Disarmament and International Security Committee

Chair: Rolando Kattan

Topic 1: Global Strategies for Nuclear Disarmament
Topic 2: Preserving the Peace: Regulating the Militarization
of Space
 Table of Contents

Welcome Letter ________________________________________________________________

Committee History ______________________________________________________________

Committee Structure ____________________________________________________________

Glossary ______________________________________________________________________

Topic 1

Introduction _____________________________________________________________

History of the Topic _______________________________________________________

Current Situation _________________________________________________________

Bloc Positions ___________________________________________________________

Questions to Consider ____________________________________________________

Important Documents for Research ___________________________________________

Topic 2

Introduction _____________________________________________________________

History of the Topic _______________________________________________________

Current Situation _________________________________________________________

Bloc Positions ___________________________________________________________

 Questions to Consider ____________________________________________________

Important Documents for Research ___________________________________________

Bibliography

Topic 1 _________________________________________________________________

Topic 2 _________________________________________________________________
Welcome to DISEC!

Dear Delegates,

Hello and welcome to YMUN Singapore 2024! My name is Rolando Kattan and I will be

your Chair for DISEC.

To introduce myself briefly, I am from Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and I am a junior in

Saybrook College at Yale University studying Political Science and Comparative Literature. I am

primarily interested in the postcolonial history of Latin America, especially focusing on the

traces of colonialism in the literature of the region. Outside of class, I compete for Yale’s

collegiate Model UN team, I work as a research assistant in the Yale Center for Effective

Democratic Governance, and I am the president of the Yale International Relations Association.

In my free time, I enjoy reading anything related to my studies, spending time outdoors with

friends, and watching exorbitant amounts of stand-up comedy on Netflix.

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) serves as a vital forum

within the United Nations, addressing global challenges related to disarmament and international

security. DISEC traces its roots to the aftermath of World War II, where the devastating

consequences of conflict spurred international efforts to foster peace and prevent the

proliferation of weapons. Today, as the international community faces evolving challenges,

including nuclear proliferation and the potential militarization of space, DISEC's role in fostering

dialogue, cooperation, and the formulation of effective global policies has become increasingly

significant. Its deliberations and resolutions impact not only member states but also the broader

international community, underscoring the ongoing relevance and importance of DISEC in

maintaining global stability and promoting a world free from the threats posed by the unchecked
proliferation of arms. I chose these topics precisely because of the potential scale of discord they

could cause; in a world of increasing conflict, the threat of world-ending violence looms larger

every day. The goal of this committee–and your task for this conference–is to resolve that threat

before it is too late.

I am incredibly excited to meet you all and engage in meaningful, productive debate. My

personal goal is that each delegate will come away from this experience more knowledgeable

about the topics and better prepared for a future of addressing these challenges in the real world.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at [Link]@[Link].

Welcome again to YMUN Singapore, and I look forward to seeing you all soon.

Sincerely,

Rolando Kattan

Chair of DISEC

Director
 Committee History
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) traces its origins back

to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. Initially known as the First Committee,

it was one of the six main committees created by the UN General Assembly to address specific

global challenges. In the aftermath of World War II, the devastating impact of armed conflict

prompted the international community to prioritize disarmament and the maintenance of global

security. As the Cold War unfolded, the First Committee evolved into the Disarmament

Commission in 1952, reflecting the heightened tensions between major powers and the urgent

need for arms control. Over time, it underwent further restructuring and refinement, eventually

emerging as the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). The change in

nomenclature reflected a broadened mandate that encompassed not only disarmament but also a

comprehensive approach to international security issues.

Throughout its history, DISEC has played a crucial role in shaping global policies on

arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. It has been a forum for member states to

engage in substantive discussions, negotiate treaties, and formulate resolutions aimed at

addressing the multifaceted challenges posed by the proliferation of conventional and

unconventional weapons. Key milestones include the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, a landmark agreement that aimed to

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Today, DISEC remains an essential component of the UN's efforts to address

contemporary security threats. It continues to provide a platform for diplomatic dialogue,

cooperation, and the development of international norms to mitigate the risks associated with the

global arms race. The committee's history reflects the ever-changing nature of international
security concerns and the ongoing commitment of the international community to work

collectively towards a world free from the scourge of war and the threat of unrestrained

militarization.

Committee Structure
DISEC adheres to a structured format shared by other UN committees. Comprising all

193 member states, each state appoints a delegation, often led by a representative from its

mission to the UN. The committee will be led by the dias, although member states will inform

the flow of debate. The dias and committee members will work together to guide the committee's

proceedings, preside over meetings, and ensure the adherence to established working methods

and rules of procedure.

DISEC operates with a predetermined agenda outlining specific topics or issues for

discussion during a given session. Additionally, the committee may establish subsidiary bodies

or working groups to conduct in-depth examinations of particular subjects, fostering more

focused discussions and negotiations. Regular sessions, held during the annual UN General

Assembly, involve meetings where member states present their positions, engage in debates, and

participate in the negotiation of resolutions.

Resolutions, proposed by member states, serve as formal expressions of the committee's

stance on disarmament and international security matters. These resolutions undergo a process of

debate, amendment, and eventual adoption by the committee. DISEC ideally seeks consensus on

resolutions; however, in cases where agreement cannot be reached, a two-thirds majority vote is

employed for adoption. The resolutions and recommendations generated by DISEC are reported

to the plenary session of the UN General Assembly for further consideration and endorsement.

The committee's structure and processes are carefully designed to facilitate diplomatic dialogue,
negotiation, and decision-making, providing a vital platform for member states to collaborate on

addressing global challenges related to disarmament and international security.

