STUDY GUIDE

UNITED NATIONS HISTORIC

SECURITY COUNCIL
Agendum-
The Situation in Southeast Asia, 1976.
Freeze Date- 8th September, 1976.
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
CHAIRPERSON
Ayaan Kaushal, Suditpo Chatterjee

VICE CHAIRPERSON
Aaryan Kar

DIRECTOR
Aryan Ghosh
 INDEX
1 Chairpersons Address........................................ 4-5
2 Flow of Debate .................................................... 6
3 The Security Council .......................................... 7
4 Overview of the Agenda ..................................... 8
5 Importance of Freeze Date .................................. 9
6 Timeline .......................................................... 10-15
7 Uncovering the new alliance ................................. 16-17
8 Stakeholders and their Positions ....................... 18-35
The situation in Vietnam
The situation in Democratic Kampuchea
The situation in China
The position of the USA
The Position of the USSR
The Position of NATO
9 International Law relevant to the Issue at hand.. 36-38
10 Paperwork Guide............................................... 39-40
11 Expectations of the Executive Board ................... 41
12 Citations............................................................. 42
 CHAIRPERSON’S ADDRESS
Greetings Delegates,
The United Nations Security Council stands as the strongest body entrusted with
the maintenance of international peace and security, a mandate that extends far
beyond conventional warfare and into the complex interplay of ideology,
sovereignty and humanitarian responsibility. In 1976, the world finds itself at a
risky inflection point where the conclusion of one conflict has not brought
stability, but rather unveiled a new and far more intricate web of tensions and
alliances (Russia watch out). The end of the Vietnam War has not resulted in
peace in Southeast Asia, but instead has created a region known for its
uncertainty and ideological divisions.

While the global community hopes to feel relief after the end of a nearly 20 year
war, the situation within Democratic Kampuchea (now Cambodia) under the
Khmer Rouge has begun to raise serious humanitarian concerns with reports that
hint at atrocities on an unprecedented scale- an event that is now recognised as
the Kampuchean Genocide with nearly 2 million dead. Adding onto this already
fragile environment is the death of the PRC leader Mao Zedong (will be
discussed in committee).

Delegates must walk into this committee recognizing that the situation before
them is not a singular crisis, but a convergence of multiple issues. As shown
above, the agenda for the committee is “The Situation in Southeast Asia, 1976”.
An agenda that is deliberately broad in scope to empower discussion by granting
delegates the flexibility to explore the full scope of issues that define this moment
in history.

The Kolkata circuit has long been recognized for its emphasis on technical
precision and intellectual capability, both of which are qualities that this
committee will both demand and cultivate. Delegates are encouraged to move
beyond surface level engagement and immerse themselves in the depths of policy,
law, precedent and alliances. This is not merely a simulation of communism

4
versus capitalism and right versus wrong because on this stage, there is no true
right or wrong, the line is blurred and it is our job to find and highlight it.

Every individual present in this committee occupies a position of power and

privilege. The power to freely engage with global issues, to voice bespoke
perspectives and to influence discourse. As Uncle Ben once said to Peter, "with
great power comes great responsibility”, the responsibility to approach debate
with sincerity and a sense of diplomacy, to respect and celebrate the differences
of viewpoints and to contribute meaningfully to discussions. It is important to
remember your position as diplomats and know that war is an easy way out, to
pull the trigger is easy but to descalate and to rebuild is difficult. Know that
people have lives and that war asks for the same.

With that, I look forward to seeing each one of you rise to the occasion.

Regards,
Ayaan Kaushal,
Secretary General,
Chairperson of the United Nations Historic Security Council,
THSMUN’26

5
 FLOW OF DEBATE

6
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations Security Council is the chief executive organ of the United
Nations. It is given the mantle and responsibility of maintaining international
peace and security. Its powers are given in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the
United Nations Charter.

The United Nations Security Council is empowered under Article 34 of the UN

Charter to examine any dispute or situation involving member or observer states
that could potentially threaten international peace and security. The Council is
responsible for addressing conflicts and preventing situations that may lead to
international tension or instability. Its primary functions include:

Pacific Settlement of Disputes:

The Security Council encourages parties involved in a conflict to resolve their
disagreements through peaceful methods such as negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, or judicial settlement, often through the International Court of
Justice.

Measures Without the Use of Force:

If peaceful efforts fail, the Council may impose non-military measures against the
aggressor state. These can include economic sanctions, restrictions on trade and
communication by air, sea, rail, or post, as well as the suspension of diplomatic
relations.

Military Action:
In situations where non-military measures prove ineffective, the Security Council
may authorize the use of armed force. Such actions can involve military
operations carried out by air, naval, or ground forces contributed by UN member
states.

Permanent Members remain the same.

Non Permanent Members- India, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Philippines, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Australia.
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 OVERVIEW OF THE AGENDA
The agenda focuses on a region undergoing rapid and dangerous change. The end
of the Vietnam War has left a power vacuum and uncertainty relating to
reliability and diplomacy across Southeast Asia. At the same time, developments
within Cambodia raise serious humanitarian concerns thereby forcing the
international community to confront difficult questions about intervention and
responsibility.
The death of Mao Zedong further adds to this instability as changes within
China may significantly impact regional alliances.
This agenda requires delegates to navigate a mix of humanitarian crises, regional
conflicts and global power politics. The challenge lies in balancing sovereignty
with responsibility in intervention and national interests with international
stability.

Importance of Freeze Date

The freeze date of 8 September 1976 is one of the most important aspects of the
committee because Southeast Asia at the time stood at the edge of major
geopolitical changes whose outcomes were still uncertain. By September 1976,the
Vietnam War had ended and Vietnam had reunified under communist rule but
the regional order was still dicey despite the fall of Saigon.
Relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea were worsening through border
clashes and ideological hostility. The main significance of the freeze date is due to
the death of Chinese revolutionary and fashion icon, Mao Zedong. His death on 9
September 1976 would later reshape Chinese politics and foreign policy. The
question of the cause of his death is also to be considered uncertain for the
purpose of the committee.
At the same time, detente between the United States and the Soviet Union still
formally existed, even if it had weakened significantly after the Vietnam War.
The freeze date is equally important regarding Democratic Kampuchea. By
September 1976,reports of executions, forced labour and political purges under
the Khmer Rouge were circulating internationally,but the full scale of the
Cambodian genocide was not yet understood due to the regime’s isolation.
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Delegates should avoid acting with complete historical certainty regarding events
that have not unfolded in their entirety.
From a procedural perspective,the freeze date establishes the limits of admissible
information in committee. Delegates are strongly discouraged from referencing
post-1976 events unless introduced through Executive Board updates. Any
mentions of events occurring after the freeze date will be treated as violations
and will be marked accordingly.

9
 TIMELINE
Freeze Date- September 8, 1976
Details that are italicized are fictitious

1946-1954- The first Indochina war: France invades communist Viet Minh forces
led by Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. This conflict became part of the
larger Cold War struggle after the US classified it to be under their containment
doctrine.

