THE 2026 Intermural MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON IHL
AMBOU UNIVERSITY
Before the International Criminal Court
Pre-Trial Chamber
The Prosecutor (Applicant)
v.
General Zabu, Colonel Junda, and General Dafu (Respondents)
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
March 15, 2026
CONTENTS
Statement of Facts (Dolo Case)
Summary of Arguments
1. ICC HAS NO JURISDICTION
· A. The Case Does Not Satisfy the Complementarity Requirement
· B. The Interests of Justice Do Not Support Court Intervention
2. GENERAL DAFU AND COLONEL JUNDA DID NOT COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
3. GENERAL ZABU DID NOT COMMIT WAR CRIMES
Statement of Defence Concerning General Dafu and Colonel Junda
Statement of Defence Concerning General Zabu
Statement of Defence Regarding Reparations
Relief Sought
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
· AU – African Union
· CDU – Community Defense Units
· DIT – Dolo Integrity Team
· ERC – Equity and Reconciliation Commission
· FDRE – Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
· ICC – International Criminal Court
· ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
· ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
· MPA – Mombasa Peace Accord
· NDFD – National Defence Force of Dolo
· NTJP – National Transitional Justice Policy
· TLA – Tenu Liberation Army
STATEMENT OF FACTS (Dolo Case)
The Republic of Dolo is a sovereign Central African nation struggling with ethnic and administrative
legacies from Muzono's colonial rule, which historically favored the Jani majority. To preserve territorial
integrity against secessionist threats from the Tenu Liberation Army (TLA), the government nationalized
assets and organized national defense. In Zeno Province, the Dolo Integrity Team (DIT) and Community
Defence Units (CDU) were established to counter the insurgency and protect civilians.
In January 2017, the CDU launched necessary anti-insurgency measures, including interrogations to
gather intelligence. Some "necessary measures" resulted in localized farm burnings intended to disrupt
TLA financing. However, Colonel Junda demonstrated no criminal intent: he proactively punished those
responsible through salary deductions to compensate owners.
Later, in Dinono Province, the TLA launched aggressive strikes, forcing national forces into residential
areas. Civilian casualties occurred tragically because the TLA continued its offensive despite knowing
civilians were present. Additionally, when isolated sexual violence occurred during TLA searches,
General Zabu took immediate disciplinary action by demoting those involved.
After the conflict, Dolo demonstrated its willingness and ability to provide justice through the Mombasa
Peace Accord (MPA) and the National Transitional Justice Policy (NTJP), prioritizing restorative justice
and reconciliation. The Special Chamber prosecuted General Zabu and General Dafu, sentencing them to
three years of restricted liberty and community-service reparations. The Equity and Reconciliation
Commission (ERC) granted amnesties to individuals like Colonel Junda in exchange for truth and
apologies. While the government focused on collective reparations due to a devastated economy, this
was a legitimate sovereign decision. National authorities have effectively addressed the situation,
fulfilling complementarity and rendering ICC intervention unnecessary.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The ICC lacks jurisdiction because the case is inadmissible: it fails the complementarity requirement and
does not meet the gravity threshold for supranational intervention.
Complementarity is not satisfied because Dolo has already exercised primary jurisdiction through its
Special Chamber and the ERC. These domestic proceedings—convicting Generals Zabu and Dafu, and
granting structured amnesty to Colonel Junda—demonstrate genuine willingness and ability to address
the conflict. ICC intervention would violate Dolo's sovereignty and unlawfully substitute national courts.
Under Article 53(1)(c), the "interests of justice" require deference to the Mombasa Peace Accord. Dolo
achieved peace through restorative justice and reconciliation. A new international prosecution would
jeopardize this fragile stability, risking a return to conflict and ignoring collective reparations already
implemented.
On the merits: General Dafu and Colonel Junda did not commit crimes against humanity. CDU measures
were legitimate anti-insurgency actions to protect territorial integrity, not attacks on civilians. Any
inhumane acts were unauthorized conduct by subordinates, and Colonel Junda took corrective action
via salary deductions.
General Zabu did not commit war crimes by intentionally targeting civilians. The Dinono Province
operation was a proportionate response to retreating NDFD forces firing from residential areas, making
those areas military objectives. Sexual violence was committed by individual soldiers without Zabu's
intent or command; upon learning of these acts, he demoted the offenders, fulfilling his duty.
