Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 45 (2024) 915–924

Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences

journal homepage: [Link]

The Republic of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy: Re-evaluation

under president Tokayev
Nurbolat Nyshanbayeva, Bulent Tarmanb,*, Zhengisbek Tolenb, Alina Samayb, Zhangeldi Agybayc
a
Chair of International Relations and World Economy, Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National university, Almaty city 050040, Republic of
Kazakhstan
b
Regional Studies and International Relations, Humanitarian Law Faculty, Turan University, Almaty city 050013, Republic of Kazakhstan
c
International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of International Relations, Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages,
Almaty city 050022, Republic of Kazakhstan

Article Info Abstract

Article history: This study offers an in-depth theoretical examination of Kazakhstan’s foreign
Received 15 August 2023
Revised 21 September 2023 policy evolution during the power transition from Nursultan Nazarbayev
Accepted 2 October 2023 to his chosen successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The analysis illuminates
Available online 30 August 2024
the under-explored realm of post-Soviet Central Asian states’ foreign
policies, with a special focus on Kazakhstan and its unique geopolitical,
Keywords: economic, and geographic strengths. The methods encompass a comprehensive
K. Tokayev,
multi-vector foreign policy, review of the distinct foreign policy characteristics under Nazarbayev and
N. Nazarbayev, Tokayev’s presidencies, delineating the continuity and alterations in the
neorealism,
nation’s multi-vector diplomacy approach. Critical findings underscore
power transit,
Republic of Kazakhstan that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is stepping into an unprecedented phase,
emphasizing geo-economic values more than before. Amidst the backdrop
of regional geopolitical instability, Kazakhstan’s robust multi-vector foreign
policy functions as a stabilizing force. Ultimately, this investigation
provides valuable insights that fill a substantial knowledge gap concerning
power transition in the context of balance-based or multi-vector foreign
policy, primarily within post-Soviet Central Asian states. This contributes
significantly to academic discourse and offers an invaluable framework for
future policy analysis.
© 2024 Kasetsart University.

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: btarman@[Link]; [Link]@[Link] (B. Tarman).

[Link]
2452–3151/© 2024 Kasetsart University.

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ([Link]

