ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Comprehensive Study Notes
RBI Grade B Officer (Legal) Examination
Covering: Principles, Landmark Cases, Constitutional Provisions & Exam-Ready Summaries
Prepared: February 2026
CHAPTER 1: NATURE, SCOPE & DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
1.1 What is Administrative Law?
Definition: Administrative Law is the body of law that governs the activities of administrative agencies of
government. It deals with the powers and duties of administrative authorities, the limits of such powers, the
methods by which they are exercised, and the remedies available to persons adversely affected by
administrative action.
Ivor Jennings: "Administrative Law is the law relating to the administration. It determines the organisation,
powers and duties of administrative authorities."
K.C. Davis: "Administrative Law is the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative
agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review of administrative action."
Wade & Forsyth: "Administrative Law is the law relating to the control of governmental power."
1.2 Nature and Characteristics
• Branch of Public Law: Governs relationship between State/government agencies and citizens.
• Dynamic and expanding: Grown with the rise of the Welfare State and administrative tribunals.
• Procedural and Substantive: Both the procedures agencies must follow AND the limits on
substantive power they can exercise.
• Judge-made and Statute-made: Developed through common law (courts) and codified in statutes
like the Administrative Procedure Act (USA) or through constitutional provisions in India.
• Concerned with excess of power: Primary check is against ultra vires action — action beyond
legal authority.
1.3 Scope of Administrative Law
Administrative law covers five broad areas:
1. Delegation of Legislative Power: When Parliament delegates rule-making power to the executive
— i.e., delegated/subordinate legislation.
2. Quasi-Judicial Functions: When administrative bodies perform adjudicatory functions (e.g.,
disciplinary proceedings, licensing, tax assessment).
3. Natural Justice: Rules that ensure fairness in administrative decision-making — audi alteram
partem (hear the other side) and nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be judge in their own
cause).
4. Judicial Review: Court supervision over administrative decisions — through writs, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, quo warranto.
5. Administrative Tribunals: Specialist adjudicatory bodies — Service Tribunals, Tax Tribunals,
Consumer Forums, NCLT, NCLAT, etc.
1.4 Administrative Law vs Constitutional Law
Administrative Law Constitutional Law
Deals with powers of subordinate authorities Deals with the Supreme Law — distribution of
and agencies powers among organs of government
Governs HOW power is exercised Governs WHO has power and its limits
Mainly judge-made + statutory Primarily in the Constitution itself
Concerned with day-to-day exercise of power Concerned with fundamental structures and
rights
Administrative tribunals, Natural Justice, JR Separation of powers, Fundamental Rights,
Federalism
1.5 Growth of Administrative Law in India — Reasons
• Welfare State: Post-independence India adopted the Welfare State model. Government began
regulating vast areas — industry, trade, banking, insurance, labour — necessitating huge
administrative machinery.
• Inadequacy of Legislature: Parliament cannot legislate in detail on every technical matter.
Delegation to experts became essential.
• Inadequacy of Courts: Ordinary courts are slow, expensive, and lack technical expertise.
Specialized tribunals became necessary.
• Emergency Powers: Wars, famines, pandemics require quick executive action without waiting for
parliamentary legislation.
• RBI/SEBI/TRAI etc.: Rise of independent regulatory authorities with vast quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers.
EXAM TIP: RBI Grade B exams frequently ask about the distinction between Administrative,
Constitutional and Ordinary Law; the reasons for growth of administrative law; and the role of
administrative tribunals. Ensure these definitions and distinctions are memorised.
CHAPTER 2: RULE OF LAW
2.1 Dicey's Concept of Rule of Law
A.V. Dicey in his book "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" (1885) propounded
the doctrine of Rule of Law with three pillars:
Pillar 1: Supremacy of Law (Absence of Arbitrary Power)
No man is punishable except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before
the ordinary courts. Government has no power to punish a person except through established law.
Opposed to wide discretionary or arbitrary powers in the executive.
Pillar 2: Equality Before Law
Every person, regardless of rank or status, is subject to the ordinary law of the land and the jurisdiction of
ordinary courts. No person is above the law. In England, this meant even Ministers and government
officials could be sued in the same courts as private citizens.
Pillar 3: Judge-made Constitution
In England (no written Constitution), the principles of the constitution (e.g., personal liberty) are the result of
judicial decisions — i.e., rights are secured by ordinary law developed by courts, not granted by a written
constitution.
2.2 Criticism of Dicey's Rule of Law
• Against Delegated Legislation: Dicey was hostile to discretionary powers and administrative
tribunals. He thought they threatened Rule of Law. This view is now outdated — discretion is
necessary in modern governance.
• Equality Before Law is Formal, Not Real: Formal equality ignores substantive inequality. The poor
cannot practically access courts as easily as the wealthy.
• Wrong about Equality in England: Even in England, Crown Immunity, diplomatic immunity, and
privileges of Parliament showed inequality before law.
• Ignores Constitutional Importance of Conventions: Many fundamental rules of English
Constitution are conventions, not judge-made law.
2.3 Rule of Law in India — Constitutional Provisions
India has a written Constitution that embodies Rule of Law in several ways:
• Article 13: Laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void — establishes constitutional
supremacy.
• Article 14: Equality before law and equal protection of laws — directly embodies Dicey's second
pillar.
• Article 21: No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.
• Article 32 & 226: Writ jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts — enables judicial
enforcement of fundamental rights.
• Article 50: Separation of Judiciary from Executive — independent judiciary is essential for Rule of
Law.
• Article 311: Procedural safeguards against dismissal of civil servants — prevents arbitrary executive
action against government employees.
2.4 Key Cases on Rule of Law in India
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 — The infamous Habeas Corpus Case during
Emergency — Supreme Court (4:1) held that right to move courts was suspended during Emergency.
Justice Khanna's lone dissent upheld Rule of Law and is celebrated as the finest hour of Indian
judiciary.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299 — Supreme Court held that Rule of Law and free
and fair elections are part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. Even constitutional amendments
cannot destroy Rule of Law.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 — Landmark case that expanded Article 21 —
procedure established by law must also be fair, just and reasonable. Introduced substantive due
process into Indian constitutional law.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 — Basic Structure doctrine — Rule of Law
forms part of the indestructible Basic Structure of the Constitution.
EXAM TIP: Dicey's three pillars, their criticism, and the Indian constitutional provisions reflecting Rule
of Law (especially Articles 13, 14, 21, 32, 226) are very high-frequency exam topics. The ADM
Jabalpur and Maneka Gandhi cases are essential.
CHAPTER 3: SEPARATION OF POWERS & CHECKS AND
BALANCES
3.1 Doctrine of Separation of Powers — Origin
The doctrine was propounded by Montesquieu in "The Spirit of the Laws" (1748). He advocated that the
three functions of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — should be exercised by three
separate and independent organs so that no single organ accumulates all power, which he believed was
the path to tyranny.
John Locke (earlier) distinguished between legislative (supreme), executive, and federative powers — but
Montesquieu's tripartite formulation became the classical statement.
