INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS

1. CHR Employees v. CHR

Facts: Congress passed RA 8522 otherwise known as the General

Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of
Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. By virtue of which CHR
has upgraded and reclassified certain position in the Commission. DBM
has rejected the proposed modification scheme. CSC Central affirmed.

Issue: Whether the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an

upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in
the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management

Held: No. CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or
approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its
three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now
estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously
sought from the DBM is a superfluity. Article IX of the Constitution states
in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions
with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. 1987 Constitution and the
Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the
class of Constitutional Commissions.

2. Carino v. CHR

Facts: The case stemmed from actions taken on September 17, 1990, by
some 800 public school teachers in Manila, who conducted “mass
concerted actions” to highlight their demands due to unaddressed
grievances. These teachers, including the eight private respondents in the
Supreme Court case, were served orders by the Secretary of Education to
return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. Simultaneously, the
respondent teachers lodged complaints with the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) alleging undue replacement and lack of formal notice,
leading the CHR to initiate a case and schedule a dialogue. The CHR,
despite the Solicitor General’s motion to dismiss on behalf of Secretary
Cariño, arguing lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action,
proceeded with the case.

Issue: Whether CHR has jurisdiction

Held: No. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But it cannot try and decide cases (or

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hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial
bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
quite distinct meanings. Hence it is that the Commission on Human
Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to
do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.

3. EPZA v. CHR

Facts: Certain parcels of land in Cavite were designated as Export

Processing Zones by PD 1980. It was later sold to EPZA. Before the latter
could take possession, several individuals planted agri products without
permission from EPZA. EPZA paid P10k for them to sign quitclaims. Ten
years later, 3 of those farmers filed with CHR a joint complaint praying for
justice. CHR conducted an investigation. The farmers alleged that the
Engineer of EPZA bulldozed their crops. They tried to stopped but the
letter they showed was crumpled and they were insulted by the
engineer’s team. In May 1991, CHR issued an order of injunction against
EPZA, the PNP and Governor Remulla to desist from further acts of
terrorism etc. Two weeks later, Governor Remulla and other men
bulldozed the area, and allegedly handcuffed some of the farmers, and
intimidated them. CHR Chairman again issued an injunction Order. EPZA
filed with CHR a motion to lift the Order for CHR’s lack of authority. CHR
denied and EPZA filed with the SC. SC issued a TRO ordering CHR to cease
and desist implementing such injunction orders. CHR contended that
Article 13 of the Constitution, its power is not limited to mere investigation
but in letter c, “provide preventive measures and legal aid service to the
underprivileged.”

Issue: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or TRO
against the supposed violators of human rights?

Held: No. CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
(Cariño vs. CHR) It’s power is only to investigate, receive evidence and
make findings of fact… but fact-finding is not adjudication nor a judicial
function.” The constitutional provision “provide preventive measures
and legal aid service to the underprivileged” may not be construed
to confer CHR with jurisdiction to issue TRO or writ of injunction. If that
were the intention, the Constitution would have said so. Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law and never derived by
implication (Garcia vs. De Jesus, Tobon Uy vs. COMELEC) CHR’s power is
only fact-finding, investigation, and receipt of evidence but not
adjudication. Fact-finding is not adjudication. It must not be likened into
the judicial function of a court of justice.

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4. SIMON v. CHR

Facts: This case involves a petition filed by Brigido R. Simon, Jr., Carlos
Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, who are officials of
Quezon City, against the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The
petitioners sought to prohibit the CHR from hearing and investigating the
case filed by the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated, led by Roque Fermo, which was docketed as
CHR Case No. 90-1580. The conflict originated from a demolition notice
issued by petitioner Carlos Quimpo, ordering the private respondents to
vacate the premises along North EDSA to make way for a “People’s Park.”
Private respondents filed a complaint with the CHR alleging human rights
violations and requesting intervention to prevent the demolition. The CHR
ordered the petitioners to cease the demolition, subsequently cited
petitioners for contempt when the demolition proceeded, and approved
financial aid for the affected vendors.
Issue: Whether the CHR has jurisdiction to investigate the alleged
violations of the “business rights” of the private respondents

Held: No. The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the
1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human
Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights". The term
"civil rights” refers to those rights that belong to every citizen of the
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government.
Political rights on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis
the management of government.

SC is not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of

the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can
fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" intended by the Constitution.

However CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational

guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted
within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or
hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatory powers.

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5. Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA

Facts: Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia faced dismissal from the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) for honor violation related to tardiness.
Cudia blamed the late dismissal of the previous class which is somehow
denied. Contesting the penalty and asserting he was unjustly accused of
lying about the class dismissal, Cudia sought reconsideration, which the
PMA rejected. His case was escalated to the Honor Committee (HC), which
found him guilty of violating the Honor Code for allegedly lying in his
explanation. Parents of Cudia filed complaints before the CHR against the
HC members for alleged violation of the rights of Cudia. CHR finds
probable cause for violation of Human rights.

Issue: Whether HC shall Honor findings of CHR.

Held: No. The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not
binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at best,
recommendatory. The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the
CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court.
The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the
investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights and a
number of subsequent cases, the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not
a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to
adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The
power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:

RIGHT TO LIFE

1. Imbong v. Ochoa

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012. The case includes 14 petitions and 2
petition-in-intervention, assailing the RH Law on the following grounds:
violation to right to life of the unborn, right to health, right to religious
freedom. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives.

Issue: Whether RA 10354 unconstitutional.

Held: Partially granted. Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

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When life begins? that life begins at fertilization. Constitution affords
protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no
surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. • Contraceptives that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.

RH-IRR declared unconcstitutional. RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and

recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.

2. Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo

Facts: The case centers on the enforced disappearance of brothers

Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, who were abducted from their home in
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, on February 14, 2006, by members of the AFP
and the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). They were
subjected to torture and were detained in various military
facilities. Their ordeal ended when they escaped on August 13, 2007.
During their captivity, they were kept under deplorable conditions,
constantly threatened, and tortured. Upon their escape, the Manalo
brothers filed a petition for a writ of amparo before the Supreme Court,
marking it the first petition of its kind filed under the newly promulgated
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which took effect on October 24, 2007.
General Palparan claimed that Manalo Brothers were already free.

Issue: Whether the right to life, liberty, and security of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo was violated through their abduction, detention, and
torture by members of the military and CAFGU

Held: Yes. After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from
their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped
on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of
the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear
and convincing manner.

Discussion: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable

problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."

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The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means
"protection" in Spanish. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution
does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above
amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause,
provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human
rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and
amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of
habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution

However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of

amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, the remedy
provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; The writ of amparo serves both preventive and
curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances

Amparo Rule shall be available to persons whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation and the burden of proof is
only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

RIGHT TO LIBERTY
1. Rubi vs. Provincial Board

Facts: In 1917, the Manguianes (Mangyans) of Mindoro were ordered by

the governor to stay within an established reservation in Tigbao,
Mindoro. The Mangyans were ordered to stay in the reservation and if
they were to escape, they will be imprisoned. Rubi, a Mangyan,
through a petition for habeas corpus questioned the order as he alleged
that by being forced to remain in the reservation, they are being deprived
of their liberty and such deprivation was without due process of law.
Governor justified order that it was accordance with the administrative
code.