916 N. Nyshanbayev et al. / Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 45 (2024) 915–924

an exhaustive analysis of multi-vector foreign policy’s

Introduction theoretical-methodological aspects. They then delve into
the shifts within this foreign policy during the power
The late twentieth century’s disintegration of the transition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev. Lastly, the main
Soviet Union culminated in the birth of new states within challenges and opportunities posed by a multi-vector
international relations, which, in turn, greatly influenced foreign policy during the Tokayev administration are
the formation of foreign policy within the post-Soviet examined, thus contributing to an understanding of
space. Kazakhstan, since achieving independence, has Kazakhstan’s strategic multi-vector foreign policy since
embarked on a multi-vector foreign policy, establishing the power transition in 2019.
balanced relations with globally significant geopolitical
and economic actors. This principle of pragmatic The Basic Principles of Multi-vector Foreign Policy:
diplomacy has shaped foreign policymaking, bolstering From Nazarbayev to Tokayev
the country’s international standing (Laruelle & Royce,
2019). The establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s geographical centrality in the as an independent state in 1991 prompted Nursultan
Eurasian continent lends it considerable geopolitical Nazarbayev, its leader at the time, to shape the nation’s
significance in preserving regional political equilibrium. foreign policy. In his policy article titled “Strategy
The nation’s long-serving leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as
elicited widespread astonishment when he voluntarily a Sovereign State,” published in May 1992, Nazarbayev
relinquished his presidential duties on March 19, 2019. outlined the core principles of the country’s foreign
Highlighting the indispensable role of Kazakhstan’s policy. Central to this policy was the prioritization of
foreign policy, Nazarbayev advocated for professional Kazakhstan’s security, which would be achieved through
diplomat Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to assume leadership various means, including the establishment of strategic
of the parliamentary upper house (Shatalov, 2019). partnerships with neighboring countries such as Russia
The transfer of power following Nazarbayev’s and China, as well as fostering close cooperation with
enduring leadership presented a challenging phase for other Central Asian states, Turkey, Pakistan, and India
determining the foreign policy of the newly appointed (Nazarbayev, 2017).
president, Tokayev (Chatham House, 2019). Amidst Modern Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is defined as
some controversial decisions, including the renaming multi-vector, indicating the nation’s intention to foster
of Astana to Nur-Sultan, seen as political conformity by equal relationships with both global and regional powers.
the international community, a dual process unfolded The concept of a multi-vector foreign policy, although
during Tokayev’s presidency. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector applicable to small and middle powers in various regions,
foreign policy remained intact, but simultaneously, is primarily associated with post-Soviet countries. These
it began evolving compared to the Nazarbayev era states may adopt a multi-vector approach for a range of
(Isaacs, 2020). Following the political upheaval resulting reasons, both external and internal in nature. Additionally,
from the January 2022 coup, a decision was made to one possible rationale for Kazakhstan’s multi-vector
revert the name of the capital city from Nursultan to approach is the desire to legitimize its statehood in the
Astana. This change in the city’s name carries significant eyes of both Russians and Kazakhs (Arynov, 2023).
political and symbolic implications for Kazakhstan. This policy has guaranteed Kazakhstan’s independence,
By reverting to the original name of Astana, the new establishing the foundation for equal relations with
political administration seeks to emphasize a break with diverse states. With a relatively small population for
the past and assert its own vision for the future of the its geographic size and bordering influential states like
country. Russia and China, Kazakhstan effectively cooperates
Despite numerous studies on multi-vector foreign with the United States, the EU, and the wider global
policy during the presidencies of Nazarbayev and community. For Kazakhstan, maintaining this multi-
Tokayev, the political situation regarding Kazakhstan’s vector approach is crucial for the country’s material well-
foreign policy during Tokayev’s tenure remains relatively being (Matveeva, 1999).
under-explored. This article aims to address this gap. Nazarbayev’s rule’s most prominent legacy was the
The authors first elucidate the fundamental theoretical clear delineation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign
principles of multi-vector foreign policy through policy. According to Matveeva (1999), establishing a
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multi-vector foreign policy aimed at monetizing rich Furthermore, we use the works of Cohen (2008), Hanks
natural resources through close Western countries (2009), and Cheng-Chwee (2008) to establish the