 Topic 1: Global Strategies for Nuclear Disarmament

Introduction
As this committee convenes to discuss nuclear disarmament, the urgency of addressing

this complex and pressing issue is palpable. The specter of nuclear weapons casts a long shadow

over global security, with potential consequences that transcend borders and impact the very

fabric of international relations. The historical context leading up to this committee session is

marked by a series of geopolitical events and advancements in nuclear technology, intensifying

the need for robust discussions and cooperative strategies. As we stand on the precipice of

uncertainty, it is crucial for delegates to recognize the gravity of the situation and acknowledge

the responsibility placed upon them to navigate through the intricate web of challenges posed by

nuclear proliferation.

The relevance of the nuclear proliferation debate is underscored by the evolving

landscape of international relations, where the emergence of new nuclear-armed states and the

potential for non-state actors to acquire such capabilities present unprecedented threats. The

delicate balance between national security interests and the imperative to prevent the unbridled

spread of nuclear weapons demands the collective wisdom of the global community. As

delegates step into the committee room, they bring with them the weight of a world grappling

with the implications of recent nuclear tests, the breakdown of disarmament agreements, and

rising tensions among nuclear-armed nations. The urgency lies not just in preventing the

proliferation of these devastating arms but in crafting a collective vision for a world where the

specter of nuclear warfare is replaced by robust international cooperation and diplomatic

solutions.
 The committee session becomes a crucial arena where delegates must transcend

geopolitical differences, engage in earnest dialogue, and collaboratively forge strategies to curb

nuclear proliferation. The consequences of inaction are too dire to ignore, underscoring the

imperative for diplomats to rise above political divides and work towards a safer, more secure

global landscape. The outcome of this session holds the potential to shape the trajectory of

international security, making it a pivotal moment for the global community to demonstrate

resilience, cooperation, and a shared commitment to a world free from the threat of unchecked

nuclear proliferation.

History
Nuclear weapons have long stood as one of the most profound threats to international

peace and security. The devastating aftermath of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki in 1945 prompted immediate global concern, leading to the United Nations (UN)

General Assembly's adoption of resolution 1 in 1946. This resolution called for the elimination

of atomic weapons and laid the foundation for international efforts to curb the proliferation of

nuclear arms.

However, the post-World War II period witnessed a disconcerting trend in the opposite

direction. Between 1945 and 1950, the global count of nuclear weapons surged dramatically

from a mere 2 to a staggering 304. This escalation set the stage for an era of intense nuclear arms

competition, primarily fueled by the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. The numbers climbed

exponentially, reaching an alarming peak of over 70,000 nuclear weapons in 1987.

Efforts to address this perilous situation gained momentum, and the international nuclear

disarmament regime emerged as a critical player in curbing the proliferation of these destructive

arsenals. While substantial progress has been made over the years, with the global stockpile
reduced to fewer than 15,000 warheads by 2017, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' 2018

assessment highlighted a concerning trend. The risk of intentional or miscalculated use of

nuclear weapons grew globally, underscoring the persistent and evolving threat they pose.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has also voiced deep concern over the escalating

danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, with a particular emphasis on nuclear weapons.

Presently, nine UN Member States possess nuclear weapons, and several others hold nuclear

weapon-sharing capabilities, further complicating the dynamics of global security. The Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 defines a nuclear weapon as an

explosive device that releases energy through nuclear fission. Although nearly all UN Member

States acknowledge the fundamental importance of nuclear disarmament in achieving

international peace and security, nuclear weapon states (NWS) remain reticent to dismantle their

stockpiles. This reluctance is rooted in strategic, tactical, and security considerations that impede

a swift move towards comprehensive disarmament.

The challenges emanating from this lack of commitment and adherence to the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime profoundly hinder the ability of the international

community to achieve complete and total disarmament. This critical task has been entrusted to

the General Assembly First Committee, mandated with seeking solutions to achieve the

comprehensive disarmament of nuclear weapons.

While the First Committee has played a crucial role in making the nuclear

nonproliferation regime one of the most developed aspects of international law, the challenges of

implementation have been apparent. The committee has faced obstacles, particularly highlighted

in recent events such as the challenges encountered in the denuclearization process of the Korean

Peninsula. The international community has also grappled with difficulties in limiting the further
development of nuclear weapons and pursuing good-faith measures for total disarmament,

primarily due to a lack of consensus on the way forward and the inconsistent application of

existing nuclear disarmament frameworks.

The complexities involved in achieving progress in these areas necessitate the

development of additional frameworks and enforcement mechanisms. The pursuit of

disarmament requires universal participation, with all NWS contributing actively and

transparently to the process. The international community must confront the existing challenges,

overcome political and strategic differences, and foster a cooperative environment that prioritizes

global security over narrow national interests.

The history of nuclear proliferation underscores the imperative for international

cooperation in addressing one of the gravest threats to humanity. The journey from the

devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the contemporary challenges of nuclear

disarmament reflects the intricate dance between geopolitical interests, technological

advancements, and the collective will of the international community to safeguard global peace.

As delegates convene to deliberate on this critical issue, the urgency is not only to comprehend

the historical trajectory but to forge a path forward that ensures a world free from the looming

shadow of nuclear catastrophe. The responsibility lies with the global community to rise above

political differences, transcend national interests, and forge a future where the specter of nuclear

weapons is a relic of the past.

Current Situation

Nuclear Weapon Theory

Before diving into some more recent case studies, it is important to understand the context and

background behind the use of nuclear weapons. Scholars such as Thomas Schelling, Glen

Snyder, Robert Jervis, and Kenneth Waltz extensively explored the political implications of

nuclear weapons during the latter part of the 20th century. To enhance your preparation for this

debate, I recommend reviewing the abstracts of their numerous papers. A thorough grasp of

nuclear theory is crucial for developing a nuanced stance on NPT reform. What follows is a brief

and broad rundown of the guiding principle behind nuclear proliferation—deterrence theory.