3.2 Three Organs and Their Functions
Organ Primary Function Examples (India)
Legislature Makes laws — enacts, Parliament (Lok Sabha +
amends, repeals statutes Rajya Sabha); State
Assemblies
Executive Implements/administers laws President, PM, Council of
— governance, policy, Ministers, IAS, Police, Armed
administration Forces
Judiciary Interprets laws — adjudicates Supreme Court, High Courts,
disputes, administers justice Subordinate Courts, Tribunals
3.3 Separation of Powers in India — Position
India does NOT follow strict/rigid separation of powers as in the USA. India has a "functional separation"
with significant overlaps:
• Legislature exercises judicial functions: Parliament can punish for contempt (Article 105); can try
impeachment of President (Article 61).
• Executive exercises legislative functions: Ordinance-making power of President/Governor
(Articles 123, 213); Delegated legislation — extensive rule-making by executive.
• Judiciary exercises quasi-legislative functions: Supreme Court makes rules for its own
procedure (Article 145); judicial law-making through interpretation.
• Executive exercises judicial functions: Administrative tribunals, Revenue Courts, disciplinary
proceedings by departments.
3.4 Key Cases on Separation of Powers
Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549 — Supreme Court held that the Indian
Constitution does not contemplate rigid separation of powers. The three organs are not watertight
compartments — there is functional overlap. However, the essential functions of each organ cannot be
usurped by another.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299 — Separation of powers is part of the Basic
Structure — Parliament cannot by amendment concentrate all power in one organ.
I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 — Separation of judicial power — Parliament
cannot override fundamental rights; illustrated the boundary between legislative and judicial functions.
Asif Hameed v. State of J&K AIR 1989 SC 1899 — SC reiterated: although no rigid separation of
powers, each organ must exercise its allotted sphere. Courts should not step into legislative or
executive domains.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 — Delegated legislation is valid only if the essential
legislative function — determining policy — is retained by the legislature.
KEY PRINCIPLE: In India, the doctrine of separation of powers operates as a "functional" or "partial"
separation — not a rigid American-style separation. Checks and Balances exist through judicial review
(courts checking executive and legislature), impeachment (legislature checking judiciary), and
independent appointments.
CHAPTER 4: DELEGATED LEGISLATION (SUBORDINATE
LEGISLATION)
4.1 Meaning and Definition
Delegated Legislation (also called Subordinate Legislation or Secondary Legislation) refers to the
exercise of law-making power by an authority other than the legislature, pursuant to a delegation of power
by the legislature. The parent Act (enabling Act) authorises the executive/minister/body to make rules,
regulations, orders, notifications, bye-laws, etc.
Salmond: "That which proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power and is, therefore,
dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority."
4.2 Forms of Delegated Legislation
• Rules: Made by the executive under rule-making power conferred by a statute (e.g., Income Tax
Rules under Income Tax Act, 1961).
• Regulations: Made by independent regulatory bodies (e.g., RBI Regulations under RBI Act, 1934;
SEBI (LODR) Regulations 2015).
• Orders: Executive orders, notifications (e.g., Central Government orders under Essential
Commodities Act).
• Bye-Laws: Made by local bodies (municipalities, panchayats) under local government legislation.
• Schemes: Detailed operational frameworks made under enabling statutes (e.g., SARFAESI
schemes, insurance schemes).
• Directions: Binding directions issued by regulatory bodies (e.g., RBI Master Directions, SEBI
Circulars).
4.3 Reasons / Justifications for Delegated Legislation
• Pressure on Parliamentary time: Parliament cannot deal with vast volume of technical legislative
detail. Delegation saves time.
• Technical expertise: Many regulatory matters (banking norms, pharmaceutical standards, nuclear
safety) require expert knowledge that Parliament lacks. Specialist bodies (RBI, SEBI, AERB) are
better placed.
• Flexibility and speed: Rules can be made/amended quickly without going through full parliamentary
process — essential in emergencies.
• Local conditions: Local bodies can tailor rules to local needs through bye-laws.
• Experimentation: Delegated legislation allows pilot testing of policies that can be quickly modified
based on experience.
4.4 Constitutional Validity — Permissibility of Delegation
Position in India: The Indian Constitution does not expressly prohibit delegation (unlike the USA).
However, the essential legislative function — laying down the policy — must be retained by the
legislature. Only supplemental, ancillary, or subsidiary functions can be delegated.
Landmark Cases:
In Re Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332 (7-Judge Bench) — The Supreme Court by a 5:2 majority held that
delegation of essential legislative functions is unconstitutional, but supplemental delegation is
permissible. The legislature must lay down the policy and the delegatee merely fills in details. This
remains the foundational case on delegated legislation.
Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 465 — The legislature must lay down the legislative
policy and principle with sufficient clarity. The delegate can only make rules to carry out that policy.
Held: Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 valid.
D.S. Girewar v. Union of India AIR 1952 SC 75 — Excessive delegation — where the legislature confers
arbitrary and unguided power — is unconstitutional.
Vasantlal Maganbhai v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 4 — Test: Whether the legislature has laid down
a policy and the delegate is merely given power to effectuate it. If the legislature delegates the power to
determine what the policy shall be, it is excessive delegation.
Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 1 SCC 137 — Delegation is not abdication. The legislature
must retain control and supervise the exercise of delegated power. Held: Sub-delegation permissible if
expressly or impliedly authorised.
4.5 Grounds for Challenging Delegated Legislation
A piece of delegated legislation can be challenged on the following grounds:
• Unconstitutional (Ultra Vires the Constitution): If it violates Fundamental Rights (Part III),
contravenes constitutional provisions, or is arbitrary under Article 14.
• Ultra Vires the Parent Act: If it exceeds the scope of the parent (enabling) Act — the most common
ground. Rules cannot travel beyond what the parent Act permits.
• Procedural Ultra Vires: If the prescribed procedure (consultation, publication, tabling in Parliament,
etc.) was not followed while making the delegated legislation.
• Unreasonableness: If the delegated legislation is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious
(sub-constitutional review).
• Inconsistency with Parent Act: If it contradicts the provisions of the enabling statute.
• Abdication of Essential Legislative Function: If the parent Act itself confers unlimited, unguided
discretion — the parent Act itself is unconstitutional (excessive delegation).
4.6 Parliamentary Control over Delegated Legislation
• Laying on the Table: Rules/regulations must be laid before Parliament. Three types: (a) Simple
laying — no further requirement; (b) Laying subject to annulment (negative resolution); (c) Laying
subject to affirmative resolution — Parliament must positively approve.
• Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees: Committee on Subordinate Legislation (Lok Sabha & Rajya
Sabha) — examines all statutory instruments for procedural compliance, intra vires, clarity,
retrospective effect, etc.
• Questions and Debates: Members of Parliament can raise questions and debates on delegated
legislation.
4.7 Judicial Control over Delegated Legislation
• Ultra Vires Doctrine: Courts can declare rules ultra vires the parent Act or the Constitution.
• Writ Jurisdiction: Under Articles 32 and 226 — certiorari to quash; mandamus to compel
compliance.
• Substantive Review: Checking if the rules are within the four corners of the enabling Act.
