PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

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Reference Notes

Political Science & International Relations

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By Yogesh Kottawar​
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PS

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 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

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Content

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1.​Equality

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2.​Rights sh
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Yo
By
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 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Equality
The problem of equality and inequality has occupied a central place in political thought since
ancient times. Aristotle identified inequality—real or imagined—as the principal cause of
revolutions, highlighting how perceptions of unfairness destabilize societies. In the modern era,
the idea of the welfare state is also rooted in the pursuit of equality, though contemporary
understandings move beyond mere formal equality to include capacity building, recognising
structural disadvantages faced by certain groups. Equality, therefore, is not only a moral ideal

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but also a political necessity for social stability and legitimacy.

Broadly, the principle of equality operates at two interconnected levels: foundational equality,

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which explains why human beings are entitled to equality at all, and distributive equality,

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which addresses how equality should be realised in practice through distribution of resources
and opportunities.

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Foundational Equality: Why Are Human Beings Equal?
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Foundational equality concerns the moral and philosophical grounds on which claims to equality
are based. Historically, religion provided one of the earliest justifications. Religious traditions
argue that all human beings are children of God and hence equally entitled to the gifts and
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property of God. From this perspective, equality is a divine and moral principle.

However, critics often argue that equality does not derive support from nature. Nature, they
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claim, is characterised by inequality—differences in strength, intelligence, and ability—and

governed by the principle of survival of the fittest. On this basis, some liberals justify expanding
individual freedom and competition, even if it leads to unequal outcomes, sometimes at the cost
By

of human dignity.

In modern political philosophy, equality is most strongly grounded in the idea of common
humanity. Drawing from the Kantian tradition, human dignity is regarded as a categorical
IR

imperative—absolute and inviolable. Since all humans possess dignity by virtue of being
human, they are morally equal, irrespective of their talents, social status, or achievements. This
PS

conception provides the most robust ethical foundation for equality in contemporary democratic
societies.

Distributive Equality: Equality in Practice

Distributive equality addresses how resources, opportunities, and social advantages should be
allocated to realise equality. Here, political thought presents a wide spectrum of views.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

At one extreme, classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle believed in natural inequality.
Plato’s myth of metals justified hierarchical social roles, leaving little scope for equality, while
Aristotle defended the status quo and even legitimised slavery, arguing that it benefitted both
master and slave.

Classical liberals advocate equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcomes. According
to this view, the role of the state is to create a level playing field by removing artificial barriers,
after which individuals are free to pursue their ambitions based on merit, effort, and talent.

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Social liberals, such as Amartya Sen, go further by emphasising capacity building. They
argue that formal equality of opportunity is insufficient in deeply unequal societies.
Disadvantaged groups require additional support to convert opportunities into real freedoms.

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Thus, equality must be substantive, not merely formal.

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At the other extreme, socialists and radical egalitarians advocate what may be termed
artificial or outcome-based equality, involving extensive state intervention in both economic
and social life to ensure equal distribution. While normatively attractive, this model is often

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criticised as utopian and impractical.
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Evolution of the Idea of Equality
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The concept of equality has evolved through several stages in political theory and practice.

The earliest and most basic form is equality before law, a legalistic concept asserting that all
Yo

individuals should be treated equally by the law regardless of their social, economic, or political
status. Here, law is supreme (lex rex), and arbitrary power is rejected.

The next stage is equality of opportunity, also known as proportional equality. Central to social
By

liberalism, it holds that all individuals should have equal access to basic conditions necessary
for success—such as education, healthcare, housing, and employment. Once these conditions
are ensured, individuals bear responsibility for their outcomes.
IR

A more radical conception is equality of outcomes, associated with Marxist and radical
egalitarian thought. It seeks equal distribution of income, wealth, and social rewards, famously
PS

captured in Marx’s dictum: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”
However, since individuals differ in talents and motivation, this model is criticised for
undermining incentives, reducing productivity, and ultimately harming even the poorest sections.
Consequently, it has largely remained an ideal rather than a lived reality.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Equality Across Major Schools of Thought

Different ideological traditions interpret equality in distinct ways. Liberals prioritise equality
before law and opportunity. Marxists focus on material equality and elimination of class-based
exploitation. Feminists introduce the idea of differentiated equality, recognising that identical
treatment often perpetuates inequality due to structural disadvantages faced by women.
Communitarians emphasise the role of community and cultural context in shaping conceptions
of equality. Multiculturalists, such as Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh, extend differentiated
equality to cultural and minority rights, arguing that uniform treatment may disadvantage

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minorities and undermine genuine equality.

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Ronald Dworkin and the Centrality of Equality

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Ronald Dworkin begins from a strong normative claim that no value in liberalism has been
under greater threat than equality. Contrary to the popular belief that liberalism prioritizes
liberty over equality, Dworkin argues that equality is more fundamental than liberty, and
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liberty itself becomes hollow in the absence of equality. Much like Isaiah Berlin’s concern for
human dignity, Dworkin treats equality as the moral foundation of liberalism. A society that
protects liberty without addressing deep inequalities merely legitimizes privilege rather than
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freedom.

The central question for Dworkin, therefore, is not whether liberals should support equality, but
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in what sense people should be made equal.