Sec. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian sites selected by provincial governor.

— With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of
any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. (Admin Code) In
relation to Sec. 2759 which inflicts imprisonment for refusal to such.

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Issue: Whether Section 2145 is void for violation of rights.

Held: No. Concept of Libery: Liberty means the opportunity to do those

things which are ordinarily done by free men. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties
with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. However such right is subject to
restraint hence, it must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the
citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except
by due process of law.

They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable;
it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and it applies alike to all of a class.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the

Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,
and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of
the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

Note: Meaning of Non-Christian: The reason it that the motive of the

law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a
particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law
is predicated in the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants. The
idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and
executive authority.

2. Agan v. International Air Terminals

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Facts: In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de
Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport
can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. NAIA was
proposed to be developed under the Build Operate and Transfer
arrangement (BOT). While negotiation of agreement were on going,
workers of international service providers claimed to lose their job upon
implementation of said agreements.

Moreover, since the displaced service providers, being unable to operate,

will be forced to close shop, their respective employees - among
them Messrs. Agan and Lopez et al. - have very grave cause for concern,
as they will find themselves out of employment and bereft of their means
of livelihood. This situation comprises still another violation of the
constitution prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process.

Held: Yes. The Piatco Contracts Violate Constitutional Prohibitions Against

Impairment of Contracts and Deprivation of Property Without Due Process

Since the displaced service providers, being unable to operate, will be

forced to close shop, their respective employees - among them
Messrs. Agan and Lopez et al. - have very grave cause for concern, as
they will find themselves out of employment and bereft of their means of
livelihood. This situation comprises still another violation of the
constitution prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process. Thou doing business at the NAIA may be viewed more as
a privilege than as a right. Nonetheless, where that privilege has
been availed of by the petitioners-in-intervention service
providers for years, such privilege evolve into some form of
property right which should not be removed x x x arbitrarily and
without due process." Said pronouncement is particularly relevant and
applicable to the situation at bar because the livelihood of the employees
of petitioners-intervenors are at stake.

The Piatco Contracts by locking out existing service providers from entry
into Terminal III and restricting entry of future service providers, thereby
infringed upon the freedom - guaranteed to and heretofore enjoyed by
international airlines - to contract with local service providers of their
choice, and vice versa.

Both the service providers and their client airlines will be deprived of the
right to liberty, which includes the right to enter into all contracts
and/or the right to make a contract in relation to one's business.

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3. Astorga v. People

Facts: The case involves Benito Astorga, the then Mayor of Daram, Samar,
who was charged with arbitrary detention of five Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) employees. On September 1,
1997, these employees, escorted by police officers, were on an official
mission against illegal logging within Daram, Samar. They
encountered boats they suspected of being constructed illegally. Upon
questioning a local, they were referred to Michael Figueroa, the boats’
owner.

In the course of their duties, the team approached two more boats under
construction and met Mayor Astorga. Upon discussing their mission,
Mayor Astorga exhibited aggressive behavior, including slapping the
team leader, Mr. Elpidio Simon. Mayor Astorga prevented the team from
departing by summoning armed men, who surrounded the team. Despite
having dinner later with Mayor Astorga, the team was effectively detained
until 2:00 a.m. the following day. Sandiganbayan tried Case

Issue: Whether the team were actually detained.

Held: Yes. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal

detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve
any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the
victim sufficient to paralyze the latter , to the extent that the victim is
compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance
with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will . In the case at bar, the
restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go
home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of
almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and
the witnesses. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants
and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

RIGHT TO PROPERTY

1. Morfe vs. Mutuc

Facts: Appellee Jesus Morfe filed a complaint before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) questioning the provision under Republic Act No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, whereby government officials

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are required to periodically file a sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income, and liabilities. He alleged that the said provision is
unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional rights to due
process, right to privacy, right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and right against self-incrimination as it compels him to
disclose his assets and liabilities while holding a position of public service,
premised on the unwarranted assumption that they are corrupt at heart
unless they comply with the said requirement.

Issue: Whether the provision is unconstitutional.

Held: No. Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely
aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It
is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A
public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its
objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The
conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. Liberty is
the rule and restraint the exception.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes

though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation
of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

In this case it was stated that right to liberty includes privacy. The right to
be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. In our jurisdiction
the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. However it can be said that the subject provision
infringes the right to privacy. This is not to say that a public officer,
by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such
a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities

2. Crespo v. Provincial Board

Facts: Without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent

Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative
case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was
allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex
parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent
Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending
petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.

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According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied
in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-
handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of
the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed.

Issue: Whether Petitioner denied due process.

Held: Yes. The order of preventive suspension was issued without giving
the petitioner a chance to be heard. A fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board.
The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications
of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or
forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. It is
defined that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which
means “a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society.

In relation to Right to Property: It is a principle in American jurisprudence

which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and
the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law

3. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta

Facts: QC enacted ordinance requiring that at least six percent of the

total area of private cemeteries be set aside for the burial of
deceased indigent residents of Quezon City. Respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc., a private cemetery corporation affected by this ordinance,
filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII, asserting that Section 9 of the ordinance was unconstitutional.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid
and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: No. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is
punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction

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thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be
revoked or cancelled.'

On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by

which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the

public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least

six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

1. Alliance for the Family Foundation v. HON. Garin

Facts: SC ordered 1. directs the FDA to formulate the rules of

procedure in the screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive
drugs and devices that will be used under Republic Act No. 10354 with
minimum due process requirements. 2. DIRECTS the DOH in
coordination with other concerned agencies to formulate the rules and
regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and
distribution/dispensation of the products or supplies under RA 10354
covered by the certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it will not be used as an abortifacient
subject to the following minimum due process requirements: (a)
publication, notice and hearing, and (b) interested parties shall be
allowed to intervene. 3. Directs DOH to generate the complete and
correct list of the government's reproductive health programs and
services under Republic Act No. 1035. Respondent claims that due
process need not be complied as the questioned acts of FDA is exercise of
its regulatory power.

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The respondents further claimed in their omnibus motion that the
requirements of due process need not be complied with because the
standards of procedural due process laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR. were
inapplicable considering that: a) substantial evidence could not be
used as a measure in determining whether a contraceptive drug
or device was abortifacient; b) the courts had neither jurisdiction nor
competence to review the findings of the FDA on the non-abortifacient
character of contraceptive drugs or devices; c) the FDA was not bound by
the rules of admissibility and presentation of evidence under the Rules of
Court; and d) the findings of the FDA could not be subject of the rule on
res judicata and stare-decisis.

For the respondents, to require them to afford the parties like the
petitioners an opportunity to question their findings would cause
inordinate delay in the distribution of the subject contraceptive drugs and
devices which would have a dire impact on the effective implementation
of the RH Law.

Issue: Whether due process of petitioner has been violated.

Held: Yes. Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and
procedural. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a
law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural
due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who
are called upon to administer it.