cooperation. During the perestroika period, for instance, foundation of bilateral and multilateral strategies that
relationships with major Western energy corporations, shape Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. To offer a complete
like Chevron and Shell, were initiated, forming the understanding, the study also investigates the nature of
basis of Kazakhstan’s Western vector foreign policy. power in Kazakhstan, using Guliyev’s (2011) concept
Understanding the concept of multi-vector foreign policy of neo-patrimonial power, and assesses its impact on the
during the post-Nazarbayev era Tokayev’s governance country’s foreign policy.
period is crucial in determining Kazakhstan’s foreign The term multi-vector foreign policy has recently
policy specifics for maintaining territorial security and solidified as an academic theory in the field of international
state integrity. Recognized as a seasoned diplomat and relations. Gleason (2010) defines a multi-vectored foreign
professional civil servant, Tokayev has deep knowledge policy as a sophisticated strategy centered on a policy
of international institutions and was instrumental in approach capable of simultaneously countering potentially
forming Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy during adverse actions from several partners. The emphasis
its early independence period (Starr, 2019). of a multi-vector foreign policy is on cooperation with
As stated by Vanderhill et al. (2020), Kazakhstan’s political alliances and financial corporations, minimizing
multi-vector foreign policy mirrors the Southeast the influence of ideological concepts. Kazakhstan, while
Asian balancing system, where secondary powers preserving its national interests, employs the mechanism
maintain balance among Great Powers. Since declaring of a multi-vector foreign policy primarily on pragmatic
independence, a multi-vector foreign policy has proven grounds rather than ideological ones. Hanks (2009)
efficient by safeguarding Kazakhstan’s independence, perceives a multi-vector foreign policy as founded on
fostering economic growth, and establishing a positive the “risk-benefit ratio”. Thus, both Gleason and Hanks
reputation within the international system. As an characterize a multi-vector foreign policy as a neorealist
independent state, Kazakhstan has asserted itself in political concept grounded on a practical equilibrium
international politics as a nation with a multi-vector of national interests and forces. Cohen (2008) suggests
and pragmatic policy. One principle of this policy is that since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan’s
promoting regional integration processes by instigating multi-vector foreign policy means that Astana has
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building constructed bilateral relationships with every geopolitical
Measures in Asia. The chairmanship of the OSCE player, with each vector providing an alternative to
organization in 2010 and the election as a non-permanent the other. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector
member of the UN Security Council in 2017−2018 foreign policy metamorphoses into a compendium of
significantly elevated the importance of regional issues potential bilateral and multilateral strategies that shape
at an international level. Kazakhstan’s diplomatic efforts the country’s foreign policy. According to the theory of
have consistently aimed towards collective security and neorealism, emerging states typically respond in two
peacekeeping. These efforts are evident in the creative ways when the interests of the “great powers” in a region
actions enacted through Kazakhstan’s multi-vector and intersect. They either balance the powers or “bandwagon
pragmatic foreign policy (Vanderhill et al., 2020). the strongest player” by submitting to its mandate
(Cheng-Chwee 2008). This theory posits that the foreign
policy of small states is grounded on “maintaining their
Methodology security either through balancing conflicting interests or
bandwagoning.”
In this research, we primarily employ a theoretical Kazakhstan’s system of power centralization diverges
approach grounded in neorealism to examine Kazakhstan’s from other post-Soviet systems in its distinct manifestation.
multi-vector foreign policy. Gleason’s (2010) concept of Power in Kazakhstan is more neo-patrimonial than
a sophisticated strategy that counterbalances potentially autocratic. Power and influence are constructed not
adverse actions from several partners forms the basis solely through the “traditional” informal supporter
for understanding this foreign policy. The research system but also coupled with rational economic and
also utilizes the concept of ‘opportunistic multi- bureaucratic interests (Guliyev, 2011). The establishment
alignment’ by Hanks (2009) to explain the philosophical of the legitimacy of neo-autocratic power in the
essence of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. international arena and the formulation of pragmatic,
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balanced relations between interested forces in Central annual budget of the government is accounted for by raw
Asia, such as the United States, Russia, and China, materials.
have underpinned regional security. Since the 1990s,
