Digital Forensics
Lecture 1: Introduction to Digital Forensics
What is Digital Forensics?
• Emerging discipline in computer security
• “voodoo science”
• No standards, few research
• Investigation that takes place after an incident
has happened
• Try to answer questions: Who, what, when,
where, why, and how
Types of investigations
• Determine what the incident was and get back to
a working state
• Internal investigation
• Should be based on IR policy
• May lead to criminal investigation
• Criminal investigation
• Support for “real world” investigations
Typical investigation phases
1. Acquisition
2. Recovery
3. Analysis
4. Presentation
Phase 1: Acquisition
• Analogous to crime scene in the “real world”
• Goal is to recover as much evidence without
altering the crime scene
• Investigator should document as much as
possible
• Maintain Chain of Custody
Acquisition(2)
• Determine if incident actually happened
• What kind of system is to be investigated?
• Can it be shut down?
• Does it have to keep operating?
• Are there policies governing the handling of the
incident?
• Is a warrant needed?
Acquisition (3)
• Get most fleeting information first
• Running processes
• Open sockets
• Memory
• Storage media
• Create 1:1 copies of evidence (imaging)
• If possible, lock up original system in the
evidence locker
Phase 2: Recovery
• Goal is to extract data from the acquired
evidence
• Always work on copies, never the original
• Must be able to repeat entire process from scratch
• Data, deleted data, “hidden” data
File systems
• Get files and directories
• Metadata
• User IDs
• Timestamps (MAC times)
• Permissions, …
• Some deleted files may be recovered
• Slack space
File deletion
• Most file systems only delete directory entries
but not the data blocks associated with a file.
• Unless blocks get reallocated the file may be
reconstructed
• The earlier the better the chances
• Depending on fragmentation, only partial
reconstruction may be possible
Slack space
• Unallocated blocks
• Mark blocks as allocated to fool the file system
• Unused space at end of files if it doesn’t end on
block boundaries
• Unused space in file system data structures
Steganography
• Data hidden in other data
• Unused or irrelevant locations are used to store
information
• Most common in images, but may also be used
on executable files, meta data, file system slack
space
Encrypted data
• Depending on encryption method, it might be
infeasible to get to the information.
• Locating the keys is often a better approach.
• A suspect may be compelled to reveal the keys
by law.
Recovery (cont.)
• Locating hidden or encrypted data is difficult and
might even be impossible.
• Investigator has to look at other clues:
• Steganography software
• Crypto software
• Command histories
File residue
• Even if a file is completely deleted from the disk,
it might still have left a trace:
• Web cache
• Temporary directories
• Data blocks resulting from a move
• Memory
Phase 3: Analysis
• Methodology differs depending on the objectives
of the investigation:
• Locate contraband material
• Reconstruct events that took place
• Determine if a system was compromised
• Authorship analysis
Contraband material
• Locate specific files
• Databases of illegal pictures
• Stolen property
• Determine if existing files are illegal
• Picture collections
• Music or movie downloads
Locating material
• Requires specific knowledge of file system and
OS.
• Data may be encrypted, hidden, obfuscated
• Obfuscation:
• Misleading file suffix
• Misleading file name
• Unusual location
Event reconstruction
• Utilize system and external information
• Log files
• File timestamps
• Firewall/IDS information
• Establish time line of events
Time issues
• Granularity of time keeping
• Can’t order events that occur in the same time
interval
• Multiple systems:
• Different clocks
• Clock drift
• E-mail headers and time zones
The needle in the haystack
• Locating files:
• Storage capacity approaches the terrabyte magnitude
• Potentially millions of files to investigate
• Event reconstruction:
• Dozens, hundreds of events a second
• Only last MAC times are available
• Insufficient logging
Compromised system
• If possible, compare against known good state
• Tripwire
• Databases of “good” files
• Look for unusual file MACs
• Look for open or listening network connections
(trojans)
• Look for files in unusual locations
Unknown executables
• Run them in a constrained environment
• Dedicated system
• Sandbox
• Virtual machine
• Might be necessary to disassemble and
decompile
• May take weeks or months
Authorship analysis
• Determine who or what kind of person created
file.
• Programs (Viruses, Tojans, Sniffers/Loggers)
• E-mails (Blackmail, Harassment, Information leaks)
• If actual person cannot be determined, just
determining the skill level of the author may be
important.
Phase 4: Presentation
• An investigator that performed the analysis may
have to appear in court as an expert witness.
• For internal investigations, a report or
presentation may be required.
• Challenge: present the material in simple terms
so that a jury or CEO can understand it.
Forensics Tools
• Acquisition
• dd, pdd
• SafeBack, …
• Recovery
• Encase
• TCT and SleuthKit
• Analysis
•?
• Presentation
•?
DF Investigator Profile
• Understanding of relevant laws
• Knowledge of file systems, OS, and applications
• Where are the logs, what is logged?
• What are possible obfuscation techniques?
• What programs and libraries are present on the system and how
are they used?
• Know what tools exist and how to use them
• Be able to explain things in simple terms
Future in DF
• The need for standards
• Acquisition procedure: develop step-by-step
instructions to be followed
• Certification
• Investigators
• Tools
• Operating Systems
Future in DF (2)
• Research
• Create more meaningful audit data
• Ensure integrity and availability of audit data
• Privacy and Digital Forensics
• Develop detection techniques
• Develop automation processes
Future in DF (3)
• Documentation
• File systems
• Over 50 different FS currently in use
• Most are poorly documented
• Malware
• “fingerprint” of bad programs
• Good system state
• Accessible databases
• Every OS, version, patchlevel