Deterrence Theory

In nuclear theory, deterrence theory states that nations with nuclear weapons will not be subject

to attack, especially nuclear attack, because the prospect of a retaliatory nuclear strike is too

terrible to contemplate. This is often the chief reason countries use to justify the possession of

nuclear weapons. Under such guise, deterrence theory advertises nuclear weapons as promoters

of peace, making direct confrontation unthinkable for hostile nations due to the threat of nuclear

annihilation. Deterrence theory relies on the threat of massive and even planetary destruction that

nuclear weapons can achieve. This concept, in nuclear theory, is often referred to as “mutually

assured destruction.” The use of nuclear weapons can leave a radioactive legacy that will last for

generations. It is unlikely that only one bomb would be used in the event of a nuclear

confrontation, which escalates the threat even further. Much of deterrence theory traces its

origins back to Alfred Nobel who, amidst his invention of dynamite, proclaimed that his

invention would “usher a new era of peace for Europe” when both rivals knew they would be

faced with complete annihilation in the event of their confrontation. Deterrence theory thus
advocates for the expansion of nuclear programs for they not only avoid a nuclear war but all

sorts of wars. Lastly, it must be said that the strongest piece of evidence that deterrence theory

has is that a nuclear war has indeed not broken out.

Critics argue that the real world is too complex for deterrence theory to work. According to

Wareham, “deterrence may work when everything goes according to plan, there are no surprises,

each side in a stand-off knows exactly what the other is thinking, and leaders act rationally and in

the best interests of their people. This is not the real world but a fantasy world. In the real world

there is confusion (especially in a crisis), mistakes and errors of judgment are made, and there is

ignorance of what the other side is thinking1.” Additionally, there several instances where

deterrence theory has failed to prevent armed conflict between nuclear powers such as when

China entered the Korean War, against nuclear-armed US forces, in 1950 as well as Egypt and

Syria attacking nuclear-armed Israeli forces in the occupied Sinai and Golan Heights in 1973.

Rational Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory can be conceptualized by employing rational choice and game-theoretic

models of decision-making, as seen in game theory. Rational deterrence theory encompasses

several key principles such as rationality, unitary actor assumption, dyads, strategic interactions

and cost-benefit calculations.

1
Nuclear Deterrence Theory – Threat to Inflict Terror,
[Link]/au/journals/FlinLawJl/2013/[Link]. Accessed 24 Jan. 2024.
Deterrence theorists consistently assert that the success of deterrence hinges on the credibility of

a defending state's threat to an attacking state. A threat is considered credible if the defending

state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict significant costs in a conflict and the

conviction to employ its military forces. The four key factors under rational deterrence theory

include the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, and the

interests at stake.

Thomas Schelling, an American economist with a background in game theory, revolutionized the

study of international deterrence. His seminal work (1966) challenges the traditional definition of

military strategy as solely the science of victory, asserting that it is equally, if not more, the art of

coercion, intimidation, and deterrence. Schelling contends that the ability to harm another state

serves as a motivating factor for states to influence behavior. Successful deterrence, according to

Schelling, involves using the power to inflict harm as bargaining leverage, particularly when kept

in reserve. In summary, the foundation of deterrence theory lies in the strategic use of the

capacity to harm, which is most effective when held as a potential threat2.

Recent Nuclear Developments

Many thought that nuclear weapons were a relic of the Cold War. Arguably, they helped keep the

Cold War cold and have prevented direct confrontation between nuclear powers. Today, nine

countries possess nuclear weapons (China, North Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia,

the United Kingdom and the United States). The international landscape has witnessed notable
2
Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1–34
shifts in recent years, marked by the emergence of new actors seeking to acquire or express

interest in nuclear weapons. Notably, Iran has taken significant strides to increase their nuclear

capabilities.

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

In May 2018, following President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal

(also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)), Iran demonstrated restraint in

escalating its nuclear ambitions in the two years that followed. This, in part, due to Trump’s

willingness to impose extensive economic and financial sanctions. Trump initially decided to

withdraw from the agreement because he claimed that the agreement had failed to restrict Iran’s

arsenal and influence in the region3. According to the U.S. State Department, “On July 14, 2015,

the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the

European Union (EU), and Iran reached a JCPOA to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be

exclusively peaceful”. Proponents of the deal have claimed that the treaty's main aim was to

prevent conflict between Iran and other hostile regional neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and

Israel. Despite several condemnations, the US and its European allies have failed to hold Iran

accountable for its breaches of such agreement. President Joe Biden claims that the US would

return to the agreement with its previous conditions so long as Iran complies with the established

terms. Ever since, Iran has enriched its nuclear arsenal to nearly weapon-grade levels, alarming

the international community.

3
“What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations,
[Link]/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.
Starting from November 2020, Iran has made significant strides towards achieving a nuclear

weapons capability, taking advantage of the Biden administration's easing of sanctions as part of

its efforts to revive the JCPOA. Tehran has elevated uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent,

subsequently to an unprecedented 60 percent, and has experimented with reaching nearly 90

percent (considered weapons-grade). Additionally, the Islamic Republic has produced uranium

metal, a substance utilized in nuclear weapon cores, reactivated its underground Fordow

enrichment facility, and put into operation over 6,500 fast-generation centrifuges4.

