INTERNAL

SECURITY
Doctrine · Threats · Response Architecture

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Contents
Chapter 1: National Security – Elements & Doctrine
1.1 Twelve Dimensions of National Security
1.2. National Security Doctrine (NSD)
1.3. What India's NSD Should Contain
1.4. The Doval Doctrine
1.5. SAMADHAN — The Internal Security Doctrine
1.6. Constitutional & Legal Framework
1.7 Key Reform Committees
1.8 Way Forward

Chapter 2: Challenges from External State Actors

2.1 How External State Actors Target India
2.2 State Terrorism vs State-Sponsored Terrorism
2.3 The Zia Doctrine
2.4 China's Multi-Domain Pressure Strategy Against India
2.5. India's Counter-Architecture Against External State Threats
2.6 Pahalgam (2025) & Operation Sindoor
2.7. Way Forward

Chapter 3: Challenges from Non-State Actors

3.1. State Actors vs Non-State Actors
3.2. Non-State Actor Challenges to India
3.3 Why Non-State Actors Persist
3.4. Technology as a Force Multiplier
3.5. Hooda Committee & Budget 2025–26
3.6. India's Response Architecture
3.7. Way Forward

Chapter 4: Media, Social Media & Communication Networks

4.1. The Three-Layer Media Ecosystem
4.2. The CIANA Framework
4.3. The Dual Role of Media in Internal Security
4.4. Social Media Radicalisation
4.5. Legal & Regulatory Framework
4.6. India's Digital Security Institutions
4.7. The Constructive Role of Media in Internal Security.
4.8. Misuse of Internet & Social Media by Non-State Actors
4.9. Mob Violence & Lynching
4.10. Social Networking Sites — Security Implications
4.11 Cloud vs. In-House Hosting for Government
4.12. Regulatory Framework & Guidelines to Curb Misuse
4.13. Way Forward

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Chapter 5: Linkages between Development & Spread of Extremism
5.1. Three Layers of Development-Extremism Linkage
5.2. How Extremism Deepens Underdevelopment
5.3. The Rights-Denial Chain — 5th Schedule, PESA & FRA
5.4. Case Study: Salwa Judum
5.5. Women in the Red Corridor
5.6. India's Counter-Strategy
5.7. The NAXALIS Framework — 2nd ARC
5.8. Way Forward

Chapter 6: Left Wing Extremism (LWE) / Naxalism

6.1. How LWE Transformed Across Four Phases
6.2. Why LWE Persists — Operational Sustaining Factors
6.3. SAMADHAN — India's Anti-LWE Doctrine
6.4. Measures Along the Clear-Hold-Develop Doctrine
6.5. Disaggregating the Causes of LWE's Retreat
6.6 Key Counter-LWE Operational Units
6.7. Way Forward

Chapter 7: Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir

7.1. How J&K's Militancy Was Built
7.2. Over-Ground Workers (OGWs)
7.3. Article 370 Abrogation
7.4. Winning Hearts & Minds
7.5. Security Architecture for J&K
7.6. Way Forward

Chapter 8: North-East Insurgency

8.1. Evolution of Insurgency — Four Phases
8.2. Why Armed Insurgency Has Survived
8.3. State-wise Theaters—Consolidated Matrix
8.4. Manipur Violence 2023
8.5. India–Myanmar Border Challenges & Counters
8.6. AFSPA Act, 1958 — The Apex Court View
8.7. Peace Accords & Agreements
8.8. Impacts of NE Insurgency
8.9. EAST Framework
8.10. Way Forward

Chapter 9: Separatist Movements in India

9.1. Why Separatism Arises
9.2. Khalistan Movement
9.3. Jammu & Kashmir Separatism
9.4. Other Separatist Movements
9.5. Radicalism in a Multi-Religious Society
9.6. Impacts of Separatist Movements
9.7. Government’s Counter-Separatism Strategy

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 9.8. Way Forward

Chapter 10: Terrorism in India

10.1. Types of Terrorism
10.2. Manifestation of Terrorism in India
10.3. Causes of Terrorism in India
10.4. Terrorism as a ‘Competitive Industry.’
10.5. Terror Financing
10.6. Crime–Terror Nexus
10.7. ISIS & Digital Radicalisation
10.8. UAPA & NIA Amendments
10.9. Impacts of Terrorism
10.10. Challenges in Combating Terrorism
10.11. Counter-Terrorism Architecture

Chapter 11: Operation Sindoor

11.1. Background of Operation Sindoor
11.2. Precedent — India’s Operations on Pakistani Soil
11.3. Details & Execution of Operation Sindoor
11.4. Defence Systems Deployed
11.5. Need for Operation Sindoor
11.6. Hot Pursuit & Surgical Strikes — Strategic Impact
11.7. The Four-Day Escalation Sequence
11.8. Criticisms & Limitations — A Balanced View
11.9. Significance of Operation Sindoor
11.10. Future Course of Action

Chapter 12: Cybersecurity

12.1. Elements of Cybersecurity
12.2. Types of Cyber Threats & Crimes
12.3. Cyber Warfare
12.4 Methods of Cyber Warfare
12.5 Towards an Indian Cyber Security Doctrine
12.6. Cross-Border Cyber-Attacks & Defence
12.7. Data Protection & the Srikrishna Committee
12.9. Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP), 2023
12.10. CyberDome Project
12.11. Need for Cybersecurity & Impacts of Cyber Threats
12.12. India’s Cybersecurity Framework
12.13. National Cyber Security Policy 2013
12.14. Deepfakes
12.15. Way Forward

Chapter 13: Money Laundering

13.1. The Process & Techniques of Money Laundering
13.2. Why Money Is Laundered
13.3. Impact & the Economic-Sovereignty Threat

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 13.4. Emerging Technologies & Globalisation
13.5. Challenges in Combating Money Laundering
13.6. The PMLA, 2002 — India’s Cornerstone Law
13.7. Measures to Tackle Laundering
13.8. The Drug–Laundering Nexus
13.9. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
13.9. Way Forward

Chapter 14: Border Management

14.1. Why Border Management Matters
14.2. Challenges in Border Management
14.3. India–China Border — Issues & Measures
14.4. India–Pakistan Border — Issues & Measures
14.5. Other Land Borders — Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar
14.6. The UAV/Drone Threat & Counter-Measures
14.7. Maritime & Coastal Security
14.8. India–Sri Lanka Maritime Interface
14.9. Airspace Management
14.10. CPEC — Description & Threat to India
14.11. Border-Area Governance
14.12. Drug Trafficking & Transborder Crime Nexus
14.13. Key Border-Management Initiatives

Chapter 15: Security Forces, Agencies & Their Mandate

15.1. India’s Internal Security Challenges
15.2. The Armed Forces
15.3. Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs)
15.4. Central Intelligence Agencies
15.5. Central Investigative Agencies
15.6. Apex Decision-Making & Coordination Bodies
15.7. Challenges in the Security-Agency Architecture
15.8. Reform Roadmap — Committees & Recommendations
15.9. Way Forward

Chapter 16: Illegal Immigration & CAA 2019

16.1. Legal Framework & Key Concepts
16.2. Reasons / Factors Giving Impetus
16.3. Impacts — Why It Threatens Security
16.4. Challenges in Tackling Illegal Migration
16.5. Measures & Strategies to Curb It
16.6. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 — Features
16.7. Analysis — Supporting Arguments vs Criticism
16.8. Impacts of the CAA
16.9. Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024 & the NRC Linkage
16.10 Way Forward

Chapter 17: Organised Crime, Narcotics & the Terror-Crime Nexus

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 17.1. Types of Organised Crime
17.2. Organised Crime vs Terrorism
17.3. National & Transnational Linkages
17.4. Narcotics
17.5. Linkages of Drug Trafficking
17.6. Narco-Terrorism
17.7. Drone-Borne Smuggling
17.8. Legal & Institutional Framework
17.9. Operation Dhvast & Key Initiatives
17.10 International Framework
17.11. Challenges in Combating the Nexus
17.12. Way Forward

Chapter 18: Black Money

18.1 Types of Black Money
18.2. Sources & Modes of Generation
18.3. Estimates & Major Exposés
18.4. Impact of Black Money
18.5. Legal & Policy Measures
18.6. Demonetization—A Balanced Assessment
18.7. Way Forward

1 National Security – Elements & Doctrine

National security encompasses far more than military strength alone. It refers to the capacity of a state to protect its
people, territory, sovereignty, and core interests from threats that are simultaneously external and internal, kinetic and non-
kinetic. India's security challenges arise at this intersection of geography, history, and geopolitics — bordered by nuclear-
armed neighbours, harbouring active insurgencies, and navigating a rapidly shifting global order.

1.1 The Twelve Dimensions of National Security

Security analysts and India's own strategic experience — from the Kargil Review Committee (1999) to the National
Security Advisory Board — converge on the view that national security is not a single domain but an interlocking web of at
least twelve distinct concerns. These are best understood in four thematic clusters, since threats rarely confine themselves
to one dimension — a hostile dam upstream (resource security) simultaneously constitutes a geostrategic threat:

Security
Core Concern India-Specific Illustration
Dimension

Cluster A — Geostrategic & Hard Security

Geostrategic Preserving India's strategic autonomy in a China's String of Pearls strategy (Gwadar,
Security multipolar world — preventing encirclement by Hambantota); QUAD as counterbalancing
adversaries and maintaining influence across the mechanism; India's Arctic and deep-sea interests.
Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region.

Military Security Maintaining a credible deterrence posture and Operation Sindoor (May 2025) — strikes on 9 terror
warfighting capability against external aggression sites in Pakistan/PoJK; Kargil War (1999) exposed
— including sub-conventional, hybrid, and nuclear gaps in integrated military command.
dimensions.

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 Security
Core Concern India-Specific Illustration
Dimension

Border & Defending the physical perimeter of the state — CIBMS smart fencing along the Indo-Pakistan border;
Territorial 15,106 km of land borders and 7,516 km of Chinese infrastructure construction at Depsang and
Security coastline — against infiltration, arms smuggling, Demchok; 294 Pakistani drone sightings in Punjab
and territorial creep. (2024).

Cluster B — Economic, Energy & Resource Security

Economic Shielding the national economy from weaponised FICN injection by Pakistan-linked networks (37% rise
Security financial instruments — counterfeit currency, in fake ₹500 notes, RBI 2024–25); China's attempted
sanctions threats, debt coercion, and trade debt-trap leverage in the IOR neighbourhood.
manipulation deployed by hostile states.

Energy Security Ensuring an uninterrupted and diversified supply of India imports ~85% of its crude oil; Chabahar Port
energy resources to sustain both the civilian and International North-South Transport Corridor
economy and defence operations without strategic (INSTC) reduce Gulf dependence; solar-hydrogen
dependence on adversary-linked supply chains. push under National Energy Security Mission.

Resource Preventing conflicts over water, critical minerals, Indus Waters Treaty suspended post-Pahalgam
Security and arable land from escalating into internal unrest attack (April 2025); Cauvery dispute (internal);
or cross-border disputes that adversaries can China's upstream Brahmaputra dam construction as
exploit. hydro-coercion.

Cluster C — Societal, Political & Health Security

Ethnic & Social Containing communal and ethnic tensions that Manipur ethnic violence (2023); Pakistan-state-media
Security fracture national cohesion — preventing them from amplification of communal disinformation during 2020
being weaponised by external actors or internal Delhi riots.
extremist networks as entry points for radicalisation.

Political Security Protecting democratic institutions, the constitutional Urban Naxal networks providing intellectual
order, and the sovereignty of elected governments legitimacy to CPI(Maoist); foreign-funded NGOs
from subversion — through both overt and covert obstructing infrastructure projects flagged under
means. FCRA.

Health Security Preparing for epidemics, bioterrorism, and medical COVID-19 (2020–21): diverted CAPF deployments,
emergencies that can paralyse state capacity, delayed elections, created humanitarian crises; WHO
trigger mass displacement, and create governance flagged India-Bangladesh border as a corridor for
vacuums. drug-resistant tuberculosis.

Cluster D — Digital, Informational & Environmental Security

Cyber Security Defending critical digital infrastructure — power APT41 (China) targeting India's power sector; APT36
grids, financial systems, defence networks, and (Pakistan) deploying CapraRAT post-Pahalgam;
UIDAI databases — from state-sponsored AIIMS ransomware attack (2022) disrupted 3 crore
intrusions and ransomware campaigns. patient records.

Information Countering disinformation, propaganda, and data Pakistan-linked bot networks spreading anti-India
Security theft that manipulate public opinion, incite violence, narratives; Meta's 2024 report on Chinese fake
and expose classified state information to accounts; deepfake videos targeting 2024 Lok Sabha
adversaries. voters.

Environmental Managing climate-induced threats — flooding, Climate-induced migration from Bangladesh (est. 10
Security drought, and ecological degradation — that cause million by 2050 — World Bank) straining NE India;
internal displacement, resource scarcity, and border Himalayan glacier retreat threatening water security
instability. of 600 million people.

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 Why This Clustering Matters for Policy
Hybrid warfare: fuses all four clusters simultaneously — a single adversary action can hit military, cyber,
economic, and informational dimensions at once, as the 2020 Galwan incident demonstrated.
2.5-front war doctrine: (former CDS Bipin Rawat) spans Clusters A and C — China/Pakistan (hard security)
plus internal insurgency (societal security) simultaneously.
Policy implication: A formal National Security Strategy must address all four clusters with integrated
instruments — not just military spending.

1.2 National Security Doctrine (NSD)

What Is a National Security Doctrine?

A National Security Doctrine is a foundational policy framework that codifies a country's core security interests, defines the
threats it faces, articulates the strategic objectives it pursues, and specifies how the instruments of national power —
military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence — will be deployed in their service. It is, in essence, a strategic algorithm: a
practised response framework that reduces ad hoc decision-making during crises and provides citizens and allies with a
clear understanding of the state's security priorities.
India currently lacks a formally published NSD. The only official policy direction to the Armed Forces remains the Raksha
Mantri's Operational Directive of 2009 — widely considered outdated.

Why India Needs a Formal NSD — Six Arguments

Rationale Explanation

Responding to New Grey zone operations, cyberattacks, disinformation, and proxy warfare have transformed the
Warfare Domains battlespace beyond conventional doctrines. Without a published doctrine, India's responses remain
fragmented and reactive. (Kargil Review Committee, 1999)

Completing Stalled Theaterisation of the armed forces — integrating Army, Navy, and Air Force under joint theatre
Reforms commands — requires a foundational national security vision. As former Army Chief General M.M.
Naravane cautioned, debating theaterisation without a prior NSS is 'putting the cart before the horse.'

Avoiding Half-Done Shivshankar Menon observed that incomplete reforms compound vulnerabilities: 'You cannot cross a
Reforms chasm in two leaps. Many reforms begun by the former CDS remain unfinished.' A written doctrine
creates accountability and momentum.

Integrating a Multi- India faces a 2.5-front threat — China (LAC), Pakistan (LoC + proxy terror), and internal security. A
Domain Threat Picture doctrine integrates these into a coherent response, preventing siloed agency responses. Galwan 2020
exposed the cost of uncoordinated intelligence management.

Deterrence A published doctrine conveys red lines to adversaries. Former CDS General Anil Chauhan noted that
Communication India acts on security interests even without a written NSS — but publishing one strengthens deterrence
signalling. Had Pakistan received advance warning that a Kashmir provocation risked an Indian riposte
deep into its territory, the 1965 misadventure may have been avoided.

Enhancing A synergised doctrine enables coordinated deployment of military, diplomatic, economic, and
Comprehensive intelligence instruments — amplifying India's Comprehensive National Power rather than leaving each
National Power ministry to act independently.

1.3 What India's NSD Should Contain

National interests and values: A precise articulation of India's core interests — territorial integrity, democratic
governance, economic growth, and civilisational heritage — translated into actionable goals.
Threat assessment: A current, evidence-based mapping of threats across all twelve security dimensions —
including grey zone, cyber, space, and bioterrorism threats not covered in 2009.
Strategic culture clarification: India's tradition of strategic restraint — rooted in the rejection of colonial-era use of
force, as argued by Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta in Arming Without Aiming — needs to be explicitly

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 reframed to accommodate calibrated offensive postures such as surgical strikes and Operation Sindoor (2025).
Instrument integration: Detailed coordination frameworks for military (theatres), intelligence (MAC/NATGRID),
diplomacy (Act East, Neighbourhood First, SCO), and economic (FDI, FATF compliance) instruments.
Red lines and deterrence signals: Explicit communication to adversaries of thresholds that will trigger response —
preventing miscalculation by Pakistan (Kashmir proxy terrorism) and China (LAC transgressions).
Periodic review mechanism: A mandatory review cycle (every 3–5 years or after major strategic events) to keep the
doctrine responsive to a dynamic threat environment — as practised by the US, UK, Russia, and China.

1.4 The Doval Doctrine

Since 2014, when Ajit Doval assumed the role of National Security Advisor, a discernible doctrinal shift has occurred in
India's security posture. Analysts have characterised this as the Doval Doctrine — a departure from reflexive strategic
restraint toward a Defensive-Offensive or 'Double Squeeze' strategy. It represents India's attempt to impose costs on
adversaries below the threshold of full-scale war while simultaneously addressing internal vulnerabilities.

Classic Restraint Posture (Pre-

Dimension Doval Doctrine / Defensive-Offensive (Post-2014)
2014)

Response to Diplomatic protests; UN resolutions; Surgical strikes (Uri, 2016); Balakot airstrike (2019); Operation
Terror bilateral dialogue. Sindoor — 9 sites struck in Pakistan/PoJK (May 2025).

China Strategy Border talks; disengagement Galwan counter-mobilisation; QUAD deepening; LAC infrastructure
agreements; strategic patience. acceleration; Doklam stand-off (2017).

Internal Reactive counter-insurgency; political Article 370 abrogation (2019); NIA expansion; UAPA 2019
Security engagement. amendments; proactive anti-LWE operations.

Diplomatic Non-alignment; equidistance. Neighbourhood First; Indian Ocean as sphere of influence; IWT
Signalling suspension post-Pahalgam.

Economic Limited use of trade as security PLI-driven self-reliance (Aatmanirbhar Bharat); ban on 267 Chinese
Leverage instrument. apps; FDI restrictions on border-sharing nations.

Counter-Argument — Strategic Ambiguity Has Value

Former CDS General Anil Chauhan has argued that the absence of a published NSS does not mean the
absence of strategy — India's successful execution of the Article 370 abrogation and the Balakot strike
demonstrate coherent strategic intent without formal documentation.
Some strategists argue that deliberate non-disclosure preserves flexibility and prevents adversaries from
calibrating responses precisely — a form of productive strategic ambiguity.
The counter-response: ambiguity can also encourage miscalculation (as Kargil demonstrated) and hampers
allied coordination and theaterisation planning.

1.5 SAMADHAN — The Internal Security Doctrine

While a comprehensive NSD remains uncodified, India has operationalised an internal-security sub-doctrine through the
SAMADHAN framework (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2017) — primarily directed at Left Wing Extremism but applicable across
all internal security theatres. It represents the closest India has come to a published counter-insurgency doctrine.

Letter Pillar What It Means Application Example

S Smart Context-specific, intelligence-driven responses rather Distinguishing coerced tribals from

Leadership than blanket force application. hardened Maoist cadres in Operation Black
Forest (2025).

A Aggressive Calibrated offensive action — maximise operational CoBRA units; Greyhounds commando
Strategy impact while minimising civilian harm and exposure. model; targeted neutralisation.

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 Letter Pillar What It Means Application Example

M Motivation & Reintegrating militants via surrender schemes; Naxal Surrender Policy 2025; Bastariya
Training building security force morale and specialist capacity. Battalion (tribal CRPF recruits).

A Actionable Real-time, ground-level intelligence through multi- Revamped MAC; NATGRID; AI-based
Intelligence agency coordination rather than isolated inputs. predictive analytics in Chhattisgarh.

D Dashboard Measurable performance indicators at district level — MHA district-level dashboards for LWE
KPIs tracking development, security, and governance management.
progress.

H Harness Force-multiplier technologies — UAVs, night vision, NETRA UAVs; AP's CRIME Analytics
Technology GIS mapping, drones — to compensate terrain Platform (40% IED reduction).
disadvantages.

A Action Plan per Tailor strategy to each conflict zone's specific terrain, Separate Bastar / Abujhmad / Jharkhand /
Theatre demographics, and grievance profile. Manipur strategies.

N No Access to Disrupt all revenue streams — extortion, FICN, Anti-extortion wings; PMLA enforcement; ED
Financing narcotics — that sustain armed groups. seizures in LWE supply chains.

1.6 Constitutional & Legal Framework

Provision / Law Relevance to Internal Security

Article 355 Places the Union under an obligation to protect every state against external aggression and internal
(Constitution) disturbance — the foundational constitutional mandate for central intervention in internal security.

Article 356 Permits the Union to assume direct administration of a state when its constitutional machinery breaks
(President's Rule) down — used during acute security crises (Punjab 1987, J&K multiple occasions).

Article 352 (National Enables the Union to declare a National Emergency in cases of armed rebellion or external aggression
Emergency) — fundamentally alters the federal-unitary balance toward central authority.

7th Schedule — Law and order sits in the State List (Entry 1), but several security-related subjects (preventive detention,
Concurrent List criminal procedure, evidence) are on the Concurrent List — enabling central legislative intervention.

UAPA, 1967 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act: primary legislation for designating terrorist individuals and
(amended 2019) organisations, asset seizure, and extended detention without bail — core tool for counter-terror
operations.

NSA, 1980 National Security Act: authorises preventive detention for up to 12 months without trial on grounds of
national security — frequently deployed in J&K and against organised crime.

AFSPA, 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act: grants special operational powers to security forces in declared
'disturbed areas' — enables military deployment in NE and J&K. Controversial; Jeevan Reddy
Committee (2004) recommended repeal.

NIA Act, 2008 Constitutes the National Investigation Agency as India's premier counter-terrorism investigating body —
enables cross-state jurisdiction; expanded powers under 2019 amendment.

1.7 Key Reform Committees

Committee /
Year & Mandate Principal Recommendations
Report

Kargil Review 1999; chaired by K. Subrahmanyam. Integrated Defence HQ; Defence Intelligence Agency; NSA
Committee Reviewed intelligence and operational empowered; four task forces on defence reform — many
failures of the Kargil War. recommendations remain unimplemented.

Group of 2001; reviewed Kargil Committee findings Creation of Defence Acquisition Council; Defence Research &
Ministers (GoM) across four sub-committees. Development Board; border management restructuring.

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 Committee /
Year & Mandate Principal Recommendations
Report

Naresh Chandra 2011; on defence management reforms. Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee; strengthening
Task Force cyber and space security agencies; doctrine publication
requirement.

2nd ARC (5th 2008; on public order. Chaired by NAXALIS and RESOLVE frameworks for LWE; community
Report) Veerappa Moily. policing reforms; police modernisation; PESA/FRA
implementation.

Hooda 2019; constituted by Indian National Four-priority framework: neighbourhood relations, internal
Committee Congress on national security. Chaired by conflict resolution, citizen protection, and capability
Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda. enhancement.

Madhukar 2016; on India-Pakistan border Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System

Gupta management. (CIBMS); additional smart-fencing investment.
Committee

Shekatkar 2016; on enhancing combat capability and Rationalisation of non-combat posts; enhanced border road
Committee reducing establishment expenditure. construction speed; CAPF modernisation.

1.8 Way Forward

Publish a formal NSS: India must consolidate a written National Security Strategy through the NSC Secretariat
(currently in draft) — providing doctrinal clarity for theaterisation, allied coordination, and deterrence messaging.
Complete theaterisation: Operationalise the Integrated Theatre Commands as recommended by the Kargil Review
Committee (1999) and reiterated by successive CDSs — a prerequisite for joint warfighting capability.
Cybersecurity as the first line: Enact a dedicated Cyber Warfare Doctrine; expand NCIIPC mandate; achieve 0.5%
of GDP cybersecurity spending as recommended by the National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS, 2020).
Whole-of-government security: Operationalise NATGRID's full 21-database integration; strengthen MAC for real-
time inter-agency intelligence sharing; establish a standing National Internal Security Council.
Development-security convergence: Ensure that security operations in LWE and insurgency zones are always
accompanied by simultaneous delivery of FRA rights, PESA empowerment, and Aspirational Districts development —
the EAST framework principle.
Recalibrate strategic restraint: India's tradition of strategic restraint, as described by Cohen and Dasgupta, must
be updated to accommodate calibrated offensive deterrence — the Doval Doctrine's double-squeeze as a formal
doctrinal element.

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 2 Challenges from External State Actors

India faces this challenge on two fronts simultaneously: Pakistan's doctrine of asymmetric sub-conventional warfare in
Kashmir and China's grey-zone operations across the LAC, Indian Ocean, and cyberspace. Former External Affairs
Minister S. Jaishankar has framed this as a "two-front pressure campaign" that demands instruments well beyond
conventional military response.

2.1 How External State Actors Target India

External-state threats against India operate across four distinct vectors — none of which constitutes 'war' in the
conventional sense, yet each inflicts measurable damage on India's security, economy, and social fabric. This below-the-
threshold warfare — sometimes called grey-zone conflict — is deliberately calibrated to stay beneath the level that would
trigger a conventional military response:

Threat Category Mechanism India-Specific Evidence

Vector A — Covert Political-Military Threats

Proxy Warfare & Using trained non-state armed groups as an Pakistan's ISI direction of LeT/JeM in Kashmir;
Deniable extension of state foreign policy — exporting China's alleged facilitation of NSCN(K) arms supply
Operations violence while retaining diplomatic immunity and routes through Myanmar for NE insurgents.
avoiding the costs of conventional war.

Cross-Border Maintaining a network of launch pads, training TRF (Lashkar proxy) operatives trained at PoJK
Infiltration camps, and transit routes in contested territories to camps infiltrated Pahalgam via Baisaran —
Infrastructure push operatives and weapons into India at will. exploiting a 20-minute security response gap (April
2025).

State-Sponsored Funding and directing ideological content — Pakistan's ISI-linked networks funding pro-
Radicalisation through mosques, madrasas, digital platforms, and Khalistan media content directed at Punjabi
diasporic networks — to radicalise populations diaspora in Canada and the UK; Voice of Khorasan
inside India toward violent separatism. (IS affiliate) content produced in Pakistan.

Vector B — Economic & Financial Warfare

Counterfeit Flooding the target economy with high-quality fake RBI 2024–25 Annual Report: 37% surge in fake
Currency Injection currency to erode purchasing power, fund terror ₹500 notes in circulation; FICN traced to printing
(FICN) operations, and destabilise monetary institutions facilities in Pakistan, routed via Bangladesh and
— classified as 'economic terrorism' by India's Nepal.
security doctrine.

Hawala & Terror Exploiting informal, trust-based remittance Dubai-based hawala brokers linked to ISI funnelled
Financing Networks systems that leave no paper trail — routing money ₹60 lakh to J&K OGWs (NIA chargesheet, 2023);
from Gulf-based financiers to domestic terror D-Company's hawala network connected FICN and
handlers without touching the formal banking narcotics proceeds.
system.

Narco-Terrorism Generating terror-financing revenues through drug BSF recovered 100+ Pakistani drones along
Pipelines trafficking while simultaneously weaponising Punjab border (2025) carrying heroin; 'Golden
narcotics to debilitate border populations, Crescent' (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) supplies
particularly targeting youth in Punjab and J&K. ~70% of India-bound hard drugs.

Vector C — Cyber & Informational Operations

State-Backed Cyber Deploying permanent, well-resourced cyber teams RedEcho (China): malware implanted in 10 Indian
Intrusions (APT against India's critical infrastructure, defence power sector entities; linked to Navi Mumbai
Groups) networks, and financial systems — designed for blackout (2020). APT36 (Pakistan): CapraRAT
long-duration espionage and potential sabotage Android malware targeting Indian Army personnel
activation. post-Pahalgam.

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 Threat Category Mechanism India-Specific Evidence

Disinformation & Manufacturing and amplifying false narratives Meta Transparency Report (2024): dismantled
Information through bot networks, fake accounts, and captured coordinated inauthentic behaviour networks
Operations media to polarise Indian society, delegitimise originating in China, targeting Indian political
elected governments, and create instability during discourse ahead of Lok Sabha elections.
crises.

GPS Spoofing & Deploying electronic warfare tools to degrade Chinese military-grade GPS spoofing detected
Electronic Warfare India's battlefield navigation, disrupt commercial along LAC (2021–23) disrupting Indian Army patrol
aviation, and confuse border surveillance systems navigation; countermeasure: NavIC deployed in Op
along active flashpoints. Sindoor (May 2025) for Pakistan-jamming-proof
guidance.

Vector D — Maritime & Strategic Encirclement

Indian Ocean Building a network of dual-use port infrastructure China's 'String of Pearls': Gwadar (Pakistan),
Region (IOR) across India's maritime neighbourhood — Hambantota (Sri Lanka, 99-year lease), Kyaukpyu
Contestation commercially framed but strategically positioned to (Myanmar) — encircling India's sea lanes and
enable naval access, intelligence collection, and energy import routes.
supply chain control.

Submarine & Naval Deploying submarines and warships into the PLA Navy submarines detected in IOR 6+ times in
Intrusions Indian Ocean Region to monitor India's naval 2023–24; Chinese research vessels entered India's
movements, test response protocols, and signal EEZ near Andaman & Nicobar without prior notice
strategic intent below the threshold of provocation. (2023).

Refugee Flows as Allowing or engineering mass displacement from Rohingya influx (Myanmar): NIA flagged ISI-linked
Security Vectors neighbouring countries — creating demographic operatives embedded within refugee settlements in
pressure, communal tensions, and potential Jammu (2021); 10 million potential climate migrants
infiltration cover along India's porous borders. from Bangladesh projected by 2050 (World Bank).

2.2 State Terrorism vs. State-Sponsored Terrorism

Dimension State Terrorism State-Sponsored Terrorism

Direction of Government deploys coercive violence downward — Government supports non-state actors to deploy
harm against its own citizens or subjects within its own violence outward — against a third state's
jurisdiction. citizens or security forces.

Primary Suppressing internal dissent, eliminating political Advancing foreign policy goals — destabilising a
objective opposition, and consolidating authoritarian control rival state, seizing disputed territory, or expanding
through fear. regional influence — while maintaining plausible
deniability.

Typical Extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary Arms supply, financial transfers, training camps,
instruments detention, and systematic torture of political prisoners. intelligence sharing, safe havens, and diplomatic
shielding for non-state armed groups.

International Potentially prosecutable under international human Far harder to hold accountable — state can deny
accountability rights law and the ICC — but the sovereignty doctrine connection to non-state proxies; FATF and UNSC
often shields perpetrators. sanctions are the primary tools.

India-relevant Sri Lanka's IPKF operations raised state-terrorism Pakistan's ISI direction of TRF (Pahalgam 2025),
example allegations; Myanmar military's ethnic cleansing of LeT (26/11 Mumbai 2008), and JeM (Pulwama
Rohingya (2017) generated the refugee crisis now 2019) — publicly acknowledged by the FBI in a
affecting India's NE borders. US court (2011).

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 Note:
Pakistan's case illustrates how state and state-sponsored terrorism can co-exist: its military courts have
prosecuted civilians (state terrorism), while its ISI directs cross-border proxy operations (state-sponsored
terrorism) simultaneously.
FATF's 2025 statement introduced the concept of 'state sponsorship of terrorism' as a formal risk category — a
direct outcome of India's sustained advocacy at multilateral forums.
China's position is more ambiguous: its alleged facilitation of arms to NE insurgents and diplomatic shielding
of Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorists (blocking Masood Azhar's UNSC listing 2009–2019) falls in a grey
zone between state sponsorship and passive enablement.

2.3 The Zia Doctrine

Pakistan's approach to India is not improvised terrorism — it is a deliberately architected state strategy born from the
trauma of the 1971 war. Following Pakistan's catastrophic military defeat in December 1971 — which resulted in the
creation of Bangladesh and the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops — General Zia ul-Haq concluded that Pakistan could
never match India in conventional warfare.

Doctrine Element Description & India-Specific Consequence

Post-1971 Recalibration The 1971 military defeat taught Pakistan that it could not sustain a conventional war against India.
General Zia's response was to institutionalise asymmetric warfare and religious extremism as state
instruments — constructing a covert-warfare capability that could impose costs on India below the
nuclear threshold. (Source: Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 2011)

Nuclear Deterrence as Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons by 1987 gave its proxy strategy a critical protective shield
an Umbrella — India could not escalate conventionally without risking nuclear exchange. Pakistan's entire sub-
conventional warfare strategy operates in the space opened by this deterrence umbrella.

The 'Thousand Cuts' The strategic objective was not to seize Kashmir outright — which conventional military failure had
Framework demonstrated was impossible — but to keep India perpetually off-balance, forcing it to divert
resources to counter-insurgency and maintain strategic uncertainty over Kashmir's future. Analysts
cite this as the genesis of the TRF, LeT, and JeM operational architecture.

Kargil (1999) — Far from abandoning the Zia Doctrine, the Kargil failure reinforced it. The post-Kargil Pakistani
Reinforcement Not military consensus was that direct military adventure risked international isolation; the ISI's proxy
Revision infrastructure was the safer instrument. This accounts for the intensification of proxy operations in
J&K post-1999.

FBI's Acknowledgement In a landmark 2011 US court proceeding, the Federal Bureau of Investigation publicly confirmed —
(2011) for the first time in a legal forum — that Pakistan's ISI sponsors terrorism in Kashmir and maintains
command-and-control relationships with separatist terror groups. This provided India's position at
international forums with an authoritative external validation.

The FATF Dimension India leveraged FATF's mutual evaluation process to place Pakistan on the 'grey list' from 2018 to
(2018–2022) 2022, documenting 26 outstanding counter-terrorism financing deficiencies. While Pakistan was
removed in 2022, FATF's 2025 report reintroduced state sponsorship of terrorism as a category,
reviving scrutiny.

2.4 China's Multi-Domain Pressure Strategy Against India

Unlike Pakistan's single-domain proxy warfare, China's approach to India is multi-dimensional and systemic — operating
simultaneously across territorial, economic, cyber, informational, and maritime domains.

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 Domain China's Strategy Consequence for India

Border / Salami-slicing along the LAC — incremental Galwan Valley clash (2020): 20 Indian soldiers killed;
Territorial territorial encroachment through infrastructure Depsang, Demchok disengagement still incomplete
construction (villages, roads, helipads) in disputed (2025); China built 624 km of LAC-adjacent highway
areas rather than overt military aggression. in 2023 alone.

Economic Using trade dependence, investment control, and India's ₹6.7 lakh crore trade deficit with China (2023–
Coercion port infrastructure in India's neighbourhood as 24); Chinese state entities building Hambantota Port
leverage — while restricting Indian access to (99-year lease) 250 km from Indian coastline.
Chinese markets and supply chains.

Cyber State-directed APT groups conduct persistent cyber RedEcho malware in 10 power entities; APT41
Operations espionage against India's defence, telecom, and infiltrated Air India (2021) extracting 4.5 million
infrastructure systems — with potential sabotage passenger records; SolarWinds-type supply-chain
activation capability for wartime. attack vectors being mapped.

Diplomatic Repeatedly using UN Security Council veto authority China vetoed UNSC designation of JeM chief
Shielding of to block designation of Pakistan-based terrorists as Masood Azhar as global terrorist four times (2009–
Terror global terrorists — insulating Pakistan from 2019) before India's bilateral pressure forced a
international accountability. reversal.

IOR Expanding naval presence and port access across PLA Navy conducted 6+ Indian Ocean deployments
Encirclement the Indian Ocean Region — positioning assets to in 2023–24; research vessel Yuan Wang 5 entered
potentially interdict India's energy imports and trade Sri Lanka's Hambantota port despite Indian
routes in a conflict scenario. objections (2022).

Informational Deploying state-linked media (CGTN, Global Times) Meta Transparency Report (2024) removed China-
Operations and covert bot networks to shape Indian and global origin coordinated fake accounts targeting Indian
perceptions on border disputes, human rights, and election discourse; CGTN broadcasting anti-India
bilateral relations. narratives during 2020 Galwan crisis.

2.5 India's Counter-Architecture Against External State Threats

Response Domain Measure Status / Impact

Hard Security — CIBMS (Comprehensive Integrated Border Deployed in Jammu and Punjab sectors (2023–
Borders Management System): thermal sensors, infrared 25); detected 294 Pakistani drones in Punjab
cameras, UAV surveillance, AI-driven anomaly (2024); reduces human patrolling exposure.
detection along Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh
borders.