For these reasons, charges should not be confirmed. The national legal system has effectively resolved
the situation in a manner serving both justice and peace.
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1. ICC HAS NO JURISDICTION
The ICC lacks jurisdiction because the situation is inadmissible: it fails the complementarity requirement
and does not meet the gravity threshold.
The actions of General Dafu and Colonel Junda do not constitute war crimes; their conduct was dictated
by military necessity during a non-international armed conflict. Even if grave crimes occurred, the ICC is
legally barred from intervening once a State has effectively resolved the situation through domestic
mechanisms. The Rome Statute's object and purpose—preventing future crimes and maintaining peace
—would not be served by forcing Dolo to revisit a conflict nearly a decade old. Such intervention would
threaten hard-won national stability.
A. The Case Does Not Satisfy the Complementarity Requirement
Dolo has demonstrated genuine willingness to act by establishing a specialized legal framework: the
Special Prosecution Office and Special Chamber. These bodies investigated those with highest
responsibility, satisfying the "activity" requirement. The national government is neither silent nor
inactive but is exercising its primary right to provide justice domestically.
The legal response is genuine, not a sham. Dolo applied penalties like restricted liberty and community
service to promote social reintegration rather than mere isolation. These measures, conditioned on
truth-telling and public apologies, fulfill the "interests of justice" under Article 53. This transparent
framework proves the State is not avoiding punishment but reconstructing its society after conflict.
Domestic proceedings satisfy complementarity.
Reconciliation can prevail over criminal responsibility because international law recognizes that peace is
often a prerequisite for justice in fragile post-conflict societies. The "interests of justice" allow
restorative measures when traditional trials risk renewed violence. International instruments encourage
broad amnesties to facilitate national healing and cessation of hostilities. This approach prioritizes
collective stability and victims' "right to truth" over purely retributive goals.
B. The Interests of Justice Do Not Support Court Intervention
Intervention would violate the "Interests of Justice" under Article 53(1)(c). Dolo is in a fragile transition,
rebuilding its devastated economy and social fabric through the Mombasa Peace Accord. A technical
gravity assessment must balance the potential for an ICC investigation to reignite ethnic tensions or
destabilize reconciliation. The African Charter guarantees the right to peace. The Court should respect
Dolo's restorative justice model, which has provided accountability through truth-telling and community
service. Because an international trial would risk hard-won stability without offering victims a superior
outcome, the case is inadmissible.
Civilian loss of life is deeply regrettable, but ICC intervention would contravene the interests of justice by
destabilizing Dolo's fragile peace. The State's duty to maintain national stability and prevent a relapse
into conflict outweighs retributive prosecution goals. Criminal trials a decade later would risk renewed
ethnic tensions and undermine the devastated economy without offering survivors a superior outcome.
Sexual violence is grave, but ICC intervention would violate the interests of justice by destabilizing Dolo's
peace process. National accountability has already been secured through restorative truth-telling and
social healing, ensuring stability and preventing ethnic conflict. The Court must prioritize long-term
reconciliation and the right to peace over retributive international prosecution.
Moreover, superior officials did not remain silent in the face of misconduct. They took immediate and
decisive action against subordinates who acted ultra vires and outside military mandates. By demoting
those responsible for unauthorized sexual violence and implementing salary deductions for destruction
of property, leadership repudiated these individual excesses, satisfying the State's duty to suppress and
punish crimes without international intervention.
The charges of "Other Inhumane Acts" under Article 7(1)(k) fail to meet the threshold of a "widespread
or systematic attack" orchestrated by the State. The Zeno Province incidents—farm burnings and
detentions—were isolated acts of misconduct by subordinates acting ultra vires and contrary to standing
orders. These actions were not part of a high-level strategic policy nor intended to cause great suffering,
but resulted from individual soldiers exceeding mandates during civil unrest.
Dissatisfaction of internal NGOs and civil society cannot trigger ICC intervention. The Prosecutor must
prioritize the "interests of justice" and overall national stability. Subjective anger of organizations does
not override the State's sovereign success in achieving peace through its own domestic legal framework.