Instead of addressing the petitioners' assertion that the questioned

contraceptive drugs and devices fell within the definition of an
"abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH Law because of their
"secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of
the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb," the
respondents chose to ignore them and proceeded with the
registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of
several contraceptive drugs and devices.

Court notes that Step 5 requires the FDA to issue a notice to all
concerned MAHs and require them to submit scientific evidence that their
product is non-abortifacient; and that Step 6 requires the posting of the
list of contraceptive products which were applied for re-certification for
public comments in the FDA website.

Indeed, due process does not require the conduct of a trial-type

hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution requires is
that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide
on the applications submitted by MAHs after affording the oppositors like

13
the petitioners a genuine opportunity to present their science-based
evidence. As earlier pointed out, this the FDA failed to do.

2. City of Manila vs. Laguio

Facts: Malate Tourist Development Corp operates victoria court Malate.

Licensed as a Motel but accredited as Hotel. MTDC filed petition for TRO
impleading petitioner in relation to the City Ordinance declaring motels
and inns as among its prohibited establishments. MTDC claims that
such ordinance violates constitutional rights and an invalid exercise of
police power.

Issue: Whether subject ordinance is valid

Held: No. The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the

fiat No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property,
in each appropriate case, be valid.

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on

government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process." Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the
procedures that the government must follow and Substantive due
process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government's action.

To successfully invoke Police power reasonable relation must exist

between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment. The Ordinance was enacted to address and
arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments
in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the
deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars,
karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the

core issues of morality. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. The
penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be
compensated by the government.

3. Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. vs. NLRC

Facts: Basconcillo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against vinta

maritime. Petitioners alleged that basconsillo was dismissed for his gross
negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V
Boracay regarding the closure of a certain air valve. Basconcillo rebutted
allegations and claim that has not given a chance to explain his side

14
regarding the mentioned incidents, the truth being that he was surprised
when he was told of his dismissal. POEA grant petition of Basconcillo.

Issue: Whether Basconcillo was illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes. For an employee's dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must
be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process.
The alleged incidents of incompetence were unsupported by relevant and
convincing evidence.

Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice
and hearing. The employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1)
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without
running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. No notice was ever given to
him prior to his dismissal. This fact alone disproves petitioners' allegation
that "private respondent was given fair warning and enough opportunity
to explain his side [regarding] the incidents that led to his dismissal."

4. Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion

Facts: Pres. Marcos issued PD 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Philippines, signed
the RP-US Extradition Treaty with the United States. The treaty detailed
the processes and required documents for extradition requests between
both countries. DOJ received from DFA a US Note containing a request for
the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States
for various charges. Mark Jimenez request to be furnish a copy of the US
Note as well as all documents submitted therein which was later denied.
Mark Jimenez filed with RTC a mandamus which was granted. Petitioner
contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.

Issue: Whether respondent has an actual right to be enforced and

protected.

Held: Yes. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the
rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of
notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights
from a prospective extraditee. In the case at bar, private respondent does
not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land.

15
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of
due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or
ruling complained of. SC also held that private respondent’s due process
rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees.

5. EL Blanco Espanol v. Planca

Facts: Engracio Palanca entered into a mortgage agreement with

Plaintiff-Appellee El Banco Español, secured by various parcels of real
property. After the execution of the agreement, Engacio left the
Philippines for China where he lived and died. Thereafter, the mortgage
defaulted, prompting the Plaintiff-Appellee to institute an action for
foreclosure of the mortgaged property before the Court of First Instance
(CFI). Since Engracio was a non-resident at the time of the action, the
Plaintiff-Appellee made the necessary notice by publication, and
deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and complaint to
Engracio’s last known residence. The action proceeded before the CFI
with Engracio failing to appear. As such, a judgment by default was
rendered in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, ordering Engracio to deliver the
amount of the mortgage. Failure to comply shall result in the public sale of
the mortgaged property. The payment was never made. Thus, the CFI
ordered the sale of the mortgaged property. After seven (7) years,
Defendant-Appellant Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of
Engracio, filed a motion to set aside the order of the CFI on the ground
that it never acquired jurisdiction over Engracio or over the subject of the
action

Issue: whether those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to

constitute due process of law.

Held: Yes. Irregularity in the case at bar did not infringe the
requirement of due process of law. Due process of law requires that
the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of
process within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to
authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal liability.
Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or
quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res,
and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him.

With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending
of notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall direct that
the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it
is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We
consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having
due regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is

16
required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the
due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible
failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that
the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel
or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination
and be delivered to him. The jurisdiction being once established, all that
due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant
to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it
would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was
fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is
permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is
supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise
of judicial power in these proceedings.

6. Ang Tibay vs. CIR

Facts: Toribio Teodoro, on behalf of Ang Tibay, a leather company,

initially faced a dispute involving the alleged layoffs of members of the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU). Teodoro claimed the layoffs were due to
a leather shortage, a claim disputed by the NLU, who argued it was a
pretext to discriminate against union members. National Labor Union, Inc
prayed for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial in view of new evidence suggesting unfair labor practice.

Issue: Whether or not the National Labor Union Inc, was deprived of due
process

Held: Yes. Case should be remanded to Court of industrial Relations. In

this case SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process
embodied as primary rights, namely: 1. The right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof, 2. the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented 3. The decision must have
something to support itself, 4. the evidence must be
"substantial", 5. the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected, 6. The CIR or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision, 7. The CIR or any of
its judges, therefore, must render decision in a manner that shows
various issues involved.

The Court have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would
be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the

17
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence
as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Court emphasized the
need for the CIR to consider all relevant evidence, highlighting the active
and comprehensive role of the CIR in resolving labor disputes beyond the
confines of technical rules of legal evidence.

Right to Equal Protection Clause.

1. Inchong v. Hernandez

Facts: The case revolves around the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
1180, which nationalizes the retail trade business in the Philippines.
The petitioner, Lao H. Ichong, represents other alien residents,
corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by the law. One of the
provision of the subject law states that a prohibition against persons,
not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade The petitioner argues that the law violates
the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 violates constitutional rights.

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions

and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by
the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits
of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already

pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard

18
do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the
existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure.

2. Imbong v. Ochoa

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress on December 21, 2012. The case includes 14 petitions and 2
petition-in-intervention, assailing the RH Law for being violative to the
constitution. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.

Issue: Whether RA 10354 violates equal protection clause.

Held: NO. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."

Equal Protection does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's

reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. it should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the
RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the
RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children.

3. British American Tobacco vs. Camacho

19
Facts: Petitioner assails Section 145 NIRC which provides for four tiers of
tax rates based on the net retail price per pack of cigarettes. As such, new
brands of cigarettes shall be taxed according to their current net retail
price while existing or "old" brands shall be taxed based on their net retail
price as of October 1, 1996. Petitioner British American Tobacco
introduced into the market Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights and
Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with a suggested retail price of
P9.90 per pack. Pursuant to Sec. 145 (c) quoted above, the Lucky Strike
brands were initially assessed the excise tax at P8.96 per pack.
Petitioner claims that the law discriminate new brands. Lower
court held constitutionality of the Law.