• Procedural Review: Checking if prescribed procedures were followed.
• Constitutional Review: Checking compliance with Articles 13, 14, 19, 21, etc.
EXAM TIP: The "In Re Delhi Laws Act" case, the concept of "essential legislative function," forms of
delegated legislation (rules/regulations/orders/bye-laws), the three types of "laying" before Parliament,
and grounds for challenging delegated legislation are all extremely likely exam topics.
CHAPTER 5: NATURAL JUSTICE — PRINCIPLES, APPLICATION &
EXCEPTIONS
5.1 Meaning and Historical Background
Natural Justice refers to the minimum standards of fairness that any adjudicatory process must comply
with. It is derived from the jus naturale of Roman law and the principles of equity in English law. The two
fundamental rules are:
• Audi Alteram Partem (A.A.P.): Hear the other side — no person shall be condemned unheard. The
right to be heard.
• Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (N.J.C.S.): No one should be a judge in his own cause — the rule
against bias.
Some scholars add a third rule: Reasoned Decisions / Speaking Orders — the duty to give reasons for
decisions.
5.2 Rule 1 — Audi Alteram Partem (Right to be Heard)
This rule encompasses several component rights:
6. Notice: The affected party must be given adequate notice of the case against them — the charges,
the nature of the inquiry, the time and place of hearing. Notice must be clear, specific, and timely.
7. Opportunity to be heard: The party must be given a genuine, effective opportunity to present their
case. Mere opportunity — without real chance — is insufficient.
8. Right to know the evidence: The party must be told of the evidence/material against them so they
can effectively rebut it (Principle of Disclosure).
9. Right to Legal Representation: Not an absolute right in administrative proceedings — depends on
statute and complexity of case. In India, courts balance complexity against formality.
10. Right to Cross-examine Witnesses: Not universally guaranteed in administrative proceedings, but
may be required when oral evidence is central to the case.
11. Right to present evidence: The opportunity to file replies, affidavits, documents, and call witnesses.
5.3 Rule 2 — Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (Rule Against Bias)
No person should be a judge in their own cause. Justice must not only be done but must manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done. Three types of bias:
(a) Pecuniary Bias
Any financial interest — however small — in the outcome of the case automatically disqualifies. No need to
prove actual bias.
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL 759 — Lord Chancellor who was a shareholder in the
company adjudicated the case. House of Lords set aside the decree. Even the smallest pecuniary
interest disqualifies.
(b) Personal / Interest Bias
A personal interest (not necessarily financial) in the outcome — family connections, friendship, enmity,
departmental bias. Test: whether a "reasonable man" would think there is a real possibility/danger of bias.
(c) Departmental / Institutional Bias
Where the same authority is both prosecutor and judge — investigates and also adjudicates. Common in
administrative proceedings.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150 — Naquishband — member of the Selection Board —
was himself a candidate for selection. Supreme Court held this vitiated the selection. Principles of
natural justice apply to administrative acts affecting rights/interests — not only to quasi-judicial acts.
Bias Tests:
• Test of Real Likelihood of Bias: English courts traditionally asked whether there was a "real
likelihood" of bias — objective.
• Test of Reasonable Suspicion of Bias: Whether a reasonable man, looking at the situation, would
think there was a real danger of bias. Indian courts have generally adopted this test.
5.4 When Does Natural Justice Apply?
The requirement to follow natural justice depends on the nature of the action:
Situation — Natural Justice Applies Situation — May Not Apply (or Reduced
Obligation)
Quasi-judicial decisions affecting Purely legislative functions (making
rights/interests rules/policies)
Disciplinary proceedings against employees Policy decisions at highest government level
Cancellation of licence, permits, approvals Purely administrative actions with no civil
consequences
Forfeiture of property, debarment Situations where urgency requires immediate
action
Blacklisting of contractors/suppliers Where statute explicitly excludes NJ (subject to
constitutional review)
Deportation, detention orders National security matters (though courts are
increasingly watchful)
5.5 Key Cases on Natural Justice
Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40 (House of Lords) — Revolutionized natural justice — held it applies
wherever a public authority has the power to take action affecting a person's rights/interests, not just
when the authority is "judicial" in a strict sense. Restored natural justice to administrative law.
State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269 — Even an order of compulsory retirement must
comply with natural justice if it affects civil consequences. The affected party must be heard.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 — Landmark: Passport impounded without notice
or hearing. SC held that any procedure that deprives a person of right under Article 21 must be "fair, just
and reasonable." Natural justice is embedded in Article 21. Established substantive due process in
India.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan AIR 1981 SC 136 — Delhi Metropolitan Council superseded — members not
heard. SC held principles of natural justice are violated if the prejudiced party was not given a chance to
be heard, even if the order might have been the same had they been heard.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 — Pavement dwellers to be evicted —
had right to be heard. Even executive action affecting livelihoods must comply with natural justice.
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 — The inquiry procedure in disciplinary cases
against government employees. Requirements of natural justice in Article 311 proceedings — charges
must be specific, evidence disclosed, opportunity to cross-examine.
5.6 Exceptions to Natural Justice
Natural Justice can be excluded or reduced in the following circumstances:
• Statutory Exclusion: Parliament can expressly exclude natural justice by statute — but the courts
will scrutinize such exclusion for constitutional validity (especially under Articles 14 and 21).
• Emergency / Urgency: Where delay in affording hearing would cause irreparable public harm (e.g.,
temporary attachment of assets, urgent licensing action during a public health crisis). Post-decisional
hearing may be provided.
• Confidentiality / National Security: Where disclosure of evidence would harm national security or
reveal informer identities. Even here, a "gist" may need to be provided.
• Purely Ministerial/Administrative Functions: Functions that are purely ministerial with no
adjudicatory character do not attract full natural justice — though "fairness" is still required.
• No Prejudice Rule: If natural justice has been violated but the outcome would not have been
different even if NJ had been followed, courts may decline to quash the order. However, the
Supreme Court has been cautious in applying this exception — S.L. Kapoor case held even if
outcome the same, NJ violation vitiates.
• Contractual Exclusion: Parties can agree by contract to summary procedures, but minimum
fairness is still required in administrative law contexts.
5.7 Third Rule — Duty to Give Reasons
Modern administrative law increasingly recognizes a duty to give reasons for administrative decisions.
This ensures:
• Accountability and transparency in administrative decision-making.
• The affected party can understand why the decision went against them and whether to appeal.
• Courts can effectively review whether the decision is lawful.
S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 — Supreme Court held that the duty to give reasons
is an integral part of natural justice. Except where the duty is expressly excluded by statute, a quasi-
judicial authority must record its reasons. Reasoned decisions prevent arbitrariness and enable judicial
review.
Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor AIR 1974 SC 87 — Promotion of officers — Departmental
Promotion Committee must record reasons for supersession. Held: UPSC/DPC decisions must be
backed by reasons.
EXAM TIP: Natural Justice is one of the most important topics for RBI Grade B Legal. The two
cardinal rules (AAP + NJCS), the Ridge v. Baldwin transformation, Maneka Gandhi, S.L. Kapoor, A.K.
