D U S O L / N C W E B / G E PA P E R

Understanding
International Relations
Complete PYQ Academic Answer Guide — Exam-Ready Long Answers

UNIT 1 — IR & OUR WORLD U N I T 2 — N AT I O N S & A U T H O R I T Y

UNIT 3 — INEQUALITIES UNIT 4 — CONFLICT & VIOLENCE

UNIT 5 — VISUAL TURN

Prescribed Text: Jenny Edkins & Maja Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics: A New Introduction
(Routledge) · Contributors cited: David Blaney, Elena Barabantseva, Simon Dalby, Michael
Shapiro, Michael Dillon, M.I. Franklin, Roland Bleiker & others

JUMP TO UNIT

Unit 1 — What is IR? Unit 2 — Nations, States & NSAs

Unit 3 — Inequalities & Climate Unit 4 — Conflict & Violence

Unit 5 — Internet, Cinema & Museums Short Notes

U N I T O N E
What is IR? Why Study It?
Understanding Our World
Prescribed Reading: David Blaney, "Where, When and What is IR?" in Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.), Global
Politics: A New Introduction (Routledge, 2020) | Also: Jenny Edkins & Maja Zehfuss, "Global Politics: A New
Introduction" (General Introduction)

PYQ — COMBINED (UNITS 1)

Define the field of International Relations and explain why its study is
relevant in the contemporary world. How does the study of IR help in
understanding peoples, histories, and civilisations?

I. Introduction: Asking the Right Questions

International Relations (IR) is not simply a collection of facts about wars, treaties,
The term "International Relations" was first coined by
and diplomats. It is, fundamentally, a way of asking and answering questions about
Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century to describe the legal relations between
thesovereign
world wenations.
inhabit together — who makes the rules, who suffers their
consequences, and how power
1. Hans Morgenthau: is distributed
(Politics across human
Among Nations, 1948): societies. The DU SOL
IR is fundamentally
prescribed text, Globalabout the A
Politics: **struggle for power**
New Introduction among
edited bynation-states,
Jenny Edkins and
each pursuing its national interest in an anarchic international system.
Maja Zehfuss (Routledge), opens with a deceptively simple observation: global
politics is about our world, and you are already in it. Understanding IR, therefore, is
David Singer: (1961):
notIR
anisacademic
the studyluxury
of **interactions amongfor
— it is a necessity the most
any inclusive
thinking social systems**
citizen.
— that is, nation-states.

FROM PRESCRIBED READING — EDKINS & ZEHFUSS (INTRODUCTION)

"Global politics is about our world. We are all implicated in it and affected by it
whether we like it or not. The aim of this book is to help readers understand that world
better — not by providing easy answers but by helping them ask better questions."
David Blaney, in his chapter "Where, When and What is IR?", asks us to interrogate
not just what IR studies, but where and when it was constituted as a discipline — and
crucially, who was included and who was excluded from its founding frameworks.
This is the self-reflexive starting point of the DU syllabus: IR must be understood not
only as a tool for analysis but as itself a product of history, power, and particular
civilisational assumptions.

II. What is International Relations? Scope and Definition

At its most straightforward, International Relations is the study of interactions

among states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations,
multinational corporations, and individuals across the boundaries that divide the
world into sovereign territories. But this definition is already contested. As Blaney
reminds us, the very concept of a "nation-state" as the basic unit of world politics is
historically recent — emerging from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) in Europe — and
culturally specific. For centuries before Westphalia, the Indian subcontinent, China,
the Ottoman Empire, and the Aztec world all organised international political life
At its broadest, International Relations encompasses:
very differently. [Link] Politics — war, peace, diplomacy, security, alliances
[Link] Politics — trade, finance, environment, migration, human rights
[Link] Issues — terrorism, pandemics, climate change, cyber threats

THE FORMAL EVOLUTION OF IR AS A DISCIPLINE

Classical Inter-Polity Relations Westphalian System (1648)

(Greek city-states, Kautilya, Silk Road) → Sovereign states as primary actors

↓
WWI & Birth of IR (1919) Cold War IR: Realism dominates
Woodrow Wilson Chair, Aberystwyth → (Morgenthau, Waltz)

↓
Post-Cold War Critical Turn: Liberalism, Constructivism, Feminism, Postcolonialism,
Visual IR
IR as a formal academic discipline was born in 1919, after the catastrophe of World
War I, with the creation of the world's first Chair of International Politics at the
University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The goal was urgent: to understand the causes of
war so that future wars could be prevented. This idealist beginning was soon
challenged by the "realist" school, which insisted that power, not morality, governs
relations among states. But IR has since expanded well beyond this initial debate to
encompass economic globalisation, environmental politics, gender, culture, identity,
and visual representation.

III. The "Where, When and What" of IR — Blaney's Framework

David Blaney's chapter in the prescribed text asks a pointed question: IR as we know
it was constituted in a particular place (Western Europe and North America), at a
particular time (the colonial and post-colonial era), around particular questions (how
to manage the relations of European great powers). This means IR has a built-in
Eurocentric blind spot — it marginalises non-Western histories of political order and
international interaction.

“ "IR was born in the West, institutionalised in Western universities, and has
long reflected Western experiences and preoccupations. To take the discipline
seriously is to ask whose questions it is asking — and whose it is ignoring."

— David Blaney, "Where, When and What is IR?" in Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.), Global
Politics (Routledge, 2020)

This critique is crucial for DU SOL students, who inhabit a postcolonial society with
its own rich traditions of inter-polity thought. Kautilya's Arthashastra (4th century
BCE) contains a sophisticated theory of foreign policy, alliances, and statecraft that
rivals anything in Western IR theory. Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah (14th century CE)
theorised the rise and fall of political communities in ways that anticipate modern
IR's systemic thinking. Recovering these traditions is part of what Blaney calls
building a truly "global IR."

IV. Why Study IR? Five Contemporary Reasons

Global Interdependence Climate Change War & Peace

COVID-19 showed that a Carbon emissions in one From Russia-Ukraine to

virus in Wuhan affects country cause flooding in Gaza, armed conflicts

health systems in Mumbai, another. IR provides the involve state and non-state

London, and Lagos frameworks — UNFCCC, actors, international law,

simultaneously. No state CBDR, Paris Agreement — nuclear deterrence — all

can address such challenges for understanding collective core IR concerns.

alone. global action.

Economic Inequality Global Governance Digital World

The IMF, World Bank, From the UN Security Social media, cyber warfare,

WTO, and G20 make Council to the WHO, surveillance capitalism — all

decisions that affect the international institutions are now central to IR. The

daily lives of billions. IR shape health, security, and "virtual turn" in IR is part of

theory explains who has development outcomes. IR your own prescribed Unit 5

power in these institutions shows how they work — and syllabus.

and why. who they serve.

V. IR and the Understanding of Peoples, Histories, and Civilisations

One of IR's most profound contributions is its capacity to situate present events
within deep historical and civilisational contexts. The Edkins-Zehfuss framework
explicitly rejects the view that IR begins and ends with Western state behaviour. The
prescribed text includes chapters on colonialism, postcolonialism, gender, and
identity — all of which require attention to how different peoples have experienced
and shaped world politics.