According to numerous experts, had all parties honored their commitments, the agreement likely

could have effectively achieved its objective for more than a decade. The Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA) includes time-limited restrictions on Iran's nuclear program. For

instance, centrifuge restrictions were set to be lifted ten years after January 2016, and limits on

Iran's possession of low-enriched uranium would expire after fifteen years. Critics of the deal

raised concerns about these "sunset provisions," arguing that they would merely postpone Iran's

nuclear capabilities while providing sanctions relief for supporting regional terrorism.

Signatories of the JCPOA have faced challenges in revitalizing the mostly inactive agreement.

Talks to reengage the United States and Iran in the deal commenced in April 2021, but the

negotiations have been sporadic. Various factors, including the election of conservative cleric

Ebrahim Raisi as president in Iran, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the 2023 Israel-Hamas

conflict, have complicated the process due to Iran’s involvement in both of these conflicts.

4
Ackerman, Daniel. “10 Things to Know about Iran’s Nuclear Program.” FDD, 14 Nov. 2023,
Non-State Actors

Nuclear security experts consider that non-state actors could get access to nuclear weapons either

by gaining access to existing state-operated nuclear actors or by manufacturing their own

weapons of mass destruction by acquiring high levels of uranium or plutonium. Even though

both of these scenarios are improbable, especially the latter one, there are growing concerns and

increasing probabilities as we enter a world with multiple nuclear players.

Pakistani Leaders have given access to their Interservices Intelligence, which maintains intimate

relations with several Jihadist groups and the Taliban. It is also reported that several of Pakistan’s

nuclear scientists have had links to Osama bin Laden or have simply been lost track of by

Western nations. In recent years, however, the most imminent threat of nuclear proliferation to

non-state actors has been that of Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that acquiring weapons of mass destruction was his Islamic

duty. In the late 1993, Al-Qaeda was discovered attempting to procure uranium in Sudan with the

intention of using it in a makeshift nuclear device. This marks the initial indication of Osama bin

Laden's intentions to obtain nuclear material for an improvised nuclear weapon.

The information about this endeavor is provided by Fadl, who defected from al-Qaeda in 1996

and became an informant for the FBI and CIA. During court testimony, Fadl alleges that the
former Sudanese President Saleh Mobruk actively assisted al-Qaeda in obtaining South

African-origin uranium. Fadl adds that he later learned that the acquired uranium, purchased for

$1.5 million and tested in Cyprus, was confirmed to be authentic5.

Though Al-Qaeda’s efforts to detonate weapons of mass destruction have failed, Bin Laden

states in an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, “I wish to declare that if America

used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear

weapons. We have the weapons as a deterrent.” This end has been left to lower rank members of

the terrorist organization. Even though this end has not materialized, it does not mean it is not an

ongoing, imminent threat to international security.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Critics

Lastly, we will be covering the most significant milestones made by the international community

to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the criticism it has received.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), established in 1968, aimed to curb the spread of

nuclear technology by fostering cooperation among major nuclear and non-nuclear powers.

Despite not completely preventing nuclear proliferation, the NPT gained significance during the

Cold War, setting a precedent for international collaboration to impede the spread of nuclear

5
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. “Al Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Policy,
Foreign Policy, 25 Jan. 2010,
weapons. Following the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued

comprehensive arms control agreements, culminating in the Outer Space Treaty and discussions

on a non-proliferation treaty. By the early 1960s, nuclear technology had become more

accessible, prompting concerns about potential widespread proliferation. The NPT addressed

these fears by prohibiting nuclear weapons transfer, requiring non-nuclear states to refrain from

acquiring such weapons, and establishing safeguards under the International Atomic Energy

Agency.

Despite its importance, the NPT faced challenges during development. Initial proposals for a

nuclear technology distribution ban in 1961 took several years to materialize into formal

negotiations. Delicate negotiations centered on balancing interests between the U.S. and the

Soviet Union, and concerns about nuclear NATO plans complicated discussions. The treaty's

success hinged on the willingness of non-nuclear nations to forgo developing nuclear weapons.

After two years of negotiations, concessions from nuclear powers persuaded many non-nuclear

states to sign the treaty, which included provisions against nuclear weapons transfer and

acquisition, submission to IAEA safeguards, and cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology.

However, notable non-signatories included France, China, and several states close to nuclear

capability, like Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. While

the NPT is lauded for its role in mitigating nuclear proliferation, its effectiveness is challenged

by the absence of key signatories and subsequent nuclear developments in some non-signatory

states6.

6
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State,
[Link]/milestones/1961-1968/npt. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.
Criticism and the Path Forward…

Many have called the NPT a conspiracy to keep the nuclear weaponry in the hands of a few

states. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or

Use of Nuclear Weapons, stated that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring

to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and

effective international control". The main critic is that nuclear states fail to uphold this principle

in good faith when planning their national policies regarding the use and expansion of nuclear

weapons. As a result, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nuclear

Weapon Ban Treaty, is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively

prohibit nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal being their total elimination. Among the

countries voting for the treaty's adoption were South Africa and Kazakhstan, both of which

formerly possessed nuclear weapons and gave them up voluntarily.

Bloc Positions
1. Proponents of Strict Disarmament Timelines:

a. Supported by Germany, Japan.

b. Advocates for a rapid and strictly defined timeline for nuclear disarmament.

c. Emphasizes the urgency of eliminating nuclear weapons to prevent catastrophic

consequences.

d. Believes in the importance of holding nuclear-armed states accountable for timely

and complete disarmament.

2. Supporters of Gradual Disarmament with Verification:

 a. Supported by Canada, Australia.

b. Argues for a more gradual approach to disarmament, taking into account security

concerns and verification processes.

c. Highlights the need for comprehensive monitoring mechanisms to ensure

compliance with disarmament agreements.

d. Emphasizes the importance of building trust among nations through verifiable

steps.