Kraipak, types of bias, and exceptions — all are exam staples. The duty to give reasons (S.N.
Mukherjee) is also frequently tested.
CHAPTER 6: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
6.1 Meaning and Constitutional Basis
Judicial Review is the power of courts to examine the legality and constitutionality of government
(administrative, legislative, executive) action. In India, judicial review is:
• Constitutionally guaranteed: Articles 32 (Supreme Court) and 226 (High Courts) confer original
writ jurisdiction — these are fundamental rights themselves (Article 32 is a fundamental right).
• Part of Basic Structure: Judicial review of legislative and executive action is part of the Basic
Structure (L. Chandra Kumar case, 1997).
• Three-pronged review: Courts review (i) legislative action (constitutional validity), (ii) administrative
action (legality, procedural fairness), (iii) quasi-judicial action (natural justice, reasonableness).
6.2 Grounds of Judicial Review — Lord Diplock's Classification (CCSU Case)
In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985) AC 374 (the GCHQ Case),
Lord Diplock classified grounds of judicial review into three categories:
(1) Illegality
The decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates their decision-making power and
must give effect to it. Includes: ultra vires, error of law, acting for improper purposes, taking into account
irrelevant considerations, ignoring relevant considerations, abuse of discretion.
(2) Irrationality (Wednesbury Unreasonableness)
From Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223: A decision
is irrational if it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it." The threshold
is high — courts do not substitute their own judgment for that of the decision-maker.
(3) Procedural Impropriety
Failure to observe procedural rules expressly laid down in the enabling legislation, or failure to observe
fundamental rules of natural justice.
6.3 Indian Grounds of Judicial Review — Detailed
Indian courts apply the following grounds to review administrative action:
Ground Meaning Illustration Key Case
Illegality / Ultra Action beyond the RBI cancels a bank Calcutta Gas Co. v.
Vires legal powers granted licence without following State of West Bengal
by statute RBI Act procedure AIR 1962 SC 1044
Ground Meaning Illustration Key Case
Error of Tribunal/authority acts CIT decides a matter that Anisminic Ltd v.
Jurisdiction outside its jurisdiction is within jurisdiction of Foreign Compensation
or fails to exercise another authority Commission (1969) 2
jurisdiction AC 147
Error of Law on Legal error apparent Tribunal misapplies a R v. Northumberland
the Face of from the record — clear statutory provision Compensation Appeal
Record without needing and error is visible in the Tribunal ex p. Shaw
extrinsic evidence order itself (1952)
Abuse of Power exercised for a Licensing power used to Tata Cellular v. Union
Discretion purpose other than achieve revenue purpose of India (1994) 6 SCC
(Improper that for which it was not authorised by statute 651
Purpose) granted
Irrelevant Decision-maker took Promotion denied based Barium Chemicals v.
Considerations into account factors it on regional origin of CLB AIR 1967 SC 295
should not have officer
considered
Non-application of Decision-maker did Rubber stamp approval Pratap Singh v. State
Mind not genuinely apply its of CBI report without of Punjab AIR 1964 SC
mind to the matter examination 72
Proportionality Penalty/action Dismissal from service Om Kumar v. Union of
disproportionate to the for minor technical India (2001) 2 SCC
gravity of the offence irregularity 386
Legitimate Authority departs from Government reverses Union of India v.
Expectation a practice/promise policy without giving Hindustan
without fair procedure affected party chance to Development Corp.
be heard (1993) 3 SCC 499
Wednesbury Decision so Government bans entire Om Kumar v. Union of
Unreasonableness outrageous in its industry overnight India (2001) 2 SCC
defiance of logic that without any rational basis 386
no reasonable person
could have made it
6.4 Writ Jurisdiction — The Five Writs
Writ Meaning, Purpose & Application
Orders release of a person from illegal
detention/imprisonment. Available against both
State and private persons. Cannot be
suspended except under Article 359 during
Emergency (and even then, subject to Basic
Structure review). Key right under Article 21.
Commands a public authority to perform a
public/legal duty it has refused or failed to
perform. Cannot issue against: private
Writ Meaning, Purpose & Application
individuals, President/Governor in personal
capacity, High Court/SC, purely discretionary
duties. Will lie against inferior courts, tribunals,
government departments.
Quashes (annuls) an order/decision of inferior
court/tribunal/authority made in excess of
jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or with
an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. Retrospective — nullifies the order.
Only against judicial or quasi-judicial acts
(historically — now expanded).
Prevents an inferior court/tribunal from
exceeding its jurisdiction or acting in breach of
natural justice. Prospective — prevents future
action. Available only before or during
proceedings, not after final order (certiorari is
then appropriate).
Inquires into the legal authority by which a
person holds a public office. If the holder has
no valid authority, the court orders them to
cease holding the office. Available only for
public offices of a substantive nature created by
statute.
6.5 Article 32 vs. Article 226 — Key Distinctions
Article 32 — Supreme Court Article 226 — High Courts
A Fundamental Right itself — cannot be Not a fundamental right — constitutional
suspended except during Emergency (Article provision; can be restricted by Parliament
359) (subject to Basic Structure)
Only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights For enforcement of FRs AND "for any other
purpose" — much wider
All-India jurisdiction Territorial jurisdiction — limited to High Court's
territory
SC has discretion to refuse HC also has discretion; and has additional
power of superintendence under Article 227
Constitutional remedy — paramount First port of call as HC is more accessible; SC
is apex court
6.6 Doctrine of Proportionality
Proportionality asks: "Was the measure adopted by the authority proportionate to the objective
sought to be achieved?" It involves balancing the rights of the individual against the public interest.
Courts in India have been moving from the traditional Wednesbury test to proportionality, especially in
cases involving fundamental rights.
The four-stage proportionality test (European / modern Indian approach):
12. Legitimate aim — Was the objective pursued a legitimate one?
13. Rational connection — Is the measure rationally connected to the objective?
14. Necessity — Was the least restrictive measure adopted (among equally effective alternatives)?
15. Proportionality stricto sensu — Does the benefit justify the cost to individual rights?
Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 — SC held: when administrative action involves
curtailment of fundamental rights, courts can apply the "proportionality" test on primary review. For other
administrative action, the Wednesbury test applies on secondary review.
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 — Distinguished between primary review
(proportionality — for FR violations) and secondary review (Wednesbury — for non-FR administrative
action).
6.7 Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
Legitimate Expectation arises when a public authority by its past conduct, promise, or established
practice has created a reasonable expectation in the mind of a person that: (a) they will receive a
substantive benefit, OR (b) they will be consulted/heard before a decision affecting them is taken.
Elements required: (1) Clear and unambiguous representation by the authority; (2) Reliance by the
claimant; (3) Expectation must be legitimate (not unlawful).
Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) 2 AC 629 (Privy Council) — Foundational case
— legitimate expectation of procedural fairness enforced. The immigration authority had given an
assurance that illegal immigrants would be interviewed before deportation — held binding.
Council of Civil Service Unions (GCHQ Case) (1985) AC 374 — GCHQ employees had legitimate
expectation of consultation before removal of trade union rights — procedural legitimate expectation
recognised.