Dolo has already exercised primary jurisdiction by punishing subordinates who acted ultra vires, fulfilling
its duty to suppress crimes through demotions and restitution. An international trial would directly
contravene the Interests of Justice under Article 53(1)(c) by destabilizing the fragile peace and
devastated economy protected by the Mombasa Peace Accord. Because the domestic Special Chamber
secured accountability through restorative truth-telling and community service, the Court must respect
the State's sovereign right to peace. The case is inadmissible.
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2. GENERAL DAFU AND COLONEL JUNDA DID NOT COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The defense argues that accusations against Colonel Junda and General Dafu should be dropped.
Ne Bis In Idem (Article 20): This principle renders the case inadmissible. Founded on complementarity
(Articles 17, 19, 20), Dolo has previously used its sovereign authority through the Special Chamber. As
the ICC decided in Prosecutor v. Al-Senussi, the Court must defer when a state undertakes legitimate
procedures for the same conduct. Dolo investigated, convicted General Dafu, and granted amnesty to
Colonel Junda through lawful transitional justice (NTJP). The Mombasa Peace Accord and the right to
peace under African Charter Article 23 confirm these were genuine applications of transitional justice,
not "sham" processes.
General Dafu has already been tried and is incarcerated under Ne Bis In Idem (Article 20(3)). The
prosecution must demonstrate the domestic trial was a "sham." Her punishment—three years of
restricted liberty and community reconstruction—demonstrates sincere criminal intent.
Exclusion from Criminal Responsibility (Article 31): Under Article 31(1) of the Rome Statute, the
defendants are not criminally liable even if the Chamber finds the case admissible.
Article 31(1)(d) – Necessity/Duress: The prosecution describes "strong-arming" of locals as torture. But
General Dafu acted out of necessity. Twenty million people's lives and territorial integrity were at risk
from the TLA armed rebellion. Without intelligence on TLA financing, greater damage and state collapse
would have occurred. Her orders referred to "necessary measures" and "strong-arming" (interrogation
pressure), not the specific physical abuses later recorded. She acted to protect territorial integrity and
prevent devastating civil war.
Article 31(1)(c) – Protection of Property and Mission: Colonel Junda's actions regarding burned farms fall
under defense of legally protected interests. Lack of intent: Colonel Junda did not command the
burnings. Upon discovery, he punished offenders with salary deductions, demonstrating he neither
planned nor consented to the crime. He was justifiably defending state security interests without
intending civilian starvation.
Substantial Difficulties with the Crimes' Elements:
Failure to satisfy "Custody or Control" (Article 7(2)(e)): Torture requires the victim be in the "custody or
under the control of the accused." General Dafu chaired a high-level Task Force (DIT). She did not
oversee holding facilities, and no evidence shows she gave the relevant orders. Remote rooms were
controlled by local units. Without evidence of effective command and control (Article 28) over the
specific soldiers using batons, the "custody" element is lacking.
Gravity Threshold for "Other Inhumane Acts": An act under Article 7(1)(k) must be of "similar character"
to murder or enslavement. The prosecution has not proven a "widespread or systematic attack" by
Junda. The burnings were isolated occurrences by rogue soldiers. Junda offered a domestic remedy—
salary deductions for reparations.
3. GENERAL ZABU DID NOT COMMIT WAR CRIMES
General Zabu is not responsible for war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(I) or (VI) of the Rome Statute.
The 2 August 2018 Lightning Strike Brigade operation was a legitimate military response to NDFD camps
in Dinono Province. Continuation into residential areas occurred only after gunshots were fired from
those neighborhoods, making the response driven by military necessity, not intentional targeting of
civilians as such. The principles of distinction and proportionality under Additional Protocol II and
customary IHL permit incidental civilian harm in such circumstances.
Regarding rape under Article 8(2)(e)(VI): The incidents were isolated and committed by individual
subordinates during door-to-door arms collection. These acts were not ordered nor included in any TLA
policy. General Zabu issued standard instructions to collect arms and take necessary measures against
resisters. He had no prior knowledge, and upon awareness, immediately demoted the perpetrators,
fulfilling his command duties. These ultra vires acts by undisciplined elements do not satisfy the nexus or
intent requirements for a war crime.
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STATEMENT OF DEFENCE CONCERNING GENERAL ZABU
1. Lack of Essential Elements to Constitute a War Crime
A war crime under Article 8 requires specific intent and a connection to a non-international armed
conflict. Article 8(2)(e)(I) attaches liability only when a person intentionally directs acts against civilians
not directly involved in hostilities. The operation here did not involve a specific attack on civilians; it was
a response to retreating forces firing gunshots. Without the necessary intent, the war crime threshold is
not met.