“ "The origins and expansion of the modern international system involved the
subjugation of peoples across Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Any honest
account of IR must grapple with this history — not as background context, but
as constitutive of the present order."

— Amitav Acharya & Barry Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory

(Routledge, 2010)

Understanding the Mughal Empire's sophisticated diplomatic practices, the pre-

colonial African kingdoms' inter-state relations, or the tribute system of imperial
China all constitute legitimate IR history. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
championed by India's Jawaharlal Nehru, was a distinctly postcolonial contribution
to IR thought — asserting that newly independent states need not align with either
superpower bloc and could chart an independent foreign policy course.

VI. Theoretical Frameworks in IR (Essential for Exam)

DU Syllabus
Theory Core Claim Key Thinker
Relevance

Realism States pursue power in an Thucydides, Security

anarchic world; survival is Machiavelli, dilemma,
paramount Morgenthau, great power
Waltz conflict

Liberalism Institutions, trade, and Kant, Keohane, UN, WTO,

 democracy promote peace; Nye multilateral
interdependence matters cooperation

Constructivism Identities and norms, not Alexander Nationalism,

just material power, shape Wendt identity,
state behaviour norm change

Postcolonialism Colonial legacies structure Fanon, Nandy, Eurocentric

global inequality; non- Acharya IR, Global
Western voices matter South, CBDR

Feminism Gender shapes global Cynthia Enloe, Women in

politics; women's J. Ann Tickner conflict,
experiences are marginalised UNSC 1325

Critical/Visual Images, media, and Roland Bleiker Unit 5 —

IR representations constitute (Prescribed) Cinema,
global politics museums,
internet

VII. IR and "Planetary History" — Simon Dalby's Contribution

The DU SOL syllabus also prescribes Simon Dalby's chapter, "What happens if we
don't take nature for granted?" This connects IR to the ecological question of the
Anthropocene — the geological epoch in which human activity has become the
dominant force shaping Earth's systems. Dalby argues that IR has for too long
treated nature as a background condition rather than an active dimension of politics.
Climate change, biodiversity collapse, and the COVID-19 pandemic all demonstrate
that nature is not "outside" politics but thoroughly embedded within it.

FROM PRESCRIBED READING — SIMON DALBY IN EDKINS & ZEHFUSS

Dalby argues that taking nature seriously in IR requires us to move beyond the state-
 centric framework and think in terms of planetary systems — where human
societies are embedded in ecological processes that do not respect national boundaries.

VIII. Conclusion

Why IR Matters — A Summary

International Relations is both a discipline and a disposition — a way of seeing the

world as interconnected, contested, and shaped by history. The DU SOL syllabus,
rooted in the Edkins-Zehfuss text, represents one of the most intellectually honest
approaches to IR teaching: it does not pretend that Western theories are universal, it
does not ignore colonial history, and it takes seriously the role of images, culture,
and everyday life in global politics. As Blaney urges, building a truly global IR means
recovering suppressed voices, decentring Eurocentric assumptions, and asking
whose world the discipline has been built to explain — and whose it has ignored.

U N I T T W O

Nations, States, Non-State Actors &

the Dispersal of Authority
Prescribed Reading: Elena Barabantseva, "How do people come to identify with nations?" | Michael J.
Shapiro, "Does the nation-state work?" | A. Nandy, Rashtravad banam Deshbhakti | V.P. Menon, Story of
 Integration of Indian States — all in Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.)

PYQ — COMBINED (UNIT 2)

Critically examine how non-state actors challenge traditional state authority.

Discuss the resurgence of nationalism in the post-Cold War era, what
nationalism is, and how the dispersal of authority in a globalised world
challenges the modern state.

I. Introduction: The State Under Siege

The sovereign nation-state, born out of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), was
theoretically supreme within its territory and equal among its peers in the
international system. Two foundational claims underpinned this: the state's
monopoly on legitimate violence within its borders (Max Weber), and its legal
equality with all other states in international law. Yet the 21st century has witnessed
a profound disruption of both these claims. From above, states are constrained by
international institutions and global markets. From below, they are challenged by
ethno-nationalist movements, armed non-state actors, and civil society
organisations. And from within, the very meaning of national identity — what it is to
be part of a "nation" — is constantly contested and renegotiated.

FROM PRESCRIBED READING — MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, "DOES THE

N AT I O N - S TAT E W O R K ? " I N E D K I N S & Z E H F U S S

Shapiro argues that the nation-state is not a natural or inevitable political form but a
historical construct that has always required active cultural and political work to
produce. It excludes as much as it includes — constructing "internal others"
(minorities, dissidents, the poor) alongside imagined community.
II. What is Nationalism? Elena Barabantseva's Framework

Elena Barabantseva's prescribed chapter asks: "How do people come to identify with
nations?" Her answer draws on constructivist IR theory to argue that national
identity is not primordial or natural — it is produced through education, media,
monuments, rituals, symbols, and everyday practices. People learn to be "Indian,"
"Russian," or "French" through socialisation processes that are deeply political.

“ "Nations are not given in nature but are made — through processes of
inclusion and exclusion, through stories told about 'our' past and 'their'
difference, through maps, flags, anthems and school textbooks."
— Elena Barabantseva, "How do people come to identify with nations?" in Edkins &
Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics (Routledge)

This constructivist view is reinforced by two canonical theorists assigned in the

broader DU syllabus. Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities (1983), argues
that nations are "imagined" because members will never know most of their fellow
citizens personally — the community exists in the shared imagination facilitated by
print capitalism (newspapers, novels). Ernest Gellner, in Nations and Nationalism
(1983), argues that nationalism is a product of industrial modernity:
industrialisation requires standardised, literate populations, which demands a
homogenising national culture.

HOW NATIONAL IDENTITY IS CONSTRUCTED (After Barabantseva)

Education & School Curricula National Symbols (flags, anthems, monuments)

Print & Digital Media

↓
 Collective Memory & History Rituals (Republic Day, Independence Day)

Mapping & Borders

↓
A "National Identity" that feels natural but is politically produced

III. Ashis Nandy and Nationalism in India

The DU SOL syllabus specifically prescribes Ashis Nandy's essay Rashtravad banam
Deshbhakti (Nationalism vs Patriotism). Nandy makes a crucial distinction:
nationalism (rashtravad) is a modern, often aggressive, state-building ideology
that can become authoritarian and exclusionary; while patriotism (deshbhakti)
represents a deeper, more diffuse love for one's land, culture, and people that is more
tolerant of diversity. Nandy argues that Indian nationalist politics has increasingly
shifted from the tolerant, pluralist patriotism of Gandhi toward a more exclusionary,
majoritarian nationalism — with dangerous consequences for minorities and
democratic culture.