1945- In February 1945, the three heads of states Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin
met in Yalta to decide the fate of Europe after the end of the Second World War.
Joseph Stalin, who wanted a buffer zone due to increasing tensions between the
Soviet Union and the West, violated the Yalta conference conventions and
utilised the Soviet Army presence to make most of East Europe fall under the
Soviet influence. In July of the same year, the Potsdam conference saw an extreme
shift and the ultimate complete breakdown of relations between the Soviets and
the West. The Potsdam conference which saw the division of Germany created a
huge divide between the initial grand alliance when it finally came to Berlin.
Stalin who staked complete claim to Berlin was brutally challenged and cornered
by the now more confrontational heads of Clement Atlee and Harry S. Truman.
Berlin was divided between a Western portion controlled jointly by the British,
Americans and the eventual French. This led to an extreme anger to foster within
the Soviets and Stalin refused to cooperate and work with the West due to this
humiliation.

1946- Churchill’s iron curtain speech- In March of 1946, after the soviet violations
of the Yalta agreement, Winston Churchill now out of power but with still
massive political influence gave the Iron Curtain Speech. This speech particularly
attacked the Soviets and blamed them for the division of Europe which led to the
suffering and separation of the people. In February of 1946 the US diplomat
George Kennan released the Long Telegram which detailed how the US should
treat the Soviet Union.

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The Long Telegram also included a detailed account of how the US should respond to the
Soviet Union. The US started to support the UK in their atomic arms development and
provided a special fund known as the Crown Donations to the UK to help rebuild the
United Kingdom from the devastation of the Second World War. The total donation
amounted to 6 Billion USD. In December of 1946, the KGB after more than a year of
strenuous espionage infiltrated the Ministry of Defence records and discovered the
documents of operation unthinkable. Joseph Stalin upon finding out about this understood
that he could no longer continue to treat the UK and US as merely ideological rivals but
also as an existential threat to them. Stalin ordered a mass rearmament campaign and the
search for raw materials and resources in Siberia and the Arctic territories of the Soviet
Union to fund the Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union also fast paced their atomic
weapons development. After conducting espionage and even kidnapping key researchers of
the Manhattan project the Soviets had an initial prototype of the atomic bomb in 1946.

1947- Truman Doctrine: The United States officially adopts a policy of

supporting countries resisting communism. This officially marks the beginning of
the containment policy. The Soviet Union does their first official test of an atomic
weapon.

1949: We see a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War between the
communist Communist Party of China and the capitalist Republic of China.
Chairman of the PRC Mao Zedong then established the People’s Republic of
China. American fear over communist expansion in Asia increases as they fear
the alliance of communist China and USSR.

1950: The start of the Korean War and the first real case of containment. UNSCR
83 led to the creation of a US led UN task force in Korea to assist the capitalist
South Koreans against the North Korean army. This showed the world that the
US was not afraid of assisting its capitalist allies and their containment policy
was taken more seriously. The US increased their involvement in Asia. America
also increases its aid to France in Vietnam. The emergence of the Domino theory
can also be attributed to this point in time. It expressed the American fears of
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand also falling to communism if Vietnam was allowed
to do so. A strong anti communist stance of their population allowed them to
fund counter movements to communist activities.
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1954- Battle of Dien Bien Phu: A turning point in the Cold War as France suffers
a decisive defeat against Vietnamese communist forces. All French colonial
influence in the Indochina region collapses and all eyes turn to the US.
China and the Soviet Union who wanted to avoid a Korea like situation whereby the
nation would be divided between a communist and capitalist regime secretly started
supporting the Vietnamese. The Soviet Union's support was more technological and
intelligence related. While China in a similar manner towards the end of the Korean War
provided their support in terms of man power. By the end of this conflict, the French had
suffered significant losses. Due to the Vietnamese exploiting guerilla warfare tactics was
able to kill over 50,000 French servicemen. A significant development was the sinking of
the battleship Jean Bart. The vessel was used for shore bombardment and with help from
Soviet intelligence the Vietnamese used a suicide guided torpedo to destory the warship
which killed 1100 out of the 2300 servicemen onboard. After this event the United States
Navy stationed in Okinawa decided to intervene to aid the French forces in terms of
rescue. The next action of the US was still not decided yet.

Geneva Conference of 1954: Following the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam is
temporarily divided at the 17th parallel with north vietnam being communist and
south vietnam being anti communist. Nationwide elections are proposed but they
are never held. The US (funnily) refuses to fully support the agreement due to a
fear of communist victory (a very real fear as Ho Chi Minh was getting more
favoured due to French atrocities, a weak capitalist government and general harsh
treatment by the French).

Late 1950s-Early 1960s: 1955 is regarded as the official start to an unofficial war
(the US never declared war on Vietnam) and the US heavily supports South
Vietnam financially and militarily. This leads to growing communist insurgency
in the South through the Viet Cong. The Chinese and the Soviets provide
overwhelming support to the North Vietnamese in the form of 84 mig 21 aircraft, along
with a variety of surface to air missiles which brought the total loss of US air assets to
18,000 by the end of the war.

1963: South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem is overthrown and assassinated
in a coup. Political instability in South Vietnam worsens. The Chinese who had now
12
established a significant influence of communism in the North and this influence was
growing in the South. This made the US effort extremely difficult and exacerbated
casualties.

1964- Gulf of Tonkin Incident: Alleged attacks on US naval vessels are seen by
North Vietnam in a naval confrontation. This led the US Congress to pass the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving President Lyndon B. Johnson even more scope
for military action in Vietnam. Following the passing of this resolution the Chinese
became extremely paranoid and understood that merely having nuclear weapons would
not be enough. Due to the large scale integration of intelligence which occurred owing to
the Korean War and the eventual Vietnam War started procuring more Soviet Weapons
and in particular the technology to produce Soviet diesel electric submarines in particular
the Whiskey-Class.

1965: Large scale deployment of American combat troops begins and Operation
Rolling Thunder starts which is a massive bombing campaign across North
Vietnam. Due to the use of guerrilla forces by the North Vietnamese Army,
bombs are dropped over forests and innocent civilians leading to many civilian
casualties. Massive bombing campaigns target North Vietnam.

1965-1973: The US begins its use of napalm, white phosphorus and chemical
defoliants such as Agent Orange. Millions of civilians and children are affected by
this which draws international criticism against American conduct in the war.
Photographs such as ‘Napalm Girl’ and other journalist work proves instrumental
in uncovering the real extent of American ‘atrocities’.

1968- Tet Offensive: This major surprise offensive launched by North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong forces beginning January 31, 1968, during the Lunar New Year
holiday. This was costly for American morale. A coordinated attack of over
85,000 communist troops attacked over 100 cities, towns and military
installations, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and took over most of these
from American control.

13
Despite eventually losing control, the campaign led to American media
criticizing the American spending in Vietnam ($300,000 per confirmed Vietcong
kill) and it still proving ineffective. Huge protests broke out in the US homeland
against the war.

