Presumption:

Meaning of presumption:

Presumption means assuming something to be true. Therefore the

expression “presumption in interpretation” would mean that while
construing statute or any provision thereof, the courts must deem
certain things to be true and correct. In other words, the courts must
proceed to interpret with the conception of correctness of certain things.

Meaning of consideration:

Consideration means a thought or concern. The courts must interpret a

statutory provision with due attention as to the conclusions thereof. It
would not be appreciable if the courts adopt a particular construction
unmindful of the outcome. The courts must be concerned about the
result of interpretation, must give a thought to it and must assess it in
order to ensure that it reflects true legislative intent. Therefore a result
which is absurd or anomalous or unjust; or creates hardship or
inconvenience must be rejected, as the legislature can never so intend.

Distinction between presumption and consideration:

Presumption is a supposition or assumption with which the courts

proceed to interpret a statutory provision whereas consideration is a
thought which courts must give to the conclusions by it as to true
legislative intent. Thus the courts start the process of interpretation with
the presumptions and end up with the consideration as a result thereof.
Presumption in statutory interpretation:

a) Presumption that statutes are valid –

There is a presumption in law that statutes are valid. The legislature

does not intend to enact a law which is ultra-vires the Constitution.

The Acts which are either passed by the Parliament or by the State
Legislature or by their subordinate bodies should not cross the
constitutional boundaries. No laws can be enacted which are against
the provisions and spirit of the constitution. If there are two
interpretations, one that saves the Act from becoming
unconstitutional and the other that makes the statute void, then in
such case, the interpretation that renders the Act constitutional
should be followed.

A law which is inconsistent with the Constitution cannot survive.

Since legislature is presumed to know this fact, it is not expected to
enact a law contrary to Constitutional provisions. Hence every statute
enacted by the legislature is considered to be constitutionally valid
unless otherwise proved. But the court should not hastily infer that a
law is ultra-vires the Constitution. The burden of proving that a law is
ultra-vires the Constitution lies on the person who challenges the
constitutionality of that law.

If the words used in the language of an enactment are capable of

bearing more than one meaning and as a result, the language gives
out two different interpretations, then such an interpretation shall be
adopted by the court which will uphold the validity of the statute. The
construction which would lead to unconstitutionality of a statute
must be avoided.

i) Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration

S.30 (2) and S.56 of “The prisons Act,1894” was challenged on the
ground that it violated rights guaranteed under Articles 14,19 and
21 of the Constitution of India. S.30 (2) of The Prisons Act provides
The Court did not strike down Sections 30(2) and 56 — it upheld their
constitutional validity, but with a narrow interpretation to prevent abuse.

It ruled that: Solitary confinement cannot be automatic or routine for death-

row prisoners. It can be used only in exceptional cases and only after the
death sentence is confirmed by the higher courts. The sections must be
read in harmony with Article 21, so that they are not misused for cruel or
degrading treatment.
 for solitary confinement of a prisoner under death sentence in a
cell. S.56 of the Act provides for confinement of prisoner in prisons
for safe custody. The Supreme Court by giving narrower
construction held that, these Sections were constitutionally valid.

ii) Govindlalji vs. State of Rajasthan

The constitutional validity of “The Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple

Act” was challenged. U/s 16 of the said act, words ‘affairs of the
temple” were construed as restricted to the secular affairs, and as
such, has to be constitutionally valid. If a wider construction
would have been given to the said section, it would have violated
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

b) Presumption as to territorial operation of the statute:

It is presumed that the law enacted by the legislature would operate

within the territorial limits of that legislature only. The ordinary
principle of construction is that, legislature will only deal with the
subject – matter which is situated within its own territorial
jurisdiction. It should be assumed that the effect and operation of an
enactment is restricted to those subjects over whom the legislature
has authority and from whom the legislature can expect compliance.

In order that a territorial connection is sufficient; two things are to be

considered, they are:-

a) The territorial connection should be real and factual, and not

illusory;

b) The liability under the act sought to be enforced, must be related

to that territorial connection only.

i) Ajay Agarwal vs. Union of India criminal conspiracy

The Supreme Court held that, the offence of criminal

conspiracy is in the nature of continuing offence. Therefore,
the acts which constitute criminal conspiracy, whether
 committed in Dubai or Chandigarh is immaterial. The
offence can be tried in India u/s 4 of The Indian Penal Code.

ii) [Link] vs. The State of Madras

The Supreme Court held that, the laws made by the state
legislature apply within the boundaries of the concerned
state. It can be challenged on the ground of its extra-
territorial operation because Article 245 (2) of the
Constitution of India empowers only the Union Parliament to
make extra-territorial laws.

c) Presumption as to jurisdiction of courts:

The term ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court to hear, try and
determine a casue and to adjudicate upon it. There is a presumption
that an interpretation that takes away the jurisdiction of the courts
must not be given effect, unless the words of the statute provide so in
clear and explicit terms.

