Lecture Readings Tutorial/ Spoken

General definitions
 Power: the capacity to bring about intended effects.
Politics
 Government& Governance – the institution of gov
- Thomas Hobbes [more value to state, less to indiv. Ppl consent to be governed]
 Gov provides us w protection from the harm that we wld otherwise inflict on each other
in our quest for gain& glory
 By granting a monopoly of the sword to a gov, we transform anarchy into order, securing
peace n the opp for mutually beneficial cooperation
 In a democracy, gov supposedly provides security n predictability to those who live under
its jurisdiction
Citizens& biz can plan for the long term, knowing that laws r developed in a standardized
fashion, take into account competing opinions, n r consistently applied
 Dangers – abuse its own authority, creating more probs than it solves
- John Locke (^dangers) [more value to indiv, less to state]
 State of nature (SON)
- Hobbes – chaos, orderless, violent -> gov creates order, tyranny>SON
- Locke – capable of reason, biases, emotions ->standard, being explicit, making laws known to
everyone
 Hobbes v. Locke: *Diff justifications the existence of gov because of diff understanding of SON, diff
assumptions abt human nature
 Luke’s 3 dimensions of power
1. Power sld be judged by identifying whose views prevail when actors involved possess
conflicting views/preferences / thrs an observable conflict of interests on what sld be done
 Decisions r made on issues. Greater the correspondence btw a person;s views n decisions
rched, greater is that person’s influence: more wins indicate more power
2. Capacity to keep issues off the political agenda by preventing emergence of topics wch wld
threaten values/ interests of decision-makers
 Controls whether preferences r expressed
 Decisions r prevented from being taken on potential issues over wch thrs an observable
conflict of interests
 Bachrach and Baratz (1962) : a person or group creates or reinforces barriers to the public
airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power'.
 E.g. In China, fear of government reprisals currently discourages many people from expressing their
support for a transition to democracy. By narrowing the public agenda in this way, the ruling communist
party renders democracy a non-issue.
3. Formation, rather than merely the expression, of preferences
 Potential issues r kept out of politics, whether through social forces, institutional
practices, or decisions of indivs.
 Agenda control is achieved by manipulating/shaping consensus/preferences n the flow of
info so as to prevent any conflict from arising in the 1st place.
 E.g. In war time, governments otten seek to sustain public morale by preventing news of military defeats or
high casualties from seeping into the public domain.
 Most efficient form of power -> preventing 1st& 2nd dimensions from coming into play.
 *Legitimacy (Patrick O’Neil): a value whereby smt or someone is recognized and accepted as
right and proper.
 Whr power is the capacity to act, authority is the acknowledged right to do so.
- Authority is a more efficient form of control than brute power
- Authority provides the foundation for the state
- Ways of validating political power
 Tradition / the accepted way of doing things
 Charisma / intense commitment to a leader n his/her message
 Appeal to egal-rational norms, based on the rule-governed powers of an office, rather
than a person
-
Agency& Structure
 Differences (Social sciences)
- Testing hypotheses in controlled environments – Qn of falsifiability
- Role of the researcher
- Humans – agency, social n political structures
 Structure& agency logically entail one another
A social/ political structure only exists by virtue of the constraints on, or opp.s for, agency it
effects
 Power
- is bound up w the idea of the victory of the agent/ subject over its other – structure/
object
- It’s the qn of agency, or influencing upon the structures wch set contexts n define the
range of possibilities of others
 Political ontology relates to political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically, n
to the units that comprise political reality
[Google def: approach within anthropology to understand the process of how practices, entities (human and
non-human), and concepts come into being or are enacted]
 Ontology: the nature of the social& political world n of ‘social being’

 Structuralism - Viewpoint privileges structure within the structure-agency relationship.

Structure: “context & setting within wch social, political n economic events occur n acquire
meaning”
- Defines the range of possible actions – enables & constrains
- Structures relevant in politics - Formal& informal, material& non-material
- Structure conditions agency
- seeking to account for observable social& political events, processes n outcomes in terms
of the operation of unobservable social& political structures of wch actors r merely bearers
- social& political outcomes r explained not in terms of motivations& intentions of actors
involved, but in terms of consequences of their efforts
- Critiques:
 Underestimates activity of indivs
Explaining away their real autonomy n denying that they hv an effect or make a diff
 Paints a pic of the social& political world in wch we r all mere automata, passive dupes of
structures beyond our comprehension n over wch we can exert no influence
 Encourage fatalism& passivity
 Contradiction
If we r all merely passive dupes of the structures we bear, the structuralist position can
nvr be expressed
->Structuralism appears to rely on an extremely patronizing& condescending
distinction btw the enlightened theorist n the masses-> logically unsustainable
 Intentionalism
- Agency – “the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt
to realise his or her intentions” (Colin Hay, Political Analysis, p. 94)
 Autonomy
  Agents in politics - Individual& Collective; Governmental& Non-governmental
- Agents create& shape structures
 Powerful agents create structures for others, even less powerful agents can change
structures sometimes
 Social structures r reproduced by action
- Focuses on social practices, human agency n the rich texture of social& political interaction
- Structures as a pdt of intentional action
- Concept of constraint& context largely absent
- Take issues of social& political interaction largely at face value, constructing explanations
out of direct strategy preferences, intentions, motivations choices n self-understandings of
actors, agents involved
- Associated w notions of indeterminacy, contingency, voluntarism, methodological
individualism
- Focus on micro-practices of social interaction as opposed to macro-embeddedness of
action within broader social& political structures
- Voluntarism – in order to understand political outcomes we ms merely consider the
motiv& intentions of actors as if thrs some one-to-one correlation btw the intent n the
effect of action
 Poverty – structuralism v. intentionalism
- Individualistic perspective
 from personal weaknesses, failings, n inadequacies.
 Indiv prob – by-product of characteristics, choices & behaviors of the poor
 Victims of their own bad decisions n lifestyle preferences
 Society is a meritocracy in wch hard work n determination pay off
Rewards ppl receive correspond to their econ contribution
 Distribution of earnings, income n wealth is reflection of diff in indiv ability& effort
- Structural perspective
 Assortment of economic, political, cultural n social forces outside of the immediate
control of the indiv
 Social prob – by-product of distribution of power n institutional features of society
 Victims of choices, behaviors, decisions n actions of the ppl who occupy positions of
political& economic power
 Distribution of earnings, income, n wealth is outcome of economic n political struggles n
enduring disparities in power
- Perspective disagree about:
Current inequalities fair/not, opp.s for getting agead plentiful/scarce, do indivs compete on
a level/tilted playing field, does discrimination continue to play a signif role in explaining
race& gender inequalities.
The State
 State of nature
- Anarchy: individuals not subject to gov
- Uncertainty& insecurity: the life of man is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, n short’
 State needed to provide security, thus
- Gov
- Monopoly on the legitimate use of violence
- Law& order
 State v. Gov
- States defines pol community of wch gov is the managing agent
- By enjoying a monopoly of authority, state creates a mandate for rule wch gov then puts
into effect
- Head of state (monarch/ non-executive president) v. Head of gov (PM)
 The state of nature, reason, n natural rights
- ‘The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, wch obliges every one: And reason,
wch is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal n indep,
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions’
- State of nature still inconvenient, not ideal
 The state n the social contract
- ‘Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, n independent, no one can be put
out of this estate, n subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent’
- ‘The great n chief end, thus, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, n putting themselves
under gov, is the preservation of their property. ‘
 The role of war in state formation
- Need to extract resources from population & territory to eliminate external& internal
challenges
- State develops a bureaucratic& coercive structure, along w a set of policies & regulations
- Consolidating authority& defining territorial borders
- Tilly: ‘war made the state, n the state made war’
If thrs any single force that’s responsible for the emergence of the modern state, its war.
 1960 UNGA Reso 1514 (XV): Declaration on the Granting of Indep to Colonial Countries n
Peoples
1. The subjection of ppls to alien subjugation, domination n exploitation constitutes a
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the UN n is an
impediment to the promotion of world peace & cooperation
2. All peoples hv the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely det their
political status n freely pursue their economic, social n cultural dev
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social/ educational preparedness sld nvr serve as a
pretext of delaying indep.
 Returning to Social Contract
- Herbst: State failure likely to be “a ‘normal’ aspect of global society”
- Fulfilling the social contract
 Quasi-states: states that exist n r recognized under international law but whose govs control
little of the territory under their jurisdiction
 [states w judicial statehood without empirical statehood]
- Negative sovereignity (judicial statehood) – legal condition, right to non-interv.
International recognition of state sovereignty, territorial borders.
- Positive sovereignty (empirical statehood) – govs hv substantive control over their territory
No empirical statehood = Thr r regions/ territories within the state whr ppl don’t abide by the laws /
dk what the laws r. Gov doesn’t provide public gds e.g. hospital. Gov hv trouble controlling its
territory e.g. hv insurgent grp n gov isn’t able to do anyt abt it n lost control over that territory
 De facto states: States that r not recognized under international law tho they control
territory n provide governance
 Nation-state: s sovereign political association whose citizens share a common national
identity
Multinational state: a state consisting of multiple diff national grps under a single gov
 Future of the state
- States r as strong as ever
 Hv monopoly over the control n use of militaries,
 key actors in the economic production n international trade,
 citizens still identify mainly w their home states n r subj to authority n rules of the state, n
 ability of states to respond to new challenges hv grown thx to technological innovation
- becoming stronger
 making themselves felt in lives of their citizens in ways not alws obv
 recent rise of parties& movements in multiple countries campaigning in support of the
nationalist idea of the right of states to be free of external intv, or to place their interests
above those of other states
- Credibility& power of the state has fallen so far that the state system may act be in
terminal decline
Devs under way over wch states hv only limited control:
 Globalization: increased economic interdependence, changes in tech& communication,
growth of international mkts, spread of a global culture, n harmonization of public
policies in the face of shared/ common probs
 Ppl became more mobile: complex new patterns of emigration hv been driven by a
combi of econ need n personal choice, n mass tourism has broken down many of the
psychological barriers among states
 Expansion of interstate cooperation on a wide range of issues, wch diluted their indep
existence
States hv signed thousands of bilateral& multilateral cooperative treaties, hv come tgt in
numerous free trade blocs, n r linked by a network of intergovernmental orgs (IGOs)
responsible for encouraging n monitoring cooperation on a wide range of matters
Failing state: a state w weak governing institutions, oft deep internal divisions, n whr basic
needs of ppl r no longer met
 Why:
- Success is oft a matter of geography n good luck
- Environmental change
- Institutions – leaders follow the wrong kinds of policies
- Herbst: no external challenge (invasions) that might’ve compelled them to create viable
states
E.g.:
- Probs in collection of taxation
- Primitive nature of basic transport
- Shifting military balances
- Inability to overcome religious, ethnic, n national divisions
- Est a national political order over even relatively small distances is a difficult task
- Difficult external env whr neighbors wr alws a threat
- Continuous aggressive competition for trade& territory among changing states of unequal
size
- Internal strains > Neighbours want formally to annex parts of their territories
Some of the states that wr created out of the colonial empires.
 Nigeria – It was the most signif military force in Liberia but didn’t want to annex Liberia,
but to restore power to Monrovia
 South Africa – Not interested in expandint its territory but only in destabilizing its
neighbors to keep them from posing a potential threat
 Diminishing Value of size
World international economy is growing/developing quickly/significantly
->Developing countries hv been successful in capturing an increasing share of manufactured
exports
-> Export orientation is esp attractive
->Countries now produce for the world economy rather than for domestic mkts
->States no longer compelled to expand their territorial reach to get rich
->Ever-diminishing relative value of land n whats underneath it
->made the world a safer place for the week
- Countries don’t become rich tdy by mining a vast hinterland / by dint / large labour forces
- Its by possessing adv manufacturing & service sectors
E.g. Japan, Korea n TW succeeded despite they hd v little land n territory that they
possessed. Bereft of natural resources
 International Protection
- International community embraced the goal of boundary stability
To prevent application of the norm of self-det to a grp of ppl once their country hd become
indep
- World community allowed any country, no matter how underdeveloped its political&
economic institutions, to enjoy the full privileges of sovereignty
- E.g. many West African countries
 Growth& structure of African militaries r indicative of the relative peace they’ve
experienced on their external borders for most of the postindep period
 Challenge
- States fail within their existing boundaries
 Even failed states r tdy safe from formal takeover by their neighbours
 International community has no way of withdrawing recognition from a state once it has
received indep from its colonial power
E.g. The entire international community recognizes the political entity - Democratic
Republic of the Congo, tho its js a geographic expression
 International community is v reluctant to recognize new political units emerging out of
the ruins of old units
E.g. WB& IMF offered no assistance to Somaliland cos it didn’t hv a recognized status,
despite the gov in Hargeisa ws at least providing some service to its citizens
 Presence of the old, failed state reinforced a tendency to try to put the old political
arrangement back agn despite decisive evi that the national order cnnt work
E.g. Tho its obv that Somalia hd collapsed by Dec1992 when US/UN interv force ws being
planned, no one srsly considered trusteeship / other legal concepts other than continuing
the fiction that Somalia ws still a sovereign nation state
- Few incentives for local actors to help reestablish the old order
 Thrs now a set of powerful econ processes at work that allow the enrichment of leaders&
followers n don’t req them to reest. A national political order
 Ressurection of an even nominally capable national political order may interfere w the
patronage opps of some actors
 International community’s attachment to the current map of states-> outsides r more int
in reest. The old national order
 Asymmetry of interests-> outside intv to correct state failure appear perverse n
eventually fail
- Strong pressures for power to continue to fracture in failed states into smaller factions of
rebel grps
 Cause
World hv become safe for those who hold sway over smaller units +
International system doesnt seem to be willing to adjust boundaries acc to how power is
act expressed
 E.g.
Somalia - Mohamed Farah Aideed when confronting the US/UN forces spent far more
time trying to keep his own coalition tgt than fighting outsiders
 Potential intervenors respond – try to build up the maj protagonists so thrs sbd with
whom they can do business -> rival claimants may be ignored
E.g. American response to Laurent Kabila aft he took power
- State failure is likely to spread beyond territorial boundaries of a particular state
 1 factor that promote state failure – powerful political agents can est transnational
political& economic networks that lessen the need to strengthen the national political
apparatus
  Failed states r a convenient stage for neighbors to enter cos thrs econ assets to be taken /
opp to resolve pressing security concerns
 E.g.
DRC – alm a dozen neighbors hv been involved in the conflict
Liberia war slowly spread to Sierra Leone & Guinea, n ebbed back& forth
 Response
- *Increase congruence btw the way power is act exercised n design of units
 Many reasons for state failure can be traced to a fundamental gap btw how states govern
territory n what the boundaries n state system suggest that they sld control
 ->Alts ms work to reduce salience (prominence) of some current boundaries
- Breaking the intellectual logjam – provide the intellectual space necessary for persons
living in failed states to present alts
 e.g. ideas for new states, formulations for new divisions within states, or innovative ideas
on how subnational units can relate to the capital
 Given the quality of universities in failed states, international community might hv to
provide resources for indivs n think tanks to analyze alts to the nation state
 But once its clear that thrs at least some fluidity in the state system alts will come soon
- Decertifying old states
recognize officially that some states r not exercising formal control over parts of their
country n sld no longer be considered sovereign
 Move away from the notion that once a state achieves membership in GA, its sovereign
forever, no matter what happens within its boundaries
 Decertification wld be a signal that
 smt fundamental has gone wrong in a country,
 parts of the international community r no longer willing to continue the myth that every
state is alws exercising sovereign authority
 a country sldnt be accorded the usual privileges of sovereignty eg such prestigious
appointments as a rotating position on the SC
 Pro: Trigger initiation of new efforts at finding other leaders who r exercising control in
parts of the country
 Con: The ppl lose faith in their gov aft it has been decertified – downward spiral –
inability to bounce back to become a state again
- Recognizing / allowing for the creation of new sovereign nation-states
 Objection
 the basis of selection
Thrs v few “natural” boundaries that wld allow for the rational demarcation of land on
the basis of ethnic, geographic, or economic criteria
->recognizing new states might lead to a splintering process that wld promote creation
of ever-smaller units aka micro-state creation while entailing seemingly endless political
chaos.
BUT need to discern the specifics of situs on a case-by-case basis. Criteria for state
recognition must exist n sld be created.
 Possible “anarchy& disorder on a planetary scale”
  Inevitable disruption, mass movement of ppl w all the suffering that such movements
usually entail
BUT hv to be balanced agst profound harm that existing states do to their populations
everyday
E.g. Somaliland (the part of Somalia that declared itself indep aft Mogadishu ws left
without a gov when Siad Barre fell) is more the future than that or
Eritrea (province that simply goes its own way cos the central gov lacks ability even to
contest the succession)
 Dangers – possible instability& uncertainty
 Voracious opposition on the part of the many that’s thatve grown dependent on the
post-WW2 understanding of sovereignty
Sovereign control isn’t being exercised by central states in outlying areas
Subnational grps r alr exerting authority in certain regions
 Big state (vested interest) suppress to prevent the recognition -> Undermines progress
that small states hv achieved
E.g. China& TW
 Support
Recognizing& legitimating those grps->
International community hv opp to ask that they respect international norms regarding
human rights +
Bring them into the international economy
Adjust to reality n begin helping substantial no of ppl
Or else local rules who r act. exercising elements of sovereign control will continue to
survive on informal trade, oft involving drugs, guns, n poached animals, rather than
beginning initiatives to promote more routine econ dev capable of aiding all of the ppl
in their special region.
+give more legitimacy
 Criteria for recognition – to the core of the probs of state consolidation –
if the break-away area provide more political order on its own than is provided by the
central gov
Provide international recognition to the governmental units that r act providing order to
their citizens as opposed to relying on the fictions of the past.
->acknowledge whats happening on the ground while avoiding anarchy
- Decertifying& Recognizing – con – superpower interests
Criteria/benchmarks will be set up by international orgs e.g. UN but they are never entirely
completely neutral. Structural factors e.g. UNSC veto power
->politically&self-motivated benchmarks -> forward geopolitical ambitions of big states
e.g. US, China TW
Political Ideologies and Beliefs
Ideology: an organized set of related ideas abt politics that r related to n modify& support one
another
 Useful to ppl
- Personal POV / ease& satisfaction – helps us to make sense reasonably easily& quickly of
the varied political qns that come to our attention
- Public political activities
 In politics /political argument, we r typically concerned to convince others that a policy
we favor is the right one / attract as many allies as possible.
 We usually hv personal reasons for favoring the policy but theyre not usually gd public
reasons. Ideologies serve this purpose v well
 An ideology organizes ideas, but as it absorbs new ideas It itself evolves n is slowly modified.
 Ideologies r developed& maintained
We develop our ideologies in such a way that they fit our needs& predispositions, reflecting
what we want
But they also take on a life of their own n guide our decisions
 Ideology usually r det by an intellectual structure – a core value/ values, from wch a no of
disparate policy positions can be derived by deduction

Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism

 Liberalism
- Historical dev
 Contesting political& social hierarchies in Europe (monarchy& feudalism)
 17th century England – English Civil War; Glorious Revolution
 French Revolution
 Industrial Revolution
 European Enlightenment n the Age of Reason
- Key tenets (v+ freedom from power + low gov intv)
 The highest good of society = ability of all indiv members of society to develop their indiv
capacities to the fullest extent
 Ppl be maximally responsible for their own actions
By acting& feeling the consequences of such action we can dev our capacity to act
 Indiv liberty (priority)
 Inalienable rights of the indiv (&freedom)
 Human capacity to reason
(cnnt hv ppl make decisions for us->take away my freedom of choice n use my reason to make
my own choices)
(But humans don’t alws hv reasonable/ rational decisions!)
 ‘Do no harm’ principle
(limits indiv freedoms. We can exercise power over another person when we r seeking to
prevent this person from harming another / taking away another person’s ability exercise their
liberty;
All of us hv certain rights & hv capacity to reason-> our exercise of reason ms be limited. Cnnt
use our freedom to take away sbd else’s freedom)
  Indiv responsibility
(indivs r maximally responsible for their own actions n welfare. All hv the rights to make our
own decisions, even if we might make mistakes n we r responsible for those decisions n
mistakes)
 Equality of opportunity
(all indivs given equal opp to exercise their reason n pursue their own welfare)
- State& gov
 Democracy
 Intellectual freedom (including freedom of speech, religion, n press)
 Guard agst excesses / abuse of power
 Minimal gov
 Conservatism (Priority of community + Value of authority + strong gov)
- Reaction to instability & disruptions E.g. The Reign of Terror in France, Industrial
Revolution
- Key Tenets
The highest good of society = the maintenance of ordered community n of common values
 Community instead of individualism
 Value tradition n traditional social structures – identity, culture, stability, social
connections, morality
 Acceptance of diffs amongst indivs, hierarchies, differentiated roles
 Responsibilities
- American conservatism – maintenance of an efficient, minimally regulated economy, wch
has involved opposition to governmental regulation of ppl’s lives n of businesses, n fiscal
prudence in the form of balanced budgets.
Desire to maintain common values of morality& spirituality, n opposition to legalized
abortion.
- Societies n other grps of ppl r more than js sums of their parts, a grp of ppl creates greater
happiness through its existence n maintenance as a grp than its members cld individually
produce for themselves.
- Society sld hv order& structure n this structure sld be stable enough to let ppl know whr
they stand w.r.t. each other.
- An ordered grp develops n maintains religion n standards of morality.
- Ppl r imp as members, not indivs. What matters is how they fit into the web of mutual
responsibilities.
- Structure of the community sld be relatively stable& predictable so many easily fit into
their place in it
- Accepts& welcomes power – appropriate arrangements for power will ensure gd
treatment for everyone
 Responsibilities of power
 Liberalism – suspicious of power n seeks to limit it
Conservatism – power as binding n shaping its holder in gd ways
 Liberalism – the ppl/weak sld be given responsibility for their own affairs
Conservatism – responsibility of the powerful in a community to help the weak
 E.g.
 Late 18th Century Britain, under conservative regime, system of guaranteed min. income
1832, Liberals took power -> abolished this system.
 Feminism
Liberal – + - eliminate men’s domination of women
Conservative - - - traditional family, clear structure of authority
 Religion. Conservatism welcomes active encouragement of religion by state. Liberal no.
 Socialism
- Historical Context: Industrial Revolution, freedom
- Society consisted not of indivs but of classes
Class: a grp of ppl who share the same relationship to the means of production n who thus
dev a distinctive view of themselves n of the world
- Communism n Democratic socialism (split in the socialist movement)
 Communism - Fundamental transformation of society, Revolution
Economic equality + Freedom from exploitation
Karl Marx
 Alienation& exploitation
 Primitive Communism-> Slave societies-> Feudalism-> Capitalism
 Solution: a class-less, state-less society
Marx believed that this cld be achieved through political revolution, whr the working
class (proletariat) forcibly takes over the state from the hands of the elite (bourgeoisie)
 Collective ownership, Abolition of the state, eradicate social conflict by eradicating class
 Freedom from the possibility of econ inequality
 Actual manifestations of communist states tended to take authoritarian forms, including
command n state-managed economies (not emphasis of this mod)
 Democratic Socialism - Realis greater socio-economic equality within democratic systems
n within capitalism economies
 Socialists more willing than communists to settle for partial improvements for workers,
rather than holding out for a tot change
- Commitment to economic equality
Communism also believes in freedom from economic exploitation that’s endemic to
capitalism
- VS Liberalism
 Similar to liberalism – all persons deserve equal treatment by the state n sld hv equal opp
to dev themselves
 Diff from lib – socialism didn’t posit that ppl cld dev individually, n
socialism isn’t sus of the conc of power n of positive action by the state

Ideologies in Politics: US& SG

 USA: American Liberalism v. Conservatism
- Inconsistent mix of ideological elements
- American Liberalism - Indiv equality& liberty AND Minimal gov intv in economy& society
- American Conservatism
Minimal gov intv in econmy& society
Preservation of traditional values& common values morality& spirituality
 SG – single-mindedly seize opp for SG n avoid insidious dangers
- Pragmatism
 Ideologies as cognitive frames
 Ideologies in public political arguments

 Neoliberalism – adopted economic part of liberalism

- Cut back on gov regulation of economy, privatized state-run biz, made central banks more
indep of direction from gov n opened biz in their state to international competition by
lowering trade barriers
- E.g. Econ success of US in 1990s

 Factors that might account for / influence indiv political behaviour – beliefs& actions
- Environment
Includes political elements, elements of the social& cultural system, elements of the
economic order, physical features of the env
 Effects – might activate, repress, transform, amplify a person’s political behaviour
 Presents the indiv w stimuli n opp n obstacles to certain political beliefs& actions
 Framework that guides, n to some extent det, political behaviour
 E.g. Vietnam v US
Vietnam: voting is an obligatory act, a required gesture of support for the current political
leadership, rather than a genuine selection among candidates – no choice.
Vote cos sbd who doesn’t vote risks unwanted scrutiny by Communist Party authorities
US: voting has alws been a voluntary act, no sanctions for not voting-> citizens decides
whether her sense of civic responsibility / desire to affect the outcome on ballot choices
merits the effort of going to vote
 Political environment
 Effects on info abt politics
Myanmar – gov strictly limits info avail-> many citizens hv only minimal knowledge of
the current politics
US – interested citizen hv access each day to info abt worldwide political events
 Effects on indiv’s political party involvement
 Broader Cultural, social, economic, n physical environment – indirect but no less powerful
influence
- Agents of political socialization: major sources of political training& indoctrination shaping
an indiv’s political beliefs n values
Political socialization: processes through wch individuals acquire their beliefs n values abt
the political world
 Family (oft most powerful& lasting)
 B4 indivs r capable of making judgments for themselves, they’ve absorbed perceptions
abt the political world from conversations overheard within the family
 If the family is v hierarchical, the child might conclude that this is the appropriate
pattern of authority relationship s in the society
  If the family tends to discuss issues b4 it makes rules/ decisions, the child might feel
more strongly that she hv the right to participate actively in decisions, even in the
political world
 Schools (the state’s most valuable agent)
 Offer the opp for sustained& highly controlled contact w youth at the extremely
impressionable age when many political beliefs can still be molded
 Teacher is the authority figure who rewards thinking& behavior that conform to whats
deemed desirable by the society n who sanctions / withholds rewards from those who
fail to conform
 Every school system has rituals that support the political system. E.g. songs, chants,
activities that express allegiance to political leaders/ symbols
 Peer grps: friends& colleagues from social networks eg work, school, church, n clubs
 Media
For most adults – the maj source of political info
While most media context isn’t explicitly political, much of it does contain subtle info that
influences how one thinks abt politics n society
 Agenda setting: drawing ppl’s attention to some political phenomena rather than to
others
 Religion
 Political beliefs& actions can be influenced by religious beliefs that indivs sld act to
correct failures of secular society n sld promote religious views on issues whr the gov has
enacted unacceptable public policies.
 Ppl in some environments r so disillusioned w the conditions of their society that they
look to religion for a framework of beliefs& actions to improve those conditions
 Acceptance of the dominance of religious prescriptions over secular authority
 Culture (like media) can be extensively controlled by the dominant political order in a
society n can be used to reinforce the state’s view of the political world.
 Events – a specific event can act as a sudden n powerful agent of political socialization.
- Personal characteristics (demographic)
 filters that influence how the environment n the agents of political socialization affect an
indiv’s political behavior, the kinds of political phenomena to wch the person is exposed
 influence expectations that others hv regarding how the person ought to think n act
politically
- Personality n human nature
 Political personality: the deeper psychological dynamics inside the indiv that affect that
person’s response to political stimuli
 Political personality approaches can delve quite deeply, explaining the psychological
needs, drives, or experiences embedded in the person’s psyche that r the underlying
forces resulting in her political behavior.
 Biology n human nature
Democracy
Democracy & Elections
 Democracy: a form of gov organized in accordance w the principles of popular sovereignty,
political equality, popular consultation, n majority rule (Ranney)
 Popular sovereignty: the ultimate power to make political decisions is vested in all the ppl
rather than in some/ a small grp of them or 1 of them
- Problematic – protects authoritarian govs
Ranney:
- Ultimate Decision-Making Power
The nation is sovereign – it has full& exclusive legal power to make& enforce laws for the
ppl within its territory n under its jurisdiction
 In every sovereign nation the ultimate power over political decisions is located
somewhere in the political-governmental structure
- Vestment in the Ppl
 Principle of popular sovereignty doesnt logically req that all the ppl directly make all the
daily decisions of gov
 Ppl may lead, or ‘delegate’ part of their decision-making power to legislators, executives,
judges, or anyone else they wish
 The ppl r sovereign as long as they hv the ultimate power to decide wch decision-making
powers will be kept for themselves n wch will be delegated to whom, under what
conditions of accountability, n for what periods of time
- The People: all adult citizens (not all persons who happen to be arnd
- Sovereignty v. right to self det
Sovereignty is the outcome of the fight for right of self det (fighting for sovereignty)
 Participatory v. Accountable-Elites Models
- Participatory (Direct) democracy – direct participation of citizens in the decisions of gov
 Difficulties: large states, complex task of governing
- Accountable-Elites model (Representative democracy) – ppl r represented through elites
who r accountable to ppl
 Btr suited for modern states n societies
 [Ranney] Control is exercised through the competition of elites for office & power,
Popular selection of the winners by the ppl in periodic elections,
limitations on the power that any elite can exercise while in office,
Removal of the incumbent leaders whenever they fail to perform to the ppl’s satisfaction
 Elections n the 4 principles of democracy
- Popular sovereignty in representative democracies – rule by the ppl ^
- Popular consultation
 Public officials need to learn what the ppl want
Policy ms hv some kind of institutional machinery through wch public officials learn what
public policies the ppl wish adopted& enforced (Ranney)
 Public officials hv to act acc to the wishes of the ppl
Having ascertained the ppl’s preferences, public officials ms then put those preferences
into effect, whether the officials approve or not (Ranney_
 [Ranney] Logical consequence of popular sovereignty.
 When officeholders do what they, rather than the ppl, wish n do so without any
accounting. Danger of losing office, they, n not the ppl, r sovereign
 [Ranney] The essence of democracy is gov by the ppl n the decisions abt wch public
policies will best promote the ppl’s interests ultimately ms be made by the ppl
themselves, n not by any self-selected / nonaccountable ruling class of party leaders,
scientists, priests, military leaders, business ppl, or college professors.
- Popular equality: Each adult citizen has the same opp as every other adult citizen to
participate in the political decision-making process (Ranney)
 Universal suffrage & equal vote
 Eligibility to run for public office
- Majority rule: when the ppl disagree on an idea, the gov sld act acc to the wishes of the
maj rather than the minority
 Unanimity is alm nvr achieved-> most political decisions in a democracy eventually
become choices among alt policies, each of wch has some supporters among the
sovereign ppl (Ranney)
 Meaningful, free & fair elections
- Competitive elections 0 >1 choice for voters, possibility that incumbent might lose
- Gov is in the hands of elected representatives – no reserved domains of power
- Universal suffrage, equal right to vote – no intimidation, violence, fraud
 Problems/ Challenges
- Whether voters r able to make informed choices in elections
- Is the ppl able to hold gov accountable btw elections
- What if the govs acts in a tyrannical way aft being elected
- What if thrs tyranny of the majority
- Liberal critiques of democracy