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corp. (1993) 3 SCC 499 — SC accepted doctrine of
legitimate expectation in India. If public authority departs from established practice, affected party must
be given opportunity to be heard.
Punjab Communications v. Union of India (1999) 4 SCC 262 — SC clarified that legitimate expectation
can be defeated if there is an overriding public interest, but the authority must demonstrate that public
interest and provide reasons.
EXAM TIP: The GCHQ case (Lord Diplock's three grounds), Wednesbury unreasonableness,
proportionality (Om Kumar), legitimate expectation (HDC case), all five writs and their application —
these are almost certain exam topics. The Article 32 vs 226 distinction is another perennial favourite.
CHAPTER 7: ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
7.1 Meaning and Distinction from Courts
Administrative Tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies created by statutes to adjudicate disputes in specific
fields. They combine features of courts (adjudication, impartiality) and administrative agencies (expertise,
informality, speed).
Ordinary Courts Administrative Tribunals
Established under the general law / Constitution Established by specific statutes (special
legislation)
Preside over by judges with legal qualifications May include technical/expert members
alongside judicial members
Bound by strict rules of evidence and procedure May follow flexible, less formal procedures
Jurisdiction over all types of civil and criminal Jurisdiction limited to specific subject matter
matters
Appeals generally lie to higher courts Appeals may lie to HC/SC under Articles
226/136
Civil Procedure Code applies Governed by their constituting statute; CPC not
strictly applicable
7.2 Constitutional Provisions — Articles 323A and 323B
• Article 323A (inserted by 42nd Amendment, 1976): Empowers Parliament to establish
Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of disputes relating to recruitment and service conditions of
public servants.
• Under Article 323A, Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 establishing the
Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals (SATs).
• Article 323B: Empowers Parliament AND State Legislatures to establish tribunals for a list of
specified subjects: taxation, foreign exchange, import-export, industrial and labour, land reform,
ceiling on urban property, elections, food, drugs, rent, etc.
7.3 Important Tribunals in India
Tribunal Constituting Act Jurisdiction Appeals
Central Administrative Service matters of central High Court under
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 government employees Article 226 (L.
Tribunal (CAT) Chandra Kumar)
Income Tax Income Tax Act, Appeals against CIT(A) High Court on
Appellate Tribunal 1961 orders on income tax substantial question
(ITAT) of law (Section 260A)
Tribunal Constituting Act Jurisdiction Appeals
National Company Companies Act, Company law, insolvency NCLAT, then HC/SC
Law Tribunal 2013 (IBC), mergers, winding up
(NCLT)
National Company Companies Act, Appeals from NCLT orders Supreme Court on
Law Appellate 2013 / IBC 2016 question of law
Tribunal (NCLAT)
Securities Appellate SEBI Act, 1992 / Appeals against SEBI, Supreme Court under
Tribunal (SAT) SCRA, 1956 IRDAI, PFRDA orders Section 15Z
Debt Recovery Recovery of Debts Recovery of debts due to DRAT, then High
Tribunal (DRT) and Bankruptcy banks and FIs above Rs.20 Court
Act, 1993 lakh
Debt Recovery RDDB Act, 1993 Appeals from DRT orders High Court / Supreme
Appellate Tribunal Court
(DRAT)
Telecom Disputes TRAI Act, 1997 Telecom, broadcasting, IT Supreme Court
Settlement & disputes
Appellate Tribunal
(TDSAT)
National Green NGT Act, 2010 Environmental disputes, Supreme Court
Tribunal (NGT) forest law, biodiversity
Competition Competition Act, Appeals from CCI orders NCLAT (now), then
Appellate Tribunal 2002 SC
(COMPAT) /
NCLAT
Armed Forces Armed Forces Service matters of armed Supreme Court on
Tribunal (AFT) Tribunal Act, 2007 forces personnel leave (Article 136)
7.4 Landmark Cases on Tribunals
S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 386 — Upheld Articles 323A and 323B and the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Held that CAT is an effective substitute for High Courts in service
matters. Constitution was not violated — Parliament can create tribunals as alternatives to courts.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 (7-Judge Constitution Bench) — Landmark —
partially overruled Sampath Kumar. Held: (a) Clauses 2(d) of Art. 323A and 323B (excluding HC
jurisdiction) are unconstitutional — they destroy the Basic Structure (judicial review by HC under Art.
226 is part of Basic Structure). (b) CAT/SAT/Tribunal orders can be challenged before Division Bench of
HC under Article 226. Tribunals can only be "supplemental" adjudicatory bodies — cannot be exclusive
substitutes for HCs.
Union of India v. Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1 & (2021) 3 SCC 645 — The National Tax
Tribunal case — repeatedly challenged the constitution and functioning of tribunals. SC laid down
guidelines: (a) Judicial members must have appropriate qualifications; (b) Independent selection
process; (c) Security of tenure; (d) Adequate salaries and conditions of service; (e) Independence from
the parent ministry.
Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC 1 — SC struck down the Tribunal, Appellate
Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members)
Rules, 2017 as they compromised judicial independence. Reiterated L. Chandra Kumar principles.
EXAM TIP: L. Chandra Kumar is the most important case on tribunals — its two key holdings (HC
jurisdiction cannot be excluded; tribunals are supplemental not exclusive) are essential. Know CAT,
DRT, SAT, NGT, NCLT/NCLAT in terms of constitution and jurisdiction. The Madras Bar Association
cases on tribunal independence are also important.
CHAPTER 8: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION — GRANT, CONTROL
& ABUSE
8.1 Meaning of Discretion
Discretion in administrative law means the power to choose between two or more courses of action. When
a statute confers discretion on an authority, it means the authority has a choice — unlike a duty which
compels a specific outcome. However, discretion does not mean unfettered or arbitrary power — it must be
exercised within legal limits, for proper purposes, and reasonably.
8.2 Grounds of Abuse of Discretion
• Mala fide / Bad Faith: Discretion exercised with improper motive, personal spite, or corrupt intent.
• Improper Purpose: Power used to achieve an objective outside the purpose for which it was
conferred.
• Irrelevant Considerations: Decision based on factors that should not have been taken into account.
• Non-application of Mind: Decision made mechanically without genuinely applying mind to the
matter.
• Dictation: Authority exercises power not on its own judgment but at the dictation of another —
superior officer, minister, or private party.
• Fettering Discretion: Authority pre-commits to always exercising discretion in a particular way — by
inflexible policy — without leaving room for individual consideration of each case.
• Wednesbury Unreasonableness: Decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could
have made it.
• Exceeding Jurisdiction: Acting beyond the limits of the power granted.
8.3 Doctrine of Colourable Exercise of Power
The doctrine of colourable exercise of power (colorable legislation in constitutional law) applies when an
authority formally acts within its powers but actually achieves a purpose for which it has no power. The
form is legal but the substance is ultra vires. Courts look to the pith and substance of the action.
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375 — What cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly. If a legislature lacks the competence to do something, it cannot achieve the same
result by indirection — colorable legislation is invalid.
