizes
continue to increase we find ourselves heading towards overall increasing costs.
The transport costs due to larger ships could be substantial. There are size-related fixes to existing infrastructure, such as
bridge height, river width/depth, quay wall strengthening, berth deepening, canals/locks and port equipment (crane
height, outreach). Mega-ships also require expansion of infrastructure to cater to the higher peaks related to mega-
ships; as a result, more physical yard and berth capacity is needed. These annualised transport costs related to mega-
ships could amount to US$ 0.4 billion, according to our rough and tentative estimations. Roughly a third of the additional
costs might be related to equipment, a third to dredging and another third to port infrastructure and port hinterland
costs.
A substantial share of the dredging, infrastructure and hinterland connection costs are costs to the public sector in
many countries. Public policies need to better take account of this and act accordingly. Key question is how the costs
for the public sector imposed by mega-ships could be covered. Many ports and countries have, either accidentally or
on purpose, encouraged the development of mega-ships. More balanced decision-making would be needed, with
clearer alignment of incentives to public interests, policy support to enhance supply chain productivity, more regional
collaboration and the creation of an appropriate forum for a discussion between liner companies and all other relevant
transport actors.
Cost Savings of Mega-Container Ships

Most of the cost savings of the largest container ships are not related to size. The 19000 TEU units provide large
economies of scale compared to 15000 units but these are widely attributable to the new design and changing modus
operandi of the liner shipping industry. Their construction coincides with the emergence of slow steaming in container
shipping: voluntarily going slower to save fuel costs and to avoid laying up ships in a context of severe overcapacity. This
has two implications: first, the new ships are more efficient at current low speeds than previous container ships that were
designed for higher speeds; second, slow steaming has become an inherent feature of the new generation of ships,
because they would not be able to go faster if required.
A significant amount of the economies of scale of the modern 19000 TEU container carriers is attributable to the change
in modus operandi of the industry. Using average main engine fuel prices of US$ 600, it can be stated that between 55
and 63 percent of the savings per TEU when upgrading the vessel size from an early 15000 TEU design to a modern 19000
TEU design are actually attributable to the layout for lower operation speeds.
Modern 19000 TEU ships offer significant savings compared to the first 15000 TEU ships. But 55-63% of these savings are
attributable to optimization for slow steaming. When comparing modern 19,000 TEU units with modern 14000 TEU units,
the true economies of scale of the modern 19000 are defined more precisely. When the vessel is deployed on an
imaginary round trip, capital costs, operating costs and propulsion related consumptions are recorded. When analyzing
the savings per TEU, the modern 19000 TEU indeed provide noticeable savings per transported TEU compared to the
previous generation of 15000 TEU units. Compared to the 8500 units, the savings per TEU are reduced by roughly 40-46
per cent though.

The cost savings related to bigger scale were large a few decades ago, but the cost savings are decreasing as ships
become bigger. A large share of the cost savings were achieved by ship upsizing up to 5,000 TEU, which more than
halved the unit costs per TEU, but the cost savings beyond that TEU capacity are much smaller.
This decreasing cost savings tendency continues with the introduction of the newest generation of container ships.
According to estimates the cost savings of going from the previous to the newest generation of container ships are four
to six times smaller than the previous rounds of savings, depending on the assumed vessel speed.
Further increase of maximum container ship size would raise transport costs. So one could wonder if such increases
would be desirable. The potential cost savings to carriers appear to be fairly marginal, but infrastructure upsizing costs
could be phenomenal. Introduction of one hundred 24000 TEU ships in 2020 would require substantial investments in
those places where these ships would be first introduced (Far East, North Europe, Mediterranean), but would also - via
cascading effects - result in introduction of 19000 TEU ships in North America and 14000 TEU ships in South America and
Africa. This would imply additional investment requirements there as well.

Challenges to Fill Mega-Ships

Cost savings of bigger vessels are crucially dependent on the extent to which the ships are being filled. However, the
difference in utilization corresponding to a given slot cost is not very large between different vessel size classes. If the
utilization rate drops by only 3-5% the cost advantage of a vessel that is “one size” larger will be evened out the
utilization rate that a 18000 TEU ship would need to have to achieve cost savings relative to a fully loaded 14000 TEU ship
is approximately 91%. Shipping lines have difficulties attaining such high utilization rates. In practice most ships are
loaded with lower rates.
However, there are large differences between carriers and alliances. The largest ships are built for one trade lane (Far
East-North Europe); this trade lane is dominated by three lines that also have links with the main ports in North Europe;
however, most other lines now also ordered the largest ships; how are they going to find the cargo?
Moreover, the largest shipping lines have a world-wide network, connected to a few transshipment hubs on the Far
East-Europe trade lane, where cargo from the Far East could be transshipped to other destinations than Europe;
however, most shipping lines lack such a network, so will have more difficulties using these ships optimally. This large
differences between alliances with regards to ship turn-around time might be explained by the complexity of certain
alliance structures that could have an impact on the stowage planning of a ship that in turn could impact the
turnaround time in ports.