 It is still a democracy even if not all eligible voters cast their votes in elections
Cos: voters can make the decision not to vote
 FALSE: It is not a democracy unless citizens r able to make public policy decisions
Cos: in an accountable-elites model, citizens elect representatives who do this work on
their behalf
-
Liberal Democracy
 Rule of law & constitutionalism
- Rule of law
 Everyone is equally subjected to the same laws
 Ensures rights
- Constitution: a set of fundamental n authoritative principles, rules, n procedures that the
gov has to abide by
 Limits the power of gov
 Constitutions can be codified/ uncodified
 What constitutions do
 Set out fundamental principles, values, n aspirations
 Define the nature of relationship btw the state & the citizen
 Set out the institutional structure n processes of gov
 Separation of powers n. the 3 branches of gov
- Diff functions hv diff powers
- System of checks& balances
- Branches of gov
 Executive
 Implement laws& policies of the state
 Head of state v. head of gov
 Functions:
Setting gov’s objs
Spokesperson for the ppl
Formulates policies n strategies
Supervises& controls a bureaucracy (i.e. civil service) that implements & administers
public policies
 Judiciary – interprets laws, det whether laws hv been violated, n type of remedies &
sanctions required (if any)
 Diff types of laws
Civil, criminal, international
Constitutional/ statutory law – power of judicial review
 Checks& balances
 Judicial indep
 Role of executive& legislature in judicial appointments
 Legislature – bicameral (2houses), Unicameral (single house)
 Functions
Represent the citizenry
Deliberation
Pass laws – able to vote proposed bills into law
Authorize budget
 Oversight of the executive
Scrutinize executive performance
Impeachment & removal of executive
->E.g. Process of impeaching& removing the US president
 1st Trump impeachment: Abuse of power & obstruction of Congress
2nd Trump Impeachment: Inciting insurrection
- Parliamentary v. Presidential Models: Fusion or Separation of Powers
 Parliamentary Model – Chief executive appointed from legislature (Fusion)
 No separation btw legislature & executive-> legislature n the Dominant party in legislature hv a
lot of power. Concentration of all policy-making power in the legislature
 Legislature not only makes the laws but chooses from among its members a cabinet to exercise
the executive powers n direct the administrative agencies
 Executive is from Parliament
 Decision-making n implementation:
Less antagonistic relationship btw the 2 branches->
easier for Parliament to pass bills proposed by the executive branch
+ easier for political parties & candidates to keep their election promises once they are in power
 Checks& balances:
1 political party can dominate both the executive& legislature
BUT can still hv checks& balances
E.g. SG Parliamentary System. Court still hv the power of Judicial review that allows courts to
check the other 2 branches. Parliaments – place whr MPs can ask cabinet ministers qns n debate
policies & laws, opposition MPs can ask difficult qns
 Presidential models of democracy – Chief executive appointed independently of
legislature (Separation)
 Executive& Legislature more separate from each other, can hv antagonistic relationship w each
other esp if President is not from largest party in legislature
 E.g. US: The last years of President Obama’s 2nd Term. Both the Senate n the House of
Representatives wr controlled by the Republican party while Obama was a democrat
 Decision-making n implementation:
difficulties finding agreement btw executive& legislate to get things done
Presidential candidates make promises during election campaign but find it hard to keep
promises
 Checks& balances:
The possibility of having legislature& executive controlled by diff parties-> easier for the 2
branches to check each other
 Indiv rights & freedoms
- Right to life& liberty, right to fair trial, freedom of expression, association, religion, etc
- Protected by the law
- Enjoyed by all
 Constitutional liberalism (ideology), liberal democracy (political system) [similar]
Liberal democracy is built on the ideas of constitutional liberalism
 Undemocratic liberalism – If thrs truly rule by the ppl, sldnt the ppl (n its elected gov) be
free to do whatever they want
- Y sld we protect certain rights if it’s the will of the ppl to violate these rights
- If a gov hv been democratically elected, doesn’t limiting the power of the gov be limiting the will of
the ppl
 (Zakaira) Tension btw constitutional liberalism & democracy – scope of governmental authority
Constitutional liberalism is abt the limitation of power
Democrcy abt tis accumulation& use
 Illiberal democracy (Zakaria) – democracies that doesn’t necessary protect indiv rights& freedoms,
don’t necessarily hv limited gov or the rule of law.
- Is it democracy / liberalism that we truly value?
What is truly imp is liberalism cos its liberalism that protects indiv rights, protects indiv from
coercion, prevents gov from abusing the ppl.
When we hv unquestioning commitment to democracy, its dangerous.
- Democracy without liberalism = a bad idea. no liberalism, democracy is v dangerous
 Be careful of promoting democracy in societies whr liberalism is not thr yet.
 Without liberal respect for indiv liberty / rule of law, democracy can -> worsen divisions
within societies esp those whr thrs high degree of fragmentation e.g. religious divisions -
>abuse of power, ethnic divisions, conflict& war.
 Political candidates / parties might appeal to religious sentiments n when they get into
power, they take away rights& freedoms of others.
Elected govs claiming to represent the ppl hv steadily encroached on the powers& rights
of other elements in society
In illiberal democracy, political leaders can use democracy to justify all sorts of things eg
violations of rights& freedoms by justifying it as the will of the ppl
 Liberals saw in democracy a force that cld undermine liberty
 Tyranny of the majority
Danger of oppression in a democracy came from the majority of the community.
The v essence of democratic gov consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority
 Tendency for a democratic gov to believe it has absolute sovereignty (that is, power) can
result in the centralization of authority, oft by extraconstitutional means n w grim results
- Liberal autocracy btr than illiberal democracy?
 Sldnt condemn non-democracies cos if these r liberal non-democracies
Thrs commitment to the rule of law n protection to rights& freedoms
 Under certain conditions democracy is unlikely to endure.
The constitution, rule of law, n protection of indiv liberty r more essential than
representative gov.
Rather than encouraging the intro of elections in many developing countries, Western
policy sld favor the est of ‘liberal autocracy’
The sequence of 1st liberal constitutionalism, then gradual democratization, can hv adv in
accustoming ppl to the req of self-gov
 Plattner: Cnnt separate democracy from liberalism
We can acknowledge that liberal& democratic traditions r distinct from each other, but
Thr r imp links btw them.
- ‘Liberal’ in ‘Liberal democracy’ refers to how rule is exercised. Gov is limited in its powers n
its modes of acting. 1st by the rule of law, n esp by a fundamental law/ constitution, nden
by rights of the indiv.
- Powerful intrinsic links btw electoral democracy n a liberal order
 Liberties ms be maintained at least to the extent necessary to make possible open
electoral competition
 Human rights mandated by the liberal tradition includes right to electoral participation.
E.g. Article 21 of UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
  Political doctrine at the source of liberalism – all legitimate political power is derived
from the consent of indivs, who r by nature not only free but equal
->democracy not the only legitimate form of gov, political community free to decide whr
it chooses to bestow legislative power – democracy or monarchy etc
->Liberalism didn’t originally insist on democracy as a form of gov, but it insisted upon the
ultimate sovereignty of the ppl
- Democracy req civil liberties
Democratic elections req guarantee of certain civil liberties – freedoms of speech,
association, n assembly – if they r to be genuinely free& fair.
- Liberalism has come to req democracy
Once ppl start accepting liberal ideas – eg that all humans r equally free – we will all start objecting
to having a eg monarch, rejecting minority elite rule over us-> demand right to choose gov n hold
gov accountable n any other political system apart from democracy will be seen as unjust from
liberal pov.
- No liberal autocracies r truly liberal. liberalism cnnt exist outside of democracy
These r autocracies that in 1 way or another deny the right to participate in politics, systems whr
indiv rights& freedoms r restricted eg opposition parties not allowed to form.
Gov is not held accountable to ppl -> what of rule of law?
- Modern democracy can ameliorate liberal fears – the accountable-elites model aka
Representative democracy instead of direct democracy.
Substitution of representative gov for direct democracy ws justified by the larger size of
modern states, wch made it impractical for the whole ppl to assemble
Elected representatives r expected to be superior to the average citizen, richer, btr
educated, n more talented than most of their fellow citizens.
 +: least likely to give in to the worse impulses. Make policies that r unpopular but the best. Avoid
the tyranny of the majority.
 -: eliminate the ppl from direct participation in self-gov. Constitute an aristocratic deviation from
political equality. Exclusions in tension w the underlying principle of liberalism.
- Cnnt promote liberalism without promoting democracy.
Sld hv realistic expectations of democracy& democratization
Not all countries wr successfully democratized in 1 attempt. Holding elections alone doesn’t
guarantee economic prosperity etc.
Countries that hv hd an earlier experience w democracy that failed r mor elikely to succeed in a
subsequent attempt than countries w no prev democratic experience.

 (Zakaira) Forces of democracy r the forces of ethnic harmony& peace – False!

