FABIHA CHOUDHURY SAYED

2311065016

SUBMITTED TO: Dr. Saleh Mohammad Shahriar (SAMS)

Abstract

Pakistan's constitutional history is characterized by a turbulent battle to create a long-lasting legal system,
which resulted in the country's first constitution in 1956 after nine years. This essay explores the complex
issues surrounding constitution-making from 1947 to 1956, examining the institutional, geographical, and
ideological obstacles that impeded development. This paper aims to focus on How did Pakistan's early
constitutional experiments fail due to the ongoing conflict between the desire for provincial
autonomy among various ethnic groups and the need for a centralized Islamic state? Using a
historical-analytical approach, this paper suggests that the delay in drafting a constitution produced a
political void that ultimately allowed the military and bureaucracy, two non-elected institutions, to
consolidate their hold on power. This legacy continues to shape Pakistan's democratic landscape.

Introduction
The enormous challenge of creating a constitution for a country marked by ethnic diversity and
geographic division coincided with Pakistan's independence in 1947. Pakistan was governed under the
revised Government of India Act 1935 for over ten years, in contrast to many post-colonial republics that
swiftly moved to a permanent legal structure. The identity of the state and the allocation of power were
hotly debated on topics throughout this time. The research paper's objectives are to determine the
underlying reasons behind Pakistan's first constitution's nine-year delay, to examine the ideological
disagreement over Islam's place in the state between the religious leadership and modernists/secularists,to
assess how the demographic divide and geographic separation between East and West Pakistan led to a
federalist dilemma and to investigate the "Doctrine of Necessity's political and legal ramifications for
Pakistan's future constitutionalism.

The Leadership Vacuum and Inherited Framework

A "crisis of leadership" that essentially halted the drafting process characterized Pakistan's early
years. The Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a charismatic mediator who could
mediate disputes between religious groups and local authorities. Less than a year after
independence, in September 1948, he passed away, leaving the Muslim League—a movement
rather than a formal political organization—in chaos.

The party broke apart into local cliques in the absence of Jinnah's powerful voice. The center
became even more unstable when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951.
The "viceregal" customs of the British Raj, which transferred authority from the elected
members of the Constituent Assembly to the Governor-General's administrative offices, were
able to reemerge because of this void. The essence of the state changed throughout this
transition, going from democratic consensus to bureaucratic authoritarianism, rather than just a
change in individuals.

The Ideological Conundrum: Islam's Place

Determining Pakistan's "Islamic" identity was the biggest challenge. Minorities and secularists
were alarmed by the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which attempted to find a compromise. The
vision of the Ulama was for a polity in which the Quran and Sunnah governed all [Link]
Modernists' Vision: Imagined a democratic society based on contemporary constitutional norms
but motivated by Islamic beliefs. Consensus on the preamble and fundamental rights was delayed
for years due to this ideological struggle (PerQueryResult 2.1.2).

East vs. West: The Federal Challenge

Pakistan's peculiar topography—two wings divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory presented a
federalist nightmare. Representation was a major issue. Although 54% of the population lived in
East Bengal, the elite from the West feared "Bengali domination. Then there was the language
crisis; the Language Movement, which further politicized regional politics, resulted from the
1948–1952 attempt to declare Urdu the exclusive national language, which alienated the
Bengali-speaking majority (PerQueryResult 2.5.2). The "One Unit" plan was developed by the
West Pakistani leadership, led by Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and Governor-General
Ghulam Muhammad, to combat the "Bengali majority" in the legislature. The provinces of
Punjab, Sindh, NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Baluchistan were combined into a single
administrative unit via the West Pakistan Act of 1955. Establishing "parity" between the two
wings was the fundamental constitutional motivation behind the declared objectives of reducing
provincialism and streamlining administration. The leadership might argue for a 50/50 split in
parliamentary seats by establishing a single West Pakistan, so balancing the East's numerical
advantage. This was a clear transgression of the democratic ideal of "one person, one vote." A
decade of constitutional animosity that no legal instrument could ultimately resolve resulted from
the One Unit concept, which came to represent Punjabi-Mohajir domination over the
demographic majority of the East and the smaller provinces of the West.

The Doctrine of Necessity and Judicial Failure

The most important turning point in Pakistan's constitutional history is still the legal dispute
between Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan and the Federation of Pakistan. Chief Justice Muhammad
Munir relied on Bracton's dictum, "That which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by
necessity," to reverse the ruling of the Sindh High Court and approve the Assembly's
[Link] "Doctrine of Necessity" gave the president a "blank check" under the law. It
implied that the survival of the state took precedence above the letter of the law. Critics contend
that this ruling just protected the autocrats rather than the state. The judiciary abandoned its duty
as the protector of the constitution by putting executive expediency ahead of constitutional
sovereignty. The martial regimes of 1958, 1969, and 1977 were eventually justified by this
precedent, starting with a cycle in which the constitution was viewed as a "piece of paper" rather
than the ultimate rule of the state.

The Language Movement and Cultural Alienation

Perhaps the greatest fundamental barrier to constitutional agreement was the national language
controversy. Jinnah proclaimed "Urdu, and only Urdu" to be the official state language in Dhaka
in 1948. The demographic fact that more than 54% of people spoke Bengali was disregarded in
this statement. For the inhabitants of East Bengal, this was not only a language problem but also
an economic and political one; Bengalis would be essentially excluded from military
commissions and public service positions if Urdu were the only official language.

When police opened fire on protesters in Dhaka on February 21, 1952, killing many activists, the
tension reached a breaking point. This incident turned the constitutional discussion into a
widespread ethnic identification movement. The psychological harm was done, but the First
Constituent Assembly was compelled to acknowledge Bengali as a national language in the 1954
draft. The "Language Movement" (Bhasha Andolon) laid the groundwork for the ultimate 1971
secession by demonstrating how the West Pakistani elite saw the federation through a prism of
cultural uniformity rather than pluralistic democracy.

The 1956 Constitution: A Vulnerable Agreement

A parliamentary republic was finally established under the 1956 Constitution. It did not,
however, resolve the fundamental complaints about regional autonomy. It was more of a
"document of expediency" than a "document of consensus." Pakistan's first democratic era ended
with Ayub Khan's military takeover in 1958 as a direct result of its failure (PerQueryResult
2.3.1).

Conclusion
Pakistan's constitution-making issues were not just procedural; they sprang from a crisis of
national identity and a lack of confidence among the federating entities. Authoritarian forces
were able to solidify their position due to the delay in drafting a constitution, which led to a
society in which "necessity" frequently triumphed over the "rule of law." As Pakistan continues
to negotiate the challenges of federalism and the 18th Amendment, it is crucial to comprehend
these early mistakes.

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