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been molded in Multi-vector Policy: Nazarbayev-Tokayev Transit
the context of this concept. Astana has adeptly
capitalized on the rivalry between significant regional The Foreign Policy Concept for the Republic of
“major players” to its benefit (Charles, 2014). Kazakhstan’s Kazakhstan from 2020–2030 is a significant document,
multi-vector foreign policy is crafted in alignment with developed during the presidency of Kassym-Jomart
the post-Soviet period’s geopolitical circumstances. Tokayev, delineating the main priorities of state policy
Deyermond (2009) posits that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector for the decade (Akorda, 2020). This document gained
foreign policy diverges from those of Russia, China, particular importance due to the recent leadership
the EU, and the United States in its objective to “maintain transition in the country, with the resignation of the
neutrality in the struggle against regional hegemony.” previous President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the
The concept of “opportunistic multi-alignment,” ensuing concerns over potential changes in Kazakhstan’s
introduced by Hanks (2009), comprehensively elucidates foreign policy. However, the newly elected President
the philosophical essence of a multi-vector foreign Tokayev, in his address to the nation in 2019, committed to
policy. This foreign policy course has managed to a policy of “continuity” from the previous administration.
preserve relationships across multiple different directions The Concept represents an in-depth and systematic
and attain “its regional goals by pitting active actors analysis of contemporary international politics, including
against each other.” (Yuneman, 2023). an evaluation of potential crises, emerging challenges,
According to the other theory, in contrast, an emerging and methods to mitigate risks in the international relations
state uses the method of “supporting the strongest actor,” system. In keeping with these commitments, President
the essence of which is to find a clear direction in foreign Tokayev’s policy has an emphasis on “economic”
policy and locate interests in that country which is diplomacy, focusing on expanding non-resource sectors
considered to be the most effective one (Ahmad, 2016). of the economy and increasing the number of economic
As the influence of foreign policy interests in the Central priorities from nine to fourteen (Akorda, 2020).
Asian region increased, Kazakhstan began to pursue The Concept reflects a significant shift in the
a foreign policy based on “pragmatic balance” which country’s foreign policy, with Kazakhstan positioning
meant that instead of “supporting the strongest player” itself as a “regional leader”, as opposed to the earlier
the country chose a multi-vector policy. However, role of a proponent of regional integration. This suggests
several other methods are used in international practice an evolving strategy aimed at strengthening broad
as well. For example, it is stereotypical for Southeast geostrategic partnerships with major global powers like
Asian countries to use the techniques of “soft balance” China, Russia, the US, and the EU while continuing
and “institutionalization of power” to accompany to nurture relationships with Central Asian countries.
a strategy of “prosperity and increasing the influence This shift is manifested in initiatives such as the
of China” (Estellés et al., 2021). In line with neorealism establishment of a regional trade and investment hub in
theory, scholars have identified key domestic variables Almaty and the enhanced status of the UN Interregional
affecting the foreign policy of emerging states. For Center for Sustainable Development for Central
instance, according to Cheng-Chwee Kuik, in the case Asian States and Afghanistan, indicating a committed
of “emerging states,” “the capabilities and obstacles engagement with international organizations to bolster
of the domestic political elite in terms of legitimizing regional security.
power play a key role in determining the direction Building on these priorities, Kazakhstan’s foreign
of foreign policy” (Johnson, 2012). According to policy under President Tokayev has also notably shifted
Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s lack of access to direct sea towards environmental and economic diplomacy.
trade paved the way for mutually beneficial relations It’s reflected in the expanded partnership in the fields of
with Russia and China, which are “the main gateway to transport, energy, and environmental protection in the
the world communication flow” (Goble 2019). This is Caspian region, adhering to the Convention on the Legal
due to the fact that market diversification is a very Status of the Caspian Sea adopted in 2018. Moreover,
important step for the country, where 70 percent of total Kazakhstan’s relationship with the Eurasian Economic
exports are petroleum products and 40 percent of the Union countries has been systematized, suggesting
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a strategic aim to deepen economic integration and The year 2022 emerged as a pivotal and arduous period
collaboration within the region. in the history of Kazakhstan, marked by internal political
Importantly, the Foreign Policy Concept reflects a turbulence and external geopolitical unpredictability. In