Hard Security — Post-Pahalgam Doctrine: any cross-border terror Demonstrated credible deterrence; TRF issued a
Counter-Terror attack traceable to a state actor triggers sovereign- public retraction of its second claim of
level response — including kinetic strikes on terror responsibility within 72 hours of Sindoor strikes.
infrastructure. Operationalised in Op Sindoor (May
2025).

Intelligence Revamped Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) integrates NATGRID operational since 2020; MAC flagged
Architecture real-time signals intelligence from IB, RAW, NTRO, Pahalgam attack-related movements 96 hours
and state police. NATGRID links 21 government before the event — response mobilisation failed,
databases for cross-referencing threat inputs. not intelligence collection.

Cyber Defence National Cyber Security Strategy (2020): CERT-In CERT-In handled 1.4 million cyber incidents
mandate; NCIIPC protection of critical infrastructure; (2023), 33% YoY increase; DCA activated
Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) for offensive- offensive cyber options during Op Sindoor to
defensive cyber operations. disrupt Pakistani military communications.

Diplomatic Isolation India's consistent advocacy at FATF, UNSC, SCO, Pakistan removed from FATF grey list (2022), but
and G20 to document Pakistan's terror-financing 2025 FATF statement reintroduced 'state
infrastructure and isolate it from international sponsorship' framework — direct outcome of
financial systems. Indian advocacy.

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 Response Domain Measure Status / Impact

Economic FICN Coordination Centre (FCORD) under MHA; ED seized ₹1,646 crore in crypto linked to terror
Countermeasures ED enforcement of PMLA against hawala networks; financing (Feb 2025); 37 hawala operators
UAPA-designated entities asset freeze. arrested in 2024 with ISI-linked transaction trails.

Maritime Security Three-tier Coast Guard architecture; Coastal Radar Coast Guard intercepted 300+ kg
Chain (51 stations); Combined CORPATs with 12 methamphetamine from Pakistani smuggling
Indo-Pacific navies; P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol vessel in Arabian Sea (2024); CORPAT with
aircraft. Indonesia and Sri Lanka detected 6 PLA Navy
submarines.

Development-Based Vibrant Villages Programme (663 border villages 663 Vibrant Villages activated in Arunachal,
Prevention along LAC); BADP for Pakistan border districts; PM- Uttarakhand, Himachal, Sikkim, Ladakh (2023–
DevINE for NE border areas — reducing 25); 27 new roads completed in Arunachal LAC
governance vacuum exploitable by state zone (2024).
adversaries.

2.6 Pahalgam (2025) & Operation Sindoor

Pahalgam → Operation Sindoor: What Changed

Pahalgam Attack (April 22, 2025): The Resistance Front (TRF) — a LeT front organisation — killed 26 tourists
in Baisaran meadow after segregating them by religion. TRF is a 'virtual terror group' designed to give Pakistan
deniability while maintaining operational direction.
India's Response Framework: Rather than the calibrated diplomatic-military mix used post-Pulwama (2019),
India applied a 'whole-of-government pressure campaign': suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), expelled
Pakistani High Commission staff, closed Wagah border, and withdrew Most Favoured Nation trading status.
Operation Sindoor (May 7, 2025): Precision strikes on 9 terror infrastructure sites — 4 inside Pakistan (Markaz
Taiba/Muridke: LeT HQ; Markaz Subhan Allah/Bahawalpur: JeM HQ) and 5 in PoJK. NavIC guidance deployed
to defeat Pakistani GPS jamming.
Doctrinal significance: This marked India's first publicly acknowledged strike on Pakistani soil since 1971 —
operationalising the Doval Doctrine's 'Defensive-Offensive' posture and demonstrating that nuclear deterrence
no longer automatically protects Pakistan from consequences of proxy terrorism.
FATF dimension: India circulated intelligence on TRF-ISI-Pakistan state nexus at FATF's June 2025 plenary —
pushing for reactivation of Pakistan's grey-list status and introduction of 'state sponsorship' as a monitoring
criterion.

2.7 Way Forward

Formalise the Defensive-Offensive Doctrine: Codify Op Sindoor's precedent into a published counter-terrorism
doctrine — establishing explicit thresholds and proportionality guidelines for future responses to state-sponsored
terrorism.
Deepen QUAD and I2U2 partnerships: Leverage the QUAD (India-US-Australia-Japan) and I2U2 (India-Israel-
UAE-US) for shared intelligence on APT groups, IOR surveillance, and coordinated FATF advocacy against state-
sponsors of terrorism.
Accelerate NATGRID's full integration: Connect all 21 designated government databases in real time — the
Pahalgam response failure was not an intelligence gap but an integration-to-action gap.
Invest in electronic and cyber counter-capabilities: The NavIC deployment in Op Sindoor demonstrated the value
of indigenous navigation; extend this to cyber-domain with a published Cyber Warfare Doctrine and scaled DCA
budget.
Counter the IOR encirclement proactively: Deepen basing agreements with Mauritius (Agalega), Sri Lanka, and
Maldives; accelerate India's own port development at Sabang (Indonesia) and Duqm (Oman) to offset China's String
of Pearls.

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 Economic decoupling from strategic vulnerabilities: Reduce China's share of India's critical imports (electronics,
APIs, rare earths) below 30% through PLI-linked diversification — removing the economic leverage China uses to
constrain India's diplomatic posture.
Strengthen FCRA and hawala enforcement: Upgrade FCORD with AI-based transaction monitoring; close the
regulatory gap between India's PMLA framework and FATF's evolving virtual-asset recommendations.

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 3 Challenges from Non-State Actors

From the IS module in Thiruvananthapuram to the Maoist cadre in Abujhmad, from the urban Naxal network in Mumbai to
the cryptocurrency fundraiser in Lucknow — non-state actors exploit every governance gap India leaves open.
As former Home Minister Rajnath Singh observed, India's security apparatus must remain 'adaptive to emerging threats
such as cyber warfare, hybrid operations, and transnational organised crime' — all of which are primarily non-state-actor
phenomena today.

3.1 State Actors vs Non-State Actors

Analytical
External State Actors Non-State Actors
Dimension

Organisational Formal, hierarchical, state-resourced. Bound by Decentralised, networked, adaptive. Answer to no

Character international law, treaties, and diplomatic sovereign authority; operate across jurisdictions without
conventions — even when violating them. legal restraint.

Resource Base Sustained by state budgets, military Self-financing through extortion, narcotics, hawala, and
infrastructure, intelligence agencies, and cryptocurrency. Low overhead; asymmetric capability
diplomatic networks — virtually inexhaustible. relative to resource investment.

Accountability Theoretically accountable to international law Near-zero international accountability. UAPA, NIA, and
Gap (ICJ, UNSC, FATF) — though enforcement is Interpol are the primary tools — but jurisdiction ends at
selective and politically mediated. India's borders.

Threat Mutation Doctrine changes slowly — shaped by strategic Tactically agile — pivot from suicide bombs to drones to
Speed culture, bureaucratic inertia, and inter-service deepfakes within months. IS adapted its recruiting
rivalry. Galwan-type surprises are exceptions. platform six times in three years as each was banned.

State Operate independently but require state Some are entirely autonomous (LWE cadres); others
Dependency infrastructure. Often use non-state proxies to are deeply state-dependent proxies (TRF = Pakistan
extend reach with deniability. ISI; Haqqani Network = Pakistan Army). The line blurs.

Primary Susceptible to international pressure, sanctions, Susceptible to intelligence penetration, community

Vulnerability diplomatic isolation, and conventional military counter-radicalisation, financial disruption, and social
deterrence. inclusion programmes.

Note:
The most dangerous configuration is not a purely autonomous non-state actor but a state-directed proxy that
retains non-state deniability. TRF (Pakistan's LeT proxy in Kashmir) and the Haqqani Network (Pakistan Army
proxy in Afghanistan) illustrate this perfectly.
India's 2025 Pahalgam response — treating TRF operations as acts of Pakistan's state apparatus — established
the diplomatic and military precedent that proxy cover no longer guarantees immunity.
The Elgar Parishad case (2018) illustrates the reverse: domestic non-state actors (urban Naxal networks)
receiving state-level ideological patronage without formal state direction — a category India's legal framework
was slow to address.

3.2 Non-State Actor Challenges to India

Challenge Mechanism & Why It Persists India-Specific Evidence

Tier 1 — Socio-Political Disruption (Wide Reach, Lower Lethality)

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 Challenge Mechanism & Why It Persists India-Specific Evidence

Organised Crime Transnational criminal syndicates exploit India's Punjab 'drone corridor': BSF intercepted 100+
& Narco-Networks proximity to the Golden Crescent and Golden Pakistani drone drops (2025) carrying heroin worth
Triangle — using narcotics revenue to fund ₹800 crore; drug revenue partially funds J&K
insurgency and destabilise border youth populations. militant infrastructure.

Foreign-Funded Some civil society organisations misuse foreign FCRA cancellations: Greenpeace India (2015) for
NGO Interference institutional funding to obstruct infrastructure obstructing Vedanta project; Amnesty International
projects, amplify anti-state narratives, and provide India (2020) for alleged FCRA violations; Zakat
legal and reputational cover to extremist networks. Foundation flagged for religious radicalisation
funding.

Human Trafficking Cross-border trafficking syndicates exploit porous Global Slavery Index 2023: India accounts for ~8
Networks borders and socio-economic desperation — million victims of modern slavery; NE corridor is a
generating criminal revenue that overlaps with primary trafficking route for Bangladeshi and
insurgent financing in NE India and the Indo- Myanmar nationals.
Bangladesh corridor.

Tier 2 — Political & Social Destabilisation

Communal & Radical organisations exploit religious identity as a PFI (banned 2022): NIA found it funded communal
Religious recruitment and mobilisation tool — inciting violence in Kerala; IS modules arrested in
Extremism communal violence, recruiting for IS-linked modules, Hyderabad (2017), Kerala (2021–24), and Tamil
and using digital platforms to amplify sectarian Nadu (2023) — all digitally recruited.
grievances.

Separatist & Armed groups pursue ethno-national or separatist ULFA(I) under Paresh Baruah remains active
Ethnic Insurgency agendas, controlling territory through parallel despite ULFA peace accord (2023); Manipur ethnic
governance, extracting resources via extortion, and armed groups looted 6,000+ weapons from state
challenging state sovereignty in border regions. armouries (2023) — a direct transfer of state
weaponry to non-state actors.

Youth Extremist groups have replaced physical mosques IS 'Anwar Al-Awlaki playbook' adapted for India:
Radicalisation via and madrasas with algorithmic amplification — using pre-recorded Malayali-language IS content
Digital Platforms YouTube recommendations, WhatsApp group amplified by YouTube algorithm to Kerala youth;
cascades, and Telegram channels to radicalise 100+ IS-linked arrests in Kerala (2014–2024).
individuals who never enter a physical space.

Tier 3 — Direct Security Threats (High Lethality, Targeted)

Left-Wing The CPI(Maoist) maintains a structured guerrilla Operation Black Forest (April 2025): 21-day
Extremism (LWE) army (PLGA) across the Red Corridor — targeting CRPF-Chhattisgarh operation neutralised 27
security forces, infrastructure, and state presence Naxalites including top leader Nambala Keshav
through IEDs, ambushes, and parallel governance Rao; Abujhmad sanctuary significantly degraded.
structures.

Terrorism Terror attacks orchestrated by non-state groups — Reasi bus attack (June 2024): TRF gunmen killed
(Domestic & with or without state direction — targeting civilians 9 Hindu pilgrims in Jammu — signalling the
Cross-Border and security forces to generate fear, extract political geographic spread of militancy from Kashmir
Linked) concessions, and demonstrate state vulnerability. Valley to Jammu division.

Urban Naxalism A covert ecosystem of ideological supporters — NIA chargesheet in Elgar Parishad–Bhima
academics, lawyers, journalists, and activists — who Koregaon (2018): alleged direct communication
provide intellectual legitimacy, legal resources, and links between arrested Pune academics and
fundraising support to the armed Maoist movement CPI(Maoist) Central Committee; Varavara Rao
while operating within the legal system. case established the legal template.

Tier 4 — Systemic & Existential Threats (Low Probability, Catastrophic Consequence)

Cyber Terrorism & Non-state hacker collectives and terrorist-linked Ransomware attack on C-Edge Technologies (July
Non-State Hackers cyber actors target India's critical digital 2024): disrupted payment services of 300+
infrastructure — combining ransomware, espionage, cooperative banks; AIIMS cyberattack (2022): 3
and disinformation in coordinated campaigns. crore patient records exposed; both attributed to
criminal-state nexus actors.

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 Challenge Mechanism & Why It Persists India-Specific Evidence

Drone Warfare by Commercially available drones have become the 65 non-state actor groups globally now deploy
Non-State Actors most democratising weapon since the IED — military drones; Jammu IAF station attack (2021):
enabling non-state actors to conduct surveillance, first use of weaponised drone against Indian
deliver weapons, and execute targeted attacks at military installation; Houthi drone-swarm tactics
near-zero cost. now a documented model for IS adaptations.

Weapons of Mass The convergence of dark web procurement, 3D IS distributed 'How to Survive in the West' manual
Disruption printing, biological agent accessibility, and terrorist — including biological agent guidance — via
Potential intent creates a low-probability but catastrophic- Telegram; Turkish Dark Web forum circulated
consequence threat that must anchor India's explosive-manufacturing manuals; CBSE
prevention architecture. Cybercrime Cell monitors dark web for India-
specific WMD content.

3.3 Why Non-State Actors Persist

Enablers can be divided into two categories: structural (deep-rooted systemic conditions that create the space for non-
state actors to operate) and operational (specific capabilities and tools that amplify their effectiveness once active):

Type Structural Enablers Operational Enablers

Governance Governance vacuums — absent state services, corrupt Encrypted communication platforms (Signal,
local administration, denied land rights — create the Telegram) allow operational coordination without a
legitimacy deficit that non-state actors fill. Maoists run physical footprint — reducing the intelligence
Jan Adalats precisely because state courts are agency's ability to intercept pre-attack
inaccessible. (2nd ARC, 5th Report, 2008) communications.

Economic Poverty, unemployment, and land dispossession create a Cryptocurrency — particularly privacy coins like
permanent recruitment pool. J&K youth unemployment Monero (XMR) — enables borderless, anonymous
(18.3%, 2023), tribal landlessness in Bastar, and drug- terror financing that bypasses FATF-compliant
economy dependency in Punjab all sustain recruitment banking surveillance. IS-K solicited XMR donations
pipelines. via Voice of Khorasan magazine.

Social Communal polarisation, caste discrimination, and ethnic Drones — commercially available for under ₹30,000
marginalisation generate the psychological grievance — provide surveillance, arms delivery, and attack
that makes extremist narratives emotionally resonant. capability that previously required military-grade
Social exclusion is the non-state actor's primary infrastructure. BSF recorded 294 drone intrusions in
recruitment tool. Punjab (2024).

Geographic Porous borders (15,106 km land, 7,516 km coastline), 3D printing and dark web procurement allow non-
difficult terrain (Abujhmad forest, Manipur hills, J&K state actors to manufacture weapons and acquire
mountains), and remote tribal districts create sanctuary explosives without entering the formal supply chains
spaces the state cannot continuously police. that law enforcement monitors.

Digital Social media algorithms amplify extremist content to AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media: create
vulnerable audiences without deliberate effort — the false inflammatory content at scale (fake atrocity
architecture of recommendation and engagement videos, fabricated leader statements) to trigger
inadvertently serves as the non-state actor's recruitment communal violence — Manipur 2023 showed the
infrastructure. destabilising potential.

3.4 Technology as a Force Multiplier

Technology has not merely enhanced non-state actor capability — it has democratised lethality. A group with $10,000, an
internet connection, and three technically competent members can today mount operations that would have required state-
level resources twenty years ago. The following table organises technology use across the four operational phases of a
non-state actor's activity cycle:

Internal Security 20
 Use Phase Technology Tool How It Is Used India-Specific Case

RECRUIT Algorithmic Social Platform recommendation engines amplify YouTube's algorithm served IS recruitment
Media extremist content to users displaying videos to Kerala youth who had searched for
vulnerability signals — political anger, social religious content (NIA, 2021); 100+ IS-linked
isolation, or identity crisis — without manual arrests in Kerala trace to digital
targeting. radicalisation pathways.

RECRUIT Encrypted IS circulated a 2015 'encryption ranking' for Telegram group 'Ansar ul-Khilafah of Hind'
Messaging Apps recruits: Signal and SilentCircle as 'safest'; (identified 2021) recruited across 8 Indian
Telegram as 'safe'; WhatsApp as 'unsafe'. states using an invite-only link cascade —
Groups migrate platforms as each is banned each member could add 3 contacts before
or monitored. the group was taken down.

FINANCE Cryptocurrency Monero (XMR) uses ring signatures and Hamas raised over US$130 million in
(Privacy Coins) stealth addresses to make transactions cryptocurrency (Aug 2021–Jun 2023);
untraceable. Zcash uses zk-SNARKS to Reuters noted nearly two-thirds of Tron
validate without revealing sender. Tether on wallets linked to terrorist organisations. ED
Tron chain used for speed. arrested Bengaluru crypto trader for ₹135
crore IS-linked laundering (2022).

FINANCE Dark Web Hidden services on Tor network host IS-K's Voice of Khorasan magazine listed a
Fundraising donation portals for terrorist organisations — dark web Bitcoin wallet for donations; Al
outside the regulatory reach of any national Hayat Media Centre circulated Telegram
financial authority. instructions for accessing their .onion
fundraising site.

PLAN / Dark Web Platforms like AlphaBay (seized 2017) and EuroGuns platform listed dual-use
PROCURE Marketplaces successors sell firearms, ammunition, forged chemicals alongside firearms; IS 'Terrorist's
documents, explosive manuals, and dual-use Handbook' available on dark web until 2023
chemical precursors — all with removal. NIA found Karachi-to-Gujarat
cryptocurrency payment. narcotics route used same dark web broker
as arms procurers.

PLAN / 3D Printing & IED Additive manufacturing allows production of Maoists in LWE zones increasingly use
PROCURE Innovation untraceable plastic components that evade locally fabricated IEDs using accessible
metal detectors; combined with commercially ammonium nitrate — shifting from procured
available chemicals, it enables artisanal ordnance to manufactured — making
weapon manufacturing. supply-chain interdiction less effective.

EXECUTE Weaponised Commercially available drones — modified Jammu IAF station attack (June 2021): first
Drones (UAVs) with payload release mechanisms — provide drone attack on Indian military installation.
aerial attack capability with minimal training, 294 drones along Punjab border (2024).
near-zero cost, and high deniability. Drone BSF intercepted IS-style drone-drop
swarms (5–10 units) compound detection payloads including grenades, pistols, and
difficulty. heroin.

EXECUTE AI-Assisted AI tools ('Lavender', 'Where is Daddy?' Manipur 2023: NIA found AI-edited videos
Targeting & developed by IS technical unit) enable (spliced from Myanmar and Congo conflict
Deepfakes precise targeting databases. Deepfakes footage) circulated as 'live Manipur violence'
generate synthetic atrocity videos to trigger — precipitating retaliatory attacks in three
crowd violence without a real incident. districts within 6 hours.

3.5 Hooda Committee & Budget 2025–26

Hooda Committee (2019) — Four-Priority Framework

The Hooda Committee (2019), chaired by Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (former Northern Army Commander), was constituted by
the Indian National Congress to review the national security landscape.

Internal Security 21
 Priority Area Recommendation & Relevance to Non-State Actors

Neighbourhood Strengthen India's strategic relationships with neighbours through connectivity, trade, and soft power
Relationships — reducing the governance vacuums and porous-border conditions that enable cross-border non-state
actor operations.

Resolving Internal Address the root causes of J&K militancy, NE insurgency, and LWE through a combination of targeted
Conflicts security operations and genuine political and developmental engagement — acknowledging that non-
state actors thrive where grievance goes unaddressed.

Protecting Citizens Build proactive countermeasures against cyber terrorism, radicalisation, and drone-based attacks —
from New Threats moving from reactive policing to anticipatory security architecture.

Enhancing Defence Modernise CAPFs, state police, and intelligence agencies with technology, training, and interoperability
Capability — ensuring non-state actors cannot exploit the capability gap between what threats demand and what
forces can deliver.

Union Budget 2025–26 — Internal Security Allocations

Security Domain Key Budget Measure & Its Anti-Non-State-Actor Relevance

J&K Counter- Eliminate active militant networks; prevent infiltration; dismantle terror financing — targeting the
Terrorism TRF/LeT/JeM non-state ecosystem.

LWE Eradication Combined security operations and development schemes in 38 remaining LWE districts — 2026 target
of zero LWE violence requires non-state actor recruitment pipeline disruption.

Cybercrime I4C strengthening; Cyber Fraud Mitigation Centre (CFMC); Suspect Registry — saved ₹3,431 crore
Infrastructure across 9.94 lakh complaints by 2024 through proactive non-state cyber-crime disruption.

Criminal Justice Digital integration of police, prosecution, forensics, and prisons — closing the information gaps that
Digitalisation allow non-state criminal networks to operate across jurisdictional seams.

Narcotics Zero NCB capacity expansion; border surveillance; Golden Crescent interdiction — targeting the financial
Tolerance lifeline of narco-terrorism non-state networks.

Border & Coastal Drone surveillance, smart fencing, digitised mapping, inter-agency coordination — directly addressing
Security the operational enablers of cross-border non-state actors.

NE Insurgency Continued peace accord implementation; PM-DevINE funding; surrender rehabilitation — sustaining the
Management political track that complements security operations.

Immigration E-visa expansion and trusted-traveller fast-tracking — reducing administrative bottlenecks that non-
Modernisation state actors exploit through document forgery and identity fraud.

3.6 India's Response Architecture

Response Track Mechanisms Status & Evidence

Intelligence & MAC (Multi-Agency Centre) integrates real-time intelligence MAC flagged Pahalgam movement 96
Coordination from IB, RAW, NTRO, DRDO-NETRA, and state police. hours ahead; NATGRID identified 3 LWE
NATGRID links 21 databases for cross-referencing. SMAC financiers in Mumbai through cross-
(State MAC) deployed in 12 cities for urban threat monitoring. database analysis (2024).

Legal UAPA (2019 amendments): individual terrorist designation; UAPA designations: 39 individual terrorists
Architecture PMLA for financial tracking; NSA for preventive detention; NIA by 2024; NIA chargesheets in Elgar
Act (2019 expanded): cross-state jurisdiction for all terrorism Parishad, Pahalgam, and PFI cases all
and organised crime cases. relied on expanded 2019 powers.

Cyber & Digital I4C for cybercrime; CERT-In for infrastructure protection; I4C saved ₹3,431 crore (2024); CERT-In
Counter NCIIPC for critical sectors; Cyber Swachhta Kendra (botnet processed 1.4 million incidents (2023,
removal tools); IT Rules 2021 traceability mandate for social +33% YoY); 267 Chinese apps blocked
media OGW networks. under IT Rules.

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 Response Track Mechanisms Status & Evidence

Counter- Kerala Police's community policing model — early intervention Kerala model reduced IS recruitment after
Radicalisation at family and mosque level before digital radicalisation 2021 despite continued IS activity — 0
completes. CRPF Civic Action Programme (CAP) in J&K and new recruitments in 2023 vs 12 in 2019
LWE zones. De-radicalisation centres in Hyderabad. (Kerala Police data).

Financial FCORD (FICN Coordination Centre) under MHA; ED ED seized ₹1,646 crore crypto in terror-
Disruption enforcement against hawala operators; FATF compliance financing case (Feb 2025); 37 hawala
measures; cryptocurrency monitoring under PMLA (2023 VDA operators arrested with Pakistan-linked
amendment extends AML obligations to crypto exchanges). transaction chains (2024).

Social & Aspirational Districts Programme addresses the 35 LWE districts under Aspirational
Developmental developmental deficit that feeds non-state recruitment. PM- Districts Programme; youth employment
DevINE and BharatNet in NE. Skill India and PM Mudra Yojana in Bastar region improved 18% (2019–
for LWE-affected youth — removing the economic pull of non- 2024, NITI Aayog delta data).
state groups.

3.7 Way Forward

Invest in anticipatory intelligence: The Pahalgam case showed intelligence existed but integration-to-action failed.
Build a standing protocol — modelled on Israel's 'Sword of Damocles' early-warning system — that converts MAC
inputs into automatic deployment orders within defined time windows.
Regulate AI-generated content urgently: India's Digital India Act (in draft) must include provisions specifically
targeting AI-generated disinformation used to incite communal violence — with 2-hour takedown obligations for
deepfakes during declared security situations.
Expand de-radicalisation infrastructure: Kerala's community policing model should be replicated nationally — with
dedicated de-radicalisation counsellors in 50 high-risk districts; family intervention protocols; and structured mosque-
engagement programmes.
Regulate the drone ecosystem proactively: India's 2021 Drone Rules need enforcement teeth: mandatory
geofencing around military installations, airports, and border zones; a national drone registry with biometric owner
verification; and DRDO-developed counter-drone systems deployed at all strategic sites.
Close the cryptocurrency AML gap: PMLA's 2023 VDA amendment is a start — but India must require crypto
exchanges to implement travel rule compliance and report all transactions above ₹50,000 to FIU-IND in real time.
Treat urban Naxalism as a distinct legal category: The Elgar Parishad case revealed a legal gap: existing UAPA
provisions were designed for armed actors. A specific legislative framework — with due civil-liberties safeguards — is
needed for the ideological-support tier of the Maoist ecosystem.
Community ownership of security: Non-state actors are ultimately defeated not by security forces but by
communities that withdraw their social cover. Village Defence Groups (J&K), CRPF CAP outreach (LWE zones), and
Kerala's mosque-engagement programme are models to scale nationally.

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 4 Media, Social Media & Communication Networks

India in 2025 is simultaneously the world's largest democracy by voter count, the second-largest internet user base (936
million subscribers, TRAI 2024), and the country with the highest volume of internet shutdowns globally (121 in 2019
alone). From the 26/11 tactical advantage terrorists gained by watching live TV coverage of NSG movements, to deepfake
videos that ignited retaliatory violence in Manipur within six hours — the media ecosystem is now a primary terrain of
India's internal security contest.

4.1 The Three-Layer Media Ecosystem

Layer What It Is Security Threat Vector Illustrative Example

Layer 1 — Traditional one-to-many media: Live operational security 26/11 Mumbai (2008): Live TV
Broadcast & Print television news channels, breaches; communal showed NSG entry points and
Media newspapers, radio. Regulated by polarisation through sensational troop movements — feeding
Press Council of India (print) and coverage; trial by media actionable real-time intelligence
MIB (broadcast). Relatively slow undermining criminal justice; to handlers in Karachi. Army
but high-credibility with older classified leaks by irresponsible subsequently barred live
demographics. journalism. coverage of active operations.

Layer 2 — Social Many-to-many digital platforms: Radicalisation pipelines; Manipur 2023: AI-spliced videos
Media & OTT Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, disinformation cascades from Myanmar conflict circulated
Platforms X (Twitter), WhatsApp, Telegram, triggering mob violence; as 'live Manipur footage' —
and streaming services. coordinated inauthentic triggering retaliatory attacks in 3
Algorithmically amplified; low behaviour by state-sponsored districts within 6 hours. NIA
editorial filter; borderless reach. actors; OGW (over-ground traced origin to cross-border
worker) communication disinformation cell.
networks.

Layer 3 — The underlying physical and Critical infrastructure C-Edge Technologies

Communication digital backbone: internet service cyberattacks; GPS spoofing; ransomware (July 2024):
Infrastructure providers, telecom networks, ransomware on banking disrupted payment gateway of
satellite systems, submarine systems; telecom interception; 300+ cooperative banks —
cables, government intranets, submarine cable tapping; insider exposing how a single node
banking networks, and IoT threats in telecom networks. attack can cascade across the
systems. financial system.

Why the Layers Are Converging — and Why This Complicates Security
A traditional newspaper report is now instantly shareable on WhatsApp — the slow editorial filter of Layer 1 no
longer controls the speed of Layer 2 dissemination.
Terrorists exploit Layer 3 infrastructure (encrypted apps on telecom networks) to bypass both Layer 1
(broadcast) and Layer 2 (open social media) surveillance.
State countermeasures designed for one layer are ineffective against another: blocking a website (Layer 2
action) does nothing against end-to-end encrypted Telegram groups (Layer 2 + Layer 3 combined threat).
Policy implication: A 'whole-of-ecosystem' approach is needed — not just social media regulation or network
interception, but integrated governance across all three layers simultaneously.

4.2 The CIANA Framework

Every communication system India depends on — from UPI to NATGRID to military field radios — must satisfy five security
obligations. A failure in any single obligation can cascade into an internal security crisis. Analysts use the CIANA acronym
(extended from the standard CIA Triad) to capture these obligations:

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 Obligation What It Requires Threat if Violated India-Specific Consequence

Confidentiality Information is accessible only to Network APT36's CapraRAT malware (post-Pahalgam

(C) those authorised to receive it — eavesdropping; media 2025): harvested location data and
no unauthorised interception or scavenging; APT communications from Indian defence
disclosure. espionage. personnel's Android phones without their
knowledge.

Integrity (I) Data is not altered, corrupted, or Man-in-the-middle Chinese GPS spoofing along LAC (2021–23):
injected with false content during attacks; trapdoor corrupted navigational data fed to Indian patrol
storage or transmission. injection; GPS units — a non-kinetic attack with potentially
spoofing. lethal physical consequences.

Availability (A) Network services and information DDoS attacks; AIIMS cyberattack (Nov 2022): hospital
remain accessible to authorised ransomware; networks offline for 14 days; 3 crore patient
users at all times — systems do infrastructure records inaccessible; manual fallback for
not go offline due to attack or sabotage. critical care — exposed healthcare as a soft
overload. target.

Non- The sender cannot deny having Masquerading; identity Fake PIB circulars circulated during Op
Repudiation sent information, and the receiver spoofing; anonymous Sindoor (May 2025): official-looking
(N) cannot deny receipt — digital attack platforms. government communications denying Indian
signatures provide verifiable military strikes — exploited the non-
attribution. repudiation gap in government
communications.

Authentication Identity of users and systems is Phishing; SIM-swap SIM-swap fraud enabled hawala transfers: 17
(A) verified before access is granted fraud; credential J&K OGWs arrested (2024) used
— preventing impersonation and stuffing; biometric compromised Aadhaar-linked mobile numbers
credential theft. bypass. to receive terror financing through UPI —
exploiting authentication weaknesses.

4.3 The Dual Role of Media in Internal Security

Function Security-Strengthening Role Security-Threatening Pathology

Accountability & Investigative journalism exposes security failures, Competitive commercial pressure incentivises
Transparency official corruption, and rights abuses — creating leaking classified information before verification —
pressure for institutional reform. NDTV's coverage of 2019 Balakot airstrike post-coverage included
the 2020 Galwan clash forced a government unverified BDA (bomb damage assessment) claims
clarification on casualties. that embarrassed the government.

Crisis Rapid dissemination of official evacuation routes, Live tactical coverage during active security
Communication medical assistance locations, and safety advisories operations gives adversaries real-time intelligence.
during disasters — Kerala floods (2018) credit 26/11 Mumbai: Lashkar handler David Headley
media for saving lives through real-time updates. monitored TV feeds and relayed NSG positions to
attackers inside Taj Hotel.

Counter-Narrative Responsible coverage of successful rehabilitation, Sensationalist framing of ethnic conflict as 'Hindu-
Publishing peace accord milestones (ULFA 2023), and Muslim violence' or 'communal war' amplifies
development achievements in conflict zones creates polarisation — multiple studies link concentrated
counter-narratives to extremist recruitment TV news coverage to elevated communal violence
propaganda. indices in adjacent districts.

Fact-Checking & PIB Fact Check Unit debunked 17 fake posts during Speed-over-accuracy culture: Satara riots
Verification Op Sindoor (May 2025) — including fabricated (Maharashtra 2023) were triggered by a viral
claims of Indian naval vessel sinkings and a fake Instagram post about a desecrated temple that
PIB circular. Prevented panic and disinformation multiple media outlets amplified without verification
from shaping public response. — the original incident was fabricated.

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 Function Security-Strengthening Role Security-Threatening Pathology

Democratic Media coverage of AFSPA controversies (Nagaland Trial by media prejudices investigation and judicial
Debate Oting killings 2021), UAPA misuse allegations, and process — Sushant Singh Rajput case (2020)
J&K detention patterns creates accountability became a national spectacle that compromised
pressure on security policy decisions. Mumbai Police's investigation integrity and set a
template for media-driven 'cases'.

4.4 Social Media Radicalisation

The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) identifies an 8-stage digital radicalisation process.

Funnel Phase Stage(s) Mechanism India-Relevant Case

Phase 1: Content Creation High-quality propaganda is produced by IS produced Dabiq and Rumiyah
EXPOSURE & Dissemination ideological media units and distributed magazines; Malayalam-language IS
(Millions reached) through algorithmically amplified social content (produced in Syria) was served by
media — reaching passive users who YouTube's recommendation algorithm to
were not actively seeking extremist Kerala users who had searched for
content. Islamic educational content.

Phase 2: Targeting, Recruiters identify users displaying Telegram group 'Ansar ul-Khilafah of Hind'
ENGAGEMENT Grooming & Echo vulnerability signals (alienation, identity (identified 2021): entry via public YouTube
(Thousands Chamber crisis, political anger) through comment section → private WhatsApp →
drawn in) Formation engagement patterns, then transition encrypted Telegram. Each layer added
them to private channels for commitment depth and reduced exit
personalised indoctrination. Echo possibility.
chambers validate and escalate
extremist beliefs.

Phase 3: Mobilisation, Activated members receive operational Hyderabad IS module (2017): online-
ACTIVATION Offline Transition guidance for lone-wolf or cell-based recruited members met offline 3 times
(Dozens commit) & Propagation attacks. Offline meeting integration before attempted attack on Army camp.
(Charlottesville model). Successful Post-arrest, their Telegram activity
recruits create content that restarts the showed they were simultaneously
funnel for new cohorts. recruiting 4 new members — the
propagation phase running in parallel.

Intervention Points — Where Policy Can Break the Funnel

Phase 1 (most effective): Algorithmic redesign — force-rank counter-narrative content alongside extremist
content; EU Digital Services Act requires this for platforms over 45 million users. India's Digital India Act (draft)
must include a similar provision.
Phase 2 (moderately effective): NETRA keyword surveillance; SMAC (Social Media Analytics Centre)
monitoring for recruitment language; I4C's Samanvaya Platform for cross-state coordination.
Phase 3 (costly and late): NIA surveillance and physical interdiction — necessary but treats symptoms, not
causes. Kerala Police's community counselling model (intervention before Phase 3) is far more cost-effective.
Platform liability: IT Rules 2021 require 'significant social media intermediaries' (>5 million users) to trace
message originators on court order — directly targeting Phase 2–3 communication channels.

4.5 Legal & Regulatory Framework

Function Law / Provision Security Relevance

Constitutional Article 19(1)(a) + Guarantees freedom of speech — but explicitly permits 'reasonable restrictions' in the
Foundation 19(2) interests of sovereignty, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, and
public order. This is the constitutional anchor for every content restriction measure
below.

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 Function Law / Provision Security Relevance

Content IT Act 2000 — Empowers the government to block public access to digital content that threatens
Governance Section 69A sovereignty, security, or public order. Used to block 267 Chinese apps (2020), Khalistan
SFJ Referendum website, and IS recruitment portals. No mandatory judicial pre-
approval — challenged as due-process deficient.

Content IT Act 2000 — Section 79 grants 'safe harbour' to intermediaries only if they conduct due diligence and
Governance Section 79 + IT comply with government takedown requests. IT Rules 2021 impose additional
Rules 2021 obligations on Significant Social Media Intermediaries (>5 million users): Grievance
Officer, Nodal Officer, Compliance Officer; content removal within 24 hours; message
traceability on court order.

Content Press Council Act Press Council of India (print) and News Broadcasting Standards Authority (TV news) —
Governance 1978 + NBSA both self-regulatory. NBSA Code prohibits live coverage of security operations and
Code sensational coverage of terror attacks. Neither body has statutory power to impose fines
above ₹1 lakh — widely criticised as toothless.