Issue: Whether the subject law discriminates new brands.

Held: No. The law creates a four-tiered system which we may refer to as
the low-priced medium-priced, high-priced, and premium-priced tax
brackets. The current net retail price is then used to classify under which
tax bracket the brand belongs. Due to this there may be a
circumstance that a previously classified brand wherein it prices
raises but still be classified as a lower bracket. The central issue is
whether the classification freeze provision violates the equal
protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution.

It was held by the SC that absence of clear showing of breach of

constitutional limitations a statute will not be overturn.

The classification freeze provision has not been shown to be

precipitated by a veiled attempt, or hostile attitude on the part of
Congress to unduly favor older brands over newer brands. On the
contrary, we must reasonably assume, owing to the respect due a co-
equal branch of government and as revealed by the Congressional
deliberations, that the enactment of the questioned provision was
impelled by an earnest desire to improve the efficiency and effectivity of
the tax administration of sin products.

Petitioner did not, however, clearly demonstrate the exact extent

of such impact. It has not been shown that the net retail prices of
other older brands previously classified under this classification
system have already pierced their tax brackets, and, if so, how
this has affected the overall competition in the market. Further, it
does not necessarily follow that newer brands cannot compete against
older brands because price is not the only factor in the market as
there are other factors like consumer preference, brand loyalty, etc. In
other words, even if the newer brands are priced higher due to
the differential tax treatment, it does not mean that they cannot
compete in the market especially since cigarettes contain addictive
ingredients so that a consumer may be willing to pay a higher price for a
particular brand solely due to its unique formulation.

20
4. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

Facts: Mayor Lim signed into law the ordinance prohibiting wash up
rates in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. Petitioners filed motion to
intervene in the complaint claiming that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila. RTC issued writ of preliminary injunction ordering city to desist in
the implementation of the subject ordinance. CA reversed RTC affirming
the constitutionality of the ordinance since it aims to curb immoral
activities and establishments are still allowed to operate
h
Issue: 1. Whether the subject ordinance is constitutional. 2. Whether the
establishments has the locus standi to plead for protection of their
patrons' equal protection rights.

Held: 1. No. Substantive requirements (1) must not contravene the

Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. In the case at bar
the apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use
of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike.

The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by

patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are
rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance
shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all
susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.

2. Yes. Although petitioners has no relationship with its patron, the

overbreadth doctrine comes into play. Overbreadth generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine
applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance
makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can
see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers
from overbreadth.

5. Biraogo vs. Phil. Truth Commission

Facts: The case consolidates two petitions challenging Executive Order

No. 1 (EO 1), issued by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30,
2010, which established the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).
The commission was created to investigate reported cases of graft

21
and corruption during the previous administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Petitioners claim that E.O. No. 1 violates the
equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Issue: Whether EO 1 violate equal protection clause

Held: Yes. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply

requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For a
classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be

struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out
the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

6. Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City

Facts: Several LGU in Metro Manila implement curfew ordinances on

minors. Petitioners assails the said ordinances for being arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or
detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators and violates
their constitutional rights (right to lift and travel).

Issue: Whether curfew ordinances constitutional.

Held: Manila unconstitutional, QC constitutional.

Discussion: void and vagueness. The vagueness doctrine involves

cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well
as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Petitioners fail to point
out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew

22
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a
suspected minor would be determined. While it is true that there is no
parameter regarding the determination of the age, RA 9344 the
statutory law has the prescribed such measures. (birth cert,
baptismal, or testimony).

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to

minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,
but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.
Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental
role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity

Test of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.

 Strict scrutiny applies when a classification either (i) interferes
with the exercise of fundamental rights
 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.
 Rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the
first two tests.

Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes

with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government
has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest (restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling
interest).

This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus,
unduly trample upon protected liberties The Quezon City Ordinance
stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights and provides adequate
exemptions for the minors to enjoy the exercise of their rights.

7. Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP

Facts: New Central Bank Act took affect abolishing the old central bank.
Almost 8 years of effectivity. Petitioners assails the further
implementation of Sec. 15(c) of the law for being unconstitutional, it

23
provides that that compensation and wage structure of employees
whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758. It makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees
in the BSP which are the BSP officers (exempt class) and rank-and-file
employees (Not exempt class). Petitioner posits that the classification is
not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether such law results in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers violating equal protection
clause.

Held: Yes. It should be noted that it is clear in the legislative deliberations

that the exemption of officers from the SSL was intended to address
the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
against the rank-and-file.

However while R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the
legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws
exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs (LBP, SSS,
GSIS, DBP, HGC, PDIC, SBGFC) leeched all validity out of the
challenged proviso. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as
regards the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file
so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees
were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The
distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary.
It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other
GFIs.

Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed

Subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the

challenged proviso in violation of equal protection clause due to lacking
real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other
Government Financial Institutions.

8. Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC

Facts: President Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system

24
for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. The
law also mandates that registered voters shall submit themselves for
validation otherwise be deactivated. Petitioners filed petition for TRO.
Petitioners argue that biometrics registration is unconstitutional for failing
the strict scrutiny test and deprivation of right to suffrage.

Issue: Whether the mandatory biometrics registration system is

constitutional.

Held: Yes. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by
law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the case at
bar Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It
is not a qualification for such right.

Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. As
pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such
as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,

rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In this case, respondents
have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to
facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by
containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying
voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for
achieving the above-said interest. The re-registration process is amply
justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel
technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of
electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in
this country. Also, such re-registration was taken only as a form of
updating one’s registration.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1. Chavez v. Gonzales

Facts: The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
national and local elections. Secretary Bunye threatened to release wire
tapped conversation between Pres. Arroyo and high ranking officials of
COMELEC to turn the election in her favor. DOJ Secretary Raul

25
Gonzales, warned that those who had copies of such CD may be held
liable of Anti Wiretapping Act and subsequently ordered NBI to conduct
investigation to media organization who had found to cause the
spread of the same. Petitioner filed petition under rule 65 against
respondents alleging that the acts of the latter violates freedom on
expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern

Issue: Whether such act is in violation of the rights

Held: Yes. Art. III Sec. 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Abstraction on Free Speech: free speech and free press may be

identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship and punishment. Freedom of speech
and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any
matter of public consequence. The scope of freedom of expression is
so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding
secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular
field of human interest. The constitutional protection is not limited to the
exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to
speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or
informative.

However, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech
may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its
pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal
right of others or those of the community or society.

Generally restraints from freedom of speech and expression are

evaluated into three tests:
 dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on
speech once a rational connection has been established between
the speech restrained and the danger contemplated
 balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts
need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests
 The clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise
that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger
that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right
to prevent.

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the

dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to

26
resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we
have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or

other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. However it not sufficient to determine whether the
subject act constitute prior restraints a distinction should be made
between Content based and Content neutral regulation.

Content Based and Content neutral speech should be distinguished.