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Rejection of Welfare Equality

Dworkin strongly rejects the utilitarian idea of equality of welfare, where justice requires
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equalizing pleasure or satisfaction. Welfare, in utilitarian thought, refers to subjective pleasure,

happiness, or preference satisfaction. Dworkin finds this deeply problematic.
PS

He illustrates this with a simple example: imagine a father with two sons—one content with a
simple lifestyle and the other having expensive tastes. If the goal is to equalize welfare, the
father would have to give more resources to the son with expensive tastes, simply to keep his
pleasure level equal to that of the simpler son. This, Dworkin argues, is morally absurd,
because it rewards extravagant preferences and penalizes modest ones. Justice cannot require
society to subsidize expensive tastes merely to equalize subjective satisfaction.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Thus, equality of welfare fails as a principle of justice because it ignores responsibility,

effort, and choice.

Critique of Libertarianism and Nozick

Dworkin is equally critical of libertarian theories, particularly Nozick’s entitlement theory, which
limits the role of the state to protection, regulation, and rectification of property rights. Nozick

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treats property as fully owned by individuals and rejects distributive justice, arguing that
inequalities arising from free exchange are morally acceptable.

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Dworkin agrees with Nozick on one limited point: individuals should be held responsible for

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the choices they make. However, he sharply disagrees with holding people responsible for
circumstances they did not choose. According to Dworkin, justice must distinguish between
chosen circumstances and unchosen circumstances. People may reasonably bear the

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consequences of their voluntary choices, but it is unjust to burden them for disadvantages
arising from birth, natural abilities, disabilities, or brute chance.

This distinction becomes the cornerstone of Dworkin’s theory.

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Equality of Resources: Core Idea

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Dworkin proposes equality of resources as the correct liberal conception of equality. Justice,
according to him, does not require equal happiness or equal outcomes, but equal concern and
respect, operationalized through a fair distribution of resources.
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The aim is to ensure that people begin their lives with a fair share of resources, adjusted for
unchosen disadvantages, after which they are free to shape their lives through their own
ambitions and choices. Compensation, therefore, is required only at the initial stage, not
IR

repeatedly throughout life.

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The Island Thought Experiment and Auction Model

Dworkin explains his theory through a thought experiment described in Sovereign Virtue. A
group of people are shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with abundant natural resources.
Since there is no existing society, property system, or hierarchy, they must design a just system
of distribution from scratch to avoid conflict.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Dworkin argues that the most just method of allocating resources is through an auction,
because only competition reveals how much people value different goods. Price, in this sense,
becomes a mechanism of value discovery rather than exploitation.

However, an auction can be just only if the initial conditions are fair.

Endowment-Sensitive and Ambition-Sensitive Auctions

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Dworkin distinguishes between two dimensions of justice in the auction system.

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First, the auction must be endowment-sensitive, meaning it must account for differences in

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natural capacities and unchosen disadvantages. People differ in health, physical ability,
intelligence, and talents—factors over which they have no control. To neutralize these
inequalities, Dworkin proposes an equitable (not equal) initial distribution of resources.

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He introduces the envy test to assess fairness: a distribution is just if no one envies another
person’s bundle of resources after compensation for disadvantages. To achieve this, individuals
with natural disadvantages may receive extra resources so that they are not worse off due to
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circumstances beyond their control.

Once this fair initial distribution is achieved, individuals enter the second stage—the
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ambition-sensitive auction. Here, people use their resources (symbolized by “clamshells”) to

bid for goods according to their preferences and life plans. Differences in outcomes at this stage
are morally acceptable because they reflect choices, priorities, and ambitions, not unfair
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starting points.
By

Brute Luck and Option Luck

A key innovation in Dworkin’s theory is his distinction between brute luck and option luck.
IR

Brute luck refers to misfortunes beyond one’s control—such as being born with a disability or
PS

suffering an unavoidable accident. Justice requires compensation for brute luck because
individuals did not choose these conditions.

Option luck, on the other hand, arises from deliberate and informed choices—such as risky
investments, career decisions, or lifestyle preferences. Losses resulting from option luck do not
require compensation, since individuals voluntarily accepted the risk.

This distinction allows Dworkin to combine equality with responsibility, avoiding both moral
harshness and moral paternalism.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Role of Insurance
Dworkin further refines his theory through the concept of hypothetical insurance. Rational
individuals, aware that misfortune may strike even after fair initial distribution, would voluntarily
set aside some resources to insure themselves against bad outcomes. This collective insurance
pool can later support those who suffer disadvantages due to option luck.

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Thus, redistribution under Dworkin’s model resembles insurance chosen by rational agents,
not charity imposed by the state. This preserves individual dignity and autonomy while ensuring

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fairness.

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Amartya Sen and the Shift from Resources to Capabilities
Amartya Sen takes the debate on equality a decisive step beyond the idea of equality of
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resources. He begins from the insight that equality is an evolving concept, deeply linked to
human dignity. Merely distributing equal resources does not ensure real equality, because
individuals differ significantly in their physical, social, cultural, and psychological capacities. Two
ge

persons given the same income, education, or material resources may still be unequally placed
in their ability to convert those resources into a life of dignity. Hence, for Sen, the focus of justice
must shift from resources to capabilities—that is, what people are actually able to be and do.
Yo

Equality, therefore, cannot be judged only at the level of inputs; it must be assessed at the level
of real freedom.
By

Capability Approach: Core Idea

IR

Sen’s capability approach defines equality in terms of people’s substantive freedoms.

PS

Capabilities refer to the genuine opportunities available to individuals to achieve functionings,

such as being healthy, educated, respected, nourished, and able to participate in social and
political life. What matters is not how much a person has, but what a person can realistically
achieve with what they have.