3. Nuclear Deterrence Advocates:

a. Supported by the United States, United Kingdom.

b. Supports the concept of nuclear deterrence as a crucial element for maintaining

global stability.

c. Argues that nuclear weapons act as a deterrent against potential aggression and

ensure national security.

d. Believes that a complete elimination of nuclear weapons may compromise a

nation's defense posture.

4. Sanctions and Diplomacy Supporters:

a. Supported by France, Germany.

b. Favors the use of economic sanctions and diplomatic measures to discourage

nuclear weapons development.

c. Stresses the importance of diplomatic negotiations and international cooperation

in resolving proliferation concerns.

d. Advocates for targeted sanctions against non-compliant states to enforce

disarmament efforts.
 5. Nuclear-Free Zone Advocates:

a. Supported by Brazil, South Africa.

b. Calls for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in specific regions as a step

towards global disarmament.

c. Believes that creating zones free of nuclear weapons contributes to regional

stability and peace.

d. Emphasizes the role of regional agreements in fostering a nuclear-free

environment.

6. Non-State Actor Concerns Bloc:

a. Supported by Japan, India.

b. Raises concerns about the potential involvement of non-state actors in acquiring

or using nuclear weapons.

c. Advocates for strengthened measures to prevent non-state actors' access to

nuclear materials.

d. Emphasizes the need for international cooperation to address the non-proliferation

challenges posed by non-state entities.

Questions to Consider
1. How can countries balance the urgency of nuclear disarmament with the need for a

cautious and verifiable approach, considering the diverse perspectives within the

committee?

2. What measures can be implemented to enhance transparency and cooperation among

nuclear-armed states, particularly in the context of gradual disarmament with

verification?
 3. In what ways can the committee address the concerns of nuclear deterrence advocates

while ensuring the overall goal of global stability and disarmament?

4. How can diplomatic solutions and strategic arms reduction treaties be strengthened to

effectively address the challenges posed by non-compliance and potential security risks in

the disarmament process?

5. What role can economic sanctions play in discouraging nuclear weapons development,

and how can the committee ensure their targeted and effective implementation?

6. How might the establishment of nuclear-free zones contribute to regional stability, and

what challenges may arise in the negotiation and implementation of such zones?

7. Considering the potential involvement of non-state actors in nuclear proliferation, what

cooperative measures can be taken to prevent their access to nuclear materials and reduce

the threat they pose to global security?

Important Resources for Research

1. [Link]

2. [Link]

3. [Link]

ction/

4. [Link]

5. [Link]

6. [Link]

-of-nuclear-weapons/

7. [Link]

dices/[Link]
 Topic 2: Preserving the Peace: Regulating the

Militarization of Space

Introduction
In an era marked by rapid technological advancements and evolving geopolitical

dynamics, the question of preserving global peace has extended beyond terrestrial borders into

the vast expanse of space. The topic of "Preserving the Peace: Regulating the Militarization of

Space" holds a pivotal place in international discourse as nations grapple with the implications of

deploying military capabilities beyond Earth's atmosphere. The once uncharted territory of space

has become a frontier for strategic competition, raising profound questions about the responsible

use of this cosmic domain.

The militarization of space encompasses the deployment of military assets, such as

satellites and weapon systems, in orbit or on celestial bodies. As space becomes integral to

communication, surveillance, and navigation, the dual-use nature of satellite technology has

blurred the lines between civilian and military applications. The escalating interest in

space-based assets for national security purposes has sparked concerns about the potential

weaponization of this celestial arena, threatening the delicate equilibrium that governs

international relations.

Against this backdrop, regulating the militarization of space has become paramount. The

international community faces the challenge of establishing norms, frameworks, and treaties that

ensure the responsible use of space while preventing the weaponization of Earth's orbit. As

nations pursue advancements in space capabilities, the need for transparency, cooperation, and

adherence to international agreements becomes increasingly urgent. This topic invites a critical
examination of the evolving role of space in the global security landscape and underscores the

necessity of diplomatic initiatives to preserve peace in the cosmic realm. Delegates must

confront the complex intersection of technological innovation, national security imperatives, and

the shared responsibility to safeguard the peace and stability of our planet from the potential

ramifications of an armed conflict extending beyond its bounds.

Around three paragraphs introducing the topic. Set the stage for delegates from immediately

before whatever brought about the committee session and include the relevance of the topic and

urgency of coming to a solution. You will get into the details later in this topic guide. (~300

words)

History
To say that the space exploration of the mid-20th century carried out by the US and Soviet Union

primary aim was military is an overstatement, however, both world powers saw this race as an

opportunity to showcase their missile and ballistic capabilities. Ever since, the space has served

as fertile ground for military spacecrafts and communication satellites. In the 21st century, we

are faced with a complex paradigm towards space and its military potential.

The arms race in space is not new. At the dawn of the Cold War, the US enjoyed a comfortable

military advantage over the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union sought to offset that advantage

by all means possible. Intercontinental missiles provided an avenue for the Soviet Union to gain

a military edge over the US. Thus, in 1957, President Eisenhower presented a proposal of

accompanying the scientific space endeavours with an arms control agreement. The idea was for

international inspectors to establish whether all the objects sent to space would serve exclusively
peaceful ends and scientific purposes. The concept aimed at having global inspectors determine

if all items launched into space were intended solely for peaceful and scientific uses.