“ "Nationalism in its modern form seeks to homogenise, to flatten diversity in

the name of national unity. Patriotism, at its best, celebrates the plurality of
traditions that constitute a civilisation."
— Ashis Nandy, Rashtravad banam Deshbhakti (Translated by A. Dubey, Vani Prakashan,
2005)

IV. Post-Cold War Resurgence of Nationalism: Causes and Manifestations

The end of the Cold War in 1991 was expected by liberal thinkers like Francis
Fukuyama to herald the "End of History" — the global triumph of liberal democracy
and market capitalism. Instead, it unleashed a wave of ethno-nationalist conflicts as
previously suppressed identities reasserted themselves. The Soviet Union's collapse
gave birth to 15 independent states; Yugoslavia's disintegration produced seven
states and multiple wars, including the genocide at Srebrenica (1995). The pattern
repeated across Caucasus (Nagorno-Karabakh), Africa (Rwanda genocide, 1994), and
South Asia (Sri Lanka, Kashmir).

CAUSES OF POST-COLD WAR NATIONALIST RESURGENCE

Collapse of Bipolar Order (1991) Economic Globalisation & Its Losers

Revival of Suppressed Ethnic Identities

↓
Populist Political Entrepreneurs Social Media & Digital Propaganda

Anti-Immigration & Cultural Anxiety

↓
21st-Century Manifestations: Brexit · Hindutva · Trumpism · Russian expansionism ·
Orbán's Hungary

V. Non-State Actors: Who Are They and How Do They Challenge the State?

The DU syllabus foregrounds non-state actors (NSAs) as one of the central

challenges to traditional state authority. NSAs are entities that participate in
international relations but are not states. They include transnational corporations,
international NGOs, terrorist organisations, diaspora networks, and social
movements. The proliferation of NSAs since the 1990s reflects what IR scholars call
the "cobweb paradigm" — a world where power is distributed not hierarchically
among states but laterally through complex transnational webs.

Mode of
Type of NSA Challenge to State Example
Operation

MNCs Economic Tax avoidance, race- Apple's tax

investment, to-the-bottom on arrangements in
lobbying, labour standards Ireland; Amazon's
regulatory labour practices
arbitrage

INGOs Advocacy, service Monitor and Amnesty International,

delivery, norm challenge state human MSF, Greenpeace
entrepreneurship rights records

Terrorist Political violence, Directly contest state ISIS (controlled

Groups territorial control, monopoly on violence territory 2014–17),
propaganda Hezbollah in Lebanon

Diaspora Remittances, Create transnational Indian diaspora in

Networks political lobbying, loyalties that USA; Tamil diaspora
cultural diplomacy complicate national and Sri Lankan civil
identity war

Social Mass mobilisation, Pressure states on Extinction Rebellion,

Movements digital organising, domestic and foreign BLM, Fridays for
norm challenge policy Future

VI. The "Does the Nation-State Work?" Question (Shapiro)

Michael Shapiro's prescribed chapter raises a fundamental challenge: the nation-

state is premised on the fiction of a culturally homogeneous "people" — but virtually
no state in the world is genuinely homogeneous. All states contain internal diversity
— linguistic, religious, ethnic, regional — that the official nationalist narrative
suppresses or manages through varying degrees of coercion and accommodation.
India's federal structure, its linguistic reorganisation of states (1956), its
constitutional protections for minorities, and its ongoing conflicts in Kashmir and
the Northeast all illustrate the gap between the ideological fiction of national unity
and the lived reality of deep diversity.

V. P. M E N O N — P R E S C R I B E D R E A D I N G : S T O R Y O F I N T E G R A T I O N O F
I N D I A N S TAT E S

Menon's account of the integration of 562 princely states into the Indian Union (1947–
48) illustrates how the nation-state was actively constructed through negotiation,
persuasion, and sometimes coercion — not inherited as a natural entity. The
Hyderabad "Police Action" and the Kashmir accession both show the state's
willingness to use force to assert its territorial claims.

VII. The Dispersal of Authority in a Globalised World

Beyond non-state actors, the very architecture of globalisation has dispersed state
authority. Economic globalisation means that states have ceded significant authority
over their economies to international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank,
WTO). Political globalisation has produced regional bodies (the EU, ASEAN, SAARC)
and global institutions (UN, ICC) that constrain state behaviour. And the digital
revolution has created transnational information spaces that states struggle to
control.

THE MODERN STATE — SQUEEZED FROM EVERY DIRECTION

 UN & UNSC IMF/WTO Rules
(Above) (Above) THE NATION-
STATE

EU/ASEAN ICC/ITLOS
(Above) (Above)
Sovereignty contested

Terrorist NSAs MNCs

(Below/Within) (Lateral)

Social Movements Ethnic Minorities

(Within) (Within)

VIII. Conclusion

The Nation-State: Resilient but Transformed

The nation-state has not disappeared — but it has been fundamentally transformed.
It now shares power with multinational corporations, international institutions,
armed non-state actors, and global civil society in ways that Westphalian theory
never anticipated. Nationalism, rather than becoming obsolete with globalisation,
has returned with renewed force — partly as a political response to the dislocations
produced by globalisation itself. As Barabantseva's analysis shows, national identity
is always a construction, always contested, and always susceptible to both inclusive
and exclusionary political manipulation. The challenge for any genuinely democratic
politics in the 21st century is to harness the positive energies of collective belonging
while preventing the slide toward exclusion and violence that virulent nationalism
has historically enabled.
 ✦

U N I T T H R E E

Inequalities: Politico-Military,
Economic & Climate
Prescribed Reading: A. Damodaran, "Encircling the Seamless — India, Climate Change, and the Global
Commons" | Simon Dalby in Edkins & Zehfuss | P. Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments | Also: Paul
Cammack, "Why are some people better off than others?" in Edkins & Zehfuss

PYQ — COMBINED (UNIT 3)

Discuss various forms of inequalities in international relations. How do

economic and climate disparities influence contemporary international
politics? Critically analyse the concept of the global commons and
differentiated responsibilities with respect to climate change.

I. Introduction: The World of Unequal States

The principle of sovereign equality — that all states are equal under international law
— is one of the foundational fictions of IR. In practice, the international system is
profoundly hierarchical. The United States spends more on its military than the next
ten countries combined. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council
can veto any resolution, however widely supported. The poorest 46 countries account
for less than 1% of global trade. And the nations that have emitted the least carbon
historically are those that will suffer most from climate change. Understanding these
inequalities — their causes, their consequences, and the international responses to
them — is the central task of Unit 3.

F R O M P R E S C R I B E D R E A D I N G — PA U L C A M M A C K , " W H Y A R E S O M E
PEOPLE BETTER OFF THAN OTHERS?" IN EDKINS & ZEHFUSS

Cammack argues that global inequality is not accidental or natural but is structurally
produced by the international political economy — by patterns of trade, investment,
debt, and governance that systematically advantage the wealthy and disadvantage the
poor.

II. Politico-Military Inequality: Big States and Small States

Military and political power in the international system is distributed enormously

unequally. The five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council — the USA, UK,
France, Russia, and China — possess veto power, nuclear weapons, and global power
projection capabilities. This P5 status reflects the power configuration of 1945, not
2025: India (1.4 billion people, the world's fifth-largest economy) has no permanent
seat; Germany and Japan — the world's third and fourth largest economies — are
excluded. Africa, with over 1.4 billion people across 54 states, has no permanent
representation.