This approach rejects the tendency to treat people merely as instruments of economic growth.
Instead, it treats human beings as the ends of development. Development, in Sen’s words, is
the expansion of freedom, and freedom is understood in terms of enhanced capabilities.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Distinctive Features of the Capability Approach

Social Choice Perspective

The first distinctive feature of Sen’s approach is that it is grounded in social choice, not
abstract rational choice. Sen criticizes theories that rely on hypothetical individuals negotiating

ar
in imagined situations. Real societies consist of real people facing diverse and overlapping
deprivations. The capability approach therefore takes into account social structures, cultural
norms, and power relations.

w
For example, even when boys and girls are given equal resources in India—such as food,

tta
schooling, or healthcare—girls often experience greater deprivation due to social practices like
gender bias, early marriage, and restricted mobility. Hence, equality of resources fails to
translate into equality of well-being. Sen’s framework captures these social realities and adopts

Ko
a multidimensional understanding of poverty, rather than reducing poverty to income
deprivation alone.
sh
Realization-Focused Approach
ge

The second defining feature of Sen’s theory is its realization-focused character. Sen argues
that justice should be evaluated by actual outcomes, not merely by the fairness of procedures.
Yo

The ultimate goal of life is well-being, which he explains through the ideas of “being” and
“doing.”

“Being” refers to a person’s state of existence—being respected, being healthy, being free from
By

humiliation. “Doing” refers to actions a person values—working, learning, participating in public

life. The distinction between choice and compulsion is crucial here. For instance, fasting is a
voluntary choice that may give a sense of moral or spiritual fulfillment, whereas hunger is an
enforced deprivation that undermines dignity. The two may look similar externally, but are
IR

radically different in terms of freedom and well-being.

PS

Thus, Sen evaluates equality not by formal rights or equal goods, but by real freedom to lead a
life one has reason to value.

Development as Freedom
From this perspective, Sen redefines development itself. Development is not merely economic
growth or increase in national income; it is the expansion of human capabilities. Economic
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

growth is valuable only insofar as it enhances people’s freedoms. Education, health, nutrition,
social security, and political participation are not means to development—they are constitutive
elements of development.

This approach directly challenges growth-centric and authoritarian models of development that
treat people as tools for economic efficiency rather than as agents of their own lives.

ar
Affirmative Action and Capability Enhancement

w
The capability approach provides a strong normative justification for affirmative action,
understood as positive intervention by the state to enhance the capabilities of historically

tta
disadvantaged groups. In every society, certain communities have suffered long-term exclusion
and deprivation due to caste, race, gender, or ethnicity. Such groups cannot achieve equality
merely through formal equality of rights or resources; they require external support to

Ko
overcome structural disadvantages.

Examples include Dalits in India and African-Americans in the United States. Affirmative action
aims to enhance the capabilities of such communities so that they can compete on fair terms
sh
with others.
ge

Group-Based Nature of Affirmative Action

Yo

Sen’s logic supports group-based affirmative action, not purely individual-based assistance.
Historical disadvantage is collective in nature and cannot be addressed by focusing only on
individual poverty. For instance, a poor Brahmin in India may require state assistance through
By

poverty alleviation schemes, but he does not qualify for affirmative action, because his
community has not suffered systematic social exclusion. In contrast, members of Dalit
communities are eligible for reservation because their deprivation is structural and historical,
IR

not merely economic.

This distinction ensures that affirmative action remains a tool for social justice, not general
PS

welfare.

Affirmative Action vs Preferential Policies

It is crucial to distinguish affirmative action from preferential policies. Affirmative action
benefits historically disadvantaged groups to correct structural injustice. Preferential policies, on
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

the other hand, extend benefits to already dominant or politically powerful groups. Examples
include demands for reservation by dominant castes such as Jats in Haryana or Marathas in
Maharashtra, or state policies favouring the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. Such measures do
not promote justice; instead, they reinforce existing inequalities.

Debates and Criticism of Reservation Policies

ar
Affirmative action policies, especially reservation, are among the most contested policies in
India. As Ramachandra Guha observes, debates on reservation often generate more heat than

w
light. Pratap Bhanu Mehta similarly notes that public discourse on reservation is marked by
moral inconsistency—people often hold very different views in public and private.

tta
Critics argue that reservation compromises merit, amounts to reverse discrimination, and serves
as a form of compensatory justice driven by political considerations rather than genuine

Ko
empowerment. However, Sen’s framework suggests that the success or failure of affirmative
action depends on how it is conceptualized and implemented, not on its mere existence.
sh
Judicial Interventions and Enabling Nature of Reservation
ge

Indian judicial pronouncements have increasingly emphasized that reservation is an enabling

policy, not a permanent entitlement. In the Ramsingh case (Jat reservation case), the Supreme
Yo

Court directed the government to identify new vulnerable groups, such as transgender
persons. In the Ashok Kumar case concerning reservations in higher education, the Court
clarified that affirmative action must aim at creating conditions where backwardness is
eventually eliminated.
By

An enabling policy is justified only so long as inequality persists. The ultimate goal is to reach a
stage where society can legitimately claim that equality has been achieved and special
IR

measures are no longer necessary.

PS

Amartya Sen and the Shift from Resources to Capabilities

Amartya Sen takes the debate on equality a decisive step beyond the idea of equality of
resources. He begins from the insight that equality is an evolving concept, deeply linked to
human dignity. Merely distributing equal resources does not ensure real equality, because
individuals differ significantly in their physical, social, cultural, and psychological capacities. Two
persons given the same income, education, or material resources may still be unequally placed
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

in their ability to convert those resources into a life of dignity. Hence, for Sen, the focus of justice
must shift from resources to capabilities—that is, what people are actually able to be and do.

