Negotiable Instruments
Negotiable Instruments
1968
Negotiable Instruments
Dudley Warner Woodbridge
William & Mary Law School
Repository Citation
Woodbridge, Dudley Warner, "Negotiable Instruments" (1968). Virginia Bar Notes. 38.
[Link]
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
[Link]
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j)r:Jf.-,.._s L- 0 .f [//~#,- h. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Revised June 1965 1.
1, Jones executes /a ne.g4tiable note payable to Smith for a gambling debt. Before
ma tul'~. ty,C becomes the holder of the note in due course, and when it. is due, he sues
buth Jones and Smith. What defenses can Jones and Smith make?
Vl/11-14 makes gambling contracts "utterly void". The U .c.C.3-305 expressly provide ~
that a holder in due course takes free from all defenses except "(2 )(b) such ~!-::-!~
illegality -lHH~ aa renders the obligation a nullity." Hence the defense that the note
was given for a gambling debt is a real defense which Jones can make even against a
holder in due course. (Note. Some q11estion may be raised as to the above conclusion
in Virginia because of 116 Va.834 in which it, was held that a bank that had lent
money to maker of a note who, unknown to the bank, had borrmved it for the purpose
of gambling, was entitled to a judgment against the maker). Smith, however, is
liable under u.c.c. 3-417(2)(d) because of a breach of an implied warranty to C
that no defense of~~ par~ ~ ·s ood against him.
f) r:J~ t:Jf Jv~.' 1, rl _ A~ s t-,..- s
r. I hold the c, And D. I desire to sue. In what order are
not~ ' or A, endo se~· by B,
· the endorsers liable, and how many may be sued?
As between themselves endorsers are liable in the direct order of signing unless
there was some agreement between them to a different effect. Such an agreement may
be shown in spite of the parol evidence rule since their endorsements do not purport
to set forth the contract as between themselves. As regards holders, it is immateria:
what the arrangement was as between the endorsers. At common law the holder could
only proceed against one endorser at a time QDless there was a joint endorsement.
But by V#6-422 all prior parties may be joined in one action and a joint judgment
given. ,
I(;} d~ ;~ [Link]. . c6<,v.,..S L- · · .
.3. Chas. Moses is i~., .debted to the Front Royal National Bank in the sum of $500.00
as evidenced by the joint negotiable note of himself and wife. At the time of pro-
curing the loan he likewise delivers to the bank, as collateral security a note of
wm. Brown, payable to Moses, for the sum of $300.00, and payable six months after
date. Three days later, Brown, not knowing that the note has been pledged to the
bank, pays to Moses the sum of $200 on this note. Later Moses and his wife both
become insolvent and the bank institutes suit on Brown's note for $300, which it
held as collateral security. Brmm claims the credit of ~~200 above referred to.
Will his claim be upheld?
No. The bank is a holder in due course. Most defenses and all equities of owner-
ship are out off by a negotiation to a holder in due course. Brown could have pro-
tected himself by insisting that all payments made by him be indorsed on the note.
A taking for a pre-existing debt or as collateral for such a debt is value. Note:
To be a holder in due course (u.c.c. 3-302) one must be a holder who takes for value,
in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
~ any de ense or~ J laim to it on the p:::~ any person.
£I .s. - ;re..c61:~1 J:~f.,-.u
• The maker of i negotiable note stipulates on its face that in the event of de-
fault in the payment thereof he will pay 10% attorney's f ees for collection. What
is the present doctrine in Virginia as to this stipulati on?
Such a sUpulation does not destroy negotiability. u.c.c. 3-106(l)(e). If the
ten per cent attorney's fee is reasonable under the cl~cumstance s , that sum will be
due if it is necessary to resort to an attorney to collect, but attorneys' fees are
subject to court control as an incident of attorneys being regarded as off icers of
the court. Note: Learn the following from u.c.C.J-104:(1) Any writing to be a nego-
tiable instrument wit,hin th::l.s Article must (a) be signed by the maker or drawer;and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order, obligation or power given by t he maker or drawer except as
authorized by this Article; and (c) be payable on demand or at a definite time;and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
And by u.c.C.3-102(l)(b) an order must identify the person who is to pay with
reasonable certainty.