POLITICO-MILITARY INEQUALITY IN THE UN SYSTEM

UN General Assembly: Formal Equality (193 states, 1 vote each)

↓ But overshadowed by
UN Security Council: Institutionalised Hierarchy
(P5 veto = structural inequality)

↓ Results in
 Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine (2022–)

USA vetoes resolutions on Palestine (2024) China blocks action on Myanmar

↓
Small and weak states have no effective voice on their own security

Beyond the UN, nuclear inequality defines the security architecture. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968) formally divides the world into nuclear "haves"
(P5) and "have-nots" — while the P5 are obligated under Article VI to work toward
disarmament, they have manifestly failed to do so. This double standard — "nuclear
weapons for us, but not for you" — is deeply resented in the Global South and fuels
proliferation pressures (North Korea, Iran).

III. Economic Inequality: Rich States and Poor States

Economic inequality between states is one of the defining features of the

international system. The gap between the average incomes of citizens in high-
income countries (around $50,000+ per capita) and low-income countries (around
$800–1,200 per capita) represents a difference not just of degree but of kind — in
life expectancy, education access, health outcomes, and political power.

Poor/Low-Income
Dimension Rich/High-Income States
States

GDP per capita (avg) $50,000+ $800–1,200

Life expectancy 78–83 years 55–65 years

Share of global trade (WTO, USA + EU + Japan ≈ 55% 46 LDCs ≈ <1%

2022)
 IMF voting power USA alone ≈ 16.5% (effective All LDCs together <
veto) 5%

Historical CO₂ emissions USA + EU ≈ 50% of cumulative Sub-Saharan Africa ≈

total 3%

The Bretton Woods institutions — the IMF and World Bank, created in 1944 — were
designed by and for the richest nations. Their voting structures, conditionalities, and
policy prescriptions have long been criticised for serving the interests of wealthy
states at the expense of developing nations. Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist
of the World Bank, documented how Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)
imposed austerity, privatisation, and trade liberalisation on indebted developing
countries in ways that often deepened poverty and social inequality.

“ "The IMF and World Bank, in pushing developing countries toward market
liberalisation, were not following the prescriptions that had worked for
successful developed countries. They were undermining development."

— Joseph Stiglitz, Globalisation and Its Discontents (2002)

IV. The Global Commons: Definition and Challenge

The concept of "global commons" refers to domains that lie beyond national
jurisdiction and are shared by all of humanity: the high seas, the atmosphere,
Antarctica, and outer space. These are governed (imperfectly) by international
treaties rather than state sovereignty. The foundational challenge of the global
commons was theorised by Garrett Hardin in his 1968 essay "The Tragedy of the
Commons": when a shared resource is open to all but owned by none, rational
individual actors will overuse it, eventually destroying it for everyone.
 DEFINITION — THE GLOBAL COMMONS

Areas beyond national jurisdiction shared by all states and humanity as a whole.
Key examples: (1) The High Seas — UNCLOS governs navigation and resource
extraction; (2) The Atmosphere — UNFCCC governs greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) Antarctica — Antarctic Treaty System (1959) demilitarises and preserves; (4)
Outer Space — Outer Space Treaty (1967) governs use; (5) Deep Seabed — the
"common heritage of mankind" under UNCLOS (1982).

India's engagement with global commons debates is specifically addressed in A.

Damodaran's prescribed essay, "Encircling the Seamless — India, Climate Change,
and the Global Commons." Damodaran argues that India faces a profound dilemma:
as a rapidly industrialising nation with enormous development needs and a vast
population in poverty, India needs the "atmospheric space" to emit carbon as it
grows. Yet it also faces severe climate vulnerability — from Himalayan glacier melt,
to monsoon disruption, to rising sea levels threatening coastal cities like Mumbai
and Kolkata. India's negotiating position at UNFCCC Conferences of Parties (COPs)
has therefore been to insist on the principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities (CBDR) while resisting binding commitments that would constrain
its development path.

V. Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)

CBDR is the cornerstone principle of international climate law. Established in the

Rio Declaration (1992) and enshrined in the UNFCCC, it holds that while all nations
share the common responsibility to protect the global atmosphere, their specific
obligations must reflect their different historical contributions to climate change and
their different capacities to act. In short: the countries that industrialised first,
emitted the most carbon, and grew rich in the process bear a greater responsibility
than countries that are still developing.
 “
"States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but differentiated responsibilities."
— Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7 (1992)

THE CLIMATE INEQUALITY PARADOX

Historical Emitters (USA, EU, UK, Australia) — Industrialised 19th–20th century; created
the problem

↓ Yet
Current Victims: Bangladesh, Maldives, Kiribati, Pacific Islands, Sahel, India's coasts

↓ CBDR demands
Rich nations cut emissions faster Rich nations provide climate finance

Technology transfer to developing world

↓ Contested by
Rich nations' resistance to binding commitments; "all countries must do equal part"
argument weakens CBDR

VI. From Kyoto to Paris: The Shifting CBDR Landscape

The Kyoto Protocol (1997) represented the most rigorous application of CBDR: only
Annex I (developed) countries were given legally binding emission reduction targets;
developing countries including China, India, and Brazil were exempt. The United
States signed but never ratified Kyoto; it withdrew in 2001 under President Bush.
The Paris Agreement (2015) took a fundamentally different approach: all countries,
regardless of their development status, were required to submit Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) — voluntary national pledges to reduce emissions.
Critics from the Global South argued this effectively dismantled CBDR by creating a
false equivalence between countries with vastly different historical responsibilities
and current capacities.

The COP27 agreement (Sharm el-Sheikh, 2022) on a Loss and Damage Fund was a
landmark moment — acknowledging for the first time that the most vulnerable
countries deserve financial compensation for climate impacts they did not cause and
cannot adapt to. However, the fund's capitalisation remains far below the scale
needed (estimated at $400 billion annually by the 2030s).

VII. Conclusion

Inequality as IR's Central Challenge

The inequalities embedded in the international system — political, military,

economic, and ecological — are not incidental but structural. They reflect the
accumulated advantages of those who have dominated the international order since
the colonial era and the continuing disadvantages of those who were subjugated. The
global commons debate crystallises this inequality most acutely: the atmosphere,
which belongs to no one and everyone, has been disproportionately occupied by the
richest nations, while the consequences are borne by the poorest. A just
international order requires not just formal equality of sovereignty but substantive
equality of capacity, voice, and ecological burden-sharing — goals that remain far
from achieved.
 ✦

U N I T F O U R

Sites of Conflict and the Changing

Nature of Violence
Prescribed Reading: Michael Dillon, "What makes the world dangerous? Living dangerously?" | Also: Jenny
Edkins chapters on political violence, trauma, and memory — in Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics

PYQ — COMBINED (UNIT 4)

Analyse the role of technology in reshaping modern conflicts. What are the
sites of conflict? Describe the changing nature of violence in global politics.