Late 1960s-Early 1970s: Further anti-war protests spread across the United States.
The hippie and counterculture movements become strongly anti-war. This public
pressure led to the American congress having to reconsider the extent of their
involvement in Vietnam.

1969: Richard Nixon becomes President and introduces Vietnamization which

overviews gradual withdrawal of US troops and giving greater reliance on South
Vietnamese forces.

1970: US and South Vietnamese forces invade Democratic Kampuchea to attack

Viet Cong bases present in the region which causes instability to significantly
increase in the country and the regions surrounding it.

1971: The People’s Republic of China becomes the official representative of

mainland China in the United Nations following UN resolution 2758.

1972- Nixon’s Visit to China and the Shanghai Communique- For the purpose of the
committee, these events are to not be considered and any future diplomatic alliance from
the aforementioned date between the US and China are to not be considered.

1973- Paris Peace Accords: The final straw of the Vietnam war and led to the complete
removal of US troops from Vietnam. Signed by the United States, North Vietnam, South
Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

March 1973: All American combat troops and weapons leave Vietnam. Direct US military
involvement ends and financial ties are also greatly reduced.

April 1975- Fall of Saigon: Saigon (capital of south vietnam) falls to North Vietnamese
forces and Vietnam reunifies under communist rule. The US evacuation from Saigon
became a symbol of American defeat in Vietnam.
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April 1975: The Khmer Rouge captures Phnom Penh in Cambodia and
establishes the country of Democratic Kampuchea under the leader Pol Pot.

1975-1976- Kampuchean Genocide begins: Most major cities are emptied and
forced labor camps are established. These camps are made for intellectuals,
minorities and political opponents. Reports of mass killings and starvation begin
emerging internationally yet under article 2(7) of the UN charter, intervening in
a sovereign country without a proper investigation regarding its threat to
international peace is considered illegal.

1975-1976: Border tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia escalate. Vietnam

becomes increasingly aligned with the USSR while Kampuchea develops closer
ties with China (note the alliance for committee).

July 2 1976: Vietnam is unified under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and it
becomes a permanent observer in the United Nations.

On 8 September 1976: The United States had fully withdrawn from Vietnam.
Southeast Asia remains unstable and ly divided. Cambodia faces a growing
humanitarian catastrophe. Cold War rivalries between the US, USSR and China
continue shaping the region. The international community faces growing
pressure to respond to escalating crises in Southeast Asia.

15
UNCOVERING THE NEW ALLIANCE
(These details are fictitious and made for the purpose of committee)

During the middle of the Vietnam war, an alignment formed between Vietnam, China
and the Soviet Union based on ideological uniformity. This alliance was made to be
strongly united by their common objective of defeating American influence in Southeast
Asia.

Details of the alliance-

Although ideological tensions between China and the Soviet Union were there during the
Sino-Soviet split, both nations continued to provide extensive support to North Vietnam
throughout much of the conflict. This led to the creation of a highly significant military
coordination framework against the Western bloc.

China played a major role in sustaining the North Vietnamese war effort by supplying
massive quantities of small arms, ammunition, artillery, logistical equipment and
engineering assistance. Chinese support included weapons such as the Type 56 assault
rifle, Type 53 rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft artillery and large
quantities of Soviet-designed ammunition manufactured domestically within China.
Beijing also deployed thousands of engineering and support personnel into North Vietnam
over the course of the war to repair bombed railways, roads, bridges and supply routes
damaged by American bombing campaigns. This is what allowed Vietnamese troops to
remain concentrated on combat operations and ultimately lead to the retreat of the USA.

At the same time, the Soviet Union emerged as North Vietnam’s largest provider of
advanced military technology and heavy weaponry. They supplied the Vietcong with
strong air defense systems and modern combat equipment that increased the cost of
American operations in the region and was the reason congress was forced to pressure an
end to the war. Soviet military assistance included SA-2 Guideline surface to air missiles,
MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighter aircraft, T-54 tanks, radar systems, armored personnel
carriers, heavy artillery, Katyusha rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns and vast amounts
of ammunition and fuel. Soviet advisors were also ly involved in training North
Vietnamese personnel in operating advanced missile and radar systems, particularly
during major American bombing operations such as Operation Rolling Thunder and
16
later Linebacker campaigns. Many of the American aircraft losses over North Vietnam
were attributed directly to Soviet-supplied missile systems and air defense coordination.
The Soviet Union additionally used Chinese rail networks and logistical corridors for the
transfer of weapons and equipment into Vietnam during earlier stages of the war, creating
an indirect military supply chain connecting the three capitals.

This triangular relationship effectively formed an anti Western axis during the war.
Despite the underlying distrust between China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam
caused a balance between them and allowed the three to focus on the common enemy.
Seeing this new alliance however, there is no certainty of how the western powers will
react and what steps they might take to neutralise this communist force.

Although relations are still fragile, it is up to the delegates to consider the facts and
determine the future of this alliance. (Vietnam and China are divided over Kampuchea,
USSR and China had the Sino-Soviet Split etc. but they have to decide whether their
distrust is strong enough to break such an important alliance).

17
 STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR
POSITIONS
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
By September 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was one of the major
nations of Southeast Asia with regards to geopolitical influence. The conclusion
of the Vietnam War and the Fall of Saigon in April 1975 marked not only the
defeat of South Vietnam but also one of the greatest strategic and political
humiliations in the history of the United States. Vietnam had successfully
defeated 2 nuclear bearing p5 countries. First the French forces during the First
Indochina War and later arguably the most militarily advanced powers in the
world, the US. The victory of North Vietnam demonstrated that ideological
determination, guerrilla warfare and likability could overcome overwhelming
military and economic superiority. From this, Vietnam’s status across the world
rose dramatically and caused many to view it as the centre for revolutionary
success in Asia.
Beneath this image of victory however, would have laid a nation struggling to
survive the consequences of war were it not for a new alliance between the
communist powers. Despite years of intense American bombing campaigns,
widespread destruction of infrastructure and the use of ‘chemical’ agents had left
much of the country economically shattered and environmentally damaged but
Vietnam was recovering fast from its newfound support. However, despite the
economic help, the broken populace could not be repaired and Vietnam was still
set back on agricultural production and human support, the two things it was the
most dependant on. The government faced severe shortages of food, medicine
and housing, while simultaneously attempting to reunify the formerly divided
North and South under a single communist administration. The process of
reunification itself was difficult, as the South remained politically unstable and
economically dependent after years of American influence. No amount of
support could have fixed this and it left Vietnam bitter and war against outside
powers. The communist government initiated campaigns of political
consolidation, including the restructuring of institutions, suppression of
opposition and the establishment of re-education camps for former South
18
Vietnamese military personnel and officials. Such measures however increased
criticism from Western nations who claimed Vietnam was an authoritarian
governance and had significant human rights violations (funny of them to say),
while its allies largely defended the policies as necessary for national stability and
revolutionary consolidation.
As noted previously, Vietnam had become ly aligned with the Soviet Union and
China but this alliance also had a lot of problems. This was mostly due to the
Sino-Soviet split but the Vietnam war had caused improvements in relations.
However, things were only going to get worse due to the emergence of
Kampuchea into the picture. Vietnam had long been wary of Kampuchea due to
their genocidal leader Pol Pot who caused multiple cross border skirmishes
between the two countries. (Vietnam also invaded Kampuchea in 1978 due to
escalation by Kampichea which led to the entirety of Kampuchea being occupied
in 2 weeks and Vietnam keeping the country for the following decade). Despite
happening after the freeze dates, evidence of the divide between these two
countries could be seen and significantly complicated the good relations formed
during the Vietnam War.
At the time of the freeze date, Vietnam and China were in a peculiar state.
Despite decades of support by China against France and the USA, the cultural
revolution and Chinese support for Cambodia caused distrust from Vietnam. For
the representation of Vietnam, the decision of pro/anti China will be very
important for the committee.