The Soviet Union rejected Eisenhower’s proposal. At the time, the Soviet Union gained the

temporary upper hand in space affairs, being the first country to put a satellite into orbit and

successfully test an intercontinental missile. So, they presented a counterproposal to President’s

Eisenhower’s proposal, where they would agree to his treaty if the US gave up its military bases

around the world. The proximity of these bases to Soviet territory allowed the US to pose a

nuclear threat to the Soviet Union without the need of an intercontinental missile. The Soviet

Union would thus agree to the US’ proposal if the US would forfeit its military bases around the

world. With the United States unwilling to do so, the deal fell stagnant on both ends and never

went through. The US, proceed to catch up with space technology throughout the 1950s.

At last, in 1967, the United Nations adopted the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 after various UN

resolutions. This treaty prohibited the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass

destruction in space, as well as military tests and installations on celestial bodies. However, it did

not address several other military activities in space, such as the detonation of weapons of mass

destruction, the passage of missiles through space (whether conventional or weapons of mass

destruction), and the deployment of conventional weapons in space. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic

Missiles Treaty limited land-launched missile defense systems to one location on each side,

prohibiting space-based systems. In 1979, talks on anti-satellite weapons failed, and both nations

were already in the process of testing such systems.

In 1980, President Ronald Reagan started his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aimed to boost

the US’s standing in the space arms raise but for many reasons failed. For starters, the public

interest and urgency to gain military advantage over space had significantly diminished in the

US. The Soviet Union had proposed a ban on the militarization of space, and nuclear tensions

were easing. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the recommendations on space missiles were

taken with less urgency by the international community.

In 2001, President George W. Bush unilaterally terminated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles

(ABM) Treaty, reigniting discussions about an arms buildup in space. The U.S. contends that its

now scaled-down missile defense program targets rogue states like North Korea or Iran.

However, Russia and China view it as a strategy to undermine their nuclear second-strike

capabilities. Notably, in 2007, China and the U.S. demonstrated satellite destruction capabilities

by shooting down their own satellites from the ground or sea. This showcased the potential for

any state with rocket launch capabilities to possess satellite destruction capabilities. The

termination of the ABM Treaty by the U.S. in 2001 has raised concerns about the militarization

of space, with geopolitical interpretations varying on the intentions behind missile defense

programs7.

Current Situation
The termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty marked the first time the US had

withdrawn from a major international arms treaty. This also marked the creation of the Missile

Defense Agency, a branch of the U.S. Department of Defense tasked with creating a thorough

defense system against ballistic missiles. Its inception can be traced back to the Strategic

7
“Brief Historical Outline of Space Arms Control: War and Peace.” Brief Historical Outline of Space Arms
Control | War and Peace, [Link]/en/m7/articles/m7-13. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.
Defense Initiative (SDI), initiated by Ronald Reagan in 1983. George Bush, at the time, justified

such action under the premise that the US necessitated a defense mechanism against rogue states

that had now acquired nuclear capabilities, such as North Korea and Iran. This was also meant to

stop the blackmail from such countries.

Critics of the termination of the ABM

Former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, articulated much of the fears of the international

community and the American population:

“Our chief peril is that the poised nuclear doom, much of it hidden beneath the seas and in

remote badlands, is too far out of the global public consciousness. Passivity shows broadly.

Perhaps this is a matter of defeatism and its cohort, distraction. Perhaps for some it is largely a

most primal human fear of facing the “unthinkable.” For others, it might be a welcoming of the

illusion that there is or might be an acceptable missile defense against a nuclear attack. And for

many it would seem to be the keeping of faith that nuclear deterrence will hold indefinitely—that

leaders will always have accurate enough instantaneous knowledge, know the true context of

events, and enjoy the good luck to avoid the most tragic of military miscalculations.8”

Much of the fear boiled down to a destabilization of the nuclear order. By acquiring defense

technologies, world powers would no longer be deterred to initiate a nuclear attack. The concept

of mutually assured destruction would cease to be a concern for nuclear states.

8
Brown, Jerry. “A Stark Nuclear Warning: Jerry Brown.” The New York Review of Books, 27 Mar. 2022,
[Link]/articles/2016/07/14/a-stark-nuclear-warning/.
Russian Response

Following the withdrawal, the newly elected Russian President, Vladimir Putin, took action by

ordering an enhancement of Russia's nuclear capabilities to offset U.S. advancements. Putin,

however, emphasized that there was no immediate threat resulting from the U.S. withdrawal.

Subsequently, on May 24, 2002, Russia and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive

Reductions Treaty in Moscow. This agreement called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear

warheads but did not specify cuts to total stockpiled warheads, lacking any enforcement

mechanism.

In a move mirroring the U.S. withdrawal, on June 13, 2002, the U.S. officially exited the ABM

Treaty, prompting Russia to announce its discontinuation of the START II treaty the following

day, despite it not being in force. In 2017 interviews with Oliver Stone, President Putin disclosed

that both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had, without evidence, attempted to persuade Russia

of an emerging nuclear threat from Iran to justify the U.S. withdrawal.

Fast forward to March 1, 2018, Putin, in an address to the Federal Assembly, unveiled the

development of advanced "super weapons" in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM

Treaty. An anonymous U.S. official dismissed Putin's claims as exaggerated. Putin, attributing

the decision to increase Russia's nuclear capabilities to counterbalance the U.S., expressed this

move as a response to the U.S. triggering the withdrawal.

By 2021, Putin continued to cite the U.S. withdrawal as one of his grievances against the West,

claiming efforts to partner with the West were unaccepted, characterizing it as one of America's

significant post-Cold War transgressions9.

China’s Response and Demonstrations in 2007

In January 2007, China triggered international concern by deliberately destroying one of its

satellites, generating hazardous space debris and raising fears of an emerging space arms race.