continuity with the multi-vector foreign policy established January, the nation encountered its most violent unrest
by former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This policy, since attaining independence in 1991, culminating
founded on the dual pillars of national security and in the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty
economic development, has allowed Kazakhstan to Organization (CSTO), led by Russia, which Moscow
leverage its natural resources and geopolitical position portrayed as a “peacekeeping mission.” Furthermore,
to maintain a complex balancing act among the regional Russia’s incursion into Ukraine on February 24th, 2022,
great powers. This strategy has welcomed investment intensified the challenges faced by Kazakhstan (Libman
from a wide array of international actors in sectors & Davidzon, 2023). On one hand, Kazakhstan remains
like oil and energy, facilitating economic growth and among the few strategic partners for Russia during
diversification. this time. On the other hand, it also perceives Russia’s
Further, the Concept reveals Kazakhstan’s commitment aggressive endeavor to redefine the post-Soviet Union
to maintaining stability in the region. It is exemplified by landscape as a direct threat. The precarious circumstances
its active role in mediating military and political conflicts confronting the country have prompted observers to
in Ukraine and Syria, reaffirming the country’s position question the future of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign
as an influential “bridge” between the West and the policy, suggesting that the altered geopolitical reality
East. Despite the recent transition of power, the Concept could render Kazakhstan heavily reliant on Russia.
reaffirms that the multi-vector foreign policy, which has The diplomatic interaction between Kazakhstan and
proven its efficacy over the past thirty years, will continue to Russia is underpinned by a rich historical narrative and
guide Kazakhstan’s foreign relations in the foreseeable future. an impressive border stretching over 6,800 kilometers—
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, as argued the longest globally. Given the profound geopolitical,
by Hanks (2009), pivots on two key aspects: national historical, cultural, and economic ties binding both
security and economic development. Under Nazarbayev’s nations, coupled with the presence of approximately
leadership, the country effectively leveraged its natural four million ethnic Russians domiciled in Kazakhstan,
resources and geopolitical position to balance its relations it is palpable that both countries are significantly
with the regional great powers. Notably, a ‘strategy of interdependent, and their continued interaction is all but
inclusion’ has been at the heart of Kazakhstan’s foreign inevitable (Ibrayeva et al., 2023). Clear indication of
policy, an approach that encourages foreign entities (e.g., this was Tokayev’s first official visit to Moscow upon
Russian, Chinese, American companies in the oil and his ascension to the presidency. Here, he pledged to
energy sector) to invest in the local market (Omelicheva uphold Nazarbayev’s policy and to continue fostering the
& Du, 2018). This strategy enables Kazakhstan to development of Kazakh-Russian cooperation. Despite
balance competing interests and to extract concessions, the ostensibly cordial relations, the diplomatic relations
particularly when other states are constrained by other between Russia and Kazakhstan have been punctuated by
circumstances. several “sensitive” issues, notably the Eurasian Economic
Kazakhstan’s status as a crucial ‘bridge’ between Union’s activities, the Russia-Ukraine tension, and some
the West and the East implies that military or economic comments by Russian nationalist politicians questioning
conflicts will inevitably affect the country. This is why Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity. Notwithstanding these
Nazarbayev proactively mediated in the resolution of concerns, both Kazakhstan and Russia remain active
military and political conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and participants in some ambitious projects, which experts
beyond. Under Tokayev’s presidency, Kazakhstan’s argue serves as a viable counterbalance within the
foreign policy perspective is unlikely to undergo Eurasian Economic Union (Osipova et al., 2018).
significant changes. Tokayev is adhering to the multi- In a further escalation of events, widespread riots
vector foreign policy outlined by Nazarbayev, which transitioned into acts of vandalism in Kazakhstan in
has demonstrated its efficacy over the past thirty years. January 2022, compelling the Kazakhstani authorities
Furthermore, the multi-vector foreign policy strategy to solicit assistance from members of the Collective
also correlates to economic diversification, particularly Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Subsequently,
in relation to the oil industry, where the lion’s share is on January 6, 2022, the deployment of CSTO forces,
controlled by foreign companies. including peacekeepers from Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
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Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, began. The intervention of has elevated diplomatic relations with China to new