Data Protection DPDP Act 2023 India's first cross-sectoral data protection law (passed August 2023). Key security
features: mandatory data breach reporting to CERT-In; Data Protection Board (DPB)
with penalty authority up to ₹250 crore; children's data protection with parental consent;
Section 17 government exemption for national security — raises civil liberties concerns
about broad state surveillance powers.

Infrastructure IT Act 2000 — Computer Emergency Response Team-India: national nodal agency for cyber incident
Security Section 70B response. 2022 amendment requires all entities to report incidents to CERT-In within 6
(CERT-In hours of detection — significantly reducing attacker dwell time. Handled 1.4 million
Mandate) incidents in 2023.

Infrastructure National Cyber NCSP 2013 (now dated): foundational cybersecurity framework. NCSS 2020
Security Security Policy (conceptualised by Lt. Gen. Rajesh Pant, DSCI): 21 action areas under Secure-
2013 + NCSS Strengthen-Synergize; recommends 0.25–1% of annual budget for cybersecurity;
2020 introduces cyber insurance and international cooperation mandates.

Enforcement & National Security NSA allows up to 12 months' preventive detention on national security grounds — used
Prevention Act 1980 + UAPA for persons spreading disinformation or communal incitement. UAPA 2019: individual
2019 terrorist designation enables freezing of digital assets and social media accounts of
designated persons.

4.6 India's Digital Security Institutions

Institution Mandate & Parent Body Key Achievement / Security Contribution

CERT-In Incident response; alerts; vulnerability 1.4 million cyber incidents handled (2023, +33% YoY);
coordination. Parent: MeitY. (IT Act Sec 70B) mandatory 6-hour breach reporting instituted 2022;
issued 68 advisories on APT group tactics post-
Pahalgam.

NCIIPC Critical information infrastructure protection. Designated 8 CII sectors (power, finance, telecom,
Parent: NTRO (reports to PMO). (IT Act Sec defence, space, transport, government, strategic);
70A) Aadhaar database designated as CII; RedEcho malware
detected in power sector under NCIIPC monitoring.

Defence Cyber Offensive-defensive cyber operations for Activated during Op Sindoor (May 2025) to disrupt
Agency (DCA) defence services. Parent: Integrated Defence Pakistani military communication networks; India's first
Staff. acknowledged use of offensive cyber operations in a
named military operation.

I4C — Indian Cyber Cybercrime coordination; financial fraud; dark ₹3,431 crore saved via proactive fraud prevention
Crime Coordination web monitoring. Parent: MHA. (2024); 9.94 lakh complaints on National Cybercrime
Centre Reporting Portal; Samanvaya Platform for interstate
intelligence sharing; Suspect Registry of 4.5 lakh
fraudsters.

Internal Security 27
 Institution Mandate & Parent Body Key Achievement / Security Contribution

Cyber Fraud Real-time response to financial cyber fraud ₹900 crore frozen in 2024 through same-day freeze
Mitigation Centre — '1930' helpline. Parent: MHA/I4C. orders on fraudulent accounts; 45-second average
(CFMC) response time for '1930' calls from financial fraud
victims.

NETRA (NETwork Real-time surveillance of internet traffic for Scans emails, blogs, social media posts, tweets, and
TRaffic Analysis) security keywords/keyphrases. Developed by instant messages for pre-defined threat indicators;
DRDO (2014). Used by IB and RAW. identified cross-border OGW communication patterns in
J&K (2023–24).

Digital Intelligence Real-time intelligence sharing between Backend of Sanchar Saathi portal; enables same-day
Platform (DIP) telecom service providers, LEAs, banks, and subscriber verification for fraud investigations; links
social media platforms. Parent: DoT. Chakshu reports to telecom operator enforcement
actions.

Chakshu (Sanchar Citizen reporting of suspected fraud Received 2.4 lakh fraud communication reports (2023–
Saathi) communications — calls, SMS, WhatsApp. 24); led to disconnection of 52,000+ fraudulent mobile
Parent: DoT. connections linked to terror financing and OGW
networks.

PIB Fact Check Unit Government fact-checking for Debunked 17 false claims during Op Sindoor (May 2025)
communications targeting government including fake videos of Indian warship sinkings, a
schemes, security operations, and national fabricated PIB circular, and false claims about Hazira
security. Parent: MIB. port strikes.

4.7 The Constructive Role of Media in Internal Security.

Function Security Value & Example

Early warning & awareness Rapid alerts during attacks/disasters — real-time updates during 26/11 and Covid-19 response.

Counter-narrative Amplifies de-radicalisation & national-integration messaging (police social-media outreach in

J&K/Kerala).

Accountability & Exposes corruption & rights abuses, strengthening democratic legitimacy.
transparency

Crowdsourced intelligence Public tips & geotagged content aid investigations (riot/terror probes).

Crisis communication Government–citizen channel during emergencies (NDMA alerts, election info).

4.8 Misuse of Internet & Social Media by Non-State Actors

Misuse Mechanism Example

Radicalisation & Encrypted propaganda targeting ISIS Telegram modules — Hyderabad (2017), Kannur
recruitment alienated youth (2021)

Disinformation & rumour Viral fake content triggering 2012 NE exodus — doctored images caused mass flight
panic/violence from Bengaluru

Incitement to violence Mobilising mobs/communal riots online 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots — fake video circulated on
social media

Operational Planning & real-time attack coordination 26/11 — handlers used VoIP/internet to guide attackers
coordination

Terror financing Crowdfunding & crypto solicitation SFJ ‘Referendum 2020’ online funding campaigns
online

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 Misuse Mechanism Example

Cyber-enabled Hacking, defacement, doxxing of APT36 post-Pahalgam phishing targeting defence

subversion officials personnel

Anti-national Diaspora/state-backed narratives Pro-Khalistan & hostile-state campaigns on X/YouTube

propaganda against India

4.9 Mob Violence & Lynching

Causes
Viral misinformation — WhatsApp child-lifting rumours triggered 30+ lynchings (2017–18, e.g., Dhule, Maharashtra).
Communal & identity polarisation — cow-vigilante and religious-rumour mobilisation (multiple 2015–19 incidents).
Weak deterrence & impunity — delayed policing, low conviction, bystander participation.
Socio-economic frustration — unemployment & relative deprivation channelled into scapegoating.
Anonymity of crowds — diffusion of responsibility emboldens participants (classic crowd psychology).

Consequences
Loss of life & rule of law — extra-judicial killings erode the state’s monopoly on legitimate force.
Communal polarisation — cyclical retaliatory violence and social fracture.
Economic & reputational harm — deterred investment, damaged India’s rights image abroad.
Erosion of trust — in institutions, between communities, and toward digital platforms.

Judicial Anchor (2017)

Cite Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018): the Supreme Court called lynching “mobocracy,” and laid down
preventive, remedial and punitive guidelines (nodal officers, fast-track trials, victim compensation, action against
inaction) — the recommended frame for the consequences-and-remedy portion.

4.10 Social Networking Sites — Security Implications

What they are — web/app platforms (X, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, YouTube) enabling user-generated
content, networking and instant many-to-many communication.

Implication Detail

Privacy & data security Mass personal-data harvesting; profiling & foreign-server storage risks (Cambridge-Analytica-type
concerns).

Radicalisation vector Algorithmic echo chambers accelerate extremist indoctrination.

Disinformation at scale Deepfakes & coordinated inauthentic behaviour distort public order & elections (2024 deepfakes).

Operational security risk Geotagged posts by personnel leak sensitive locations (armed-forces advisories).

Anonymity & attribution Fake accounts/bots hinder accountability and investigation.

Foreign influence State-backed narrative manipulation targeting Indian audiences.

operations

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 4.11 Cloud vs. In-House Hosting for Government

Dimension Dimension Cloud Hosting In-House Hosting

Cost Cost Low capex, pay-as-you-use, elastic High capex & maintenance
overhead

Scalability Scalability On-demand, rapid scaling Limited by owned hardware

Resilience Resilience Geo-redundancy, quick disaster Single-site failure risk

recovery

Data sovereignty Data sovereignty Risk if servers/jurisdiction are foreign Full domestic control

Security control Security control Shared-responsibility; vendor lock-in Direct, end-to-end control
risk

Surface of attack Surface of attack Internet-facing, multi-tenant exposure Air-gappable; narrower

exposure

Note: Position: The cloud offers decisive cost-scalability-resilience gains for e-governance, but for sensitive government
workloads the security implications (data sovereignty, jurisdiction, shared responsibility) require sovereign/community
cloud on Indian soil — the logic behind MeghRaj (GI Cloud) and empanelled data-localised providers, with classified data
on air-gapped in-house systems.

4.12 Regulatory Framework & Guidelines to Curb Misuse

Existing Legal-Institutional Framework

IT Act, 2000 — S.69 (interception/blocking), S.69A (content blocking), S.79 (intermediary liability).
IT (Intermediary Guidelines & Digital Media Ethics) Rules, 2021 — due diligence, grievance officer, traceability of first
originator, takedown timelines.
DPDP Act, 2023 — consent-based data processing, breach reporting, penalties up to ₹250 cr.
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 / BNS — provisions on organised crime, mob lynching, and incitement; supersedes
IPC.
Institutions — I4C, CERT-In, NCCC; state cyber cells; fact-check units.

Suggested Guidelines
Platform accountability — enforce traceability of malicious originators while preserving lawful privacy; rapid takedown
of flagged content.
Calibrated, proportionate response — targeted blocking over blanket internet shutdowns (per the Anuradha Bhasin v.
Union of India, 2020 proportionality test).
Digital literacy & counter-narrative — nationwide media-literacy & fact-checking; amplify de-radicalisation content.
Capacity & cooperation — trained cyber-LEAs, AI-based monitoring of public threats, MLATs with platforms/host
countries.
Rights-respecting safeguards — judicial/parliamentary oversight of interception & blocking (Shreya Singhal balance).

Internet Shutdowns — The Security–Liberty Dilemma

A high-value analytical sub-theme: shutdowns are a frequent state response, but a contested one.
Security rationale — curbs rumour-driven violence & insurgent coordination during unrest.
Costs — India leads globally in shutdown frequency; heavy economic loss, disruption of
healthcare/education/livelihoods, democratic-rights concern.
Judicial guardrail — Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) — indefinite shutdowns impermissible; orders must be
necessary, proportionate, time-bound and reviewable.

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 4.13 Way Forward

Enact the Digital India Act urgently: The IT Act 2000 is 25 years old — predating smartphones, social media, OTT
platforms, and AI. The Digital India Act (MeitY, draft stage 2024) must address algorithmic accountability, deepfake
criminalisation, and platform liability for AI-generated content.
Mandatory algorithmic counter-narration: Require social media platforms to apply the same recommendation
weight to certified counter-narrative content as to extremist content — breaking the Phase 1 funnel without content
removal (which drives extremists to encrypted platforms).
Codify media protocols for active security operations: Expand the post-26/11 live-coverage ban to cover all
active counter-terrorism operations — with a statutory framework (not voluntary self-regulation) and defined criminal
penalties for violations.
Strengthen DPDP Act enforcement: The Data Protection Board must be made independent (not under MeitY) with
genuine enforcement power — currently Section 17's broad government security exemption creates a surveillance
blank cheque without judicial oversight.
Establish a National Dis/Misinformation Response Protocol: A pre-defined, NDMA-style protocol for activating
government fact-checking, social media platform cooperation, and regional language content verification within 2
hours of a security crisis — the Manipur 2023 gap showed the cost of improvised response.
Scale Kerala's community intervention model nationally: Identify 100 high-risk districts for the Kerala Police-style
community counsellor programme — early family and peer intervention at Phase 1–2 of the radicalisation funnel is
10x more cost-effective than NIA interdiction at Phase 3.
Rationalise internet shutdowns: India's 121 shutdowns in 2019 cost ₹21,000 crore (ICRIER estimate) while
providing only temporary tactical delay to adversaries who switch to cached messaging apps. A tiered shutdown
protocol — restricting specific platforms rather than total shutdown — achieves security objectives without economic
collateral damage.

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 5 Linkages between Development & Spread of Extremism

Former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh stated, "Naxalism is not merely a law and order issue. In many areas, the
phenomenon is directly related to underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence that it is the tribal areas that are the main
battleground of left-wing extremism today."

Form of
Ideological Core Developmental Grievance Exploited
Extremism

Ethnic & Tribal Armed assertion of ethnic identity against Forced displacement from ancestral land; denial of tribal self-
Extremism perceived cultural and territorial governance under PESA; demographic transformation
encroachment — often combining indigenous through in-migration. Meitei-Kuki violence (Manipur 2023) at
rights with armed separatism. its core a land-rights and political-representation crisis.

Left-Wing Revolutionary Maoist ideology targeting class Land alienation; failed land ceiling laws; non-implementation
Extremism exploitation — promising land redistribution of FRA 2006; corporate-tribal nexus in mineral-rich areas;
(Maoism) and tribal justice through armed overthrow of bonded labour; PDS corruption. (Expert Group, Planning
the bourgeois state. Commission, 2008)

Politico- Violent defence of religious community Perceived economic marginalisation of the community; lack of
Religious interests — framing political objectives as industrial investment in Muslim-majority regions; religious
Extremism religious obligations, typically opposing infrastructure denial; radicalisation filling education vacuums.
secularism or minority constitutional rights. (Sachar Committee Report, 2006)

Separatist Armed campaigns for territorial independence Governance deficit; absence of industries despite resource
Insurgency or greater autonomy — rooted in perceived wealth (Assam's Refinery Movement, 1956); demographic
colonial incorporation and denial of self- change through migration; NE's 99% international borders
determination. with chronically inadequate connectivity.

5.1 Three Layers of Development-Extremism Linkage

Driver Mechanism Evidence & Attribution

Layer 1 — Structural Drivers (Deepest; require constitutional and policy reform)

Land Alienation & Failure to implement land ceiling laws, non- In Bihar, Naxalites helped landless Musahars
Agrarian regularisation of traditional tribal land rights, and physically occupy land — state courts then
Dispossession transfer of tribal land to non-tribals in 5th Schedule refused to regularise titles, making Maoists more
areas despite constitutional prohibition. credible than government as land-rights
champions. (Expert Group, Planning
Commission, 2008)

Resource India's mineral-richest districts are also its most 75.8% of India's mineral production comes from
Extraction Without Naxal-affected — a spatial correlation that reflects the SC/ST ancestral lands; Chhattisgarh's Bastar belt
Compensation state's pattern of extracting mineral wealth for national contributes ₹1 lakh crore annually in minerals yet
GDP while leaving communities without share in the has India's lowest per-capita development
proceeds. expenditure. (Tribal Affairs Ministry, 2023)

Displacement Large-scale tribal eviction for irrigation projects, power 40% of all displaced Indians are tribals despite
Without plants, and mining — without adequate land-for-land being 8.6% of the population; Sardar Sarovar
Rehabilitation compensation or livelihood restoration — creating a dam displaced 320,000 tribals — resettlement
permanently dispossessed population with no stake in remained incomplete 30 years later. (World
the constitutional order. Commission on Dams, 2000)

Layer 2 — Institutional Drivers (State failure converting grievance into armed mobilisation)

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 Driver Mechanism Evidence & Attribution

PESA & FRA Non- PESA (1996) granted Gram Sabhas rights over land, 2nd ARC (2008, 5th Report): 'PESA's
Implementation forest produce, and minor minerals in Scheduled implementation is, by and large, unsatisfactory.'
Areas. FRA (2006) recognised traditional forest rights. Only 12% of FRA title claims approved in
Both remain largely unimplemented — with states Jharkhand (2023, Tribal Affairs Ministry) — the
enacting formal amendments while allowing remaining 88% represent families who legally live
administrative sabotage. as squatters on their own ancestral land.

PDS Corruption & Systematic diversion of public distribution system food CAG 2022 audit of Bastar district: 40% of PDS
Welfare Leakage grain, MGNREGA wages, and tribal welfare funds by ration diverted to black market; MGNREGA
corrupt intermediaries — making the state appear workers paid ₹180/day against statutory ₹258
more extractive than protective to beneficiary minimum. Maoists exploited these failures by
communities. ensuring minimum wages were actually paid in
their controlled areas.

Governance 60%+ of LWE-affected villages lack all-weather roads, Abujhmad region (4,000 sq km, Chhattisgarh): no
Vacuum & Absent functional primary health centres, and secondary government official posted for 3 consecutive
State schools — making the Maoist Jan Adalat and Jan years (2018–21) before Operation Black Forest
Militia the only visible 'government' many tribals (2025). Maoists ran parallel tax collection,
interact with. dispute resolution, and agricultural credit
systems.

Police Repression Arbitrary detention, fake encounter killings, and forest NHRC received 4,000+ human rights violation
& Impunity department harassment of tribals — conducted complaints against police in LWE zones (2010–
without accountability — generate a cycle of 2020); Salwa Judum SPOs accused of burning
resentment that Maoist propaganda converts into 600+ villages — state-abetted violence that
recruitment. boosted Maoist recruitment more than any
propaganda campaign.

Layer 3 — Psycho-Cultural Drivers (Individual-level recruitment accelerants)

Psychological The Maoist movement offers something that the Expert Group, Planning Commission (2008): 'The
Empowerment constitutional state has failed to deliver to Naxalite movement has provided psychological
Theory marginalised tribals: a sense of dignity, power, and empowerment to the oppressed — particularly
political agency. For a young tribal who has been youth — who find a sense of power and identity
treated as sub-human by forest officials and in the movement.' This explains why surrender
contractors, the gun provides a psychological rates plateau even when material conditions
transformation that no welfare scheme replicates. improve.

Cultural Alienation State education systems, commercial media, and Introduction of Hindi-medium government
urban-centric development models systematically schools replaced Gondi-language learning in
delegitimise tribal languages, knowledge systems, Bastar — reducing school attendance by 34%
and cultural practices — creating an identity crisis that (DISE 2019) and creating a generation
extremist movements address by restoring cultural functionally excluded from both traditional culture
pride through resistance. and modern economy.

Youth Tribal regions combine high youth population growth J&K youth unemployment: 18.3% (2023); Sukma
Unemployment as with near-zero formal sector employment — creating district (Chhattisgarh): only 9% of tribal youth in
Force Multiplier a demographic bulge of educated-but-unemployed formal employment (NSSO 2022). PLGA
young men and women for whom the Maoist recruitment fee: ₹5,000 joining incentive +
movement offers both income and meaning. monthly stipend — competing directly against
daily-wage agricultural work.

5.2 How Extremism Deepens Underdevelopment

Dimension How Underdevelopment Creates Extremism How Extremism Deepens Underdevelopment

Infrastructure Absent roads, schools, and hospitals signal state Maoists prevent road construction (extortion, attack on
indifference — Maoists fill the governance contractors) — ensuring the isolation that protects their
vacuum with parallel services and gain operational sanctuary. 8,175 km of roads targeted by
legitimacy. Maoists since 2000.

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 Dimension How Underdevelopment Creates Extremism How Extremism Deepens Underdevelopment

Investment & Low industrial investment and absent formal Active LWE zones deter private investment — NER
Economy sector employment push youth toward Maoist contributes only 2% of India's industrial investment;
recruitment — the organisation provides income Bastar's mineral wealth is extracted but not processed
and status. locally.

Education Poor school quality and cultural alienation Maoists burn schools (246 schools destroyed in LWE
exclude tribal youth from the mainstream — zones, 2010–2023); teachers threatened and driven out;
making Maoist propaganda about 'people's 11 LWE districts had no Kendriya Vidyalayas sanctioned
justice' credible. by 2020.

Governance Corrupt administration and absent officials Maoists assassinate cooperative officials, elected
Legitimacy create a credibility vacuum — Maoists exploit it sarpanches, and developmental workers — making
with Jan Adalats that actually deliver quick governance service delivery impossible and reinforcing
justice. the state's absence.

Security Security forces deployed in LWE zones are not Each CRPF battalion deployed costs ~₹80 crore/year —
Resource available for developmental protection — funds diverted from tribal development schemes. The
Diversion perpetuating the civilian security deficit. 'conflict economy' (Ajai Sahni) becomes a vested interest
for multiple actors.

5.3 The Rights-Denial Chain — 5th Schedule, PESA & FRA

India's constitutional architecture contains an elaborate protective framework for Scheduled Tribes — one of the most
comprehensive in any constitutional democracy. Its systematic non-implementation represents the single most important
institutional driver of LWE.

Provision What It Promised How It Was Denied LWE Consequence

PESA Act, Gram Sabhas with rights over States enacted formal amendments Maoists assumed de facto Gram
1996 (5th land transactions, minor but administrative sabotage Sabha function — their Jan Adalats
Schedule minerals, minor forest produce, nullified them — 2nd ARC (2008): filled the governance vacuum PESA
Extension) and village management in 'implementation is, by and large, created but failed to fill. Cadre
Scheduled Areas. unsatisfactory.' District collectors recruitment pitched as 'real PESA
continue overriding Gram Sabha enforcement.'
decisions on mining leases.

5th Schedule Governor's regulations to prohibit Many states either failed to enact Land alienation to mining
— Land transfer of tribal land to non- regulations or carved exceptions companies was the proximate
Transfer tribals — protecting territorial for industrial/mining projects. MP's trigger for Maoist expansion into
Prohibition integrity of Scheduled Areas. Land Regulation Rules (1959) still Odisha and Jharkhand post-2004.
permit non-tribal land acquisition on Vedanta/POSCO projects became
loan default. recruiting tools for Maoist cadres.

Tribes Up to 20 members (3/4 ST Meetings became perfunctory. 2nd Loss of constitutional political voice
Advisory representatives) to advise ARC analysis of AP and MP TAC drove tribal youth toward Maoist
Council (5th Governor on ST welfare — minutes (1999–2004): not a single political structures as the only
Schedule) constitutional voice for tribal meeting discussed land alienation platform where their land and
interests at state level. — the primary grievance. Body livelihood demands were taken
captured by state political elite. seriously.

FRA, 2006 Recognition of traditional forest Implementation delegated to 'Jal, Jungle, Zameen' became the
(Forest rights — including rights to district-level committees dominated defining Maoist slogan — directly
Rights Act) cultivate forest land, collect by Forest Department officials who exploiting FRA's failure.
minor forest produce, and have institutional interest in Surrendered cadres consistently
manage community forests — for rejecting claims. Only 12% of cite unresolved FRA claims as their
Scheduled Tribes and other claims approved in Jharkhand primary recruitment motivation.
traditional forest dwellers. (2023). (Chhattisgarh Police data, 2024)

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 Provision What It Promised How It Was Denied LWE Consequence

Samatha Supreme Court held: 'The Judgement unenforced in other Corporate-tribal conflict became the
Case Constitution intends that the land states. Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and most fertile recruiting ground for
Judgement always should remain with the Jharkhand continued granting Maoists — Niyamgiri (Vedanta) and
(SC, 1997) Tribals.' Struck down Andhra mining leases on tribal land through POSCO (Odisha) resistance
Pradesh government's lease of various administrative workarounds movements had Maoist ideological
tribal land to private companies and special purpose vehicles. framing and organisational support.
for mining.

Three Commission Reports — Diagnosing 5th Schedule Failure

Bhuria Commission Report (2004) — the Bhuria Committee, chaired by Dr. Dileep Singh Bhuria, examined the
working of PESA and concluded that states had diluted its provisions through subordinate rules, leaving Gram
Sabhas with notional authority over land, minor minerals, and forest produce.
Mungekar Committee Report (2009) — examined the administration of Scheduled Areas under the 5th Schedule
and flagged the casual, irregular nature of Governor's annual reports to the President — the very constitutional
safeguard that was meant to keep tribal welfare under scrutiny.
Xaxa Committee Report (2014) — High-Level Committee on Socio-Economic, Health & Educational Status of
Tribal Communities under Prof. Virginius Xaxa documented systemic non-implementation of PESA, FRA, and
the 5th Schedule across LWE-affected states, and recommended placing the Governor's report before
Parliament.
Common conclusion across all three: the 5th Schedule's protective architecture is sound on paper but
vacated in practice — making Scheduled Areas the precise terrain where LWE recruits its cadre.

5.4 Case Study: Salwa Judum

Salwa Judum (Gondi: 'Purification Hunt' or 'Peace March') was a state-sponsored vigilante force active in Chhattisgarh
(2005–2009). It is the most instructive cautionary case in India's counter-insurgency history — demonstrating precisely
how corporate-security nexus, rights violations, and absent accountability can transform a counterinsurgency operation
into its opposite: a Maoist recruitment campaign.

Analytical Dimension What Happened & Why It Matters

Formation & Corporate Salwa Judum was initiated in 2005 by Chhattisgarh's BJP government — framed as a spontaneous
Nexus tribal peace movement. The 2nd ARC (2008) and subsequent NIA investigations found the movement
was backed by corporations (Tata Steel, Essar Steel) holding mineral concessions in Bastar — who
needed tribal communities cleared from mining areas. This corporate-security nexus made Salwa
Judum simultaneously a counterinsurgency measure and a land-clearance operation.

Special Police Officers By 2008, Salwa Judum members were formally designated as Special Police Officers under the
(SPOs) Chhattisgarh Police Act 2007 — receiving state arms and authorisation to conduct counter-
insurgency operations with minimal training. Many SPOs were former Maoists who brought tactical
knowledge of Maoist hideouts and social networks.

Scale of Abuse SC-appointed commission found: 600+ villages burned; 300,000 people forcibly displaced to
government 'relief camps'; 98 SPO deaths and up to 800 total deaths. The Darbha Ghat massacre
became the defining symbol of Salwa Judum's brutality — a convoy of civilians killed in
circumstances attributed to Maoist retaliation against Salwa Judum collaborators.

Supreme Court SC banned Salwa Judum entirely and directed disarming and disbanding of all SPOs. Key holdings:
Intervention (Nandini (1) Excessive legislative delegation — Act gave police unlimited discretion with no accountability
Sundar v. State of framework; (2) SPOs played active combat roles without adequate legal authority or training —
Chhattisgarh, 2011) violating Article 14's equal protection guarantee; (3) State placed minors and untrained youth in lethal
danger without legal justification — violating Article 21's right to life.

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 Analytical Dimension What Happened & Why It Matters

Maoist Recruitment Paradoxically, Salwa Judum accelerated Maoist recruitment. NIA analysis (cited in SC proceedings):
Consequence Maoist cadre strength increased by an estimated 23% between 2005 and 2010 in Chhattisgarh — the
period of Salwa Judum's maximum activity. Abused communities who had previously maintained
studied neutrality joined the movement after Salwa Judum displaced or killed their relatives.

Lesson for The Salwa Judum case established: (1) Outsourcing security to community vigilantes without legal
Development-Security framework, training, and accountability is unconstitutional; (2) Corporate-backed counter-insurgency
Policy generates more insurgents than it neutralises; (3) The 'Clear, Hold and Develop' strategy — in which
development delivery follows immediately behind security clearance — is the only constitutionally
and operationally sustainable model. (Joint Doctrine, Indian Armed Forces, 2017)

5.5 Women in the Red Corridor

Women constitute an estimated 40–60% of CPI(Maoist) total cadre strength — including combat positions in the People's
Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA).

Dimension Analysis

Why Women NCRB 2019: Five LWE-affected states (AP, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, MP, Odisha) recorded 84,938 crimes
Join — Push against women — the highest regional concentration in India. Tribal women face triple marginalisation:
Factors gender, caste, and class. Domestic violence, forced marriages, sexual assault by forest officials and security
forces, and bonded labour remain inadequately prosecuted in tribal courts. The Maoist movement's Krantikari
Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (KAMS) positioned itself explicitly as a response to this justice vacuum.

Why Women The Maoist movement, paradoxically, offers tribal women an institutional equality that constitutional India has
Join — Pull not delivered. Women hold command positions in PLGA units; cadre rules prohibit domestic violence against
Factors female members; Gram Sabhas in Maoist-controlled areas were enfranchising women before PESA began to
be implemented in formal governance. These pull factors are rational responses to an asymmetry in justice
delivery, not evidence of false consciousness.

Scale of PLGA: women account for ~40% of active cadres and over 90% of martyrs (killed in operations) — reflecting
Participation their disproportionate deployment in frontline roles. Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (KAMS): mass
organisation of 90,000+ tribal women in LWE zones, mobilised around land rights, wages, and protection from
violence. Both organisations operate simultaneously.

Policy Gap India's surrender and rehabilitation schemes are almost entirely designed for male combatants — offering
vocational training in traditionally male trades (tailoring aside) with no childcare provisions, no domestic
violence protection, and no recognition of female cadres' distinct needs. This institutional blindness explains
why female cadre surrender rates are consistently below 30% even when male surrender rates exceed 60%.
(MHA Surrender Statistics, 2024)

Counter- Community-level women's empowerment — Self-Help Group financing, PESA-based Gram Sabha
Extremism enfranchisement for women, FRA title registration in women's names, and dedicated tribal women's courts —
Implication is the most effective long-term counter-recruitment strategy for female cadres. Kerala's model of SHG-based
community counsellors has been piloted in 3 LWE districts (2023–24) with documented reduction in female
recruitment.

5.6 India's Counter-Strategy

Time Horizon Instruments Key Initiatives & Evidence

IMMEDIATE (0–2 Targeted operations; SAMADHAN doctrine; Operation Black Forest (April 2025): 21-day joint CRPF-
years) Security Unified Command; CoBRA and Chhattisgarh Police operation in Abujhmad — 27 Naxalites
Operations Greyhounds; intelligence-led rather than neutralised including top leader Nambala Keshav Rao.
area-sweep operations. 81% reduction in LWE violence (2010–2024). Target:
March 31, 2026 zero-LWE.

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 Time Horizon Instruments Key Initiatives & Evidence

IMMEDIATE (0–2 Road Connectivity Project for LWE; LWE 8,175 km roads constructed in LWE areas (2014–2024);
years) Mobile Tower Project; BharatNet; fortified 2,335 mobile towers installed; 2,100+ km BharatNet
Infrastructure police stations; rail services in Bastar. connectivity; Bastar rail connectivity boosted tourism
Delivery revenue 28% (2023–24).

MEDIUM-TERM (2–5 Back to Village (B2V); Civic Action Aspirational Districts Programme: 30 most LWE-affected
years) Governance Programme (CAP); Aspirational Districts districts show average 23% improvement in health,
Restoration Programme; Unified Command education, and financial inclusion indicators (NITI Aayog,
development integration; Tribal Youth 2024). CAP: 10,430+ personal interactions in LWE zones
Exchange (NYKS); Roshni digital literacy. (2023).

MEDIUM-TERM (2–5 Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy; 8,000+ Naxalites surrendered in last decade; Chhattisgarh
years) Surrender & financial grants; vocational training; land allocated 15,000 PM Gramin Awas Yojana houses for
Reintegration allocation. Naxal Surrender Policy 2025: surrendered cadres. Female surrender rates remain low —
rehabilitation within 120 days, urban policy redesign underway.
housing, agricultural land.

LONG-TERM (5+ FRA full implementation; PESA compliance 1.9 million FRA titles distributed nationally (but 88% of
years) Structural enforcement; Samatha Case judgement Jharkhand claims still pending). PM-DevINE ₹15,000 crore
Rights Reform enforcement; tribal self-governance; land for NE tribal development; PESA being enforced via Union
title digitisation; end of displacement- Ministry incentives (2nd ARC recommendation). Only
without-rehabilitation. structural reform breaks the root-cause cycle.

5.7 The NAXALIS Framework — 2nd ARC

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (5th Report, 2008) provided the most comprehensive governance-based
framework for addressing LWE — going beyond the security-centric SAMADHAN doctrine to address institutional causes.

Letter Pillar Recommendation

N Negotiations as Peace talks with extremist organisations — including active armed groups — should be the first
Primary Instrument resort, not the last. Mizo Accord (1986) and ULFA Accord (2023) demonstrate that negotiations
conducted in good faith can achieve what decades of military operations could not. Source: 2nd
ARC, 5th Report, para 5.3.

A Administrative Revive periodic official field inspections — including by senior officers — in LWE-affected
Presence & districts. The collapse of official field visits after 2005 (due to security concerns) created the
Accountability governance vacuum Maoists filled. Senior officers must be provided security escorts, not desk
postings. Source: 2nd ARC, 5th Report.

X eXpand Legal Rights Constitute multi-disciplinary FRA Oversight Committees including tribals, forest conservation
Enforcement experts, and civil society representatives — to ensure FRA implementation does not perpetuate
administrative delays or create ecological harm. Source: 2nd ARC, FRA Implementation
Section.

A Augment & Security forces must operate within constitutional bounds through codified Standard Operating
Professionalise Procedures (SOPs) — the Salwa Judum disaster resulted from the absence of such protocols.
Security Forces Specialised jungle-warfare units (Greyhounds model, AP/Telangana) are more effective than
mass CAPF deployments. Source: Shekatkar Committee (2016).

L Learning & Force Security and administrative personnel deployed in tribal areas must be trained in tribal history,
Sensitisation cultural practices, constitutional rights, and the root causes of LWE — transforming them from
occupying forces into development partners. LBS National Academy of Administration to
develop a mandatory tribal-governance module. Source: 2nd ARC.

I Implementation The Union Ministry of Panchayati Raj must monitor and incentivise state compliance with PESA
Monitoring of PESA — including through conditional fiscal transfers. States that fail to amend Panchayati Raj Acts in
line with PESA should face reduction in centrally-sponsored tribal welfare allocations. Source:
2nd ARC.

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 Letter Pillar Recommendation

S Strengthening Local State police rather than central forces should form the frontline in LWE zones — local officers
Police Capacity with knowledge of communities, languages, and terrain are operationally more effective.
Establish and staff local police stations in extremist-affected areas with locally recruited tribal
police. Source: 2nd ARC; reinforced by Bastariya Battalion model (CRPF, 2017).

5.8 Way Forward

Treat the 2026 deadline as a floor not a ceiling: MHA's March 31, 2026 target for zero-LWE districts is a crucial
mobilising goal — but post-2026 resilience planning must begin now to prevent the governance vacuum recurrence
that allowed LWE to return to 'zero districts' in the 1980s before rebounding.
Address the corporate-tribal nexus directly: All future mining leases in 5th Schedule areas must require prior
Gram Sabha consent (consistent with Samatha 1997 and Niyamgiri 2013 SC judgements), tribal community benefit-
sharing (minimum 20% of mineral revenue), and mandatory FRA settlement before project commencement.
Redesign surrender policy for women: Female cadres constitute 40%+ of the PLGA — yet rehabilitation policy is
designed for men. Introduce childcare provisions, domestic violence protection, and SHG-linked livelihood support
tailored to women's specific needs and vulnerabilities.
Scale the psychological empowerment alternative: The Maoist movement provides dignity and political agency
that the state has failed to deliver. Constitutional alternatives — elected Gram Sabhas with real powers, tribal leaders
as genuine magistrates, culturally-affirming state schools in tribal languages — must be built as conscious
competitors to Maoist ideological appeal.
Break the poverty-education-conflict trap: Expand Eklavya Model Residential Schools to all 200 LWE-affected
blocks; provide tribal scholarship pathways to IITs and IIMs; create tribal language content in UGC-approved courses
— making social mobility through education a more attractive path than the Maoist movement.
Implement the 'Clear, Hold and Develop' doctrine with fidelity: Every CRPF operation that clears a Maoist area must
be immediately followed by pre-planned governance delivery: a new police station, an anganwadi worker, a PM Awas
beneficiary list, and a FRA claims review committee. The failure to do this after Operation Green Hunt (2009–12) is
why LWE rebounded.

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 6 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) / Naxalism

India's Maoist insurgency presents a paradox that most revolutionary movements do not survive: it is older than most
independent nations. Beginning in Naxalbari in 1967 — two decades after Indian independence — it has outlasted the
Soviet Union that inspired it, survived multiple military offensives, and persisted through India's dramatic economic
transformation.
Yet as of 2024, affected districts have fallen from 126 to 38, violence is 81% below its 2010 peak, and Operation Black
Forest (April 2025) neutralised the movement's top military commander, Nambala Keshav Rao, in his last significant
sanctuary.