- Mature liberal democracies can usually accommodate ethnic divisions without violence/
terror n live in peace w other liberal democracies.
 But without a background in constitutional liberalism, intro of democracy in divided
societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, n even war.
- Elections req that politicians compete for ppl’s votes.
 In societies without strong traditions of multiethnic grps/ assimilation, its easiest to org
support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines.
 Once an ethnic grp is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic grps
 Political competition so divisive can rapidly degenerate into violence
Democracy in Crisis
Democratic backsliding (Haggard & Kaufman): the incremental erosion of [democratic]
institutions, rules, n norms that results from the actions of duly elected govs
- Erosion: quality of democracy decline, but the system broadly maintained.
 Erosion from electoral democracy: Bolivia, Dominican Rep., Ecuador
 Erosion from liberal democracy: Brazil, Greece, Hungary, Poland, US
- Reversion: ended in outright reversion to authoritarian rule
 Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Russia, Servia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Zambia
 Reasons for backsliding (Haggard & Kaufman)
- Political polarization: a process through wch political elites n publics become increasingly
divided over public policy n ideology
 Affects functioning of gov n popular trust in gov & institutions
Whr opposing parties r polarized, gov is less likely to function effectively n more likely to
witness either stalemates/ swings btw policy extremes
-> popular disaffection n distrust of institutions tends to be higher
 More extremist/ populist parties
In polarized settings mainstream parties r more likely either to be captured by extremist
elements /
Displaced by new populist political movements arising from either right/ left
 Focus on winning at the expense of democracy
 When populist candidates n their voters view critics n political opponents as existential
threats rather than legitimate competitors, its easy for them to place greater value on
winning than on maintaining the constitutional order, including the integrity of elections
 Might be willing to do so even at the expense of democratic rules& norms. Willing to
violate democratic rules& norms to win.
 Sources – underlying social& political bases:
 Anxieties spurred by economic prises n structural changes induced by econ reforms
 Greater openness to trade
 Skills-biased technological change
 Racial, ethnic, n regional diffs
 Deeper ideological divides btw cosmopolitan n nationalist worldviews
 Autocratic leaders made appeals that exploited grievances n portrayed competitors as
enemies of the ppl, heightening divisions
 Effect of polarization on back-sliding will depend on whether (v)
 wld-be autocrats can capture the executive
 they manage to gain the legislature’s support for or acquiescence to the concentration
of their authority
- Weaker legislatures – weakened horizontal accountability – weaker democracies (system
more susceptible to backsliding)
increasingly less indep / autonomous from an autocratic executive branch
 Autocrats succeed in gaining executive office (control of executive branch)
-> Access to signif organizational resources that can be used to undermine democratic rule
-> command of the bureaucracy, military, n security apparatus
-> endless opp to influence the media n the economy
  Consolidation of autocratic control depends on becoming president / PM + cooperation
of legislature through support of acquiescent ruling parties/ coalitions
Extent of democratization in post-communist countries ws highly correlated w index of
legislative strength that included oversight powers, freedom from executive control, n
authority in specific policy areas.
 Gaining a legislative maj augmented the executive’s power in ways:
 Eliminated an imp source of oversight-> easier for the executive to misuse bureaucracy
to deploy public resources to target political enemies
Whr horizontal checks wr weak, corruption flourished. Crony capitalism is a feature of
backsliding.
 Legislatures expanded& extended executive powers
E.g. through fundamental constitutional amendments / drafting of new constitutions
that concentrated power in the executive
That power came in diff forms, direct& indirect, ranging from increased executive
discretion to greater authority in making judicial appointments to diluted indep of the
legislature.
 Compliant legislatures acquiesced in steps that directly weakened/ dismantled
institutions of horizontal accountability
W judiciary& legislature itself as key targets, the executive’s power soared.
- Incremental democratic backsliding
Democratic backsliding is incremental in nature, wch provides tactical adv to incumbents.
Harder to detect
 Gradual subversion of democratic institutions allows
incumbents eg Illiberal executives who rch office through elections
who typically test normative limits through piecemeal initiatives to weaken constraints
making each subsequent step easier to pursue
to slowly accrete powers,
making the process difficult to detect n counter til its too late
 The course of the backsliding process is not foreordained but rather
is contingent on how n when an autocrat improvises n exploits avail openings
 (^)Autocrats enlist legislatures to weaken horizontal checks on executive discretion->
‘collapse of the separation of powers ‘
Curtailing the indep of judiciary is key.
 Aspiring autocrats deploy the power of appointment n bureaucratic reorganization to
undermine a range of institutions that normally serve to limit executive discretion n
provide oversight
e.g. central banks, civil-service commissions, n specialized agencies designed to provide unbiased info
Without these checks – esp from judiciary - autocrats can more easily violate their
opponents; democratic rights& liberties
 Attacks on rights r not aimed only at the media/ opposition; theyre oft used to rally
support agst scapegoats on the other side of the us-vs-them divide
->Targeted grps r oft depicted as not being legitimate members of the national
community but nevertheless enjoying special benefits n protections while corrupting the
fabric of society
  Democracy ultimately rests on integrity of the electoral system
Manipulation of electoral authorities ws pivotal in many countries that regressed to
authoritarian rule
Thrs also legal means on wch empowered executives n pliant legislatures can rely to keep
their hold on power while eating away at voters’ faith in the system e.g. gerrymandering
 Measures
- Confronting political polarization – acknowledge genuine anxieties n social grievances that
give rise to polarization in the 1st place + build more inclusive politics
- Deter autocratic capture of legislatures
Help opposition parties preserve institutional footholds; Electoral monitoring n assistance;
support opposition parties more directly
- Incrementalism – dev early-warning systems
Backsliding in USA
 Populist Challenge
- Populism – antagonistic relationship btw the ‘people’ n the ‘other’
 ‘The people ‘= virtuous, but oppressed
Trump: we are transferring power from Washington, D. C., n giving it back to u, the
people
 The ‘Other’ – Enemy of the ‘People’. Elite. Hopelessly corrupt.
Privileged elite that benefits from the current system at the expense of the ppl n seeks to
perpetuate this oppressive system to maintain the privileges n their hold on power.
Responsible for suppressing the voice of the ppl
Accused of humiliating the ppl, stereotyping the ppl as being ignorant / backwards.
 Anti-elite
Trump: For too long, a small grp in our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of gov,
while the ppl hv borne the cost
 Anti-status quo, anti-establishment, sense of crisis & need for change
Lost of faith in the status quo cos the status quo works agst the interests of the ppl.
The ppl need to be heard urgently cos the establishment/elite hv created a system so
destructive that we need an urgent& decisive break from the status quo
 Anti-pluralist
Populists oft understand the ppl in a kind of unitary terms. Those who r part of the ppl
all hv the same identity, the same values n same interests. The ppl r all oppressed n
seeking to regain their voice n dignity& liberty
Populists don’t recognize legitimate diffs btw/ within the ppl
- Populist leaders
 Special, direct connection to the ppl
 Ordinary indivs w extraordinary attributes
 Heroic figures fighting agst the enemies of the ppl
 Thus
->Moralising discourse n demonizing of political opponents (reject differences& diversity)
->Criticism of populist leaders oft seen by followers as evi of virtue
The more the populist leader’s opponents mock/ criticize this figure, the more this
figure’s followers might identify w this populist leader. Common oppressor. Evi that this
populist leader is subjected to the same types of oppression as the ppl.
The v things the populist leader was criticized for then becomes symbols of
identification n even pride amongst followers
->Populist leaders speak what the ppl don’t dare say – giving the ppl a voice
- Populism an ideology?
 Cas Mudde: populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale
(general will) of the people”
Mudde: Populism is a thin ideology
Populism doesn’t act hv mch substance in terms of policies& progress-> populism can
be blended w diff ideologies from both left& right of the ideological spectrum
  Benjamin Moffitt: populism isn’t an ideology but a political style
A way of performing politics that shapes how populist leaders& their followers relates
to each other, the rest of the world, n their perceived enemies
- How populism change liberal democracy
 Recap: democracy – popular sovereignty, popular consultation, political equality, majority
rule
Danger of the ‘tyranny of the majority’
Connecting liberalism w democracy: protecting indiv rights& liberties, limiting gov n maj
rule, accepting diversity
 Populism
 Unaccepting of pluralism n diversity – myth of homogeneity (William Galston)
 Rejection of political debate n compromise.
Galston: populism is inherently divisive& exclusionary -> ppl represented by the heroic
populist leader cnnt n must not lose their fight agst the enemies of the ppl
If the system seem rigged agst them / system puts restraints on the populist leader /
populist gov that’s preventing the ppl’s will from being implemented, then these
restraints will hv to give way before the ppl’s will v
 Willingness to undo limits on gov n majority rule
Populist leaders r oft willing to dismantle democratic checks& balances in gov to ignore
laws& regulations that govern those in power. Co s these constraints r part of the status
quo establishment
 Populism accepts the principles of popular sovereignty& democracy but is skeptical abt
constitutionalism n liberal protections for indivs n minority grps
 They claim liberal norms& policies weaken democracy n harm the ppl-> liberal
institutions that prevent the ppl from acting democratically in their own interest sld be
set aside.
 Populism might become a justification for moving away from the usual democratic way
of doing things, moving away from the democratic status quo
 Populism seems to be a rejection of many liberal tenets that r seen as essential to the
proper functioning of democracy tdy
- Rise of Populism
 Backlash to dominant liberalism Populist movements r a reaction n a rejection of liberal
ideas that hv been dominant in politics& economics in the last few decades.
Based on perceptions that the promises of democracy n econ liberalism haven’t been
realized. Galston.
Economic liberalization
Open borders to trade& investment, deregulation of various econ sectors
-> thrs gnna be winners& losers. Some who r more well-connected, educated n mobile,
r able to make use of opps created by globalization. Those who r less privileged oft feel
as if they’ve been left behind. Immigrants r perceived to hv benefited from our system
in a way that many of us cldnt. Such inflows of migrants r also perceiced as undermining
identity& unity of the ppl
Elite justifications
 Loss of faith in the elites
 Role of media & the internet – scandals, news headlines:
Personal lives n work of political elites come under increasing scrutiny by the public->
any sort of scandals in elites’ personal/ professional lives / inappropriate behavior,
comes to light mch more easily n it gets picked up -> many sensationalist hate lines n
undermines faith in this elite.
‘De-mystification’ of political office:
Ppl nowadays can find all sorts of info, opinions n citicisms on political issues online->
when we think abt decisions that politicians might hv to make, those in office oft don’t
seem so superior to the rest of us n their work doesn’t seem that difficult.
Ppl get the sense that they hv a v gd grasp on these policy issues n oft think they hv a
btr solu than the on offered by the gov -> representatives seem incompetent / working
agst ppls’ interests
- William Galston: plunges democratic societies into endless series of moralized zero-sum
conflicts. (morals. Populists say elites r evil, ruin society etc. emotional language in speech&
campaign etc. Ref newspaper/ speeches)
- Response to populist challenge
 Identify n counter threats to liberal institutions
Political reforms r needed to restore ability of liberal-democratic institutions to act
effectively
 Distinguish btw policy disputes n regime-level threats
 Liberal democrats ms make their peace w national sovereignty
- Populism& Democracy
 Populist threat to democracy (Galston)
 Relationship btw populism& democracy
Populism enabled by democracy
Haggard & Kaufman: populism= a majoritarian conception of democratic rule that’s
ultimately illiberal
Populism – part of democratic debate? Or a disruption of democratic politics?
 Populism bases its appeal on some key pillars of democracy, notably populist
sovereignty, popular consultation n majority rule.
But it rejects some key liberal tenets of indiv liberty, limits to gov n limits to majority
rule.
 Populism also highlights challenges in representative democracy
 Executive Power & Crisis
- Growth of executive power
Despite checks on executive power by judiciary& legislature, executive tended to be the
most powerful of the 3 branches of gov. In democracies, executive power tends to grow
over time. Reasons:
 Complex task of governing: Executive hv greater capability n more resources
 Members of parliament typically don’t hv same capability as executive in terms of
expertise& resources to acquire info n draft policy positions
 Executive branches/ cabinet ministers etc r able to draw upon the state bureaucracy n
this bureaucracy provides the executive w a lot of support& info that gives the
executive an edge over the legislature.
  Legislature taking a more reactive role whr executive proposes stuff.
 Executive’s political influence
 Organised interest grps / lobby grps tend to lobby the executive rather than legislature
cos lobby grps r aware of the power of the executive branch
+ easier n more efficient to lobby key indivs in the executive eg president / relevant
cabinet minister than to lobby enough members of the legislature in order to be able to
influence decision making in gov.
When certain influential lobby grps support the chief executive, it also gives the
executive an adv over the legislature
 Ability to rally public support Executive oft finds it easier to gain public support
Chief executive might be btr able to cultivate sense of loyalty amongst the ppl. Ppl
generally find it easier to support a person in the form of the chief executive instead of
an institution/ branch of gov like the legislature, wch comprises of diff political parties,
personalities, positions.
->Executive hv inherent adv in terms of getting public opinion on their side. Esp the case
in political systems whr president is sbd who does enjoy a lot of support independently
of the political party
 Executive usually has a more streamlined& unified structure compared to legislature
In a democracy whr the system is politically competitive, parliaments r usually comprised
of diff political parties that disagree w each other on all sorts of things. Compare that to
the executive, executive finds it easier to act decisively compared to legislature that’s oft
v divided.
 Institutionalized checks on the executive might not work well
Divisions within legislature (Parliament that hv diff political parties)
might mean that institutionalized check on the executive that rely on the legislature
being able to make certain decisions js might not work well
e.g. US Presidential Trump impeachment (Requirement to remove President from office -
simple maj in House of Representatives, 2/3 majority in Senate-> v hard for articles of
impeachment to go through both houses of the legislature successfully )
when thrs divided legislatures, diff political parties in the legislatures might act block
attempts to hold the objective to account
->while impeachment is meant to be an imp check on power of executive, in practice, its
not necessarily a genuine check on presidential power
 Times of crisis-> growth in executive power
Ppl look for a heroic figure eg president/ PM-> becomes symbol of the nation n
Crisis oft req quick action-> ppl tend to look for indivs who can act quickly& decisively.
This person tends to be from the executive instead of legislature
Even aft crisis is over, these powers tend to stay put
- Executive power in US during crises
 Executive tends to take the lead (autonomy & authority)
 Quick, decisive action
 Decisions might be based on sensitive info – cnnt be made public
 Commander-in-Chief & war
 Legislature
  Acts more slowly – process of deliberation& debate
 Might not hv access to v sensitive info, n wldnt be able to discuss such info in public
 Demonstrating patriotism
- Checking executive war-making powers in US
US Constitution ‘War Powers Clause’ – Congress (legislature) hv power to declare war
->US president cnnt unilaterally make a declaration of war that wld bring the US into
military conflict w another state
1973 War Powers Resolution
 CW – US military involvement globally, growth of executive power & discretion
 Increasing Congressional oversight over the use of armed forces
- Growth of executive power
 War & emergencies
Executive resistance to limits on executive war-making powers
E.g. Pres Harry Truman: KW = police action
Excluding joint military exercises from the resolution
2020ne strike killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad
 Emergencies
 Declaration of national emergency – gives the executive additional powers
 US National Emergencies Act – allows president to declare emergency
 Proclamation 7463 of 14Sep2001 – Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of
Certain Terrorist Attacks. In response to 9/11 attacks, but still in force tdy
- Emergencies n Congressional oversight
 Little Congressional oversight - National Emergencies Act
 National emergencies expire aft a yr, unless the president renews them by notifying
Congress
 Congress is supposed to review emergency acts every 6 months
 Declaration of emergency can be used by executive for political purposes
E.g. 15 Feb 2019 Trump administration declares emergency to fund border wall
- Post-911 Authorization for Use of Military Force
 Crises & rally around the flag effect – can lead to increase in executive power
 E.g. Authorization for Use of Military Force, September 18, 2001, Public Law 107-40 (US
Congress): “... the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.”
 Broadly interpreted by the executive to allow the executive to act against
groups without connections to 9/11 attacks (e.g. ISIL)
Authoritarianism: a form of gov in wch the ruling authority imposes its values n policies on
society regardless of the ppl’s wishes
 Characteristics
- Techniques of making decisions by public discussion n voting r largely / wholly supplanted
by the decrees of those in authority
- Ruler r not restrained by constitutional limitations n can impose whatever policies they
choose
- The authority the ruler claims doesn’t necessarily nor usually derive from the consent of
the governed but rather from some special quality – some unusual personal charisma /
special knowledge – that such ruler alone is thought to possess
- Ppl cant vote out those in power, no free& fair competitive elections. Oppositions no opp
to win power through elections. Siginif suppression of descent & opposition.
Undemocratic. Political leaders not made accountable to the ppl, theyre able to ignore
wishes of the ppl regularly cos the ppl cant remove the leaders through elections n ability
to criticize leaders is significantly restricted.
 Who rules in an authoritarian state. Ruling authority can vary from state to state
- Absolute monarchy e.g. Saudi Arabia
- Personal rule e.g. Robert Mugable, Zimbabwe
1 indiv who dominates gov& society. Use a cult of personality to legitimate their rule,
create a larger than life image of themselves as hero or father figure.
- Ruling parties Political party that is v dominant n acts in undemocratic ways. Oft combined
w strong personal rule. e.g. CCP
- Military gov Council of military officers e.g. Myanmar under military rule.
Military taking power oft through some kind of coup, nden oscillating btw civilian& military
rule.
- Theocracy e.g. Iran aft the Iranian Revolution
Religious leader rules.
 Totalitarianism (v. Authoritarian) Characterized by total control over all aspects of life. Rule is
usually guided / justified by an ideology n its accompanied by a high degree of violence
used.
E.g. Stalin’s Soviet Union, North Korea
Distinction:
Authoritarianism not totalitarian – states might control the political space but hv more space
& indep for indivs in other aspects of life e.g. indivs more free to persue economic activities
they choose / adopt diff political ideologies. Goal of ruling elite is to stay in power, not
heavily ideological.
 Hybrid regimes – possess some features of democracies, but also significant undemocratic
features
Some elements of democracy, some rule of law / political equality, political leaders publicly
espouse a commitment to democracy (cos in tdy’s world democracy is seen as the only form
of legitimate gov)
Despite these, key defining characteristics of democracy are also undermined. Also
authoritarian elements whr the system is manipulated to keep an elite in power e.g.
elections may be held regularly but theyre not free& fair.
 Closed v. Electoral Authoritarianism E.g. China.
- Closed authoritarian: those “in which a country’s leaders are not selected through national
elections, opposition political parties remain banned, political control is maintained
through the use of repression, and there is little space for a free media and civil society”
 no public political contest (Von Soest & Grauvogel)
 eg single-party regimes
 Preclude any opposition no public political competition
Opposition political parties remain banned
no opposition political parties to compete in elections
 Country’s leaders not selected chosen by the ppl through national elections
 Political control maintained through use of repression
 Little space for free media n civil society Closure of political space
no indep media / v little space for such actors to publicly criticize the gov, usually high
degree of coercion used
 Internally within small political elite, there may be power struggles, but in public sphere,
no political competition allowed e.g. elections not held.
- Electoral authoritarianism: existence of the nominally democratic institution of elections n
– at least formally – allow open political contestation.
 Unlike closed authoritarian regimes, electoral authoritarianism opens up political positions of
executive& legislative power aka aka highest office to multiparty elections
->even if elections r fraudulent, it allows citizens a stronger oversight.
 Regular elections under non-democratic conditions
 Mix of democratic procedures n authoritarian practices’
 Might hv opp parties that contest elections, but only on paper as its still authoritarian not
democratic system.
 Depending on how dominant the incumbent is, n the strength of the opposition
Hegemonic e.g. North Korea Competitive eg Hungary
Elections almost entirely an Regular Elections w more meaningful competition
authoritarian facade, meaningless held but in undemocratic conditions, uneven playing
Dominant candidate/ party wins field whr ruling elite hv big advantage.
elections by wide margins Elections r more politically signif, less meaningless
than in Hegemonic
- Opposition activity severely - Elites Leaders unable to completely ignore
constrained due to democratic rules, more likely to manipulate
widespread intimidation of democratic rules to their adv
opposition n severe electoral - E.g. Instead of using brutal force to suppress
fraud. descent, use legal tools e.g. laws, co-opt judges
Opp parties r so limited by in court so the court will alws take the gov’s side.
the state so much so that Instead of taking control of all media outlets,
theyre not able to participate direct a lot of funding towards pro-gov media
in political debate / outlets.
campaigning. - But democratic laws still thr so still opp for
- Voter intimidation, electoral opposition to challenge, win some seats in gov.
fraud. - Keeping a façade of democracy
 - Regardless of lvl of popular
dissatisfaction / support,
everyone knows that the
incumbent is alws gg to win
elections by a v large margin
Sit back and don’t have to worry Gov still hv to take opposition & elections srsly.
abt elections at all

 SG Hegemonic last time, recent yrs more Competitive EA

Hegamonic – Operation Coldstore etc
 Electoral authoritarianism v. Electoral democracy
Authoritarian: Elections not free/fair cos of no lvl playing field.
Democracy: yes^ + Institutions more democratic