I. Introduction: What Makes the World Dangerous?

Michael Dillon's prescribed chapter, "What makes the world dangerous?", opens with
a deceptively simple question — but immediately complicates it. Asking "why is the
world dangerous?" risks a kind of essentialism, as if danger were fixed and
permanent. Asking instead "how does the world become dangerous?" draws
attention to the processes, technologies, practices, and representations through
which violence is made possible, justified, and enacted. This methodological insight
— from "why" to "how" — is central to the DU SOL approach to understanding
conflict.

FROM PRESCRIBED READING — MICHAEL DILLON IN EDKINS & ZEHFUSS

 Dillon argues that modern warfare is not simply about states fighting each other — it is
about the management of populations through technologies of surveillance,
control, and killing. Drawing on Foucault's concept of "biopower," he shows how
modern states govern through the power over life and death — deciding who lives and
who is "let die."

Violence in global politics has always been purposive — aimed at political ends. But
its forms, sites, and technologies have undergone profound transformation since the
Cold War. The line between war and peace, between combatants and civilians,
between state and non-state violence has become increasingly blurred.
Understanding this transformation is essential for any serious engagement with
contemporary IR.

II. The Changing Nature of Conflict: "Old Wars" and "New Wars"

Mary Kaldor's influential concept of "New Wars" (1999) provides a crucial

framework for understanding the transformation of armed conflict. Old wars were
primarily inter-state conflicts fought by professional armies for geopolitical goals,
with clear front lines and (at least notionally) the Geneva Conventions protecting
civilians. New wars — the dominant form since the end of the Cold War — are
typically intra-state or transnational in character, involve multiple armed non-state
actors alongside states, use identity politics (ethnic, religious, tribal) as their driving
motivation, deliberately target civilians as a strategy, and sustain themselves through
a war economy of looting, diaspora funding, and criminal networks.

OLD WARS vs. NEW WARS (After Mary Kaldor)

 Old Wars: State vs. State · Geopolitical Goals · Professional Armies · Clear Front Lines

New Wars: Multiple NSAs · Identity Goals · Civilian Targeting · Diffuse, Network-Based

↓ Examples of New Wars

Syrian Civil War (2011–) DRC Eastern Conflict Yemeni Civil War

Rwandan Genocide (1994)

↓ But also hybrid cases

Russia-Ukraine (2022–): Inter-state WAR with new war characteristics (cyberattacks,
disinformation, targeting of civilian infrastructure)

III. Sites of Conflict: Where Does Violence Occur?

The DU syllabus explicitly asks students to identify and analyse different "sites of
conflict." In contemporary IR, conflict no longer occurs only on battlefield fronts — it
is distributed across a multiplicity of physical, virtual, and social spaces.

Site Character of Violence Example

Interstate Conventional military conflict Russia-Ukraine War (2022–),

Battlefields between state armed forces Gulf War (1991)

Intrastate/Civil Armed conflict within borders, Syrian Civil War; Yemeni War;
War often involving NSAs; Ethiopian Civil War
frequently internationalised

Urban Spaces Fighting in cities; civilians used Battle of Mosul (2016–17); Gaza
as shields; infrastructure (2023–24); Mariupol (2022)
targeted
 Cyberspace Attacks on digital Stuxnet (2010); NotPetya (2017);
infrastructure (power grids, Ukraine power grid attacks
banking, government systems) (2015–16)

Information Disinformation, propaganda, Russian IRA interference in US

Space psychological operations election 2016; anti-Rohingya
hate speech on Facebook

Bodies Sexual violence as a weapon of Systematic rape in DRC, Bosnia;

war; torture; forced ISIS sexual slavery
displacement

Economic Sanctions, trade war, US sanctions on Iran, Russia;

Space weaponisation of financial China's economic coercion of
system Australia

IV. Technology and the Transformation of Conflict

Technology has always shaped the character of war — from the horse and chariot to
gunpowder to the atomic bomb. But the pace of technological change in the 21st
century is unprecedented, and its consequences for conflict are profound across
several dimensions.

A. Cyber Warfare

Cyber conflict has emerged as perhaps the most significant new domain. States can
attack an adversary's critical infrastructure without physical violence and often
without clear attribution. The Stuxnet worm (2010), believed created by the USA and
Israel, physically destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges at Natanz through computer
code alone — the first documented case of digital code causing physical industrial
damage. Russia's sustained cyber operations against Ukraine — including the 2015–
16 power grid attacks that left hundreds of thousands without electricity — have
made Ukraine the world's most documented laboratory for cyber warfare.
B. Drone Warfare and Remote Killing

Drone technology has radically altered the calculus of military violence by removing
the physical risk to the attacking side. The United States' drone programme —
dramatically expanded under the Obama administration's "kill lists" — conducted
strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan. This raises profound
questions about sovereignty (attacking states without declaration of war),
accountability (who decides who is a "target"), and the psychology of remote killing
(operators sitting in Nevada killing people in Waziristan). The Bayraktar TB2 drone's
decisive role in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War demonstrated how affordable
drones can shift military balances and empower smaller states.

C. Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) / "Killer Robots"

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) — weapons that can select and
engage targets without meaningful human control — represent perhaps the most
ethically fraught technological development in military history. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has called for a new international treaty
regulating LAWS, warning that fully autonomous weapons would violate
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) — the requirements
of distinction (between combatants and civilians), proportionality, and human
accountability.

“ "Machines that can decide to kill without meaningful human control would
represent a fundamental change in the conduct of warfare — one that raises
serious questions under international humanitarian law and humanity's
fundamental ethical principles."

— ICRC Position Paper on Autonomous Weapons Systems, 2021

V. Forms of Violence — Johan Galtung's Triangle

The DU syllabus asks students to go beyond direct physical violence to analyse
"forms of violence" in global politics. Norwegian peace scholar Johan Galtung's
typology remains indispensable:

Direct Violence Structural Violence Cultural Violence

Physical harm inflicted by Harm embedded in social, Ideologies that legitimate

identifiable actors. War, economic, and political and normalise direct and

terrorism, torture, structures. No single structural violence. Racism,

assassination. Visible, identifiable perpetrator. religious extremism, caste

dramatic, easy to condemn. Poverty kills more people hierarchy, gender norms.

Example: the bombing of annually than all wars Example: Dehumanising

Hiroshima; the 9/11 attacks. combined. Example: propaganda before

preventable disease deaths genocides (Rwanda, Nazi

in LDCs; caste Germany).

discrimination in India.

“ "Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their
actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations."

— Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research
(1969)

VI. The Role of Technology: A Critical Assessment

While technology has enabled new forms of military power, it has also created new
vulnerabilities and new ethical dilemmas. The "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA)
— the idea that precision technology and information dominance could produce
clean, efficient, and decisive military outcomes — was exposed as largely illusory in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite overwhelming technological superiority, the United
States could not defeat insurgencies that relied on roadside bombs, social support
networks, and ideological commitment. Technology can win battles but it cannot
substitute for political legitimacy and social cohesion.