Similarly, for rape under Article 8(2)(e)(VI), the Elements of Crimes require the intrusion occur in
circumstances related to the conflict. Isolated opportunistic acts by subordinates promptly addressed by
demotion do not meet this standard.
2. The Principle of Military Necessity
General Zabu's actions were based on military necessity in response to an imminent threat during active
combat. Pursuing retreating NDFD/CDU forces was necessary and proportionate. Any incidental harm
must be assessed within lawful military operations, consistent with Additional Protocol II, Article 13, and
ICRC Customary IHL Rules 1 and 14.
3. Ultra Vires Acts and Absence of Command Responsibility
Sexual violence was outside the scope of General Zabu's orders or legal authority (ultra vires). Article
28(a) requires a military commander be held accountable only if he knew or should have known forces
were committing crimes and failed to take reasonable measures. General Zabu had no actual or
constructive knowledge beforehand. When he learned of the incidents, he took immediate and
reasonable measures—demoting offenders—fulfilling his duty to punish and breaking any chain of
responsibility, as clarified in Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Appeals Chamber).
4. Prior Prosecution of the Higher Official
The Special Chamber of the High Court of Dolo charged General Zabu with war crimes, convicted him,
and imposed three years of restricted liberty plus community service contributions, conditioned on
truth-telling and non-repetition. This constitutes genuine proceedings under Article 17 of the Rome
Statute, preventing ICC admissibility. Dolo's NTJP and ERC also addressed reparations.
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STATEMENT OF DEFENCE REGARDING REPARATIONS
I. The Legal Standard for Reparations
Reparations under Article 75 of the Rome Statute include restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.
Reparations are restorative rather than punitive and aim to repair harm while ensuring fairness and
proportionality. The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo held that reparations must
be proportionate to harm, consider the convicted person's role and financial capacity, and not impose
impossible burdens. Similarly, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga confirmed reparations may be individual
or collective and must link to harm directly caused by the crimes.
II. General Dafu and Colonel Junda Took Steps to Repair Harm
Colonel Junda ordered disciplinary measures against CDU members responsible for burning farms and
ordered salary deductions to compensate affected farm owners. These actions demonstrate good faith
and willingness to repair harm during an ongoing armed conflict. International criminal law recognizes
that cooperation with reparations and willingness to repair harm are relevant considerations.
III. Reparations for Burnt Farms Should Be Collective
The burning of farms caused economic hardship, but the broader armed conflict—displacement,
disruption of agriculture, insecurity—also contributed. Not all economic loss can be directly attributed to
General Dafu and Colonel Junda. In Katanga, the ICC held that collective reparations are appropriate
where crimes affect entire communities. Appropriate collective reparations include agricultural
rehabilitation programs, provision of seeds/tools/fertilizers, community irrigation projects, food security
programs, and reconstruction of agricultural infrastructure.
IV. Reparations for Victims of Rape: Rehabilitation and Dignity
Reparations must be proportionate, individualized, and based on verified victims and proven harm. In
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the ICC held that reparations for sexual violence victims should
include medical treatment, psychological rehabilitation, education support, and socio-economic
assistance, prioritizing rehabilitation and restoration of dignity over purely financial compensation.
Appropriate reparations include medical treatment, reproductive health services, psychological
counseling, education and livelihood support, community reintegration programs, and housing/social
support.
V. Reparations Should Be Implemented Through the Trust Fund for Victims
Large-scale reparations programs should be implemented through the Trust Fund for Victims established
under Article 79. The Trust Fund has implemented reparations in Lubanga and Katanga, providing
education support, housing reconstruction, psychological rehabilitation, and livelihood programs.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Respondent respectfully requests the Pre-Trial Chamber to:
1. Declare the case inadmissible because Dolo has satisfied the complementarity requirement and the
interests of justice do not support ICC intervention;
2. Confirm that General Dafu and Colonel Junda did not commit crimes against humanity;
3. Confirm that General Zabu did not commit war crimes;
4. Order reparations that are collective, restorative, proportionate, and implemented through the Trust
Fund for Victims; and
5. Dismiss all charges against the Respondents.
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Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for the Respondents