~~ fJ; d~ fv-le.. - - L ~s .-~ _NFt'bTIABTE
INS'ffiUHENTS Revised June 1965
rf, A solicits from 1ra loan~onf,ooo~ B agrees to lend him the money upon a not~
endorsed by C and D. In the presence of B, C endorsed the note with the express
pr oviso that both D and E shall also endorse it. A secures ·t;he endorsement of D,
but not that of E, and then delivers the note to B. The note is not paid. Can B
recover from C on his endorsement and reason?
No. B knew that as between the parties C was not to be liable until the condi tior1
precedent of E's signing had taken place. An o~al condition precedent can be shown
as between the parties(despite the parol evidence rule)not for the purpose of va:cyirg
-llc:s en~1gem~t b~t, to show that there is no such engagement.
U f1t.P rLHt1- J) (J J r• h-4!.--
6. A purchases in ordinary course a negotiable note from B, who has no knowledge of
any equities between the original parties. A, however, has such knowledlge at the
time of such purchase. Can he or not enforce the note clear of such equities?
He can under the ''umbrella doctrine''. One who traces his title through a holder in
due course has all the rights o! a hol der_jn du course. Hence A's knowledge of a
defense is immaterial. This does not make the maker any worse off, while any other
rule might seriously impair a holder in due course's privilege of further negotiating
the instrument. This doctrine is su'Qject to the exception that orie cannot improve
his position by reacquiring the instrument after it has gone through the hands of a
holder in due course.
7. When, if at all, does a check operate as an assignment of the funds to the credit
of the drawer?
Under U~C .C.3-409 a cheek or draft is not in t. There i s
some authority to the e
ec a a certification a check amounts to an assigrnn~nt
but the U.C.C.J-411 dealing with certification of a check is silent on this point.
There are decisions to the effect that a check is an assignment,(l) when it is for
the exact amount due the drawer when he closes his accoun·t. 9 (2) when the bank has
received a sum of money to cover a specificed check, and, (3) when the drawer borrows
money on the faith of a particular deposit made known to his creditor.
Note(l):The u.c.C.(3M417 and 3-418) adopts the rule of Price v. Neal both as to
payment and acceptance and certification; Hence if F forges D's name as drawer of a
check payable to the order ofF, and ifF cashes the check at the P Store, and the
drawee bank honors the check and fails to return the itemwithin the time allowed if
presented through a clearing house the loss is on the drawee bank. It cannot charge
D's account because D did not authorize or ratify the forgery. It cannot recover
back the payment made to the P Store [Link] the P Stor e acted in good faith and
only warranted that it had no knowledge that D's signature was forged.
Note(2). This is to be contrasted with the rld,Je ap nt t'g;r~ ements a;(,Q;:der
pape[• In such a case ti1e holder who collects warrants that he has good title which,
of course, he does not have if he must trace his title through a forgery, and while
the drawee bank cannot legally charge the draHer's account(because it paid to the
order of forger when directed other-v1ise)it is entitled to recover back any sum paid
on quasi-contractual principles--mon ~y - r-aid under a mutual mistake of fact. The
reason for the distinction between t he recovery of money paid because of a forged
drawer's signature and that of a forged indorsement is that the dralvee has or can
have the drawer's signature on file, but he cannot be expected to know the signatures
of indo: sers ~o may ~ a~~ the world.
~~en,fif ~~ will a holder of a check have a right of action against the
bank on which it is drawn?
~fuen the bank has accepted or certified it. The doctrine of third party benefici-
aries has not been extended to include anyone who might be a holder. Thus, as a
rule, only the drawer would have an action against the bank for wrongful refusal to
honor the drawer's checks. Also when there is something in addition to the check
sufficient to make it operate as an ass i grunent.
c ,e,rf.' ti t../:1-t: .:>--. Negotiable Instruments Revised 6-1965 3.
9" "V-Jhat is the effect as to dratver and [Link] when the [Link] of the check pro-
cures it to be certified or accepted by the bank on which it is drawn?
lClo What. is thE'! affect as to the drawer of a check, when the drawer on his orm
account procures the check to be certified or accepted by the bank on which H is
d:;:awn, and then delivers it to the payee?