Despite China's subsequent declaration of a halt to similar tests a month later, the incident

showcased the nation's advancing space capabilities and its ability to defend against satellite

surveillance during wartime. The delayed official response fueled uncertainty, prompting

inquiries into the motives behind China's actions and casting doubt on the authenticity of its

proclaimed "soft rise" policy.

The ASAT test highlighted the broader discussions surrounding anti-satellite weapons,

emphasizing their potential to disrupt a nation's intelligence collection and military operations.

China's 2007 ASAT test, following multiple failed attempts, prompted suspicions about the

government's intentions. Speculations suggested potential miscommunication between China's

civilian government and military leadership, given the unexpected success of the test. CFR

Fellows proposed multifaceted motivations, including military concerns over a prospective U.S.

9
Schwirtz, Michael, et al. “Putin’s War: The inside Story of a Catastrophe.” The New York Times, The
New York Times, 17 Dec. 2022,
[Link]/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/[Link].
space-based missile defense system neutralizing China's nuclear arsenal, leading to a call for a

ban on space weapons. This incident underscored China's growing military prowess, particularly

its ability to target satellites critical to U.S. intelligence and precision weaponry, raising concerns

about potential disruptions to essential daily functions dependent on global positioning satellites

(GPS). Furthermore, China's diplomatic efforts, aligned with Moscow, seek a treaty to ban the

deployment of weapons in space, reflecting unease with U.S. dominance and aiming to restrict

American activities in space. China's decade-long investment in its space program, featuring

diverse satellite types, launching vehicles, and lunar exploration plans, further highlights its

commitment to modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and expanding its influence in

space exploration10.

US 2008 “Operation Burn Frost”

Operation Burnt Frost, conducted in 2008, aimed to intercept and destroy the non-functioning

U.S. National Reconnaissance Office satellite, USA-193. The Missile Defense Agency

characterized it as a mission to prevent the uncontrolled re-entry of a 5,000-pound satellite

carrying over 1,000 pounds of hazardous hydrazine propellant, thus safeguarding human life.

Launched from the USS Lake Erie on February 21, 2008, the mission, utilized a heavily

modified Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to shoot down the satellite. The SM-3 successfully

intercepted its target within minutes of launch, accomplishing its mission. Although effective, the

operation faced scrutiny, particularly from China and Russia. The operation faced significant

controversy and raised alarms in the international community.

10
“China’s Anti-Satellite Test.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations,
[Link]/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.
Kamala Harris Self-imposed Ban on Direct-ascent Anti-satellite Missile Tests

Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States will impose a self-imposed ban

on direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests that generate orbital debris. Harris, who chairs

the National Space Council, emphasized the dangers of such tests, pointing to Russia's 2021 and

China's 2007 tests as serious threats to space security and sustainability. The U.S. decision aims

to set an international example for responsible space behavior and encourage other nations to

follow suit. Harris highlighted the risks these missile tests pose to space activities, urging for a

shared understanding of safe and responsible space conduct.

Harris's announcement received mixed reactions, with experts praising it as a step toward

ensuring space safety and sustainability. They emphasized the importance of establishing

international norms for responsible behavior in space. Critics, particularly Republicans, viewed

the decision as unilateral, voluntary, and unnecessary. Rep. Doug Lamborn expressed concerns

that the U.S. commitment not to conduct ASAT tests could give China and Russia an advantage

in space, creating a false equivalence. Despite criticisms, proponents argue that the U.S. ban sets

a specific commitment example and aims to lead by encouraging other nations to join in

promoting responsible space conduct.

Space and Cybersecurity

The convergence of space and cyberspace poses unprecedented challenges to national security, as

both domains become increasingly interdependent. The intricate connection between outer space
and the internet, with space assets relying on internet-based networks and vice versa, demands a

comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. Current space and cybersecurity policies are

ill-prepared for this intersection, heightening national security risks. To address these challenges,

coordinated efforts involving government, industry, and international collaboration are

imperative. The militarization of space, driven by geopolitical competition, introduces new

dimensions to cybersecurity concerns. Space activities, crucial for global services like the Global

Positioning System (GPS), are vulnerable to cyber threats that may escalate due to heightened

militarization. Current international laws and diplomatic efforts have not effectively addressed

space cybersecurity, necessitating a focused approach.

Path Forward

At the forefront of addressing the intricate challenges posed by the convergence of space and

cyberspace are space agencies, poised to assume a pivotal role in crafting cybersecurity

recommendations tailored to the evolving landscape of space activities. This undertaking

demands not only domestic collaboration but a concerted effort to engage with the burgeoning

private sector, where the commercial space industry is rapidly expanding. Legislative initiatives

must be strategically formulated to go beyond mere endorsement, actively reinforcing and

amplifying the cybersecurity endeavors led by the industry. This legislative support is

particularly crucial as the commercial space sector undergoes unprecedented growth, presenting

both opportunities and vulnerabilities that necessitate robust protective measures.

On the international stage, the imperative is collaboration among nations to collectively navigate

the complexities of space cybersecurity. Multilateral frameworks, such as NATO, provide fertile

ground for fostering cooperative endeavors in this domain. Moreover, countries should actively

seek out bilateral forums dedicated to in-depth discussions on the nuanced intricacies of space

cybersecurity. This comprehensive approach, intertwining national efforts with global

cooperation, reflects an acknowledgment of the multifaceted nature of the challenges at hand. It

transcends the confines of conventional cybersecurity discourse and underscores the urgency for

a sophisticated and adaptive framework capable of safeguarding the intertwined realms of outer

space and cyberspace in the face of escalating security risks.