VII. Conclusion

Violence in the 21st Century — Complex, Distributed, and Harder to End

Dillon's key insight — that we must ask "how" rather than "why" the world becomes
dangerous — points us toward the practices, technologies, and political
arrangements that enable violence. Modern conflict is not reducible to states
fighting each other with armies; it operates across multiple sites simultaneously,
exploits technological capabilities that most states cannot match or regulate, and
increasingly targets the human body, the digital network, and the information
environment as its primary battlefields. Galtung's triangular framework reminds us
that the absence of direct violence does not mean peace — structural and cultural
violence continue to kill and maim far more people than bullets and bombs. A
genuine commitment to peace requires tackling all three forms of violence
simultaneously.

U N I T F I V E

The Visual Turn: Internet, Cinemas &

Museums in IR
Prescribed Reading: M.I. Franklin, "How does the way we use the Internet make a difference?" | Roland
Bleiker (Visual Turn, Cinema, Museums) | In Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics: A New Introduction
(Routledge)

PYQ — COMBINED (UNIT 5)

Write an essay on the role of social media in international diplomacy and

conflicts. Describe the visual turn in international relations through cinema
and museums.

I. Introduction: The Virtual and Creative World of IR

Unit 5 of the DU SOL syllabus is among its most innovative — it asks students to look
beyond traditional actors (states, armies, diplomats) and examine how the virtual
and creative dimensions of our world shape international politics. The internet,
social media, cinema, and museums are not merely "culture" existing outside politics
— they are central arenas in which power is exercised, identities are formed, conflicts
are waged, and memory is constructed. The "visual turn" in IR scholarship,
associated in your syllabus with scholars like Roland Bleiker, argues that images and
representations do not merely reflect a pre-existing political reality — they actively
constitute that reality.

THE VISUAL TURN — CORE ARGUMENT (ROLAND BLEIKER)

"Images do not merely represent global politics — they constitute it. How we see the
world shapes how we act in it. IR must therefore learn to read images, films, and
artistic representations as political texts, not merely as illustrations of 'real' events."
II. The Internet and International Relations — M.I. Franklin's Framework

The prescribed chapter by M.I. Franklin asks: "How does the way we use the Internet
make a difference?" This is a subtly important question — it does not treat the
internet as an autonomous force determining political outcomes, but focuses on the
practices and uses through which the internet enters politics. Different actors use the
internet in different ways — and with vastly different access and power.

FROM PRESCRIBED READING — M.I. FRANKLIN IN EDKINS & ZEHFUSS

Franklin argues that the internet is neither inherently liberating nor inherently
oppressive. Its political effects depend on who uses it, how, and with what
power. The same platforms that enable pro-democracy activists in authoritarian
states also enable surveillance, censorship, and disinformation by those same states.

The internet's impact on IR operates across multiple dimensions. As a

communication infrastructure, it has accelerated globalisation, enabled transnational
civil society (Avaaz, [Link]), facilitated diaspora political engagement, and
created new spaces for public diplomacy. As a military and security domain, it has
become the arena for cyber warfare, intelligence operations, and critical
infrastructure attacks. And as an information environment, it has enabled both
unprecedented access to knowledge and unprecedented capacity for disinformation
and manipulation.

THE INTERNET IN IR — DUAL NATURE (After M.I. Franklin)

EMANCIPATORY USES OPPRESSIVE USES

Pro-democracy mobilisation (Arab Spring)

State surveillance & censorship (China's Great Firewall)

 Transnational human rights advocacy

Hate speech & genocide facilitation (Myanmar/Facebook)

Citizen journalism & accountability

Disinformation & election interference (Russia IRA)

Public diplomacy & soft power

Recruitment by terrorist organisations (ISIS on Telegram)

The "Splinternet" — Fragmentation of Global Cyberspace

One of the most significant geopolitical trends in internet governance is what

analysts call the "Splinternet" — the fragmentation of the global internet into
national or bloc-based networks. China's "Great Firewall" blocks Google, Facebook,
Twitter, and thousands of other Western platforms, creating a parallel digital
ecosystem dominated by Baidu, WeChat, and Weibo — all subject to state
surveillance and content control. Russia has developed a "Runet" — a domestic
internet that could, in theory, be isolated from the global network in a crisis. This
digital sovereignty agenda represents a direct challenge to the American vision of a
free, open, and globally integrated internet.

III. Social Media and International Diplomacy

"Twiplomacy" — diplomacy conducted through social media platforms — has become

a defining feature of 21st century foreign policy. When heads of state communicate
foreign policy positions via tweets or Instagram posts, they bypass traditional
diplomatic channels, speak directly to domestic and international publics
simultaneously, and create a real-time, high-stakes communication environment
with little room for the careful deliberation that effective diplomacy requires.
 “ "Social media has not replaced diplomacy — but it has changed its texture.
Messages designed for one audience are instantly visible to all audiences. A
tweet to domestic supporters can constitute an international incident."

— Nicholas Cull, Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital
Age (2019)

The Arab Spring (2010–2012) demonstrated social media's capacity to accelerate

political mobilisation at a speed unprecedented in history. Mohamed Bouazizi's self-
immolation in Tunisia, filmed and shared on Facebook, catalysed protests that
toppled governments across four countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen). Philip
Howard and Muzammil Hussain's research found that social media played a central
role in coordinating protest movements while degrading state media control over
information flows.

Yet the Arab Spring's aftermath has sobered utopian readings of social media's
democratic potential. In Egypt, a brief democratic opening was followed by a military
coup (2013) and the installation of an authoritarian government more repressive
than Mubarak's. In Syria, social media facilitated both opposition organising and the
propaganda of both the Assad regime and ISIS. And in Myanmar, Facebook became
the primary vector for genocidal anti-Rohingya hate speech that contributed to the
ethnic cleansing of 700,000+ people (2017) — a case the UN Fact-Finding Mission
described as one in which the platform "played a determining role."

IV. The Visual Turn in IR — Cinema as Politics

Roland Bleiker's concept of the "visual turn" in IR asks us to take seriously what
pictures, films, and artistic representations do in world politics. This is not just a
methodological flourish — it reflects a genuine insight: in an era saturated with
images, the politics of visibility — who is seen, how they are seen, and by whom — is
itself a form of power.
Cinema has been one of the most powerful instruments of soft power in the modern
era. Joseph Nye's concept of soft power — attracting rather than coercing —
identifies cultural products, including films, as central to a state's international
influence. Hollywood has functioned as an instrument of American soft power for
over a century, projecting values of individualism, freedom, and technological
optimism to global audiences. During the Cold War, the US State Department and
the CIA's "Congress for Cultural Freedom" covertly funded film production,
translation projects, and cultural diplomacy to counter Soviet influence in Western
Europe — as documented by Frances Stonor Saunders in Who Paid the Piper?
(1999).