Equality, therefore, cannot be judged only at the level of inputs; it must be assessed at the level
of real freedom.

Capability Approach: Core Idea

ar
Sen’s capability approach defines equality in terms of people’s substantive freedoms.

w
Capabilities refer to the genuine opportunities available to individuals to achieve functionings,
such as being healthy, educated, respected, nourished, and able to participate in social and

tta
political life. What matters is not how much a person has, but what a person can realistically
achieve with what they have.

Ko
This approach rejects the tendency to treat people merely as instruments of economic growth.
Instead, it treats human beings as the ends of development. Development, in Sen’s words, is
the expansion of freedom, and freedom is understood in terms of enhanced capabilities.
sh
Distinctive Features of the Capability Approach
ge

Social Choice Perspective

Yo

The first distinctive feature of Sen’s approach is that it is grounded in social choice, not
abstract rational choice. Sen criticizes theories that rely on hypothetical individuals negotiating
in imagined situations. Real societies consist of real people facing diverse and overlapping
By

deprivations. The capability approach therefore takes into account social structures, cultural
norms, and power relations.
IR

For example, even when boys and girls are given equal resources in India—such as food,
schooling, or healthcare—girls often experience greater deprivation due to social practices like
gender bias, early marriage, and restricted mobility. Hence, equality of resources fails to
PS

translate into equality of well-being. Sen’s framework captures these social realities and adopts
a multidimensional understanding of poverty, rather than reducing poverty to income
deprivation alone.

Realization-Focused Approach
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

The second defining feature of Sen’s theory is its realization-focused character. Sen argues
that justice should be evaluated by actual outcomes, not merely by the fairness of procedures.
The ultimate goal of life is well-being, which he explains through the ideas of “being” and
“doing.”

“Being” refers to a person’s state of existence—being respected, being healthy, being free from
humiliation. “Doing” refers to actions a person values—working, learning, participating in public
life. The distinction between choice and compulsion is crucial here. For instance, fasting is a
voluntary choice that may give a sense of moral or spiritual fulfillment, whereas hunger is an

ar
enforced deprivation that undermines dignity. The two may look similar externally, but are
radically different in terms of freedom and well-being.

w
Thus, Sen evaluates equality not by formal rights or equal goods, but by real freedom to lead a
life one has reason to value.

tta
Ko
Development as Freedom
From this perspective, Sen redefines development itself. Development is not merely economic
sh
growth or increase in national income; it is the expansion of human capabilities. Economic
growth is valuable only insofar as it enhances people’s freedoms. Education, health, nutrition,
social security, and political participation are not means to development—they are constitutive
ge

elements of development.

This approach directly challenges growth-centric and authoritarian models of development that
Yo

treat people as tools for economic efficiency rather than as agents of their own lives.
By

Affirmative Action and Capability Enhancement

IR

The capability approach provides a strong normative justification for affirmative action,
understood as positive intervention by the state to enhance the capabilities of historically
disadvantaged groups. In every society, certain communities have suffered long-term exclusion
PS

and deprivation due to caste, race, gender, or ethnicity. Such groups cannot achieve equality
merely through formal equality of rights or resources; they require external support to
overcome structural disadvantages.

Examples include Dalits in India and African-Americans in the United States. Affirmative action
aims to enhance the capabilities of such communities so that they can compete on fair terms
with others.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Group-Based Nature of Affirmative Action

Sen’s logic supports group-based affirmative action, not purely individual-based assistance.
Historical disadvantage is collective in nature and cannot be addressed by focusing only on
individual poverty. For instance, a poor Brahmin in India may require state assistance through
poverty alleviation schemes, but he does not qualify for affirmative action, because his
community has not suffered systematic social exclusion. In contrast, members of Dalit
communities are eligible for reservation because their deprivation is structural and historical,
not merely economic.

ar
This distinction ensures that affirmative action remains a tool for social justice, not general

w
welfare.

tta
Affirmative Action vs Preferential Policies

Ko
It is crucial to distinguish affirmative action from preferential policies. Affirmative action
benefits historically disadvantaged groups to correct structural injustice. Preferential policies, on
sh
the other hand, extend benefits to already dominant or politically powerful groups. Examples
include demands for reservation by dominant castes such as Jats in Haryana or Marathas in
Maharashtra, or state policies favouring the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. Such measures do
ge

not promote justice; instead, they reinforce existing inequalities.

Yo

Debates and Criticism of Reservation Policies

By

Affirmative action policies, especially reservation, are among the most contested policies in
India. As Ramachandra Guha observes, debates on reservation often generate more heat than
light. Pratap Bhanu Mehta similarly notes that public discourse on reservation is marked by
moral inconsistency—people often hold very different views in public and private.
IR

Critics argue that reservation compromises merit, amounts to reverse discrimination, and serves
PS

as a form of compensatory justice driven by political considerations rather than genuine

empowerment. However, Sen’s framework suggests that the success or failure of affirmative
action depends on how it is conceptualized and implemented, not on its mere existence.

Judicial Interventions and Enabling Nature of Reservation

 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Indian judicial pronouncements have increasingly emphasized that reservation is an enabling

policy, not a permanent entitlement. In the Ramsingh case (Jat reservation case), the Supreme
Court directed the government to identify new vulnerable groups, such as transgender
persons. In the Ashok Kumar case concerning reservations in higher education, the Court
clarified that affirmative action must aim at creating conditions where backwardness is
eventually eliminated.