If a check is certified after delivery, on presentation by the holder, the bank
beecmes the aboolute--debtor of the holder, and the drawer is released, the cheGk
b0ing regard€:d as paid as between the d:rawer and the holder. It hc.s been held, he>w-
er;rer, that when a check is certifiecr'before delivery, the effect is to assure the
person afterward receiving it that it . is genuine, and will be paid, the bank and the
drawer both being bound therefor. In the first case endorsers would also be dis-
charged for suchacceptance or certification would be an election to look to the
bank alone ..
11. What is the cardinal difference in legal effect betwean negotiable and non-
vega+ ; ahl e j nstt"nments?
In the case of non-negotiable paper assignees have no better rights than their
assignors. In the case of negotiable paper holders in due course t ake free from all
/) dy fe~es except real defenses and also free from eq:1i ties of [Link].
{fW /.} e. k-..s. c..>
12. Give two instances when a negotiable note is void in Virgini a, and cannot be
enforced by a holder in' due coursa?e
Real defenses include forgery, fraud in the factum( where [Link] person Was not
~egligen·~)' ~~ y' some cases of insa . ~xtreme dure ~s and ip ~ ir&inia, that
J.t was [Link] for a gaming transaction. These defenses are good aga:mst anyone, even
a holder in due course. Fraud in the factum is to be distinguished from Fraud in
the procurement which is not a real defense: Examples-I : :·equest you to sign a paper
telling you that it is my tvill. You sign it and it turns out to be a note. That is
fraud in the factum. On the other hand if I falsaly tell you that X stock is sell-
[Link] at $150 per share on Wall St. and thus get your note for $900 for seven shares
tha~ i p frj-Jl? il) .the procurement and is not a real defense.
!J1.~'1 V orl t9{ /Yffe -r,d-. t>-....-
. lJ., lrJhat is the effect of material alteration of a negotiable instrument?
A holder who makes a fraudulent alteration can recover nothing.. Holders in due
ourse may recover according to the original tenor of the instrument. Non-fraudulent
alterations are ineffeetive. u.c.C.3 ~407.,
17. ~ draw' a check for $500 in favor of B on the [Link] Exchange Bank of Roanoke.
B endorses and transfers the check, for ~alue and without notice of any infirmity
in the check, to c. Subsequently A notifies the ban1c to stop payment because the
check was obtained by fraud by B. Is the bank r ight i n refusing payment to C?
Yes. The bank must follow the drawer ' s direc tions . A check may be stopped by the
drawer at any t i me before paid. C has no privity with the banke C1 s rights are
against A and not against the bank, or against B as an endorser.
f.·e:L"-~~<W., . P~~ NEGOTIABLE INSTRUHENTS ReYised 6-le65 ~. ~
J8 ~ John Stnithf an attorney-at-law, sold land belong:!.ng to hts client, and the pur~·
r_. haser executed his two negotiable [Link] for the purchase price payable to ~' Joi1n
[Link] th, Attorney / 1 which notes were endorsed by him in like style before ma·~ur:Lt.y ·co
Samuel Smiles in payment of a debt due by Smi-th to him. VJhen the notes fell due t hc;y
weJ:e paid to Smiles. Upon discovering this, Smith 1 s client sued Smiles to re~over
the amount paid him by the purchaser of the property. Is he entitled to recover
in tho suit?
Yes. Smiles vras not a holder in due course as he could not have taken in good
faith when the instrument itself contained the words "John Smith, Attorney". The
word "attorney•.• put him on guard ~to find the agent's authority to pay his private
. debts wi th1 fiduciary paper.
JJ~nh.J Jt~/c-
19" When is a negotiable note payable on demand due, and within what time must pay-
ment be demanded in order to fix the liability of the endorser? A executed his two
negotiable notes to B, one based upon an usurious and the other upon a gambling con-
sideration both before maturity pass int.o the hands of an innocent holder for value.
Can A make defense to the notes or either of them?
(a) A demand note is due on its date, or, if no date is stated, on the date of
issue. Note that a demand in the case of an ordinary demand note is not a conditiorl
precedent to its becoming due, and the statute of limitations starts running at. ome.
(b) By u.c.C.3-503(l)(e) presentment for payment to hold indorsers of demand paper
must be made within a reaso::1able time after such party became liable theraon. In
the case of an ordinary check 7 daya is presumed to be a reasonable time in the case
of indorsers. To be a holder in due course of demand paper one must acquire it
within a reasonable time a:'ter its issue .. u.c~C.3-304(3)(c)The gambling note is made
utterly void by statute. A has no defense to the usury note an against a holder in
due course since there is no statute in Virgirua making usurious contracts utterly
void. Illegal~ tr is ordinarily enly a personal defense.