19
THE SITUATION IN DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA
Democratic Kampuchea was deemed to be very unstable since its inception. It
was formed through a violent military overthrow driven by the Communist Party
of Kampuchea (CPK). Its establishment was a consequence of the breakdown of
Cambodia’s brittle neutrality during the Vietnam war and the destabilisation of
Indochina. Under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia had tried to maintain
formal neutrality as the conflict grew. But, it was always under strain due to the
inflow of North Vietnamese forces using sanctuaries in Cambodia along the
eastern border. Widespread bombing by the United States led to a huge amount
of internal instability. 1969 onwards, the US also engaged in covert and then
overt bombing of Cambodian territory during Operations Menu and Freedom
Deal to disrupt communist supply lines. These bombings caused a lot of
dislocation of civilians, destruction of crops and growing resentment of the Lon
Nol government .
All of this reached its tipping point when General Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk
in 1970 and brought Cambodia closer to US. A violent civil war erupted and
ended with the Khmer Rouge winning from increasing rural support as they
presented themselves as anti-imperialist liberators fighting both American
aggression and home-grown corruption. Finally, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge
captured Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 and officially established the new
government by January 1976.
When it gained power, Democratic Kampuchea initiated one of the most radical
revolutionary transformations of the twentieth century. Under the influence of a
agrarian communist ideology, the Khmer Rouge intended to eradicate all traces
of urban, intellectual, religious and foreign presence in Cambodian society. The
authorities engaged in violence, completely emptying cities of their inhabitants
and forcibly marching thousands of civilians into the countryside. Private
property was abolished along with currency, as the state attempted to rebuild a
society around collective agricultural labour. The implementation of the regime's
policies resulted in widespread starvation, forced labor, arbitrary detention and
executions of political opponents, ethnic groups, professionals and even members
of the Khmer Rouge. By the freeze date, widespread state terrorism was common
20
throughout the country. These acts were grave violations of basic principles of
international humanitarian law and human rights law such as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions to name a few.
Despite these grave violations however, foreign countries and even the United
Nations could just watch as Kampuchea claimed the above as an internal matter
thereby giving rise to questions under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. At the
time, Right to Protect was not codified in international law so legal unilateral
action and even a UN task force was out of scope.
Democratic Kampuchea may have been diplomatically isolated by the freeze date
of 8 September 1976 but it had a special strategic significance- The People’s
Republic of China. Credible sources have uncovered almost $1 billion in interest-
free economic and military aid in 1975 alone from the PRC which accounted for
almost 90% of all foreign economic aid. The two regimes were ideological mirror
images with Democratic Kampuchea modeling itself on Maoist ultra-radicalism
thereby hoping to incorporate the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap
Forward.
Ultimately,
At the time of the freeze date, Kampuchea had a clear alliance in place with the
PRC but its survival in the upcoming crises seemed bleak without stronger
regional alliances. For the representation of Kampuchea, the decision of alliances
will play a strong part of its stance in committee (especially if war breaks out).

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 THE SITUATION IN CHINA
he People’s Republic of China entered the 1970s as one of the most
transformative and unpredictable actors within the global Cold War order.
Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War
in 1949, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). The Communist victory fundamentally altered the strategic
balance in Asia and was perceived by the United States and its allies as one of the
greatest geopolitical setbacks of the early Cold War. It sought to export
revolutionary ideology throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America while
simultaneously consolidating internal control through campaigns such as land
reform, collectivization and political purges. China’s intervention in the Korean
War between 1950 and 1953 demonstrated its willingness to directly challenge
American military power and cemented its image as a militant revolutionary
state prepared to use force to defend communist influence in Asia.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, China formally aligned itself with the Soviet
Union under the framework of socialist solidarity. However, ideological and
strategic tensions gradually shattered this relationship in what became known as
the Sino-Soviet Split. Mao increasingly accused the Soviet leadership under
Nikita Khrushchev of “revisionism,” saying that Moscow had abandoned
revolutionary principles in favor of peaceful coexistence with the West. At the
same time, Soviet leaders viewed Mao’s policies as reckless and extreme.
However, the Vietnam war came in as a beacon of unity. It allowed both the powers to
put aside their differences and jointly support their ideological ally Vietnam in whatever
way they can. This cooperation led to surprisingly good relations considering how recent
the sino-soviet split was (about a 7 year gap between good relations and the split).
However, this was not sustainable. Similar to the end of the second world war where the
US and USSR’s cooperation ended after the defeat of Germany, the tripartite alliance
stands at a similar crossroad. China is faced with the difficult choice of embracing
extreme divide against the west while the USSR attempts to create a peaceful coexistence
or to work with the USSR and Vietnam for stronger overall cooperation but by letting go
of its founding principles (could be costly to the new leader when Mao Zedong is on the
verge of death) and also possibly cut its ties with Kampuchea.

