THE JUDICIARY OF TANZANIA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AT ARUSHA

LABOUR REVISION NO. 000002020 OF 2026

BONIFACE THOMAS MWIMBWA .............................. COMPLAINANT / APPELLANT /

APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

CRDB BANK PLC .............................. RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT

RULING

KAINDA, J

This Court has been moved by the applicant, Boniface Thomas Mwimbwa, invoking the

revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of the Employment and Labour

Relations Act, Cap 366 R.E. 2023 and the Labour Court Rules, GN No. 106 of 2007. The

applicant seeks intervention of this Court to call for and examine the record of proceedings

and the ruling delivered by the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration in Labour Dispute

No. CMA/ARS/ARS/210/23/135/2024 on the 16th day of December, 2025, with a view to

satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the said decision, and to

revise and set aside the same. The application is supported by an affidavit sworn by the

applicant, while the respondent opposes the application through a counter affidavit sworn by

learned counsel who represented it before the Commission. Both parties filed written

submissions, which this Court has had the benefit of carefully reading and considering in

their entirety. The Court is equally grateful to both learned counsel for the industry exhibited

in the preparation of their respective submissions. The factual background giving rise to this

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 application is not in serious dispute. The applicant was employed by the respondent for a

considerable period of time, having joined its service in or about the year 1991. Over the

years, he rose through various positions and eventually held the position of Branch Manager

at the Meru Branch in Arusha. It is not disputed that on or about the 12th October, 2011, the

applicant was suspended from employment to pave way for investigations into alleged

fraudulent transactions said to have occurred at the branch under his management. The

events that followed thereafter significantly altered the course of his life and form the

foundation of the present dispute. The applicant was subsequently arrested and charged

with criminal offences connected to the alleged fraudulent transactions. He remained in

custody and later in prison for a prolonged period spanning from 2011 until 2019. During this

time, he underwent criminal proceedings which culminated in his conviction by the High

Court. However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and acquitted

him. The acquittal marked a turning point, as the applicant then sought to re-engage with

the respondent regarding his employment status and entitlements. The record reveals that

the applicant addressed letters to the respondent following his acquittal, seeking clarification

of his employment relationship and payment of what he considered to be his lawful dues,

including salaries and benefits for the period he was under suspension and incarceration.

The respondent did not accede to his demands, and this led the applicant to refer a dispute

to the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration in the year 2023. Before the Commission,

the applicant filed Form CMA F1, in which he outlined the nature of his complaint and the

reliefs he sought. It is apparent from the record that the claim as initially framed primarily

revolved around suspension and the consequences thereof, including a prayer for

reinstatement and payment of outstanding salaries and benefits. The dispute proceeded

through mediation without success and was subsequently referred to arbitration. During the

course of arbitration proceedings, the applicant, through his counsel, sought to amend his

claim so as to incorporate additional reliefs which, according to him, had not been included

in the initial Form CMA F1. These included claims for compensation arising from financial,

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 social and psychological hardship allegedly suffered by him and his family during the period

of his incarceration. The application for amendment was opposed by the Respondent and

was ultimately dismissed by the learned Arbitrator. Following that development, and prior to

the hearing of the main dispute, the applicant opted to seek withdrawal of the dispute with

leave to refile. The stated reason for this course of action was to enable him to properly

present his claims in a comprehensive manner, free from the limitations imposed by the

initial formulation of his complaint. The Respondent opposed this application as well,

contending that it was a disguised attempt to achieve through withdrawal what had already

been denied through the application for amendment. In a ruling delivered on 16th

December, 2025, the learned Arbitrator allowed the applicant to withdraw the dispute but

declined to grant leave to refile. The effect of that decision was to bring the dispute to an

end without a determination on the merits, and without affording the applicant an opportunity

to reintroduce his claims in a revised form. It is this decision that has provoked the present

application. In approaching this matter, this Court is acutely aware of the nature and scope

of its revisional jurisdiction. Revision is not an appeal. It is not intended to afford a rehearing

of the matter or to substitute the Court’s own view merely because it would have arrived at a

different conclusion. Rather, it is a supervisory jurisdiction aimed at ensuring that

subordinate courts and tribunals act within the confines of the law, exercise their discretion

judiciously, and do not occasion injustice through misdirection, illegality or procedural

impropriety. The central question that arises in this application is whether the learned

Arbitrator exercised his discretion properly when he allowed withdrawal of the dispute but

refused to grant leave to refile. That question cannot be answered in isolation from the

surrounding circumstances and the reasons that informed the decision under challenge.