Note:
Districts affected: Reduced from 126 (2018) to 38 (2024); most affected: 4 in Chhattisgarh, 1 in Jharkhand, 1 in
Maharashtra.
Violence trajectory: 81% decline from 2010 peak (1,936 incidents) to 2024 (374 incidents); deaths down 85%.
Operation Black Forest (April 2025): 21-day CRPF-Chhattisgarh joint operation in Abujhmad; 27 Naxalites
killed including Nambala Keshav Rao (CPI Maoist General Secretary). Abujhmad — the last major sanctuary —
significantly degraded.
Government target: Eliminate LWE by March 31, 2026 — MHA deadline under SAMADHAN doctrine.
PLGA strength: Estimated 4,000–5,000 active cadres (down from peak 10,000+); 60% female composition.
Surrenders: 8,000+ Naxalites surrendered in the last decade; Naxal Surrender Policy 2025 guarantees
rehabilitation within 120 days.

6.1 How LWE Transformed Across Four Phases

The Naxalite movement is not a single continuous organisation — it has reinvented itself ideologically and organisationally
four times in response to state pressure, internal factionalism, and changing social conditions. Understanding these
mutations explains both why it survived and why it is now declining:

Phase & Period Ideological Character What Changed & Why It Matters

Phase 1: Agrarian Pure peasant rebellion. Charu Majumdar's Naxalbari (1967): Tribal youth assault on police sparked
Insurrection 'annihilation line' — targeting class national controversy. CPI(ML) formed under Majumdar.
(1967–1972) enemies individually. Broad mass base Movement spread to Bengal, Bihar, AP, and urban Kolkata.
but no sustained military strategy. Ideological purity became a liability — internal purges
alienated the mass base. Crushed by 1972 by the United
Front government and Indira Gandhi's security operations.
Lesson: Ideological maximalism without political programme
is unsustainable.

Phase 2: Fragmentation into four competing Emergency (1975–77) fractured the movement but
Fragmentation & factions (MCC, PWG, Party Unity, CPI-ML inadvertently professionalised the underground. Four factions
Adaptation (1975– Liberation), each developing distinct developed different social bases — caste (Bihar), forest-tribal
2004) tactical lines. MCC in Bihar conducted (Telangana), and industrial labour (Bengal). By 1998, Party
caste warfare on behalf of Dalit landless Unity and PWG merged into CPI-ML(People's War). Lesson:
labourers — targeting upper-caste Ranvir Decentralisation enabled ideological diversification —
Sena. PWG pioneered guerrilla warfare different factions found different recruitment pools.
doctrine in Telangana forests.

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 Phase & Period Ideological Character What Changed & Why It Matters

Phase 3: Unified CPI(Maoist) formed (2004) through Post-merger, violence reached historic peak (1,936 incidents,
Command & Peak PU+MCC+PWG merger — creating 2010). Dantewada (2010): 75 CRPF personnel killed in single
Violence (2004– India's first unified Maoist command with ambush — largest single-day CAPF loss in Indian history;
2012) PLGA as professional guerrilla army. stalled Operation Green Hunt. But merger also created rigid
Military capability reached peak. Urban command hierarchy that became vulnerable to intelligence
outreach expanded through front penetration. Salwa Judum paradoxically boosted cadre
organisations. numbers. Lesson: Centralisation increased firepower but
created exploitable vulnerabilities.

Phase 4: Strategic Conscious tactical retreat — preserving 81% violence reduction is partly security force success and
Retreat & Decline cadre strength by avoiding pitched battles. partly deliberate Maoist strategy — protecting remaining
(2013–Present) Shift from military operations toward cadres. Intelligence estimates suggest PLGA leadership
political and urban underground work. decided concentrated military engagement was causing
Technology adoption (encrypted apps, unsustainable attrition. Operation Black Forest (2025)
drone surveillance of security positions). disrupted this strategy by penetrating Abujhmad sanctuary
Last sanctuary: Abujhmad forest, and eliminating the General Secretary. Lesson: The endgame
Chhattisgarh. of a cornered insurgency is either negotiated settlement or
total military defeat — the 2026 deadline forces that choice.

Malkangiri & Naxalbari — The Two Focal Points

The Two Foci

Naxalbari (West Bengal, 1967) — the historical birthplace of the Naxalbari Uprising; symbolises the original peasant-
tribal grievance against land alienation, exploitation and absentee landlordism that ignited the movement.
Malkangiri (Odisha) — a long-standing Maoist stronghold in the tri-junction of Odisha–Andhra–Chhattisgarh;
emblematic of how tribal displacement by large industrial and mining projects, multiple times over, has alienated
communities and supplied Maoist recruitment.

Corrective Strategies
Mainstream the displaced — fair land-acquisition compensation, R&R packages under the LARR Act 2013,
transparent grievance redressal in displacement projects.
Constitutional protections — rigorous enforcement of the Fifth Schedule, PESA 1996 and the Forest Rights Act 2006
in scheduled areas; consent-based tribal land transfer.
Aspirational development — PM-JANMAN, Eklavya Model Residential Schools, Aspirational Districts focus on
Malkangiri-type blocks; road, school and health infrastructure first.
Surrender & rehabilitation — calibrated surrender-cum-rehabilitation packages with skilling, livelihood and security
guarantees — a humane off-ramp.
Community-centric policing — deep contact-team policing, civic-action programmes, language-and-culture sensitive
force training (minimum-force doctrine).

6.2 Why LWE Persists — Operational Sustaining Factors

Sustaining Factor How It Keeps LWE Alive Despite Decline Counter-Strategy Required

Terrain Dense forests, remote hills, and riverine areas in UAV/drone surveillance mapping; rapid-
Sanctuaries Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand-Odisha-Maharashtra tri- deployment helicopters; BRO road construction
junctions provide operational sanctuary where security specifically targeting sanctuary approaches.
forces face terrain disadvantages and supply chain Abujhmad's degradation (2025) via Operation
limitations. Black Forest demonstrates this approach works.

Cross-Border NSCN(K)-linked arms trafficking through Myanmar Operation Sunrise with Myanmar Army (2019–
Arms Supply border provides weapon replenishment for PLGA — 20); scrapping of FMR (2024) to reduce cross-
Chain documented NIA finding (2024). Without this supply, border movement; dedicated NIA-BSF
PLGA would exhaust its arsenal. coordination cell for NE-LWE arms nexus.

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 Sustaining Factor How It Keeps LWE Alive Despite Decline Counter-Strategy Required

Urban Covert urban cells in Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad, and UAPA Section 17 (conspiracy provisions); NIA
Underground Pune fundraise, recruit educated cadres, provide legal chargesheets in Elgar Parishad (2018);
Network representation, and manage international propaganda dedicated digital surveillance of urban cell
— sustaining organisational capacity independently of communication patterns; distinguish legitimate
forest operations. civil society from material support networks.

Encrypted PLGA cadres use Telegram, Signal, and mesh- NETRA keyword surveillance; IT Rules 2021
Communication networking apps for command communication — traceability provisions; judicial warrants for
Adaptation evading traditional signals intelligence collection and message originator identification. Critical gap:
reducing the value of individual arrests for intelligence India lacks a specific lawful interception
purposes. framework for end-to-end encrypted platforms.

Extortion Systematic extortion of contractors, mining companies, Anti-extortion and economic offences wings in
Economy and transport operators in LWE zones generates an state police; mandatory contractor reporting of
estimated ₹2,000–2,500 crore annually — funding extortion demands; PMLA action against
PLGA operations, arms purchases, and urban extortion proceeds; anonymous reporting
underground activities. Extortion creates business mechanisms to break the silence of threatened
interests in the conflict's continuation. contractors.

Residual Tribal Despite security force success, a residual tribal Aspirational Districts Programme for tangible
Sympathy sympathy base persists in remote areas — providing welfare delivery; FRA title distribution; CRPF
shelter, intelligence, and civilian cover to PLGA units. Civic Action Programme (CAP) for trust-building;
This is both a moral testament to unresolved distinguishing active supporters from
grievances and an operational resource for the communities that provide cover under threat
movement. rather than by conviction.

Leadership Despite significant neutralisations, CPI(Maoist) has Intelligence penetration of the Central
Continuity maintained continuity through succession planning — Committee succession process; targeting
the Central Committee has replaced killed leaders second-tier leadership simultaneously with first-
faster than India's security forces expected. Post- tier; negotiate with moderates within the
Nambala, the succession process has reportedly organisation who favour the political track over
already been activated. military continuation.

Article 244 & the Fifth Schedule — The Non-Implementation Impact

The Constitutional Provision

Article 244(1) — applies the Fifth Schedule to the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in States
other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram (which fall under the Sixth Schedule).
Fifth Schedule key features — Tribes Advisory Council in each State; Governor’s special powers to make regulations
restricting transfer of tribal land, regulating moneylending and protecting tribal interests; Presidential power to declare
and modify Scheduled Areas.
Supplementary laws — PESA, 1996 (extending self-governance to Scheduled Areas) and Forest Rights Act, 2006
(recognising individual and community forest rights).

Non-Implementation — The LWE Link

Failure Point How It Has Fed LWE Growth

Land alienation Despite the Governor’s power to bar transfer of tribal land, non-tribal acquisition and corporate land
transfers in mining belts continued — dispossession became the chief Maoist recruitment narrative.

Inadequate Tribes Tribes Advisory Councils have functioned weakly in most Fifth-Schedule States, denying tribals a real
Advisory Councils voice in administration.

PESA hollowed out Many States enacted PESA rules late or in diluted form — Gram Sabha consent on land acquisition
and mining leases is often ignored in practice.

Forest Rights Act denial Backlog and rejection of individual / community forest-rights claims in Maoist-affected States eroded
trust in the constitutional bargain.

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 Failure Point How It Has Fed LWE Growth

Displacement without Industrial and mining projects in scheduled areas displaced tribals without effective R&R, validating
rehabilitation the insurgent narrative.

Weak governance Persistent absence of basic services (roads, schools, health) in scheduled areas widened the
legitimacy gap the Maoists exploit.

6.3 SAMADHAN — India's Anti-LWE Doctrine

SAMADHAN (MHA, 2017) is India's closest equivalent to a published counter-insurgency doctrine—simultaneously

addressing security operations, development delivery, intelligence, and technology. Unlike NAXALIS (2nd ARC's
governance track), SAMADHAN is the operational action framework.

Letter Pillar What It Requires Implementation Evidence

S Smart Context-specific, intelligence-led Partly implemented: Operation Black Forest (2025)

Leadership responses — distinguishing coerced demonstrates precision targeting of leadership — but
tribals from hardened cadres, applying cordon-and-search operations in civilian areas
proportionate force rather than area- continue to generate human rights complaints (NHRC,
sweep operations. 2023).

A Aggressive but Maximise operational impact through Well implemented: CoBRA and Greyhounds have the
Calibrated specialised jungle-warfare units — best operational records. Bastariya Battalion (local
Strategy CoBRA (CRPF), Greyhounds tribal recruits) reduces the 'occupying force' perception
(AP/Telangana), Bastariya Battalion — problem significantly. These units are the operational
rather than mass CAPF deployment. model for the 2026 target.

M Motivation & Surrender and rehabilitation schemes — Partially effective: 8,000+ surrenders in a decade.
Reintegration financial incentives, vocational training, Naxal Surrender Policy 2025 (120-day rehabilitation
land allocation — making surrender more guarantee) is an improvement. Critical gap: female
attractive than continued insurgency. cadre surrender rates remain below 30% —
rehabilitation policy was designed for male
combatants. (MHA Surrender Statistics, 2024)

A Actionable Real-time, ground-level intelligence Improving: NATGRID (operational 2020) and NETRA
Intelligence through MAC, state MAC (Jagdalpur, UAVs have transformed intelligence collection in
Gaya), and NATGRID — enabling Abujhmad. Critical gap: only 15% of LWE police
targeted operations rather than reactive stations use AI/ML analytics tools (MHA 2024) — most
deployments. intelligence remains paper-based.

D Dashboard- District-level KPI dashboards tracking Implemented for security metrics; weak for
Based security incidents, development delivery, development metrics. CAG (2022): 40% of Aspirational
Performance and governance metrics — enabling Districts Programme targets in LWE areas not
Monitoring course-correction rather than waiting for achieved — but dashboard did not trigger corrective
annual reviews. action, suggesting the monitoring loop is incomplete.

H Harness UAVs for surveillance, GIS mapping of Strong progress: CRPF's NETRA UAVs; AP's CRIME
Technology Maoist infrastructure, AI-based predictive Analytics Platform reduced IED attacks by 40%; 2,335
analytics, night-vision equipment for mobile towers installed for surveillance connectivity.
security forces — closing the night-time Critical gap: Maoists are also adopting technology
operational advantage Maoists have faster than expected — drone surveillance of CRPF
historically enjoyed. positions recorded in Chhattisgarh (2024).

A Area-Specific Tailored security-development strategies Well implemented in principle: Unified Command

Action Plans for each LWE zone — Bastar, Abujhmad, integrates state police, CRPF, and civil administration
Saranda (Jharkhand), and Gadchiroli in each state. Saranda Development Plan (₹130 crore)
(Maharashtra) require different for Jharkhand's Maoist forest belt is the model.
approaches based on terrain, Abujhmad's sustained neglect until 2025 suggests area
demographics, and grievance profiles. plans were not consistently enforced.

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 Letter Pillar What It Requires Implementation Evidence

N No Access to Disrupt Maoist revenue streams — Weakest pillar: estimated ₹2,000–2,500 crore/year
Financing extortion networks, FICN linkages, extortion economy continues relatively uninterrupted.
narcotics proceeds — through anti- Anti-extortion wings understaffed; contractor fear
extortion wings, PMLA enforcement, and prevents reporting; ED has not prioritised LWE
anonymous reporting mechanisms. extortion proceeds as a PMLA category. (2nd ARC
recommendation on economic offences wing largely
unimplemented)

6.4 Measures Along the Clear-Hold-Develop Doctrine

The Clear-Hold-Develop doctrine (Joint Doctrine, Indian Armed Forces, 2017) provides the most useful organising
framework for India's counter-LWE measures. The critical lesson of Operation Green Hunt's failure (2009–12) was that
security clearance without immediate development delivery creates a vacuum that the Maoists refill. The three stages must
advance simultaneously, not sequentially:

Stage Security Instruments Development & Governance Instruments

CLEAR Neutralise CoBRA units; Greyhounds (AP/Telangana); Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:
armed groups; Bastariya Battalion; Operation Black Forest reimburses state for CAPF logistics costs. National
disrupt logistics; model; CRPF Unified Command; fortified Policy on LWE (2015): multi-pronged security-
establish security police stations; NETRA UAV surveillance; development framework. Intelligence: revamped MAC +
dominance GIS-mapped Maoist infrastructure. state MACs at Jagdalpur and Gaya.

HOLD Maintain India Reserve Battalions (61 sanctioned for Civic Action Programme (CAP): CRPF's 10,430+
security presence; NE/LWE states); Village Defence Groups; personal interaction events with tribal communities
prevent vacuum; SPOs (within constitutional limits set by (2023). Back to Village (B2V) equivalent for LWE: district
begin trust-building Nandini Sundar judgement); Special officials mandated to visit affected villages quarterly.
Infrastructure Scheme for fortified police CRPF school outreach and health camps in cleared
stations. areas.

DEVELOP Deliver Surrendered cadre rehabilitation Aspirational Districts Programme (30 LWE-affected
welfare; address root (₹10,000/month financial aid; vocational districts); LWE Road Connectivity Project (8,175 km
causes; make peace training; land allocation). Anti-extortion constructed 2014–2024); 2,335 mobile towers;
economically investigations to allow normal contractor BharatNet connectivity; Eklavya Model Residential
attractive operations. Naxal Surrender Policy 2025: Schools; Roshni digital literacy; GOAL (Facebook-NYKS
120-day rehabilitation guarantee. programme); Livelihood Colleges; Saranda Development
Plan (₹130 crore, Jharkhand).

6.5 Disaggregating the Causes of LWE's Retreat

India's official position attributes the 81% decline in LWE violence (2010–2024) to security force success and development
delivery. The reality is more complex — four distinct factors contributed, each with different policy implications:

Factor Contribution to Decline Policy Implication

Security Force Upgraded training (CoBRA, Greyhounds), intelligence- This factor is most amenable to continued
Effectiveness led operations, and tactical adaptation — culminating in improvement. But it explains perhaps 35–40% of
Operation Black Forest (2025) — have degraded the decline — security alone cannot explain a
PLGA's operational capacity. Intelligence penetration of movement abandoning operational areas where it
CPI(Maoist) Central Committee has led to systematic had structural social support.
leadership neutralisation.

Maoist Tactical PLGA leadership deliberately reduced operations after This factor is the most important for 2026
Retreat 2013 to prevent unsustainable attrition — a strategic planning — a movement in tactical retreat can
choice to preserve cadres for a future political reconstitute when pressure reduces. The 2026
opportunity rather than risk military annihilation. The deadline must be followed by continued
movement is contracting, not collapsing. governance delivery, or LWE will rebuild in 5–10
years as it has done twice before.

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 Factor Contribution to Decline Policy Implication

Development Road connectivity, mobile tower installation, and This is the most durable factor — but the 23%
Delivery Aspirational Districts Programme have materially improvement in Aspirational Districts indicators,
Improvement improved living conditions in previously isolated tribal while real, leaves substantial gaps. LWE cannot
areas — reducing the developmental grievance that be declared 'permanently defeated' until the full
provides Maoist recruitment rationale. Rights-Denial Chain (FRA, PESA, land titles) is
resolved.

Demographic & A new generation of tribal youth — connected by mobile This factor is most easily reversed by policy
Attitudinal Shift phones, accessing PMJDY financial services, and failure — if economic opportunity does not
aware of opportunities outside the forest — has higher materialise for connected youth, the phone
opportunity costs for joining PLGA than their parents' becomes a radicalisation tool rather than an
generation. Martyrdom has less appeal when integration tool. The 2026 generation is the
smartphones offer alternatives. critical cohort.

6.6 Key Counter-LWE Operational Units

Unit Structure & Mandate Operational Record Distinctive Feature

Bastariya Recruited exclusively from tribal Significantly reduced the First Indian security force
Battalion (CRPF, youth of Bastar region — 'occupying army' perception explicitly designed around
2017) providing local identity, terrain problem; local recruits identify community identity rather than
knowledge, and language former classmates and family professional background. Model
capacity to CRPF operations in members among cadres — for future anti-insurgency units
Chhattisgarh. enabling intelligence collection in tribal conflict zones.
impossible for outsider units.

CoBRA (CRPF — CRPF's specialist jungle-warfare Consistently the highest- India's most battle-tested
Commando commando unit — 10 battalions performing CRPF unit in LWE jungle-warfare force. Doctrine:
Battalion for deployed exclusively in LWE operations; credited with 80%+ of 'minimum force, maximum
Resolute Action) zones. Training emphasis: significant PLGA leadership precision' — direct operational
survival, jungle navigation, small- neutralisations since 2015; lower embodiment of the 'S' and 'A'
unit tactics, and intelligence-led civilian complaint rate than regular pillars of SAMADHAN.
operations. CRPF battalions.

Greyhounds State police jungle-warfare Operational template for all State police ownership creates
(AP/Telangana commando unit established in subsequent anti-LWE specialist deeper local intelligence
Police) Andhra Pradesh in 1989 — units. 2nd ARC (2008) specifically networks than central forces.
considered India's most effective cited Greyhounds as the model Demonstrates that state-led
anti-Maoist force at its peak; for building capacity in state (not CRPF-led) operations with
credited with virtually eliminating police machinery for tackling specialist training produce the
Maoist presence in Telangana by LWE. (Source: 2nd ARC, 5th best long-term results.
2015. Report)

C-60 Force Maharashtra Police's elite Virtually eliminated organised Hyper-local specialisation:
(Gadchiroli commando unit operating Maoist presence in significant single-district mandate enables
District, exclusively in Gadchiroli district parts of Gadchiroli through depth of community intelligence
Maharashtra) — India's most Maoist-affected sustained intelligence-led impossible for multi-district
district outside Chhattisgarh. operations; contributed to deployments. Gadchiroli model
Maharashtra's removal from 'most being studied for replication in
affected' LWE category by 2022. Chhattisgarh.

Black Panther State-raised commando battalion Deployed in Sukma, Bijapur and Chhattisgarh's first homegrown
Force modelled on AP's Greyhounds; Dantewada; integrated into the special force — closes the
(Chhattisgarh, jungle warfare and IED-detection 2025 Operation Black Forest state-capacity gap that had
2022) training; works with area-domination grid. forced over-reliance on central
CRPF/CoBRA in Bastar. CAPFs.

6.7 Way Forward

Build a post-2026 resilience plan now: The 2026 zero-LWE target requires a parallel long-term plan: LWE was
'zero' in the 1980s and rebounded spectacularly when governance delivery stalled. The National Policy on LWE

Internal Security 44
 (2015) must be updated to include a 10-year consolidation framework.
Close the extortion economy first: The 'N' pillar of SAMADHAN — cutting Maoist finances — is the weakest
implemented pillar. Without disrupting the ₹2,000–2,500 crore annual extortion economy, even zero-incident LWE
districts will face rapid reinfiltration when security pressure reduces.
Use the Dantewada model nationally: Dantewada district's transformation from India's most violent LWE district
(2010) to a tourist destination (2023) through aggressive development delivery provides the replicable model. Apply
the Saranda and Dantewada frameworks to remaining 38 affected districts.
Negotiate with the political wing: CPI(Maoist) has a legitimate political demand embedded in an illegitimate armed
strategy. A structured negotiation process — with conditions (ceasefire, registration as political party, renunciation of
violence) — is the only path to a sustainable political settlement. Mizo Accord (1986) and ULFA (2023) provide the
template.
Legislate the urban Naxal framework carefully: The Elgar Parishad case established legal precedent for
prosecuting ideological supporters of armed movements. The legal framework must distinguish material support
(prosecutable) from intellectual dissent (protected) — a distinction UAPA Section 17 currently handles clumsily and
courts have challenged.
Address the 2026 successor organisations risk: Intelligence inputs suggest CPI(Maoist) has already activated
succession planning post-Nambala. The 2026 deadline may produce a name change rather than a genuine
demobilisation. Counter-strategy must monitor for reconstitution under new identities.

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 7 Militancy in Jammu & Kashmir

The J&K conflict has two dimensions that are analytically inseparable yet frequently confused. The external dimension —
Pakistan's territorial claims, ISI's proxy infrastructure, and the Zia Doctrine of asymmetric warfare — has been extensively
documented.
The internal dimension — the socio-political alienation of J&K's people, the legacy of the 1987 election rigging, the exodus
of Kashmiri Pandits, and the governance deficit — is equally significant but less conveniently attributable to a foreign
adversary.
Sustainable peace in J&K requires addressing both dimensions simultaneously: defeating Pakistan's proxy infrastructure
through Operation Sindoor-type responses, while delivering the constitutional promise of Insaniyat (humanity), Jamhooriyat
(democracy), and Kashmiriyat (Kashmir's composite culture) that Atal Bihari Vajpayee articulated as the only durable
resolution framework.

Note:
Active militants: Reduced from 250 (end-2019) to ~100 (end-2022); security target: below 100.
Recruitment decline: 100 Kashmiris joined militant ranks in 2022 vs 143 in 2019 — local recruitment falling, but
foreign militant proportion rising (43% of militants killed in 2022 were foreign nationals).
Civilian casualties: Militant-caused civilian deaths reduced from 44 (2019) to 29 (2022) — post-Article 370
trend.
L&O disturbances: Plummeted from 584 incidents (2019) to just 26 (2022) — a 95%+ reduction in civil unrest.
Voter turnout: 58.46% in 2024 Lok Sabha elections — highest in decades; testament to restored democratic
participation.
Hurriyat renouncement: 12 Hurriyat-linked organisations including J&K Mass Movement renounced
separatism (2025) — embraced unity with India.
Concern: Terror attacks increasing in Jammu region (Reasi, Kathua, Doda); Pahalgam attack (April 2025) killed
26 civilians — signalling geographic shift of militancy from Valley to Jammu.

7.1 How J&K's Militancy Was Built

Threshold
What Happened Alienation Generated
Moment

1949–1953 Sheikh Abdullah — J&K's most popular First major breach of trust: India's constitutional promises of self-
Dismissal of leader and Prime Minister — arrested on determination gave way to central government control. Created
Sheikh sedition charges in 1953 and replaced by the foundational narrative that J&K's incorporation was coercive
Abdullah a puppet government. J&K's promised rather than consensual — a narrative Pakistan has exploited ever
plebiscite never conducted. since.

1960s–1980s Progressive dilution of J&K's special Pattern of electoral manipulation made democratic politics in J&K
Autonomy status through presidential orders. Sadiq appear futile — why participate in elections whose outcomes the
Erosion government (1960s) and Farooq centre would override? Created demand for armed resistance as
Abdullah's dismissal (1984) — central the only credible political instrument.
government repeatedly overrode
democratic outcomes when results were
inconvenient.

1987 Rigged State assembly elections rigged to defeat This is the single most cited trigger for the 1989 armed
Assembly the Muslim United Front (MUF) — a insurgency. JKLF founders and Hizbul Mujahideen leaders point
Elections coalition of parties with genuine mass to 1987 as the event that convinced them peaceful political
support. Winning MUF candidates had participation was impossible. The FBI's 2011 court testimony on
their victories stolen through ballot ISI control of separatist groups becomes operationally significant
manipulation. only after 1987 creates the human terrain ISI can exploit.

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 Threshold
What Happened Alienation Generated
Moment

1990 Kashmiri 90,000+ Kashmiri Pandit families forced Simultaneously: (a) gave militancy a communal character it had
Pandit Exodus to flee the Valley amid targeted killings, lacked under JKLF's secular founding ideology; (b) removed the
threats, and a climate of fear — creating moderating Hindu presence from Valley society; (c) created a
India's largest internally displaced permanent humanitarian grievance. The exodus's causes — ISI-
community. sponsored terror AND state failure to protect — are both real.

2016 Burhan Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Demonstrated the emergence of a 'new militancy' — digitally
Wani's Death Wani killed by security forces — triggering recruited, ideologically distinct from JKLF's liberation nationalism,
the largest mass protests in J&K since and oriented toward pan-Islamic jihadism rather than Kashmiri
1989. Wani was a social media-savvy identity politics. Social media replaced the mosque as the primary
militant who had glamourised armed radicalisation infrastructure.
resistance for a new generation.

2019 Article Article 370 revoked; J&K bifurcated into Immediate: massive security backlash averted; L&O disturbances
370 two UTs; internet shutdown for months; dropped 95%. Medium-term: statehood still not restored (2025)
Abrogation senior political leaders detained. despite SC directive; local political representation delayed. Long-
term: political reintegration requires credible democratic
participation — still incomplete. Hurriyat's 2025 renouncement of
separatism is the most significant positive outcome.

2025 TRF (LeT proxy) killed 26 tourists in Two security implications: (1) 15 local collaborators signals
Pahalgam Pahalgam; 15 locals aided the attackers; persistent alienation in Jammu's Muslim communities —
Attack & Shift 20-minute security response delay. governance gap, not just Pakistani infiltration; (2) geographic
to Jammu Simultaneously, attacks in Reasi, Kathua, spread requires a new security architecture for Jammu that
and Doda signal geographic spread from doesn't yet exist. India responded with Operation Sindoor (May
Valley to Jammu. 2025) — addressing the external dimension. The internal
dimension requires a Jammu-specific development and
governance response.

7.2 Over-Ground Workers (OGWs)

Over-ground workers (OGWs) are the civilian interface of the militant organisation — individuals who maintain a legal
identity while performing essential functions for armed groups. The banning of Jamaat-e-Islami J&K (2019) brought the
OGW network into sharp public focus, revealing an infrastructure far more sophisticated than the simple 'logistics provider'
description suggests. The OGW ecosystem has three tiers:

OGW Tier Who They Are What They Do Countermeasure

Tier 1: Senior religious figures, Frame militant violence as justified UAPA designation of organisations
Strategic political actors, and business resistance in sermons and (Jamaat-e-Islami ban 2019); financial
OGWs leaders who provide ideological publications; channel foreign funding tracking under PMLA; NIA
legitimacy, political cover, and through legitimate investigation of funding chains;
high-value intelligence to the religious/charitable institutions; surveillance of digital communications
militant organisation. Often provide political intelligence on (NETRA).
protected by reputational government planning and security
status. movements.

Tier 2: Mid-level operatives — Arms storage and onward Intelligence Bureau source networks;
Operational contractors, transport workers, movement; safe house provision; checkpost monitoring; CCTV
OGWs hotel staff, former militants — intelligence on security force surveillance in sensitive areas;
who provide logistics, arms movements and deployment community policing informant
storage, communication patterns; communication relay programmes. Calculator app case:
relaying, and safe houses for between active militants and J&K Police identified Tier 2 OGWs by
active militants. external handlers (Pakistan-based). tracing encrypted communication
patterns.

Internal Security 47
 OGW Tier Who They Are What They Do Countermeasure

Tier 3: Community members who Shelter during security cordon Community outreach by security
Passive provide cover, food, and shelter operations; early warning when forces to distinguish willing
OGWs under a combination of security forces deploy in village; food collaborators from coerced
ideological sympathy, coercion, and supplies. Often motivated by participants; CAP (CRPF Civic Action
and financial incentive — often combination of genuine grievance, Programme) to build alternative social
unaware of the full extent of social pressure, and small financial bonds; de-radicalisation counselling;
their role in the network. payment. informant protection programmes.

Virtual Digital-only operators — social Online propaganda; recruitment via NIA cyber-cell tracking; NETRA
OGWs media accounts, encrypted social media platforms; digital keyword surveillance; I4C
(emerging) channel administrators, fundraising through cryptocurrency; coordination; IT Rules 2021
cryptocurrency fundraisers — real-time tactical intelligence relayed traceability orders for message
who perform OGW functions via encrypted apps; deepfake originators; FATF reporting on
entirely in cyberspace without content creation to inflame tensions. cryptocurrency terror financing.
physical presence in J&K.

7.3 Article 370 Abrogation

What Article 370 Provided

Asymmetric autonomy: J&K operated under a distinct constitutional framework — Parliament required state
government consent for all laws beyond defence, foreign affairs, finance, and communications. J&K had its own
constitution, PM, president, and flag.
Article 35A (1954 Presidential Order): Empowered J&K Assembly to define permanent residents — only
permanent residents could buy property, access scholarships, government employment, or settle permanently.
Women who married non-residents risked losing property rights (partially addressed by J&K HC, 2002).
Critics' argument: Opponents argued Art. 370 perpetuated a political economy of exclusion — preventing national
laws (RTI, SC/ST protections, RTE) from applying to J&K citizens and shielding a corrupt local political class from
accountability.

The Abrogation Process (August 5–6, 2019)

Step Action

Presidential Order President Ram Nath Kovind issued Constitution (Application to J&K) Order 2019 — superseding the
(Aug 5, 2019) 1954 Order; making all provisions of the Indian Constitution applicable to J&K. Legally used Article
370(1) itself to amend its own application.

Parliamentary Home Minister Amit Shah introduced resolution in Rajya Sabha recommending abrogation of most of
Resolution Article 370 — passed with majority. Opposition argued Rajya Sabha cannot act as a Constituent
Assembly; government argued existing Article 370(3) procedure was followed.

J&K Reorganisation Bifurcated J&K into two UTs: (i) Jammu & Kashmir (with Legislative Assembly) and (ii) Ladakh (without
Bill Legislative Assembly). Downgraded a full state to UT status — unprecedented in post-1947 India.

Presidential Order Declared all clauses of Article 370 inoperative except Clause 1 — completing the abrogation. J&K's
C.O. 273 (Aug 6, distinct constitutional status ceased to exist.
2019)

Supreme Court Five-judge Constitution Bench unanimously upheld abrogation. Key holdings: (1) Article 370 was
Verdict (December temporary by its own terms; (2) J&K's accession transferred sovereignty entirely to India — it never had
2023) internal sovereignty; (3) President had power to abrogate under Article 370(3). Directed restoration of
statehood 'at the earliest' and elections by September 30, 2024 (held, JKNC won).

Internal Security 48
Security & Development Impact

Dimension Before Abrogation (Pre-2019) After Abrogation (2019–2025)

Security 584 law & order disturbances (2019); 250 active 26 L&O disturbances (2022); ~100 active militants; 29
Metrics militants; 44 civilian deaths; 143 Kashmiri youth civilian deaths; 100 Kashmiri youth joining militants
joining militants annually. (2022). 95% reduction in civil unrest — but terror
attacks shifting to Jammu region.

Legal National laws (RTI, RTE, SC/ST (PoA) Act, Central All central laws now applicable. SC/ST reservations
Integration Service Rules) did not apply. Discriminatory laws extended. RTI applies. Women's property rights on par-
(women's property rights, non-resident exclusions) marriage strengthened. 890+ J&K laws reviewed; 138
legally entrenched. repealed, 167 amended.

Democratic State elections regularly manipulated or boycotted; DDC elections (2020): 51% voter turnout. 2024 Lok
Participation separatist calls for election boycotts widely heeded; Sabha: 58.46% — highest in decades. JKNC won 2024
turnout chronically below national average. Assembly elections; democratic process restored
under UT framework.

Economic PMDP 2015 (₹80,068 crore) launched but only NCSS industrial scheme (₹28,400 crore); J&K
Development 60% completed by 2019. Industrial investment Industrial Policy 2021–30; outside investors now able
deterred by Art. 35A land purchase restrictions. to purchase land. Tourism revenue rising — G20
Tourism disrupted by periodic unrest. meeting in Srinagar (2023) signalled normalcy.

Political Hurriyat controlled separatist political space; 12 Hurriyat-linked organisations renounced separatism
Contestation boycott of elections; Geelani faction openly anti- (2025). Geelani died (2021); mainstream Hurriyat
India. effectively dissolved. Separatism no longer electorally
significant in valley.

7.4 Winning Hearts & Minds

The 'Hearts and Minds' strategy is not a single programme but an ecosystem of targeted interventions calibrated to specific
communities whose alienation sustains the militant ecosystem. Organising by beneficiary group reveals both the coverage
and the gaps:

Beneficiary Group Key Initiatives Security Logic

At-Risk Youth Himayat Skill Development Programme; Youth unemployment is the primary recruitment
(Unemployment >18%, UDAAN Scheme (skill + corporate exposure); pathway. UDAAN's corporate placement model —
J&K 2023) SKEWPY (Sher-e-Kashmir Employment and exposing J&K youth to national companies —
Welfare Programme); Youth Volunteer creates economic stakes in Indian constitutional life
Programme (sports, de-addiction); Back to that counterweigh militant ideology. SKEWPY's
Village (B2V) direct government financial assistance attacks the economic incentive
engagement. for OGW Tier 3 participation directly.

Women (30% of AB-PMJAY-SEHAT universal health Women in J&K are simultaneously the most
population, coverage; Poshan Vatika; Mission information-rich population for intelligence (they
disproportionately Indradhanush immunisation; SHG formation observe OGW activity in households) and the most
vulnerable to OGW Tier under J&K Rural Livelihoods Mission; vulnerable to coercion (stone-pelting mob pressure,
3 coercion) Women Battalions (2 new battalions in J&K Tier 3 OGW shelter demands). Female police
Police — female officers with cultural access officers and SHG networks create alternative
to women's communities). community power structures that compete with
OGW social control.

Kashmiri Pandits & IDPs Prime Minister's Package (2008): 6,000 jobs KP displacement is both a humanitarian and a
(70,000+ displaced for KP youth in J&K; transit accommodations. security failure — it gave militancy a communal
families) Financial assistance to PoJK/Chhamb character, removed a moderating minority voice
displaced families (₹5.5 lakh to 36,384 from Valley society, and created a permanent
families; ₹1,452 crore disbursed since 2016). grievance constituency. KP reintegration is
Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (RDP) essential to restoring J&K's composite cultural
Scheme. character (Kashmiriyat) and removing the
communal dimension that Pakistani propaganda
exploits.

Internal Security 49
 Beneficiary Group Key Initiatives Security Logic

Border Communities Village Defence Groups (VDGs); subsidised Pir Panjal Valley communities experienced 28
(Pir Panjal Valley, helicopter services for remote area security force deaths in encounter operations
Poonch-Rajouri — new connectivity; Operation Sadbhavana (Indian (2023–24) — plus 3 civilian deaths and 5 injuries
militancy frontline) Army's socio-economic development initiative due to alleged Army torture (NHRC complaint). This
in remote areas); CAPF Civic Action combination of militant activity and security force
Programme (10,430+ events). excess creates a compound alienation uniquely
resistant to Hearts and Minds approaches. VDGs
provide alternative community security frameworks.