8.4 Doctrine of Proportionality in Discretion
When exercising discretion — especially in imposing penalties — the principle of proportionality requires
that the severity of the response be proportionate to the severity of the violation. This is increasingly
applied in Indian administrative law, particularly in service law and regulatory matters.
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 — In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court/SC
can interfere with the penalty if it is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct — even
though the courts cannot normally reassess the evidence.
8.5 Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation (Recap)
A person has a legitimate expectation when: (a) a public authority has by its past conduct, representations,
or established practice created a reasonable belief that certain benefits will be received or certain
procedure followed; AND (b) the person has acted in reliance on that belief. Courts enforce procedural
legitimate expectations rigorously and substantive legitimate expectations more cautiously.
8.6 Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel against Government
The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents the government from going back on a clear and
unambiguous promise made to an individual/company who has acted to their detriment in reliance on that
promise — even without formal consideration (i.e., despite the fact that it cannot be enforced as a
contract).
Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718 — Promissory estoppel applies against the
government when it makes a representation upon which the other party acts to its detriment.
Government cannot resile from such a promise.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 SC 621 — SC held that government is bound
by its promise of tax exemption even though it is not a contract. The promisee acted to their detriment in
setting up an industry relying on the exemption. However, in public interest the government may go
back on the promise — but must compensate.
Amrit Banaspati Co. v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 335 — Promissory estoppel does not lie against
the government in matters involving exercise of legislative or executive sovereign functions —
distinguished from commercial/contractual promises.
EXAM TIP: Abuse of discretion (8 grounds), colourable exercise of power, proportionality in
disciplinary matters (B.C. Chaturvedi), and promissory estoppel against government (Motilal
Padampat) are important examination topics. Be clear on the distinction between discretion and duty.
CHAPTER 9: OMBUDSMAN, LOKPAL & LOKAYUKTA
9.1 Concept of Ombudsman
The Ombudsman (Swedish: "grievance man") is an independent, impartial officer who investigates
complaints of maladministration by public authorities and recommends remedies. Originated in Sweden in
1809. Adopted in various countries: Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in UK (1967),
Lokpal/Lokayukta in India.
Characteristics of an Ombudsman: Independent of executive; receives complaints from citizens;
investigates maladministration (not necessarily illegality); recommendations not binding (in classical model)
but carries moral authority; free, accessible, informal grievance mechanism.
9.2 Lokpal — India's Ombudsman
India enacted the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 after decades of debate and the Anna Hazare
movement. The Lokpal is established at the Central level.
• Composition: Chairperson (who is or has been Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the SC, or an
eminent person of impeccable integrity) + up to 8 Members (half judicial; half from SC/HC/CVC/IAS
of 45+ years; at least 50% from SC/ST/OBC/Minorities/Women).
• Jurisdiction: Public servants including Prime Minister (with conditions), Ministers, MPs, Group A, B,
C, D officers, companies/societies/trusts receiving government funding above threshold.
• PM Inquiry: Inquiry against PM only when full Bench of Lokpal sits; no inquiry into matters relating to
international relations, external/internal security, public order, atomic energy, or space.
• Prosecution: Lokpal can attach/confiscate assets of accused even before completion of inquiry
under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
• CBI: Superintendence over CBI for matters referred to it by Lokpal. Director of Prosecution under
Lokpal.
• Search Committee: Selection by a Search/Selection Committee: PM as Chairperson, Speaker of
LS, Leader of Opposition in LS, CJI, eminent jurist.
9.3 Lokayukta — State Level
Lokayukta is the state-level ombudsman institution. First Lokayukta established in Maharashtra in 1971.
Most states now have Lokayukta under state legislation. Under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013,
states are required to establish Lokayuktas within one year. Karnataka's Lokayukta is considered the most
active and effective in India.
9.4 Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)
Established by CVC Act, 2003. The CVC is an apex vigilance institution with the following features:
• Multi-member body: Central Vigilance Commissioner + 2 Vigilance Commissioners. Appointed by
President.
• Jurisdiction: Central Government employees, Central Government undertakings, nationalised
banks, LIC, etc.
• Functions: Superintendence over the functioning of CBI in cases relating to Prevention of
Corruption Act; advising government on vigilance matters; inquiring into complaints of corruption.
• Not a prosecution agency: CVC recommends; it is for the government/disciplinary authority to act.
EXAM TIP: The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013 provisions (composition, jurisdiction, PM inquiry
conditions), CVC, and the concept of ombudsman (Swedish origin, Parliamentary Commissioner) are
important. Also know the first Lokayukta in Maharashtra (1971) and the most active — Karnataka.
CHAPTER 10: GOVERNMENT LIABILITY — TORT AND CONTRACT
10.1 Government Liability in Tort — Historical Background
Under the old common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, "The King can do no wrong" — the Crown
could not be sued in its own courts for tortious acts of its servants. This created severe injustice.
In India, the Government of India Act, 1858 and later the Government of India Act, 1935 made the
Union and States suable in contract and tort — but with the sovereign/non-sovereign function distinction.
10.2 Sovereign vs. Non-Sovereign Functions
Sovereign Functions (State cannot be sued) Non-Sovereign Functions (State can be sued)
Defence and military activities Post offices, railways (until commercialised)
Maintenance of law and order — policing Government commercial undertakings, PWD
construction
Foreign affairs, diplomacy Medical treatment in government hospitals
Collection of taxes (sovereign act) Running a ferry service, workshops
10.3 Landmark Cases on Government Liability in Tort
P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (1861) 5 Bom HCR App 1 — Foundational
case establishing sovereign/non-sovereign distinction in India. Held: The State is not liable for
negligence in sovereign function (maintenance of military equipment) but IS liable for non-sovereign
function. This distinction has been criticized but has continued to influence Indian law.
State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati AIR 1962 SC 933 — SC held: a government jeep driven by a
government driver engaged for official purpose, which caused injury, creates vicarious liability of the
State. This was a non-sovereign activity.
Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 1039 — Confiscation and misappropriation of
gold by police officers — held to be sovereign function. State not liable. This case is widely criticized for
applying an outdated distinction.
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 — Landmark case in public law compensation. SC
held that in a writ petition for violation of fundamental rights (here, custodial death violating Article 21),
the State must pay compensation as a public law remedy. Distinguished from private law tort — no
sovereign immunity defence available against constitutional rights violations.
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 — Laid down comprehensive guidelines on arrest
and custody to prevent custodial deaths. SC reiterated that State is liable to compensate under public
law for custodial deaths/torture. Issued 11 mandatory guidelines for police in arrest situations.
Chairman, Railway Board v. Mrs. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 — Gang rape of a Bangladeshi
woman by railway employees in a railway retiring room. SC held: running of a railway retiring room is a
commercial/non-sovereign activity — Railways vicariously liable. Awarded compensation.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chella Ramakrishna Reddy (2000) 5 SCC 712 — SC virtually abolished
the sovereign/non-sovereign distinction in constitutional public law claims — held that State is liable for
all violations of fundamental rights regardless of sovereign/non-sovereign classification.