the Russian-led CSTO forces proved instrumental in heights. The ambitious trans-Eurasian economic corridor
reinforcing President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s hold initiative, known as the “Silk Road Economic Belt”,
on power amid the attempted coup. The intervention dovetails well with Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol” program
raised concerns about its potential implications for (Laruelle, 2018). The shared goals of developing transport
Kazakhstan’s balanced, multi-vector foreign policy. systems, energy, community infrastructure, and the sale
Nevertheless, President Tokayev’s subsequent actions of agricultural products underscore this initiative as an
underscored the commitment to preserving equilibrium in ambitious and large-scale twenty-first-century project.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Umarov (2022) conjectured The investment of five billion dollars in the “Nurly
that the cost of the CSTO-led intervention for Kazakhstan Zhol” project indicates a bright future for diplomatic
could involve the recognition of Crimea, refraining from relations between China and Kazakhstan, necessitating
the adoption of the Latin alphabet, or the closure of a thoughtful diplomatic strategy to manage China’s
“Anti-Russian” NGOs. However, none of these projected increasing influence in Kazakhstan (Laruelle, 2018).
outcomes have materialized, reflecting the resilience On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s active participation
and commitment of the Tokayev administration to in both the Eurasian Economic Union and the “Belt and
maintaining a balanced foreign policy. The evolution of Road Initiative” (BRI) initiative reflects an institutional
Kazakh-Russian relations in the era of President Tokayev commitment to maintaining regional balance in foreign
underscores the nuanced yet crucial role of multi-vector policy (Novikov & Bocharova, 2024). The vast borders
foreign policy in shaping Kazakhstan’s diplomatic Kazakhstan shares with Russia (~7000 km) and China
interactions with other nations. (~1700 km) underscore the significance of these
As a neighboring nation sharing a border of 1,782 neighboring nations in its foreign policy. A relationship
km, China, apart from being Kazakhstan’s principal trade rooted in mutual trust with these two pivotal neighbors is
and economic associate, also represents a significant crucial to unlock the “Western” direction of Kazakhstan’s
geopolitical trade corridor to the West. China’s global multi-vector foreign policy. In the context of establishing
economic growth enhances Kazakhstan’s significance in ties between Kazakhstan and the West, Russia and China
world politics. Kazakhstan is bolstering its ties with China must be assured of Kazakhstan’s commitment not to act
via platforms such as the SCO and the “Belt and Road against their interests. As argued by Laruelle and Dylan
Initiative” (BRI) initiative. During President Tokayev’s (2019), the efficacy of U.S. initiatives in Kazakhstan
term, the role of China as the “eastern neighbor” in typically hinges on cooperation with Russia.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has seen notable progression. In this geopolitical tapestry, Tokayev emerges as an
Trade and investment relations between Kazakhstan optimal choice for Moscow and Beijing, a successor
and China remain unaffected by Russia, with the latter dedicated to preserving Nazarbayev’s policy and
adopting a more circumspect stance in its dealings with effectively perpetuating the diplomatic trajectory.
China compared to Kazakhstan’s Western allies. Since Therefore, during Tokayev’s term, all interested parties
the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, stand to gain from maintaining the status quo concerning
there has been a noted decline in Russian influence in Kazakhstan’s domestic situation and the established
Kazakhstan. This is concurrent with an increasing rise of course of its foreign policy. Radical political changes
China’s sway in the region. China’s increasing influence offer no discernible benefits to any of the parties involved
can be traced to its intensified economic engagement, (Laruelle et al., 2019).
strategic alliances, and infrastructure projects under the However, the complexities notwithstanding, China’s
Belt and Road Initiative. As Russia diverts its attention role as a crucial geostrategic partner for Kazakhstan
to the European theater, China’s strategic expansion into persists, acting as a counterbalance to potential Russian
Central Asia fills the void. Consequently, the geopolitical or US predominance in the region (Laruelle & Royce,
landscape of Central Asia is witnessing a paradigm 2019).
shift in power dynamics, marking a new era of Chinese The “Western” direction of Kazakhstan’s multi-
predominance. vector foreign policy serves as a principal balancing
The President’s fluency in Chinese and professional force against the influences of Russia and China.
experiences in China signal a robust continuation Participation in organizations such as the Collective
of Kazakh-Chinese relations during his tenure. Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai
The involvement of Kazakhstan in the BRI project Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Turkic State
 N. Nyshanbayev et al. / Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 45 (2024) 915–924 921