What can the International Community Do?

The prevailing concern among the majority of United Nations member states centers on the

potential arms race stemming from the weaponization of outer space. Advocates for a

multilateral treaty, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), receive resounding

support annually in the UN General Assembly, with the exception of the United States and Israel,

which consistently abstain. The PAROS resolution urges states, especially those with space

capabilities, to refrain from actions conflicting with its objectives and actively contribute to its

goals, seeking to enhance the legal framework governing outer space and prevent the deployment

of space weapons and related technologies.

Simultaneously, the General Assembly endorses a transparency and confidence-building

measures (TCBMs) resolution proposed by Russia and China. While TCBMs are recognized as
positive steps toward fostering trust and cooperation, they are acknowledged as not replacing a

legally-binding PAROS treaty. Seen as an initial step, TCBMs are part of a gradual approach to

prevent the weaponization of outer space. Initiating a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in

2010, the General Assembly explores TCBMs to enhance space security, signaling ongoing

international efforts to address the complexities of preventing outer space weaponization amidst

advancements in science and technology11.

Bloc Positions
1. United States and Allies Bloc:

Position: Emphasizes the right to defend national interests in space.

i. Key Points:

1. Supports the development of missile defense systems for

protection against potential threats.

2. Advocates for the responsible use of space for both civilian and

military purposes.

3. May express concerns about potential adversaries' actions in space,

justifying the need for defensive capabilities.

4. Likely to highlight the importance of protecting space assets

critical for national security.

2. Russia and China Partnership:

11
Outer Space - Reaching Critical Will,
[Link]/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/[Link]. Accessed 24 Jan.
2024.
 Position: Stresses the need for an international treaty on the prevention of an arms

race in outer space (PAROS).

ii. Key Points:

1. Advocates for a legally binding agreement to prevent the

weaponization of space.

2. Highlights the risks associated with the militarization of space and

the potential for an arms race.

3. Supports transparency and confidence-building measures

(TCBMs) as initial steps towards preventing outer space

weaponization.

4. Likely to express concerns about the actions of the United States

and its allies in space.

3. Non-Aligned Bloc:

Position: Promotes a balanced approach considering the interests of all nations.

iii. Key Points:

1. Emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in space

exploration and utilization.

2. Calls for the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an

arms race without aligning strictly with any major bloc.

3. May support measures that ensure the responsible behavior of all

nations in space activities.

4. Likely to seek diplomatic solutions and negotiations to address

concerns related to the militarization of space.

4. European Union (EU) Bloc:

Position: Focuses on multilateralism, diplomacy, and international agreements.

iv. Key Points:

1. Supports efforts for a comprehensive and legally binding

international treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer

space.

2. Advocates for increased transparency and cooperation in space

activities.

3. Emphasizes the role of international organizations, such as the

United Nations, in addressing the challenges of space

militarization.

4. Likely to express concerns about the potential impact of space

militarization on global stability.

Questions to Consider
1. How can the international community assess the potential impact of space militarization

on global security and stability?

2. What regulatory frameworks can be proposed to effectively govern the militarization of

space and ensure responsible conduct by nations?

3. How can verifiable mechanisms be established to ensure compliance with any

international agreements or treaties aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space?

4. How should the international community address the dual-use nature of space

technologies, particularly satellite capabilities with both civilian and military

applications?
 5. What confidence-building measures (CBMs) can be implemented to foster trust among

nations and mitigate concerns related to space militarization?

6. In what ways can the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty be

strengthened, and how can nations be encouraged to join and comply with it?

7. How can space and cybersecurity policies be integrated to address the growing challenges

at the intersection of outer space and cyberspace?

8. What diplomatic initiatives can be proposed to encourage dialogue and cooperation

among nations with different perspectives on the militarization of space?

Important Resources for Research

1. [Link]

2. [Link]

3. [Link]

4. [Link]

pdf

5. [Link]

ons-to-join/

6. [Link]
 Bibliography

Topic 1
Ackerman, Daniel. “10 Things to Know about Iran’s Nuclear Program.” FDD, 14 Nov. 2023,

[Link]/analysis/2023/11/14/10-things-to-know-about-irans-nuclear-program/.

Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. “Al Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Policy,

Foreign Policy, 25 Jan. 2010,

[Link]/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/.

Nuclear Deterrence Theory – Threat to Inflict Terror,

[Link]/au/journals/FlinLawJl/2013/[Link]. Accessed 24 Jan. 2024.

Proliferation and Non- State Actors - [Link],

[Link]/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/trt_dp_format_ks.pdf. Accessed 24

Jan. 2024.

Proliferation and Non- State Actors - [Link],

[Link]/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/trt_dp_format_ks.pdf. Accessed 24

Jan. 2024.

Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.

1–34

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, [Link]/milestones/1961-1968/npt.

Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.

“What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations,

[Link]/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.

Topic 2

“Brief Historical Outline of Space Arms Control: War and Peace.” Brief Historical Outline of

Space Arms Control | War and Peace, [Link]/en/m7/articles/m7-13. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.

Brown, Jerry. “A Stark Nuclear Warning: Jerry Brown.” The New York Review of Books, 27 Mar.

2022, [Link]/articles/2016/07/14/a-stark-nuclear-warning/.

“China’s Anti-Satellite Test.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations,

[Link]/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test. Accessed 23 Jan. 2024.

Outer Space - Reaching Critical Will,

[Link]/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/[Link]. Accessed

24 Jan. 2024.

Schwirtz, Michael, et al. “Putin’s War: The inside Story of a Catastrophe.” The New York Times,

The New York Times, 17 Dec. 2022,

[Link]/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/[Link].