Authoritarian resilience & Strategies

(despite international& domestic pressures for change) foster Regime durability
 Institutions of elections – give impression of ‘democracy’/ ‘participations’
 Provide arena for authoritarian leaders to co-opt various opposition political forces into
the coalitions to reduce resistance to their rule n broaden their support base
 Create new political institutions / adapt existing ones.
rely on control of the state n its infrastructural power& capacity to stabilize n strengthen
their rule
 Legislatures, Ruling parties
 Political economic conditions like the autocrats’ embrace of capitalist dev n foreign aid n
revenue from exporting natural resource wealth
 Repressive regime may restrict access to state welfare benefits n jobs for those perceived as
opposing the gov
Authoritarian strategies (Gerschewski)
 Repression, eg physical violence, judicial repression
But: costly to maintain over long periods
- Use of threat of force
- High intensity repression
 Target large no of ppl, prominent indivs, major institutions
E.g. Belarus hit squads
 High visibility – can get a lot of national & international attention
 More common in closed authoritarian / hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes
- Low intensity repression
  E.g. surveillance, low profile harassment of opposition, denying employment to activists,
stopping electricity to communities perceived as opposition supporters
 Low visibility – easier for the gov to get away with these things.
 Make it inconvenient for ppl to criticize the gov / contest the power
 Co-optation: the capacity to tie strategically-relevant (or a grp of actors) to a regime elite
Elite co-optation n dispensing patronage
- Identify those who may be significant assets to me / who may pose a signif threat to the
income elite, nden persuade them to cooperate n work with me.
- E.g. of strategically-relevant grps: military, economic elite, those w influence, strategically
relevant segments of the population
- Through:
Sharing of spoils (patron-clientelist politics) – elite & mass forms (need a lot of $)
Policy concessions e.g. support certain industries
- But: autocrats may become vulnerable to declines in the resources under their control n
maintaining support is vexed n complex task
 Legitimation: strategy used to seek legitimacy (Grauvogel)
- Authoritarian legitimation: Efforts used by authoritarian govs to convince an audience that
they r indeed the right & proper authorities/ rulers of the state
- Audience (oft multiple)
International audience, elite audience, Von Soest & Grauvogel: national audience
- Why legitimation: offensive& defensive purposes (Ngoun)
 Prevents popular revolution Get active & maybe passive consent of the ppl (3rd dimension
of power)
 Costs& risks of Repression
 Financial costs
To repress successfully, u oft need to coercive forces on your side e.g. army, police n
security forces. Its expensive to maintain the security forces n keep them on your side
 Potential disruption to economy
 Attracts international attention
Other states might on intervene directly but might impose sanctions that make life
harder for the authoritarian leaders
 only works for as long as the gov has the ability to repress
(keep coercive forces on their side, ability to pay the cost of repression n control the
coercive forces. If loose the control of the army, can no longer repress)
 Costs & risks of Co-optation
 Sharing spoils requires resources
need to hv spoils to share. What is sbd is rich n btr able to share their spoils n get ppl
on their side.
 Risk of dissatisfied actors
Strategically relevant actors who cant be co-opted no matter how hard u try.
Opponents who hv decided they want to be the new patron
- Expression of public support of gov performance applied to liberal democratic regimes cos
of their effectiveness in managing state affairs n in delivering modernization projs
 - Some regimes r not democratic but effective in managing state administration n
modernization projs
- Several authoritarian regimes allowed some political opening – ‘hybrid regimes’
e.g. permitting opposition political parties to contest elections, provides a semblance of
electoral democracy n impression that their rule is based on popular consent
- Inward/ ‘self-legitimation’ strengthens collective identification n cohesion among members
of ruling elites – crucial for regime stability
- Authoritarian legitimation tends to rest on multiple Claims to legitimacy (Van Soest &
Grauvogel)
When these claims diff dimensions r invoked n enacted tgt at the same time, they tend to
strengthen overall basis of autocrats’ legitimacy power
also cos some dimensions may work as functional equivalents, thereby offsetting
weaknesses in respect to other dimensions
 Can be instrumental manipulations to safeguard political power
/ genuine belief among the political elite (that they r the rulers)
[Not mutually exclusive]
-> strategic value n may express elite members’ true convictions abt their perceived
entitlement to rule -> enable a regime to maintain its entitlement to rule
-> shape the way in wch a regime implements its rule, n its susceptibility to internal crises
n external pressure
 Strong claims to legitimacy enhance elite cohesion.
The more pronounced the process of legitimation, the more likely it is to create
collective identification-> increases bonds among the ruling elite.
 Well-crafted claims to legitimacy -> more likely that an authoritarian regime will
successfully steer the broader population’s perceptions of legitimacy
 The respective legitimation strategies det who can criticize the regime n in wch ways.
This agenda-restricting function may serve to marginalize anti-gov actors.
 Claims
- Performance-based / Output-based:
Regime legitimacy that stems from a regime’s claim/ deliberate citation of its
achievements in being successful at producing socio-economic gds/ security for its citizens,
satisfying citizens’ needs, fulfilling societal demands eg material security /
Employs claims of achievements in the absence of real improvements
 State org equal redistribution n access to certain public gds , n presentation of a regime
as a guarantor of stability, territorial integrity / state building aft a civil war
 Use proxies eg econ growth, inflation, n UnE. Output-based growth & dev, securing
political stability.
 Economic, distributional n security performance
- Identity-based
 (v) Foundational myth + Ideology: stress the prospective societal order, the
transcendental nature of the regime / simply the superiority of a nation
 Foundational myth
 Esp strong solidarity ties r est during periods of violent struggle eg war, revolutions, n
liberation movements, wch r oft used as powerful legitimation narratives
  Parties that emerge from a successful national liberation struggle oft claim an
entitlement to steer the country’s future based on past achievements n a fusion of the
(former) liberation movement n the state
 Politicians/ parties involved in the est of a polity + their recurrent& prominent reference
to it to boost their domestic legitimacy
 Ideology e.g. only true communist party / only true nationalist
 Regime’s teleological proclamation of an ‘official’ belief system against wch all political
behaviour is assessed. Belief system intended to create a collective identity & sometimes
specific societal order / Righteousness of a given political order
 This ideology can comprise ‘macro’/ ‘micro’ claims n narratives other than grand
ideologies eg communism
 Include references to nationalism& religion + political ideologies e.g. only true
communist party / only true nationalist
 Personalism-based – focus on personal qualities of ruler to boost their appeal among
population n political elite
 Charisma, leadership qualities
- Procedural – rational-legal authority. democratic procedures
 Rule-based mechanisms for handing over power through ‘orderly’ process
 Democratic through elections
Authoritarian gov can claim they wr elected through the right procedures e.g. elections.
Other may say that elections wr unfair, but they r gnna claim they wr free & fair n claim
they hv procedural legitimacy
 Hereditary power transfer – “I am the legitimate monarch cos I am the legitimate son of
my father who was the monarch”
 Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes go to considerable lengths to operate within
a legalistic framework despite the many arbitrary elements in their exercise of authority.
- International engagement
 Disproportionate international engagement used to bolster domestic legitimation, esp for
regimes that can hardly draw on domestic sources of legitimation
 E.g. international negotiations / regional org, provide global public gds n acting as an
ideological ‘model exporter’
 The need to defend the country agst an external enemy
 Legitimation strategy & regime Diff forms of authoritarianism n their claims to legitimacy
- Closed authoritarian regimes: identity-based claims
Ideological foundations n references to the genesis of a – frequently new – nation and to a
heroid ‘father of the nation’ remains particularly salient for those regimes that attempt to
inhibit every opposition.
(less able to use procedural cos these days only democratic procedures r seen as legitimate
n they cant claim democratic legitimacy)
- Electoral authoritarian: Procedure-based
More likely w competitive authoritarianism than hegemonic electoral authoritarianism
Regularly hold elections, even if undemocratic, still can make use of the existence of
elections to claim legitimacy
 - Electoral democracy – procedure-based claims, but less (strategies slightly weaker) than
electoral authoritarian
They hv free& fair elections but use procedure-based claims less oft cos their procedural
legitimacy is less contested
- All authoritarian regimes – performance-based legitimacy (even if performance is poor)
 Claims of legitimacy r double-edged sword
- Enable exercise of power
- Restrain exercise of power, make regime vulnerable when disjuncture to reality becomes
too stark n adjustment fails.
E.g. Procedure-based legitimacy claims may spur DD for real democratic change.

Case Study: Cambodia

 Von Soest & Grauvogel: hegemonic authoritarian 1993-2010
- 1975-79: Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime
- 1978-79 Vietnam’s military intv removes Pol Pot from power
Sets up Vietnam-supported Cambodian gov, w Hun Sen as PM from 1985
- 1980s Cambodian Civil War & 1991 Paris Peace Accords
- 1993 UN-administered elections
Incumbent (Cambodian People’s Party, CPP) forces a power-staring arrangement w
Funcinpec Party
 Repression& Co-optation
- Repression
 Banning of CNRP (Cambodia National Rescue Party) in 2017
 Arrest& imprisonment of dissidents
 Curtailing media indep
- Co-optation – sharing the spoils
 Money & financial opp
 Offering political power & positions
 Offering resources& dev
- What allows effective repression& co-optation
 Bureaucratic power – control of state institutions allows repression& co-optation
 Personalised rule of Hun Sen – centralization of power, personal networks
 Legitimation strategies in Cambodia
- Nation’s saviour – identity-based – personalism, ideological, foundational
- Brilliant n competent leadership – Performance, identity-based – personalism
- Elections – Procedure
- Man of merit – identity-based – personalism
- National heritage defender – identity-based – ideological, international engagement
- Online populism – identity-based – personalism
Authoritarian Collapse
 Externally imposed democracy
 Eg. US intervention into Iraq 2003 – seen as western imperialist power in the region. Negative
impact on US global reputation. Intv violated international law, Iraq’s sovereignty. Seen as did so
for self-interest
Oft runs into trouble (oft unsuccessful):
- Opposition from population domestic grps
 Intervention esp military oft seen as violating sovereignty of the state: right to non-intv,
right to self-det.
 External imposition seen as imperialist exercise of power.
- Opposition from within the intervening state’s population
 Can lead to a lot of instability& violence-> this kind of intv potentially v costly in terms of
$ & cost of life.
 For democracies, own population might not want to bear the costs of this war waged
elsewhere.
- Military interventions by US/dictatorships lead to a strategically signif reduction in
democracy relative to what cldve been expected if thr had been no intv (clark et al)
- Tho its likely to produce the trappings od emocracy, eg elections& legislatures, intv by
democratic states, n esp US, fails to increase the lvl of democracy in target countries to the
point at wch they’ll be considered democratic. (clark et al)
 Democratic transition DIFF FROM Democratic consolidation (strengthening so no backsliding)
 Most real-world cases r characterized by botto-up + top-down transition process.

Bottom-Up Democratic Transitions – Popular revolution where ppl rise to overthrow an

authoritarian regime, leading to democratization
Extremely rare even when the ppl prefer democracy over authoritarianism.
Oft not predicted in advance by outsiders but seem inevitable in hindsight
 Popular revolution req collective action
- Needs enough ppl to participate in order to succeed achieving public gds
- Public gds: non-excludable & non-rivalrous
- Democracy is a form of public gd-> attempts at collective action to being it abt suffer from
a free-rider prob
 Collective Action prob: Free-riding
- Participating in popular revolution is costly n potentially risky (takes up time& energy + thrs
a risk that u might be punished for participation)-> difficult to get indivs to participate in
protest
- Indivs hv strong incentives not to participate in mass protests/ demonstrations calling for
democratic reform n instead free ride on the actions of others
- The end result is that public displays of opposition r extremely rare in dictatorships ->
authoritarian elites usually seem, at least on the surface, to hv a strong hold on power
 Explaining stability of authoritarian regimes
- [^Prev lecture] authoritarian strategies & authoritarian resilience
- Free rider prob
 Indivs know they’ll benefit from democratization even if they didn’t contribute to the
collective action->indivs oft don’t participate in popular revolutions despite wanting
democratization
- High costs of participation – Authoritarian repression
 Use of force & coercion in authoritarian systems
 Fewer limits to the gov’s power in authoritarian systems
(^lect on gov n its institutions – separation of powers, checks& balances) missing / a lot weaker in
authoritarian system.
 Forms of collective action eg protests, strikes, revolutions, lobbying, n the like r less likely
to be successful when the no of grp members required for success is signifly smaller than
the no of ppl who will benefit from the success
 Grps leaders will be more successful if they tell their members that success depends on
participation of nearly all of their members rather than just a few of them.
 Political parties try to convince their supporters that all of their votes r crucial to their
electoral success.
- Unpredictability of popular revolutions
 Preference falsification – indivs don’t reveal their true preferences publicly due to fear of
repression
 Signif dangers associated w publicly opposing dictatorships-> indivs who dislike
authoritarian regimes tend not to reveal their true preferences – instead of opposing the
dictatorship in public, they support it.
 ->The perception is that society is publicly behind the dictatorship supporting it n that
thrs no point opposing it
 -> Authoritarian elite n other observes / Indivs oft hv v inaccurate / incomplete info - dk
true extent of popular dissatisfaction to the regime, lvl of opposition in a dictatorship
 Authoritarian govs oft try v hard to find out real preferences of the ppl
E.g. Cultural Revolution, China – domestic surveillance
Gov wanted to secure ideological purity of communist revolution in China n wanted to purge
society of any resistance / anyone who might subscribe to capitalist/ anti-socialist thought-> gov
needed to identify those who wr dissenting -> needed to find out what ppl rlly think->
informants wr encouraged& persuaded to surrender even their friends& family for expressing
dissenting views in private
 Even if collective action cld be effectively organized, indivs might still choose not to
protest cos theyre not sure whether others rlly oppose the regime or not
 Preference falsification helps explain y popular revolutions nearly alws come as a
surprise yet appear so inevitable in hindsight
 Thresholds& Cascades
 Revolutionary threshold – the size of protest at wch an indiv is willing to participate
->Intuition behind this: as the size of a protest grows, it becomes harder for the state to
identify n punish indivs for participating
->Costs of participation decline in rough proportion to the no of protesters
->People’s thresholds r likely to depend on many diff factors eg whether they hv
benefited/ suffered under the regime, whether they hv much to lose from participating
in protests, n whether they believe that the regime is fragile/ stable
 ->Preference falsification means that a society’s distribution of revolutionary thresholds
is nvr known to the indivs of that society
Each indiv knows his own revolutionary threshold, but not that of anyone else
-->A society can come to the brink of revolution without anyone ever knowing it
 Revolutionary cascade – when a protest grows large enough to pass many indivs’
revolutionary thresholds, n passes a ‘tipping point’-> a critical mass of ppl revealing their
true preferences by joining protests
/when 1 person’s participation triggers the participation of another, wch triggers the
participation of another, n so on
 Tipping point model – explains y popular revolutions r difficult to anticipate
No body knows the real distribution of revolutionary thresholds
Shift in revolutionary thresholds of a small grp of ppl can lead to cascade
The tiny shift can make the diff btw the successful& failed revolutionary action.
 Worldwide, the greatest threat to autocrats’ rule has come from elites, who hv the clout&
resources to influence political actors