22
Returning to the mid 1960s, the Cultural Revolution destabilized nearly every
institution within China. Schools and universities closed, senior party officials
were hunted, intellectuals were persecuted and Red Guard factions engaged in
violent ideological campaigns across the country. Although the main aim of the
Cultural Revolution was the targeting of domestic opponents, it also reinforced
China’s increasingly militant and revolutionary worldview to the West. The
government encouraged revolutionary movements throughout Asia and
portrayed itself as the authentic defender of anti imperialist struggle against
capitalism.
This ideological atmosphere became particularly influential in shaping China’s
policies toward Cambodia during the mid-1970s. Throughout much of the
Vietnam War, China continued supporting North Vietnam against the United
States through arms transfers, engineering assistance, anti-aircraft units and
infrastructure support. Beijing publicly framed this assistance as part of a broader
anti-imperialist struggle against American aggression and interventionism in
Southeast Asia. Chinese leadership condemned American bombing campaigns,
troop deployments and operations in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as violations
of state sovereignty and territorial integrity under principles reflected in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter. The extensive civilian casualties caused by operations
such as Rolling Thunder strengthened Chinese propaganda portraying the US as
an imperialist power seeking domination over Asia through military force.
Despite this earlier cooperation, relations between China and Vietnam seemed to
deteriorate after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 as discussed before. Chinese
leadership increasingly feared that Vietnam sought to establish itself as the
dominant regional power in Indochina and feared it would do so under Soviet
support. China saw Soviet influence in Vietnam as part of a broader strategy of
strategic encirclement aimed at isolating China geopolitically if it did not
cooperate. The signing of economic and military agreements between the USSR
and Vietnam increased the concerns that Vietnam would function as a Soviet
proxy directly along China’s southern frontier. Ideological tensions further ened
these suspicions. Vietnamese communism had historically been influenced by
both Soviet and Chinese revolutionary thought, but after 1974, Vietnam seemed
to increasingly favor Soviet models of centralized state development over Maoist
revolutionary protocols (may have been Chinese paranoia but they were wary of
the tripartite alliance turning against them). Chinese policymakers interpreted
this shift not simply as ideological divergence but as a direct threat to regional
balance and Chinese strategic interests.
During this time, China also cultivated very close ties with Democratic
Kampuchea under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. Beijing viewed the Khmer
Rouge as ideologically compatible and in pursuit of a radical agrarian socialist
transformation that was inspired partially by Maoist principles. Chinese support
for Democratic Kampuchea included military aid, economic assistance,
infrastructure projects, diplomatic recognition and political backing within
international forums. China became the Khmer Rouge regime’s main foreign
patron after 1975 giving nearly 90% of the country's foreign aid. China viewed
Kampuchea as an important avenger to Vietnam in case their alliance failed. By
strengthening Democratic Kampuchea, China hoped to prevent the emergence of
a unified Soviet-aligned bloc stretching across Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Legally and diplomatically, China consistently emphasized principles of
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in state affairs, particularly
in response to foreign military intervention in Asia. It frequently condemned
American military operations in Vietnam and Cambodia as violations of
international law and the UN Charter. At the same time, however, China’s
extensive support for revolutionary movements and armed factions throughout
Southeast Asia complicated its own claims regarding non intervention. The
biggest example of this hypocrisy is the backing of the Khmer Rouge. The above
reasons caused greater tensions across the world and even reflected in China’s
alliance with Vietnam which was beginning to deteriorate due to Vietnam’s
policy against Kampuchea.
By the freeze date of 8 September 1976, China stood at a critical transitional
moment. Mao Zedong was barely alive after suffering a heart attack just 5 days
prior, the Cultural Revolution had severely weakened state institutions and
political stability and China had to choose between an alliance that would single
handedly shape its future. The struggle for succession within the Communist
Party intensified between radical Maoist factions associated with the Gang of
Four and more pragmatic leaders such as Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping.
Internationally, China remained suspicious of both Soviet intentions and
Vietnamese regional ambitions while continuing to support Democratic
Kampuchea as a strategic buffer against Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.
For the representation of China, the decision of supporting the alliance of
Vietnam and USSR or leaving it could change not only the country’s future, but
also of the entire committee.
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 THE POSITION OF THE USA
In the late 1970s, America faced an unprecedented crisis. The freeze date of 8
September 1976 marked the end of the view of Southeast Asia as only a remote
conflict area for America. Southeast Asia became seen as the only place where the
entire global balance of power and American military credibility had been tested,
where the future of Cold War containment and the limits of superpower
involvement were both visibly demonstrated. The fall of South Vietnam in April
1975 was viewed as more than just the collapse of an ally. The defeat of South
Vietnam provided proof of America's 20 years of unsuccessful strategic planning
in that country and would fundamentally change the way that policymakers,
military and intelligence personnel, allies, enemies and the American public
viewed the role of the United States as a global superpower.
The American involvement in Southeast Asia cannot be understood in isolation
from the geopolitical consequences of WWII. As European colonial empires fell
apart, the United States and the Soviet Union took their place as two competing
rival superpowers with ideological and strategic goals and ambitions. The US’s
increasing desire to use the framework of containment was evident through the
Korean war, Cuban missile crisis and most of all in the Vietnam War. All of these
have to be discussed to get a good sense of where the US stood.
The Korean War outbreak in 1950 heightened fear for many Americans. It was
proof that the Soviet Union and Communist China were responsible for
coordinated aggression and that they were actively involved in trying to spread
communism, especially in Asia. Therefore, it is no surprise that Southeast Asia
held a lot of strategic value to the US despite being of little or no direct
economic significance to the United States. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy
and Johnson administrations gradually embraced the Domino Theory. It stated
that the collapse of one state to communism would destabilize neighboring
governments and trigger a huge regional realignment against Western interests.
Vietnam therefore became viewed not merely as an isolated conflict but, as the
US hoped, a symbol of capitalist success against the evil forces of communism.