~
celeration.
(_fi-ve-,- f1 ~ I• It
(1) When 1s an 1nstrument payable to bearer?(2) A check read, 11 Pay X, or bearer
$500-Y 11 • Y sent this check through the mails to X. Z stole it .from the mails and
forged X's name thereto and negotiated it to A, a holder in due course. The drawee
bank charged Y's account. \nJas it wH,hin its rights in so doing?
(1~ By U.C.C./13-111 an instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to beare!
or to the order of bearer, or to a specified pernon or bearer, or cash or to the
order of cash, or any other indication which does not purport to designate a specific
payee. And "[Link] U.C .C .//3··204 (2) a.n instru:r.1ent payable to order and indorsed in blank
becomes payable to bearer ar1d may be negotiated by delhrery alone until specially
indorsed. Note: Bearer paper of Jill kinds can be effeotively specially indorsed.
(2) Yes. This is bearer ;)aper. A does not have to trace a title through the
forgery and hence may stril{e it out. If this ha.d been order paper the bank would
have~ ad o make good as they would not have paid to the order of X.
-r::
c· Ut.-
k~~~
4~ P g e his servant, A, a check filled in every way ~~cept as to amount, and
directed him to get certain articles at the X store and fill in the amount of the
check for those articles.. A got articles for himself instead and filled in a much
greater amount in the presence of the storekeeper, and absconded. (1) Must P make
good to the storekeeper? (2) If tile storekeeper had passed the check to a holder in
due course would P be liable on the check?
The answer is nyesn in each case pl:'ovided the storekeeper acted in good faith.
The [Link] .. treats this case as an alteration and under U.C.C./;lJ-407(3) when an in-
omplete instrument has been completed a holder in due course may enforce it as
ompleted. And by U.C.C.#J-302(2) a payee can be a holder in due course •
( ; • X made out his note to Y for $500 but had not yet given it to him. The parties
. disagreed. While X left the room to see what his ~ife wanted Y walked off with the
note, and negotiated same to H, a holder in due course o (1) Is X liable thereon?
(2) Suppose the note had been incomplete and Y had filled it in before he negotiate1
it to H.
X is liable in each case to H.
Lack of delivery of a completed instrument is only a personal defense. The U.C.C,
(3-115 and J-407 combined) makes X liable even in the case of a stolen incomplete
instrument which [Link] X's genuine signature. 11 And when an incomplete instrument is
completed(a holder in due cou:cse) may enforce it as completed." (
J) ~ft-..s. of )~f ~f {(y;,_s:cle;;). "- - ~e{eiL . . €. l. , ...)( • 'i~t./4L-
6. Plaintiff, the payee, in his motion for judgmen't on a note agau!'st the maker d:.d
not allege that the note was given for value. Defendant demurred. Result?
Demurrer over-ruled. Considerat i on is presumed. Lack of consideration must be
set up as a defense. Note that lack of consideration is not a defense as against
a holder in due course . However, J.f Maker is m.::.ed by an alleged holder in due course
and i f Maker can [Link] a personal defense, then the alleged holder in due course
has the l:urden of proving t hat he is in all respects a holder in due course or traces
his title through a holder in due course.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Revised June 1965 6ft
'( ., X lent Y $500, for which Y gave X his negotiable note. X endorsed this noee to
Z after maturity and without any consideration. Y refused to pay and Z sued X and
Y both of whom set up the fact of no consideration. Result?
X is not liable to Z as he has received no consideration for his indorsement as Z
knew . Y is liable to Z as he has no defense. True Z is not a holder in due course
but that is immaterial unless there is some sort of defense. Z has at least all the
rights of a gratuitous assigneeo X meant to make a gift to Z and not to Y and it
~ make~ no difference to Y wpether he ~ays X or a party whom X has ordered him to pay.