Content-neutral regulation merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, while in
Content-based restraint or censorship is based on the subject matter of
the utterance or speech.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral

regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for
its validity. On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass its constitutionality with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at
bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they
are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on
but one object—a specific content

On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who

have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom
of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the
anti-wiretapping law. Facts shows that even the integrity of the tapes
are in question and it is also arguable whether it’s airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law. There is also doubts on the identity of the
personalities regarding the spread of such CD.

2. MTRCB v. ABSCBN

Facts: On October 15, 1991, ABS-CBN aired an episode titled “Prosti-

tuition” on its program “The Inside Story,” which about students
resorting to prostitution for tuition fees. The Philippine Women’s
University (PWU) was identified as an institution attended by some of the
students featured, leading to complaints from PWU representatives
and parents citing damage to the school’s reputation and
harassment of female students. MTRCB filed complaint. ABSCBN

27
argued that “The Inside Story” was a public affairs program protected
by constitutional freedoms of expression and press, thereby
exempting it from MTRCB’s review

Issue: Whether MTRCB Has jurisdiction.

Held: Yes. MTRCB has the power to screen, review and examine all
‘television programs. Thus, when the law says “all television
programs,” the word “all” covers all television programs, whether
religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. Respondents claim
that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has
been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom
of expression and of the press has a preferred status. It bears
stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has
authority. Court will not determine whether petitioner violated
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution providing that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the
press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the
program. Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit. Respondents were
merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner “The Inside
Story” for its review and approval.

3. Arch Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

Facts: Bishop Navarra posted 2 tarpaulins, each with approximately 6 ft

by 10 ft size for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote”
and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” [Link] electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law.
COMELEC ordered the immediate removal of the tarpaulin for it is
beyond the size allowed for election propaganda. Bishop Navarra
argues that the order of the COMELEC is in violation of their right
to free speech. Respondent claims that the tarpaulin is an election
propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its
mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence,
respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal for being
oversized are valid and constitutional. Respondents argue that the
tarpaulins election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it.186 As such, it is subject to regulation by
COMELEC.

Issue: Whether the order of the COMELEC violates the rights of freedom of
speech and expression.

Held: Yes. COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions

made by private citizens Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do

28
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority
to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by
the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. Conduct is treated

as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech’"
such that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the
same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct
may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the right to freedom of expression.’"
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted,
and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.

Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been

said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to
utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.

However not all speech are treated the same. Some speech may be
regulated by the exercise of State’s police power.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the

named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily
mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.

Discussion on what the scope of free expression: Regulation of

speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are
not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which
are taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that
the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that
can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the
choice of a candidate.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally

valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates,
only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has
for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the

29
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this
purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private
property.

In the case at bar a fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without
any relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be
arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no
longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political
consequences.

4. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism

Council

Facts: First Petition fails due to lack of requisite of judicial review. The
case pertains to six consolidated petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372, known as the Human Security
Act of 2007. The petitioners are various organizations and
individuals who claim that the law infringes on constitutional
rights including freedom of speech, due process, and equal
protection of the laws. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and
overbroad, which could lead to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The petitioners assail the law for being intrinsically vague
and impermissibly broad that the definition of the crime of terrorism such
as "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-

vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since
these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372
regulates conduct, not speech.

Issue: Whether RA 9372 constitutional.

Held: Yes. The Court states that the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are
not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered.
No prosecution would be possible. The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for

30
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute.

The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental

purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the

aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of
which should not at all times be abridged. In insisting on a facial challenge
on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that
the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by
the free speech clause.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to

permit a facial analysis of its validity. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.

It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part,
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Since speech is not involved here, the
Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis

Note: On its face invalidation results in striking them down entirely on

the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It means to constitutes
a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts

Note: A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.

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5. Calleja v. Executive Secretary

Facts: This case involves 37 separate petitions for certiorari and

prohibition all assailing RA 11479 or the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.
Petitioners assail provision of ATA (4 & 12) due to their perceived facial
vagueness and overbreadth that purportedly repress protected
speech. It is argued further that the unconstitutionality of the definition
of terrorism and its variants will leave it with "nothing to sustain its
existence." Pursuant to the law, Anti-Terrorism Council issued resolution
automatically adopting the list of designated terrorists by the UNSC, it
also designates as terrorists the CPP/NPA, and 16 organizations
associated with the Islamic State and "other Daesh-affiliated
groups in the Philippines

Issue: Whether the provision of ATA violates constitutional right to

freedom of speech and expression. (Sec. 4 and 16)

Held: Partially granted. A careful scrutiny of the language of the law

shows that it is not overbroad since it fosters a valid State policy
to combat terrorism and protect national security and public safety,
consistent with international instruments and the anti-terrorism laws of
other countries.

The Court notes that the ATA's definition of terrorism under the main part
of Section 4 conforms with the definition of terrorism with the UN’s
convention on terrorism. The language employed in Section 4 of the
ATA is almost identical to the language used in other
jurisdictions.

However the provisio of Sec. 4 innately affects speech and expression as

it directly pertains to "advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work,
industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights".

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "Conduct is treated as a

form of speech sometimes referred to as 'symbolic speech' such that
when 'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, the communicative element of the conduct may be
sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression]."

Not intended Clause shifts the burden to the people to prove that
such actions constitute an exercise of civil and political rights,

"Not Intended Clause" fails the void for vagueness, overbreadth, and
strict scrutiny tests, because it curtails, as well as obscures, not only
certain kinds of protected speech but the very freedom to speak
itself. While Congress is constitutionally empowered to restrict certain
forms of speech to prevent or deter terrorism, it must do so in a

32
reasonably clear and non-abusive manner narrowly tailored to
achieve that purpose, so as not to sweep unnecessarily and broadly
towards the protected freedom of speech. (Not intended Clause:
Terrorism shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work,
industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical
harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety" courts revised the phrase as “terrorism
as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent,
stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of
civil and political rights,")

Court strikes down the "Not Intended Clause" as unconstitutional and

categorically affirms that all individuals, in accordance with Section 4 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, are free to protest, dissent, advocate,
peaceably assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances,
or otherwise exercise their civil and political rights, without fear of being
prosecuted as terrorists under the ATA

Court conveys that terrorism is not ordinarily the goal of protests and
dissents. Such exercises of the freedom of speech are protected, even
if they might induce a condition of unrest or stir people to anger.
Incitement aside, intimidating the government or causing public unrest is
not unlawful per se if the means taken to cause such intimidation or
unrest is through speech, discourse, or "expressive conduct".

RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY

1. Bayan v. Ermita

Facts: Petitioners allege that their rights as organizations and individuals

were violated when the rally, they participated in a march to Malacanang
to protest presidential issuances on October 6, 2005 other group aims
to conduct a rally on Mendiola bridge, that they were violently
dispersed by policemen implementing BP. 880 or the Public Assembly
Act. Petitioners allege that BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage
a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of
a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought. It was also contend that it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Respondent claims that his denials of permits were under the "clear and
present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt

33
the economy and to protect the lives of other people. Also
respondent claims that the law is a content-neutral restriction.

Issue: Whether BP 880 violates right to assembly.

Held: No. Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and

petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power.