National
IR/Soft Power Function Example
Cinema

Hollywood Projects American values, technological Top Gun: Maverick, Saving

(USA) superiority, military heroism Private Ryan, Marvel
universe

Bollywood Cultural diplomacy; reach across South Dangal, RRR (global

(India) Asia, Middle East, Africa, diaspora streaming success); India's
"soft power" asset

Hallyu K-drama and K-pop as cultural Parasite (Oscar 2020), Squid

(South diplomacy; "Korea brand" globally Game (Netflix global #1,
Korea) 2021)

Chinese State-directed "discourse power" (话语 Wolf Warrior 2 ($870m box

Cinema 权); counter-narrative to "China threat" office, 2017); Battle at Lake
Changjin

Iranian Counter-narrative to Western A Separation (Oscar 2012),

Cinema representations; critical of both Iran's The Salesman (Oscar 2017)
state and the West
China's deliberate investment in cinema as an instrument of foreign policy is
particularly instructive. President Xi Jinping's concept of "discourse power" (话语权,
huàyǔquán) — the ability to frame global narratives — has been explicitly linked to
investment in film co-productions, CGTN's global broadcasting network, and
Confucius Institutes. Films like Wolf Warrior 2 explicitly depict China as a heroic
global protector — a direct challenge to Hollywood's domination of the "global
superhero" narrative.

V. Museums, Memory, and IR

Museums function as what French historian Pierre Nora called "lieux de mémoire"
(sites of memory) — places where nations and communities construct, contest, and
perform their historical identities. The politics of museums is therefore deeply
intertwined with IR: what is displayed, how it is labelled, whose history is celebrated,
and whose suffering is commemorated all reflect and reinforce international political
relationships.

“ "Museums are not neutral storehouses of the past. They are institutions of
power that make claims about whose history matters, whose art is worth
preserving, and which version of the past is 'official.'"

— Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum (1995)

The debate over colonial artefacts in European museums is one of the most
contentious IR issues in cultural politics. The Benin Bronzes — over 3,000 intricate
metal sculptures looted from the Kingdom of Benin (in present-day Nigeria) by
British forces in 1897 — are held by museums across Europe (British Museum,
Berlin's Humboldt Forum, etc.). Nigeria and multiple African states have long
demanded their repatriation. In 2022, Germany announced it would return 20 Benin
Bronzes — a precedent-setting move that has intensified pressure on other museums.
The Elgin Marbles (Parthenon Sculptures), held by the British Museum and claimed
by Greece; the Koh-i-Noor diamond (India); and thousands of other artefacts all
represent contested material legacies of colonialism that continue to shape IR today.

War memorials and genocide museums play a distinct IR function: they

institutionalise memory as a form of political commitment. The Holocaust museums
and memorials in Germany, Poland, Israel, and the United States frame the
Holocaust not merely as a historical event but as a moral imperative — "Never Again"
— that is intended to motivate contemporary action on genocide prevention. The US
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington DC explicitly connects
Holocaust memory to its "Committee on Conscience" which monitors contemporary
atrocity risk. This represents a direct link between visual/cultural representation and
foreign policy advocacy.

VI. Conclusion: Seeing and Being Seen in Global Politics

The World of Images Is the World of Power

The "visual turn" in IR — encompassing the internet, cinema, photography, and

museums — represents a fundamental expansion of what we consider to be
"international relations." As M.I. Franklin shows, the internet is not just a
communication tool but a contested political space. As cinema studies reveal, films
do not merely entertain — they construct identities, project power, and shape public
opinion about "us" and "them." As museum controversies demonstrate, the past is
not simply over — it is actively contested in the present, with consequences for
diplomatic relations, reparations debates, and postcolonial justice. The student of IR
who ignores the visual and creative dimensions of global politics is missing some of
its most important and formative processes.
 ✦

S H O RT N O T E S

Concise Scholarly Notes — Exam-

Ready
Covering all PYQ short note topics: Eurocentric IR, CBDR, Structural vs. Direct Violence, Cinema as Soft
Power, Planetary History, Internet, Rich States & Poor States, Market IR

SHORT NOTE 1

Eurocentric IR Narratives

Eurocentrism in IR refers to the systematic tendency to treat Western — specifically

European and North American — historical experiences, theoretical frameworks, and
political assumptions as if they were universal. The discipline of IR was
institutionalised in 1919 at Aberystwyth, UK, in response to European wars, by
European thinkers, to solve European problems. Its foundational concepts —
sovereign equality, the balance of power, international law, the distinction between
"civilised" and "uncivilised" states — were all shaped by European colonial
assumptions.

“ "IR was not just born in the West — it was built with the explicit purpose of
managing a world in which European states were the only 'real' actors. Non-
Western polities were either colonies, quasi-states, or simply outside the
 system."
— David Blaney, "Where, When and What is IR?" in Edkins & Zehfuss (Prescribed
Text)

Specific critiques include: (1) The "standard of civilisation" — a colonial-era legal

concept that excluded non-Western states from full international legal personality
unless they proved their "civilisation" by Western criteria. (2) The invisibility of
colonial violence, slavery, and extraction in mainstream IR history. (3) The
marginalisation of non-Western IR thinkers: Kautilya's Arthashastra, Ibn Khaldun's
Muqaddimah, Chinese tributary system theories, all offer sophisticated IR
frameworks ignored by Western textbooks. (4) The postcolonial critique: Ashis
Nandy, Partha Chatterjee (The Nation and its Fragments, prescribed), and Gayatri
Spivak all argue that knowledge itself is a site of power. The project of "Global IR"
(Acharya) seeks to recover suppressed non-Western knowledge traditions and build
a truly inclusive discipline.

SHORT NOTE 2

Global Commons and Differentiated Responsibilities

The global commons are areas beyond national jurisdiction shared by all humanity:
the atmosphere, the high seas, Antarctica, outer space, and the deep seabed.
Managing these shared resources requires international cooperation, but is
complicated by the fact that states have vastly different interests and capacities. The
principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), enshrined in the
Rio Declaration (1992) and the UNFCCC, is the central mechanism for managing this
tension in the climate context.

CBDR — THE LEGAL FORMULA

 "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities." — Rio Declaration, Principle 7 (1992)

A. Damodaran's prescribed essay on India's engagement with the global commons

debate shows how CBDR is operationalised in diplomatic negotiations. India argues
that it has contributed minimally to historical emissions (roughly 3% of cumulative
global CO₂), has 700 million people without reliable energy access, and therefore
cannot accept the same emission reduction obligations as industrialised nations that
grew rich by burning fossil fuels. This position has been central to India's stance at
every major COP from Kyoto (1997) to Dubai (COP28, 2023). The tension between
the climate emergency's urgency and the justice demands of CBDR remains the
central unresolved conflict of international environmental politics.

SHORT NOTE 3

Difference Between Structural Violence and Direct Violence

Norwegian peace scholar Johan Galtung introduced this foundational distinction in

"Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" (Journal of Peace Research, 1969). The
distinction is critical for IR because it dramatically expands our understanding of
what counts as violence and who or what is responsible for it.

Dimension Direct Violence Structural Violence

Nature Physical harm (killing, Harm from social/economic/political

torture, injury) structures (poverty, hunger, discrimination)
 Perpetrator Identifiable actor No single identifiable perpetrator; built into
(person, state, army) the system

Visibility Visible, dramatic, Invisible, chronic, normalised, rarely labelled

widely condemned "violence"

Example in The bombing of Gaza; Preventable poverty deaths from IMF

IR the Rwandan genocide austerity; hunger in food-exporting countries

Mortality Millions per century Billions per century from preventable poverty,
scale from wars disease, discrimination

Galtung's insight is that a state of "negative peace" (merely the absence of direct
violence) is insufficient — genuine peace requires "positive peace," the removal of
structural violence through just institutions, equitable distribution of resources, and
elimination of cultural legitimation of harm. This framework has been foundational
for the human security agenda, the SDGs, and feminist IR theory.