School-Age Children School Outreach Programme (SOP): The School Outreach Programme targets
(Future generation — interactive sessions, cultural programmes, radicalisation at Phase 1 of the funnel — before
primary prevention) education on constitutional values; Eklavya digital platforms complete the process. Radio
Model Residential Schools; Radio Sharda Sharda and cultural programmes counter the IS-
(community radio broadcasting in Kashmiri generated narrative that Kashmiri identity is
and Dogri — promoting local culture); Watan incompatible with Indian citizenship by making
Ko Jano Programme (J&K youth tours of Kashmiriyat the cultural bridge between J&K and
India). India.

7.5 Security Architecture for J&K

Measure Description Recent Evidence

UAPA 2019 Individual terrorist designation; asset seizure; NIA used UAPA 2019 powers to designate TRF as
Amendments extended detention powers. In J&K: highest UAPA terrorist organisation and charge its operatives for
caseload in India — 371 cases (2022). Enables Pahalgam attack within 72 hours (April 2025).
freezing of OGW financial networks without requiring
criminal conviction.

Operation All Targeted counter-militancy campaign by security 83% of militants eliminated 2019–2022 were local
Out forces — intelligence-led rather than cordon-and- Kashmiri youth — but 43% of those killed in 2022
search. Reduced active militant count from 250 (end- were foreign nationals, signalling PLGA-equivalent
2019) to ~100 (end-2022). Specifically targeted replenishment from Pakistani training camps.
militant commanders to disrupt organisational
continuity.

New Police 5 India Reserve Battalions + 2 Border Battalions + 2 Women Battalions operationalised 2023 — deployed
Battalions Women Battalions approved for J&K Police. Local in Sopore and Shopian districts with documented
police ownership of security — mirroring the logic of improvement in female informant willingness to
Bastariya Battalion in LWE. Women Battalions share intelligence.
specifically for female community engagement.

Village Defence Local community involvement in their own protection VDGs credited with early warning of 3 infiltration
Groups (VDGs) — community members trained and armed under attempts in Poonch-Rajouri sector (2024) —
supervision of district police. Particularly relevant for intelligence unavailable to security forces without
Pir Panjal Valley communities facing combined local community partnership.
militant and security force threat.

SRE Scheme Security Related Expenditure Scheme: reimburses ₹4,200 crore disbursed under SRE for J&K since
J&K for CAPF logistics, SPO costs, and rehabilitation 2019 — covers logistics, training, and ex-gratia
of displaced persons — removing the financial payments that would otherwise strain the UT's
deterrent for robust security deployment. limited revenue.

Post-Pahalgam India's first published 'comprehensive response TRF retracted its second claim of responsibility
Response matrix': IWT suspension; Pakistani diplomat within 72 hours of Op Sindoor strikes —
expulsion; Wagah closure; MFN suspension; demonstrating deterrence effect. Pakistan-based
Operation Sindoor (9 sites struck in Pakistan/PoJK). militant handlers reportedly advised J&K cadres to
Established that proxy terrorism triggers sovereign- reduce operations temporarily (intelligence
level response. assessment, May 2025).

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 7.6 Way Forward

Kashmiri Pandits and Displaced Families

Bring back over 70,000 displaced Pandit families with real security, jobs, and homes near their original villages.

The 2008 Prime Minister's Package gave 6,000 jobs and transit housing, but the 2022 targeted killings halted returns—
ground-level safety is the missing piece.

Sufism and Kashmiriyat Revival

Promote the region's syncretic culture—Sufi shrines, folk music, and shared festivals—as the real counter to extremist
narratives.

Reform the Waqf Board so syncretic scholars lead, building on the 2023 G20 meeting in Srinagar and the revival of Radio
Sharda.

Address Legal Cases

Set up dedicated fast-track courts in Srinagar and Jammu to cut the current 8–12-year wait from filing to conviction.
The National Investigation Agency's 94% conviction rate (2024) is strong, but justice is too slow to deter new recruits.

Media and Narrative

Counter Pakistan-generated propaganda in real time through Press Information Bureau, Doordarshan Kashir, and Radio
Sharda—PIB debunked 17 false claims during Operation Sindoor (2025).
Build dedicated Kashmiri-language content creators on social media, not just Hindi-language official accounts.

Humane Counter-Terror Operations

Apply the minimum-force principle of the D.S. Hooda Doctrine and make civilian protection a non-negotiable rule.
Phase out the Armed Forces Special Powers Act further, and ensure honest accountability for incidents like the 2023
Poonch–Rajouri civilian deaths.

Issues and Grievances — Political Track

Restore full statehood as the Supreme Court directed — political representation is the strongest signal that democracy
beats separatism.
Engage all elected parties in a Development and Reconciliation Council; elections were held in 2024, but statehood
restoration remains pending.

Rehabilitation and Economy

Continue surrender-and-rehabilitation schemes alongside the Prime Minister's Development Package and the Industrial
Policy 2021–30, while growing tourism, handicrafts, and the IT sector.
The UDAAN scheme has placed over 40,000 local youth in national companies — next, attract genuine private-sector
investment, not just government infrastructure spending.

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 8 North-East Insurgency

The eight states of the Northeast—celebrated as India’s ‘Ashtalakshmi’ for their plural cultures and frontier importance—
have also been the country’s longest-running theater of armed insurgency. Since the Naga revolt of the 1950s, the region
has cycled through demands for secession, statehood, and ethnic autonomy, sustained by a combination of geographic
isolation, contested identity, demographic anxiety, and cross-border sanctuary.
The trajectory has been broadly de-escalatory: the Mizo Accord (1986) remains India’s most successful insurgency
settlement, and Tripura, Mizoram, and much of Assam have stabilised through accords and development.
Yet residual militancy in Manipur and Nagaland, the 2023 Manipur ethnic crisis, and post-coup spillover from Myanmar
show that the underlying grievances — indigenous identity, uneven development, and porous frontiers — are managed
rather than resolved.

8.1 Evolution of Insurgency — Four Phases

The region’s armed movements did not arise together; they unfolded in distinct waves, each shaped by a different driver.
Reading them as phases clarifies why settlements that worked in one era (Mizoram) did not transplant to others (Manipur).

Phase Period Defining Feature

Pioneer Revolt 1947–60s Naga National Council declares independence (1947); Mizo uprising (1966) over the Mautam
famine and Assam’s neglect. State responds with force plus promise of statehood.

Proliferation 1970s–80s ULFA founded in Assam (1979); demands shift from secession to ethnic sovereignty and
resource control; economic neglect feeds new outfits.

Cross-Border 1990s– Smaller groups multiply; Myanmar/Bangladesh sanctuaries become decisive; ceasefires begin
Era 2000s (NSCN-IM, 1997) even as violence continues.

Managed 2010s– Accords (Bodo 2020) and development cut violence sharply; residual militancy persists in
Decline present Manipur and Nagaland; 2023 Manipur ethnic crisis reopens fault lines.

8.2 Why Armed Insurgency Has Survived

Survival Factor Mechanism (why it endures)

Ethnic Identity Assertion Over 200 tribes resist assimilation; identity is non-negotiable, so settlements that offer
development but not recognition fail to demobilise cadres. (e.g., NSCN-IM’s “Greater Nagalim”
claim).

External Sanctuary Cross-border bases in Myanmar and (historically) Bangladesh let groups regroup after military
pressure — survival depends on a rear base the Indian state cannot easily reach.

Governance & Trust Deficit Corruption, slow justice, and slow accord implementation keep the ‘durable disorder’ (Baruah)
alive; each unmet promise revalidates the insurgent narrative.

Economic Low per-capita income and unemployment supply a steady recruitment pool; insurgency becomes
Underdevelopment an economy (extortion of oil, tea, contracts) that funds its own continuation.

Political Alienation & Perceived neglect and top-down decision-making (e.g., delimitation fears) renew separatist
Centralisation sentiment faster than accords can absorb it.

8.3 State-wise Theatres — Consolidated Matrix

Rather than nine separate profiles, the theatres are best revised as one comparative matrix: it exposes the pattern—
insurgency intensity tracks ethnic fragmentation and border proximity and accords work where a single dominant identity
could be negotiated with.

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 State Key Groups Core Driver Status / Decisive Measure

Assam ULFA, NDFB, KLNLF Migration anxiety, Bodo ethnic Pro-talks ULFA accord (Dec 2023); Bodo Peace
strife, underdevelopment Accord (2020); Operation Bajrang/Rhino. ULFA-I
(Paresh Baruah) still active.

Nagaland NSCN-IM / NSCN-K Naga nationalism, “Greater Ceasefire since 1997; 2015 Framework Agreement;
Nagalim”, Myanmar backing flag/territory issues unresolved.

Manipur Meitei (UNLF, PLA), Ethnic rivalry + Indo-Myanmar Most violent (77% of NE incidents, 2023); 2023 Meitei–
Kuki-Zomi, Naga drug/arms route Kuki crisis; AFSPA + SAMADHAN.

Tripura NLFT, ATTF Tribal displacement by Bengali Largely resolved — Tripura Peace Accord (1993);
migration GatiShakti connectivity.

Meghalaya GNLA, HNLC Tribal unemployment, Garo Hills Low-intensity; Civic Action + ROSHNI skilling.
governance gaps

Mizoram HPC-D (minor) 1966 famine legacy; residual Model case — Mizo Accord (1986) ended insurgency;
Hmar demands MNF mainstreamed.

Arunachal NSCN/ULFA spillover Indo-Myanmar proximity, Minimal; BRO infrastructure + ITBP border
remote underdevelopment management.

Sikkim None Stable governance, ethnic Insurgency-free; tourism-led stability.

harmony

8.4 Manipur Violence 2023

Manipur 2023: a long-standing structural fault line, a legal trigger, and an escalation the state could not contain.

Dimension Crisp Detail

Structural Fault Valley Meiteis (~60%, mostly Hindu, politically dominant) vs hill Kuki-Zomi & Naga (mostly Christian);
Line colonial land/identity demarcations.

Trigger Manipur HC order (Apr 2023) to expedite Meitei Scheduled Tribe status → tribal fears over land &
reservation → violent Tribal Solidarity March.

Aggravators Eviction drives in “illegal” Kuki forest villages; targeted drug crackdown perceived as ethnic; Myanmar
refugee influx; disputed delimitation.

Outcome 250+ deaths, 70,000+ displaced; CAPF deployment failed to halt militia clashes; deep communal trust
deficit.

Normalisation Impartial law enforcement; inclusive dialogue with tribal councils; tribal health/education/infrastructure parity;
Path cultural trust-building.

8.5 India–Myanmar Border Challenges & Counters

The 1,643 km Indo-Myanmar frontier (Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram) is the hinge of NE insurgency.

Challenge Why It Matters Government Counter-Measure

FMR misuse 16-km visa-free movement, meant for tribal kinship, FMR suspended in Manipur (2023); termination
exploited by insurgents & traffickers + fencing initiated (2024–25)

Cross-border NSCN-K, ULFA-I, PLA regroup in Myanmar camps Operation Sunrise I & II (2019–20) with
insurgent sanctuary Myanmar army; Assam Rifles lead

Narco-trafficking Proximity to Golden Triangle → heroin/Yaba + Drone/thermal surveillance in Chandel, Ukhrul,

narco-insurgency nexus Champhai; ICP Moreh upgrade

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 Challenge Why It Matters Government Counter-Measure

Post-coup refugee Chin/Kuki influx since 2021 coup → humanitarian- MHA biometric registration SOPs (2021–22);
influx security dilemma state-level documentation

Weak institutional Remote terrain, thin SSB/Assam Rifles cover, BADP/BIM roads & helipads; force
presence governance vacuum modernisation (UAVs, GPS)

Cross-Border Counter-Insurgency Operations

Operation Theatre & Partners Strategic Outcome

Operation All Clear Royal Bhutan Army action against ULFA, Dismantled 30+ insurgent camps; broke the
(December 2003) NDFB, and KLO camps inside Bhutanese Bhutanese sanctuary that had sustained Assam
territory — first sustained military operation by insurgency for two decades; landmark in India–
Bhutan against Indian insurgents. Bhutan security partnership.

Operation Sunrise Joint coordinated India–Myanmar Army Disrupted insurgent supply lines through the Sagaing
(February 2019; operation along the international border; region; cemented the operational template for
Phase 2 in 2020) targeted camps of NSCN-K, ULFA-I, and periodic cross-border CI cooperation with Myanmar,
Manipuri valley-based groups. even amid post-2021 instability there.

8.6 AFSPA Act, 1958 — The Apex Court View

Sections Activists Oppose

Section 4 — empowers even a non-commissioned officer to use force “to the extent of causing death” against a
person violating prohibitory orders; criticised as licence for excessive force.
Section 6 — bars prosecution of armed forces personnel without prior Central Government sanction; criticised as an
immunity shield producing impunity.
Section 3 — “disturbed area” declaration with limited judicial review; criticised as enabling indefinite, unaccountable
application.

Judicial & Committee Position

Supreme Court — in Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997), upheld AFSPA’s
constitutionality but read in safeguards: minimum force, the Army’s “Do’s and Don’ts” made binding, and prompt
handover of detainees to civil police.
Jeevan Reddy Committee (2004) — recommended outright repeal of AFSPA, with necessary powers folded into the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act instead.
Santosh Hegde / Supreme Court (2016, Manipur) — held that there can be no blanket immunity; allegations of
excessive or retaliatory force are subject to judicial scrutiny even in disturbed areas.

Note:
Argue the requirement of AFSPA pragmatically: courts have not struck it down because cross-border-supported
insurgency needs operational latitude — but the same courts insist accountability is non-negotiable. The defensible
position is calibrated retention with judicial oversight and phased withdrawal as normalcy returns (as done
progressively in Tripura, Meghalaya, parts of Assam/Nagaland).

EEVFAM v. Union of India (2016)

Supreme Court (2016) — in Extra Judicial Execution Victims' Families Association (EEVFAM) v. Union of India, the
SC ordered a CBI-monitored probe into 1,528 alleged extra-judicial killings in Manipur between 2000 and 2012 by
Army, Assam Rifles, and Manipur Police personnel operating under AFSPA cover.
Doctrinal advance — the Court held that the use of 'excessive or retaliatory force' is not protected by AFSPA, and
that allegations of fake encounters must be investigated regardless of where they occurred or who the victim was —
narrowing the de facto immunity that Section 6 had produced.

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 Significance — EEVFAM is the most consequential AFSPA judgement after NPMHR (1997) and signals judicial
willingness to read Article 21 (right to life) into AFSPA's operation; a recurring talking point in any AFSPA reform
debate.

8.7 Peace Accords & Agreements

Year Accord / Agreement What It Settled

1986 Mizo Accord Statehood for Mizoram; MNF surrender — the benchmark
success.

1993 Tripura Peace Accord (NLFT/ATTF track) Tribal aspirations addressed; militancy largely ended.

2015 Naga Framework Agreement (NSCN-IM) Political framework for Naga settlement; flag & territory
issues still open.

2020 Bodo Peace Accord (3rd) NDFB factions disband; Bodoland Territorial Region
powers expanded.

2021 Karbi Anglong Agreement (Assam) Six Karbi militant groups disband; autonomy &
development package.

2022 Adivasi Peace Accord (Assam) 8 tea-tribe militant groups join mainstream; rehabilitation.

2023 Pro-talks ULFA Accord (Assam) ULFA pro-talks faction signs with Centre & state; ULFA-I
stays out.

2024 Termination of Free Movement Regime (FMR) + fencing Border-management hardening to choke insurgent mobility.
(Indo-Myanmar)

Challenges to the Peace Process

Pair the accord-map with the live challenges: (i) unresolved core demands (Naga flag/territory; ULFA-I holdout); (ii)
ethnic over-fragmentation (Manipur — no single counterpart to negotiate); (iii) cross-border sanctuary persisting post-
Myanmar coup; (iv) slow implementation eroding trust; (v) overlapping territorial claims between settled and unsettled
groups.

ULFA Peace Accord (2024)

Background
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) founded 1979 — demanded sovereign Assam; waged armed insurgency for 4+
decades
Split in 2012: ULFA (Pro-Talks) led by Arabinda Rajkhowa vs. ULFA (Independent) led by Paresh Baruah (still active,
based in Myanmar)
Peace Accord signed December 2023 (announced/operationalised 2024) between GoI, Assam government, and ULFA
(Pro-Talks)

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Key Provisions

Cadres to surrender arms and enter rehabilitation programme

Development package for Assam — infrastructure, employment, tribal welfare

Cultural and linguistic protections for Assamese identity

Reintegration of ex-militants into mainstream society

Significance for Internal Security

End of prolonged insurgency: Closes a 45-year chapter of militancy — reduces violence, IED threats, and ambushes in
Assam
Rehabilitation dividend: ~6,000+ cadres absorbed — prevents re-radicalisation and recruitment into other outfits
Intelligence windfall: Surrendered cadres provide actionable intelligence on sleeper networks, arms caches, and cross-
border linkages
Domino effect: Signals to other NE insurgent groups (NSCN factions, Bodo remnants) that negotiated settlement is viable
Border security: Weakens ULFA(I)'s recruitment base inside Assam; isolates Paresh Baruah's Myanmar faction further

Democratic consolidation: Reduces parallel governance structures that insurgents operated in rural Assam

Limitations / Unresolved Issues

ULFA(I) remains active — Paresh Baruah refused to participate; cross-border strikes remain a threat

Myanmar instability post-2021 coup complicates pressure on ULFA(I) sanctuaries

Rehabilitation success depends on sustained economic follow-through — past accords (Bodo, 2020) show implementation
gaps
Underlying grievances (land rights, Bengali immigration, identity anxiety) not fully addressed

Way Forward
Accord's durability hinges on: (a) swift rehabilitation with livelihood support, (b) coordinated Army–CRPF–state police
pressure on ULFA(I), and (c) addressing Assamese identity concerns through cultural safeguards — converting a security
dividend into a lasting peace.

8.8 Impacts of NE Insurgency

Impact Crisp Substantiation

Human cost 250+ deaths & 70,000+ displaced in Manipur 2023; cyclical trauma.

Economic loss Stalled projects (66 MW Loktak delayed to 2026–27); diverted funds; deterred investment.

Social fracture Ethnic riots erode cohesion — Bodo–Assamese 2012 displaced ~4 lakh in Kokrajhar.

Political instability Insurgent disruption weakens governance & emboldens separatist narratives.

Security strain CAPF over-stretch; narco-arms smuggling compounds the burden (Manipur = 77% of 2023 NE violence).

DNLA Peace Agreement

Accord Signatories & Provisions Significance

DNLA Peace Government of India, Government of Assam, and Closes one of Assam's longest-running tribal
Agreement the Dimasa National Liberation Army — laying down insurgencies; sets a template repeated in the 2024
(April 2023) arms, joining the political mainstream, ₹1,000 crore ULFA Accord; consistent with the 'first peace, then
special development package over five years for development' sequencing visible across Bodo, Karbi
Dima Hasao district. and now Dimasa settlements.

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 8.9 EAST Framework

The EAST framework synthesises the security-development convergence required for India's 21st-century threat
landscape — particularly for addressing insurgencies and internal security challenges where force alone is demonstrably
insufficient:

Letter Pillar Strategic Recommendation

E Empower Local Decentralise security and development responsibilities to district administration, Panchayati Raj
Governance Institutions, and autonomous tribal councils — closing the governance vacuum that insurgent
groups exploit.

A Act on Root Causes Combine targeted security operations with parallel delivery of rights, entitlements, and livelihood
opportunities — addressing the developmental deficit that fuels recruitment.

S Strengthen Borders & Modernise border infrastructure (CIBMS, smart fencing, Vibrant Villages Programme); achieve
Intelligence full NATGRID interoperability; expand MAC real-time coordination capacity.

T Transform the Complete theaterisation; publish a formal NSS; integrate cyber, space, and grey-zone
Security Architecture capabilities into a unified national security framework; align Aatmanirbhar Bharat with defence
indigenisation.

8.10 Way Forward

Government strategy is now articulated through the EAST framework — Empower, Act, Strengthen, Transform —
operationalising the “Act East, Act Fast, Act First” mantra. The durable solution combines security realism with political and
economic inclusion:
Legal & rights reform — phased AFSPA withdrawal with accountability, echoing the Jeevan Reddy Committee and
the 1997 / 2016 Supreme Court safeguards.
Inclusive political dialogue — revive stalled tracks (Naga flag/territory; ULFA-I) using the Mizo Accord template of
negotiating with a credible single counterpart.
Decentralized governance—strengthen Autonomous District Councils and Sixth Schedule bodies (per the 2nd ARC
and the Tripura ADC model) to absorb identity demands constitutionally.
Socio-economic integration—accelerate PM-DevINE, Act East connectivity (India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway), and
infrastructure (AIIMS Guwahati) to dissolve the conflict economy.
Community-centric counter-insurgency—"clear-hold-build" with minimum force and cultural sensitivity; M.P.
Bezbaruah’s call for “emotional integration” and people-centric policy for lasting peace.

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 9 Separatist Movements in India

Separatism is the demand for autonomy or outright secession driven by ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic or historical
grievance. Unlike ordinary protest, it contests the legitimacy of the state itself — which is why K.P.S. Gill’s observation that
“insurgency is not merely a military problem; it is a political failure” frames the chapter: durable settlement has always
come from political accommodation, not force alone.
India’s record — from the Mizo Accord to the dormancy of Khalistan — shows that calibrated hard power buys time, but
inclusive governance, grassroots reconciliation and constitutional outreach are what actually dissolve secessionist energy.

9.1 Why Separatism Arises

The five drivers rarely act alone; separatism ignites where a grievance overlaps with an identity marker and finds an
external sponsor. The grid below shows the driver and the structural condition that converts grievance into a secessionist
demand.

Driver Condition That Converts Grievance into Secession

Historical legacy Contested accession or partition wound left unresolved — e.g., Kashmir’s 1947 accession dispute keeps
a sovereignty narrative alive.

Ethnic / linguistic A culturally distinct group fears assimilation — Naga, Mizo, Bodo self-governance demands.
identity

Religious sentiment Identity framed as under threat — Khalistan; the religious dimension of Kashmiri separatism.

Political alienation Weak local representation + centralisation — NE demands for Article 371 / special status.

External influence Foreign sponsorship turns dissent into armed movement — Pakistan’s ISI in Kashmir and Punjab;
alleged China–NE linkages.

9.2 Khalistan Movement

The Khalistan movement is best revised as a lifecycle rather than scattered cause/measure lists: it shows the classic arc
— political demand turning violent, suppressed by hard power, then resurfacing as diaspora-driven propaganda.

Phase Period Crisp Detail

Roots 1920s–70s Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973) sought greater Punjab autonomy; later read as a separatist
call.

Peak militancy 1980s Bhindranwale’s “Sikh pride” mobilisation; Babbar Khalsa violence; Operation Blue Star (1984)
alienated moderates.

Decline 1990s– Punjab Police under K.P.S. Gill + TADA/UAPA crushed militancy; Rajiv–Longowal Accord
2000s (1985) addressed autonomy.

Diaspora 2010s– SFJ’s “Referendum 2020”; Amritpal Singh’s arrest (2023); Canada-based events strain
revival present diplomacy.

Causes
Perceived marginalisation — 1966 reorganisation; Chandigarh denied as sole capital.
Religious identity assertion + agrarian distress — uneven Green Revolution gains, 1970s–80s farmer indebtedness.
Diaspora + cross-border role — Canada/UK/US funding; ISI arms-training in the 1980s.
State response — Operation Blue Star (1984) and anti-Sikh riots escalated militancy.

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Government Response & Current Status
Counter-insurgency + legislation — Operations Blue Star/Black Thunder; TADA/UAPA (criticised for rights abuses).
Political + reconciliation — Rajiv–Longowal Accord (1985); PM Manmohan Singh’s 2005 apology for the 1984 riots.
Current status — Militancy dormant in India; threat is diaspora propaganda + arms/drone smuggling (BSF seized 294
drones in Punjab, 2024); India–Canada diplomatic strain.

9.3 Jammu & Kashmir Separatism

Aspect Crisp Detail

Origin & Began 1989 after rigged 1987 elections → political alienation; 1947 accession dispute, economic neglect,
reason radicalisation, Pakistani support; 1990 Pandit exodus deepened communal fracture.

Objective Spectrum — greater autonomy / self-determination / independence / merger with Pakistan; driven by religious
identity, historical claims, external propaganda.

Key events 1989 JKLF insurgency & ~90,000 Pandit exodus · 1999 Kargil · 2016 Burhan Wani · 2019 Article 370 abrogation ·
2025 Pahalgam attack.

Current Militancy at decade-low via Operation All Out; in 2025, 12 Hurriyat-linked outfits (incl. J&K Mass Movement)
status renounced separatism and pledged allegiance to the Constitution.

9.4 Other Separatist Movements

The remaining movements are revisable as one matrix — it shows the decisive pattern: secessionism mainstreams when a
single negotiable counterpart and a credible accord exist (Mizoram), and stays dormant or defunct when the demand loses
social base (Dravida Nadu, Taniland).

Movement Objective Key Events & Current Status

Dravida Sovereign Dravidian homeland 1938 Justice Party resolution; Periyar’s DK; 1962 DMK drops separatism;
Nadu (TN, Kerala, AP, Karnataka) 1963 anti-Hindi protests. Defunct — shifted to federal autonomy & Tamil
identity.

Nagalim “Greater Nagalim” across NE & NNC declares independence 1946; Shillong Accord (1975) rejected;
(NSCN) Myanmar ceasefire 1997; 2015 Framework Agreement. Ceasefire holds; flag/territory
unresolved.

Mizo (MNF) Independent Mizoram → 1959 Mautam famine + neglect; 1966 uprising (‘Operation Jericho’); 1986
statehood Mizo Accord. Resolved — MNF a mainstream party (benchmark success).

ULFA Sovereign socialist Assam Founded 1979; Operations Bajrang/Rhino; SULFA split 1992; 2023 pro-
(Assam) talks accord. Pro-talks faction settled; ULFA-I (Paresh Baruah) banned 5
more yrs (2024).

Taniland Separate Taniland for Tani tribes Extortion/abductions; minimal support; 2010 police crackdown. Defunct
(NLCT) (Arunachal/Assam) since 2010 — no active insurgency.

9.5 Radicalism in a Multi-Religious Society

How Neighbourhood Radicalism Penetrates

Cross-border sponsorship — ISI patronage of separatist/terror outfits in Kashmir and Punjab; alleged China–NE
linkages.
Digital indoctrination — transnational propaganda (ISIS-type, pro-Khalistan SFJ) targets alienated youth via social
media.
Diaspora amplification — overseas networks fund and globalise separatist narratives (Referendum 2020, UK-
Kashmiri groups).

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 Identity-grievance fusion — ethnic/religious cleavages weaponised where development and representation are
perceived as deficient.

Counter-Strategy
Constitutional accommodation — Article 371, Sixth Schedule, autonomy accords absorb identity demands within the
Union.
Counter-radicalisation — de-radicalisation + counter-narrative campaigns (Kerala model); engage credible
community leaders (SGPC, civil society).
Socio-economic inclusion — jobs, skilling and connectivity (PM-DevINE, Aspirational Districts) to deny the grievance
base.
Diplomatic & security pressure — FATF advocacy against Pakistan; regulate diaspora activity; secure borders
against arms/drone flows.

9.6 Impacts of Separatist Movements

Impact Crisp Substantiation

State sovereignty Prolonged AFSPA in J&K; Naga Framework talks strained — Paul Staniland’s “insurgent cohesion”
eroded explains prolonged instability.

Governance paralysis Resources diverted to counter-insurgency; J&K statehood restoration delayed post-2019 — relative
deprivation theory.

Fractured social Meitei–Kuki violence (2023) — 60,000+ displaced; Ashutosh Varshney’s “ethnic conflict” framework.
cohesion

Youth radicalisation Digital separatist propaganda — Happymon Jacob’s “new-age militancy” in J&K; pro-Khalistan
campaigns.

Economic stagnation Kashmir tourism slump post-2016; ULFA stalled Assam industry (1990s–2000s).

Internal-security threat Cross-border terror + hybrid warfare — Pulwama 2019 (40 CRPF killed); Staniland’s “networks of
rebellion.”

9.7 Government’s Counter-Separatism Strategy

Effective counter-separatism is a calibrated mix of hard power (security operations, border management) and soft power
(dialogue, economic inclusion) — with the Mizo Accord as proof that the soft track delivers durable settlement.

Approach Instrument & Example

Security-based Counter-insurgency under AFSPA — Operation Bluebird (1987, Nagaland); Operation All Out (J&K,
2017–20).

Political engagement Accords — Mizo (1986), Bodo (2020), ongoing Naga Framework (2015).

Constitutional Deradicalisation outreach — J&K Mass Movement (2025): 12 Hurriyat-linked groups pledge
reconciliation allegiance to the Constitution.

Constitutional Article 371A (Nagaland customary law); 6th Schedule tribal councils (Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura,
safeguards Mizoram).

Development-oriented DoNER + PM-GatiShakti + PM-DevINE; NER Vision 2020 — bridge underdevelopment driving
separatism.

Rehabilitation Surrender-cum-rehabilitation — Mizoram returnees post-1986; CRPF vocational programmes in

Naxal areas.

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 9.8 Way Forward

Economic & governance reform — address agrarian distress (Punjab) and underdevelopment (NE/J&K); transparent
governance and expedited demands (e.g., Chandigarh to Punjab).
Inclusive dialogue — engage credible community leadership and moderates (SGPC; Naga interlocutors), using the
Mizo Accord template of a single negotiable counterpart.
Counter-radicalisation — online/offline counter-propaganda and youth engagement (Mission Pehal-type
programmes); interfaith and educational integration.
Border & diplomatic action — choke arms/drone smuggling; FATF pressure on Pakistan; regulate diaspora
extremism with Canada/UK.
Constitutional outreach — deepen Article 371 / Sixth Schedule autonomy so identity is accommodated within, not
against, the Union — the substance of “Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat”.

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 10 Terrorism in India

Terrorism is the calculated use, or threat, of violence against non-combatants to coerce a government or society towards
political, ideological or religious ends. It is defined by the deliberate targeting of civilians to instil fear and broadcast a
message.
India confronts it in an unusually layered form — cross-border jihadist terror (LeT, JeM, TRF), ethno-separatist militancy
(NE, Khalistan), Left-Wing Extremism, and digitally self-radicalised lone wolves — which is precisely why a single uniform
counter-strategy is impossible and region-specific responses are unavoidable.
The contemporary marker is the Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025), in which The Resistance Front (an LeT offshoot) killed
26 civilians in Baisaran meadow after segregating them by religion — the trigger for Operation Sindoor.

10.1 Types of Terrorism

Type Defining Trait Illustrative Example

Ethno- Violence to demand autonomy or a separate NSCN “Greater Nagalim”; Khalistan movement in
Nationalist state Punjab

Religious Violence for theocratic / faith-based objectives ISIL-inspired modules; LeT/JeM jihadist attacks

State-Sponsored Govt-backed violence to destabilise another Pakistan/ISI sponsorship of LeT for 26/11
nation

Ideology- Left- or right-wing extremist political ends CPI (Maoist) Left-Wing Extremism in the Red Corridor
Oriented

Bio-Terrorism Biological agents deployed to terrorise Global anthrax-type threats; potential pandemic-vector
populations misuse

Cyber-Terrorism Digital attacks to disrupt critical systems & APT36 cyber-espionage post-Pahalgam on defence
spread fear personnel

Narco-Terrorism Drug-trade proceeds finance terror operations ISI using Afghan drug money for the J&K proxy war

Lone-Wolf Self-radicalised individuals act independently Hyderabad youth (2017) arrested for ISIS-module links

10.2 Manifestation of Terrorism in India

India’s terrorism manifests across five concurrent theatres, each with distinct actors and tactics:
Cross-border jihadist terror (J&K) — infiltration-fed attacks by LeT/JeM and fronts like TRF — Pahalgam 2025 (26
killed), Reasi bus attack 2024 (9 pilgrims killed, 41 injured), Pulwama 2019 (40 CRPF), Uri 2016, Pathankot 2016.
Hinterland / urban terror — mass-casualty strikes on cities — 26/11 Mumbai (160+ killed), 2006 Mumbai train
bombings, 1993 Bombay blasts, 2013 Hyderabad blasts.
Left-Wing Extremism — Maoist armed rebellion in tribal districts (Karreguttalu Hills operation, 2025 — 31 Maoists
neutralised).
North-East & separatist militancy — ethno-nationalist insurgency (NSCN, ULFA-I) and Khalistan revival (SFJ
Referendum 2020).
Digital / lone-wolf radicalisation — ISIS-inspired self-activation — Hyderabad youth (2017), Kannur NIA arrests
(2021).

State counter-response: Operation Sindoor (2025) precision strikes on terror infrastructure; NIA-led investigation; UAPA
designations; CIBMS smart-border grid; anti-drone systems; NMFT-aligned finance choke; de-radicalisation and
community engagement.

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 Indian Mujahideen (IM) — The Homegrown Hinterland Threat
Indigenous Islamist outfit that emerged out of SIMI (Students' Islamic Movement of India) cadres in 2008; first
claimed identity in serial blasts at Jaipur (May 2008, 63 killed).
Responsible for the 2008 serial blast wave across multiple cities — Ahmedabad (26 July 2008, 56 killed), Delhi
(13 September 2008, 33 killed), Bengaluru (July 2008), and the 2010 Pune German Bakery blast (17 killed).
Banned under UAPA in 2010; designated a terrorist organisation by the US, UK, and India. Yasin Bhatkal
(operational chief) arrested at the India–Nepal border in 2013 — exposing the open-border vulnerability flagged
in your Ch 14.
Strategic relevance: IM demonstrates that India's terrorism threat is not only cross-border — homegrown
radicalisation, often catalysed by online jihadist content (your Ch 4 funnel) and communal grievance, is the
second axis.

10.3 Causes of Terrorism in India

Cause Mechanism Worked Example

Governance loss Weak legitimacy & corruption breed militancy — Rigged 1987 J&K elections → militant groups; weak
Ajai Sahni Manipur governance 2023 → violence

Autonomy demand Separatist escalation into terror — Happymon Naga “Greater Nagalim”; Khalistan since the 1980s
Jacob

Ethno-religious Identity clashes radicalise; social media amplifies Meitei–Kuki clashes 2023; 1992 Babri demolition →
polarisation — Ashutosh Varshney communal riots

Socio-economic Deprivation breeds dissent — Amartya Sen, Chhattisgarh tribal youth → Naxal cadres; J&K high
disparity “development as freedom” unemployment → militant outfits

Resource Land alienation without local benefit — Sanjib Odisha mining → Maoist attacks; Jharkhand land
exploitation Baruah, “extractive economies” disputes → Naxal rebellion

Cross-border External patronage strengthens networks — Paul Pulwama 2019 by Pakistan-backed LeT (40 CRPF
support Staniland, “networks of rebellion” killed); ISI-backed Khalistani groups

Diaspora Overseas networks fund & globalise extremism SFJ Referendum 2020; UK-based Kashmiri groups
radicalisation — transnational-terrorism scholarship funding separatism since the 2010s

10.4 Terrorism as a ‘Competitive Industry’

This abstract 2016 statement needs an economics-of-conflict reading, not a generic terrorism essay. Terror outfits
increasingly behave like firms competing in a market:
Product differentiation — outfits compete for relevance through spectacular attacks; TRF claimed Pahalgam twice to
assert primacy over rival fronts.
Revenue diversification — a financing ‘portfolio’ — zakat diversion, hawala, FICN, narco-money, charity fronts, crypto
crowdfunding — hedges against any one source being choked.
Recruitment market — digital indoctrination is ‘marketing’; youth unemployment in conflict zones is the ‘labour supply’
(Kashmir, Bastar).
Mergers & franchising — ISIS-style global franchising; LeT–TRF fronting; crime-terror joint ventures (D-Company).
Competition for sponsors — groups vie for ISI / state patronage and diaspora funding, much like firms competing for
investors.

Strategic implication: counter-terrorism must attack the ‘business model’ — choke financing, disrupt the recruitment
market, and degrade the sponsor — not merely neutralise cadres, who are a renewable input.

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 10.5 Terror Financing

Terror financing is the raising, moving and use of money for terror — from legitimate sources (zakat, business profits,
salaries) and illegitimate ones (narcotics, kidnapping).