Top-Down Democratic Transitions

the dictatorial authoritarian ruling elite introduces liberalizing reforms that ultimately lead to
democratic transition
 Authoritarian elite introduces liberalizing reforms that become a slippery slope-> democratic
transition
- Liberalizing reforms not intended to lead to democratization – meant to entrench
authoritarian elites in power through co-optation Meant to stabilize not to dismantle the
authoritarian regime
- These reforms r oft thr to eg placate those calling for more political space.
Oft introduced when authoritarian regime is facing some instability e.g. mounting
challenges to its legitimacy. Offering some concessions to co-opt the pro-democratic
opposition.
- Soft-liners (co-opt) – within the authoritarian elite, those who support such reforms as a
solu to probs faced by the gov. Prefer to liberalize n broaden the social base of the
dictatorship in an attempt to gain allies n manage opposition grps
v. Hardliners (repress) – prefer the old ways of maintaining rlly tight control over the
political space, satisfied w the political status quo
- Policy of liberalization entails a controlled opening of the political space n might include
the formation of political parties, holding elections, writing a constitution, establishing a
judiciary, opening a legislature, etc
 How does the democratic opposition react
1. Accept the offer of greater liberalization, n stop contesting the undemocratic aspects of
the system
Agree to maintain the dictatorial rules of the game in return for entrance into the formal
political sphere, insititutions of a broadened dictatorship.
Authoritarian strategy of liberalization succeeds n authoritarian rule is stabilized
2. Reject the offer, continue criticizing the regime n seeking democratic transition
Take adv of its new freedoms to further org n mobilize agst the dictatorship
 Position of soft-liners in dictatorship likely to be undermined
 Authoritarian response
- Revert to hardliner strategy of use force to Repress dissent n popular mobilization n
restore order.
 If successful, all liberalizing reforms gone. Back to narrow dictatorship: closure of political
space,
rejection of the softliner strategy, soft-liners pay the consequence for having introduced a
failed policy of liberalization n r replaced by hardliners
 Risk: if u repress n don’t offer the opposition any concessions/ space at all, thrs a risk that
the opposition might say thrs no use talking to the gov, attempt to overthrow gov by
force.
 Repression carries risk of insurgency
- Democratise Democratic opposition succeeds in achieving democratic transition
 What informs decision-making of both parties
- Perception of how the other side will react to their move
^game theory: strategic interactions btw players
Choice by the authoritarian elite to stick w the political status quo / open up the regime
depends on how It thinks the democratic opposition will respond to liberation
Choice by the democratic opposition to enter a broadened dictatorship / continue
mobilizing depends on how it thinks the dictatorship will respond to ongoing mobilization.
- 4 stages of decision-making
1. Authoritarian elite – whether/not to liberalise
Authoritarian elite aims to stabilize the system
 If believe opposition strong (expect opposition wont be content w js mere concessions):
Soft-liners know that strong opposition will respond to liberalization by organizing ->
they’ll eventually be forced to democratize. To avoid being forced into a democratization
they don’t want, soft-liners do nothing don’t liberalise n stick w political status quo
-> status quo, nothing changes (even if this means the opposition can continue fighting
actual, violent/ peaceful means agst authoritarianism)
 If believe opposition weak: Liberalise
Expect weak opposition to accept this compromise as they don’t hv the strength to push
for democratic transition-> limited liberalization of the system will be the best possible
deal that the opposition can get.
 Because: liberalizing reforms may end up inadvertently strengthening alr strong
opposition as theyre given more space to mobilize ppl, organize, n advocate for their
cause
2. Democratic opposition – accept limited liberalization/not. Response
softer authoritarianism
 Weak opposition likely to accept the deal n enter authoritarian institutions-> broadened
dictatorship
 This kind of liberalization is prob the best outcome u cld realistically achieve
Btr than the status quo. Opposition knows its not strong enough to prevent soft-liners
from successfully repressing it if it chooses to continue organizing& mobilizing agst the
regime.
  This then stabilizes the system by reducing criticism towards the gov.
 Outcome: status quo / broadened dictatorship i.e. no democratic transition maybe
(competitive) electoral authoritarianism
-> authoritarian regimes r so resilient even when thrs democratic opposition that might
be quite strong
 Strong opposition knows that if it organizes, then its strong enouh that soft-liners will be
unable to successfully repress it-> prefer to democratize
3. Authoritarian elite – Repress/ democratize
(democratize-> democratic transition-> end.;
repress-> v)
4. Democratic opposition – turn to insurgency/not
 When r top-down transitions possible
only when authoritarian elites make a mistake aka they think that the democratic opposition
is weak when in fact opposition is strong
- Tho citizens r likely to support the regime in public, they may well oppose it quite
vehemently in private
Opposition grps r likely to take great care to keep their activities hidden from the prying
eyes of the dictatorship n its secret police
Stage ^
1. Liberalise, mistakenly thinking that opposition is weak
Thinking they’ll be able to control everyt n opposition will accept their compromise.
Make this mistake cos eg incomplete info, preference falsification etc Democratic
opposition cldve been operating underground away from the eyes of the gov-> gov
underestimate their strength
2. Reject offer, knowing the opposition is strong. Knowing their own strength, choose not to
compromise
3. Two possible outcomes
 Democratise, knowing opposition is strong Authoritarian elite now has more info abt the
opposition n its true strength, realise opposition is strong enough to push for
democratization.
->game ends w democratic transition
 Repress despite strong opposition – risks insurgency.
Risky for them cos strong opposition might well succeed in using violence to overthrow
the regime. Authoritarian leader, if know that hes gnna loose power anyway, pref to lose
power through a peaceful transition instead of being defeated in battle.
Cos:
 Mistake. They still don’t understand that the opposition is strong.
An authoritarian gov that’s been in power for a long time, faced off many democratic
challenges to rule in the past, might look at the past n believe that they can survive this
latest challenge.
 Calculated strategy – pref to risk insurgency instead of accepting democratic transition
->Authoritarian elite might believe that democratic transition wld result in unacceptable
consequences for the elite eg. end up in prison/ executed-> democratization is the worst
possible outcome for them -> nothing to lose
 ->Believe that if it comes down to actual fighting, democratic opposition will be at a
disadv. Opposition might enjoy popular support but if req ppl to take up arms agst gov to
fight in insurgency, fewer ppl might be willing to do so. When it comes to a fight like this,
the state might hv adv as long as they hv loyalty of the armed forces. Insurgency is also
higher cost& risk endeavor than non-violent opposition-> forcing opposition into that
choice of insurgency might result in ppl’s revolutionary thresholds going higher -> harder
for opposition to mobilize ppl to fight

Sudan (ref w8 lecture vid more verbal details)

 Bottom-up model
- Von Soest & Grauvogel: hegemonic authoritarian (1991-2010)
- Longstanding grievances in Sudan
- No successful collective action til 2018/19 protests
- 2011- increased economic hardship
Shift in revolutionary thresholds
Impetus to civil society org e.g. Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA)
- Tipping point: Dec 2018 -> Revolutionary cascade
 Top-down game
- 11 Apr 2019 Coup by armed forces overthrowing Bashir
 Formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC)
 Announce transition to democratic rule
 Starts nego w the opposition grp, Forces of Freedom & Change (FFC)
- Y the armed forces abandoned Bashir
 Mounting challenges to the regime
 Economic crisis undermined Bashir’s ability to keep the armed forces loyal
 Democratic transition?
- Still in stage 1
 TMC’s commitment to democratic transition?
 Transition to civilian rule to be overseen by security forces
 Delayed negotiations w opposition
 Attempts to consolidate power by eradicating rivals
 Decision to placate opposition without democratization
- Is the TMC comprised of soft-liners - Presence of hardline factions
 Stage 2: Opposition continues to mobilise n organize protests
Cos:
- Unattractive offer by TMC
- Strength of opposition
Choice of indivs to continue protesting? Perception of likelihood of success, costs of participation
 Stage 3.
- Repression
3 June 2019 Violent suppression of protest
Shutting down internet
Suppressing civil society
- Hardline faction: Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
 Stage 4 – non-violent protest instead (unlike^)
Cos:
- Legitimacy of non-violent protest, criticism of TMC’s suppression
 - Emotions n sense of community (?)
 Choice not to repress – back to stage 3
- Avoid repression – Aug2019 FFC& TMC agreement
Sovereign council – members from FFC& TMC
Nov 2022 Multiparty elections
- Reasons
 Strength of the democratic opposition
 International factors
Role of regional players in negotiations
Taking Sudan off US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST)
 Current state of play
- Oct 2021 Military coup
 Repress w promise of liberalization
 Democratic opposition: Reject
- Apr 2023: Civil war
 Sudanese Armed Forces
 Rapid Support Forces

 Y ‘authoritarian collapse’ instead of ‘democratic transition’ – Possible outcomes:

- Democracy (liberal/ electoral)
- Authoritarianism (closed, hegemonic electoral, competitive electoral)
Its far from certain that authoritarian collapse will result in a transition towards democracy
 Fragmentation of the internal-security apparatus
- Using diff security organs as counterweights to one another
- giving them overlapping responsibilities
- reducing their lines of communication& coordination
- Goal:
 make it more difficult for any one branch fo the security apparatus to organize a coup:
Rivalries btw diff security organs increase costs of collective action n inhibit cooperation
on a coup plot
 Lowers likelihood that any coup attempt will succeed
Policy
 Public Policy - Decision by a gov; Leads to certain actions; Meant to achieve certain aims&
objectives
 Types of Public Policies
- ‘Foreign’ Policy
- ‘Domestic’ Policies – Edu, health, Social Welfare, Transportation, Environment etc

Public Policy Process

1. Deciding to decide (agenda setting) v
2. Deciding how to decide
3. Issue definition
4. Forecasting
5. Setting objectives & priorities
6. Options analysis
7. Policy implementation, monitoring & control
8. Evaluation & review
9. Policy maintenance, succession, or termination
 Desirable features of this formulation:
- it sees policymaking as a more/less continuous process
- it stresses political issues of agenda setting, decision process n definition
- it doesn’t take the implementation of the decision for granted

Agenda-setting - what sld be a public policy issue i.e. in what issues sld the gov intervene
 Alternatives – mkt, voluntary org
 Political ideologies
- American conservatism (right) eg state sldnt intervene too much in many econ issues
- American liberalism (left) a lot more economic issues wld be public policy issues cos they’ll be
probs u get when mkt is unregulated
 Who has agenda-setting power
Gov, political opposition, lobby grps, media n influential opinion-makers, civil society n
advocacy grps, the ppl

Policy-making: CMC (1962) Graham Allison, Essence of Decision [details verbal& slides in w9 lect]
 Rational Actor Model
- Foreign policy decision-making is orderly, coherent, rational
- An action results from a combination of a nation’s
 Relevant national values & objectives.
US& USSR hd clear objectives they wanted to achieve but theyre also aware that in this case, the
objectives came into conflict w each other
 Cuba
1959 Cuban Revolution – Fidel Castro overthrow pro-US Cuban gov
1961 Bay of Pigs invasion – failed US-sponsored invasion of Cuba
 USSR
Strategic balance of power
 Bargaining Chip
CW n Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
 US
->National security of US: Removal of missiles, Avoid escalation to war w USSR
->CW competition: US needed to demonstrate strength
 Perceived alternative courses of action
Players consider diff policy options, trying to anticipate each other’s moves n trying to
choose the best move in order to achieve their objectives
 Options considered (US)
Freezing the situ w diplomatic communication
Invasion of Cuba
Surgical air strikes
Naval ‘quarantine’
 Estimates of various sets of consequences
 Net valuation of each set of consequences. Rational decisions
 US
US gov = unitary, rational actor
Avail options considered
Optimal solu chosen
 USSR
26 Oct Khruschev private letter: promise of no invasion in return for removal of missiles
27 Oct Khruschev public msg: US to promise no invasion + remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey
28 Oct Agreement on removal of missiles – Private agreement that US wld remove missiles in
Turkey once crisis over.
 Bounded Rationality – incomplete info, finite resources
We need energy to make rational decisions, to consider all diff options.
To calculate costs& benefits, we might need to acquire info& knowledge thatll guide our
decisions n collecting that kind of info takes time& energy we might not hv-> we can nvr devote
enough time/ resources to rlly consider all options-> make a short list of most likely options n
choose from that -> even rational actors might end up choosing the wrong policies to achieve
their objectives
- Bureaucracy [Max Weber]
v leads to efficient& rational bureaucracy
 Division of labour
Task of governing is divided up amongst diff ministries& agencies, each of wch specializes
in a particular policy area. Even within ministries, thrs likely further division of tasks into
diff departments in charge of diff things
 Official hierarchy
Clear line of authority n reporting w junior reporting to senior officials, wont hv junior /
mid-lvl bureaucrats making ad hoc decisions on their own. All decisions r made by top lvls-
> everyone employed in bureaucracy r directed by goals n values of the org-> org acts like a
single unitary actor. Lower lvls of org will alws be implementing decisions made by the
upper lvls.
 Adherence to formal rules& procedures
Hv a lot of formal rules& procedures wch can lead to v high degree of impartiality
 Thr to ensure consistence n predictability
 Record-keeping Organisational memory
 Merit-based selection
 Select n promote ppl based on their merits, qualifications, performance, skills n abilities,
instead of things like personal connections
 Hire ppl w the knowledge n skills for the job, n reward them for doing their jobs well
 Meant to make bureaucracy more efficient& effective.
 Indivs will continue wanting to do a gd job cos that’s how theyre assessed
 Makes it harder for anyone to influence bahavior of indiv bureaucrats.
Nobody can tempt bureaucrats to implement policies in certain ways by offering them
an alt non-merit based path to promotion
 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA): an attempt to put monetary figures on the costs& benefits
accruing from an investment over time
 Probs in:
->Establishing an agreed ranking of values
->measuring n predicting outcomes
as far as most public policy decisions r concerned
 Some of these difficulties derive from the fact that the model is implicitly based on
how 1 indiv decision maker wld approach a prob
In practice virtually all public policy deciions r made by organisations, only some of
wch even claim to be ‘bureaucratic’ or to be rational decision makers
 Organisational Process
Govs r not unitary actors – collection of coordinated orgs
- Organisations – tend to function acc to standard patterns of behaviour (Standard
Operating Procedures) (SOPs) n programmes
- Division of responsibility& labour in gov
- Rational actor model ?
In organisations, thr might not be as much flexibility/ openness to consider all possible
options n choose the best possible option
 Discovering the missiles: US Intelligence ‘Failures’
14 Oct US U-2 plane takes pictures of missile installations on Cuba
Prev Intelligence
E.g.
- Reports of Soviet ships arriving in Cuba
- Sighting by a CIA agent of the rear profile of a strategic missile
- Refugee reports of missile sightings
The need for these intelligence to fuel through these bureaucratic hierarchy might’ve led to the US
discovering the missile installations ltr rather than sooner
 Consideration of air strikes
- Air Force estimate of 90% effectiveness of surgical airstrikes
- Assumption that missile installations wr ‘mobile’
 Bureaucratic (Governmental) Politics
Policies = outcome of ‘pulling& hauling’ btw diff players w diff objectives (Graham Allison)
 The policy that comes out depends on who wins the bargaining within the gov, wch then
depends on what the formal positions& powers r, personal networks n relationships etc
- Nikita Khrushchev – domestic political considerations
 US Strategic superiority
 1961 Berlin Crisis
 Economic probs at home
- John F Kennedy
 Kennedy: “it doesn’t make any diff if u get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet
Union or one that was 90 miles away”
 Kennedy’s objectives
 Cuban regime
 Domestic political considerations
 Discovering the missiles
- Aug 1961 John McCone (CIA director) voiced concerns that USSR might introduce offensive
missiles to Cuba
- Sept 1961 McCone pushing for surveillance flights over Cuba – y delay til 14 Oct
- CIA v. Air Force
- McCone v. McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor) & Dean Rusk (Secretary of State)
 Decision on ‘quarantine’: Bargaining& coalitions - Who was able to get their way
- Supporters of air strike included Joint Chiefs of Staff, John McCone
- Supporters of naval ‘quarantine’ included Robert McNamara, Theodore Sorensen
 Implications for understanding of policy-making
Policy-making oft combination of all 3 models
- State not alws a rational, unitary actor
- Policy not alws directed at national objectives
- Beyond CMC
CMC = Foreign policy + Crisis situation
Policy-making: Types of actors, issues, political systems