SHORT NOTE 4

Cinema as Soft Power

Joseph Nye's concept of soft power — the ability to attract and influence rather than
coerce — identifies cinema as one of its primary vehicles. Film is uniquely powerful
as a soft power instrument because it reaches mass global audiences, creates
emotional identification with characters and values, and operates through pleasure
rather than persuasion. Audiences do not feel they are being propagandised; they feel
they are being entertained.

Hollywood cinema has served as a vehicle for American soft power for over a century.
The Pentagon's Hollywood Liaison Office advises on and sometimes co-funds major
film productions (Top Gun: Maverick, Black Hawk Down, etc.) in exchange for
editorial input — ensuring sympathetic portrayals of US military power. The CIA
similarly operates an Entertainment Industry Liaison. Films like the Marvel
Cinematic Universe project a fundamentally American cosmology — even when set in
space or mythical worlds.

India's Bollywood is increasingly recognised as a soft power asset: Dangal (2016)

earned $193m in China alone; RRR (2022) won an Oscar and streamed globally on
Netflix. South Korea's "Hallyu" (Korean Wave) — encompassing K-drama, K-pop,
and cinema — has dramatically improved South Korea's global image and tourism
receipts, demonstrating that cinema-led cultural diplomacy can be state-directed and
economically significant. China's Wolf Warrior 2 (2017) — in which a Chinese soldier
rescues African civilians and defeats American mercenaries — is an explicit piece of
state-directed "discourse power" cinema.

SHORT NOTE 5

Planetary History

Planetary history, associated with historian Dipesh Chakrabarty ("The Climate of

History: Four Theses," 2009), represents a radical expansion of historical and IR
analysis beyond the human to encompass the deep time of Earth's geological and
biological systems. Chakrabarty argues that the Anthropocene — the geological
epoch in which human activity has become the dominant force shaping Earth's
systems — requires historians and social scientists to think simultaneously at the
scale of human civilisations and at the scale of deep planetary time.

"The distinction between natural history and human history is collapsing.

 “
Climate change brings the two into conversation in ways that neither geology
alone nor human history alone can address."

— Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Climate of History: Four Theses," Critical Inquiry (2009)

For IR, planetary history has several implications. It challenges the

anthropocentrism (human-centredness) of IR theory — the assumption that nature is
merely the backdrop against which human political dramas unfold. Simon Dalby's
prescribed chapter in Edkins-Zehfuss makes precisely this argument: when we "take
nature for granted," we ignore the ecological systems in which all political life is
embedded. Planetary history also challenges the state-centrism of IR: climate
change, mass extinction, and ocean acidification operate on timescales and spatial
scales that dwarf individual states or even civilisations. A genuinely planetary IR
must think not only about what states and peoples want, but about what the planet
can sustain.

SHORT NOTE 6

The Internet in International Relations

M.I. Franklin's prescribed chapter in Edkins-Zehfuss asks us to think critically about

how the internet is used in global politics — recognising that it is not a neutral tool
but a contested political space shaped by questions of access, power, governance, and
design. Approximately 5.4 billion people are now internet users (2024) — but access
remains deeply unequal: digital inequality maps closely onto global economic
inequality, with the Global South significantly underrepresented in internet
governance institutions.

Key IR dimensions of the internet: (1) Governance — ICANN (Internet Corporation

for Assigned Names and Numbers), historically dominated by the United States,
governs core internet infrastructure. The ITU (International Telecommunication
Union), where all UN member states have a vote, represents an alternative
governance model preferred by authoritarian states. (2) Cyber Sovereignty —
China, Russia, and Iran all advocate for states' rights to govern their domestic
internet space, as against the liberal "free and open internet" model. (3) Cyber
Warfare — States increasingly use cyber operations for intelligence gathering,
sabotage, and coercion (Stuxnet, NotPetya, SolarWinds). (4) Disinformation —
State-sponsored and commercially motivated disinformation campaigns undermine
democratic deliberation and inflame ethnic and national tensions globally.

SHORT NOTE 7

Rich States and Poor States

The divide between rich and poor states is the most persistent and structurally
embedded inequality in the international system. It is not merely a difference of
income but a difference in political power, institutional access, military capacity, and
ecological vulnerability. The theoretical frameworks for understanding this divide are
multiple:

Dependency Theory (Raúl Prebisch, André Gunder Frank): The international

economic system is structured to transfer wealth from the "periphery" (Global South)
to the "core" (Global North) through unfavourable terms of trade, capital flight, and
debt. World Systems Theory (Immanuel Wallerstein): A tripartite structure of
core, semi-periphery, and periphery describes global capitalism's hierarchical
geography. Post-development theory (Arturo Escobar): "Development" itself is a
discourse that imposes Western standards and pathologises non-Western societies.
Human Development approach (Amartya Sen, UNDP): Poverty should be
understood not just as income deprivation but as "capability deprivation" — the
inability to live a full and dignified human life. This framework underpins the
UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) and the SDGs. The gap between rich and
poor states is not narrowing fast enough — and in the areas of climate vulnerability,
public health infrastructure, and debt distress, it is in many respects widening.

SHORT NOTE 8

Market IR (International Political Economy)

Market IR — or International Political Economy (IPE) — studies the intersection of

economics and politics in the international arena. It asks: how do markets shape
political power, and how does political power shape markets? The discipline emerged
as a distinct field in the 1970s, partly in response to events that neither IR theory nor
economics alone could explain: the OPEC oil embargo (1973), the collapse of the
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system (1971), and the debt crises of the 1980s.

Three classic paradigms organise IPE: Mercantilism — states use economic policy
instrumentally to accumulate power, wealth, and security (China's Belt and Road
Initiative, US technology export controls against China are contemporary examples).
Liberalism — free markets produce mutual gains and underpin the "democratic
peace" (Keohane's interdependence theory). Marxism/Structuralism —
capitalism systematically produces and reproduces global class inequalities, with the
international system reflecting the interests of dominant capitalist classes.

Contemporary "market IR" debates include: the "weaponisation of economic

interdependence" (Farrell & Newman, 2019) — the US-China rivalry over
semiconductors, 5G networks, and financial systems shows how economic
integration can become a source of strategic vulnerability. The "China model" — state
capitalism with market mechanisms — challenges the liberal assumption that
economic development necessarily leads to political liberalisation. And the COVID-
19 pandemic exposed the fragility of globally integrated supply chains, triggering
"friendshoring" (reshoring to allied nations) and a broader retreat from
hyperglobalisation.

✦
DU SOL GE — Understanding International Relations
Answers aligned to prescribed texts: Edkins & Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics: A New Introduction
(Routledge) · Blaney · Barabantseva · Dalby · Franklin · Bleiker · Dillon · Nandy · Damodaran

All answers designed for 7–8 page exam responses (long) or 1–2 page responses (short notes)