B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a

restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assembly that would use public places. The reference to
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise
of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to

"rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place."

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to

peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear
and present danger
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is
not relevant to the regulation.

However in this case, the term Calibrated Preemptive Response

should be omitted, for it serve no valid purpose since it is the same thing
as Maximum tolerance.

2. Malabanan v. Remanto

34
Facts: Petitioners were member of Student Council of Gregorio
Araneta University. They were granted a permit to conduct an
assembly in the second hall lobby but such assembly was held at the
basketball court. They continued to conduct the assembly outside the
coverage (Time and place) of their permit. Petitioners well held into
preventive suspension for failure to explain. Petitioner assails such
suspension for failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of
freedom of peaceable assembly

Issue: Whether such suspension is a violation of freedom of peaceable

assembly.

Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable

assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech
has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to

students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive
evil that the state, has a right to present.

In this case, the students opposed the merger of the institute of

animal science with the institute of agriculture that it will lead to
increase of tuition fees increasing the burdens of their parents,
although the speakers are exaggerated, it being conducted in daytime
during school hours, there’s no clear and present danger can be
discernible.

As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of

the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of
an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under
the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to
be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense.

35
To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a
one-week suspension would be punishment enough or an disciplinary
action.

3. Villar v. TIP

Facts and Issue: The crucial question in this petition is that whether the
exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of
respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for
their being barred from enrollment. However it should be noted that
SC took other circumstances to into consideration, such as the records of
the petitioners, hence only those who has 1 failing grade has been
taken into consideration. The constitutional provision on academic
freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal.

Held: No. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable

assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom
of expression, which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on
a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher

learning" includes the right to set academic standards to
determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard
should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the
equal protection clause being disregarded.

However, SC held the exclusion of those student who has failing grades
for being justified because of their marked academic deficiency.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1. People v. Marti

Facts: Marti with his common low wife went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying 4 packages. Marti told Anita
Reyes (the one who attended them) that the packages is to be send in
Switzerland having Walter Fierz as consignee. Marti refused inspection
of the packages by Anita. Before delivery to BOC, Job Reyes opened
the boxes as the final procedure in their SOP. Due to suspicious material,

36
several grams of the content of the box were forwarded to NBI for
investigation. Job Reyes brought the remaining parcel to the NBI
and opened the box in the presence of the NBI personnel and it
was discovered that it contains dried marijuana. Information was
filed against Marti for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti claims
that evidence was obtained in violation of his rights and therefore
inadmissible in evidence.

Issue: Whether the evidence is inadmissible in evidence.

Held: No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The
Constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be

invoked against acts of private individuals.

Job Reyes inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure

on the part of as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to
the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. The mere presence of
the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search affected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution.

If the search is made was initiated by private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without Gov’t intervention
, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for it is only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual

affected through private seizure equally applies to the alleged violation,
non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy
and communication.

2. Guanzon v. De Villa

Facts: This involves 41 petitions for prohibition with preliminary injunction

to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Area Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila. Such Area Target Zonings and Saturated
Drives pinpoint places where subversive is hiding. The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights
abuses, such as: cordoning of an area including one or more

37
residence, banging of walls and windows of houses, men are
ordered to strip down to be examine the tattoo or other marks,
disappearance of money and properties during operations, etc.

Respondents claims that they had legal authority (Power of the

President regarding faithful execution of laws and as the
Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Ph) and accusations
are all lies.

Issue: Whether the Area Target Zonings is valid.

Held: Case remanded. The Constitution grants to Government the

power to seek and cripple subversive movements. However, all
police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of
Rights.

In this case the Court discussed that one of the most precious rights of the
citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his
own house. Which is also a guaranteed right under our Constitution (1973)
which provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated xxx”. This constitutional right protects a citizen
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy and
liberty as to his person, papers and effects. What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to
his residence.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant
assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were
conducted. However, in the pleadings there’s no showing of an
impediment to secure warrants before any house were search or
individuals arrested, hence the objective sought to be obtained by the
areal zoning could be achieved while protecting the rights of the low-
income families.

It is clear that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the
determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case. For
the case at bar contains only allegations and those who said to
suffered human rights violation did not appear in court as a witness
or as a petitioner.

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are

serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of
prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as
a matter of course. The Court believes it highly probable that some

38
violations were actually committed. Case remanded until petitioners
may present evidence supporting their allegations.

3. Ramirez v. CA

Facts: A civil case was filed by Ramirez against Garcia for the latter’s act
of allegedly vexing her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. As a result
of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes."

RTC granted motion to quash of the petitioner, reversed by the CA.

Petitioner claims that the act of taping the private conversion not illegal.
Petitioner also claims that the “private communication” under the law
does not include “private conversation”

Issue: Whether the act of petitioner of taping the private conversation

illegal.

Held: Yes. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 states that. “It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.”

The Court states that it is the intent of the law to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section

1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity.

Communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,

as in a conversation. It also signifies process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols such as Language, signs or gestures. These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latter's office.

39
4. Zulueta v. CA

Facts: Zulueta is the wife of respondent Martin who on March 1962

entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened the drawers and
took 157 correspondences between Martin and his alleged
paramours. The said documents were used as evidence for legal
separation and disqualification to practice medicine. Martin filed a case for
recovery of the said instruments and for damages before the RTC which
was held in his favor, RTC declared Martin was the exclusive owner of
the letters and that Zulueta took it without consent. Affirmed by the
CA. Petitioner claims that the subject instrument is admissible as
evidence since it was ruled on another case between Martin and
her lawyer that such instruments were admissible.

Issue: Whether the subject instruments in the case at bar is admissible as

evidence.

Held: No. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in

evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife, who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. The
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists

Note: The case between Dr. Martin and Atty. Felix involves a disbarment
case in which Atty. Felix were charged by misconduct by using such
documents to obtain the confession of Dr. Martin.

5. Ople v. Torres.

Facts: Petitioner Blas Ople prays to invalidate AO No. 308 issued by

President Ramos entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two constitutional grounds, 1. it is
a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate and 2. it
impermissibly intrudes on citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

40
Respondents claim that AO No. 308 protects an individual interest in
privacy.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number
to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use
of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."

Issue: Whether AO. 308 violates rights to privacy.

Held: Yes. The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection (Morfe v. Mutuc).

SC points out that right to privacy is enshrined in several provisions of the

constitutions such as Art. 3. Sec 3.1 right to privacy of communication
and correspondence; Sec. 2 Right to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure; Sec. 6. The
liberty of abode and of changing the same; Sec. 8 right of the people to
form unions; and Sec. 17. No persons shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.

SC prescind that that the right to privacy is a fundamental right

guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O 308 is predicated into 2
considerations such as it is for the purpose of convenience and to
reduce fraudulent misrepresentation by person.

SC rejects the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a

reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the use of biometrics
technology. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The
use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not
assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As
technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases

Also, the law does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. Clearly,
the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other
than the identification of the individual through his PRN. Pursuant to
said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time
he deals with a government agency. The more frequent the PRN has

41
been used would result to build up of information which may
cause or lead to its misuse.