25
Initially, American involvement in Indochina focused on supporting France
during the First Indochina War. By the early 1950s, the United States financed a
substantial portion of French military operations against the Viet Minh led by
Ho Chi Minh. The US feared that French defeat would accelerate communist
expansion throughout Asia. This began to be seen after the French collapse at
Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and fundamentally altered the regional landscape. The
Geneva Accords temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel into the
communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and the anti-
communist Republic of Vietnam in the South. Nationwide elections intended to
reunify the country were scheduled but ultimately never occurred. American
officials feared that Ho Chi Minh’s immense popularity and anti-colonial
legitimacy would guarantee communist victory. As a result, the US increasingly
committed itself to constructing and preserving a viable anti-communist South
Vietnamese state.
The rise of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam became central to this strategy.
American officials portrayed Diem as a nationalist modernizer capable of
resisting communist insurgency while building stable anti-communist
governance. Yet the South Vietnamese government rapidly developed severe
internal weaknesses. Political repression, corruption, religious discrimination
against Buddhists, economic inequality and authoritarian governance
undermined public legitimacy. At the same time, communist networks within
South Vietnam reorganized through the National Liberation Front, commonly
known as the Viet Cong. From the American perspective, the insurgency
represented externally directed communist aggression supported by North
Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. From the perspective of many Vietnamese
revolutionaries, however, the struggle represented resistance against an
illegitimate regime sustained through foreign intervention.
Throughout the early 1960s, American involvement escalated steadily. The
Kennedy administration increasingly embraced theories of flexible response and
unconventional warfare, believing that communist insurgencies required
sophisticated counterinsurgency rather than conventional military deterrence
alone. Yet the instability of South Vietnam worsened dramatically following the
overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Furthermore, coups,
political fragmentation, military instability and declining morale within the
South Vietnamese government intensified fears that communist victory was
becoming inevitable without direct American intervention.
26
All of this built up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. This became
the decisive turning point. Following reports of attacks against American naval
vessels by North Vietnamese patrol boats, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution which granted President Lyndon B. Johnson authority to expand
military operations without a formal declaration of war. Although the factual
basis of the second reported attack later became very disputed, the incident
provided political justification for large-scale escalation. What followed was one
of the largest military interventions in modern history, that too without any
declaration of war. American troop deployments surged from advisors
numbering in the thousands to combat forces exceeding half a million personnel.
Massive bombing campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder targeted North
Vietnamese infrastructure, transportation systems, industrial facilities and
military positions. Simultaneously, the United States launched extensive search-
and-destroy operations, pacification programs, strategic hamlet initiatives,
intelligence campaigns and counterinsurgency missions throughout South
Vietnam.
American military strategy relied heavily upon overwhelming technological
superiority as it possessed unmatched airpower, artillery capabilities, naval
dominance, helicopter mobility, electronic surveillance systems and industrial
production capacity. Policymakers also stronglybelieved that sustained military
pressure would eventually destroy communist operational capabilities and force
Hanoi into negotiations on favorable terms. Yet the structure of the conflict
undermined many American assumptions. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army relied upon guerrilla tactics, political mobilization, decentralized
networks, tunnel systems and prolonged warfare rather than conventional
battlefield confrontation. Communist forces demonstrated extraordinary
resilience despite enormous casualties and material destruction.
As the war intensified, the methods employed by the United States generated
escalating international criticism and domestic opposition. Bombing campaigns
extended into Laos and Cambodia in efforts to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail
and communist sanctuary zones. Covert operations such as Operation Menu
subjected Cambodia to extensive aerial bombardment while officially remaining
secret from much of the American public. Entire rural areas across Indochina
were devastated through bombing, defoliation, forced relocation and military
operations. The United States employed chemical defoliants such as Agent
27
 Orange to destroy forest cover and agricultural production, generating severe
long-term environmental and humanitarian consequences. Napalm strikes and
artillery bombardments caused a lot of civilian suffering which greatly reduced
the popularity of the South Vietnamese government. Millions of civilians
throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were displaced, while infrastructure,
farmland and urban areas suffered catastrophic destruction.
These actions generated profound legal and moral controversy. Critics argued
that American operations violated fundamental principles of international law,
including Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force
against state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Bombing campaigns in Laos
and Cambodia raised additional concerns because they occurred extensively
without formal declarations of war or any justification for war. Under the
framework of Jus ad Bellum, critics questioned whether American escalation
satisfied any of the principles of necessity, proportionality, legitimate authority
and last resort and by the end, even the criteria of a decent chance of success was
coming into question. Simultaneously, the conduct of the war itself generated
accusations of violations under Jus in Bello, the Geneva Conventions and the
UDHR. The principles of distinction between civilians and combatants,
proportionality in attacks, military necessity, humane treatment of detainees and
prohibitions against collective punishment became the main points of criticism
against the US.
The My Lai Massacre of 1968 became globally symbolic of the brutality
associated with the conflict. American soldiers killed hundreds of unarmed
Vietnamese civilians during a counterinsurgency operation. All of this was
initially covered up and reported as a success with hundreds of Viet Cong deaths.
However, as independent journalists looked closer and pressured Washington,
the reality of the details came out. The massacre was one of the biggest reasons of
anti war sentiment and damaged American credibility internationally.
Allegations regarding torture, unlawful detention, forced displacement,
destruction of civilian infrastructure and indiscriminate bombardment greatly
increased perceptions that the United States had become trapped within a
morally and strategically destructive conflict. The publication of photographs
depicting napalm victims and civilian suffering transformed the public's opinion
regarding the war.
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Inside the US, the Vietnam War produced one of the greatest political crises in
modern American history. Massive anti-war demonstrations erupted across
universities and major cities. Student activism, civil rights movements,
journalists, intellectuals and veterans challenged the legitimacy of the war. The
Tet Offensive of 1968 proved especially devastating as it saw the capture of every
single US base and embassy at once. Although communist forces suffered severe
military losses during the offensive, the attacks demonstrated that the war was
far from victory despite repeated official assurances from the US. Even after
winning back the bases at a very hefty price, the damage was done. Considering
that per confirmed kill cost about $300,000, the American public was done with
the war and urged for an end to it. The publication of the Pentagon Papers later
also exposed internal awareness among senior officials that many public claims
regarding progress in Vietnam had been misleading or deceptive.
This eventually led to president Richard Nixon’s strategy of “Vietnamization”
which aimed to transfer combat responsibilities gradually to South Vietnamese
forces while reducing American troops. Simultaneously, Nixon expanded
bombing campaigns and covert operations in Cambodia and Laos in attempts to
pressure North Vietnam militarily before negotiations and to show that the US,
despite retreating, was not weak. The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 formally ended
direct American combat involvement, yet the underlying conflict continued.
South Vietnam remained heavily dependent upon American financial and
military assistance while North Vietnam retained significant military
capabilities.
The final collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975 shattered remaining illusions
regarding American success. As North Vietnamese forces advanced rapidly
toward Saigon, scenes of chaotic evacuation from the American embassy became
internationally symbolic of defeat and humiliation. For many within the US, the
fall of Saigon represented the collapse of American credibility itself.
Policymakers were afraid that allies across Europe, the Middle East and Asia
would question the reliability of American security guarantees, while adversaries
would interpret withdrawal as evidence of declining American strength.
This perception strongly shaped American foreign policy by September 1976.
The United States faced a strategic contradiction. On one hand, many officials
believed that failure to resist communist expansion encouraged Soviet
assertiveness globally.
29
 On the other hand, the trauma of Vietnam created enormous reluctance toward
future large-scale military interventions. This phenomenon became known as the
“Vietnam Syndrome”.
The broader geopolitical environment increased these anxieties. Although
détente formally continued between the United States and the Soviet Union
through agreements such as SALT I and the Helsinki Accords, many American
strategists increasingly believed that Moscow was exploiting détente
opportunistically. Soviet influence expanded across Africa, the Middle East and
Asia during the mid-1970s. Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan’s instability and
Vietnam’s alignment with the USSR all appeared to suggest growing Soviet
confidence. Southeast Asia therefore became viewed within the US as evidence of
shifting global momentum favoring Soviet expansion.
Developments in Cambodia further complicated American policy. The Khmer
Rouge victory in April 1975 initially appeared as another communist success
linked to American retreat from Indochina but reports gradually emerged
regarding forced evacuations, executions, famine, labor camps and mass political
purges under Democratic Kampuchea. Although the full scale of atrocities
remained unclear by September 1976, American officials increasingly recognized
Cambodia as both a humanitarian disaster and a variable within the Sino-Soviet
rivalry.
The regional security environment remained unstable. Vietnam increasingly
aligned with the Soviet Union. Laos had fallen under communist control.
Cambodia remained under the extremist Khmer Rouge regime supported by
China. Thailand feared insurgency and Vietnamese expansionism. ASEAN states
increasingly emphasized sovereignty and non-interference as defensive principles
against ideological destabilization and external intervention.
Considering the above, perhaps the greatest American fear by 1976 was the
possibility that the international balance of power itself was shifting irreversibly.
Policymakers feared that revolutionary movements throughout the developing
world increasingly viewed Vietnam as proof that prolonged guerrilla warfare
could defeat even the strongest military power on earth. Soviet leaders appeared
increasingly assertive. Every crisis throughout Southeast Asia acquired
significance far beyond the region itself because it intersected with the wider
global view of deterrence and containment.
30
By the freeze date of 8 September 1976, the United States no longer viewed
Southeast Asia as a failed intervention. It viewed the region as the central lesson.
This would shape the future of American policy. Every crisis, no matter how
small, was now of utmost priority to the US who feared non involvement would
result in complete destruction of the capitalist world (funnily their involvement
also causes the same thing).