An enabling policy is justified only so long as inequality persists. The ultimate goal is to reach a
stage where society can legitimately claim that equality has been achieved and special

ar
measures are no longer necessary.

w
tta
Ko
sh
ge
Yo
By
IR
PS
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Rights
Rights are a distinctly modern political concept. In medieval times, political authority was
justified through the theory of divine right of kings, where power flowed from God to the ruler
and subjects had no autonomous claims against authority. With the decline of feudalism and the
rise of modernity, this idea was replaced by the theory of natural rights of man, which
asserted that individuals possess certain rights by virtue of being human, not because they are
granted by the state.

ar
In its origin, the concept of rights is anti-statist in nature. Rights impose limitations on the
power of the state, ensuring that authority does not become arbitrary. Over time, rights have

w
also come to limit the power of society itself, especially in protecting individuals against social

tta
oppression, majoritarianism, and customary injustices. Thus, rights act as safeguards for
individual autonomy against both political and social domination.

Ko
Rights as a Liberal Discourse and Marxist Critique
sh
The idea of rights is closely associated with liberal political philosophy. Liberalism treats
individuals as autonomous moral agents whose interests deserve protection from coercion.
From this perspective, rights are instruments to preserve liberty, dignity, and equality.
ge

Marxists, however, view rights as a bourgeois concept rooted in false consciousness.

According to them, liberal rights create an artificial separation between individual interests and
Yo

collective interests. In reality, Marxists argue, social relations are shaped by class structures,
and rights merely mask exploitation by projecting an illusion of equality. Consequently, socialist
states historically placed greater emphasis on duties rather than rights.
By

This ideological difference is reflected in political practice:

●​ Liberal democracies emphasize civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech,
IR

voting, and legal equality.​

PS

●​ Socialist states tend to prioritize social and economic rights, such as the right to
work, food, and welfare, while often restricting civil and political liberties.​

Major Types of Rights

Civil Rights
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Civil rights are essential for a civilised and dignified human existence. They protect
individuals from arbitrary interference and ensure basic freedoms. These include the right to life
and liberty, equality before law, right to property, and social reforms such as the abolition of
untouchability. Civil rights form the foundation of individual freedom.

Political Rights

Political rights enable citizens to participate in the political process. These include the right to
vote, the right to contest elections, and the right to hold public office. Political rights transform

ar
individuals from passive subjects into active citizens and are central to democratic governance.

w
Social and Economic Rights

tta
Social and economic rights relate to the material conditions of life. They aim to ensure
minimum standards of well-being and social justice. Examples include the right to food, right to
work, right to education, and the right to equal pay for equal work. These rights reflect the

Ko
influence of socialist and welfare-state thinking.

Legal Rights
sh
Legal rights are those rights that are explicitly recognised and enforced by law or the
constitution. They are also known as positive rights because they require state action for
their enforcement. Examples include the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution,
ge

freedom of religion under Article 25, or the right to compensation in land acquisition laws.

Different political systems recognise legal rights differently.

Yo

●​ In the United Kingdom, there exists a system of residual rights, where the law
specifies what citizens cannot do, and everything else is permitted.​
By

●​ In India and the United States, rights are codified in a Bill of Rights, explicitly listing
citizens’ claims. This makes it harder for the state to curtail rights and often results in
judicial supremacy.​
IR

Legal rights may or may not align with moral reasoning. For instance, Section 377 of the IPC
PS

was legally valid for decades despite being morally contested, until it was struck down by the
judiciary.

Moral Rights

Moral rights are based on ethical, philosophical, or social claims, rather than legal
recognition. These rights may not have enforceable legal backing. Examples include the moral
right of elderly parents to be cared for by their children, debates over abortion, or emerging
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

claims about the rights of animals and nature. Courts can uphold moral rights only when they
are translated into legal provisions.

Rights Classified by Their Source

Rights can also be classified on the basis of their source of legitimacy:

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●​ Divine Rights derive from God and were central to medieval political thought.​

w
●​ Natural Rights arise from nature and human reason, forming the philosophical basis of
modern liberalism.​

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●​ Fundamental Rights are rooted in natural rights but constitutionally guaranteed.​

Ko
●​ Legal Rights are created and enforced by the state through law.​

●​ Moral Rights originate from society, customs, traditions, and ethical reasoning.​
sh
ge

Theory of Natural Rights

Yo

The theory of natural rights is the oldest and most influential theory of the rights of man.
It provided the philosophical foundation for landmark political documents such as the American
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen (1789). According to the American Declaration, natural rights are “self-evident truths”,
By

meaning they do not require proof or state recognition. Every individual possesses the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, not because the state grants them, but because
they are endowed by God or nature.
IR

At its core, the theory of natural rights asserts that rights precede the state. The state does not
create rights; rather, it exists to protect pre-existing rights. This makes natural rights an
PS

inherently anti-statist and absolutist theory of rights.

Core Assumptions of Natural Rights

The theory rests on a few fundamental assumptions. First, natural rights are considered
self-evident, accessible through human reason and moral intuition, not through institutions or
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

positive law. Second, these rights are fundamental to human existence and cannot be
legitimately taken away under any circumstances. Third, natural rights are viewed as
inalienable, meaning individuals cannot surrender them even voluntarily.

Historically, the theory has a theological origin, as rights were often seen as gifts from God.
Because of this, critics argue that the theory of natural rights of man is not entirely different from
the theory of divine right of kings—both ground political authority and moral claims in a
higher, non-human source. The key difference lies in direction: divine right justified authority
from above (God → King), while natural rights justify resistance from below (God/Nature →

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Individual).