(.)~> . {:c._ ,J :- .,_ of ~~~~ew-...-ff..s ·
Bo Classify the follow~ng indorsements(l) Pay toY, X. (2) X. (3) Pay Y if he passes
the bar exam, X (4) Pay Y only, X (5) X, without recourse on me. (6) Pay Y, for
collection only, X. (7) Pay Y as trustee for B, Xo
(1) Is a special indorsement, (2) blank, (3), (4), (6), and (7) are restrictive,
~escl-v:e:-rdt
d (5) is quai{ i ied. ..J- _
In
r. t[( e~ ·
question (3) would the drawee bank be safe in paying if it knew he had failed
to pass the bar exam indicated?
No. Under U.C.C.#J-205 the former conditional indorsement has been changed to one
. form of restrictive indorsement. And under u.c.C.#3-603(l)(b) a payment made in a
(10. ~£i
man~ ~con;~ tent with a restrictive indorsement does not discharge the payoro
is the effect of a restrictive endorsement?
Section 3-206. Effect of Restricti-ve Indorsement.
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation of the
instrument.
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the depositary bank, is
neither given notice nor otherwise [Link] by a restrictive indo:csement of any
person except the bank's immediate transferor or the person presenting for payment.
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an indorsement which is
conditional or includes the words 11 for collection", llfor deposit", "pay any bank",
or like terms(sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 3~205) must pay or apply any
value given by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the
indorsement and to the ex:tent that he does so he becomes a holder for value. In
addition such transferee is a holder in due course if he otherwise complies with
the requirements of Section 3~302 on what constitutes a holder in due course.
(4) The first taker under an indorsement for the benefit of the indorser or an-
other person(subparagraph (d) of Section 3-205) must pay or apply any value given
by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the indorsement
and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such
taker is a holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the requirements of
Section 3-302 on what constitutes a holder in due course. A later hoider for value
is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by such restrictive indorsement un-
less he has knowledge that a fiduciary or o ther person has negotiated the instrwnent
in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty(subsection (2)
o~ ~ectio~1 3-304) • . ·-'
£11#[Link]-.7] () i ...uJ clUJ !ft,~L.--
11. ·{1) X jorge yfs name as drawer of a check and negotiated it to z, a holder in
due course, who indorsed to A as follol-JS- 11 Pay A, without recourse on me, Z •11 Is z
liable to A? {2) X, an infant, wrote the folJowing check "Pay to the order of cash
$50.00, X. 11 He then delivered the check to Y who passed it to Z without endorse-
ment. Z indorsed to A. X stopped payment. A neglected to give Z notice of dis-
honor. (a) If A sues Z what result? (b) If A sues Y what result?
(1) Yes. Under u.c.C.#3-417 (2)(b) any party who transfers an instrument for a
consideration warrants that all signatures are genuine or authorized. (2)(a) Z is
liable on his warranty that no defense of any party is good as against him unless
he indorsed without recourse in which case the warranty is (as to this point) that
he has no knowledge of any defense. No proceedings on dishonor are necessary to
hold a party on warranties. (b) Y is not liable. A transferror without indorsement
is liable only to his immediate transferee. Had Y indorsed he would have been
liable on his warranties to any subsequent holder who took in good faith.
{(1 'f 0 Ju JffY .s e../?( ~J- NEGOTIABLE- INS'rRL"MENTS / .Revised June 196.5 7 ,,
l ?.. Suppose X forgets to indorse when he passes the instrument on toy for valu e,
[Link] [Link] Yis rights?
Section 3·..201. T:::-ansfer: Right to Indorsement.
(1) Transfer of an instrument, vests in the transferee such rights as the t:-cansf l':r' ··
or has therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a
defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a ]_ate:,~
holder in due course. (2) * ~~- ~~- (;3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value
of an instrument not then :payable· to bearer gives the transferee the specifieall~r
enforceable right to have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. NegotiaGion
takes effect only when the indorsement is made and until that time there is no pre-
~umpp i~n that the transferee is the owner.
"-·tf/J i/, 1'-J of hdcnrsws
13. What/should be remembered about the liability of indorsers as indorsers?
Section 3-414. Contract of -Indorser; Order of Liability.
(1) Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by Gu~h words as "without re-
ooursen) every indors~ engages that upon dishonor and any ne~essc:try notice of dis-
honor and protest. he will pay the instrument accordiqg to its tenor at the time
of his indorsement to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up,
even though the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so. (2) Unless they
otherwise agree indorsers are li ~ble to one another in the order in which they in-
dorse, which is preswned to be the order in which their signatures appear on the
t~~~t:: 6"
~ ~~;sked Y hr
u -·
he, Y, would cash his $200 check. Y telephoned the drawee bank,
and upon their promise to honor X's check, Y told X that he would take it. After
Y called the bank several other checks were presented to the bank drawn by X which
exhausted his account. The bank refused to honor X's check. Y sued the bank.