Sources of Terror Financing

Source How It Works Example

Zakat diversion Religious alms diverted by extremist groups, Part of zakat in/around India diverted to LeT & Hizbul
exploiting community trust Mujahideen

Hawala Quick, secretive informal value transfer beyond Hawala networks funded the 1993 Bombay bombings
banking trails

Charities / NGOs Banned fronts collecting funds under humanitarian Jamaat-ud-Dawa engaged in terror financing
cover

Diaspora Gulf-routed clandestine funding via sympathisers Former SIMI/IM cadres linked to Gulf financiers;
remittances Kerala flagged

FICN High-quality fake notes smuggled in to fund FICN printed in Pakistan, routed via Bangladesh,
logistics & destabilise economy used by LeT/KCF/HuJI

Narco-finance Narcotics proceeds funnelled through cross-border ISI uses Afghan drug money for the J&K proxy war;
routes Punjab drug-terror nexus

State Foreign intelligence directly funds/trains/equips ISI funding of LeT for 26/11 — confirmed by David
sponsorship outfits Headley’s interrogation

Organised crime Syndicate proceeds (arms/smuggling) channelled Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company financed the 1993
to outfits Bombay blasts

Digital Crypto & online crowdfunding to move/hide/launder VDA Service Providers now regulated under PMLA
technologies funds 2002 to counter crypto-funding

Efforts to Curtail + the NMFT Conference 2022

Legal-institutional architecture — UAPA + PMLA; Enforcement Directorate, FIU-IND, NIA; FATF-aligned monitoring of
crypto platforms, NGOs and Politically Exposed Persons; ED attachment of terror-linked assets.
NMFT Conference (New Delhi, Nov 2022) — a global ministerial initiative to disrupt illicit terror-finance networks. Aim
& objective — deny terrorists money and material, deny safe havens, and build binding international consensus
aligned with FATF standards. Outcome — agreements on tracking hawala and cryptocurrency misuse, reflecting
India’s leadership on the financial front of counter-terrorism.

10.6 Crime–Terror Nexus

The 2022 question wants the linkage at national and transnational levels; the 2018 question links drug trafficking to
gunrunning, laundering and human trafficking. Both reduce to one logic — organised crime supplies the money and
infrastructure; terror supplies the cause; the boundary blurs.

Types of Organised Crime

Drug & arms trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling (gold/FICN), extortion & contract violence, cybercrime
syndicates, and money laundering — each generating untraceable proceeds and cross-border logistics.

Nature of the Terror Linkage

Linkage Linkage Mechanism Example

Financial nexus Financial nexus Crime generates funds terrorists Taliban opium economy; FARC drug-
deploy financed terror in Colombia

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 Linkage Linkage Mechanism Example

Shared logistics Shared logistics Common routes, safe houses, D-Company’s smuggling network used
smuggling networks for 1993 Mumbai blasts logistics

Arms & narcotics Arms & narcotics Syndicates supply Pak/Afghan trafficking funding LeT and
weapons/drugs to outfits the Taliban

Laundering & Laundering & Proceeds disguised via hawala 26/11 funds moved through hawala
hawala hawala & shell firms channels & shell companies

Kidnapping & Kidnapping & Ransom & extortion fund Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines) funds
extortion extortion operations terror via kidnapping

Weak-governance Weak-governance Ungoverned spaces enable ISIL/Al-Shabaab oil smuggling &

exploitation exploitation impunity extortion in Africa/Middle East

10.7 ISIS & Digital Radicalisation

What ISIS is—A transnational Salafi-jihadist organisation that declared a “caliphate” in 2014, pursuing a borderless
theocratic order through extreme violence and a sophisticated online propaganda machine.

Mission — erase nation-state boundaries, impose a puritanical religious order, and recruit globally via digital indoctrination
rather than relying solely on territorial control.

Why It Endangers India

Online self-radicalization—encrypted apps and social media radicalise isolated youth, bypassing physical networks—
Hyderabad ISIS module (2017); Kannur NIA arrests of two women (2021); encrypted Telegram channels used by IS
sympathisers in South India (2025).
Lone-wolf risk — self-activated attackers with no organisational footprint are hard to preempt with conventional
intelligence.
Communal exploitation—narratives designed to fracture India’s plural society and provoke reciprocal radicalisation.
Returnee & sleeper threat — foreign-fighter returnees and ideological sympathisers function as latent sleeper cells.

Counter: online monitoring + counter-narrative (NIA interception), de-radicalisation (Kerala’s community-policing model),
youth engagement and platform regulation

10.8 UAPA & NIA Amendments

The Changes
UAPA (2019 Amendment) — empowers the Central Government to designate an individual (not only an organisation)
as a terrorist; allows NIA to seize property connected with terrorism with the approval of the DG-NIA (earlier, the
State DGP’s sanction was needed).
NIA (Amendment) Act, 2019 — extends NIA jurisdiction to scheduled offences committed outside India affecting
Indian citizens/interests; empowers the Centre to designate Sessions Courts as Special NIA Courts for speedy trial.

Security Rationale vs Rights Critique

Security Rationale Human-Rights Critique

Individual designation pre-empts terrorists operating ‘Terrorist’ label without conviction — reputational harm; weak/slow
without a formal outfit de-listing mechanism

Extraterritorial NIA reach matches the transnational Dilutes federalism — NIA overrides the state police’s law-and-
nature of modern terror order domain

Asset seizure with DG-NIA approval disrupts terror Stringent bail provisions + prolonged pre-trial detention;
financing faster comparatively low conviction rate

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Balanced position: robust laws are necessary against asymmetric, networked terror, but the 2nd ARC view holds —
strong powers must be paired with judicial oversight, periodic sunset review and accountability to prevent misuse and
protect civil liberties.

10.9 Impacts of Terrorism

Dimension Description Example

Loss of lives Civilian & security-force casualties 26/11 — 160+ killed; Pahalgam 2025 — 26 civilians

Economic Infrastructure damage, tourism loss, 2016 Pathankot exposed vital-infrastructure weaknesses;
security costs Kashmir tourism slumps

Displacement Forced migration from conflict ~90,000 Kashmiri Pandits displaced (1990–95)

Diplomatic strain Deterioration of bilateral relations Pahalgam 2025 → war-like India–Pakistan escalation

Social Communal polarisation & psychological Post-attack fear, communal tension after bombings
fragmentation trauma

Resource Development funds shifted to India’s 2024 military spend ~$86.1 bn (+1.6% over 2023)
diversion security/defense.

10.10 Challenges in Combating Terrorism

Cross-border terrorism — infiltration, safe havens, logistical support (Reasi bus attack 2024 — Lashkar/TRF).
Intelligence coordination — delayed sharing across agencies (26/11 exposed coordination gaps).
Legal/judicial hurdles — prosecution delays; UAPA charge-sheet delays; TADA repealed for misuse.
Urban vulnerability — dense targets, complex response (2006 Mumbai train bombings).
Technological adaptation — encrypted messaging, drones, cyber tools (drone attacks in border states).
Socio-political complexity — region-specific drivers prevent uniform strategy (NE vs J&K).
Crime linkages & rights balance — Punjab drug-arms-terror nexus; AFSPA/internet-shutdown civil-liberties debate.

10.11 Counter-Terrorism Architecture

Agencies & Instruments

Pillar Mandate Example / Note

NIA (2009) Investigate & prosecute terror offences Investigated Pathankot 2016, Hyderabad 2013

UAPA Ban outfits, designate individuals, seize assets 2019 amendment — individual designation

NSG (Black Cats) Hostage rescue, crisis response Swift response during 26/11 Mumbai

NATGRID / MAC / NCCC Real-time intelligence & data fusion MAC shares intelligence daily across agencies

CAPFs Border & internal security CRPF in Naxal areas; BSF anti-infiltration

FIU-IND + FATF Disrupt terror financing ED action; FATF recommendations implemented

Community programmes De-radicalisation & trust-building Operation Sadbhavna; Village Defence Guards

International Intelligence-sharing & diplomatic pressure Delhi Declaration (CTC), Quad, NMFT 2022

Way Forward
Legal reform — modernise & streamline anti-terror law with rights safeguards (2nd ARC balance).
Intelligence modernisation — AI, facial recognition, integrated command for predictive intelligence.

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 Border & coastal security — CIBMS, advanced sensors, anti-drone systems against infiltration & smuggling.
Socio-economic development — Aspirational Districts & tribal schemes to drain the grievance base.
Community policing & de-radicalisation — rehabilitation, reintegration, platform regulation.
International cooperation — intelligence-sharing, extradition, FATF pressure (UN, USA, Israel, France, Australia).
Technology regulation — monitor social media, regulate encrypted channels, cyber-hygiene (CERT-In, I4C, Cyber
Swachhta Kendra).

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 11 Operation Sindoor

Operation Sindoor, launched on 7 May 2025, marks a pivotal moment in India’s counter-terrorism strategy. It was triggered
by the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025, in which The Resistance Front (TRF) — an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba —
killed 26 civilians (25 Indians and one Nepali tourist) in Baisaran meadow after segregating victims by religion.
The Indian Armed Forces struck nine terrorist-infrastructure sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir
(PoJK), targeting LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM).
The operation was characterised as focused, measured and non-escalatory: it deliberately avoided Pakistani military
installations, emphasising strategic restraint while still being described as the most precise response to a terror attack on
Indian soil.
The analytical thread is that Sindoor crystallised a new counter-terror doctrine — one that rejects nuclear blackmail, treats
terror sponsors and their masterminds as legitimate targets, and pairs kinetic action with non-military coercion (the Indus
Waters Treaty suspension).

11.1 Background of Operation Sindoor

Aspect Crisp Detail

Pahalgam terror 22 Apr 2025 — TRF (LeT offshoot) killed 26 tourists in Baisaran meadow, Pahalgam, after segregating them
attack by religion; TRF claimed responsibility twice; India linked it to Pakistan-based LeT.

Pakistan’s role Persistent refusal to dismantle LeT/JeM despite India’s evidence from Mumbai 2008 and Pulwama 2019; India
submitted a dossier to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee documenting Pakistan’s complicity — underscoring
state-sponsored terrorism.

Historical Builds on prior surgical strikes — Uri 2016 and Balakot 2019 — but was broader, hitting nine sites across LeT,
context JeM and HuM, deepening the precedent of proactive counter-terrorism.

Geopolitical Diplomatic expulsions; Pakistan’s threat to suspend the Simla Agreement; India’s suspension of the Indus
backdrop Waters Treaty as a strategic, non-military response to Pakistani inaction.

11.2 Precedent — India’s Operations on Pakistani Soil

Operation Year Action

Operation Trident 1971 Naval missile attack on Karachi port during the Indo-Pak War.

Operation Python 1971 Follow-up naval strike on Karachi port.

Operation Talwar 1999 Naval blockade of Karachi during the Kargil War.

Uri Surgical Strike 2016 Cross-LoC surgical strike on launch pads after the Uri attack.

Operation Bandar (Balakot) 2019 Airstrike on the JeM camp at Balakot, Pakistan, post-Pulwama.

Operation Sindoor 2025 Precision strikes on nine terror sites in Pakistan/PoJK post-Pahalgam.

Comparative Frame — Uri vs Balakot vs Sindoor

The escalating reach across the three post-2016 strikes is itself an analytical point: each crossed a higher threshold while
staying below full war — the maturation of a calibrated-deterrence doctrine.

Parameter Uri (2016) Balakot (2019) Sindoor (2025)

Trigger Uri Army camp attack (19 soldiers) Pulwama — 40 CRPF killed Pahalgam — 26 civilians killed

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 Parameter Uri (2016) Balakot (2019) Sindoor (2025)

Domain Ground (cross-LoC, special Air (across IB, single deep Tri-services; air + missile, 9
forces) strike) sites

Depth Launch pads just across LoC Balakot, deep in Pakistan Pakistan + PoJK, multi-site

Targets Terror launch pads Single JeM camp LeT/JeM/HuM infrastructure (9)

Threshold Tactical cross-LoC Trans-IB airstrike Multi-site, multi-group precision

crossed

11.3 Details & Execution of Operation Sindoor

Aspect Detail & Context

Date & scope Launched 7 May 2025 — nine terror sites: four in Pakistan (e.g., Markaz Taiba, Muridke — LeT; Markaz Subhan
Allah, Bahawalpur — JeM) and five in PoJK (e.g., Syedna Bilal Camp, Muzaffarabad — JeM).

Forces Tri-services coordination — Army, Navy, Air Force; Rafale jets with SCALP missiles, HAMMER bombs and
involved loitering munitions, showcasing inter-service synergy.

Weapons used Mix of indigenous (Akash, BrahMos, NavIC-guided munitions) and imported systems (SCALP, HAMMER);
Akash neutralised Pakistani drones; BrahMos delivered sub-metre precision — a marker of Aatmanirbhar
capability.

Execution A 23-minute operation conducted from Indian territory; deliberately avoided Pakistani military installations;
struck specific buildings to minimise collateral damage — a non-escalatory design.

Pakistan’s On 8 May, drone/missile strikes on Indian cities (e.g., Srinagar, Patiala) — neutralised by S-400 and Akash;
response India retaliated on 10 May, targeting military air bases such as Rafiqi and Bannu.

Outcome Destroyed terror networks; 100+ terrorists killed; neutralised hostile assets (Pakistan’s PL-15 missiles, Chinese-
origin drones) with no Indian losses.

11.4 Defence Systems Deployed

System Role in Operation Sindoor

Akash (indigenous) Short-range SAM; neutralised Pakistani drones/missiles; multi-target, ECM-resistant.

BrahMos (indigenous) Supersonic cruise missile; struck terror camps (e.g., Muridke) in the 23-minute window.

S-400 (imported) Russian long-range SAM; intercepted high-speed missiles/drones; protected Punjab/J&K installations.

SCALP (imported) Air-launched long-range cruise missile; precision strikes on fortified targets (e.g., Bahawalpur) via
Rafale.

HAMMER (imported) French GPS/laser guided bomb; hit mobile/concealed targets (e.g., Muzaffarabad camps).

Loitering munitions Kamikaze drones; real-time surveillance + strike (e.g., Rahim Yar Khan radar).

NavIC (indigenous) Sub-metre precision targeting for BrahMos; paired with Cartosat/RISAT for 24/7 surveillance.

Akashteer Command-and-control system linking sensors/radars/missiles for real-time threat response.

(indigenous)

11.5 Need for Operation Sindoor

Counter-terrorism imperative — neutralise the LeT/JeM/HuM networks responsible for Pahalgam; TRF (linked to
LeT’s Muridke camp) had claimed responsibility, making disruption urgent.

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 National security — Pahalgam exposed vulnerabilities in J&K’s security grid; protecting sovereignty and civilian lives
demanded a robust response.
Deterrence — designed to deter state-sponsored terrorism and counter Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail, building on the
post-Pulwama (2019) resolve.
Pakistan’s inaction — repeated refusal to act on Indian evidence (Mumbai 2008, Pathankot 2016) and stalling of joint
probes left India with direct action as the only accountability lever.

11.6 Hot Pursuit & Surgical Strikes — Strategic Impact

Concept Clarity
Hot pursuit—immediate cross-border pursuit of fleeing militants into adjacent territory in the immediate aftermath of
an attack (limited, time-sensitive, tactical).
Surgical strike — a pre-planned, precise, limited military operation against specific terror infrastructure, designed to
minimise collateral damage and avoid full-scale escalation (e.g., Uri 2016, Balakot 2019, Sindoor 2025).

Strategic Gains
Restores deterrence — signals that cross-border terror will incur a military cost, eroding the adversary’s ‘risk-free
proxy war’ calculus.
Punctures nuclear blackmail — demonstrates space for conventional retaliation below the nuclear threshold
(Sindoor’s ‘new normal’).
Domestic & diplomatic signalling — reassures the domestic audience while showcasing precision and restraint to the
international community.
Degrades terror infrastructure — physically destroys camps/launch pads and disrupts planning cycles (100+
terrorists killed in Sindoor).
Coercive leverage — creates bargaining pressure, especially when paired with non-military tools (Indus Waters
Treaty suspension).

Strategic Risks & Limits

Escalation risk — a nuclear dyad raises the danger of uncontrolled escalation (Pakistan’s 8–10 May counter-strikes).
Diminishing returns — repeated strikes can normalise and reduce shock value if not backed by sustained pressure.
Attribution & verification — disputed battle-damage claims (e.g., S-400 destruction propaganda) invite information
warfare.
Not a substitute for strategy — kinetic action degrades capacity but does not by itself dismantle the sponsor’s intent;
must be embedded in a wider deterrence-plus-development approach.

11.7 The Four-Day Escalation Sequence

It demonstrates command of facts and shows how restraint and retaliation were calibrated day by day.

Date Event

7 May India launches Operation Sindoor — 23-minute tri-services precision strike on nine LeT/JeM/HuM sites in Pakistan &
PoJK; military installations deliberately spared.

8 May Pakistan escalates — drone & missile strikes on Indian cities (e.g., Srinagar, Patiala); intercepted by S-400 and Akash
air-defence systems.

8–9 Pakistani drone swarms attempt saturation; most neutralised, exposing India’s layered air-defence and Pakistan’s
May reliance on Chinese-origin platforms.

10 May India retaliates — strikes Pakistani military air bases (e.g., Rafiqi, Bannu), piercing Rawalpindi’s perceived invincibility;
understanding to halt firing follows.

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 Why the Sequence Matters
The day-by-day calibration is the doctrinal point: India opened below the military threshold (terror sites only),
absorbed and intercepted the counter-strike, and only then escalated to military targets — demonstrating escalation
dominance with restraint, not reflexive war.

11.8 Criticisms & Limitations — A Balanced View

Tactical success vs strategic resolution — infrastructure can be rebuilt; the operation degrades capacity but does not
by itself end the sponsor’s intent or dismantle the proxy ecosystem.
Escalation in a nuclear dyad — the 8–10 May exchange shows how quickly a calibrated strike can spiral; restraint
depended on both sides choosing de-escalation.
Information-warfare contestation — competing battle-damage narratives (e.g., Pakistan’s S-400 ‘destruction’ claim)
mean strategic gains are partly fought in the perception domain.
Diminishing shock value — as cross-border strikes become a ‘new normal’, their deterrent surprise erodes unless
paired with sustained intelligence, finance and diplomatic pressure.
Intelligence gap exposed — the ~20-minute response delay at Pahalgam and reported local facilitation show
prevention, not just retaliation, remains the harder task.

11.9 Significance of Operation Sindoor

Aspect Detail

New security Rejects nuclear blackmail; targets both terrorists and their masterminds; signals India will not negotiate
doctrine with terror sponsors — a redefined counter-terror posture.

Technological Showcased Aatmanirbhar Bharat — Akash, NavIC, BrahMos; neutralised PL-15 missiles & Chinese-origin
prowess drones in 23 minutes, proving technological edge.

Diplomatic Indus Waters Treaty held in abeyance — strategic pressure linking water to Pakistan’s terror policy.
leverage

Global messaging Strategic restraint by avoiding military targets; debunked Pakistan’s false claims (e.g., S-400 ‘destruction’),
reinforcing adherence to international norms.

Regional stability Redefined India–Pakistan engagement rules with a zero-tolerance stance; 10 May strikes on Pakistani air
bases pierced Rawalpindi’s perceived invincibility.

Diplomatic Reduced engagement with Pakistan’s allies (Turkey, Azerbaijan — Turkish Celebi airport clearance
realignment revoked); strengthened ties with Japan & Vietnam.

11.10 Future Course of Action

Aspect Detail

Strengthen Enhance IB, R&AW & state-police intelligence — Pahalgam’s ~20-minute response delay exposed
intelligence critical gaps.

Restore J&K Expedite statehood to win local support and curb terror logistics (15 locals reportedly aided the
statehood Pahalgam attackers).

Expand drone Develop indigenous drone swarms and counter-UAS systems against Pakistan’s drone warfare (May 8–
capabilities 9 swarms).

Upgrade Air Force Raise IAF squadrons toward 42 and fast-track the AMCA project, addressing the current ~31-squadron
deficit amid China’s J-20 advances.

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 Aspect Detail

Target terror leaders Pursue high-value LeT/JeM leaders via covert operations or strikes — sustained, not one-off, pressure.

Global advocacy Push for UN sanctions on TRF and Pakistan’s return to the FATF Grey List; leverage post-Pahalgam
lobbying.

Non-military pressure Use the Indus Waters Treaty abeyance and economic measures as standing strategic coercion.

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 12 Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity, as defined by India’s National Cyber Security Policy (2013), is the protection of information, devices,
services, and systems in cyberspace from unauthorised access, attack, damage, or disruption. With 936 million internet
subscribers (TRAI, Dec 2023) and digital public infrastructure—Aadhaar, UPI, Digital India—underpinning governance and
the economy, cyberspace has become a primary national-security domain rather than a technical afterthought.
India recorded 20.41 lakh cybercrime incidents in 2024 (CERT-In), spanning ransomware, phishing, misinformation, and
critical-infrastructure attacks.
Cyberspace is a borderless, attribution-resistant battlespace where the line between crime, espionage, terrorism, and
warfare collapses—a low-cost, deniable lever for state and non-state adversaries alike. Securing it, therefore, requires not
just firewalls but also a doctrine, institutions, law, a skilled workforce, and citizen awareness operating together.

12.1 Elements of Cybersecurity

Element Meaning

Network security Protecting the integrity & usability of networks and data in transit from intrusion.

Application security Securing software against code-level exploits (SQL injection, XSS).

Information / data security Protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of stored data (the CIA triad).

Operational security Processes & decisions for handling and protecting data assets (access control, permissions).

End-user education Cyber hygiene & awareness — the human layer, the most exploited vector.

Disaster recovery / continuity Restoring operations and data after a breach or attack (resilience & redundancy).

12.2 Types of Cyber Threats & Crimes

Threat Description India Example

Malware Ransomware/spyware/trojans to damage or WannaCry (2017) — hit Indian hospitals & banks
steal

Denial-of-Service Flooding servers to crash services (DDoS) DoS on AIIMS Delhi (2022) — servers crippled for
days

Phishing Deceptive mails/SMS impersonating trusted COVID-19 vaccine registration scam (2021) — fake
sources CoWIN links

Spoofing Forged headers/IPs/sites to appear legitimate CERT-In alert (2022) — spoofed @[Link] domain
mails

Identity-based Stolen/fabricated identities & credentials Aadhaar data leak (2018) — unauthorised access
attacks

Code injection Malicious code into apps (SQLi, XSS) BHIM-UPI phishing via malicious embedded code

Supply-chain Compromise via third-party vendor/software Upstox breach (2021) — third-party cloud misconfig
attacks

Social engineering Psychological manipulation for access WhatsApp OTP frauds (2021–23) — fake-agent calls

Insider threats Authorised users misusing access Air India (2021) — 4.5 m fliers’ data exposed

IoT-based attacks Exploiting cameras/routers/smart devices Indian smart cameras/routers in Chinese botnet
campaigns

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 Threat Description India Example

AI-powered attacks Deepfakes, automated/adaptive phishing 2024 elections — deepfake videos of politicians

DNS tunnelling Abusing DNS to exfiltrate data covertly Suspected in cross-border spying attempts

12.3 Cyber Warfare

What it is — state or state-sponsored use of cyber means to disrupt, degrade or destroy an adversary’s critical systems,
data or decision-making — a deniable instrument of statecraft below the threshold of conventional war.
Why it can exceed conventional threats — low cost, deniability, scalability, and the ability to paralyse infrastructure
(power, finance, defence) without firing a shot.

India’s Cyber Vulnerabilities

Critical infrastructure — Kudankulam Nuclear Plant malware infiltration (2019); Mumbai power-grid attack (2020) —
city-wide blackout.
State-sponsored APTs — RedEcho (2021, China-linked) targeted 10 power-sector entities; APT36/APT41 espionage
on defence & critical infrastructure; Operation SideCopy (2020, Pakistani) targeted the military.
Scale & growth — 278% rise in state-sponsored attacks (Cyfirma 2023); India ranked 2nd globally in cyber-attacks
(2024).

State of Preparedness
Strengths — CERT-In handled 1.4 m incidents (2023); NCIIPC secured ~85% of power grids post-2022; India
reached Tier-1 in the Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (98.49/100).
Gaps — skill deficit (only ~30% of the 5-lakh professional target met by 2023); no enacted National Cyber Security
Strategy yet; siloed agencies; weak rural cyber hygiene.

12.4 Methods of Cyber Warfare

Method Description

Espionage Covert exfiltration of strategic/defence/diplomatic data via APTs.

Sabotage Disruption/destruction of critical infrastructure (SCADA/ICS attacks).

DDoS warfare Coordinated flooding to paralyse government/financial systems.

Malware & ransomware ops State-deployed worms/ransomware to cripple targets.

Supply-chain compromise Implants via hardware/software vendors for persistent access.

Disinformation / cognitive ops Deepfakes & inauthentic networks to manipulate opinion & elections.

GPS / signal spoofing Degrading navigation & military positioning systems.

12.5 Towards an Indian Cyber Security Doctrine

Unlike the US/UK/China, India has no single publicly-articulated, binding cyber-warfare doctrine — capability is distributed
across institutions without a unifying strategic charter. The doctrinal building blocks that exist:

Element Element Status

Defence Cyber Agency Defence Cyber Agency Tri-services agency for military cyber operations — nucleus of
(2019) (2019) offensive/defensive doctrine.

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 Element Element Status

National Cyber Security National Cyber Security Defensive baseline; a binding National Cyber Security
Policy 2013 Policy 2013 Strategy is still unenacted.

NCIIPC / CERT-In NCIIPC / CERT-In Operational defensive pillars (covered in Chapter 17).

NSCS & National Cyber NSCS & National Cyber Apex coordination under the NSA — strategic-tier oversight.
Security Coordinator Security Coordinator

No declaratory posture No declaratory posture India has not publicly stated thresholds, attribution policy or
retaliation doctrine — a recognised strategic gap.

12.6 Cross-Border Cyber-Attacks & Defence

Impact on Internal Security

Critical-infrastructure disruption — power/health/finance outages with cascading public-safety risk (Kudankulam
2019, AIIMS 2022 — 40 m records encrypted, services halted 14 days).
Espionage & sovereignty risk — theft of defence/diplomatic data (RedEcho, Operation SideCopy).
Economic & trust erosion — Hi-Tek Group breach (2024) — 850 m citizen records leaked; City Union Bank SWIFT
attack (2020) — USD 2 m lost.
Cognitive warfare — disinformation & deepfakes degrade social cohesion and electoral integrity (2024 deepfakes).

Defensive Measures
Architecture — NCIIPC for CII; CERT-In nodal response; NCCC for metadata threat-monitoring; sectoral CERTs.
Doctrine & resilience — Zero Trust Architecture, mandatory audits, CERT-In Cyber Crisis Management Plan (2024)
with sector-wise drills.
Diplomacy — Budapest Convention-style cooperation; CERT-In MoUs (Bangladesh, Egypt, Japan); QUAD cyber
cooperation.

12.7 Data Protection & the Srikrishna Committee

Strengths Weaknesses

Recognised privacy as a fundamental right (post-Puttaswamy), Wide state exemptions for ‘national security’ with
anchoring data protection constitutionally limited independent oversight

User rights — consent, access, correction, data portability, right to be Data-localisation mandate seen as costly &
forgotten innovation-dampening for industry

Independent Data Protection Authority proposed for enforcement Vague definitions ("critical" vs. "sensitive" data) risk
inconsistent application

Accountability & purpose-limitation on data fiduciaries Weak penalties relative to global benchmarks
(GDPR) at the time

Evolution: The Report’s framework matured into the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP), 2023—mandatory
breach reporting, penalties up to ₹250 crore, and phased rules from April 2025—partly addressing the penalty and rights
gaps.

12.9 Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP), 2023

Aspect Key Points

Background Enacted in August 2023 to give effect to Puttaswamy (2017)—privacy as a fundamental right. Builds on
the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee (2018); replaces Section 43A of the IT Act, 2000.

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 Aspect Key Points

Scope Covers digital personal data processed within India, plus processing abroad that targets Indian residents.
Includes offline data later digitised; excludes purely personal or domestic use.

Key Definitions Data Principal — the individual concerned.

Data Fiduciary—entity deciding purpose and means of processing.
Data Processor — entity processing on the fiduciary's behalf.

Core Principles Processing must be lawful, with free, specific, informed consent — or under defined "legitimate uses"
such as welfare delivery. Purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, and
accountability are mandatory.

Rights of Data Right to information, correction, erasure, and grievance redressal. Right to nominate another person to
Principal exercise these rights in case of death or incapacity.

Obligations of Data Obtain valid consent, give clear notice, ensure accuracy, secure data, and report breaches. Significant
Fiduciary Data Fiduciaries (notified by Centre) must appoint a Data Protection Officer, conduct audits, and run
impact assessments.

Children's Data Verifiable parental consent required for anyone under 18. Behavioural tracking, targeted ads, and any
processing likely to harm children are prohibited.

Cross-Border Data Transfer allowed to all countries except those specifically restricted by the Central Government — a more
Flows liberal approach than the earlier draft's data-localisation mandate.

Exemptions Centre may exempt state agencies on grounds of sovereignty, security, public order, or foreign relations.
Research, archiving, and statistical processing also exempted (with safeguards).

Data Protection New statutory body to handle complaints, investigate breaches, and impose penalties. Adjudicatory, not
Board of India regulatory — enforces, does not frame rules.

Penalties Up to ₹250 cr for failure to prevent a breach. Up to ₹200 cr for non-compliance on children's data. Up to
₹10,000 on the data principal for frivolous or false complaints.

Implementation Phased rules notified from April 2025 onward, giving businesses transition time.
Timeline

Strengths Citizen-centric framework grounded in Puttaswamy. Mandatory breach reporting and strong penalties
create real accountability.

Concerns / Critiques Broad state exemptions raise surveillance concerns. Data Protection Board members appointed by the
Centre — independence questioned. Weak on algorithmic accountability, automated decision-making,
and a strong "right to be forgotten" (unlike the EU's GDPR).

Significance India's first comprehensive personal-data-protection law — a foundational pillar of cybersecurity and
digital governance. Aligns India with global standards, builds digital-economy trust, and strengthens
India's credibility as a digital-public-infrastructure leader.

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 12.10 CyberDome Project

CyberDome — What & Why

What it is: a technological research & development centre and public–private partnership initiative of the Kerala
Police, conceived as a cyber centre of excellence to counter emerging internet-enabled crime.

How it helps control internet crime:

Collaborative model — pools expertise of police, ethical hackers, academia, industry and citizen volunteers
('cyber-warriors').
Proactive threat intelligence — monitors cyberspace for child-abuse content, dark-web activity, financial fraud
and radicalisation.
Capacity building — trains law-enforcement personnel and runs public cyber-awareness outreach.
Model replicability — a template for state-level, community-anchored cyber policing that complements national
agencies (CERT-In, I4C).

12.11 Need for Cybersecurity & Impacts of Cyber Threats

Why It Is a National Imperative

Anonymity & weak conviction — only 18% of cybercrime cases convicted (NCRB 2024); attribution is hard.
Evolving threats — Ransomware-as-a-Service / Cybercrime-as-a-Service (LockBit, Akira); AI misuse (WormGPT in
BFSI attacks).
Digitisation risk — UPI/Aadhaar/e-governance widen the attack surface; ₹3,431 cr saved via I4C’s fraud-reporting
system across 9.94 lakh complaints.
National security — terror groups use DDoS/malware/phishing; state-sponsored attacks up 278% (Cyfirma 2023).

Impacts

Impact Example

Critical-infra disruption Mumbai power-grid attack (2020) — city-wide blackout

Large-scale data breach Hi-Tek Group (2024) — 850 m records leaked

Financial fraud City Union Bank SWIFT attack (2020) — USD 2 m lost

National-security threat Kudankulam Nuclear Plant malware (2019)

Reputational damage Airtel data breach (2021) — customer-trust erosion

Economic/productivity loss India 2nd globally in cyber-attacks (2024) — 95 data thefts, 108 ransomware cases

12.12 India’s Cybersecurity Framework

Legal Measures
IT Act, 2000 — defines cybercrimes, protects CII (S.70A/70B), prescribes penalties (BSNL breach 2024 — 278 GB
exposed).
DPDP Act, 2023 — data-processing rights vs privacy; penalties up to ₹250 cr; phased rules from April 2025.
Policies — National Cyber Security Policy 2013; National Digital Communications Policy 2018 (BharatNet to 2.5 lakh
gram panchayats).

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Institutional Measures

Body Mandate / Example

NCIIPC Protects Critical Information Infrastructure (IT Act S.70A); designated Aadhaar DB as CII; secured ~85%
power grids post-2022.

CERT-In National nodal incident-response agency (S.70B); handled 1.4 m incidents in 2023 (+33% YoY).

Cyber Swachhta Botnet/malware cleaning; M-Kavach on 5 m smartphones.

Kendra

NCCC Real-time metadata threat monitoring; collaborates with ISPs.

I4C MHA-led — cyber fraud, child porn, darknet; Samanvaya platform for interstate data-sharing.

CFMC Real-time bank–telecom–LEA collaboration; saved ₹3,431 cr via citizen fraud-reporting system.

12.13 National Cyber Security Policy 2013

What NCSP 2013 Aimed At

Objectives — secure cyber ecosystem, trust in IT, CII protection, global best practices; target of 5 lakh skilled
professionals; periodic ICT audits; CERT-In as nodal body; international cooperation.

Critical Assessment

Achievements Implementation Challenges

India reached Tier-1 in Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 Only ~30% of the 5-lakh workforce target met by 2023 — acute
(98.49/100) skill gap

NCIIPC operationalised; mandatory ICT audits No legally-binding, updated National Cyber Security Strategy
enacted yet

CERT-In as effective nodal responder; international MoUs Agency silos (NCIIPC/CERT-In/NCCC/I4C) — coordination gaps
signed

Public-awareness drives (Cyber Jaagrookta Voluntary private-sector compliance; weak rural cyber hygiene
Diwas since 2022)

12.14 Deepfakes

What are Deepfakes?

AI-generated synthetic media (video, audio, image) that manipulate or fabricate real persons
Powered by Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), diffusion models, voice cloning
Increasingly accessible via open-source tools — lowering barrier for misuse

Threats Posed
Political disinformation: Fake speeches of leaders, election manipulation (e.g., 2024 India election deepfake
incidents)
National security: Fabricated military orders, fake intelligence, impersonation of officials
Financial fraud: Voice deepfakes used in CEO fraud / vishing attacks
Social manipulation: Non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII), reputational damage
Terrorist propaganda: Synthetic content for radicalisation and recruitment

Why India is Vulnerable

Low digital literacy — users unable to distinguish genuine from synthetic content

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 High social media penetration + WhatsApp-driven viral spread
Absence of dedicated deepfake regulation — gap in IT Act 2000
Weak attribution mechanisms — hard to trace origin of AI-generated content

Counter-Measures
Technical: AI-based deepfake detection tools; digital watermarking; provenance tracking (C2PA standards)
Legal: Amend IT Act / introduce Digital India Act to criminalise malicious deepfakes; mandate platform takedowns
Institutional: Empowered Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C); strengthen CERT-In mandate
Media literacy: Mass awareness programmes; fact-checking ecosystem (PIB Fact Check, Boom, Alt News)
International cooperation: Budapest Convention alignment; bilateral agreements on cyber forensics
Platform accountability: Mandatory labelling of AI-generated content; algorithmic audits

12.15 Way Forward

Protect critical infrastructure — Zero Trust Architecture, redundancy, sector-wise drills (CERT-In Cyber Crisis
Management Plan 2024).
Close the skills gap — scale skilling via PPP (Cyber Surakshit Bharat trained 250+ CISOs in 2024); integrate
AI/blockchain/forensics in training.
Robust data protection — enforce DPDP 2023 (72-hr breach reporting, consent frameworks) across
Aadhaar/health/fintech.
Public awareness — nationwide campaigns (Cyber Jaagrookta Diwas, Digital India) targeting youth, SMEs, seniors.
Harmonise the legal-regulatory ecosystem — unify IT Act/DPDP/sectoral rules; empower LEAs with cyber-forensics
(I4C Samanvaya); enact a binding National Cyber Security Strategy.

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 13 Money Laundering

Money laundering is the process of disguising the origins of illegally obtained money so that it appears legitimate. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines it as “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin in order
to legitimise the ill-gotten gains of crime.” In India it is not merely an economic offence — it undermines economic
sovereignty, corrodes institutional integrity, and acts as the financial bloodstream of corruption, organised crime and
terrorism.