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tta
Two Traditions within Natural Rights Theory
Social Contract Tradition

Ko
One major strand of natural rights theory is found in the social contract tradition, particularly in
the writings of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. According to Locke, individuals in
the state of nature enjoyed natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Human reason teaches
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that no one should harm another in these basic interests.

For Locke, these rights are inalienable. When individuals enter into a social contract and
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establish a state, they do not transfer their natural rights to the state. They merely authorize
the state to protect these rights more effectively. Any state that violates natural rights loses its
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legitimacy, thereby justifying resistance or revolution.

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Teleological Tradition

The second strand of natural rights theory is the teleological tradition, associated with thinkers
like Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill, and T. H. Green. Teleology refers to purpose. Unlike
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Locke, Thomas Paine rejected the social contract theory, arguing that it is illogical to bind future
generations to a contract they never consented to.
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Instead, Paine grounded rights in the moral purpose of human life. Humans are different from
animals, and therefore they must possess rights that allow them to live a fully human life.
Similarly, T. H. Green argued that rights are conditions necessary for the development of
human personality. In his words, “Human consciousness postulates liberty; liberty involves
rights.” Thus, rights are justified not because of history or contract, but because they are
essential for moral self-realization.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Rights as “Trumps” – Ronald Dworkin

Building on the liberal tradition of rights, Ronald Dworkin developed the influential idea of
“rights as trumps” in his book Taking Rights Seriously. According to Dworkin, individual rights
have priority over collective goals or majority preferences. Rights function as trumps in a
card game—they override ordinary policy considerations.

For Dworkin, the primary purpose of the state is the protection of individual rights. Any action
that curtails fundamental rights undermines the very justification for the existence of the state.

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Therefore, rights should not be balanced against utility, social welfare, or majority
convenience. Treating rights as negotiable destabilizes the concept of rights itself.

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Limits to the “Rights as Trumps” Doctrine

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However, Dworkin does not adopt an absolutely rigid position. He acknowledges limited
exceptions where rights may be constrained. First, when the core values protected by a right
are not genuinely at stake, but only marginally or indirectly involved. Second, when the social
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cost of protecting a particular right is extraordinarily high compared to the benefits it
provides.
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This creates tension with constitutional practices such as reasonable restrictions on rights. For
instance, the Indian Constitution permits restrictions on freedom of speech in the interest of
public order, security, and morality. Such balancing approaches directly challenge the strict
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interpretation of rights as trumps, highlighting the ongoing debate between absolutist and
pragmatic approaches to rights.
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Theory of Legal Rights – Jeremy Bentham

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The theory of legal rights emerged as a powerful critique of the theory of natural rights, most
forcefully articulated by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham belongs to the positivist tradition of law
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and follows the Hobbesian understanding of society. According to this view, in the state of
nature, human beings did not possess rights but only power. In the absence of a sovereign
authority, might was right. Rights become meaningful only after the establishment of the state,
law, and institutional order. Hence, the true source of rights is the state, not nature.

Bentham famously argued that “man has liberty only where law is silent”, meaning that
freedom exists only within the framework created and enforced by the state. Rights are
therefore not pre-political or inalienable; they are creatures of law, shaped by the state’s
capacity to recognize and enforce them. This legal theory of rights dominated political and legal
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

thought until the Second World War. Even today, it is reflected institutionally: the UK largely
follows the legal-rights tradition (residual rights), whereas USA and France follow the natural or
fundamental rights tradition.

Bentham’s Critique of Natural Rights

Bentham launched one of the most aggressive attacks on natural rights, using deliberately

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provocative language. He described natural rights as:

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●​ “Nonsense upon stilts” – completely groundless claims​

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●​ Chimeras – imaginary and illusory​

●​ Anarchical fallacies – ideas that encourage disorder​

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●​ Terrorist language – rhetoric that provokes rebellion and violence​
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According to Bentham, there can be no absolute rights. Any theory that treats rights as
inviolable undermines the authority of law and threatens social order. For him, the theory of
natural rights was as dangerous as the theory of divine right of kings—both claim authority
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beyond the state and reason.

Bentham’s hostility toward natural rights was deeply influenced by the French Revolution,
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especially its descent into the Reign of Terror under the Jacobins. He believed that invoking
abstract, natural rights without institutional safeguards leads to chaos. Since natural rights rely
on natural law, which is vague and open to interpretation, they lack certainty. Only positive
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law, created and enforced by the state, provides clarity, stability, and enforceability.
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Marxist Critique and Limits of Legal Rights

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While Bentham rejected natural rights from a positivist standpoint, Karl Marx criticized natural
rights from a materialist perspective. Marx argued that rights discourse in capitalist societies
protects the bourgeois class. Granting equal rights in an unequal society merely entrenches
inequality. Thus, natural rights produce a false consciousness, disguising exploitation behind
formal equality.

However, Marx also implicitly exposes the limitation of Bentham’s legal rights. If rights depend
entirely on the state, then in an unjust or authoritarian state, rights lose moral force. This
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

dilemma became evident in the twentieth century, particularly after experiences with fascism
and totalitarianism.

Criticism of Bentham and Revival of Natural Rights

Despite Bentham’s claim to precision, critics argue that his theory is equally vague in practice.
As Thomas Hodgskin observed, Bentham tried to destroy the natural rights tradition without

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offering a convincing moral alternative. Critics famously remarked that “Bentham destroyed
everything and created nothing.”