10.4 Government Liability in Contract
Article 299 of the Constitution: All contracts made in the exercise of executive power of Union/State shall
be expressed to be made by the President/Governor and shall be executed on behalf of the
President/Governor by persons authorized by him. Non-compliance renders the contract void and
unenforceable.
Key requirements under Article 299: (1) Contract must be expressed to be made by the President or
Governor; (2) Must be executed by authorized person; (3) Must be in writing (formal).
Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113 — Contract not expressed to be made by the
President — invalid under Article 299. Party could not recover under contract. This rule is strictly
applied.
Union of India v. N.K. (P) Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 915 — Even if a contract does not comply with Article 299,
the government cannot use that to unjustly enrich itself — quantum meruit claims may be available.
EXAM TIP: The evolution from strict sovereign immunity (Kasturilal) to public law compensation
(Nilabati Behera, D.K. Basu) is a crucial development. Article 299 requirements are frequently tested.
The sovereign/non-sovereign distinction should be known with specific examples from cases.
CHAPTER 11: ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, INQUIRIES &
CONTEMPT
11.1 Quasi-Judicial Functions
Quasi-judicial functions are those that are neither purely legislative nor purely judicial but partake of the
character of both. An administrative body performing a quasi-judicial function: (a) applies law/policy to a
specific case; (b) gives both parties an opportunity to be heard; (c) makes a decision that affects rights.
Examples: Income tax assessment, licensing decisions, disciplinary proceedings, regulatory orders
(RBI/SEBI), competition law adjudication by CCI.
11.2 Disciplinary Proceedings under Service Law (Article 311)
Article 311: A civil servant of the Union or a State cannot be dismissed/removed/reduced in rank without:
(i) being informed of the charges; (ii) being given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in respect of the
charges. Exceptions (no inquiry required): (a) conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where inquiry is
reasonably practicable; (c) where the President/Governor certifies that inquiry is against national security.
The disciplinary inquiry process (as evolved by courts):
16. Framing of charges — must be specific, clear, and supported by prima facie evidence.
17. Serving the charge sheet — with all supporting documents.
18. Reply by charged officer — given reasonable time.
19. Inquiry by Inquiry Officer — who must be independent; oral evidence, cross-examination.
20. Inquiry Officer's report — findings on each charge.
21. Second show cause notice — if major penalty proposed; charged officer given opportunity to reply to
the inquiry report.
22. Final order by Disciplinary Authority — with reasons.
23. Appeal — to Appellate Authority.
11.3 Key Cases on Disciplinary Proceedings
State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur AIR 1963 SC 375 — The person against whom
disciplinary action is taken must be given adequate opportunity to defend himself. Denial of this renders
the order invalid.
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 — Constitution Bench extensively analyzed Article
311 exceptions — especially when inquiry is "not reasonably practicable." Laid down exhaustive
guidelines on when second show cause notice is required.
Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997) 2 SCC 699 — Inquiry proceedings must
conform to natural justice. Even technical violations of procedural rules will vitiate the proceedings if
they cause prejudice to the charged officer.
11.4 Contempt of Courts Act, 2006 & Administrative Tribunals
Administrative Tribunals exercising judicial functions have the power to punish for contempt under their
respective constituting statutes. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 applies to courts but not automatically
to all tribunals — the tribunal must be specifically granted contempt power.
Two types of contempt: (1) Civil Contempt — wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,
order, writ; (2) Criminal Contempt — publication of matter that scandalizes the court; prejudices a pending
proceeding; interferes with administration of justice.
CHAPTER 12: RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT, 2005 —
ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY
12.1 Constitutional Basis
Right to Information is derived from Article 19(1)(a) — freedom of speech and expression (which includes
the right to know/be informed). Affirmed by SC in Secretary, Ministry of Information v. Cricket
Association of Bengal (AIR 1995 SC 1236): "The right to receive information is inherent in the freedom of
expression."
12.2 Key Provisions of RTI Act, 2005
• Section 3: Subject to provisions of the Act, all citizens have the right to information from public
authorities.
• Section 4: Proactive disclosure obligations — every public authority must maintain records, publish
information suo motu on website, update computerised records. 17 categories of mandatory
disclosure.
• Section 6: Application procedure — written application to Public Information Officer (PIO); no reason
required; reasonable fee; Below Poverty Line applicants exempt from fee.
• Section 7: Time limit — 30 days ordinarily; 48 hours if life/liberty involved; 40 days if Third Party
information involved.
• Section 8: Exemptions from disclosure — National security, sovereignty, cabinet papers, fiduciary
relationships, personal information with no public interest, foreign government information,
Parliament/legislature privilege, court orders, intellectual property, investigative information,
commercial secrets.
• Section 8(2): Notwithstanding exemptions — if public interest in disclosure outweighs harm to
protected interest — information shall be disclosed (public interest override).
• Section 11: Third Party information — before disclosing information relating to third party, PIO must
give third party 5 days notice and opportunity to make representation.
• Section 12-13: Central Information Commission (CIC) — Chief Information Commissioner + up to 10
Information Commissioners; non-renewable 5-year or 65-year age limit term.
• Section 20: Penalty — Rs.250/day (max Rs.25,000) for failure to provide information; disciplinary
proceedings for persistent failures.
KEY NOTE: After the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 — the terms and service conditions of CIC and SIC
members are now determined by the Central Government (removing equivalence with Election
Commissioners) — controversial change affecting independence.
12.3 Exempted Bodies
The following organizations are exempt from RTI (Second Schedule) — can be notified by the government
but must provide information relating to corruption and human rights violations:
• Intelligence Bureau (IB)
• Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
• Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)
• Central Economic Intelligence Bureau
• Directorate of Enforcement
• Narcotics Control Bureau
• Aviation Research Centre
• Special Frontier Force
• BSF, CRPF, CISF, ITBP, SSB (only certain categories exempt)
CHAPTER 13: CROWN/STATE PRIVILEGE (PUBLIC INTEREST
IMMUNITY) & OFFICIAL SECRETS
13.1 Public Interest Immunity (Crown Privilege)
Public Interest Immunity (PII) is the rule of evidence that allows the government to withhold documents
from courts and inquiries on the ground that their disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. In
India, this is governed by Section 123, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now under BSA, 2023).
• Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act: No one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived
from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, except with the permission of the Head of
the Department — who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit.
• Section 162 IEA: Court may inspect the document to decide whether to order its production.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case) AIR 1982 SC 149 — Corr. of the SC held that Section
123 claims by the government must be examined by the court — the court can inspect the documents
and judge whether public interest really requires their protection. Government cannot assert PII as an
absolute shield.
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC 493 — The court (not the executive) is the
ultimate judge of whether a public interest immunity claim is valid. Court must balance public interest in
disclosure against public interest in protection.
13.2 Official Secrets Act, 1923
The Official Secrets Act, 1923 (colonial era legislation, still in force) prohibits: (a) spying —
communication of secret official information to foreign powers; (b) wrongful communication of official code
words, passwords, sketches, documents; (c) trespass in prohibited government areas.