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 THE POSITION OF THE USSR
By September 1976, the Soviet Union viewed itself as the strongest defender of
socialism and the leading force opposing capitalist influence across the globe.
After the communist victory in Vietnam and the withdrawal of the United States
from Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union regarded the region as one of the greatest
strategic successes of the Cold War. The emergence of an alliance between the
Soviet Union, China and Vietnam represented a historic opportunity to
consolidate communist influence throughout Asia and challenge the dominance
of the Western bloc. Soviet policymakers believed that the defeat of American
forces in Vietnam had demonstrated the limitations of Western military power
and validated the effectiveness of this new alliance. Due to the same reasons, the
Soviets hoped to deepen military, economic and technological integration among
its Asian allies while presenting itself as the guarantor of regional stability and
revolutionary progress.
The Soviet Union's support for this alliance was founded upon military
cooperation during the Vietnam War which included MiG 21 fighter aircraft, T
54 and T 55 main battle tanks, SA 2 surface-to-air missile batteries, BM 21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers, anti aircraft artillery systems, radar networks, armored
personnel carriers and substantial quantities of ammunition and spare parts.
Through weapons transfers and intelligence sharing arrangements, the Soviet
leadership tried to create a unified socialist security architecture capable of
deterring intervention by both Western and Eastern capitalist powers. The
alliance also provided the USSR with greater access to strategically important
ports across Southeast Asia thereby expanding influence in the indo-pacific.
During the mid 1970s, the Soviet Union positioned itself as a champion of anti
imperialism and national liberation movements. Its diplomats argued that the
people of Vietnam had exercised their right to self-determination by rejecting
foreign domination and establishing a socialist government. Furthermore, they
strongly condemned American bombing campaigns and especially the use of
chemical weapons such as Agent Orange. At the same time, Soviet leaders
portrayed their own involvement as legitimate international solidarity rather
than foreign interference.

32
However, beneath this public image lay significant strategic calculations. The
Kremlin understood that maintaining unity among China and Vietnam was
essential for preventing the Western bloc from exploiting divisions within Asia.
A stable socialist alliance would secure Soviet influence across a vast geographical
area stretching from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea and would
dramatically strengthen Moscow's position in the global balance of power.
Therefore, by September 1976, the Soviet Union's primary objective was not
merely the survival of socialist governments in Southeast Asia, but the
transformation of the region into a permanently aligned sphere of communist
cooperation capable of countering American, NATO, and Japanese influence for
decades to come. In the eyes of Soviet leadership, the struggle in Southeast Asia
was no longer about winning a war but was about securing the future of socialism
itself.
However, it would not be so easy. With the rise of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
in Kampuchea, the alliance started to sour. With China’s uncertainty regarding its
position between Vietnam and Kampuchea, a new division within the socialist
forces seemed imminent (USSR, Vietnam and China, Kampuchea). For the
representation of USSR in committee, it will be extremely important to decide
the future of this alliance. Will the USSR be able to hold together the strongest
communist alliance of the time or will they succumb to diverging internal
interests.

33
 THE POSITION OF THE NATO
(NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION)
By September of 1976, the emergence of an alliance between the Soviet Union,
China and Vietnam represented one of the most significant geopolitical
developments of the Cold War from the perspective of the Western bloc. For
NATO, this alliance was not just some weak regional arrangement (ASEAN
cough) but the formation of a powerful and capable communist axis which was
already altering the global balance of power. The alliance essentially united the
best between the three countries- the industrial and military capabilities of the
Soviet Union, the enormous population and manufacturing potential of China
and the battle-hardened armed forces of Vietnam. To many policymakers in the
USA, UK, France, West Germany and other NATO capitals, the alliance was one
of the greatest fears of Cold War strategists. The defeat of their strongest
country, the United States, in the Vietnam War had already shaken confidence in
Western power and raised concerns about the effectiveness of the Containment
Doctrine. The formation of this new alliance seemed to suggest that rather than
slowing communist expansion, the events of the previous decade had
strengthened it.
From a military perspective, the alliance presented a serious concern. The Soviet
Union had one of the world's largest and most technologically advanced armed
forces and also had a huge nuclear arsenal along with sophisticated missile
systems. China contributed a massive standing army and rapidly expanding
industrial base capable of sustaining long-term military production. Vietnam
brought extensive combat experience gained through decades of warfare against
both French and American forces. Soviet military assistance had already
transformed Vietnam into a strong military power after acquiring the MiG 21, T
54 and T55 tanks, SA2 surface-to-air missile systems and advanced radar
networks and logistical support. Combined with the raw manpower of China,
NATO feared the alliance could establish a military bloc capable of resisting
external pressure

34
Economically, NATO governments also viewed the alliance with concern. A
coordinated socialist bloc spanning Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and
Southeast Asia had the potential to create extensive trade networks, resource-
sharing agreements, and industrial cooperation mechanisms that could reduce
dependence on Western markets and institutions. A consistent weak point for
the communist blocs where their economic strength but with such a diverse
alliance, that seemed to be disappearing. This was not in the interest of NATO as
without any hardships faced by the people under socialism, they would not be
ready to accept a new form of governance.
Despite these concerns, NATO's weak response (they did nothing) was
constrained by the situation of the post-Vietnam era. The enormous military and
political costs of the Vietnam War had created widespread public opposition to
another major military intervention in Asia. Western governments understood
that direct confrontation with the alliance risked escalating into a broader
conflict involving multiple nuclear powers. Therefore, NATO increasingly
focused on strengthening regional partnerships and expanding intelligence
cooperation. Greater emphasis was placed on cooperation with members outside
of the North Atlantic such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and Southeast Asian
states that remained outside the communist sphere.
Ultimately, by the freeze date, NATO saw the Soviet-China-Vietnam alliance as
the most significant strategic threat facing the Western world. It represented an
ideological, political, economic and most importantly a gruesome military
challenge. The alliance seemed very capable of reshaping the balance of power
across Asia, thereby undermining decades of Western containment efforts and
providing communist movements worldwide with a powerful example of
successful cooperation. For NATO, the challenge was no longer simply defending
Western Europe against Soviet expansion but it was preserving the broader
international balance against communism, especially in Southeast Asia.

35
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUE AT HAND
The situation in Southeast Asia in 1976 is ly connected to several principles of
international law, particularly those relating to sovereignty, humanitarian
protection, armed conflict and most importantly, the maintenance of
international peace and security. The following laws, conventions, agreements
and international frameworks are especially relevant to the issue at hand and
form the legal foundation upon which debate in committee may be based.

[Link] Nations Charter (1945)

The United Nations Charter is the primary legal framework governing
international relations. Important articles include Article 2(4), 2(7), 39-42, 51 and
many more. These articles (and more) are especially relevant in the context of
Cambodia and rising Vietnam-Cambodia tensions, where the UNSC must
determine whether the issue remains an internal matter or constitutes a broader
international threat.