 Voluntary org.s relate to the state

-
Provide services to the community in collaboration w the gov – n increasingly oft as
contractors to it
- Many voluntary org.s lobby the state to pass legislation, or spend money on causes helpful
to their client grp
 Y orgs r not alws rational
- Psychological limitations
Orgs r composed of indivs w limited knowledge n skills n imperfectly known values
- Limitations arising from multiple values
Orgs face add probs in det values& objectives cos theyre composed of indivs w diff values&
objs
- Factored probs n fractionated power
 Division of probs amongst specialist departments helps to overcome the psychological
prob but creates new ones
  Sub-units concerned w part of the prob treat it in isolation n elevate their own sub-goals
over those of the org as a whole, whilst their leaders seek power& influence for
themselves
- Information probs
Tho orgs collectively possess much more info on probs than indivs (through filing systems,
computer databases etc), they frequently fail to access the relevant info at the right time
->they lose one of the maj strategic adv they possess
- Cost limitations – blind rule implementation
If a rule appears. To apply, then itll be automatically operated
 Requirements for implementing public policy
- Unambiguous signal of required behaviour ms rch local implementer n be understood
- Either:
 They ms want to conform to new policy n hv power to implement it
 Costs of non-implementation ms be made to clearly exceed benefits of inertia
 Managing local public policy
Variables wch may affect manaagers’ capacity to take an indep view of how policy sld be
implemented:
- Relationship to, n distance from, clients
- Relationship to local authorities / central departments
- Degree of their dependence on firms/ voluntary organizations etc for resources
-
Development
 Why is ‘dev’ imp
- Universally desirable (?)
- Objective of many actors eg civil society, govs, international orgs
Economic process
 Wealth
- Indicator of economic welfare of citizens
- GDP: tot mkt value of all g&s produced in a country over a period of 1yr
- Gross National Income (GNI): production of all citizens of the state
- EG: increase in production of g&s over a period of time (oft 1 yr)
Oft: % change in GDP
 UNGA declares ‘development Decade’ in 1961: “to attain in each under-developed
country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, w each country setting its own
target, taking as the objective a minimum rate of growth/ aggregate national income of
5% at the end of the Decade”
 Importance: Productivity & Wealth
 EG figures hv to be interpreted carefully
 Wealthy countries don’t alws hv high EG rates
 Low EG rates can indicate economic challenges
- Per capita figures – btr indicator of wellbeing of ppl
- World Bank classification of countries
High income, Upper middle income, Lower middle income, Lower income
 Structure of the economy (Type of economic activities)
- Agrarian -> industrial, Services
- Subsistence-> Large-scale commercial, profit-making

Human development
 (Amartya Sen) Development as Freedom
- Freedom “both as the primary end n as the principal means” of dev
- Freedom= capabilities
- Removing sources of ‘unfreedom’
Poverty, Poor economic opps, Neglect of public facilities, Tyranny & repressive states,
Systemic social deprivation, Intolerance
 UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Developemnt Index’s 3 dimensions:
- Long& healthy life
- Knowledge
- A decent SOL

Questioning development: a post-developmental critique

 Happiness
- Hedonic: material. having pleasant feelings instead of unpleasant/ negative feelings
Eudaimonic: flourishing. self-actualization. Living life to the fullest potential in accordance to your
values. Finding meaning& purpose in life.
 - Resolution adopted by UNGA recognized happiness as a “fundamental human goal” that’s
universally desired
- World Happiness Reports
Surveys ppl on how happy they perceive themselves to be, n how satisfied they r w their
lives
- Moving beyond prosperity
 2012 World Happiness Report
 Income
Easterlin paradox: Beyond a certain lvl of income, further increases in wealth don’t lead
to increase in happiness
 Life expectancy
 Social support & close relationships
 A sense of freedom to make life decisions
 Generosity
 Perceptions of corruption
 Why ‘development’ - Critique of ‘development’:
- Eurocentrism
- Power inequalities
- Narrow understanding of the ‘good’ that we sld pursue
- Significant costs
 Inequality
 Ecological costs
 Prevents genuine change?
 Forgoing of alternatives: Other ways of life, values, n goals
E.g. rural communities becoming smaller etc
International Relations:
War & Peace
 Formalisation & institutionalization of the discipline aft WW1
When powerful states fight, they can drag in other states& ppl into the fight.
Since WW1, 1 of the big preoccupations is to avoid another worldwide war
 UK
1919 1st department of international politics at Aberystwyth

1920 Chatham House founded

1927 Department of IR, LSE

 US
 1919 Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
 1921 Council on Foreign Relations
 1928 University of Chicago’s Committee on IR
 1930 Princeton School of Public n International Affairs

 Paradigms (D’Anieri) “A theoretical approach that includes one or more theories that share
similar philosophical assumptions”:

 Realism
Approach that focuses alm exclusively on the role of state power in an anarchic world whr
insecurity is high.
International politics is abt the exercise of power by states, unconstrained by moral limits.
- Realist theories
 Oft quite pessimistic abt the prospects for long term n durable peace& cooperation in IR
 All kind of agree on the importance of power n specifically material power
- Ways in which Realist look at IR / Central Assumptions
 International Anarchy
 Thrs no world gov to rule over the states State of nature -> international politics is
fundamentally diff from domestic politics
 Anarchy predisposes international politics towards conflict
 Most imp actors = states
States as the Central, Rational, unitary actors
State sovereignty – state is the highest n final authority, final decision maker in the
territory-> no higher authority than the state in the territory
If IR is comprised of these states that all hv that final authority in their own territories n
no world gov can tell states what to do, then its states that make imp decisions abt
peace& war. States hv the most capability to act.
States generally hv a lot more power than non-state actors cos states possess a lot of
material power. States oft hv an army, police, control of the economy / economic policy,
legal& moral authority to act on behalf of the ppl.
 Central
International orgs primarily reflect the interests of the states that create them
States can control actors eg multinational corporations when they rlly want to
-> international politics is politics btw states
 Rational
 Rationality doesn’t mean states alws make the best / ‘right’ decisions, but rather hv
consistent, ordered preferences, n calculate costs& benefits of all alt policies in order to
maximize their utility
In most of the imp matters, states r highly constrained by their circumstances-> foreign
policy is a rational response to external conditions, n diff leaders in the saem situ cld be
expected to bahve similarly
It doesn’t matter if a liberal/ conservative is in power / even if gov is democratic/
authoritarian.
We don’t need to look inside them to see how they behave, we only hv to understand
the external forces to wch theyre subject
-> Realism is characterized primarily as a system-level paradigm: behaviour is driven by
the conditions in the system, not by internal politics of the indiv states
 Unitary – State seen as a single coherent entity
Simplification – every country contains many indivs& grps, n every gov contains a
complex array of orgs n decision-making procedures
 Criticism: increasing no of nonstate actors hv influence on a wide variety of issues
 (implication of anarchy) Without a gov thrs No enforcement of law, a situ of uncertainty,
violence, insecurity, a self-help world fight for survival
States can nvr be certain that promises made by other states will be honoured, that other
states wont attack them -> the most imp goal for states in IR / the most imp national
interest is to accumulate as much power as possible to rely upon urself to protect&
defend urself (self-help world) v
 Pursuit of power
 Power as the main det of outcomes n the pursuit of power as the main det of policies
 Thucydides: “the strong do what they hv the power to do n the weak accept what they
hv to accept”
 Power is necessary to obtain any other goal
-> Relatively powerful states r able to shape the behavior of others (through threats/
bribes).
->Other things being equal, the more powerful state will prevail
-> Powerful states r safe; weak states r not
-> States wld alws rather hv more assets/ resources than less
-> Distribution of power is the central force in international politics
 Every rational unitary state pursue power, national interest boils down simply to getting
more power, try to find the best ways to become more powerful
cos they know its central to their ability to pursue their interests, whether those
interests r defined as survival, expansion, or acquisition of wealth
so it can defend itself so it can make sure that its secure
 Power for realists tends to be in terms of material, esp military power cos that’s the
most directly linked to the ability of the state to defend itself
Economic power: possession of vital natural resources, essential underpinning of military
power, esp in the long term
 Demographics of the state as imp aspects of power
  Criticism: Power is hard to define-> realism’s reliance on that concept is one of its
central weakness
 Realism also tends to ignore other manifestations of power eg institutional power,
‘soft’ power, structural power, n collaborative power
To the extent that power can be measured, its clear that the most powerful don’t alws
prevail in conflict
- Security Dilemma : tendency for 1 state’s efforts to obtain security to cause insecurity in
others
Anarchy->thrs no one to stop 1 country from attacking another-> insecurity
‘self-help world’= No international police force to protect states / punish aggressors, stop 1
country from attacking another-> If states r to survive, they ms rely on their own means
Insecurity-> states arm themselves. States that want to survive ms be able to defeat
potential attackers/ deter them from attacking in the 1st place.
 Power= relative
Every time a state acquired more power e.g. by acquiring more weapons / increasing size
of its army, this is at the expense of other states. This is cos as 1 state becomes more
powerful relative to the other states, the other states become less powerful
 Acquisition of power = zero-sum game
Thrs no way that 1 state can gain more power without other states losing power cos
other states become relatively less powerful. Power gap btw states r increasing.
States that r falling behind, relatively less powerful, end up hving less security cos
power is what secures u.
 Pursuit of power can lead to attempts by other states to do the same
Prob: When state A arms, even if only to protect itself, states B C D view the action as a
threat-> States BCD increase their armaments-> state A faces a bigger threat than b4->
it increases its armament-> The other states respond to this threat, n so on -> arms
race.
States r competing to acquire more military power n now thrs a greater possibility of
war as states race to stay ahead of others
 Irony: A state’s attempts to accumulate power to increase security can lead to greater
insecurity
If a state refrains from engaging in the weapons competition w other states, it leaves
itself vulnerable to attack.
But if it builds new weapons, it creates insecurity for others. The others’ natural response
is to arm, making the 1st state less secure.
The dilemma is that either way, the state ends up less secure.
Insecurity leads states to arm, but arms create more insecurity
 Prisoner’s Dilemma: Indiv rationality leads to collective irrationality
 Game theory
Prob of cheating / defection
Scenario: 2 suspects r interrogated by the police in 2 separate rooms
Neither suspect confesses (i.e. both cooperate) – 3, 3
1 suspect confesses, but the other refuses to work w the police (i.e. 1 defects, 1
cooperates) – 4, 1
 Both confess (i.e. both defect) – 2, 2
Eqm: regardless of what the other player does, its btr for u to defect
Liberal view of this: can defect n will still defect, but sld create international orgs to manage this
Constructivism: This can create/develop a more hostile identity n hv certain interests.
 Collective action prob
the dilemma is whether / not to arm (/ to arm further)
Arming = defecting; not arming = cooperating
In anarchy, the rational state will arm, regardless of what its neighbour does
But when both states arm, both end up less secure (cos war will not be more
destructive) n less wealthy
Agn, individually rational behavior-> collective irrationality
The dilemma is that the state faces diminished security whether it arms/ not
Overcoming this dilemma is v difficult cos thrs no one to enforce agreements, cheating
can leave a state that cooperates vulnerable
-> prudent states consistently ‘defect’, acquiring more& more arms
 Assumptions:
States r unified actors, behave rationally, game is played only once, diff issues r not
connected, payoffs r symmetric
->hard to apply the model to the real world. But it captures a basic prob in international
politics n many other situs
 Implications for foreign policy
 States ms act rationally, based on hard-headed strategic calculations. Amoral
Cnnt be distracted by morality, ideology, or emotions
Machiavelli: for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who
abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring abt his own
ruin than his preservation
Political leaders making decisions hv to be prudent n lvl headed instead of idealistic /
ethical cos otherwise the consequences wld be disastrous.
State foreign policy sld be amoral. Sld ignore moral arguments n focus only on the
pursuit of power cos they need to do so.
Realism finds that morality plays little/ no role in relations btw states.
States do whats in their interests. States that r altruistic risk being annihilated.
When a leader advocates some standard of international morality, its usually a standard
that serves the interests of that leader’s country.
Normative arguments r js another weapon in power politics
International system is a harsh realm n only a hardheaded pursuit of self-interest will
prevent ruin
 Moral obligation of the state to its ppl
Role of a state’s gov is to serve the national interest of that state n the gov has no moral
obligations to other states / other ppl, we owe this to our own ppl.
Thus we need to ensure that the state survives, protect& secure the state
- Balance of Power Theory: thrll be relatively even distribution of power among the most
powerful states
 Post-CW unipolarity: Dominance of US
  Balance of power instead of imbalance/ unipolarity
E.g. CW: Bipolar international system (US& USSR eg CMC)
 Cos: Tho indiv powerful states will oft seek to dominate [realist], states will counter each
other’s attempts to dominate, other states will strive to prevent gaps from emerging cos
their security depends on being able to fend off the most powerful Security dilemma (ppl
increase cos others increase)-> superiority will be almost impossible to achieve -> balance of
power
 Causes of war
 States don’t balance when they sld (imbalance of power) Encourage the powerful to
attack
E.g. Napoleon cld entertain dreams of conquering Europe cos other countries failed to unify to oppose
him
 War is waged to balance a state that’s too powerful
 States may initiate war in the pursuit of power. To :
->augment their own power E.g. Germany’s expansionist aims in WW2
-> prevent another state from becoming too powerful. E.g. Israel’s attack on Iraqi
nuclear facilities
 Balance of power theory sees stability in balance n sees the chances of war increasing as one
state seeks to dominate the others
Hegemonic stability theory sees stability in dominance n sees the chances of war increasing as the
situ moves toward equality
- Hegemonic Stability Theory (Contradicts the balance of power theory)
 Benefits of hegemony (1 dominance state) unipolarity
Stability results from 1 dominant state ensuring some degree of order in the system
 Other states don’t challenge the hegemon
 Hegemon provides peace, order& stability, punishes defection Solves prisoner’s
dilemma prob
 Causes of war:
 Declining hegemon
Hegemon is no longer able to pay the price of maintaining its hegemony
Hegemony is facing internal difficulties w its own economy/ political system
Its status declines cos its unable to maintain its international order n position anm
Hegemon becomes less willing to bear the cost of maintaining global order
Dominant position of the leader erodes, giving other states the temptation to seek
dominance
 Rising challenger wages war to take the hegemon’s place n seeks to assert its power
Hegemon wages war n attacks preemptively to stop the rise of challenger crush the
rising threat b4 it becomes even more powerful
A state that’s becoming increasingly powerful, increasingly able to be a rival to the
hegemon
Heightened risk of war cos the hegemon decides that it needs to fight this challenger in
order to defeat& suppress that challenger b4 the challenger becomes too strong /
Rising challenger decide that it wants to wage war w the hegemon to take the
hegemons place
 Y hegemon settle for leadership n not try to conquer the others
 Hegemon can make signif gains, both economically& politically, without provoking others to dig in
their heels n go to war
 If hegemons r able to order the system in a way that benefits them, y do they ever decline
 Costs of empire: As hegemon’s ambitions grow, so do the costs of pursuing them. Wars r esp
expensive. Hegemon bears these costs, while other states invest in their economies n grow at a
faster rate
 Potential for internal decay – spending more n investing less
 Technological advantages diffuse from the hegemon to other states, n new leading economic
sectors may rise in other countries
Underlying cause is economic. Hegemony erodes when the economy underlying it becomes less
productive than those of its competitors.
- Generalizations
 Distribution of power det the options open to states
 Striving to dominate others is a primordial human motivation
 Distribution of power is the primary cause of war& peace
 In international politics thrs no shared morality-> morality cnnt be the basis for action
 Liberalism
Concerned w purpose as well as power
States hv a range of goals beyond accruing power n cooperation is oft as imp as power in
achieving state aims.
- Critique
 R states the primary actors in IR
 R states rlly unitary, rational actors
 Does anarchy necessarily lead to a realist world (insecurity, self-help, pursuit of power)?
 Diff liberal theories hv diff ans to these qns
- Liberal tradition – more optimistic than realists abt the possibility of international
cooperations
 Its possible to overcome the worst aspects of the realist world
 Cooperation& order r possible in international affairs
 World described by realists is so dangerous-> states n other actors hv a powerful
incentive to try to escape from that system / moderate its worst effects
 International politics concerns the struggles to find solus to the prob of anarchy
 They don’t necessarily see ppl as ‘gd’ / inherently peaceful, or see collaboration as
simple/ unproblematic, [realists- cooperation is inherently limited, liberals no. ]
but they do see ppl as being smart enough to recognize the probs created by
international anarchy n to work to overcome them.
 Power politics is not completely irrelevant. Sometimes states compete for power, n this
drives international politics.
But some goals req collaboration so states oft join to pursue mutual goals
 Collaboration can make all participants btr off n that sld be a priority in international
affairs
- Assumption: ppl r rational n understand their interests
- Returning to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
 Assumptions of this game
 Game only played once
 Thrs only 1 game gg on at any 1 point
 Players unable to communicate w each other / get info on whether the other is
defecting
 Thrs no rules/ guidelines/ norms in place that inform the calculations of the players
 Without these assumptions, is cooperation more likely?
 Iterated games: worries abt future games -> incentives to cooperate now
 >1 game (linking games/ issues tgt)
 Communication& info can lead to more cooperation
 Setting out rules, guidelines, norms, n penalties
- Liberal Institutionalism theory
 Mitigating the effects of the prisoner’s dilemma
 States r able to communicate w & monitor each other.
In IR, its not alws easy to hide defection. Theyre able to get info abt each other’s
intentions& behaviour
 Iterated games
 States don’t js play 1-off games. States interact w each other continuously-> states r
aware that if I defect this time, then next time nobody will trust& cooperate w me.
 Issue linkages
States r playing multiple games at 1 point. States might be negotiating w each other
over diff things. States might be able to link these issues tgt
 Moving from mutual defection to mutual cooperation, Possible for 2 states to become
btr off at the same time
Undermines the realist assumption that international politics is a zero-sum game in wch
1 state can gain only at the expense of another
Liberals: states hv powerful incentives to overcome the security dilemma, n some ability
to doso
 Institutions: “sets of agreed upon norms, rules, n practices” (D’Anie..)
Effort to use institutions to overcome the worst aspects of anarchy
 E.g. International law – Rules that make it a lot clearer whats acceptable n whats not in
international politics
 ->Address defections e.g. UNSC’s role in maintaining international peace n security
->Monitor compliance e.g. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Ira:
More transparency. Harder to defect
As realists emphasize, states r reluctant to agree to limit their behavior cos of the fear
that others will cheat
Cooperation is more likely when any cheating can be detected b4 it threatens state
security
Collaboration itself can make it easier to verify that states r not cheating
->Regularise communication
 Effect of these International institutions on peace& cooperation - increase confidence
that agreements will be followed-> states r less worried that other states will break
promises-> Incentivizes states to make promises-> through agreements, help maintain
stable balance of power-> increase security, n states cld give more attention to other
concerns
Create a system whr its beneficial for states to abide by rules, serves their interests.
 Collaboration doesn’t result fromm altruism/ trust, it results from the rational pursuit of self-interest
 Tho agreeing to do some things n not do others may impinge on state sovereignty, many states frind
it worthwhile to impose this limitation on themselves
 Tho security may sometimes be increased by gaining power, its oft increased by agreeing.w others to
limit the unbridled pursuit of power / to collaborate to deal w common threats
 Similarities w Realism – Accepts realist assumptions
 States as self-interested, unitary, rational actors
 Nature of international Anarchy-> uncertainty & insecurity Security dilemma
 Danger of the security dilemma provides states w strong incentives to find a way out. It
makes them willing to nego formal& informal agreements to overcome the
counterproductive behaviors that result from anarchy.
 Believes realist assumptions don’t necessarily lead to pessimism n the conclusions
specified by realism. Liberal institutionalist arrives at diff conclusions.
 Realist critiques
 Cooperation unlikely when stakes r high.
International orgs n agreements r set up to serve the interests of the powerful
- Complex Interdependence theory
 States and other actors (non-governmental) Pluralism, web of relationships
Discard the focus on the state as the central actor. Multiple channels connect societies
 Diff lvls of gov n diff ministries hv links w each other.
Ppl hv links w each other e.g. migrate n hv family/ friends from other states. Ppl share
religious/ ethnic identity w ppl from other states, transnational.
 Instead of being simple, stark, n conflictual, is complex, multifaceted, n oft
characterized by collaboration.
 Transgovernmental relations btw societal actors across nation-states eg firms, NGOs
 Diverse goals n a variety of driving forces Not security dominating all other goals
 No clear hierarchy of issues
Unlike that of realist perspective, states don’t necessarily alws prioritize issues of national
security n power.
Other actors also hv other interests. Diff players within gov might hv their own interests.
Non-state actors like biz, their primary motive isn’t national security its profit.
 Use of military force less prominent in IR than realists may believe
cos military force may not be the most useful/ obv way to achieve goals like econ dev /
find solu to transnational probs
Military force is oft not considered a viable tool of policy. In dealing w allies/ w issues
that hv little to do w security, military force wld be inappropriate if not counterproductive
 globally, complex webs of relationships
 Rejects realist assumptions n argues that if assumptions r flawed, theory build on them
ms be flawed
 Realist Critiques
->States still most imp actors Non-state actors exist but theyre nowhere near as
powerful/ signif as states. Non-state actors also oft depend on state permission to exist/
operate / invest in the country
->Clear hierarchy of goals National security remains the most imp priority in IR
- Democratic Peace Theory
 Democracies don’t go to war w each other but might go to war w non-democracies
 Diff from realism wch believes that:
it doesn’t rlly matter whether ur a democracy ornot, states r gg to behave in a certain
way, all states r unitary rational actors.
This assumption^ implies that a state’s form of gov doesn’t affect its behavior.
But democratic peace theory – characteristics of govs r crucial to understanding IR
Liberal democracies r able to escape the conflictual dynamics of anarchy
 Govs accountable to citizens: wary of waging war
Democratic politicians want to get reelected
 Democracies more likely to keep promises
Democracies greater lvl of gov transparency. higher level of trust
->Defection more easily detected harder to defect
->Institutional checks agst breaking promises
 E.g. South African High Court reverses gov’s withdrawal from International Criminal
Court
 Democratic political culture
The idea of being a democracy is we want politics whr its abt negotiating n debating n
having compromises
Moderate policies most of the time cos a more moderate policy is btr able to gain
majority support of the population
Translate into international behaviour
Democracies more likely resort to talking instead of fighting, likely to look for peaceful
ways of conflict resolution
 Mutual respect btw democracies
Democracies believe in popular sovereignty-> more likely to respect popular
sovereignty in the state -> invading another democracy to tae away rights of the ppl in
the other state wld be hypocritical
Btw democracies& non-democracies, more likely to hv hostile opinions on each other.
 US-China
China not democracy, US=democracy -> Democratic Peace Theory doesn’t apply!
 Difficulties / Criticism of democratic peace theory
 Whats ‘democracy’
The more well-established a democracy is the more likely it will be part of the liberal peace
 Other reasons for peace amongst democratic states (apart from democracy)
 Do democratic& undemocratic states rlly behave differently
 Ppl argue that its not that democracies DON’T go to war w each other, its js less likely
- Critique of Realism
 R states the primary actors in IR
 R states rlly unitary, rational actors
 Does anarchy necessarily lead to a Relist world (insecurity, self help, pursuit of power)
 Diff liberal theories hv diff ans to these qns
 Implications for war & peace in US-China relations
Identity& Norms - Constructivism (IR paradigm)
- Anarchy is what states make of it (Alexander Wendt)
 It is objectively true that the world is anarchic
 The meaning of anarchy is socially constructed
 What states think& believe shapes IR
 If states think that IR is a realist war n their quest for power& security is their top
priority, then they’ll act as if it’s a realist world n in so doing produce a realist world. But
if they think it’s a liberal world, they’ll act accordingly
 States perceptions& believes r most powerful in shaping our world when these r
collective perceptions& beliefs
- Identity= relatively stable, role-specific understandings& expectations abt self (Alexander
Wendt)
- Identity& interests can be formed through processes of interactions btw states
i.e. Socialization
Interactions reinforces certain dynamics n thus identities
 (Comparison w) Realism& Liberal Institutionalism
- The interests of states
 Realism – survival& power
Realism assumes that all states hv the same priorities, national interests, n that has to do w
survival, security, n power. Cos if u dh these things u cant start thinking abt anyt else
Liberal Institutionalism – broader than Realist account
Assume states hv certain interests n these might not necessarily be js security, survival, n
power all the time e.g. prosperity, economic growth n dev etc
 Constructivism is interested in how actors define their national interests, threats to those
national interests, n their interests’ relationships to one another
States’ interests n identity shaped through interaction
 Realists & liberal institutionalists tend to simply take state interests as given assumes
that state identities& interests n r pregiven-> when states enter IR/ prisoner’s dilemma
game, they alr know what theyre interest r-> game of IR is js states trying their best to
achieve their interests/ objectives
 Constructivism puts IR in the context of broader social relations
State decide what they want based not only on material needs, but also on ‘social’
interaction
Identity of the potential adversary matters, not js its military capabilities n interests. This
is a rejection of realist assumption that states alws want more rather than less power&
wealth + assumption that state interests exist independently of a context of interactions
among states
- International anarchy leads to conflict n issues of cooperation
(Realism& lib institutionalism) Disagree on whether students r able to mitigate these negative
consequences of international anarchy
(Realists a lot more pessimistic.
Liberal Institutionalist believes that if we create gd international institutions, we can
overcome international anarchy / its negative consequences-> achieve international
peace& cooperation to a certain extent )
 - Constructivism n achieve domestic international peace n cooperation
 Change & contestation
- Intersubjective understandings – collective meanings usually relatively stable
 Constructed through a process of social interaction-> they can change ->v
 Objective societal believes in smt, social facts, guide^& influence ppl behaviours
 Social construction (process) that leads to intersubjective understandings (outcome)
 Non-intersubjective understandings – subjective.
 Norms r a type of intersubjective understandings
- Possibility of change
 State identities r complex& changing, n arise from interactions w other states – oft
through socialization
 Even if IR looks a certain way rn (realist/ liberal etc), thrs still a possibility that another
type of IR can be produced, possibility of shaping state identity n thus a state’s
interests in a diff direction
-> if we change our future interactions w each other, we might be able to change all
the intersubjective understandings that constitutes the system
 Change not js in behavior of state that can be due to a change in the distribution of
power/ incentives to cooperate,
but also possibility of changes in social structures, in ppl’s / state identities (deeper n
fundamental form of change)
Over time, states can conceptualize one another in such a way that thrs no danger of a
security dilemma, arms races, or the other effects of anarchy
Contrast w
 Realism
Pessimistic abt the possibility of change
Its alws a uncertain, dangerous, self-help kind of international system -> state interests r
pregiven, not gg to change over time. States r alws gg to be suspicious of each other, not
gg to trust each other much, top national interest is alws gg to be security in power
 Liberal institutionalism
 More optimistic abt the possibility of change in IR, but only certain types of changes.
 Rational states r gg to pursue their self-interst n international institutions can change
behaviour of states. States might behave more cooperatively n peacefully than
otherwise
 Liberal institutionalists don’t pay as much attention to things like changing the identity/
interests of the states. States alr hv these identities& interests, n they achieve certain
interests by constructing institutions
 Democratic Peace Theory
 State can change from democratic to authoritarian or the other way arnd
 This can lead to changes in its behavior n possibly even its identity& interests
 This kind of change is the result of internal changes in the state (diff from argument
abt interests & identities being the outcome of interactions w other actors
 Democratic states will alws relate to other states in a certain way. Democracies don’t
go to war w each other.
 How states relate to n see each other doesn’t depend on preexisting characteristic of
the state eg how democratic the state is. It depends on previous interactions n how
interactions hv shaped intersubjective understanding.
- Constraints on change
 If thrs certain actors/ states that don’t want to change, then change ofc becomes difficult
 Once intersubjective understandings r in place n hv been reinforced repeatedly over time,
they can be v difficult to change
 When we think abt intersubjective understandings as being collective, collectively held
meanings, the ability of 1 state to change a system by thinking differently/ behaving
differently is quite limited.
So these intersect Even if these intersubjective understandings r socially constructed over
time, each indiv player/ state confronts these intersubjective understandings as if theyre
objective facts
 Norms: a shared expectation abt behavior, a standard of right/ wrong (Tannenwald)
- Taboos: a particularly forceful kind of normative prohibition… concerned w the protection
of indivs& societies from behavior defined/ perceived to be dangerous n typically refers to
smt that’s not done, said, or touched (Tannenwald)
- Norm entrepreneurs: advocates of new norms.
 Need ppl to persuade others to embrace norms, nden when enough ppl do embrace
these norms, these norms become intersubjective understandings that can be v signif.
 Can be a variety of actors eg states, indivs, activists, journalists, scholars, civil society
orgs, international orgs
- Logic of Consequences v. Logic of Appropriateness
 ‘What will happen to me if I behave a certain way’
States do certain things cos of the consequences
E.g. states don’t go to war cos theyre afraid they’ll lose the war / costs of war wld disrupt trade n impact
economic prosperity etc
VS
 ‘How sld I behave in this situ’
States need to acquire more power cos if they don’t then theyre gg to be insecure
(Constructivists) States do/don’t do certain things cos of their beliefs on whats
appropriate / whats right.
Its our norms, our expectations of appropriate behaviors that informs the logic of
appropriateness
When constructivists talk abt the logic of appropriateness, theyre not saying that the logic
of consequences nvr applies. They acknowledge both
- Tannenwald: Norms do not determine outcomes, they shape realms of possibility
Js cos norms exist doesn’t mean theyre not violated, doesn’t det how we behave but
influence behaviours
 Nuclear weapons in IR
- Nuclear states
 Official nuclear states under Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: US, UK, France, China,
Russia
 India, Pakistan, Israel, NK…
- Controlling the spread n use of nuclear weapons
 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban treaty
 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Non-proliferation
Disarmament
Peaceful use of nuclear technology
- Benefits of having nuclear weapons
 Prestige
 Security
 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) – powerful nuclear deterrent
Second-strike capability – possession of nuclear weapons able to survive a first, pre-
emptive nuclear strike
 Advantages of being in a nuclear power
- Anomalies: Proliferation & use of nuclear weapons
 Non-use of nuclear weapons when the nuclear deterrent didn’t exist
 Y non-nuclear states still attack nuclear states
 Y small, non-nuclear states not more insecure
 Y hasn’t thr been more nuclear proliferation
 Lack of proliferation & use
- Nuclear Taboo
Global nuclear taboo: ‘widespread popular revulsion agst nuclear weapons n widely held
inhibitions on their use’
 Thrs a v strong norm, strong intersubjective understanding abt nuclear weapons. A taboo
so strong that it seems almost unthinkable to violate. We expect that anyone who
violates this taboo will suffer terrible costs
 The intersubjective understanding shapes the way in wch states perceive nuclear
weapons n actually constrained self-help within international anarchy
 Realists say that the world is insecure, power is what guarantees your security.
->from realist pov it might seem logical that states will try to acquire nuclear weapons cos
that’s a big bump up in your power n thus in ur security
 Constructivist: International anarchy exists. (agree w realists) No world gov-> anarchic IR
This intersubjective understanding changes the implications of anarchy for state bahavior
when it comes to nuclear proliferation n use. Despite international anarchy, the existence
of this v strong norm, this taboo, changes the consequences of anarchy for state
behavior.
 States don’t necessarily alws pursue power& security despite anarchy. Anarchy is what
states make of it
 Norms r linked to state identity.
 1945 Use of atomic bombs – no norm in existence
- 3 Normative Effects
 Regulative/ Constraining
Think abt using nuclear weapons but decide no to E.g. Korean War
From logic of consequences to appropriateness considerations gradually
 Existence of a certain norm regulates& affects behavior (even if I don’t agree with the
norm, I am worried abt not following the norm)
 Constitutive
Use of nuclear weapons unthinkable E.g. Vietnam War, Gulf War
It constitutes n becomes an aspect of my Identity
Norm to not use nuclear weapons has been internalized n tied to our identities
Logic of appropriateness. What I sld do.
 Permissive
Taboo against nuclear weapons implicitly suggests other types of weapons r acceptable
even if they can be equally / even more destructive than nuclear weapons
E.g. Gulf War
Side effect. Certain things acquire a stigma