[Link]?
Judgment for the bank. It cannot be held as an acceptor unless acceptance was
~
writing and on the draft(check).
)"~I{ ~ ~- ~ ~~ ,rf- 'b r-IQ<.i (/,/'
L)J
~nD~awer -tr~ral checks and died before the checks cleared. Would the
Drawee Bank be within its rights in honoring these checks if its officers knew about
Drawer 1 s death?
U.c.C •.f/4~405 reads in part:Death or Incompetence of Customer.* ~*" ~~Neither death
nor incompetence of a customer revokes such authority to accept, pay, C•)[Link] or
account until the bank knows of the fact of death or of an adjudication of incompe-
tence and has [Link] opportunl ty to al!t on it. (2) Even with knowled ge a bank
may for ten days after the date of death pay or certify checks drawn on or prior to
that date unless ordered. to sto:;::> payment by a person claiming an intei·est in the
account.
16. A [Link] inStr11ment -v1as not a able to crder or bearer. Is it
governed by Arti cle
Yes. [Link] #3-805 provides t hat such an instrument is negotiable for all purposes
except that there can be no holder i n due course. All other provisions of Article
3 are applicable. I·Ience indorsers are entitled to notice of dishonor, consideration
ia presumed, and procedural provisions apply.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ~-. -~.-/- ~Wd
{ - m,qo/J June 1965 166 Va .. 439.
One S turned over $150Q _to her son-:01.:~ ~61:-end on real estate. M lent the
0
money to C who gave a note for $1500 payable to bearer, and C executed a deed of
trust to Mo The note sho't~ed that it was secured by deed of trust. M later pledged
this note for a debt of his own to the ~ Bank. S claims that she is entitled to t he
note. The bank claims that it is a holder in due course of bearer paper. Discuss.
1. Statements on notes payable to bearer that they were secured by deed of trust
made unto named party as trustee should have arous~suspicion of bank acquiring notes
from such party of possible equities of other parties, although statements were not
sufficient in themselves to charge bank with bad faith in acquiring note. 2. Section
56 of the N.I.L. (Code 1919 1!'5618) makes a distinction between constructive notice as
applied in other branches of the law, particularly equity, and as applied under the
law merchant. In the former, ••The care which a person of ordinary honesty and
prudence would have exercised is the test.n Under the law merchant the question is
•1 not ought the holder to have suspected, but did he suspect the existence of the
equity. 11 3. At the time the bank acquired this note it knew that M was unable to
meet his financial obligations. He was $1500 in arrears for office rent due the
bank. The bank knew M was the son-in-law of S, that he habitually lent money for
her and others on Norfolk real estate and that he made himself trustee in the deeds
of trust securing these loans. Yet the bank make no inquiry of any sort from M or
anyone else. A jury could find from these facts not mere negligence, but bad faith,
and if they did, as they did in this case, it -vms error for the trial court to set
aside the verdict of the jury.
Note: There would be the same result under the u.c.c. The test of good faith in
Virginia is "the empty head and white heart rule". But if a purchaser has knowledge
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith he has
not taken in good faith. The Virginia version of u.c.c. #3-30u adds a nsuhseotion (7)
W Eich keeps the law on this-point in this State as it w nder the N.~-~·
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTsfk~ .JP;J_ ~ .tJr-tlV--;5 .;-th.. • '.!L 1 1/J-( 166 Va.325
A $250 note was payab~e~ instal~ents of $10 1 eaCh' staftinn; April 1, 1932, the in-
stalments being due every 2 months. The note provided that 11 In the event that two of
said payments shall be due and unpaid at the same time, and then, if not paid within
30 days of the due date of the last of the s aid two overdue payments, the balance
in full of this note shall immediately become due and payable without notice."
(1). Does the statute of limitations run from the due date of the last instalment,
or, from accelerated due date, in case of default? (2) Is the note negotiable?