[Link] Conference of 1954 and Geneva Accords (1954)

The Geneva Conference ended the First Indochina War and temporarily divided
Vietnam at the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam. The agreements
recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states in Indochina and
called for elections to reunify Vietnam. Although the United States did not fully
support the accords (the 10 resulting documents from the Geneva conference),
they remained internationally significant and formed the diplomatic basis for
later discussions on intervention and foreign involvement in Southeast Asia. The
agreements are important because they established the legal expectation that
foreign powers should not interfere militarily in the internal affairs of the region,
an issue that became increasingly controversial as the Vietnam War escalated.

[Link] Peace Accords

Signed in 1973 by North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the United States and the
Provisional Revolutionary Government, the Paris Peace Accords officially ended
direct American military involvement in Vietnam.
36
 The agreement called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, respect for
Vietnam’s territorial integrity and the exchange of prisoners of war. While the
accords failed to establish lasting peace, they remain highly relevant because they
reaffirmed the principles of sovereignty and non intervention. The collapse of
South Vietnam in 1975 and the reunification of Vietnam under communist rule
fundamentally altered the balance of power in Southeast Asia and contributed to
rising tensions with Cambodia by 1976.

[Link] Conventions
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 established the modern foundations of
international humanitarian law. They provide protections for civilians, wounded
soldiers, prisoners of war and non-combatants during armed conflicts. The
conventions prohibit torture, inhumane treatment, collective punishment and
deliberate attacks on civilians. Allegations of forced labour, executions,
starvation and mass displacement under the Khmer Rouge regime directly
contradict the humanitarian principles outlined within these conventions.
Additionally, criticisms of American military conduct during the Vietnam War,
including bombings and the use of incendiary and chemical agents, were often
evaluated through the lens of the Geneva Conventions.

[Link] on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide
The Genocide Convention was adopted by the United Nations following the
Holocaust and defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy
national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Signatory states are obligated to
prevent and punish genocide wherever it occurs. By September 1976, the full
extent of atrocities in Cambodia was not yet internationally confirmed, but
reports of systematic killings and persecution had begun to emerge. This
convention is therefore highly relevant to discussions surrounding whether the
international community has a legal or moral obligation to respond to
developments in Democratic Kampuchea.

37
 [Link] Protocol
The Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in
warfare. During the Vietnam War, the United States used substances such as
Agent Orange and other chemical defoliants, arguing that they were herbicides
rather than chemical weapons. Critics strongly challenged this interpretation,
claiming such substances caused severe environmental destruction and long-term
civilian suffering. The debate surrounding the legality and morality of chemical
use in Vietnam remains one of the most controversial legal aspects of the conflict.

[Link] Trials Principles

The Nuremberg Trials established the principle that individuals, including state
officials and military leaders, can be held accountable for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and violations of international law. These principles reinforced
the idea that “following orders” is not an acceptable defense for large-scale
atrocities. Although the trials occurred after World War II, the legal standards
established there remained highly influential by 1976, particularly in evaluating
mass killings and state-sponsored violence in Cambodia and alleged violations
during the Vietnam War.

[Link] Nations General Assembly and Security Council

Resolutions
These are the cornerstone of international law and the creation of new
precedence. Important GA resolutions like Resolution 2625 clarified important
principles of international law, including sovereign equality, peaceful settlement
of disputes, non intervention and the prohibition of force against another state
whilst SC resolutions like UNSCR 83 gave precedence for a military deployment
by the Security Council. Such resolutions are extremely important for the
committee and are a great help in backing claims, arguments and solutions. Their
(correct) use is highly encouraged.

38
 PAPERWORK GUIDE
Committee Email: [Link]@[Link]

Delegates of this committee can send the following kinds of paperwork to the
Executive Board:
Position Paper (compulsory): A position paper is a brief document that outlines
a country’s stance on the committee’s agenda. It usually includes background on
the issue, the country’s perspective and policies, and possible solutions that align
with its national interests. Position papers help delegates organize their research,
demonstrate preparation, and guide debate and resolution drafting during the
conference. A position paper is a compulsory paperwork required to be
submitted by all delegates.
Deadline for Submission- 14th June, 2026; 11:59pm

Draft Resolution: A draft resolution is a formal proposal that outlines the

collective ideas and solutions of delegates on the topic being discussed. It
represents the committee’s attempt to address the issue at hand through
structured, agreed-upon actions. Draft resolutions are debated, revised, and voted
on, and if passed, they reflect the official stance and decisions of the committee.

Public/Private Communique: A communique is a form of paperwork with the

purpose of conveying new information to the executive board and committee.
Private communiques are only meant to be seen by the executive board in their
entirety and if ratified, may be presented as an update. A public communique on
the other hand will be presented to the committee in its entirety if ratified. A
maximum of 2 pre committee communiques or other forms of paperwork are
allowed per delegate. Joint paperwork involving multiple delegates will be
counted towards the total number of communiques.
Deadline for Submission- 15th June, 2026; 11:59pm.
Please keep communiques and communique arcs grounded with the current
situation and realistic (they can be radical and disruptive).

39
Additional Documents:
1. Statutes
2. Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties
3. Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs)
4. Conventions
5. Presidential Statements
6. Action Orders
7. Charters
8. Directives Treaties must be compliant with the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.

Statutes must be compliant with actual statutes and their format (eg- The Rome
Statute).

40
 EXPECTATIONS OF THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD
The humanitarian concerns of the Vietnam War are discussed.
The updates are discussed adequately.
The threats to international peace are discussed regarding the cambodian
genocide.
Alliances are thought out well and be in line with the updates presented by
the executive board.
The final paperwork for this committee will be a Draft Resolution but
action orders may be discussed based on committee consensus.
The draft resolution should not be made useless and ineffective in an
attempt to make it “unscrappable”.
War be the last resort of the committee and only be done under
circumstances where no more diplomacy and deliberation is possible.
The use of Artificial Intelligence is strictly prohibited during committee
sessions. If caught, the executive board reserves the power to make
deductions as seen fit.

42
 CITATIONS

United Nations Charter

Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ICRC)
Customary International Humanitarian Law Database
Hague Conventions 1899 & 1907 (ICRC)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Permanent Court of Arbitration - Philippines v. China Award (2016)
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
Cold War International History Project - Wilson Center
Office of the Historian - U.S. Department of State
Encyclopaedia Britannica - Cold War
NATO Official History & Archives
Encyclopaedia Britannica - Vietnam War
U.S. National Archives - Vietnam War Records
Library of Congress - Vietnam War Resources
Pentagon Papers Archive - National Archives
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Yale Cambodian Genocide Program
Encyclopaedia Britannica - Khmer Rouge
Office of the Historian - Nixon Visit to China
Encyclopaedia Britannica - Cultural Revolution
Encyclopaedia Britannica - Soviet Union
Wilson Center - Soviet Foreign Policy Archives
NATO Official Website

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