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Although natural rights are abstract and philosophically contested, historically they played a

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crucial role in the liberation of man, anti-colonial struggles, and democratic revolutions. After
the atrocities of the Second World War and the Holocaust, the purely legal conception of rights
appeared morally insufficient. This led to a revival of natural rights in the form of human

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rights, recognized as universal moral claims that limit even sovereign states.
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Conservative Critique – Edmund Burke
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A different critique of natural rights comes from the conservative tradition, most prominently from
Edmund Burke. Like Bentham, Burke rejected the idea that rights are self-evident truths.
However, unlike Bentham, Burke did not reduce rights merely to law. Instead, he argued that
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rights arise from customs, traditions, and social practices.

For Burke, natural rights are metaphysical abstractions, rooted in theology rather than lived
social reality. Rights that lack social sanction cannot be effectively enjoyed. He strongly opposed
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the French Revolution for destroying inherited institutions in the name of abstract rights.
According to Burke, society should evolve through gradual reform, not radical rupture.
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Burke also criticized natural rights for ignoring duty, discipline, and social responsibility.
Excessive emphasis on rights encourages individualism without obligations. This conservative
view later influenced communitarians and cultural relativists, who argue that rights are
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embedded in communities, not possessed by abstract individuals. As Alasdair MacIntyre

famously remarked, believing in natural rights is like believing in witches or
unicorns—intellectually appealing but socially unreal.

Laski’s Social Democratic Theory of Rights

 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Moving beyond the liberal–positivist divide, Harold Laski offered a social democratic theory
of rights. According to Laski, “Rights are the necessary conditions without which no man can
seek to be at his best.” Rights are not abstract claims; they are practical conditions for human
development.

Laski emphasized that rights and duties are inseparable. A social order that ignores individual
claims is unstable, but rights without duties are equally dangerous. He argued that the
legitimacy of a state depends on the quality of rights it maintains and its contribution to
human happiness. Unlike Bentham, Laski insisted that civil and political rights are insufficient

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without social and economic rights. Hence, the state must regulate and even control industry;
otherwise, economic power will dominate political power, turning the state into an instrument
of capital.

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Three Generations of Rights – Karel Vasak

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In the 1970s, Karel Vasak proposed a widely accepted framework of three generations of
rights, reflecting the historical expansion of the rights discourse.
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The first generation consists of civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
freedom of expression. These are often called negative rights because they restrict state
interference and are rooted in liberal philosophy.
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The second generation includes social, economic, and cultural rights, such as the right to
education, work, equal wages, and social security. These are positive rights, as they require
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proactive state intervention and are associated with socialist and welfare-state traditions. Both
first and second generation rights were formally recognized in 1966 through two UN
Covenants.
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The third generation comprises solidarity or collective rights, such as the right to
development, peace, environment, self-determination, and humanitarian assistance. These
rights are exercised collectively rather than individually and reflect global interdependence in the
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age of globalization.
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Human Rights: Origin, Meaning and Core Debates

The modern concept of human rights emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War,
particularly as a response to the systematic atrocities committed by the Nazi regime under
Adolf Hitler against Jews and other minorities. Until this point, the monistic principle of
state sovereignty was treated as sacrosanct. States enjoyed absolute authority over their
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

domestic affairs, and international intervention was considered illegitimate regardless of how a
state treated its own citizens.

The horrors of the Holocaust fundamentally altered this understanding. It was realised that
unrestricted sovereignty can become a shield for mass crimes. Consequently, sovereignty
had to be diluted, and the international community had to be recognised as a moral and
political actor. If a state violates the basic rights of persons living within its territory, it forfeits
the moral legitimacy of non-interference, making international concern and intervention
justifiable.

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This new consciousness was institutionalised through the International Bill of Rights,
consisting of:

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●​ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),​

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●​ the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and​

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●​ the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.​
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Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
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The idea of human rights draws upon two major intellectual traditions.
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First, it is influenced by John Locke’s theory of natural rights, which holds that certain rights
are self-evident truths and exist prior to the state. These rights are not granted by governments
but merely recognised by them.
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Second, it is grounded in Immanuel Kant’s concept of human dignity. Kant argued that
humans, unlike animals, possess reason and moral autonomy, which makes every human
being an end in itself, never merely a means. From this follows the moral obligation to treat all
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human beings with equal respect, regardless of social or political status.

Hence, the theory of human rights claims that by virtue of being human, every person
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possesses certain basic minimum rights, irrespective of whether a constitution recognises

them or not. This gives human rights a pre-political and universal moral character.

Essential Features of Human Rights

At the core of human rights lie five defining characteristics.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

First, equality. Since all are human, all must be treated equally. This principle makes human
rights deeply controversial, especially in non-Western societies where social
hierarchies—particularly gender hierarchies—are culturally entrenched. For human rights
advocates, denying women equal rights amounts to denying their full humanity. This explains
why women’s rights have become the most contested terrain of human rights discourse. As
Hillary Clinton famously asserted, “Human rights are women’s rights.”

Second, universalism. Human rights apply to all humans, irrespective of nationality, culture, or
political system. However, universalism is the most disputed aspect of human rights.

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Non-Western states often invoke cultural relativism, arguing that rights must reflect local
traditions. Southeast Asian leaders, for example, defend “Asian values,” prioritising social order
and economic welfare over civil and political liberties. Western scholars counter that such

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arguments often justify soft authoritarianism.

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Third, individuality. Human rights are held by individuals, not communities. They are rooted in
the idea of individual autonomy. This aspect attracts criticism from Marxists, who see rights as
bourgeois abstractions, and from communitarians and cultural relativists, who argue that

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individuals are socially embedded rather than atomistic selves.