AO 308 falls short of assuring that personal information. The lack of

proper safeguards of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's
rights.

However, right to privacy does not automatically bar all personal

intrusion, it merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions, and that such intrusion is
accompanies by proper safeguard and standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing
A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services.

6. SPS Hing v. Choachuy

Facts: Petitioner alleged that they are the owner of a parcel of land in
Cebu and also the and respondents are the owner of the land adjacent
thereto and that the respondents are the owners of Aldo Development &
Resources and build an auto repair shop building. Respondents filed an
action claiming that the petitioner illegally building Fences that
would destroy the walls of its building. To support the claim,
respondents illegally installed a surveillance camera facing the property of
petitioners and took pictures of the on-going construction of the
petitioners without their consent. Petitioners claims that such act
violates their privacy and prayed for the removal of such cameras. RTC
ordered the removal of cameras. Set aside by CA, CA ruled that
there’s no violation of right to privacy of residence since the
subject location is not used as residence.

Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that there’s no violation of the

constitutional right of the petitioners, its children and employees.

Held: Yes. Right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and

defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation or to
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s
right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals which states that “Every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of

42
mind of his neighbors and other persons” Thus, an individual’s right
to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has
the right to exclude the public or deny them access.

SC also held that right to privacy under the civil code covers business
offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts

use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable."

The installation of these cameras should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.

Ocular inspection shows that The monitor showed only a portion of the
roof of the factory of Aldo. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to
do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the
right of petitioners as property owners.

The RTC considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of

privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or
as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras
directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion
thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

7. Disini v. Sec. of Justice

Facts: These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare RA 10175 the

Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 void. The cybercrime law aims to
regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. In this case the
concept of cyberspace is explained that cyberspace, a system that
accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing
individual accesses to and uses of the internet. It is also stated that
the wicked may also use the cyberspace for ill motive such as
hacking of bank account and exposing pornography.

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate of rights. Hence, they
challenge several provisions of the said law.

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Issue: Whether RA 10175 constitutional.

Held: Partially granted

Sec. 4(b)(3) (constitutional) defining cybercrime offenses specifically

Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use,
misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another.

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, is a right protected by

the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, in the
case of morfe v mutuc right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.

In this case the Zones of Privacy has been discussed are those
protected areas in our laws. Two constitutional guarantee creates these
zones which are (a) right against unreasonable search and seizures and
(b) right to privacy of communication and correspondence. Hence it
must be determined whether there’s an expectation of privacy
and whether such expectation has been violated.

The law defines the what are those identifying information (includes
name, citizen, his residence, his contact number) punishes those who
acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to
cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government
effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of
law. The provision regulates specific action and requires the intent to
gain.

(Unconstitutional) Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law

enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect
or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a
computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route,

time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content,
nor identities

Petitioners assail the said provision authorizing the law enforcement

agencies to collect or record traffic data, invoking the right of the people
to privacy.

SC determined whether there is compelling State interest behind the law,

and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. Undoubtedly, the State has

44
compelling interest such as to put order to the tremendous activities
in cyberspace for public good.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether one entitled to the
right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.

Although these traffic data does not reveal any names or address, the
Court believes that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are
gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of
activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons
under surveillance.

The Court explained although the provision state that it is only for “due
cause” such due case is not defined by the law. Hence, the authority that
Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint

The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize

collection of traffic data “in real time” because it is not possible to get a
court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a
“moving vehicle. However there’s no preconditions in conducting
such warrantless seizure have been provided by the Section.

(Unconstitutional) Sec. 19 Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer

Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block
access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and

violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be
secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.
Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government,
in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice
order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. Not only does
Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of
restrictions on speech.

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8. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

Facts: Julia and Julienne were both minors who took pictures only with
their undergarments while changing into their swimwear for a swimming
party. Said pictures were uploaded by certain Angela on her
Facebook profile. Computer teacher of STC, Escudero, made known of
the pictures and make the students to log in in their profile using STC
computers. Escudero reported the matter to STC and as part of their
penalty they are barred from joining the commencement exercise.
Angela’s Mother filed petition before the RTC. RTC issued TRO against the
school and order to enjoined them in the commencement exercise,
despite that, STC still barred them from graduation.

Thereafter, Petitioners filed petition for habeus data claiming that the
pictures were reproduce without consent, it was uploaded on friends
only status, that the students are the victims on this case since
their rights is violated. RTC dismissed petition. To the trial court,
petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy,

Issue: Whether RTC erred in dismissing the petition of habeas data.

Held: No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent
and summary remedy.

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to

informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. The
question to be solve that is there any right violated on Online
Social Network (OSN) activities considering its nature.

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to

interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or different
social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos,
among others, depending on the services provided by the site. In this
case the Supreme Court explained the mechanism of facebook
such as the sending of friend request user identify another to
connect in their account. That a facebook user can regulate the
visibility of its post such as (Public, Friends, Friends of Friends,
Custom).

SC states that not all Facebook user has a protected expectation of

privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities. Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user manifest the intention to keep certain posts private

46
Petitioners claim that Escudero intruded upon their children’s
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said
photos to STC, and it violated the rights of the students for their Facebook
is for “Only Friends” viewing. However, there’s no evidence to prove
that such post is for only friends only, and to negate the alleged act
of the other students who presented the pictures to Escudero.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy. Court

explained that since the default settings of facebook is in public, it can be
presumed that the subject photos were viewable to everyone in
facebook, in the absence of any proof that the subject photos were
uploaded and viewable to the minor friends only.

And even if the setting is friends only, this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy

STC cannot be faulted in imposing disciplinary actions as specified in the

Handbook and it only exercise its duty in teaching students to be
responsible in their dealing with cyberspace

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Religion – a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates

man to his creator.
 Those who does not believe in God still has religion, for hits non
belief in God is his own faith.

3 parts of Section 5.
 Non-establishment clause – no law shall be made respecting
establishment of religion.
 Free exercise clause - the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession, without discrimination and preference, shall
forever be allowed.
 Non-religious Test Clause – No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.

2 aspects
 Freedom to believe (Absolute)
 Freedom to act on one’s believe (may be regulated by the state)

Dissemination of Religious Beliefs – is the right to share one’s view

with others, or to disseminate religious information’s.

1. Estrada v. Escritor

Facts: Estrada filed complaint for an investigation of respondent Escritor,

court interpreter, for living with a man (Quiliapoi) not his husband
and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada

47
believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act and should not be
employed by the court. Escritor admitted the allegation that such
arrangement started even if her husband was still alive but living
with other women however Escritor claimed that her cohabitation
is in conformity with their religion Jehovah’s witness. For Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. That the
declaration requires the approval of the elders of the Jehovah's
Witnesses congregation and is binding within the congregation all
over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Note
represented by a lawyer, Escritor invoked her right for freedom of religion
under Sec. 5 of the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether Escritor committed an immoral conduct and should be

administratively liable.