(1) While there are cases which hold that these contracts of acceleration are for
the benefit of the creditors and merely confer upon them the right at their option
to treat the debt as due, still when the acceleration provision is absolute in form,
as here, the whole note becomes due according to the acceleration provision automa-
tically and the statute of limitations starts [Link] from accelerated date.
u.c.C.#3-109(l)(d) in accord.
(2) u.c.c. #3~109(l)(d) permits any kind of acceleration, and provides that acceler-
ation provisions do not destroy the requirement that the instrument must be payable
on demand or at a definite time.
NEGOTIABlE INSTRUMENTS--S~ 168 Va.28)~.
J bought a car on the instalment plan evidenced by one note of $428 payable in 12
monthly instalments, and in case of default all to become due at once(Note:Not at
the option of the holder but automatically). .
He failed to make the two first payments. Suit was brought therefor and judgment
recovered and paid. He refused to make any further payments and Finance Co. took
the car.
Helds Guilty of conversion. ~uit for two instalments when all instalments were due
b e remainder. "No one should be vexed wice for one and the
same thing.n Different result if acceleration had been at the option of holder
instead of automatically.
Al j· , J.. J 22o1. Revised June 1965
!·:-:~L:OTIABIE INSTRUMENTS 111~ ~{..~ (J.f v ; ~~ 172 [Link].
~~ -1. Is oral notice of dishonor suffi,:ient?
2. Is notice of [Link] sufficient if given to an executor before his qualifica-
t.::..on?
3 • If the holder of a note is also executor of a party seconda.ri1y liable m'.lSt he
give notice of dishonor?
4. If the holder-executor as above gives a binding extension of time to the MalcE::r
for 4 years is the deceased's estate released?
A.l. Oral notice is notice . The U .c.c. does not require a written notice.
2. Yes, as it would be presumed that he still had this notice in mind after he
qualified.
3. no. One need not give notice to himself.
4. An executor has no authority at common law to consent to an extension. Under Va.
Code renewals in such cases cannot exceed 2 years. Hence the deceased's estate is
not liable having been discharged by a binding extension of time for 2 years without
· a reservation of rights against parties secondarily liable.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMEN'fS ~lJev- (H. dM.- ~~c_ - ;{(,. ../'d t.-- ()~ &6SJI1~-·51B,526.
Land was conveyed to T as trustee to secure a not~~ble to t~~~er-c>f L. Upon
default T foreclosed and sold t!1e land to G for G' a $4500 note payable to bearer,
which note was secured by a deed of trust on the land sold to G at the foreclosure
[Link] of giving thia note to L, the trustee T, long afterwards sold it to C
who gave value. After maturity C -sold the note to B. Contest between L and B as to
which one has priority in the proceeds of a sale of the land,whi ch sale "las acquies-
ced in by both Land B. The $4500 note matured in 1932. When C w~s asked when she
bought the note she said she could not remember exactly but that it was some time be-
tween 1930 and 1937. B claims that he traces his title to the $4500 note through a-
holder in due course, C> and hence that he has priority o·ver L. Is this contention
sound?
Held: No. When L showed that T negotiated the note in breach of trust he showed a
defeot in c•s tttle. The law then casts the burden on B to show that C was a holder
in due course. One of the elements of being a holder in due course is a purchase be-
fore maturity. c•s testimony that she acquired the note somewhere between 1930 and
1937 when the note was due in 1932 does not sustain thi s burden.
220h.
Note: The result would be the same unde::c [Link]!3-307(3) 1-1hich reads, "After i t i s
Sfim.m ""that a def€nse exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course
has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in
all respects a holder in due course."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRill'lENTS Renunicationr iills 195 Va.92
F sold a farm to his Ne~w, N, aff fs mother for $12,000 taking their not e ther~
f or. The note bore 6% interest and vras payable in 15 annual installments of ~p 800
ea~h beginning on June 10,1948. F decided to make a gift to N and his mother of any--
thing that might be due on the note when F died so they all went to lav1yer L' s
office. L advised him to write on the note, nAt death this note is to be cancelled
and not to be collected" and to sign and date it. So they went to F 1 s home and N
wrote the statement above on the note and F signed it and gave the note to N's
mother. F died a few months later. Section 122 of the N.I.L.(V/16-475) reads in part,
11 The holder may expressly renounce his rights [Link] any party to the ins ·~rument