The basis of this presumption is that courts should be accessible to all

those who want justice and the status quo about the state of law
should be maintained. Unless the jurisdiction of the court is ousted
by the legislature in clear words or by necessary implication, the
courts should be presumed to have jurisdiction. The construction of
statute that takes away the jurisdiction of the superior courts should
be avoided.

The jurisdiction with reference to place is called ‘territorial

jurisdiction’. The power of a court may be exercised within defined
geographical limits. The jurisdiction relating to value is known as
‘pecuniary jurisdiction’. The court may be competent to take
cognizance of a subject-matter of prescribed or restricted value. The
court may also have jurisdiction with reference to the nature of the
subject-matter. It may be competent to deal with matters of a
specified kind, for eg, testamentary or matrimonial cases. When the
jurisdiction of a court is challenged, the burden to prove that the
 court does not have jurisdiction shall lie on the party questioning it.
There is a strong presumption against ouster of jurisdiction of a civil
court. The court is deemed to have jurisdiction unless otherwise is
proved beyond doubt. The jurisdiction of a court cannot be taken
away by putting a particular construction upon an act of the
legislature. The rival parties can neither remove the jurisdiction
vesting in a court nor does grant jurisdiction to a court which such
court not enjoy.

i) Provincial Government of Madras (now Andhra Pradesh) vs.

[Link]

The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of

the civil court must not be construed readily. If the provisions of
an act give the finality to the orders of the authority as enacted,
civil courts still have the jurisdiction in the matter, if the provisions
of the act are not complies with or the statutory tribunal has failed
to follow the principles of judicial procedure.

ii) Everest Apartments Co-operative Housing Society vs. State of

Maharashtra

High Courts exercise the supervisory powers under the

Constitution of India. Also, u/s 115 of “The Code of Civil
Procedure,1908”, the High Court exercises the supervisory
powers over the subordinate courts. It was held that, unless the
language of the Statute provides in clear words, this revisional
power of the High Court could not be excluded.

iii) Bhimsi vs. Dundappa

The Supreme Court held that if the Revenue Court is given the
exclusive jurisdiction to try certain matters and the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court is totally excluded, then the Civil Court should
transfer such matters to be tried and adjudicated by the
Revenue Court only.
 d) Presumption as to what is inconvenient or absurd:

The term ‘absurdity’ denotes an undesired or unexpected result. If the

words of an act are clear and precise, they must receive their ordinary,
natural and grammatical meaning irrespective of consequences. Unless
the words are reasonably open to several meanings, no meaning other
than plain, ordinary and grammatical meaning can be accepted even if
leads to absurdity. When legislature enacts something by use of specific
words and clear language, it must be enforced, even though the results
are absurd or mischievous. The consideration of absurdity comes into
play when alternative meanings are possible. If grammatical meaning
gives rise to absurdity and alternative meaning, the Court must reject
grammatical meaning and adopt alternative meaning. When two
constructions are equally open, the construction which introduces
absurdity, friction or confusion in the working of the system should be
rejected.

i) Thomson vs. Thomson

U/s 14 (3) of “The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965”, a case was filed
for dissolution of marriage on the presumption of the death of the
other party to the marriage. The fact that for a period of 7 years or
more the other party to the marriage was constantly absent from
the petitioner and the petitioner has no reason to believe that the
other party was alive during that period of 7 years or more, shall
be sufficient evidence to prove that the other party to the marriage
was dead, until contrary is proved.