Fourth, inalienability. Human rights cannot be taken away. They are not granted conditionally
by the state but are inherent to human existence.
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Finally, permanence. Human rights are not situational or temporary. A person does not lose
human rights because of political change, social status, or state policy.
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Major Debates Surrounding Human Rights

Despite broad agreement on the desirability of human rights, deep disagreements persist over
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their scope and interpretation.

A central debate concerns who qualifies as a human subject of rights. For instance, whether
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terrorists should enjoy basic human rights remains highly contested. Similarly, the question of
when human life begins fuels global disputes over abortion, especially in Catholic societies.
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Another unresolved issue is who should be the guardian of human rights. States are
expected to protect rights, yet human rights theory is inherently anti-statist, limiting state power.
This creates a paradox: states endorse human rights morally but often fail to enforce them
effectively in practice.

Philosophically, human rights face challenges from value pluralists, cultural relativists, and
multiculturalists, who question universalist assumptions about human nature, morality, and the
state-individual relationship.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Cultural Imperialism and Human Rights

A major source of resistance to human rights is the charge of cultural imperialism—the belief
that Western powers use human rights to impose their values globally. Examples include
attempts to export democracy through military intervention, such as the US intervention in Iraq.
Critics argue that values like individualism, liberal rights, and capitalism are not organically

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rooted in many Asian or African societies, yet have penetrated them through Western
dominance.

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This perception has weakened consensus on what counts as “basic minimum rights” and has
politicised human rights enforcement in international relations.

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Value Pluralism and Human Rights
An important theoretical response to these conflicts comes from Isaiah Berlin’s concept of
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value pluralism. Berlin argued that no single value—liberty, equality, justice—can claim
absolute supremacy. Different societies and individuals legitimately prioritise different values.
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Values are plural, incommensurable, and often conflicting. They cannot be measured or
ranked objectively. This led Berlin to reject attempts—such as Rawls’ lexical ordering—to
impose a fixed hierarchy of values. Choosing between values is always a tragic and hard
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choice, involving sacrifice.

Berlin emphasised toleration as the substantive heart of liberalism. Toleration is not indifference
or weakness but a deliberate act of self-restraint toward beliefs one deeply disagrees with. As
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Voltaire captured it, “I detest what you say, but I will defend to death your right to say it.”

Importantly, Berlin did not endorse moral relativism. He acknowledged the existence of generic
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values—such as honesty and courage—shared across cultures. Value pluralism thus lies
between value monism and value relativism.
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Relevance of Value Pluralism for Human Rights

Value pluralism offers a practical path forward for human rights protection in a diverse world.
Instead of imposing rights through coercion or military force, it advocates dialogue among
civilisations, mutual learning, and negotiated consensus. Imposing democracy or human rights
at gunpoint may undermine both legitimacy and outcomes.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

Cultural Relativism
The concept of cultural relativism is attributed to Franz Boas, who argued that culture is an
intrinsic part of human personality. Human beliefs, values, moral judgments, and notions of
right and wrong are shaped by the cultural context in which individuals are socialised.
Therefore, every culture is internally rational, and it is neither possible nor legitimate to

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establish a hierarchy among cultures or claim the superiority of one culture over another.

From this perspective, moral standards and social values cannot be judged using an external

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or universal benchmark. What appears just or unjust in one culture may not appear so in
another, and imposing one culture’s moral framework upon another is intellectually flawed and

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ethically problematic.

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Link with Communitarianism
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Cultural relativism overlaps significantly with the philosophy of communitarianism.
Communitarians argue that individuals are not abstract, autonomous selves but “situated” or
“embedded” selves. A person’s conception of justice, rights, and morality is shaped by
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community traditions, shared meanings, and collective experiences.

Thus, cultural relativism reinforces the communitarian claim that rights and moral norms
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cannot be understood independently of the community. The liberal assumption of a

universally rational individual making free choices is rejected as an abstraction detached from
social reality.
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Cultural Relativism and Human Rights Debate

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The cultural relativist perspective gained prominence as a reaction against the universalist
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claims of the global human rights regime, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR).

Leaders from the non-Western world, especially Southeast Asia, challenged the claim that
human rights as defined in the UDHR are truly universal. They argued that the declaration
reflects Western historical experiences, liberal individualism, and Judeo-Christian moral
traditions, rather than universally shared human values. This critique gave rise to the discourse
of “Asian values”, which emphasised social harmony, collective responsibility, respect for
authority, and economic rights over individual civil and political freedoms.
 PSIR By Yogesh Kottawar

From this viewpoint, the UDHR was seen not as a neutral moral document but as an instrument
of cultural imperialism, through which Western societies attempted to impose their value
system on the rest of the world. Consequently, cultural relativists called for a particularistic or
relativist understanding of rights, rooted in local traditions, social norms, and historical
contexts, rather than a one-size-fits-all universal model.

Philosophical Position of Cultural Relativism

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Cultural relativism holds that the conception of rights cannot be detached from a society’s

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moral universe. What constitutes dignity, freedom, or justice varies across cultures, and
therefore rights must be interpreted in accordance with a community’s conception of right

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and wrong.

In this sense, cultural relativism is philosophically closer to Edmund Burke’s conservative

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theory of rights than to the natural rights tradition. While natural rights theorists view rights as
abstract, universal, and pre-political, Burkean conservatism—and by extension cultural
relativism—treats rights as products of customs, traditions, and social practices. Rights
gain meaning and legitimacy only when they are embedded in the lived experiences of a
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community.
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