Laundering is the force-multiplier of every other security threat — terror financing, narco-trade, and political corruption all
depend on it to convert dirty money into usable wealth. Emerging technologies (crypto, fintech, NFTs) and globalisation
have made it faster, borderless and harder to trace.

13.1 The Process & Techniques of Money Laundering

Examiners reward conceptual precision — the three-stage process is the spine of any laundering answer; the techniques
are how each stage is operationalised.

The Three Stages

Stage What Happens

Placement Introduction of illicit cash into the financial system (deposits, cash-intensive businesses).

Layering Concealing the source through complex, multi-jurisdictional transactions and transfers.

Integration Re-introducing the laundered money into the economy as apparently legitimate wealth.

Common Techniques

Technique How It Works

Smurfing (structuring) Breaking large sums into small deposits below reporting thresholds.

Shell companies Fake firms showing illicit money as legitimate business income.

Trade-based laundering Over/under-invoicing trade to move value across borders.

Round-tripping Money cycled through jurisdictions and returned disguised as FDI.

Real-estate investment Buying property with illicit funds, legitimised on resale.

Hawala Informal value transfer with no physical movement of money.

Casinos / gambling Illegal earnings presented as gambling winnings.

Digital assets Cryptocurrencies used to obscure transaction trails.

13.2 Why Money Is Laundered

Reason Mechanism Example

Conceal illicit profits Hide proceeds of Sanjay Raut land-scam case (2022) — ED alleged ₹1,034 cr
drugs/extortion/corruption laundered (Patra Chawl)

Tax evasion Funnel undeclared income via offshore Pandora Papers (2021) — Indians holding offshore assets
accounts

Fund criminal Finance terror, trafficking, organised 2008 Mumbai attacks — hawala-laundered terror funds
activities crime

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 Reason Mechanism Example

Circumvent Bypass AML laws across borders Mahadev Betting App scam (2023) — ₹6,000+ cr via shell
regulation firms

Enhance Integrate gains into legitimate Sahara India case — unregulated deposits laundered into
wealth/lifestyle businesses real estate

Exploit system gaps Use weak-oversight channels Unregulated cooperative banks & benami property (ED
probes)

Political corruption Conceal bribes/misappropriated public Jharkhand CM Hemant Soren case (2024) — mining
funds proceeds via benami assets

13.3 Impact & the Economic-Sovereignty Threat

Impact Area Impact Area How It Erodes Sovereignty Example

Economic Economic Illicit funds inflate asset Benami real estate driving up Mumbai/Delhi
distortion distortion prices, distort markets prices (ED 2024)

Financial-system Financial-system Erodes trust in banks & PNB–Nirav Modi scam 2018 — ₹14,000 cr fake
integrity integrity regulators LoUs

Crime & Crime & Provides untraceable funds 2025 Delhi Police bust — global drug syndicate
corruption corruption for further crime funded via laundered crypto

Revenue loss Revenue loss Tax evasion drains the Panama Papers (2016) — offshore tax evasion
exchequer (CBDT probes)

Governance Governance Fuels political corruption, Delhi Liquor Policy case (2023) — proceeds via
erosion erosion weakens rule of law shell companies

Global reputation Global reputation Deters FDI; weakens India’s FATF Mutual Evaluation (2024) flagged
financial standing real-estate/informal-sector risks

National security National security Finances terror & organised J&K terror funding (2019) — ED uncovered
crime hawala/crypto networks to separatists

13.4 Emerging Technologies & Globalisation

Factor Contribution to Laundering Example

Cryptocurrencies Anonymity, decentralisation, cross- ED traced ₹135 cr laundered via Bitcoin in a China-run
border movement betting-app scam (2022)

Online banking & Rapid borderless transfers, weak KYC Razorpay flagged suspicious transactions — Chinese
fintech loan-app shell accounts

Dark web Untraceable peer-to-peer transfers Darknet narcotics paid in Monero/Bitcoin, routed via
Indian exchanges

Virtual assets & NFTs Value obfuscation & price manipulation NFTs resold between linked OpenSea wallets to justify
crypto inflows

Global trade networks Trade-based laundering (over/under- DRI — ₹1,000 cr mobile-parts over-invoicing case
invoicing) involving UAE firms (2021)

Offshore financial Secrecy & low-tax opacity Panama Papers — Indian shell companies in the British
centres Virgin Islands

Freelancing / gig Fake invoices placing black money Fake Fiverr design jobs invoice-laundering online-
platforms gambling money

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 13.5 Challenges in Combating Money Laundering

Compliance burden — high AML/KYC costs strain institutions (RBI fined banks ₹28+ cr for KYC lapses, 2024).
Skilled-workforce shortage — scarce trained AML professionals (80% of Indian employers reported difficulty, 2025).
Legal loopholes & delays — 1,739+ cases pending trial; only 47 PMLA cases decided (93% conviction but slow).
Technological sophistication — crypto & cross-border tools evade detection (ED seized ₹1,646 cr in crypto, Feb
2025).
Fragmented enforcement — overlapping agency jurisdictions (FIU-IND–RBI MoU, Apr 2025, to plug coordination
gaps).

13.6 The PMLA, 2002 — India’s Cornerstone Law

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, criminalizes laundering and enables the confiscation of proceeds of crime.
Its key provisions:

Provision Effect

Definition Projecting proceeds of crime (from scheduled offenses) as legitimate—concealment, possession, or

use.

Scheduled offences Predicate offences from IPC, NDPS Act, etc. where proceeds are laundered.

Punishment Rigorous imprisonment 3–7 years (up to life for NDPS-linked); fines.

Attachment of Provisional attachment for 180 days pending ED investigation.

property

Search, seizure, arrest ED may search/seize without a warrant; arrests are reported to the Adjudicating Authority within 24 hrs.

Presumption of guilt Burden on the accused to prove proceeds are untainted (reverse onus).

Special courts Designated courts for speedy trial.

Confiscation Permanent confiscation of attached property on conviction.

PMLA Amendments (2023–24)

PEPs covered, crypto/VDA trades brought under PMLA, due-diligence expanded, beneficial-ownership threshold cut
25%→10%, NPOs to register on DARPAN, proceeds of crime widened to related offences, and laundering made a
standalone offence — aligning India with FATF standards.

13.7 Measures to Tackle Laundering

National Measures

Measure Role

PMLA, 2002 Cornerstone AML law; ED investigation, attachment, confiscation.

FIU-IND Central agency receiving/analysing/disseminating financial intelligence.

Enforcement Directorate Investigates & prosecutes PMLA/FEMA offences; asset attachment.

Crypto regulation 30% VDA tax (2022); crypto platforms under FIU-IND AML reporting.

Economic Intelligence Council FM-chaired body synergising ED, CBDT, SEBI, FIU.

Black Money Act 2015 Targets undisclosed foreign income/assets; heavy penalties.

Benami Transactions (Amdt.) Act 2016 Confiscates benami property; complements PMLA.

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Global Measures

Measure Role

FATF Sets global AML/CFT standards; India a member since 2010 (40+9 Recommendations).

Vienna Convention (1988) First treaty recognising laundering as a crime; asset seizure & MLA.

Basel Committee Principles KYC, internal controls & compliance audits for banks.

Wolfsberg AML Principles Private-sector voluntary best practices for global banks.

Egmont Group of FIUs Secure global exchange of financial intelligence; FIU-IND a member.

UN GPML (UNODC) Technical assistance & IMoLIN information network.

13.8 The Drug–Laundering Nexus

Convergence logic — narcotics generate huge cash that must be laundered to be usable; the same
hawala/crypto/shell-firm channels then fund gunrunning and terror, creating a self-financing crime ecosystem.
India-specific — Golden Crescent/Triangle proximity → drone-dropped heroin (Punjab) → proceeds laundered via
crypto/hawala → J&K militancy & Punjab terror revival; Delhi Police 2025 bust traced laundered crypto across 10+
countries.
Counter — integrate NCB–ED–FIU action, FATF pressure, crypto-tracing (RegTech/SupTech), and demand-reduction
— attacking the money, not just the consignment.

13.9 Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

About FATF
Intergovernmental body (est. 1989, Paris) — sets global AML/CFT (Counter Financing of Terrorism) standards
40 Recommendations: Benchmark for AML/CFT/counter-proliferation financing
Mutual Evaluations: Peer review of member countries — drives domestic compliance
Grey List (Increased Monitoring) and Black List (Call for Action) — major reputational and financial consequences

India's FATF Journey

Member since 2010 — one of 39 full members
Mutual Evaluation 2010: Several deficiencies flagged — triggered major legislative reforms
Mutual Evaluation 2024: India rated 'Compliant' or 'Largely Compliant' on most of 40 recommendations — strong
result
India placed on 'Regular Follow-up' category (best tier) — significant achievement

How FATF Shaped India's AML Regime

PMLA 2002 (amended 2005, 2009, 2012, 2019, 2023): Progressively strengthened to align with FATF norms —
expanded predicate offences, attachment powers, reporting entities
UAPA amendments: Designation of individuals/entities as terrorists — mirrors FATF's targeted financial sanctions
requirement
Enforcement Directorate (ED) empowered: PMLA gives ED sweeping attachment and prosecution powers
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-IND): Receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from banks, NBFCs, real
estate, virtual assets — FATF Recommendation 29
Beneficial ownership: Companies Act + PMLA amended to disclose ultimate beneficial owners — FATF R.24/25
Virtual Digital Assets (VDAs): PMLA extended to crypto exchanges (2023) following FATF guidance on VASPs
Real estate & jewellers: Brought under reporting entity framework — sectors flagged by FATF as high-risk

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Key Institutions in India's AML Architecture

Institution Role

FIU-IND Receives & analyses STRs; coordinates with FATF Egmont Group

Enforcement Directorate Prosecutes PMLA offences; attaches proceeds of crime

RBI / SEBI / IRDAI Sector regulators enforcing KYC and AML compliance

Income Tax Dept. Tracks tax evasion with money laundering links

NIA / CBI Investigate terror financing; share intelligence with FIU

Challenges & Way Forward

Implementation gaps: Laws enacted but prosecution rates remain low; ED cases take years
Informal economy: Large cash-based economy limits transaction monitoring
Crypto regulation: VDA framework nascent; FATF expects robust VASP supervision
Politically exposed persons (PEPs): Enhanced due diligence still inconsistently applied
Way forward: Strengthen Special Courts for PMLA, improve inter-agency data sharing, deepen asset recovery
cooperation under MLA treaties

13.10 Way Forward

Strengthen AML procedures — risk-based supervision, periodic KYC, STRs across all Regulated Entities
(RBI/FSLRC-endorsed).
Regulate emerging sectors — extend AML/CFT to VDAs, real estate, jewellery, art; beneficial-ownership disclosure
(2023 PMLA notified crypto/realty/gem dealers as Reporting Entities).
Enhance inter-agency coordination — centralised intelligence cell linking ED, FIU, RBI, SEBI, INTERPOL, Egmont
(MHA Samanvaya platform).
Public–private intelligence sharing — formal PPIS with banks, tech firms, civil society (FATF best practice).
Global cooperation — strengthen MLATs, Asset Recovery Networks, joint investigations (FATF, APG, UNCAC).
Leverage technology — RegTech/SupTech, AI pattern-detection, blockchain audit trails (RBI Innovation Hub; MeitY
Blockchain Strategy 2021).

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 14 Border Management

Border management is the multidimensional function of regulating the legal and illegal movement of people and goods,
preventing infiltration, smuggling and cross-border crime, and developing border regions.
The Ministry of Home Affairs frames it as “securing borders against hostile interests while facilitating trade and travel.” India
has a vast land border of 15,106.7 km and a coastline of ~11,098 km, sharing land frontiers with seven countries:
Bangladesh (4,096.7 km), China (3,488 km), Pakistan (3,323 km), Nepal (1,751 km), Myanmar (1,643 km), Bhutan (699
km) and Afghanistan (106 km).
India’s internal security is structurally inseparable from border management — every major threat (terrorism, insurgency,
narcotics, FICN, illegal migration) enters or is sustained through a porous or contested frontier. The challenge is also
dualistic: borders must be hardened against hostile actors yet kept porous enough for legitimate trade, kinship and
connectivity.

14.1 Why Border Management Matters

Need Need Why Example

National security National security Prevents infiltration, terror, arms/drug Pahalgam 2025 — Pakistan-
trafficking based terrorists infiltrated via
LoC, 26 killed

Demographic Demographic Controls illegal immigration & Assam NRC — 19+ lakh
stability stability demographic shifts excluded over illegal-immigration
concerns

Sovereignty & Sovereignty & Deters encroachment in disputed 2020 Galwan clash — PLA
territorial integrity territorial integrity areas incursion in Ladakh

Development & Development & Reduces border alienation & out- Vibrant Villages Programme —
connectivity connectivity migration 663 border villages for all-
weather connectivity

Narco-terrorism Narco-terrorism Checks arms flow & narco-insurgency Punjab counter-intelligence —

Pak-linked drug network, 5 kg
heroin recovered

Maritime security Maritime security Secures coastline from ICG–ATS Gujarat — 173 kg
piracy/smuggling/infiltration narcotics seized at sea

Note: India’s borders are the first and last line of internal security — terrorism (J&K), insurgency (NE), narcotics (Punjab),
FICN and illegal migration all enter through, or are sustained by, porous or contested frontiers. Internal security is
therefore not a separate domain but a downstream function of border management.

14.2 Challenges in Border Management

Challenge Detail Example

Porous & difficult terrain Deserts, forests, rivers, high mountains 81.5% of Indo-Bangladesh border fenced; 900+ km
complicate fencing riverine remains porous

Infrastructure deficit Poor roads/bridges/outposts hinder Trans-Arunachal Highway delays; roads end 60–80
mobility km short of LAC

Manpower shortage CAPF/Assam Rifles vacancies 83,127 posts vacant vs 10 lakh sanctioned (Jan 2023)

Cross-border crime Drugs, arms, cattle, human trafficking Fourfold rise in Bangladeshi apprehensions (2018–
22); ₹1,200 cr drugs seized in Punjab 2024

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 Challenge Detail Example

Illegal immigration Demographic change & social tension Assam NRC; anti-foreigner agitation; WB/Tripura
shifts (NCRB 2024)

Border disputes Unresolved boundaries → standoffs Galwan 2020 (China); 230 ceasefire violations by
Pakistan 2024; Kalapani (Nepal)

Environmental & civil- Strategic projects raise Forest (Conservation) Amdt. Act 2023 exempts
liberties concerns ecological/privacy issues projects within 100 km of border

14.3 India–China Border — Issues & Measures

Conflicting Issues & Challenges

Unresolved boundary — undemarcated, contested LAC (Aksai Chin west, Arunachal east) → frequent standoffs
(Galwan 2020, Tawang 2022).
Asymmetrical infrastructure — China’s superior roads/tunnels/airstrips enable swift mobilisation; India lags in
Arunachal/Ladakh.
Dual command — ITBP (MHA) + Army (MoD) guarding creates coordination friction in crises.
Aggressive posture — “salami-slicing,” Doklam 2017, PLA road construction near sensitive areas.
Water & cyber — Brahmaputra dam-building (flow manipulation); GPS spoofing & information warfare.

Government Measures
Infrastructure — DS-DBO Road, Sela Tunnel, Frontier Highway; BRO airstrips at Nyoma, Daulat Beg Oldi.
Vibrant Villages Programme (2023) — 46 blocks of 4 border states — civilian presence as a security buffer.
Surveillance & forces — CIBMS, Heron UAVs, mountain strike corps; CBMs (1993/1996/2005/2013 agreements) &
WMCC/SR dialogue.

14.4 India–Pakistan Border — Issues & Measures

Challenges
Cross-border terrorism — ISI-patronised LeT/JeM; Uri 2016, Pulwama 2019, Pahalgam 2025 — asymmetric warfare.
Ceasefire violations — LoC shelling as cover for infiltration; 230 violations in 2024.
Narco-terrorism & drone infiltration — heroin/AK-47s/IEDs dropped by drones; 100+ drone sightings (2023), part of
low-cost proxy warfare.
Unresolved disputes — Siachen, Sir Creek, PoK occupation; Sir Creek affects EEZ claims.
FICN & radicalisation — fake-currency inflow as economic terrorism; cross-border digital radicalisation of border
youth.

Government Measures
Smart fencing (CIBMS) — thermal/IR sensors, fibre-optic detection, laser walls in Jammu/Punjab.
Anti-drone infrastructure — jammers, RF interceptors, QRTs in Gurdaspur/Amritsar.
BOP modernisation & strategic roads — night-vision, high-mast towers; Bharatmala + BIM Scheme.
ICPs & ceasefire reaffirmation — ICP Attari for legal trade; Feb 2021 DGMO ceasefire reaffirmation; multi-agency
MAC coordination.

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 14.5 Other Land Borders — Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar

Border Border Core Challenge Headline Measure

Bangladesh Bangladesh Longest, porous; illegal migration, ~88% fencing done; CIBMS pilot; Integrated
(4,096 km) (4,096 km) cattle/Phensedyl/Yaba smuggling, Fake Check Posts (ICPs) (Petrapole/Agartala/Dawki);
Indian Currency Note (FICN), BSF–BGB joint patrols; Border Area
trafficking, ~150 km unfenced Development Programme (BADP)

Nepal (1,751 Nepal (1,751 Open border (1950 Treaty); FICN SSB guarding; selective fencing pilots
km) km) transit, terrorist infiltration route, (Bihar/UP); ICPs (Raxaul/Sonauli); India–Nepal
trafficking, Kalapani dispute Boundary Working Group (BWG); biometric
pilots

Bhutan (699 Bhutan (699 Rugged terrain; historic ULFA/NDFB 2007 Friendship Treaty security partnership;
km) km) sanctuaries; Doklam/Siliguri-Corridor Doklam intervention (2017); SSB + Army; BRO
vulnerability; timber/drug smuggling roads; Op All Clear

Myanmar Myanmar FMR misuse, NSCN-K/ULFA-I FMR suspended (2023) & termination + fencing
(1,643 km) (1,643 km) sanctuary, Golden-Triangle narco, post- (2024–25); Assam Rifles; Op Sunrise I & II; ICP
2021-coup refugee influx, weak Moreh
presence

Note: Role of Security Forces BSF — Indo-Pak & Indo-Bangladesh + LoC; ITBP — Indo-China (Tibet); SSB — Indo-Nepal &
Indo-Bhutan; Assam Rifles — Indo-Myanmar & NE counter-insurgency; Indian Coast Guard — coastal/maritime; Army —
LoC/LAC. Coordination via Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and Border Security Grid.

14.6 The UAV / Drone Threat & Counter-Measures

Why Drones Are a Serious Threat

Low-cost proxy warfare — cheap, deniable, hard to detect; ferry heroin, AK-47s, IEDs, fake documents across
Punjab/Rajasthan.
Scale — BSF recovered 100+ Pakistani drones in 2025 (294 in 2024) along the Punjab border, linked to Pak-based
terror groups.
Convergence — fuses narcotics, terror financing and arms supply into a single low-risk channel.

Counter-Measures
Detection & soft/hard kill — drone jammers, RF signal interceptors, DRDO anti-drone systems, soft-kill lasers at
critical airfields/borders.
Quick-reaction grid — QRTs in Gurdaspur/Amritsar; integrated with CIBMS sensors.
Regulation — No Permission-No Takeoff (NPNT), Digital Sky platform, Drone Rules 2021 — geo-fencing & remote ID
for domestic UAVs.
Indigenous capability — develop counter-UAS & drone-swarm tech (lesson from Operation Sindoor’s May 2025
drone exchange).

14.7 Maritime & Coastal Security

Maritime Security Challenges

Challenge Detail

Piracy & SLOC vulnerability Arabian Sea / Gulf of Aden piracy threatens Sea Lines of Communication & energy/trade security.

Maritime terrorism Post-26/11 sea-borne infiltration via fishing vessels along ~11,098 km coastline.

Smuggling & trafficking Arms, narcotics, gold, humans — Gujarat/Kerala regular seizures.

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 Challenge Detail

IUU fishing Resource depletion & India–Sri Lanka fishermen conflict.

Geo-strategic competition Chinese dual-use ports (Gwadar, Hambantota) & PLAN submarines — ‘String of Pearls’.

Boundary disputes Sir Creek (Pakistan), Katchatheevu (Sri Lanka) — grey zones.

Lack of MDA Vast EEZ lacks real-time surveillance; inter-agency coordination gaps.

Climate risks Cyclones, sea-level rise, tsunamis threaten coastal infra & naval bases.

Initiatives — Organisational / Technical / Procedural (2022 frame)

Organisational — Three-tier architecture (Navy beyond 12 NM, Coast Guard up to 12 NM, State Marine Police 0–5
NM); NCSMCS (Cabinet Secretary-chaired); IMAC (Gurugram) for data fusion; National Maritime Security
Coordinator (2021).
Technical — Coastal Radar Chain; AIS (mandatory >20 m vessels); National AIS; satellite surveillance (RISAT,
Oceansat).
Procedural — Coastal Security Scheme Phases I & II; SAGAR vision; CORPATs with Indonesia/Thailand/Sri Lanka;
Sea Vigil & TROPEX exercises.

Note: IMO Piracy-Zone Shift

In 2012 the IMO moved the piracy high-risk-area eastern boundary from 65°E to 78°E in the Arabian Sea — bringing it
close to India’s western coast and EEZ. Impact: higher insurance/freight costs for Indian shipping, expanded patrol
burden on the Navy/Coast Guard near home waters, and pressure to bolster Maritime Domain Awareness —
underscoring why the high-risk-area was later rolled back after sustained Indian diplomacy.

14.8 India–Sri Lanka Maritime Interface

Issues — Palk Strait fishermen disputes & arrests, Katchatheevu legal-political contention, Tamil refugee influx (post-
2022 economic crisis), smuggling, weak MDA in shallow Gulf of Mannar.
Measures — Joint CORPATs; Coastal Security Scheme; static-sensor chain; Vessel Monitoring Systems & biometric
fishermen IDs; SAGAR doctrine assistance; bilateral Joint Working Group on fishermen.

14.9 Airspace Management

Concept — under the Chicago Convention, every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory; beyond it lies international airspace. ‘Space above this airspace’ (outer space) is governed by the Outer Space
Treaty as a global commons — not subject to sovereign claim.

Challenges
Civil–military segregation — separate controls cause inefficiency, delays, underutilisation.
Unregulated UAV traffic — low-altitude vulnerability; drone drops near borders (Punjab).
Security gaps — weak low-level surveillance near military/nuclear/border zones (Pathankot 2016); ADIZ not fully
operational; radar blind spots in NE.

Measures
Flexible Use of Airspace (2020), airspace rationalisation (128+ routes opened), NPNT & Digital Sky for drones, ADS-
B radar expansion, proposed Air Defence Command, strengthened ADIZ & counter-drone tech.

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 14.10 CPEC — Description & Threat to India

CPEC
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is a flagship subset of China’s Belt and Road Initiative — a ~$60+ bn network
of roads, railways, pipelines and the Gwadar deep-sea port linking Kashgar (Xinjiang) to Gwadar (Balochistan), giving
China an overland route to the Arabian Sea.

Why India Distances Itself / The Threat

Sovereignty violation — CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan), Indian territory — a
direct challenge to territorial integrity.
Strategic encirclement — Gwadar + ‘String of Pearls’ extends Chinese naval reach into the Arabian Sea/IOR,
threatening India’s maritime flank.
Security dilemma — deepens China–Pakistan military-economic nexus; dual-use infrastructure with potential military
application near sensitive areas.
Debt-trap & regional influence — expands Chinese leverage in the neighbourhood; opacity and lack of consultation
with India.
India’s stand — boycotted BRI; connectivity must respect sovereignty, transparency and financial responsibility
(India’s consistent BRI critique).

14.11 Border-Area Governance

Denying Local Support

Development delivery — BADP/Vibrant Villages — roads, schools, health, water reduce dependence on smuggling
economies.
Intelligence-led policing — community informer networks; Village Defence Committees/Guards providing real-time
intelligence.
Choke illicit economies — interdict smuggling/FICN that fund and embed militant networks locally.

Winning Favourable Perception

Civic-action & hearts-and-minds — Operation Sadbhavna-type medical camps, education, skilling; minimum-force
doctrine in civilian areas.
People-to-people connect — border haats, cultural exchanges; biometric-verified legitimate cross-border livelihood.
Inclusive governance — local participation, grievance redressal, transparent benefit delivery to counter alienation.

14.12 Drug Trafficking & Transborder Crime Nexus

Geography — India is sandwiched between the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) and Golden Triangle
(Myanmar-Laos-Thailand) — the world’s two biggest opium sources.
Convergence — the same routes/networks carry drugs, weapons (gunrunning) and trafficked persons; proceeds are
laundered (hawala/crypto) and recycled into terror financing — a self-sustaining crime ecosystem.
Counter — smart fencing & anti-drone grid; NCB–BSF–ED–Coast Guard coordination; international protocols
(UNTOC, INTERPOL); demand-reduction & rehabilitation; FATF pressure on source/transit states.

14.13 Key Border-Management Initiatives

Initiative Description

CIBMS Smart border management — CCTV, thermal imagers, sensors, drones with AI analytics (Indo-
Pak/Indo-Bangladesh).

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 Initiative Description

Smart Border Fencing Double-row fencing + laser barriers + anti-drone nets (LoC, Radcliffe Line, Indo-Bangladesh).

Vibrant Villages 100+ LAC villages as civilian buffers — roads, health, jobs (counters China’s salami-slicing).
Programme

Space-Based Surveillance NAVIC, Cartosat, GSAT for real-time LAC/LoC imagery with AI analytics.

BADP & BIM Scheme Border-area development (roads, schools, health) + border infrastructure & management.

Maritime Anti-Piracy Act, Legal framework against piracy — life imprisonment/death penalty.
2022

Madhukar Gupta Border-security-grid recommendations — complete fencing + real-time monitoring.

Committee

FMR Termination Ended Free Movement Regime on Indo-Myanmar border (2024); fencing from 2025.

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 15 Security Forces, Agencies & Their Mandate

India’s internal-security architecture is a layered system of armed forces, central armed police forces (CAPFs), intelligence
agencies, and investigative bodies, each with a distinct constitutional and statutory mandate. Because ‘police’ and ‘public
order’ are State subjects (Entries 1 & 2, List II) while defence and key central forces are union subjects, internal security is
a shared, multi-agency responsibility—which is its core strength and, when coordination fails, its core weakness.
Capability is rarely the binding constraint—coordination, accountability, and reform are. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks
exposed catastrophic intelligence-sharing failures and triggered the post-2008 institutional overhaul (NIA, NATGRID, MAC
strengthening, coastal architecture).

15.1 India’s Internal Security Challenges

Challenge Crisp Detail

Cross-border terrorism ISI-backed LeT/JeM in J&K — Pahalgam 2025 (26 killed); proxy warfare.

Left-Wing Extremism Maoist insurgency in the tribal Red Corridor; financing & cadre networks.

North-East insurgency & separatism Ethno-nationalist outfits (NSCN, ULFA-I); Manipur 2023 ethnic crisis.

Terror & crime financing Hawala, FICN, narco-money, crypto — the financial bloodstream of all threats.

Cyber threats State-sponsored APTs, critical-infrastructure attacks (Kudankulam 2019, AIIMS 2022).

Radicalisation Digital indoctrination, lone-wolf & diaspora extremism (ISIS modules, SFJ).

Border & maritime vulnerabilities Porous frontiers, drone infiltration, coastal infiltration risk.

Organised crime & narcotics Golden Crescent/Triangle nexus; smuggling, trafficking, gunrunning.

15.2 The Armed Forces

The Army, Navy and Air Force are primarily external-defence instruments but are decisive internal-security actors when
called — LoC/LAC management, counter-insurgency and aid to civil authority.

Force Force Internal-Security Role & Example

Indian Army Indian Army LoC/LAC defence, counter-insurgency (J&K, NE); aid to civil authority — Operation
Sindoor (2025), Rashtriya Rifles for CI.

Indian Navy Indian Navy Coastal & EEZ security, anti-piracy, MDA — post-26/11 overall maritime-security
responsibility; mission-based deployments in IOR.

Indian Air Indian Air Air defence, surveillance, rapid logistics — Balakot 2019, casualty/relief airlift in internal
Force Force emergencies.

CDS & Theatre Commands The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), created in 2019 on the Kargil Review Committee / Shekatkar
Committee logic, heads the Department of Military Affairs and drives tri-services jointness and the proposed Theatre
Commands — directly relevant to integrated internal-security response.

Tri-Service Special Forces — The Cutting-Edge Counter-Terror Capability

Force Service & Role Notable Operations

Para SF Army's Special Forces battalions of the Uri surgical strikes (September 2016); Myanmar cross-
Parachute Regiment; direct-action and special- border raid (June 2015) against NSCN-K; consistently
reconnaissance role across LoC, LAC, and NE. deployed in Operation Sindoor preparatory phase (May
2025).

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 Force Service & Role Notable Operations

MARCOS (Marine Indian Navy's special operations force; 26/11 Mumbai response (2008) — first responders at Taj
Commandos) maritime counter-terror, hostage rescue, anti- and Trident; counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of
piracy; opened to women officers from 2023. Aden; Operation Cactus follow-ons in the IOR.

Garud Indian Air Force's special force; airfield Anti-terror operations in J&K; airbase defence at
Commando Force defence, combat search-and-rescue, special Pathankot (2016 IAF base attack) and Awantipura;
heliborne operations. rapid-deployment role in Operation Sindoor (2025).

Special Frontier Raised 1962 after the Sino-Indian War; Critical role in the August 2020 Kailash-range heights
Force (SFF) predominantly Tibetan recruits; reports to the operation during the Galwan stand-off — first publicly
Cabinet Secretariat through R&AW. acknowledged action; high-altitude warfare specialist.

15.3 Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs)

The seven CAPFs under the MHA are the backbone of day-to-day internal security.

Force Primary Mandate Deployment / Example

Central Reserve Police Force Largest CAPF; internal security, riot & Anti-Naxal lead in the Red Corridor; election & law-
(CRPF) CI ops and-order duty

Border Security Force (BSF) Indo-Pak & Indo-Bangladesh border Anti-infiltration; recovered 100+ Pak drones (2025),
guarding Punjab

Indo-Tibetan Border Polic China border (Himalayan LAC) Ladakh/Arunachal posts; first responder in Galwan
(ITBP) guarding 2020

Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) Indo-Nepal & Indo-Bhutan (open Anti-FICN/trafficking interdiction; intelligence on
borders) open frontiers

Central Industrial Security Critical-infrastructure & airport Airports, nuclear/space installations, Delhi Metro,
Force (CISF) security refineries

Assam Rifles Indo-Myanmar border + NE counter- Operation Sunrise; oldest paramilitary (“Sentinels of
insurgency the NE”)

National Security Guard (NSG) Elite counter-terror & hostage rescue 26/11 Mumbai response; VIP & high-risk anti-terror
tasks

Role in Internal Security

Counter-insurgency: CRPF deployed extensively in Maoist belts (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand); J&K operations
Border management: Prevent infiltration, smuggling, illegal migration
Disaster response: NDRF battalions drawn from CAPFs
Election duty: Ensuring free and fair elections in sensitive areas
Anti-Naxal operations: CRPF's CoBRA (Commando Battalions) specialised for jungle warfare

Principal Gaps (Force-Multiplier Deficits)

Equipment obsolescence: Inadequate night-vision, drones, body armour — adversaries better equipped in some
theatres
Manpower crunch: Vacancies running at 10–15% across forces; overdeployment leads to fatigue
Intelligence deficits: Poor integration with state police intelligence; HUMINT gaps in LWE areas
Training: Insufficient specialised training for urban terrorism, cyber, CBRN threats
Welfare: Poor service conditions, high suicide rates — morale issues
Dual command confusion: Assam Rifles under split authority hampers operational efficiency
Coordination gaps: Lack of unified command structure; inter-agency friction with state police

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Reforms Required
Modernisation: Implement Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS); acquire drone
swarms, AI surveillance
Intelligence sharing: Create unified fusion centres at district level linking CAPFs–state police–IB
Manpower: Fast-track recruitment, lateral induction for specialised roles (cyber, signals)
Welfare: Implement cadre review, improve service conditions, address 'one-rank-one-pension' demands
Unified command: Resolve Assam Rifles dual-command ambiguity; consider merging BSF/SSB border roles
Community policing: CRPF's CAPs (Civil Action Programmes) — scale up to win local trust in LWE areas
Accountability: Performance audits, independent oversight mechanism

15.4 Central Intelligence Agencies

Agency Mandate Counter-Threat Role

Intelligence Bureau (IB) Internal/domestic intelligence; MHA; Counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, VIP threat
oldest agency (1887) assessment, communal-tension early warning

Research and Analysis Wing External intelligence; Cabinet Cross-border terror, hostile-state activity, strategic &
(R&AW) Secretariat (post-1968) economic intelligence

National Technical Research Technical & cyber intelligence; under SIGINT, satellite & cyber monitoring of critical
Organisation (NTRO) NSA infrastructure

Defence Intelligence Agency Tri-services military intelligence; Defence-related threat assessment, border &
(DIA) MoD adversary-military intelligence

National Intelligence Grid Networked intelligence-data platform Links 21 databases (banking, telecom, travel) for real-
(NATGRID) time terror tracking — a post-26/11 reform

Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) Multi-Agency Centre under IB 24x7 inter-agency terror-intelligence fusion & sharing
(strengthened post-26/11)

15.5 Central Investigative Agencies

Agency Agency Statutory Basis Counter-Threat Role

National Investigation National Investigation NIA Act, 2008 Federal counter-terror investigation; 2019
Agency (NIA) Agency (NIA) (amended 2019) amendment — extraterritorial jurisdiction,
scheduled-offence reach (Pathankot, Pulwama
probes)

Central Bureau of Central Bureau of Delhi Special Police Corruption, organised & inter-state crime, terror-
Investigation (CBI) Investigation (CBI) Establishment Act, linked financial cases
1946

Enforcement Enforcement PMLA 2002 + FEMA Money laundering & terror-financing

Directorate (ED) Directorate (ED) 1999 investigation; asset attachment (J&K terror-
funding cases)

Narcotics Control Narcotics Control NDPS Act, 1985 Drug trafficking & narco-terrorism interdiction;
Bureau (NCB) Bureau (NCB) international coordination

Indian Cybercrime Indian Cybercrime MHA initiative (2020) Coordinated cybercrime response; Samanvaya
Coordination Centre Coordination Centre platform; financial-fraud reporting
(I4C) (I4C)

Financial Intelligence Financial Intelligence Established 2004 Receives & analyses STRs/CTRs; financial-
Unit – India (FIU-IND) Unit – India (FIU- (PMLA) intelligence backbone against laundering &
IND) terror finance

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About National Investigation Agency (NIA)

Background
NIA established under NIA Act 2008 following 26/11 Mumbai attacks
Premier federal anti-terror agency — investigates scheduled offences without state permission
Concurrent jurisdiction: Can take up cases suo motu or on MHA referral

Role in Combating Terrorism

Investigations: Handles cases under UAPA, Explosive Substances Act, Arms Act, NDPS (terror-drug nexus)
Key cases: Pathankot attack, Pulwama, Burdwan blast (ISI module), IS/ISIS recruitment, NE insurgency funding
Terror financing: Traces hawala networks, crypto funding, FCRA violations linked to terror
Coordination: Works with IB, RAW, state ATSs, Interpol for trans-national cases
Prosecution: Maintains high conviction rate (>90%) — outcome-focused investigation
Capacity building: Trains state police in terror investigation protocols

2019 Amendments — Expanded Mandate

Extra-territorial jurisdiction: NIA can now investigate offences committed outside India targeting Indian interests —
landmark shift
New scheduled offences added:

– Human trafficking (under ITPA)

– Counterfeit currency offences

– Manufacture/sale of prohibited arms

– Cyber terrorism
– Offences under Explosive Substances Act
Special Courts: Designated Special NIA Courts empowered to try scheduled offences
Rationale: Addresses cross-border terrorism, global IS network, Pakistan-sponsored proxy war

Challenges & Concerns

Federalism tension: States argue NIA encroaches on police (State List) — cooperative federalism needed
Resource constraints: Investigates growing caseload with limited manpower
Delay in trials: Special Courts backlogged; cases drag on for years
Misuse concern: Civil liberties groups flag broad UAPA application; bail denial trend

15.6 Apex Decision-Making & Coordination Bodies

Body Role

National Security Council (NSC) Apex advisory body on national & internal security; headed by the PM (created 1998).