The OSA has been criticized for being misused against journalists and RTI activists. The Second
Administrative Reforms Commission recommended its repeal and replacement with a Official Secrets
(Amendment) Act. However, it remains in force and has been used against whistleblowers.
CHAPTER 14: QUICK REVISION — IMPORTANT CASES &
PRINCIPLES
14.1 Master Case Table for RBI Grade B
Case Name Year / Court Key Principle / Ratio
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 1978, SC Art.21 procedure must be fair, just & reasonable;
India natural justice embedded in Art.21; inter-
connection of Arts 14, 19, 21
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India 1970, SC Natural justice applies to administrative acts
affecting rights, not only to quasi-judicial acts;
member of Selection Board who is a candidate —
bias vitiates selection
Kesavananda Bharati v. State 1973, SC Basic Structure doctrine; Rule of Law, judicial
of Kerala (13J) review, separation of powers are part of Basic
Structure
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of 1997, SC (7J) Tribunal orders must be challenged before HC
India Division Bench; exclusion of HC Art.226
jurisdiction is unconstitutional; judicial review is
Basic Structure
In Re Delhi Laws Act 1951, SC (7J) Foundational case on delegated legislation; only
supplemental/ancillary delegation is valid;
essential legislative function must stay with
legislature
Ridge v. Baldwin 1964, HL Natural justice applies to all public decisions
affecting rights — not only formally "judicial" ones;
transformed administrative law
Associated Provincial Picture 1948, UK CA Wednesbury unreasonableness test — decision so
Houses v. Wednesbury outrageous that no reasonable authority could
Corporation
have made it
Council of Civil Service 1985, HL Lord Diplock's three-fold classification: Illegality,
Unions (GCHQ) Irrationality, Procedural Impropriety; legitimate
expectation recognised
Om Kumar v. Union of India 2001, SC Primary review (proportionality) for FR violations;
secondary review (Wednesbury) for ordinary
administrative action
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1981, SC Even if outcome same, NJ violation vitiates the
order; Delhi Metropolitan Council supersession
case
S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of 1990, SC Duty to give reasons is integral part of natural
India justice; reasoned decisions prevent arbitrariness
Case Name Year / Court Key Principle / Ratio
Nilabati Behera v. State of 1993, SC Public law compensation for fundamental rights
Orissa violations; no sovereign immunity against FR
claims; custodial death = Art.21 violation
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills 1979, SC Promissory estoppel against government — state
v. State of U.P. bound by promise on which party relied to its
detriment
Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of 1955, SC India does not follow rigid separation of powers;
Punjab functional overlap is permitted but essential
functions cannot be usurped
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj 1975, SC Rule of Law, free elections, separation of powers
Narain — all part of Basic Structure; Parliament cannot
destroy them
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant 1976, SC Habeas Corpus case; Justice Khanna's lone
Shukla dissent upholding Rule of Law celebrated as finest
hour of Indian judiciary
D.K. Basu v. State of West 1997, SC 11 mandatory guidelines for arrest/custody; State
Bengal liable for custodial deaths; public law
compensation
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1982, SC Section 123 IEA — court (not executive) decides
PII claims; correspondence on judicial
appointments disclosed
Union of India v. Hindustan 1993, SC Legitimate expectation accepted in India;
Development Corp. departure from established practice requires
hearing
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of 1995, SC HC/SC can interfere with penalty if shockingly
India disproportionate to misconduct even without
reassessing evidence
Harishankar Bagla v. State of 1954, SC Legislature must lay down policy; delegate fills in
M.P. details; test of delegated legislation validity
Union of India v. Madras Bar 2010, 2021, Tribunal independence requirements: judicial
Association SC qualifications, security of tenure, independence
from parent ministry
14.2 Key Articles and Their Administrative Law Significance
Article Subject Administrative Law Significance Key Case
Art. Definition of State Determines who is bound by FRs and Ramana Dayaram Shetty
12 who can be sued in writ jurisdiction v. International Airport
Authority (1979)
Art. Laws inconsistent Delegated legislation violating FRs is In Re Kerala Education
13 with FRs void void; constitutional supremacy Bill (1958)
Article Subject Administrative Law Significance Key Case
Art. Equality and non- Administrative action must be non- E.P. Royappa v. State of
14 arbitrariness arbitrary; reasonable classification; T.N. (1974)
procedural fairness
Art. Six freedoms Restrictions must be reasonable; Chintaman Rao v. State of
19 delegated legislation restricting M.P. (1950)
freedoms reviewed strictly
Art. Life and personal Expanded to cover all facets of Maneka Gandhi (1978)
21 liberty dignified life; NJ embedded; fair
procedure required
Art. SC writ Fundamental right; enforcement of Romesh Thappar v. State
32 jurisdiction FRs; cannot be suspended except of Madras (1950)
Art.359
Art. SLP to SC SC's extraordinary jurisdiction to hear Pritam Singh v. State
136 appeals from any court/tribunal (1950)
Art. HC writ Wider than Art.32 — for FRs and "any Bandhua Mukti Morcha
226 jurisdiction other purpose"; territorial limitation (1984)
Art. Government Contract must be in name of Bhikraj Jaipuria (1962)
299 contracts President/Governor; violation = void
Art. Civil service NJ requirements in disciplinary Tulsiram Patel (1985)
311 protection proceedings; inquiry before dismissal
Art. Administrative Parliament can set up tribunals for Sampath Kumar (1987); L.
323A Tribunals service matters; CAT established Chandra Kumar (1997)
Art. Tribunals for Parliament/State legislatures can set L. Chandra Kumar (1997)
323B other matters up tribunals for specified subjects
14.3 Writs — Quick Reference Comparison
Feature Habeas Mandamus Certiorari Prohibition Quo Warranto
Corpus
Against Any Public Inferior Inferior Holder of
whom person/State authority, court/tribunal/quasi- court/tribunal public office
holding inferior judicial body
another court/tribunal
Purpose Release Compel Quash a Prevent Challenge
from illegal performance decision/order excess of authority to
detention of public duty jurisdiction hold public
office
Timing Any time After refusal After final order Before or Any time while
during of duty passed during office is being
detention proceedings held
Feature Habeas Mandamus Certiorari Prohibition Quo Warranto
Corpus
Effect Release of Authority Retrospective — Prospective Person ousted
detained must act order quashed — from office
person proceeding
stopped
Locus Any person Aggrieved Aggrieved person Aggrieved Any person
Standi (PIL person/PIL person (public right)
possible)
Issued Yes — in No No (only public No No
against India bodies)
Private?
FINAL EXAM STRATEGY NOTE For RBI Grade B Legal Paper — Administrative Law typically carries 20-
30% weightage. Focus areas: (1) Natural Justice — AAP + NJCS + exceptions + landmark cases; (2) Judicial
Review — grounds, writs, proportionality, legitimate expectation; (3) Delegated Legislation — validity, control, In
Re Delhi Laws Act; (4) Administrative Tribunals — L. Chandra Kumar holdings; (5) Government liability —
Nilabati Behera shift to public law compensation; (6) Lokpal — composition, jurisdiction, PM inquiry conditions;
(7) RTI Act — key sections, exemptions, timeline.
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