Port Infrastructure and Congestion

There are also several supply chain costs and risks related to mega-ships. There are adaptations needed to infrastructure
and equipment: the ships are longer, wider and deeper which has consequences for cranes, quays, access channels
and all that. Mega-ships stay on average 20% longer in ports – quite an achievement for most ports as this requires
massive efforts to accommodate these longer-stay guests. The higher risks associated with mega-ships are linked to
difficulties in insuring and salvaging in case of accidents. Furthermore, mega-ships mean that more cargo is
concentrated on a single ship, leading to lower service frequencies and lower supply chain resilience – all your eggs in
one basket.
Mega-ships have redefined the meaning of the word “peak”. Massive truck movements, train movements and yard
occupancy are all related to the arrival of a mega-ship. There is a requirement to manage this huge capacity on arrival
which may lead to more port congestion.
Terminal operators are confronted with the need to adjust equipment and to handle peaks that are challenging within
current configurations. Similar story for ports confronted with new requirements on port-related infrastructure and
transport ministries with regards to port hinterland infrastructure and connectivity. Freight forwarders and logistics
operators will be concerned with any disruptions or delays of mega-ships that might cause additional transaction and
coordination costs. Finally, the peaks associated with mega-ships could cause congestion and delays for truckers,
barge and railway companies. A more detailed analysis of the impact of mega-ships on these different elements of the
transport chains is beyond the present topic of discussions.

Oversupply in the Container Trade

The growth of containerised seaborne trade is no longer in line with the growth of the world container fleet. And
shipping companies have created alliances (only four in total worldwide) which dominate container shipping. This also
leads to overcapacity. The massive ordering of new mega-ships has resulted in oversupply of container ships, which will
most likely dampen some of the cost savings due to larger ships, as low demand results in fewer savings per transported
container. Mega-ships trigger oversupply of ships.
The herd-effect after the first orders of the new generation of container ships have fuelled overcapacity of container
ships. Container ship capacity has grown at a spectacular rate since 2000, doubling slot capacity every seven years. As
a result, total container ship capacity reached almost 20 million TEUs in 2015, four times the capacity of 2000. Although
overcapacity is not a new phenomenon to the shipping industry, and occurring at such frequencies, that it could be
considered almost a structural feature of the sector, one could argue that the growing ship size has facilitated
overcapacity, especially in a period in which most shipping line perceive they have to catch up in the big ships-race.
Adding to this overcapacity is the fact that container shipping provides liner services, so regular, weekly services in a
pre-defined set of ports. This means that the number of new large ships corresponds to the number needed to be able
to provide these strings.

The acquisition of ever larger ships has been made possible to low asset prices in combination with easy access to
finance. Large ships are relatively cheap, not in the least because of conditions of the shipbuilding industry,
characterized by overcapacity, fuelled by public subsidies by main shipbuilding nations such as China and South Korea
(main producers of the mega container ships). Easy access to finance is particularly the case for the shipping
companies that are state-owned companies. These companies benefit from sovereign risk ratings rather than risk ratings
related to the sector or their company.
The development of the world container fleet over the last decade is completely disconnected from developments in
global trade and actual demand: the growth of world seaborne trade ran remarkably parallel with the growth of
average container ship capacity between 1996 and 2007, but has diverged since then, mainly because the stagnant
growth path for seaborne trade between 2007 and 2010 was not followed by the container capacity that remained
essentially on the same growth path as before and did not adjust for the stagnant global trade developments.
There is a gap between supply and demand of approximately 20% that will persist until at least 2019. The effect of this
overcapacity is low freight rates, which will undermine the profitability of the container shipping sector.

Effects on MARPOL Annex VI

IMO welcomes and encourages mega container ships as these ships will reduce emissions and comply with the
necessary regulations in Annex VI. These ships bound to replace quite a number of smaller container ships in the main
container line leading to further reduction in emissions. This will lead to 'Green Ships with least pollution'.

Other Issues

There are concerns about insurability of mega-ships and the costs of potential salvage in case of accidents. Mega-ships
also lead to service and cargo concentration, reduced choice and more limited supply chain resilience, especially
since bigger ships have coincided with increased cooperation of the main shipping lines in four alliances.
Most Companies in the transport chain are not necessarily favourable to mega-ships. Shippers are interested in frequent
and reliable maritime transport links, but bigger ships would reduce the service frequency, unless cargo streams growth
at the same pace of ship size development; moreover, large shippers might have a preference to hedge risks by
parceling out deliveries in different ships rather than concentrating everything in one ship.
Shipping lines generally do not consult with the other companies in the transport chain on their projects. We have not
found any evidence of attempts of coordination or prior warnings in this respect. One could say that shipping lines have
imposed their standards on the wider transport chains, ordering ships with dimensions that other transport companies
now have to deal with it. There has been no planned transition. Considering the character of ship size development (in
leaps, rather than gradually), what is needed in the related transport chain is a revolution rather than an evolution.
Lesson Summary

 Liner service is a fleet of ships, with common ownership or management, which provide a fixed service, at
regular intervals, between named ports, and offer transport to any goods in the catchment area served by
those ports and ready for transit by their sailing dates.

 A fixed itinerary, inclusion in regular service, and the obligation to accept cargo from all comers and to sail,
whether filled or not, on the date fixed by a published schedule are what distinguish the liner from the tramp.

 Liner shipping companies, referred to as liner operators, are the key players in facilitating international container
movements.

 The ships used in the liner sector have changed radically from the traditional liner ships of the WWII era to the
highly sophisticated fully cellular container ships of today.

 The various multi-trade strategies used today are:

 Economic regulation has been a key aspect of liner shipping right from its formative years because of the role

of what are referred to as liner conferences, also referred to as liner cartels.

 Container ships are the work-horses of the globalized economy: although they represent only one-eighth of the
total world fleet they are essential for the transport of consumer goods around the world.