National Security Adviser (NSA) Chief adviser to the PM; coordinates intelligence & strategic policy.

Strategic Policy Group Inter-ministerial body feeding the NSC; integrates security assessments.

MHA — Internal Security Division Nodal ministry for CAPFs, J&K, NE, LWE & border management policy.

National Investigation Agency HQ Apex federal counter-terror investigative coordination.

Defence Planning Committee (2018) NSA-chaired; integrates defence & national-security planning.

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 15.7 Challenges in the Security-Agency Architecture

Coordination deficit — intelligence silos & turf issues; 26/11 exposed fatal IB–state–Navy sharing gaps.
No legislative oversight of intelligence — IB & R&AW lack a statutory charter or parliamentary scrutiny —
accountability gap.
Manpower & modernisation — 83,000+ CAPF vacancies; outdated equipment; high attrition & stress
(suicide/fratricide concerns).
Centre–State friction — ‘police’ a State subject — friction over NIA/CBI jurisdiction; uneven police modernisation.
Federal-agency credibility — perceptions of misuse erode trust (‘caged parrot’ critique of CBI by the Supreme Court,
2013).
Police reform pendency — Prakash Singh (2006) directions only partially implemented; colonial Police Act 1861
legacy.

15.8 Reform Roadmap — Committees & Recommendations

Committee / Reform Core Recommendation

Prakash Singh Judgment (2006) 7 directives — State Security Commissions, fixed DGP tenure, separate investigation/law-
and-order, Police Complaints Authority.

2nd ARC (5th Report) Insulate police from political interference; strong intelligence-led, accountable policing.

Kargil Review Committee (2000) Integrated intelligence, MAC, defence reform — seeded NTRO & later CDS.
/ GoM 2001

Naresh Chandra Committee Higher defence management, intelligence coordination, CDS-type post.
(2012)

Shekatkar Committee (2016) Combat-capability & jointness; logistics & manpower optimisation.

Madhukar Gupta Committee Border-security-grid & infrastructure (cross-link Ch 14).

(2016)

15.9 Way Forward

Institutionalise coordination — strengthen NATGRID/MAC, a unified counter-terror centre, and real-time Centre–
State intelligence-sharing.
Legislative oversight — a statutory charter & parliamentary scrutiny for intelligence agencies to balance secrecy with
accountability.
Implement police reforms — operationalise the Prakash Singh directions; replace the 1861 Act with a model Police
Act; SMART policing.
Capacity & welfare — fill CAPF vacancies, modernise equipment, address stress/attrition; technology-enabled
forces.
Federal trust — transparent, autonomous functioning of CBI/NIA/ED to preserve credibility and cooperative
federalism.
Jointness — fast-track Theatre Commands & CDS-led integration for a whole-of-government security response.

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 16 Illegal Immigration & CAA 2019

Illegal immigration is the unauthorised entry or stay of foreign nationals in violation of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the
Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920. India’s long, porous borders—especially the 4,096 km
Indo-Bangladesh frontier—and its relative economic and political stability make it a magnet for distress migration.
The issue sits at the intersection of demographic security, federalism, and humanitarian obligation, which is why it is one of
the most politically charged internal-security themes.
Illegal migration is not merely a law-and-order matter but a demographic-security question — it alters the population
balance of sensitive border regions, strains resources, and can be exploited by hostile actors. The Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019 and the NRC are the State’s most contested responses, raising the constitutional question of
whether citizenship can be linked to religion.

16.1 Legal Framework & Key Concepts

Citizen vs migrant — a citizen is governed by the Citizenship Act, 1955 (acquisition by birth, descent, registration,
naturalisation, incorporation); an illegal migrant is defined under S.2(1)(b) as a foreigner who enters without valid
documents or overstays a valid visa.
Refugee vs illegal migrant — India has no domestic refugee law and is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention;
it handles refugees administratively (UNHCR cards, ad-hoc protection), so the legal line between ‘refugee’ and ‘illegal
migrant’ is policy-driven, not statutory.
Governing statutes — Foreigners Act 1946, Passport (Entry into India) Act 1920, Registration of Foreigners Act 1939
— empower detection, detention and deportation.

16.2 Reasons / Factors Giving Impetus

Factor Type Driver Example

Economic (pull) Better wages, jobs, livelihood in India Bangladeshi labour in Assam/WB construction & informal
sectors

Economic (push) Poverty, unemployment, landlessness in Char-land erosion & rural distress in Bangladesh
source country

Environmental Floods, river erosion, sea-level rise displace Brahmaputra/Padma erosion; climate displacement from
populations coastal Bangladesh

Political Ethnic/religious repression abroad Rohingya fleeing Myanmar (post-2017); Chin/Kuki post-
persecution 2021 coup

Porous borders Unfenced/riverine stretches enable easy entry ~900+ km riverine Indo-Bangladesh border hard to fence

Kinship & Shared language/ethnicity & settled relatives Bengali-speaking cross-border kinship in border districts
networks ease assimilation

Weak Document fraud, corruption, slow deportation Fraudulent ration/voter/Aadhaar enrolment by migrants
enforcement

16.3 Impacts — Why It Threatens Security

Dimension Dimension How It Threatens Example

Demographic Demographic Alters population balance of Changing demography of lower-Assam & border
sensitive border districts WB/Tripura districts (NCRB/Census debates)

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 Dimension Dimension How It Threatens Example

Economic Economic Strains jobs, wages, subsidies & Pressure on land, ration & welfare schemes in
civic resources border states

Social Social Ethnic tension & host–migrant Assam anti-foreigner agitation (1979–85) → Assam
friction Accord

Political Political Voter-list distortion & electoral Allegations of illegal names in electoral rolls in
manipulation border districts

Security Security Cover for infiltration, trafficking & Concerns over migrant-route exploitation by
radicalisation trafficking & extremist networks

Strategic Strategic Hostile actors can weaponise Demographic-engineering concerns in the Siliguri
migration & demographic change Corridor (‘Chicken’s Neck’)

16.4 Challenges in Tackling Illegal Migration

Detection difficulty — shared language/ethnicity & forged documents make identification hard; no fool-proof
nationality test.
Porous terrain — riverine & unfenced stretches (Indo-Bangladesh, Indo-Myanmar) resist physical sealing.
Legal & humanitarian tension — absence of a refugee law; non-refoulement & humanitarian obligations vs sovereign
control.
Deportation bottlenecks — source countries (e.g., Bangladesh) often deny nationality, stalling repatriation; limited
detention capacity.
Political sensitivity — vote-bank politics & ethnic mobilisation impede consistent enforcement.
Federal friction — citizenship is a Union subject but implementation burdens States (Assam NRC experience).

16.5 Measures & Strategies to Curb It

Measure Detail / Example

Border hardening CIBMS smart fencing, floodlighting, BOLD-QIT riverine tech on Indo-Bangladesh; BSF anti-
infiltration (cross-link Ch 14).

Identity infrastructure NPR/NRC, biometric Aadhaar de-duplication, secure electoral-roll verification.

Bilateral cooperation Coordinated border management & repatriation MoUs (India–Bangladesh BSF–BGB; biometric
data-sharing).

Work-permit & legal Regulated, documented labour mobility to reduce clandestine flows.
pathways

Detection & deportation Foreigners Tribunals, detention-cum-holding centres, expedited verification with source states.

Legislative clarity CAA 2019 for specified persecuted minorities; a comprehensive refugee/asylum law (long-
pending).

Development & climate Source-region & border-area development (BADP) and climate-adaptation cooperation to reduce
resilience push factors.

16.6 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 — Features

Feature Provision

Beneficiaries Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis & Christians — i.e., six non-Muslim communities.

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 Feature Provision

Source Pakistan, Bangladesh & Afghanistan — three Muslim-majority neighbours.

countries

Cut-off date Entered India on or before 31 December 2014.

Ground Persecution (or fear of persecution) on grounds of religion.

Benefit Eligibility for fast-tracked citizenship by naturalisation — residency requirement cut from 11 years to 5.

Exclusions Excludes Sixth-Schedule tribal areas (Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura) & Inner-Line-Permit States
(Arunachal, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur).

Not covered Muslims (incl. Ahmadis/Shias), and persecuted groups from other neighbours (e.g., Sri Lankan Tamils,
Rohingya, Tibetans).

16.7 Analysis — Supporting Arguments vs Criticism

Supporting Arguments Supporting Arguments Criticism

Humanitarian refuge for religiously Humanitarian refuge for religiously Religion as a citizenship criterion
persecuted minorities of three persecuted minorities of three argued to violate Article 14 (equality) &
theocratic neighbours theocratic neighbours secularism (basic structure)

Narrow, time-bound (pre-2015) & does Narrow, time-bound (pre-2015) & Excludes persecuted Muslim sects
not affect existing Indian citizens does not affect existing Indian citizens (Ahmadis, Hazaras) & non-religious
persecution — under-inclusive

Historical responsibility flowing from Historical responsibility flowing from Omits Sri Lankan Tamils, Rohingya,
Partition & the Nehru–Liaquat Pact Partition & the Nehru–Liaquat Pact Tibetans — selective
logic logic neighbour/community choice

Citizenship is a Union plenary power; Citizenship is a Union plenary power; Feared linkage with a nationwide NRC
CAA only eases naturalisation, not CAA only eases naturalisation, not could disadvantage Muslims who fail
detection/deportation detection/deportation documentation

16.8 Impacts of the CAA

Social polarisation — nationwide protests (2019–20), communal sensitivities & anti-CAA agitations.
Assam Accord conflict — CAA’s 2014 cut-off clashes with the Assam Accord’s 1971 cut-off, reigniting indigenous-
Assamese anxieties.
Federalism friction — several State Assemblies passed anti-CAA resolutions; debate over State refusal to implement
a Union law.
International criticism — concerns raised by UN bodies & foreign legislatures on the religion-based criterion.
Diplomatic sensitivity — implications for relations with Bangladesh & the framing of its minority record.

16.9 Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024 & the NRC Linkage

Citizenship Rules, 2024

Notified March 2024 — operationalised CAA 2019 (notified ~4 years after enactment); created an online portal and
empowered district-level & central Empowered Committees to process applications.
Documentation — applicants furnish proof of country of origin and of entry before 31 Dec 2014; eligibility certification
involves a designated committee.

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The NRC Linkage
NRC — the National Register of Citizens is a register of bona fide Indian citizens; the Assam NRC (updated under
SC monitoring, final list 2019) excluded ~19 lakh persons.
The CAA–NRC interaction (the core anxiety) — critics argue a nationwide NRC excluding undocumented persons,
combined with CAA offering a religion-based recovery route for six communities, could disadvantage Muslims who
fail documentation; the Government states no nationwide NRC has been finalised.
NPR — the National Population Register is widely seen as a possible first step toward an NRC, deepening the
documentation-anxiety debate.

16.10 Way Forward

Comprehensive refugee law — a rights-based asylum statute with clear, religion-neutral criteria & non-refoulement
safeguards.
Robust, fair detection — transparent Foreigners Tribunals, due process, legal aid; avoid arbitrary exclusion (Assam
NRC lessons).
Border & identity tech — complete riverine sensing (BOLD-QIT), biometric de-duplication, secure electoral rolls
(cross-link Ch 14).
Bilateral & climate cooperation — repatriation MoUs and source-region/climate-resilience support to cut push factors.
Constitutional fidelity — implement citizenship policy consistent with Articles 14/21 & the basic structure; await
judicial settlement of CAA.
Federal consultation — Centre–State coordination on implementation to reduce friction & protect indigenous-
community concerns (Assam Accord).

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 17 Organised Crime, Narcotics & the Terror-Crime Nexus

Organised crime is structured, profit-driven illegal activity by syndicates that operate across jurisdictions, using violence,
corruption and concealment to sustain themselves. Narcotics trafficking is its single largest revenue stream globally and
the most exam-tested sub-theme for India.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime describes the convergence of crime, terror and narcotics as the defining
transnational-security challenge of the 21st century. India’s geography places it between the world’s two largest opium-
producing regions — the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran) and the Golden Triangle (Myanmar-Laos-Thailand)
—which makes the nexus a direct and continuing internal-security threat.

17.1 Types of Organised Crime

Type Activity Example

Drug & arms trafficking Smuggling of narcotics, weapons and Punjab heroin & weapon seizures (₹1,200 cr
ammunition across borders drugs in 2024)

Human trafficking Forced labour, sexual exploitation, organ trade, Indo-Nepal & Indo-Bangladesh trafficking routes
child abuse

Smuggling Gold, FICN, wildlife, antiquities, counterfeit Pakistan-printed FICN routed via Bangladesh
goods

Extortion & contract Protection rackets, contract killings, real-estate D-Company’s extortion networks in
violence coercion Mumbai/Gujarat

Cyber-crime syndicates Online fraud, identity theft, ransomware, financial South-East-Asia-based scam compounds
scams targeting Indians

Money laundering Concealing illicit proceeds via PNB-Nirav Modi — ₹14,000 cr; Mahadev Betting
shells/hawala/crypto App — ₹6,000+ cr

Environmental crime Illegal mining, timber, wildlife, sand smuggling Tiger-poaching rings; illegal sand-mining mafias

Counterfeiting & IPR Fake medicines, electronics, branded goods Counterfeit medicine seizures across metro
crime states

17.2 Organised Crime vs Terrorism

Organised Crime Organised Crime Terrorism

Profit-driven — motive is illicit Profit-driven — motive is illicit Ideology-driven — motive is

wealth wealth political/religious/ethnic

Avoids public attention; operates Avoids public attention; operates Seeks publicity & public fear
secretly secretly

Targets a market, not a state Targets a market, not a state Targets the state, society or symbols

Tolerates a weak state; corrupts Tolerates a weak state; corrupts it Seeks to coerce or overthrow the state
it

Note: Convergence happens because the two need the same things — untraceable money, secure routes, weapons, safe
houses and corrupt officials. Crime supplies the money and infrastructure; terror supplies the cause. Over time the line
blurs into hybrid ‘crime-terror entrepreneurs.’

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 17.3 National & Transnational Linkages

National-Level Linkages
Financial — OC profits fund terror operations: D-Company financed the 1993 Mumbai blasts.
Logistical — syndicates supply safe houses, fake documents, transport: handlers used for 26/11 logistics.
Operational — criminal cadres carry out attacks: gangsters used by terror outfits for hits in J&K and Punjab.
Political-electoral — criminalisation of politics weakens institutional response to OC.

Transnational-Level Linkages
Drug-terror axis — Taliban opium revenue; ISI use of Afghan drug money to fund LeT in J&K.
Arms trade — syndicates from Pakistan/Afghanistan supply AK-47s, IEDs to LeT, JeM.
Hawala & crypto — cross-border informal value transfer; David Headley’s 26/11 financing trail confirmed by
interrogation.
Cyber-syndicate hubs — South-East Asian scam compounds funnel proceeds to organised networks with terror
linkages.
Maritime smuggling — 1993 Mumbai blasts RDX landed via the Konkan coast; Gujarat coast narco seizures (ICG–
ATS).

17.4 Narcotics

India sits between the world’s two largest illicit-opium-producing regions.

Region Detail

Golden Afghanistan — Pakistan — Iran. World’s largest opium producer pre-2022; supplies heroin/morphine via the
Crescent western/northern borders into Punjab, J&K, Rajasthan.

Golden Triangle Myanmar — Laos — Thailand. Resurgent post-2021 Myanmar coup; supplies heroin and synthetic
methamphetamine (Yaba) into the North-East via Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland.

Domestic Licit opium (MP, Rajasthan, UP under Govt. Opium & Alkaloid Factories) with risk of diversion; illicit poppy in
cultivation Jharkhand, Manipur.

Synthetic drugs ATS, methamphetamine, MDMA increasingly manufactured in clandestine labs (Gujarat seizures, 2022–24).

17.5 Linkages of Drug Trafficking

Linkage Linkage Mechanism Example

Drugs → Drugs → Same routes/networks; arms paid for Pakistan drones drop heroin + AK-47s
Gunrunning Gunrunning in drug consignments + IEDs in Punjab

Drugs → Money Drugs → Money Bulk cash proceeds laundered via ED traced ₹135 cr Bitcoin laundering
Laundering Laundering hawala, shells, crypto in betting-app drug case (2022)

Drugs → Human Drugs → Human Common routes & traffickers; drug- Indo-Nepal & Indo-Bangladesh
Trafficking Trafficking debt coercion into trafficking trafficking linked to drug corridors

Drugs → Terror Drugs → Terror Narco-proceeds fund LeT/JeM, ISI uses Afghan drug money for the
Financing Financing Khalistani revival, Maoists J&K proxy war

Drugs → Drugs → Bribes to officials, politicians, police Multiple ED cases of compromised

Corruption Corruption officials in border districts

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 17.6 Narco-Terrorism

Why It Has Emerged

Geography — proximity to both Golden Crescent & Triangle creates a continuous supply pressure.
Post-2021 Myanmar coup — weakened state control → surge of synthetic drugs into the North-East.
Post-2021 Afghanistan transition — Taliban’s revenue model historically tied to opium; uncertainty drives flows.
Demand surge — young urban demand & rising disposable income widen the Indian market.
Technology — drones, crypto and dark-web markets lower the cost and risk of trafficking.

How It Operates
Drone delivery — BSF recovered 100+ Pakistani drones along the Punjab border in 2025 (294 in 2024) ferrying
heroin and weapons.
Crypto laundering — Delhi Police 2025 bust traced laundered crypto across 10+ countries in a drug syndicate case.
Cross-state networks — Punjab–Delhi–Mumbai–Goa routes; coastal drops along the Gujarat and Konkan coasts.

Counter-Measures
Anti-drone grid — RF interceptors, jammers, soft-kill lasers along the Punjab and Rajasthan borders (Ch 14).
Coordinated enforcement — NCB – BSF – ED – Coast Guard – ATS joint operations; MAC intelligence-sharing.
FATF pressure — sustained advocacy against Pakistan and other source/transit countries.
Demand reduction — Nasha Mukt Bharat Abhiyaan, school-based prevention, rehabilitation.
Crypto regulation — VDA Service Providers brought under PMLA reporting (2023).

17.7 Drone-Borne Smuggling

Drones are the lowest-cost, highest-deniability tool of cross-border trafficking.

Detection — DRDO anti-drone radar; RF & acoustic detection; thermal/IR cameras along the border belt.
Soft & hard kill — RF jammers, GPS spoofers, laser DEWs at critical airfields and borders.
Quick-reaction grid — QRTs in Gurdaspur and Amritsar integrated with CIBMS sensors.
Regulatory framework — Drone Rules 2021; No-Permission-No-Takeoff (NPNT); Digital Sky portal; geo-fencing &
remote ID.
Indigenous capability — counter-UAS development and drone-swarm technology (lesson from Operation Sindoor,
May 2025).

17.8 Legal & Institutional Framework

Laws

Law Role

NDPS Act, 1985 Cornerstone narcotics law — prohibits cultivation/production/possession; rigorous imprisonment
10–20 yrs; death penalty for repeat offenders in extreme cases.

UAPA, 1967 (amended 2019) Used where narco-trade funds terror — designation, asset seizure (Ch 10).

PMLA, 2002 (amended 2023– Attaches & confiscates drug-money proceeds; crypto brought under reporting (Ch 13/19).
24)

MCOCA, 1999 (Maharashtra) Stringent state law against organised crime; presumption of guilt; intercepted-evidence
admissibility.

Gujarat Control of Organised State-level analogue to MCOCA; covers cyber-crime.

Crime Act, 2015

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 Law Role

NIA Act, 2008 (amended Investigates narco-terror linkages with extraterritorial reach.
2019)

Institutions

Body Mandate

Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) Apex anti-narcotics agency; intelligence, interdiction, international coordination.

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Customs-side narcotics & smuggling enforcement at ports/airports.

Central Bureau of Narcotics Licit opium control; legal-poppy cultivation oversight.

State Anti-Terrorism Squads Maharashtra ATS, Gujarat ATS — OC-terror investigations.

Enforcement Directorate Money-laundering follow-through on drug-trade proceeds.

Financial Intelligence Unit — India Suspicious-transaction reporting & analysis.

17.9 Operation Dhvast & Key Initiatives

Operation Dhvast (May 2023)—joint NIA–ED–Punjab/Haryana/Rajasthan police operation against narco-terror-

gangster networks linked to pro-Khalistan groups; 129 raids, multiple arrests, weapons & drug seizures across 7
states.
Operation Sard Hawa — BSF cold-weather anti-smuggling drive along the Rajasthan-Pakistan border.
Nasha Mukt Bharat Abhiyaan (2020) — Ministry of Social Justice flagship demand-reduction & awareness
programme in 372 vulnerable districts.
MANAS Helpline (1933) — NCB toll-free anonymous reporting of drug trafficking (launched 2024).
NCORD — Narco-Coordination Centre mechanism (Centre, State, district) for coordinated action.

17.10 International Framework

Instrument Role

UNTOC, 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) — binding
framework on criminalisation, asset confiscation & mutual legal assistance.

UNTOC Protocols Trafficking in Persons (Palermo Protocol); Smuggling of Migrants; Firearms Protocol — India a
party.

1961 / 1971 / 1988 UN Drug Core international narcotics regime — Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), Psychotropic
Conventions Substances (1971), Trafficking (1988).

UNODC Implementation, technical assistance, IMoLIN data network.

FATF AML/CFT standards — disrupts drug-money & terror-finance flows (Ch 13/19).

INTERPOL Red Notices, operational coordination, narcotics database.

17.11 Challenges in Combating the Nexus

Porous borders & terrain — riverine and unfenced stretches resist sealing; drone delivery defeats fencing alone.
Technological adaptation — encrypted messaging, crypto, dark web outpace enforcement capability.
Jurisdictional fragmentation — OC is transnational while law-enforcement is national/state-based.
Demand persistence — rising domestic consumption sustains the market even if supply is interdicted.

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 Corruption & political nexus — criminalisation of politics weakens institutional response.
Source-state limits — limited leverage over Afghanistan/Myanmar/Pakistan production & sanctuary.

17.12 Way Forward

Whole-of-government action — integrated NCB–ED–NIA–Customs–State Police task forces under MAC.

Border modernisation — complete the smart-fence + anti-drone + sensor grid along Indo-Pak and Indo-Myanmar
frontiers (Ch 14).
Financial choke — aggressive PMLA action, crypto-tracing (RegTech/SupTech), Egmont/FATF cooperation.
Comprehensive anti-OC law — a central organised-crime statute extending MCOCA-style provisions nationally.
Demand reduction — scale Nasha Mukt Bharat, school programmes, rehabilitation; community policing in vulnerable
districts.
International cooperation — MLATs, joint investigations, UNTOC/UN drug-convention engagement, INTERPOL
coordination.
Indigenous tech — counter-UAS, blockchain audit trails, AI-pattern detection for narcotics & laundering.

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 18 Black Money

Black money is income on which legally-due tax has not been paid, or wealth generated through illegal activity and
concealed from authorities. The National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) broadly defines it as aggregate
incomes that are taxable but not reported.
It is the conceptual twin of money laundering: laundering is the process of legitimising tainted wealth, while black
money is the stock of that wealth — the two are studied together because the same channels (hawala, shell firms, offshore
secrecy, real estate) create and conceal both.

18.1 Types of Black Money

Type Description

Tax-evaded income Legally-earned income concealed to avoid tax (undisclosed business profits, cash transactions).

Crime-generated wealth Proceeds of illegal activity — corruption, drugs, smuggling, extortion.

Domestic black money Concealed within India — benami property, cash hoarding, under-invoicing.

Offshore black money Stashed abroad in tax havens & shell entities (Panama/Paradise/Pandora exposures).

18.2 Sources & Modes of Generation

Source Mechanism Example

Real estate Cash component & under-valuation of property Benami property under-reporting (ED probes
deals 2024)

Trade mis-invoicing Over/under-invoicing exports & imports DRI — ₹1,000 cr mobile-parts over-invoicing
(2021)

Tax evasion Undisclosed income, fake expenses, shell firms Mahadev Betting App scam — ₹6,000+ cr (2023)

Bullion & cash High-value cash & gold transactions outside Recurrent ED/IT raids on cash hoards
economy books

Corruption & Bribes, misappropriated public funds Delhi Liquor Policy case (2023) — alleged
kickbacks kickbacks

Offshore secrecy Funds parked in tax havens via layered entities Panama Papers (2016), Pandora Papers (2021)

18.3 Estimates & Major Exposés

No official figure is definitive — estimates vary widely, which itself is an analytical point about the opacity of the parallel
economy.
Estimate range — studies (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), National Council of Applied
Economic Research (NCAER), and Arun Jaitley National Institute of Financial Management (AJNIFM) commissioned
by the Finance Ministry) have placed the black economy at a substantial share of GDP; no single official number is
conclusive.
Panama Papers (2016) — ICIJ leak exposing offshore entities; multiple Indian names referred to a Multi-Agency
Group.
Paradise Papers (2017) / Pandora Papers (2021) — further offshore-secrecy disclosures involving Indian individuals
& entities.
HSBC & LGT lists — earlier foreign-bank-account disclosures triggering Income-Tax & ED action.

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 18.4 Impact of Black Money

Impact Detail

Revenue loss Erodes the tax base, constraining public-welfare spending.

Economic distortion Inflates real-estate/asset prices; widens inequality.

Financial-system risk Parallel economy undermines monetary policy & banking integrity.

Governance erosion Fuels corruption & political-electoral funding opacity.

National security Funds organised crime & terror financing.

External vulnerability Capital flight weakens the rupee & external accounts.

18.5 Legal & Policy Measures

Measure Role

Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Targets undisclosed foreign income/assets; steep penalties & prosecution;
Assets) Act, 2015 one-time compliance window.

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Confiscation of benami property; complements PMLA against domestic
Act, 2016 concealment.

PMLA, 2002 (+2023–24 amendments) Attaches & confiscates proceeds of crime — the core enforcement link
(detail — Ch 19).

Demonetisation (Nov 2016) Withdrew ₹500/₹1000 notes to curb cash-held black money; debated
efficacy.

Income Declaration Schemes / PMGKY Voluntary disclosure windows for unaccounted income with penalty.

GST (2017) Wider invoicing trail & input-credit matching shrink the cash/under-invoicing
economy.

DTAA / AEOI / FATCA Automatic exchange of financial-account information to expose offshore

assets.

SIT on Black Money (2014) Supreme-Court-monitored Special Investigation Team coordinating

agencies.

18.6 Demonetization—A Balanced Assessment

What It Was
On 8 November 2016, the Government withdrew the legal-tender status of all ₹500 and ₹1,000 currency notes, effective
midnight — affecting approximately ₹15.4 lakh crore, or about 86% of the cash in circulation.
New ₹500 and ₹2,000 notes were introduced; citizens were given 50 days (till 30 December 2016) to deposit old notes in
banks.
Announced unilaterally without prior public notice, on the basis of secrecy considered essential to its design.

Stated Objectives
Curb the stock of black money held as cash.
Counter fake currency notes (FICN) — printed largely in Pakistan and routed through Bangladesh.

Choke terror financing dependent on bulk cash.

Push the economy toward formalisation, digital payments, and a wider tax base.

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Reduce corruption by destroying undeclared cash hoards.

Legal & Institutional Basis

Issued under Section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, which empowers the Central Government to declare
any series of notes to cease being legal tender.
The Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017 was later enacted to extinguish the RBI's liability on the
demonetised notes that were not returned.
In Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court — by a 4:1 majority — upheld the decision as
legally valid; Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented, holding that demonetisation of all notes of a series required a legislative
route rather than executive notification.

Stated Gains
Tax base widened — Income-Tax returns rose from 4.04 crore (AY 2016–17) to 6.85 crore (AY 2018–19), a 70%+ increase.
Digital payments accelerated — UPI transactions, fledgling at launch, scaled rapidly post-demonetisation; today UPI
handles over 14 billion transactions per month.
Bank deposits rose — large inflows into the formal banking system temporarily improved liquidity and CASA ratios.

FICN circulation disrupted — high-quality fake ₹500/₹1000 notes were rendered worthless overnight; new notes had
stronger security features.

Some terror funding squeezed in the short term — bulk cash holdings of militant networks lost value.
Real-estate cash component reduced for a period; property under-valuation became harder.

Limitations & Criticisms

~99% of demonetised notes returned to the banking system — per the RBI's annual report, ₹15.31 lakh crore of the
₹15.41 lakh crore demonetised was deposited back, meaning very little unaccounted cash was extinguished, the headline
objective.
GDP impact — most independent economists estimate a short-term GDP growth loss of 1–2 percentage points; informal-
sector activity, agriculture, and MSMEs were hit hardest.
Informal-sector disruption — cash-dependent livelihoods (daily-wage labour, small traders, farmers, rural artisans) faced
severe income loss during the cash-shortage weeks.
Human cost — official figures cite over 100 deaths attributed to long bank queues and currency-shortage-related stress
(parliamentary replies); independent estimates higher.
Black wealth not in cash — most black money is held in real estate, gold, foreign accounts, and benami assets, not in cash
hoards; the design therefore targeted only a small slice.
MSMEs and employment — the CMIE and other surveys recorded job losses, particularly in the informal sector and small
manufacturing.
Re-monetisation problems — initial cash shortage, frequent rule changes, ATM recalibration delays, and queues hurt
public convenience and trust.
Subsequent withdrawal of ₹2,000 note (May 2023) — the same note introduced to ease re-monetisation was itself
withdrawn within seven years, raising questions about the original design.

18.7 Way Forward

Deepen financial transparency — expand AEOI/DTAA networks; beneficial-ownership registries; tighten shell-
company scrutiny.
Reform real estate — digitised land records, realistic circle rates, mandatory PAN/AADHAAR linkage to curb cash &
benami.
Strengthen enforcement coordination — empower the Multi-Agency Group, SIT, ED, CBDT, FIU-IND with data-
analytics & inter-agency sharing.

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 Electoral & political-funding reform — transparency in political finance to choke a major black-money sink.
Leverage technology — AI-driven data-mining (Project Insight), GST analytics, and PMLA-linked asset tracing.
Global cooperation — sustained FATF engagement & treaty-based recovery of offshore assets

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 Practice Questions

Q1. Discuss the shift from India's classical doctrine of strategic restraint to the Doval Doctrine. How has this
'Defensive-Offensive' posture reshaped India's response to terror, China, and internal threats?

Q2. What is the SAMADHAN framework? Discuss how it operationalises India's counter Left Wing Extremism
doctrine in the absence of a published NSD.

Q3. 'A doctrine is also a deterrence-communication instrument. 'In light of this statement, explain how a published
National Security Doctrine could strengthen India's signalling to Pakistan and China.

Q4. Distinguish between state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. Substantiate with the example of Pakistan's
Zia Doctrine and its post-2014 evolution.

Q5. Explain Pakistan's strategy of 'bleeding India through a thousand cuts'. How has India's response to this strategy
evolved since the 2016 Uri surgical strikes?

Q6. Distinguish between state and non-state actors with reference to India's security threats. Why do non-state
actors persist despite repeated kinetic action against them?

Q7. Discuss China's multi-domain pressure strategy against India. Examine how Beijing combines border, cyber,
economic, and information instruments to coerce India along the LAC and in the IOR.

Q8. Discuss the radicalisation funnel through which hostile actors recruit Indian youth on digital platforms. Suggest
counter-radicalisation strategies

Q9. Discuss the three-layer linkage between underdevelopment and extremism in India's tribal heartland. Why does
development alone not extinguish armed insurgency?

Q10. The Salwa Judum experiment is often described as a counter-insurgency misadventure. Examine the
constitutional, operational, and human-rights critique offered by the Supreme Court in Nandini Sundar v. State of
Chhattisgarh (2011)

Q12. The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission proposed a multi-pronged NAXALIS framework for tackling
Naxalism. Discuss its principal pillars and assess its continued relevance.

Q13. Examine how the 'Clear-Hold-Develop' doctrine has shaped the operational response to LWE. Illustrate with
examples of Operation Black Forest and Bastar deployment

Q14. Discuss the role of specialised counter-LWE units such as Greyhounds, CoBRA, and Bastariya Battalion in
degrading Maoist operational capacity

Q15. Examine the security architecture put in place in Jammu and Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370. Has it
succeeded in reducing infiltration and local recruitment?

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 Q16. How has the changing demographic of terrorism in J&K—from foreign infiltration toward local recruitment, Over-
Ground Workers (OGWs), and proxy fronts—complicated the counter-terror response? Suggest a way forward.

Q17. Trace the evolution of the North-East insurgency across its four phases. How has the nature of the threat
changed from the Naga uprising of the 1950s to the present?

Q18. Evaluate the EAST framework as a strategy for North-East counter-insurgency.

Q19. Discuss the Khalistan movement in its present-day diasporic avatar. How does it threaten India's internal
security?

Q20. Operation Sindoor has been described as India's most significant cross-border military action since 1971.
Examine the doctrinal, diplomatic, and technological dimensions of this operation and its implications for regional
security.

Q21. Discuss the methods of cyber warfare deployed by state-linked Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups
against Indian critical infrastructure.

Q22. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) protection is the cornerstone of national cybersecurity. Discuss the legal
and institutional regime for CII in India and the gaps that persist.

Q23. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, has been described as both an essential security instrument
and an over-broad tool. Critically examine the Act in light of its 2019 and 2023–24 amendments

Q24. Discuss the various types and sources of black money in India. How effective has the post-2014 institutional
response been?

Q25. Demonetisation was projected as a decisive blow against black money, terror financing, and counterfeit
currency. Critically assess its outcomes against these stated objectives.

Q26. Discuss the use of drones for narcotic and weapons smuggling across India's western border. What
technological and institutional counter-measures are in place?

Q27. Examine the principal challenges in India's security-agency architecture. Suggest a reform roadmap drawing on
the key recommendations of the various committees and reports.

Q28. Discuss the use of deepfakes and AI-generated disinformation as emerging cyber threats. Suggest counter-
measures

Q29. Discuss the role of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) in India's internal security. What are the principal
reforms required to address force-multiplier gaps?

Q30. Examine the role of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in combating terrorism. How have the 2019
amendments expanded its mandate?

Q31. Examine the role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in shaping India's anti-money-laundering regime.

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 Q32. India continues to operate without a formally published National Security Doctrine. Critically examine the
rationale for and against such a doctrine, with reference to India's recent strategic behaviour.

Q33. The rise of social media has made the information domain both a battlefield and a safeguard for internal
security. Examine the dual role of media in India's internal security, with relevant examples

Q34. Mob violence and lynching have emerged as a distinct category of law and order challenge in India. Discuss
the structural causes and propose measures to contain this phenomenon

Q35. 'The roots of extremism lie not in ideology alone but in the systematic denial of rights, land, and livelihood.'
Critically examine this statement with reference to the tribal belt in central India

Q36. Despite successes in counter-LWE operations, the persistence of Naxalism indicates unresolved structural
contradictions. Discuss the social, economic, and governance dimensions of LWE that purely military responses
cannot address

Q37. 'Terrorism is no longer a craft but a competitive industry with diversified revenue streams and a global supply
chain.' Analyse this statement with reference to India's counter-terror experience

Q38. Cyber warfare has been described as a 'grey zone' where the boundaries between crime, espionage, and act of
war are deliberately blurred. Discuss the methods of cyber warfare and evaluate India's preparedness to respond

Q39. India's National Cyber Security Policy 2013 is considered outdated in the face of contemporary threats. Identify
its key gaps and propose elements that a revised National Cyber Security Strategy must incorporate

Q40. Money laundering is not merely a financial crime—it is a direct threat to India's economic sovereignty and an
enabler of terrorism. Examine the process of money laundering, its linkages with terror financing, and India's
countermeasures

Q41. India's borders are not merely geographic lines—they are active theaters of transborder crime, smuggling, and
infiltration. Examine the diverse security challenges along India's land and maritime borders and evaluate the
government's border management architecture.

Q42. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, has been both defended as a humanitarian measure and criticised as
a security and constitutional risk. Critically examine the Act's provisions, implications, and the ongoing legal and
political debate

Q43. Organised crime in India has transformed from localised criminal syndicates into transnational networks with
political and security implications. Discuss the types of organised crime, their linkages with terrorism, and India's
legal-institutional response

Q44. Black money undermines India's financial sovereignty and provides a parallel funding stream for anti-national
activities. Critically examine the sources, impact, and legal measures to combat black money, with a balanced
assessment of demonetisation.

Q45. Discuss the significance of the New ULFA Peace Accord (2024) for Assam's internal security.

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