Organization (TSO) are counterbalanced by cooperation

with NATO. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE Discussion
in 2010 exemplified the effectiveness of its multi-vector
foreign policy, indicating that this strategy, grounded in An analysis of Tokayev’s multi-vector foreign
sustainable neutrality and equitable political relations policy has disclosed two significant innovations. Firstly,
with major powers like China, Russia, and the United the inaugural official foreign policy document published
States, ensures its security (Isaacs, 2010). under Tokayev’s administration, “The Concept of
As the geopolitical landscape changes, Russia’s role the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan
in Central Asia is diminishing due to the ongoing conflict for 2020−2030,” underscores the prioritization of the
in Ukraine. Concurrently, the United States, albeit economy in foreign policy, thus augmenting the role of
demonstrating a decline in interest in Central Asia after “investment diplomacy.” Secondly, during Nazarbayev’s
the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, is presidency, key foreign policy issues were resolved
reshaping its role in the region (Cooley, 2021). Despite due to his personal charisma and individual capacities.
the observable shifts, the USA remains one of the largest In contrast, under Tokayev’s leadership, constructive
investors in Kazakhstan, especially in the oil and gas initiatives such as the “Belt and Road Initiative”
sectors. Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan “New Silk Road” projects, and activities within the
and the United States have been actively developing SCO, the TSO, the EAEC, and the EU are viewed as
since the former’s independence, with key areas of markers of equilibrium among the parties. Consequently,
cooperation being energy, oil resources, and international under Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign
security. The US-Kazakhstan security and military policy is evolving from a “personalized” form to
partnership has significantly intensified post the early an “institutionalized” one. Examination of various critical
1990s terrorist attack on the United States (Bingol, 2004). interpretations of the functionality of Kazakhstan’s
Given that the United States was the first Western nation foreign policy reveals that the enactment of multi-vector
to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence, the Central foreign policy is a complex undertaking. It is suggested
Asian nation assumed an important role in US foreign that, in certain scenarios, Tokayev’s professional
policy. diplomatic skills may prove insufficient for maintaining
Kazakhstan operates under the framework of a balance among the various geopolitical vectors.
the US-Kazakhstan Joint Statement, “Kazakhstan and Though President Nursultan Nazarbayev officially
the United States: An Enhanced Strategic Partnership resigned on March 19, 2019, he retained substantial
for the 21st Century,” established during President influence in important political decision-making
Nursultan Nazarbayev’s official visit to Washington, D.C. processes until the January 2022 coup attempt.
on January 15−18, 2018. Relations between Kazakhstan Therefore, the most critical “post-Nazarbayev” phase of
and the US have largely evolved around energy and Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy remains on the
conflict issues in Afghanistan. According to Ameyaw- horizon. For President Tokayev, the true litmus test of
Brobbey (2023), the US has two primary energy interests a balance-based multi-vector foreign policy will arise
in Central Asia: granting access to US oil companies and when dilemmas occur in negotiations with neo-imperial
fostering the maximum possible development of oil and Russia, ascendant China, and the globalist USA and EU.
gas as a means to alleviate pressure on global energy The future of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy
security. is set to navigate through these challenging geopolitical
Under President Joe Biden’s administration, waters.
diplomacy has been emphasized as a key component Over the years, Kazakhstan has achieved its primary
of foreign policy. Biden’s presidency is expected to objectives, including the establishment of an independent
enhance the U.S. role in Central Asia, particularly with sovereign state, implementation of structural economic
the resumption of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the Far reforms, and integration into the international system
East (Cooley et al., 2023). This is aligned with President of relations and global division of labor. Its geopolitical
Tokayev’s administration, which views increased U.S. location between two major powers provides Kazakhstan
activity in the region as a counterbalance to the growing with additional opportunities to pursue an active policy
influence of Russia and China. characterized by a high degree of maneuverability and
flexibility while maintaining a steadfast commitment to
securing its long-term interests. Its proactive stance and