It was held that, the words ‘reason to believe” used in S.14 (3)
could be proved only from the matters occurring during the period
from the period of 7 years. The beginning of the period of 7 years
should not be postponed to a time when the other party (spouse)
can be presumed to be dead. It is construed that the start of the
period to be postponed until it can be presumed that the spouse is
 dead, would cause inconvenience and hardship to the petitioner,
which is contrary to the intention of the legislature.

ii) Duncan vs. Duncan

The statue has authorized a ‘constable’ to enter licensed premises

at all times in order to prevent or detect the violations of the
licensing laws. It was held that, unless the constable has some
reasonable ground to suspect that there is a breach of law, he is
not entitled to demand admission into the licensed premises. This
construction was given to avoid the inconvenience and absurdity.

e) Presumption against intending injustice:

Whenever the language of the Statute is capable of two constructions,

in which one would lead to injustice, then the courts are of the view
that such an interpretation could not have been intended by the
legislature unless such an intention is clearly expressed in the plain
language.

If the Court is to avoid such a construction that would lead to injustice

then it must not discard or overrule that particular provision. The
Court should interpret it in such a way as would lead to justice and
common sense.

i) Celder vs. Halket

“The East India Company Act,1780” protected the magistrates in

India against any wrong or injury done in exercise of their judicial
powers. It was held that the Magistrates were exempted from the
liability only when they acted bona fide in cases in which they have
exceeded their jurisdiction by mistake.

ii) [Link]. Morris

If a person is convicted for an offence of assault and has

undergone the punishment awarded to him, then he shall be
released from all other proceedings “for the same cause”, i.e., the
 act of assault. But, if the party does afterwards from the effects of
the assault, then the person undergone the punishment for assault
will not be exempted from the prosecution of murder. Such an
exemption shall not be construed as this would defeat ends of
justice and grave injustice would be caused to the victim.

f) Presumption against impairing obligation or of permitting

advantage from one’s own wrong:

There is a general presumption that injustice and absurdity should

always be avoided. Any construction of the statute that enables a
person to impair an obligation which he has undertaken by his own act
should be rejected. No person should be allowed to be profited by his
own wrong. A man cannot take advantage from the wrong done by him.
A man cannot plead in his own favour for a self-created necessity.

i) Edgware Trust Ltd. vs. Lawrence

S.6(1) of “The Money Lender’s Act,1927” provides that contract for

repayment of money by the borrowers shall be enforceable only
when a note or memorandum of the contract is made and signed
by the borrower personally. S.6 (2) of the act provides that the note
or memorandum shall contain all the terms of the contract.

In this case, the borrower gave a promissory note in favor of

money-lender containing the default clause. The terms printed in
the promissory note were clear, but, in memorandum, certain
words were omitted. It was held that the purpose of S.6 will be
defeated if the document in possession of borrower does not
contain all the terms of the contract. The borrower was benefited
on technical grounds.

g) Presumption against prospective operation of statutes:

The cardinal rule of interpretation is that prima facie every statute is

prospective in operation, unless it is expressly or by necessary
implication made retrospective.
 Every statute which takes away any vested rights acquired under any
existing laws, or creates a new obligation or liability or imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of a past transaction, shall
be deemed to have prospective effect (i.e. applicable to the transactions
made after passing of the act).

The Parliament and State Legislature have powers to legislate

prospectively, as well as retrospectively. Every statute is presumed to
apply to only those persons and things who were born and came into
existence only after the passing of the act. Statues dealing with
substantive rights have prospective operation. Law relating to right of
action and right of appeal is substantive in nature.

It is presumed that the parliament does not intend to alter the law
which is applicable to the past events, in a manner which will be unfair
to the persons who have acquired the rights under it.

Statues dealing with succession have a prospective operation. It cannot

be applied to successions which are already opened. Taxing Statutes
are also prospective in operation. Penal Statutes have prospective
operation. Article 20 of the Constitution of India restricts the
retrospective operation of the penal statues. An Act which is legal when
it was done cannot be made illegal by enacting a new statute.

i) Gramma vs. Gramma

Kedarnath v. State of West Bengal, 1953
S.8 of “The Hindu Succession Act, 1956” provides that, if a Hindu
dies intestate, his property will devolve as per the provisions of the
Act.

The Supreme Court held that, the Act is not applicable to those
successions which opened before the Act came into operation (i.e.
successions prior to the year 1956). Thus, it has a prospective
operation.
ii) Manuram vs. Union of India

S.433 A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 provides that if a

person is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and if the
conviction is for an offence for which one of the punishment
includes death also, then such person cannot be released from
prison before he has completed atleast 14 years in prison.

The Supreme Court held that S.433 A of the Criminal Procedure

Code, 1973 is applicable only to those persons who were sentenced
after the said section came into operation, and not to those
persons who were convicted before the section came into force.