Held: No. Review of the standards from US jurisprudence has

demonstrated two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion
clause cases which are Separation Neutrality and Benevolent
Neutrality. While the strict neutrality approach is not hostile to
religion, it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for
classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action
confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Benevolent
neutrality is congruent with the sociological proposition that religion
serves a function essential to the survival of society itself, thus there is no
human society without one or more ways of performing the essential
function of religion.

Philippines: Before the American regime, Catholicism covered the

archipelago. There was a union between church and state. Under such
regime there was an instruction which states that no law shall be made
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, which is based on the US Constitution. Which was adopted by the
Philippine Bill 1902 and subsequently by the Constitution. \

Religion is defined as “bond between man and the gods”. Freedom of

choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits
any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the
practice of one's religion. The Free Exercise Clause principally
guarantees voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also
assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of
religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the
state.

In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is a

tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in
their application. There is a natural antagonism between a
command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit
its practice. In cases involving both the Establishment Clause and the

48
Free Exercise Clause, the two clauses should be balanced against each
other by reviewing the facts.

Upon perusal, Courts states that the Ph Constitution employs benevolent

neutrality in interpreting the Philippine religion clauses.

In plethora of cases, Court has ruled that government employees

engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct"
for which he/she may be held administratively liable. However, not every
moral wrong is foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise. The
morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious. The distinction between public and secular morality as
expressed in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality

In the case at bar, the SC applies the compelling state interest in

benevolent stance. entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to
religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil
Service Law.

1st step: is the Free exercise of religion has been burden? In choosing
between in keeping her employment or abandoning her religious
belief burdens the free exercise of religion of Escritor. The second
step is to ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious belief. Escritor
appears to be sincere to her religion and not merely invoking it to
be exempt from the law. However, the case at bar cannot still be
decided using the "compelling state interest" test. The case at bar is one
of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of proof
they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling state interest"
test.

It is apparent that the OCA relied on the compelling interest to uphold

the integrity of the judiciary, but there is nothing on the OCA's
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent's plea of religious
freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
exercise.

The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an
opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's
compelling interest which can override respondent's religious belief and
practice. Case remanded.

Notes:

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  Freedom of religion origin from US. Parallel to this expansion of
government has been the expansion of religious organizations which
sometimes result to disagreements.
 The Free Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual
religious convictions and beliefs and proscribes government from
questioning a person's beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities
based solely on those beliefs.
 Next to belief which enjoys virtually absolute protection, religious
speech and expressive religious conduct are accorded the highest
degree of protection.

2. Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA

Facts: INC has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired
on channel 2 every weekends which presents petitioner's religious beliefs,
doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other
religions. The Board of review classified the submitted VTR tapes of
petitioner as “X” which is not for public viewing on the ground that it
offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law. Upon appeal, the office of the President
reversed the classification. Petitioner also filed case before the RTC. RTC
ruled that the Board should 1) permit all series of the program and 2)
Petitioner should refrain from attacking other religion. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration. Upon motion for reconsideration of the RTC set aside
the order to refrain, and that the board should not review further tapes.

CA reversed RTC decision, The board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and has jurisdiction over the Petitioner. Petitioner also claims
that the term “all television programs” in the law defining the
power of the board should not include religious program.

Issue: Whether the subject program is constitutionally protected as a form

of religious exercise and expression.

Held: Yes. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by

the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect 1. freedom to
believe and 2. freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare.

SC rejects petitioner’s belief the religious program per se is exempt from

the review of the board. The Court reiterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about
the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent

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Upon review of the Videotapes presented, it shows that the so-called
"attacks" are mere criticisms. Hence, the ruling of the CA clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to
free exercise of religion.

The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another
religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. The ground "attack
against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its
Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that
administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of
the law they seek to enforce.

The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like
other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is
a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. CA failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.
There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm.

Lastly, the determination of the question as to whether or not such

vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the
boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which
cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of
Censors.

3. Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schols of Cebu

Facts: This is a consolidated case of 2 cases involving the same issue of

whether members of Jehovah witness to be expelled on account of
refusing to participate in the flag ceremony. The petitioners of the two
cases are expelled by public school authorities in Cebu for refusing
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and Dept. Order 8. Jehovah's
Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that
those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion". This issue is not brough
for the first time because it had already been decided in the Gerona case,
however the petitioners in this case did not question Administrative code
but target RA 1265 and Dept. Order. 8.

Issue: whether members of Jehovah witness to be expelled, on account of

religion, for refusing to participate in the flag ceremony.

Held: Yes. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to

the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator

51
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation. The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty)
to prevent.

The court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, a

group of small population, from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation which are untrained to love and
admire its country. Also, such expulsion is a violation of the students
right to education.

Standing quietly during the conduct of flag ceremony will not

pose a grave and present danger to the public interest in which
the State is obliged to prevent.

4. American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Facts: The plaintiffs Ph. Agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines. City Treasurer
of Manila informed plaintiff that it is engaged in selling bibles without
business permit, and is required to acquire the same. Plaintiff paid and
acquire the permit but protest the illegality of the ordinances. City of
Manila states that the Ordinances under protest were enacted by virtue of
the power granted by the Administrative Code. Plaintiff also claim that it
never made profit in the selling of bibles. Lower Court dismissed the case

Issue: Whether the subject ordinances requiring permit to the plaintiff is

valid.

Held: No. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and

enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent".

The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedom is

indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has
repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory
measure, but a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the
pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the

52
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to
suppress their exercise.

In the case at bar the act of plaintiff on selling bibles though the price is a
bit higher than the actual cost the same cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business of selling for profit.

Court upheld Ordinance No. 3000 which requires the obtention the
Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses,
trades or occupations enumerated therein.

5. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano

Facts: In his first letter, Valenciano reported that the basement of RTC
Quezon City has been converted to a Roman Catholic Chapel. He
believed that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it favor the Catholic litigants. RTC
Qc claims that the basement of RTC is known to be a praying corner
and that the masses conducted therein does not violation
separation of Church and State. In Valenciano second letter it claimed
that the masses should be stopped. RTC claims that the mass did not
disturb the hearings and that did not mean that Catholics had better
chances of obtaining favorable resolutions from the court.

Issue: Whether the holding of the mass is a violation of the doctrine of

separation and state

Heled: No. The holding of Religious Rituals in the halls of justice does
not amount to union of church and the state. Freedom of religion was
accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. It is
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess
his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good.

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation.

Freedom to believe means freedom to believe or disbelief, when a person

externalize such act, it falls now under the freedom to act.

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of

separation of Church and State. In fact, these two principles are
in perfect harmony with each other.

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved

for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's

53
interests. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of
revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state.

As reported, the masses were being conducted only during noon

breaks and were not disruptive of public services. Moreover, no Civil
Service rules were being violated. The performance of religious practices
should not prejudice the courts and the public

On the opposite side, the non-establishment clause reinforces the wall

of separation between Church and State. It simply means that the State
cannot set up a Church however the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but
merely accommodation. Since, there’s no law stating the same,
employees go to mass on their own initiative.

On the issue raised that no Appropriation of public money for the benefit
of any Church: SC held that aforecited constitutional provision "does not
inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious
character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is
available indiscriminately to the public in general.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may
offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it.

54