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focus on harmonious and mutually beneficial relationships a period of reduced pressure from Russia due to the
have positioned Kazakhstan as a stable and predictable conflict with Ukraine, and in close cooperation with
partner within the Commonwealth of Independent States European regulators to improve the human rights situation.
(CIS) and in its diverse relations with other countries
and international organizations. This strategy enables
Kazakhstan to actively engage with Russia, China, the Conclusions
United States, Central Asian countries, the European
Union, and other states in Asia and Europe. However, In conclusion, this article affirms that the adoption of
the emergence of new actors in the international system a multi-vector foreign policy in the current international
has brought new goals and challenges to Kazakhstan, relations framework continues to be pertinent. The paper
a relatively young country. The constant volatility of delineated the distinctive Kazakhstani multi-vector policy
global politics necessitates urgent actions in shaping the model and scrutinized the salient features of the state’s
priorities of its foreign policy. foreign policy during the tenure of presidents Nursultan
The active position and commitment to harmonious Nazarbayev and K. Tokayev. This research essay has
and mutually beneficial relationships have positioned undertaken a theoretical analysis of Kazakhstan’s
Kazakhstan as a stable and predictable partner within the multi-vector foreign policy during a period of power
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in its transition. The study began by establishing the concept
diverse relations with other countries and international of multi-vector foreign policy in Kazakhstan and
organizations. This strategic approach enables Kazakhstan proceeded to examine it from a conceptual standpoint.
to actively engage with Russia, China, the United States, The primary data source utilized in this analysis was
Central Asian countries, the European Union, and other the official foreign policy concept of Kazakhstan.
states in Asia and Europe. The findings of this study reveal a notable shift in
However, the recent military intervention by the the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy under
Russian Federation in Ukraine has presented new the presidency of K. Tokayev. It is evident that
challenges and goals for Kazakhstan. In light of this Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has evolved from an
situation, it is necessary for Kazakhstan to reconsider individualized approach to an institutionalized one, with
its membership in organizations such as the Collective the potential for continuity in future presidential terms.
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian This transition signifies the growing importance and
Economic Union (EAEU) to enhance its economic necessity of a well-defined foreign policy framework
and political security. While a withdrawal from these for Kazakhstan. Moving forward, it is crucial for the
organizations may not be a viable option at present, the country to continue developing and implementing
President of Kazakhstan should play a more decisive role a multi-vector approach to effectively navigate the
and lay the groundwork for a gradual exit, highlighting complexities of the international arena and advance its
that Russia’s aggression violates the fundamental national interests.
principles of these organizations, including mutually Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, characterized by its
beneficial cooperation, equal rights, and the protection of balanced, multilateral approach, is congruent with the
national interests. country’s potential, geographical location, and strategic
Furthermore, the issue of Afghanistan holds significant interests. The singularity of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector
importance for Kazakhstan’s security in various aspects. foreign policy resides in its foundational reliance on
Understanding the strategies of Russia, China, and the a “balance between the major players” to guarantee
West regarding Afghanistan is crucial. Strengthening regional stability, national security, and economic growth.
cooperation with Central Asian countries, including the
new government in Afghanistan that emerged after the
withdrawal of US and NATO forces, is key to addressing Conflicts of Interest
this issue.
The internal events in January 2022 have heightened The authors declare that there is no conflict of
Russia’s geopolitical influence on Kazakhstan and raised interest. The funders had no role in the design of the
concerns regarding the country’s reputation in the field study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of
of law. The political transformation announced by the data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision
President of Kazakhstan should be implemented during to publish the results.
 N. Nyshanbayev et al. / Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences 45 (2024) 915–924 923

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