From the record, it is evident that the learned Arbitrator was influenced by the fact that the

matter had already progressed to an advanced stage and that granting leave to refile would

have the effect of prolonging litigation. The Arbitrator also appears to have been persuaded

by the argument that the applicant was attempting to circumvent the earlier refusal to amend

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 his claim by resorting to withdrawal with leave to refile. While those considerations are not

without merit, they do not, in the respectful view of this Court, exhaust the range of factors

that ought to have been taken into account. The power to grant or refuse leave to refile is a

discretionary one, and like all judicial discretions, it must be exercised in a manner that

advances the ends of justice. The guiding principle is not merely whether litigation should

come to an end, but whether it is just and fair, in the circumstances of the case, to permit or

deny a party the opportunity to pursue his claim in a proper and complete manner. The

Applicant’s explanation for seeking withdrawal with leave to refile was that his initial claim

was not exhaustive and did not capture the full extent of the grievances he wished to

ventilate. It is not disputed that his application to amend the claim had been dismissed.

Faced with that position, he elected to withdraw the claim altogether so that he could

reframe it comprehensively. The question is whether that course of action, in the

circumstances of this case, constituted sufficient cause to warrant the grant of leave to

refile. The concept of sufficient cause is not susceptible to rigid definition. It must be

assessed on a case by case basis, having regard to the peculiar facts and the demands of

justice. In the present case, the applicant had endured a prolonged period of incarceration,

had been acquitted on appeal, and was seeking to pursue claims arising from his

employment relationship with the respondent. The claims he sought to introduce were not

trivial; they went to the heart of his alleged loss and suffering over a significant period of

time. It is true, as submitted by the respondent, that the claims the applicant sought to

introduce could be characterized as introducing new elements into the dispute. It is also true

that the law does not permit parties to endlessly reformulate their claims to the prejudice of

the opposing party. However, the Court must strike a balance between procedural discipline

and substantive justice. Where the effect of denying leave to refile is to shut out a party from

ever presenting his claim fully, the Court must be slow to endorse such an outcome unless

there are compelling reasons to do so. In the present case, the denial of leave to refile had

the effect of terminating the dispute without a hearing on the merits and without affording the

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 applicant an opportunity to present his case in a complete form. That outcome, in the view

of this Court, was disproportionate to the concerns that informed the decision. The

respondent would not have been irreparably prejudiced by allowing the applicant to refile the

claim, as it would still have had the opportunity to respond to the claim and raise all

available defences, including those relating to limitation and jurisdiction. Moreover, the

learned Arbitrator appears to have placed undue emphasis on the earlier application for

amendment and treated the application for withdrawal with leave to refile as an attempt to

circumvent that decision. While there is some overlap between the two, they are not

identical in law. An application for amendment seeks to alter an existing claim, whereas

withdrawal with leave to refile contemplates the institution of a fresh claim. The

considerations applicable to each are not necessarily the same, and it was incumbent upon

the Arbitrator to consider the latter application on its own merits. Another aspect that cannot

be ignored is the constitutional underpinning of the right to be heard. The Constitution

guarantees every person the right to a fair hearing. While that right does not entitle a party

to abuse the process of the court, it does require that courts and tribunals exercise their

powers in a manner that facilitates, rather than hinders, access to justice. In the

circumstances of this case, the refusal to grant leave to refile effectively foreclosed the

applicant’s opportunity to have his grievances adjudicated upon, not on account of their lack

of merit, but on account of procedural limitations. Having carefully weighed all these

considerations, this Court is satisfied that the learned Arbitrator did not exercise his

discretion judiciously. The decision to deny leave to refile was influenced by considerations

that, while relevant, were not determinative, and insufficient weight was given to the broader

interests of justice. The result was a decision that occasioned prejudice to the applicant and

failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the parties. In the exercise

of its revisional jurisdiction, this Court is therefore justified in intervening. The circumstances

of this case disclose a material irregularity in the exercise of discretion, and the interests of

justice demand that the decision be corrected. Accordingly, this Court allows the application

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 for revision. The ruling of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration delivered on 16th

December, 2025 is hereby revised and set aside to the extent that it denied the applicant

leave to refile the dispute. In its place, this Court orders that the applicant be and is hereby

granted leave to withdraw the dispute with liberty to refile. The applicant shall be at liberty to

institute a fresh claim in accordance with the law, subject to any applicable procedural

requirements. In view of the nature of the dispute and the relationship between the parties,

this Court considers it appropriate that each party bears its own costs. It is so ordered.

Dated at ARUSHA this 25th of March 2026 .

S. J KAINDA

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

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